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Speaker 1: Now here's a highlight from Coast to Coast AM on iHeartRadio.

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Speaker 2: Back in the late eighties when I was first diving

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Speaker 2: into this topic as a journalist, trying to find out

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Speaker 2: is there any credence to these persistent stories about crash

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Speaker 2: retrievals and reverse engineering and meta materials alien stuff. Of course,

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Speaker 2: came across the name of Lenn Stringfield that was just

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Speaker 2: mentioned by my guest Rich Hoffman. He did the first

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Speaker 2: really serious research into these connections between military secret programs

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Speaker 2: of possibility that some of these materials had come out

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Speaker 2: to my neck of the woods, Nevada, in the Nevada Desert.

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Speaker 2: So yeah, I reached out to him, got to know

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Speaker 2: him a little bit. Rich, give me your sense of

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Speaker 2: how real the crash retrieval info is, even before we

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Speaker 2: started hearing from Dave Grush, How seriously you took this?

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Speaker 2: Do you think it's legit, that it really is happening.

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Speaker 3: Well, there's been a lot of investigations that have taken

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Speaker 3: place over the years. Of course, as you very well note.

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Speaker 3: You know, we have the Roswell event with Berlitz, and

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Speaker 3: we have also the done done Schmidt and Tom Carey,

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Speaker 3: who did a lot of work in terms of investigating

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Speaker 3: the Roswell thing, and we saw that you know that,

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Speaker 3: you know, even the attempt to be able to get

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Speaker 3: the records from Roswell were all completely gone. You know,

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Speaker 3: that's pretty interesting in the context of you know, trying

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Speaker 3: to like learn something from it. And then we've had,

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Speaker 3: you know, over the years, you've had everything from like

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Speaker 3: the reports of the Yubatuba crash that took place and

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Speaker 3: there was actually material that came out of that. You've

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Speaker 3: had in nineteen what is it sixty six, you had

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Speaker 3: the Kexbrook you know object that came down in Philadelphia

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Speaker 3: that led into the retrieval of that and you know,

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Speaker 3: there were witnesses to seeing the military moving an acorn

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Speaker 3: type object away from there. So you've had these cases

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Speaker 3: over the years where there have been a very legitimate sounding,

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Speaker 3: you know, cases where there's multiple witnesses to the event,

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Speaker 3: the substantiated. You have a number of other kinds of

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Speaker 3: like things like the as you know, uh you know

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Speaker 3: asked is it called Aztec, New Mexico, where there was

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Speaker 3: a crash that was mentioned that I don't think they

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Speaker 3: ever really panned out. You had Kingman, yeah, King Yeah,

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Speaker 3: So you had Kingman, and you you heard all these

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Speaker 3: reports about all these different crashes that have happened, and

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Speaker 3: you know, some of them panned out where there was

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Speaker 3: something to it, or at least you get more information

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Speaker 3: about you know, again witnesses with anecdotal kinde of testimony,

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Speaker 3: but you walk away with your hands where you nothing

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Speaker 3: in it, you know, and you didn't have any proof

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Speaker 3: per se. And so well, you know, very much over

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Speaker 3: my you know, nearly fifty nine years to almost like

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Speaker 3: now sixty years of dealing with this topic, you hear stories,

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Speaker 3: but you know, when you it might be a story

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Speaker 3: that's compelling in a court of law, but when you

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Speaker 3: go to the court of science, it doesn't pan out

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Speaker 3: because there's no evidence, right, So you struggle with being

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Speaker 3: able to get science if you would, you know, believing

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Speaker 3: it or accepting the fact that that's that is the case.

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Speaker 3: And you can't go on the basis of just the

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Speaker 3: anecdotal testimony because basically, you know, you have a situation

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Speaker 3: where humans are fallible, you know, and their perceptions and

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Speaker 3: their memory and various other kinds of things, and so

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Speaker 3: you're always looking for, you know, evidence that you could

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Speaker 3: you could use to give to a scientist, you know,

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Speaker 3: or data or something like that. Of course, we didn't

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Speaker 3: have the technology back in those early days, you know,

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Speaker 3: to be able to do that, or you didn't get

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Speaker 3: the radar data of the object that was coming down,

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Speaker 3: and so there was, you know, being brings up a

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Speaker 3: big problem. And of course that's what you heard from

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Speaker 3: even the NASA panel was data is a problem, and

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Speaker 3: you know, calibration of equipment is a problem. And if

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Speaker 3: you don't have you know, additional sensors or something of

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Speaker 3: that nature that are that are helping to substantiate that

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Speaker 3: it's not a calibration error or something of that nature,

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Speaker 3: then you're struck. You're you know, you're struck out with

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Speaker 3: basically being able to have scientists really accepted.

