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Speaker 1: Brought to you by the reinvented two thousand twelve camera.

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Speaker 1: It's ready. Are you get in touch with technology? With

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Speaker 1: tech Stuff from how stuff works dot com. Hello again, everyone,

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Speaker 1: Welcome to tech Stuff. My name is Chris Pullett. I'm

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Speaker 1: an editor at how stuff works dot com and as usual,

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Speaker 1: sitting across from me is senior writer Jonathan Strickland. Change

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Speaker 1: the scheme, al to the mood, electrify the boys and girls,

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Speaker 1: if you'd be so kind, all right, then I have

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Speaker 1: to say he's got the presentation down at least I

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Speaker 1: think so. Thank you. You can't see it, so there

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Speaker 1: was a lot of arm gestures in there that was

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Speaker 1: there's a little there's a little flailing, um. But I

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Speaker 1: was not. I was not all lit up for that

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Speaker 1: particular quote. So if you know where that quote comes from,

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Speaker 1: you know why I said that. But we're gonna talk

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Speaker 1: about something actually a little serious, actually quite a bit

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Speaker 1: serious today, um, something that has been in the news

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Speaker 1: recently at the time of the recording of this podcast,

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Speaker 1: which is very early February two eleven, and that is

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Speaker 1: the idea of an Internet kill switch, some sort of

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Speaker 1: ability for a person or government or organization to shut

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Speaker 1: down the Internet or at least are access to the

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Speaker 1: Internet right now. What spurred this was the events in

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Speaker 1: Egypt that are going on. As Jonathan and I are

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Speaker 1: actually recording this. Um, I'm sure by the time you

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Speaker 1: are will be listening to this, the the fallout will

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Speaker 1: still be uh relevant to what's going on. Sure, but

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Speaker 1: one of the things if you are not paying attention

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Speaker 1: to current events in the world right now, you may

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Speaker 1: be unaware that there have been in late January and

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Speaker 1: early February two thousand eleven, series of protests by people

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Speaker 1: who have have been asking the Egyptian president Hostni Mubarak

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Speaker 1: to step down from office. Um. He he has as

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Speaker 1: of this point been in office for more than thirty years,

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Speaker 1: I believe, took office after the president Onwar Sadat was assassinated,

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Speaker 1: which I remember from my grade school days. Um so um.

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Speaker 1: You know, he may be saying, what does this have

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Speaker 1: to do with technology? Well, in an order in order

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Speaker 1: to prevent uh the ability of people who are protesting

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Speaker 1: the governments really really protesting and asking Mubarak to step

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Speaker 1: down from organizing using Internet based tools such as social

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Speaker 1: networking sites Twitter, Facebook, etcetera. Um, the Egyptian government basically

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Speaker 1: shut off access to the internet, um two people within

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Speaker 1: the country. Now there was one network that stayed up

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Speaker 1: a little longer um than the rest I believe it

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Speaker 1: was the NOR group was able to uh provide Internet

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Speaker 1: access a little bit after that, but they eventually went

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Speaker 1: dark as well, and the the the Internet was down

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Speaker 1: for about five days within within Egypt. UM. And UH.

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Speaker 1: The reason this is uh, the reason this is valid

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Speaker 1: to many of us who are listening in the United States. UM,

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Speaker 1: it had been proposed I guess really two thousand ten,

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Speaker 1: the possibility that to prevent uh cyber attacks on certain

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Speaker 1: infrastructure electronic infrastructure in the United States, that the President

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Speaker 1: of the United States would be given the ability to

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Speaker 1: shut down parts of the Internet within the company the country. Theoretically.

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Speaker 1: Now the question is can that really be done? Right?

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Speaker 1: So let's let's clear up a couple of things, because

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Speaker 1: obviously the case in Egypt got a lot of people

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Speaker 1: worried because the thought was, well, what if our government,

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Speaker 1: what if the United States government? Of course, Chris and

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Speaker 1: I are in the United States, so that's why when

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Speaker 1: I say our government, I'm talking about them. Uh. What

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Speaker 1: if what if the government for some reason wanted to

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Speaker 1: try and suppress civilian communication. Uh, would this give them

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Speaker 1: give the government the power, specifically the president, the power

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Speaker 1: to to make communication lines go dark? And it You know,

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Speaker 1: it's a scary thought because so much of what we

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Speaker 1: do now depends upon the Internet in one way or another.