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Speaker 2: You mentioned that you've had conversations with people about crash

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Speaker 2: retrieval programs. I don't know if you consider them sources

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Speaker 2: or or just informed observers. But have you ever had

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Speaker 2: do you have direct communications with somebody who said I

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Speaker 2: had my hands on it, somebody that you know is credible.

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Speaker 3: No, I have not had anybody that said I had

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Speaker 3: you know that I've talked with that basically have said

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Speaker 3: that they had their hands on it. They knew of

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Speaker 3: programs much like David is getting. They knew of programs

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Speaker 3: and places where things were going on, and so you

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Speaker 3: know that, you know, of course that's you hear that,

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Speaker 3: and you hear about the fact that there were like,

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Speaker 3: you know, groups of people that were in the early

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Speaker 3: in the early times were actually studying and getting together

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Speaker 3: to discuss that. In the military, they discuss the crush

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Speaker 3: retrieval efforts, and so there was like a you know,

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Speaker 3: a program in the backwoods that was dealing with that

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Speaker 3: and looking at it and discussing it. And so you know,

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Speaker 3: that's the kind of thing you would hear, but you

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Speaker 3: never got a chance. I never got a chance to

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Speaker 3: speak to anyone directly that was saying that. I got

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Speaker 3: to hold the stuff themselves.

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Speaker 2: If you had to bet, do you think that it

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Speaker 2: is real? And especially include the testimony of Dave Grush,

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Speaker 2: now that we know that it's out there and have

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Speaker 2: brought out lines about what he has said under oath,

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Speaker 2: what do you think?

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Speaker 3: Well, I think you know, probably, I'm quite honest with you.

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Speaker 3: I think that you know, we've we do have wreckage,

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Speaker 3: we do have material, uh, and it's it's been largely

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Speaker 3: put into the the you know, the industrial complex and

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Speaker 3: call that including the contractor companies, and and that they've

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Speaker 3: been playing heavily in it. I believe that there's that

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Speaker 3: whole thing that's really really going on. Now. You know,

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Speaker 3: you're not going to go to places like Lockheed Martin

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Speaker 3: gets and going to get them to admit it because

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Speaker 3: these are probably in U SAP programs or you know,

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Speaker 3: unacknowledged as staff programs, and that stuff is always going

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Speaker 3: to be that way, regardless of what you think that

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Speaker 3: grush could get accomplished here. You know, a staff is

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Speaker 3: going to remain a saff no matter what you know.

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Speaker 3: And I don't see them spilling the beans on the

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Speaker 3: fact that you know, let's say hypothetically, you know that

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Speaker 3: Lockheed Martin and I keep mentioning that company, but anyway,

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Speaker 3: Lockheed Martin has been you know, doing reverse engineering on

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Speaker 3: such and such, and you're just not going to get

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Speaker 3: that to come forward because it's still classified. Uh, And

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Speaker 3: they're going to protect classify things and information to the

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Speaker 3: NS degree. And then you can pretty well see that

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Speaker 3: in the context of just the records that were at

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Speaker 3: mar Lago and some of these things were you know,

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Speaker 3: nuclear nuclear kinds of like information that we don't want

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Speaker 3: the our adversaries to get. And like you pointed out

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Speaker 3: early on the show, there's a competition for that information.

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Speaker 3: The Chinese would love to be able to get those

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Speaker 3: wonderful documents and love to be able to get that

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Speaker 3: kind of information. That what, what do we learned from

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Speaker 3: our retrievals you know that we've had in the past.

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Speaker 3: So I think that we were kind of in a

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Speaker 3: situation where we'll probably never know.

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Speaker 1: I don't know.