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Speaker 1: It may not even directly depend on it, but indirectly

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Speaker 1: it will. And so people have gotten really sensitive about

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Speaker 1: the subject. Uh. The government, for its part, has said

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Speaker 1: that a lot of the fear is based upon misinterpretations

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Speaker 1: of the The proposed act, which is called the Protecting

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Speaker 1: Cyberspace as a National Asset Act. It was introduced by

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Speaker 1: Joseph Lieberman. Yes, and it was introduced originally in June

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Speaker 1: of It has since undergone revisions which somewhat define some

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Speaker 1: of the terms to a greater extent because the original

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Speaker 1: act had some loose language that definitely had people scared. Yeah,

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Speaker 1: But like Chris was saying, that the intent of the Act,

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Speaker 1: at least as it is worded, is not to you

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Speaker 1: be able to manipulate the Internet in order to hamper

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Speaker 1: communication among citizens or to infringe upon First Amendment rights.

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Speaker 1: It is, as he was saying, to protect our infrastructure

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Speaker 1: in the case of a cyber attack, right. I think

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Speaker 1: people have interpreted that to mean that, uh, citizens living

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Speaker 1: within the United States would not be able to access

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Speaker 1: the Internet at all anymore. And I think the if

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Speaker 1: I have read the Act correctly, what the uh the

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Speaker 1: intent is actually to shut down links to certain infrastructure

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Speaker 1: items from the Internet. So wouldn't keep people off the Internet.

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Speaker 1: It would say, if you had an electric you know,

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Speaker 1: electric station that were connected to the Internet, it would

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Speaker 1: shut access off between the electric and the electric generating

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Speaker 1: station and the Internet so that it could not be reached.

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Speaker 1: UM that way, now, I mean, that's that's the way

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Speaker 1: I've I've read it as a matter of fact. Um. UH.

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Speaker 1: Senator Lieberman and ranking Member Susan Collins and Senator Tom

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Speaker 1: Carper actually released a statement on February first about, uh,

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Speaker 1: you know, drawing the parallel between the situation in Egypt

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Speaker 1: and this act, and they denounced the the Mubart government's

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Speaker 1: actions in shutting down all Internet communications in Egypt UM

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Speaker 1: and attempted to clarify on that and for for instance,

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Speaker 1: they mentioned that the Communications Act of four UM does

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Speaker 1: give the president some control over radio communications providers, wire providers,

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Speaker 1: the wire people don't use it that way. But yeah, yeah,

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Speaker 1: that Their point was that the that act um Act

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Speaker 1: was would give the president such broad powers as to

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Speaker 1: in effect allow the president to do what we're talking

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Speaker 1: about right now is control or shut down sections of

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Speaker 1: the Internet, um under certain situations and so communications channels, right,

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Speaker 1: and and part of that depends upon you interpreting the

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Speaker 1: Act to extend to Internet communication. I mean, it's it's

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Speaker 1: not as clearly when the when it was written in

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Speaker 1: it was not about the Internet, right, I mean, it

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Speaker 1: was about telegraphs and telephone lines mainly. UM. The to

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Speaker 1: to to extend it to the Internet now would require

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Speaker 1: a little bit of interpretation, and I'm sure you would

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Speaker 1: have people challenging saying this goes beyond the intent of

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Speaker 1: the original Act. But intent and letter sometimes get a

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Speaker 1: little muddied in these situations. So Lieberman's point was that

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Speaker 1: the the Asset Act was really to to define the

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Speaker 1: limitations and the specific situations in which the president could

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Speaker 1: use this power, as opposed to one which was much

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Speaker 1: more broad. Yes, specifically the bill, at least according to

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Speaker 1: the statement in the clarification that was speaking of just

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Speaker 1: a moment ago um. They they issued a series of clarifications,

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Speaker 1: one being that it supposed to be the most critical

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Speaker 1: assets available to the Internet, including infrastructure to run the

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Speaker 1: country and the economy. Also, it has to be I'm

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Speaker 1: sering no, no, I was gonna say, I actually have

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Speaker 1: the definition for that because it comes from the US

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Speaker 1: Patriot Act. The critical infrastructure is defined in this UH way.

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Speaker 1: It says the term critical infrastructure means systems and assets,

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Speaker 1: whether physical or virtual, so vital to the United States

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Speaker 1: that the incapacity or destruction of such systems and assets

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Speaker 1: would have a debilitating impact on security, national economic security,

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Speaker 1: national public health, or safety, or any combination of those matters. Now, UH,

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Speaker 1: the the Asset Act that Lieberman introduced further defines it

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Speaker 1: and actually adds in some stuff that made some people nervous,

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Speaker 1: including UH information providers, which could essentially be I s

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Speaker 1: s um he he went on in the state meant

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Speaker 1: to say that it would require the president to if

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Speaker 1: there was an ongoing or imminent attack that's a quote,

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Speaker 1: um that could cause national or regional catastrophic events. That's

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Speaker 1: the kind of thing that would have to be going

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Speaker 1: on for the President to use this power. And UH

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Speaker 1: he or she the president UM in this case President Obama,

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Speaker 1: but whomever after later on down the road, assuming this

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Speaker 1: stays in in place, would have to use the least

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Speaker 1: disruptive means feasible again a quote UM. They would have

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Speaker 1: to notify Congress UM and wouldn't be able to be

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Speaker 1: continued for more than a hundred twenty days without approval

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Speaker 1: from Congress thirty day blocks up to a hundred twenty days,

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Speaker 1: and then at that point you must have Congressional approval

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Speaker 1: to continue it. And the bill also they, according to

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Speaker 1: statement UH, specifically forbids actions that would violate the First

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Speaker 1: Amendment and would not prevent in net traffic, email, and

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Speaker 1: other forms of communication unless they're involved with critical infrastructure.

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Speaker 1: So if you were you were I am ing a

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Speaker 1: friend on you know, a social typical social network that

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Speaker 1: would not be considered critical infrastructure, you should theoretically um

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Speaker 1: be able to continue to do that. Yeah, you should

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Speaker 1: still be able to use things like Facebook or Twitter

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Speaker 1: to to organize groups and to you know, do whatever

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Speaker 1: it is you want to do to have those those

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Speaker 1: peaceable uh public gatherings, that kind of thing. The another

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Speaker 1: element I remember reading about was that when we're telling

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Speaker 1: critical infrastructure that The example they use was Hoover Dam. Yes, right, yes,

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Speaker 1: but yeah, that's what we're really talking about. What we're

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Speaker 1: talking about critical infrastructure. We're talking about things like power grids,

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Speaker 1: water supply, water supply, nuclear power plants, the military infrasture,

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Speaker 1: military infrastructures, Yes, stuff that were it to be compromised,

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Speaker 1: would mean a terrible, terrible outcome for the citizens in

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Speaker 1: the United States of America. Right, I assume they o.

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Speaker 1: Also when they mentioned economy, we're talking about things like

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Speaker 1: Wall Street, the stock exchanges and things like that, they

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Speaker 1: would want to be careful to protect that infrastructure as well.

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Speaker 1: And if we apply a little critical thinking to this

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Speaker 1: situation and really think about, you know, is is this

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Speaker 1: is what the government is telling us? Is that really

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Speaker 1: what they mean? Like, in other words, does it really

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Speaker 1: you know? Because of course we should be skeptical, we

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Speaker 1: should question our government, but not blindingly, right, we shouldn't

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Speaker 1: just assume that what they're telling us is a fib

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Speaker 1: but we should definitely look into it, look into it, right,

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Speaker 1: And so part of the looking into it means, all, right, well,

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Speaker 1: do what do I believe that the government would not

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Speaker 1: abuse this power in such a way to somehow like

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Speaker 1: let's say let's say the wiki leaks. Sure, let's say

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Speaker 1: that the government is as, hey, you know what wiki

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Speaker 1: leaks is, uh is creating a true danger to national security.

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Speaker 1: So what we're going to do is now command all

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Speaker 1: I s I s p s in the United States

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Speaker 1: to block wiki leaks so that people in the United

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Speaker 1: States can no longer access it. That's that's something that

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Speaker 1: people were worried about. Well, under this Act, at least

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Speaker 1: in theory, you would not be able to do that

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Speaker 1: unless there were a real perceived threat, like an actual

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Speaker 1: cybersecurity attack going on that involved wiki leaks in some way.

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Speaker 1: Otherwise you would not be allowed to just tell all

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Speaker 1: the ice pas to block it. That doesn't mean that

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Speaker 1: an I s P couldn't choose to block it, right,

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Speaker 1: I mean they can because those are private companies. Right.

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Speaker 1: One of the criticisms I've seen of this had nothing

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Speaker 1: to do with, um the the potential violation of First

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Speaker 1: Amendment rights. It had more to do with why is

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Speaker 1: it the government telling private businesses how to protect themselves

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Speaker 1: when private businesses are decades ahead of the government as

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Speaker 1: far as cybersecurity is concerned, Which that that's a viable question.

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Speaker 1: I mean, you know, the the the kind of extreme

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Speaker 1: case that I've seen is saying, how can the lawyers

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Speaker 1: and the politicians who are part of homeland security, who

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Speaker 1: have no experience in I T security at all, how

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Speaker 1: can they expect to improve our practices? When we do

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Speaker 1: this for a living. This is how we build our business,

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Speaker 1: this is how we provide our services. We know how

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Speaker 1: to do this. How is someone else who has no

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Speaker 1: experience in this going to help? That's a that's a

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Speaker 1: legitimate question. You could ask, well, why does the president

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Speaker 1: need this power in the first place? Because let's say

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Speaker 1: that you are an engineer at Hoover Dawn and you

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Speaker 1: detect that there is some sort of cyber intruder or

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Speaker 1: a threat to the infrastructure, the computer infrastructure at Hoover down.

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Speaker 1: There's a a good chance that engineer is going to say,

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Speaker 1: you know what, we need to shut this down. We

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Speaker 1: have to close off our our our ports portals to

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Speaker 1: the outside world as far as the virtual port portals

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Speaker 1: are concerned, and and take care of this problem. Why

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Speaker 1: is there a need for a government intervention? And that's

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Speaker 1: a good question to ask, you know, that's that's probably

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Speaker 1: a more appropriate question to ask rather than is the

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Speaker 1: government going to shut down Facebook, because that's less likely

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Speaker 1: to happen. And I think that again, when you think

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Speaker 1: about this critically, the government taking strides to say shut

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Speaker 1: down the Internet. Let's let's take the most extreme case

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Speaker 1: that the government for some reason has decided to shut

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Speaker 1: down our access to the Internet so that no one

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Speaker 1: in the United States can now get on any sort

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Speaker 1: of Internet service. UM, there would be chaos and there

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Speaker 1: would be there. You would not solve it problems that way, right, right,

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Speaker 1: that would just create even more anger and distrust in

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Speaker 1: the public. I don't I can't imagine any sane government

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Speaker 1: official saying this is a good idea, because there's very

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Speaker 1: little chance that a positive outcome will will happen as

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Speaker 1: a result of it, right, And I think I think

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Speaker 1: to some degree, we've seen that in what happened in Egypt. UM.

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Speaker 1: Not only that, but people in Egypt found unique ways

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Speaker 1: to continue getting their message across UM. I was doing

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Speaker 1: some reading in preparation for the podcast about some of

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Speaker 1: the things that they were doing. UM. You know, they

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Speaker 1: were using. They were initially using the tools that that

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Speaker 1: so many of us use, different messaging UM and social

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Speaker 1: networking tools. But when the Internet blockage came down. UM.

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Speaker 1: As a matter of fact, I was reading on our

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Speaker 1: recaled by Ellen or Mills who wrote that on in

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Speaker 1: January twenty six, one of the c net writers and UM.

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Speaker 1: She said that people were using you know, regular phones,

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Speaker 1: fax machines, Ham radio. Remember we did our our podcast

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Speaker 1: on on Ham Radio sometime ago. Now, UM, you know,

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Speaker 1: even dial up modem usage started to go up again,

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Speaker 1: so so people had had access to those tools. UM.

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Speaker 1: You know, they didn't shut down the phone networks, just

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Speaker 1: the Internet, at least I didn't read anything that indicated

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Speaker 1: that they shut down the traditional phone networks. And in addition,

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Speaker 1: Google on Twitter UM started a service for posting tweets

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Speaker 1: without an Internet connection. Basically, uh speak to tweet allowed

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Speaker 1: people to say what they wanted to say, and it

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Speaker 1: would it would transfer it to a Twitter message with

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Speaker 1: the hashtag Egypt added on to the end of it.

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Speaker 1: So it you know, outside organizations were actually helping protesters

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Speaker 1: get the word out. So I mean, I think it

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Speaker 1: would be very difficult UM to shut it down completely.

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Speaker 1: And in some cases too, I believe they were using

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Speaker 1: mash networks UM, which I can't remember if we've ever

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Speaker 1: mentioned that on the podcast, but we definitely need to

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Speaker 1: do something on that because I think it's really cool.

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Speaker 1: One laptop per child also uses mash networks. Um, they're

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Speaker 1: sort of ad hoc UH networks, usually wireless networks, if

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Speaker 1: I'm not mistaken. UM, and uh, they don't use the

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Speaker 1: typical infrastructure on a lot of cases, places like well

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Speaker 1: in places where they use the one laptop per child

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Speaker 1: uh product. Um, we're talking about places that don't have

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Speaker 1: that infrastructure in place. They don't have hard wired phone

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Speaker 1: lines and cable connections. UM, so they use these local networks,

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Speaker 1: local internet network networks that aren't actually connect to the Internet,

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Speaker 1: but they are a small wireless network. UM. I shouldn't

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Speaker 1: have used internet in net case it. But yeah, I

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Speaker 1: mean people would were communicating using those as well. So

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Speaker 1: I don't think even if the government shut everything down,

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Speaker 1: I don't think it would the traditional infrastructure. I don't

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Speaker 1: think it would take long before people found new ways

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Speaker 1: to get in touch with one another, especially considering the

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Speaker 1: tools we've been given. And further another point, I would

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Speaker 1: I would suggest that says the government would be very

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Speaker 1: uh reticent to to take such an extreme action as

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Speaker 1: to shut down the Internet. So you've already got the

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Speaker 1: one case where you know you would infuriate your citizens

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Speaker 1: and you don't really want to do that. There's really yeah,

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Speaker 1: how would you make things better after that? Right, especially

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Speaker 1: if ostensibly your goal is eventually to come out of

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Speaker 1: this with a peaceful resolution, you would you would essentially

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Speaker 1: end up losing the trust of the citizens and in

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Speaker 1: a representative government, that means that your government is no

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Speaker 1: longer valid if the citizens no longer trust in the

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Speaker 1: government that represents them. Um. You know, assuming that you

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Speaker 1: continue to be a democracy, that pretty much means you

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Speaker 1: have guaranteed you are out the door, um as soon

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Speaker 1: as possible, in fact, probably before even elections would roll around.

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Speaker 1: So that's one part. But another part is the fact

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Speaker 1: that so many businesses rely upon the Internet, particularly in

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Speaker 1: the United States, but all around the world. And of course,

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Speaker 1: you know, the Internet has made the world a you know,

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Speaker 1: a global a true global economy. So you've got businesses

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Speaker 1: that are centered in America that would be deeply affected.

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Speaker 1: But you've got businesses in other countries as well that

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Speaker 1: have interests in America, they have um, they have infrastructure

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Speaker 1: in America that would be very much affected by the

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Speaker 1: Internet being shut down within the borders of the United

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Speaker 1: States of America. You're talking about losing billions of dollars

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Speaker 1: worth of revenue and and doing intense economic damage. In fact,

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Speaker 1: one might be able to argue that shutting down the

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Speaker 1: Internet would cause more damage economically than if you had

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Speaker 1: let the Internet stay up right like that, you know,

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Speaker 1: one of the guidelines to this act is that you

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Speaker 1: would only invoke it if there were an imminent threat

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Speaker 1: to national economic security. Well, if you were to shut

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Speaker 1: down the whole Internet, you would create that threat. Actually,

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Speaker 1: So that's the other reason I don't think it's very

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Speaker 1: likely to happen in the United States. That doesn't mean

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Speaker 1: that we wouldn't see this act UH put into place,

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Speaker 1: or even take an advantage of It's just that I

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Speaker 1: think we would be more likely to see it the

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Speaker 1: way that we're told it's intended, right, so that if

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Speaker 1: there were a concentrated attacks, say on the Pentagon, that

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Speaker 1: the President would have the authority to tell Pentagon officials,

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Speaker 1: all right, close off all routes to the Internet until

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Speaker 1: we resolve this. Again, you could argue, why does this

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Speaker 1: even need to be a presidential thing? But you could

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Speaker 1: also argue, while there, what if you have some company

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Speaker 1: that is or or some person, some organization there's in

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Speaker 1: some way UH partnering with these attacks that you know,

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Speaker 1: maybe it's not that they're the victim, but are rather

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Speaker 1: a conspirator, you know, a co conspirator. Well, in that case,

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Speaker 1: you do have to maybe rely on a higher authority

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Speaker 1: than just the company head to take UH, to take

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Speaker 1: take control of the situation and to to try and

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Speaker 1: limit whatever harm could come of it. Um. It's still scary. Yeah,

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Speaker 1: you know, you see, we've seen this happen before, not

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Speaker 1: just in Egypt, we also in Iran. We saw it

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Speaker 1: um a couple of years ago where there were the

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Speaker 1: Iranian protests. Also a lot of people were trying to

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Speaker 1: um UH organized through Twitter and Facebook, and we saw

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Speaker 1: that the Iranian government tried to UM confuse the issue

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Speaker 1: as much as possible, or at least those are the allegations, right.

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Speaker 1: I mean, it's hard for me to say, I don't

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Speaker 1: I can't understand the language, so I have to rely

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Speaker 1: upon the reports I'm seeing, and some of the reports

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Speaker 1: were not necessarily the most unbiased, so it's hard for

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Speaker 1: me to draw my conclusions. But that's based upon the

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Speaker 1: information that I encountered. Yeah, it's um, it definitely shows

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Speaker 1: how dependent we are on the Internet for all kinds

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Speaker 1: of things. The the outcry over something like this would

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Speaker 1: not have been nearly as serious in say, as it

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Speaker 1: is now because so many people are are you know,

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Speaker 1: used the Internet for communication, keeping up with friends and

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Speaker 1: family um and uh and for commerce um that you know,

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Speaker 1: we've we've come to expect that it's you know, I've

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Speaker 1: actually heard the the the idea thrown out in the

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Speaker 1: last few days that Internet access may be considered a

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Speaker 1: human right, which is a wow, that's that's sort of

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Speaker 1: a topic for another podcast really, but you know, I again,

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Speaker 1: I don't think this would have even been considered a

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Speaker 1: few years ago. And now the idea that you might

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Speaker 1: have a right to access this you know, amazing communications

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Speaker 1: tool that we all use now. Um. You know it's

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Speaker 1: funny because I wouldn't have necessarily thought of that just

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Speaker 1: a few years ago, but now so many people are

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Speaker 1: relying on it that that it is a reasonable debate

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Speaker 1: to have whether or not it's a um, a human

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Speaker 1: right to have that kind of access. But these tools

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Speaker 1: have also made it possible for protesters and demonstrators, whether

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Speaker 1: they are peaceful or violent, organize in ways that they

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Speaker 1: had haven't been before. So it's scary for governments too.

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Speaker 1: I mean, the Iranian government had a hard time because

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Speaker 1: the mobs or it wasn't it wasn't an Iran, it

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Speaker 1: was where it was Belarus. That was even before that,

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Speaker 1: where mobs would gather by text message they would say okay,

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Speaker 1: be at the square at twelve oh seven. It was

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Speaker 1: a flash mob. It was a flash mob. People would

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Speaker 1: show up, they would start to protest, the authorities would

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Speaker 1: come to crack them, crack down on them, and they

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Speaker 1: would have already disseminated the location of the next gathering.

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Speaker 1: So by the time that the authorities converged on the area,

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Speaker 1: they were gone. The protesters had gone, They had converged

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Speaker 1: on a new area, and they were they were able

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Speaker 1: to stay one or maybe even five steps of the

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Speaker 1: authorities by using these tools. It makes sense that a

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Speaker 1: government would want to be able to do that in

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Speaker 1: those instances. So that I think two is why it

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Speaker 1: seems scary, because people go, yeah, you know what, they

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Speaker 1: might want to do that, and what if they do

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Speaker 1: it to me. I don't want that to happen. Yeah,

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Speaker 1: we we've seen the president, which is what makes it scary.

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Speaker 1: But you see, I could see the other side why

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Speaker 1: they would want to. Certainly, it is definitely a scary threat.

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Speaker 1: It's one of those that the more you think about,

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Speaker 1: the more you realize it's less likely to have in

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Speaker 1: the United States. Now, I will never say it's impossible. No,

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Speaker 1: I don't think it's impossible anywhere it would be. It

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Speaker 1: would be monumentally surprising to me if it did happen

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Speaker 1: the United States, simply for the reasons I stated before,

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Speaker 1: which is that I think essentially you would have to

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Speaker 1: have a president who was saying, you know what we're

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Speaker 1: I'm just I'm going to discard the entire American system

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Speaker 1: of government for this to work, because otherwise, you're, like

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Speaker 1: I said, you're gonna end up voting everyone out as

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Speaker 1: soon as possible if you felt like you've been betrayed. Right, So,

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Speaker 1: in a democracy, this kind of approach doesn't really work.

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Speaker 1: If you want to read the bill, it's actually available online.

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Speaker 1: Um it is four and ten pages long. Yeah, the

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Speaker 1: first hundred pages of that have been struck through. I

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Speaker 1: do think that, um, yeah, I think that in light

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Speaker 1: of recent events in Egypt and some of the other

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Speaker 1: countries in the Middle East, where I mean that the

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Speaker 1: Tunisian UH protests I think have sort of helped uh

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Speaker 1: some momentum in that regard. I think that it may

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Speaker 1: cause people to give this bill another look, either you know,

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Speaker 1: go through and revise it again or strike it down

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Speaker 1: and start over from scratch. But UM, I I think

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00:27:31,680 --> 00:27:34,040
Speaker 1: it's one of those things where an actual real life

432
00:27:34,080 --> 00:27:38,760
Speaker 1: event or series of events may add some perspective. Yeah,

433
00:27:38,800 --> 00:27:41,680
Speaker 1: if you want to read it, it's uh, it's s

434
00:27:42,040 --> 00:27:47,400
Speaker 1: period three for eight zero. That is the number associated

435
00:27:47,440 --> 00:27:52,480
Speaker 1: with this particular act um and it's a it's long,

436
00:27:53,119 --> 00:27:55,600
Speaker 1: you know, and it's and it's full of legal ease

437
00:27:55,640 --> 00:27:57,680
Speaker 1: because I mean it's you know, you gotta remember, we

438
00:27:57,760 --> 00:28:02,160
Speaker 1: got lawyers running this country, so that'll happen at any rate.

439
00:28:02,359 --> 00:28:05,919
Speaker 1: But it's it's good to actually be aware of what's happening.

440
00:28:05,960 --> 00:28:09,040
Speaker 1: And like Chris said, there have been a UM there's

441
00:28:09,040 --> 00:28:11,240
Speaker 1: actually been a couple of documents that have come out

442
00:28:11,760 --> 00:28:16,240
Speaker 1: trying to um clear up matters about this act and

443
00:28:16,280 --> 00:28:19,600
Speaker 1: what is covered versus what isn't covered. Uh, you were

444
00:28:19,600 --> 00:28:22,400
Speaker 1: talking about one that was released in February. Correct. Yes,

445
00:28:23,320 --> 00:28:26,240
Speaker 1: the one I have it was actually released back in

446
00:28:26,240 --> 00:28:30,800
Speaker 1: in June of it's called myth versus Reality exactly. They

447
00:28:30,880 --> 00:28:34,040
Speaker 1: keep having to clear up a lot of the issues.

448
00:28:34,160 --> 00:28:36,080
Speaker 1: I'm sure they use a lot of the same verbiage

449
00:28:36,160 --> 00:28:38,480
Speaker 1: because it's the same questions over and over, I'm sure,

450
00:28:38,600 --> 00:28:41,760
Speaker 1: and that I mean, it's a very emotionally charged topic,

451
00:28:41,840 --> 00:28:45,960
Speaker 1: so it's understandable, yes, and yeah, whether whether or not

452
00:28:46,080 --> 00:28:48,760
Speaker 1: you necessarily feel that having access to the Internet as

453
00:28:48,760 --> 00:28:51,760
Speaker 1: a human right, you can. It's hard to deny that

454
00:28:51,800 --> 00:28:55,640
Speaker 1: it's a seriously emotional issue. People want at least they

455
00:28:55,680 --> 00:28:58,520
Speaker 1: want access to the internet, is not need access to

456
00:28:58,560 --> 00:29:03,640
Speaker 1: the Internet. So it's definitely something that's going to concern people.

457
00:29:03,760 --> 00:29:06,840
Speaker 1: And I wanted to add if I may, if you're

458
00:29:06,840 --> 00:29:10,040
Speaker 1: looking for this UH, you'll have an easy time finding

459
00:29:10,040 --> 00:29:12,000
Speaker 1: and if you go to the Library of Congress is

460
00:29:12,560 --> 00:29:14,960
Speaker 1: UM website, you can also look for all kinds of

461
00:29:15,080 --> 00:29:19,760
Speaker 1: UM legislation United States legislation. It's called Thomas UH in

462
00:29:19,800 --> 00:29:24,040
Speaker 1: the spirit of Thomas Jefferson goes the the quote at

463
00:29:24,040 --> 00:29:26,160
Speaker 1: the top of the page, but it's UM. You know,

464
00:29:26,280 --> 00:29:29,040
Speaker 1: HTTP call and slash last. There's no WS here, so

465
00:29:29,080 --> 00:29:31,800
Speaker 1: it's just Thomas th H O M A S dot

466
00:29:31,920 --> 00:29:34,520
Speaker 1: l o C. That's Library of Congress dot gov, Thomas

467
00:29:34,600 --> 00:29:36,280
Speaker 1: dot l oc, dot GOVN you can look up the

468
00:29:36,320 --> 00:29:40,360
Speaker 1: status of different bills. You could see which legislators have

469
00:29:40,440 --> 00:29:43,360
Speaker 1: introduced what legislation. It's actually a pretty interesting tool. It's

470
00:29:43,440 --> 00:29:45,440
Speaker 1: very very useful. Uh. And it's an easy way to

471
00:29:45,480 --> 00:29:47,120
Speaker 1: track this one down if you're interested in doing it.

472
00:29:47,160 --> 00:29:50,520
Speaker 1: Eve unless the top five weekly pieces of legislation people

473
00:29:50,560 --> 00:29:52,160
Speaker 1: you're looking up, and I would imagine that this one

474
00:29:52,680 --> 00:29:54,960
Speaker 1: is one of them. Yeah, I'm sure we'll ranked pretty

475
00:29:55,040 --> 00:29:58,040
Speaker 1: high up there. But this week, let's let's conclude just

476
00:29:58,080 --> 00:30:03,200
Speaker 1: by saying, remember, according to the Act, this isn't about

477
00:30:03,280 --> 00:30:06,920
Speaker 1: shutting off the Internet. It's about protecting various parts of

478
00:30:06,960 --> 00:30:11,640
Speaker 1: the infrastructure from cyber attacks. Uh. It's debatable about whether

479
00:30:11,720 --> 00:30:14,600
Speaker 1: or not that could be extended to the point that

480
00:30:14,800 --> 00:30:19,440
Speaker 1: it would affect all Americans across the United States. Uh. So,

481
00:30:19,520 --> 00:30:22,360
Speaker 1: I mean, I'm not saying that those worries are completely unfounded.

482
00:30:22,400 --> 00:30:27,040
Speaker 1: I'm just saying that I think it unlikely to see

483
00:30:27,080 --> 00:30:30,840
Speaker 1: that scenario happen, right right, And I think now that

484
00:30:30,960 --> 00:30:35,520
Speaker 1: it's become something more in the public eye, people are

485
00:30:35,520 --> 00:30:38,760
Speaker 1: going to take note and you'll see people writing their

486
00:30:38,880 --> 00:30:41,680
Speaker 1: legislators and saying, you know, what is going on with

487
00:30:41,720 --> 00:30:45,680
Speaker 1: this bill. So I think it'll probably be in the

488
00:30:45,680 --> 00:30:49,360
Speaker 1: news and we'll be seeing more clarification or movement on it.

489
00:30:50,200 --> 00:30:52,800
Speaker 1: Thirty page version of the Act to read next time

490
00:30:52,840 --> 00:30:56,600
Speaker 1: we talk about this, Yes, because that's the way we work.

491
00:30:57,800 --> 00:31:00,080
Speaker 1: So if you guys have any opinions, I'm sure are

492
00:31:00,080 --> 00:31:02,320
Speaker 1: a lot of you have opinions on this subject, I

493
00:31:02,360 --> 00:31:05,000
Speaker 1: have no doubt. Please let us know. You can let

494
00:31:05,040 --> 00:31:07,680
Speaker 1: us know on Facebook and Twitter are handled. There is

495
00:31:07,880 --> 00:31:10,680
Speaker 1: tech Stuff h s W. Or you can send us

496
00:31:10,680 --> 00:31:13,680
Speaker 1: an email. That address is tech stuff at how stuff

497
00:31:13,720 --> 00:31:15,280
Speaker 1: works dot com and Chris and I will talk to

498
00:31:15,280 --> 00:31:19,840
Speaker 1: you again, assuming the government lets us really soon, all right.

499
00:31:21,800 --> 00:31:24,360
Speaker 1: For moral nos and thousands of other topics, visit how

500
00:31:24,400 --> 00:31:27,080
Speaker 1: stuff works dot com. So learn more about the podcast,

501
00:31:27,280 --> 00:31:29,800
Speaker 1: click on the podcast icon in the upper right corner

502
00:31:29,840 --> 00:31:33,800
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503
00:31:33,920 --> 00:31:41,320
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504
00:31:41,360 --> 00:31:44,720
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