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Speaker 2: I hope that you're not right about that. I hope

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Speaker 2: that Congress will pick up the ball and run with it.

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Speaker 2: If Dave Grush has told them the buildings where this

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Speaker 2: stuff is stored, why not go after it. I'm with

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Speaker 2: you on this. I've you know, the National Security APPARATUSUS

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Speaker 2: kind of painted itself into a corner on this, yeah,

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Speaker 2: and doesn't really have a way out. There are legitimate

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Speaker 2: national security issues with this material, this technology that whoever

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Speaker 2: has it and gets it and masters it and duplicates

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Speaker 2: it wins. So there's no getting around that. There are

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Speaker 2: you know, inherently that issue. You know, there are people

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Speaker 2: that will probably go to prison if it comes out

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Speaker 2: that they've lied to Congress or misappropriated money or you know,

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Speaker 2: kept it away. And then just the value of that technology.

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Speaker 2: If I were a company that had it, I wouldn't

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Speaker 2: give it up, not willingly. You'd have to come and drag,

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Speaker 2: give me kicking, screaming to give it up. It'd be

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Speaker 2: incredibly valuable, even if you haven't figured it out yet.

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Speaker 3: I get a kick that if you. If you recall back,

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Speaker 3: the NRO was not known for like a long long time,

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Speaker 3: and uh you know, congressional leaders learned about it and

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Speaker 3: had the idea that it was that it was there.

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Speaker 3: I mean, it was basically an operation, and uh so

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Speaker 3: you had an entire government organization that was kind of

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Speaker 3: like hidden from you know, congressional people and kept so

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Speaker 3: you know, restricted in terms of people knowing it that

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Speaker 3: it was just you know, it was a surprise.

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Speaker 2: Well, you raise an interesting point. Secrets can be kept.

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Speaker 2: You've been at this for a long time, You've worked

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Speaker 2: with sensitive materials and sensitive programs. Secrets can be kept

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Speaker 2: for a really long time.

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Speaker 3: Yeah, it can. And you know I had to sign

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Speaker 3: the non disclosure agreement and it's you know, it's it's

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Speaker 3: for my life. And I used to be thinking that

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Speaker 3: it was like, you know, even for a contractor, was

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Speaker 3: during the time that I was a contractor. But no,

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Speaker 3: you you really signed the agreement saying it's for life,

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Speaker 3: you know. And I know I know things about you know,

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Speaker 3: the UAP phenomena in terms of like on supper net

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Speaker 3: and things like that to be dangerous, you know, and

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Speaker 3: I don't want, you know. And so I'm like, you know,

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Speaker 3: in that catch twenty two where it's hard for me

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Speaker 3: to you know, I have to be quiet about it.

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Speaker 3: I ke even mentioned it to the people that I

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Speaker 3: work with and you know, at work even and because

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Speaker 3: they're not even allowed to know. And then I've got,

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Speaker 3: you know, the people in SCU that I can't talk

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Speaker 3: about it. So and you can imagine as the level

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Speaker 3: of classification goes up where it's like, you know, even

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Speaker 3: above top secret, and it gets into the sci world,

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Speaker 3: when you get into even the NATO stuff with the

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Speaker 3: cosmic you know, you know, you hear about the cosmic classification.

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Speaker 3: You have the White House level classications, you add all

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Speaker 3: that stuff in, and then you have a whole different

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Speaker 3: classification system with the Department of Energy, you know, And

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Speaker 3: so there's so many of these levels of restrictions where

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Speaker 3: people get you know, polygraphs and they can't talk about

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Speaker 3: it or whatever that it just it's so it's difficult

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Speaker 3: to be able to have a conversation sometimes with people

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Speaker 3: that work there.

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Speaker 2: But you're just you're just a walking bag of secrets.

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Speaker 2: I'm gonna have to come down there and spend some

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Speaker 2: time with you.

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Speaker 3: Yeah, no kidding, I mean, you know, like I can,

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Speaker 3: I can tell you that the Air Force is playing

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Speaker 3: in in terms of like the reporting of the stuff,

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Speaker 3: because I've seen the site. You know, they're they're they're

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Speaker 3: reporting videos and various other things that they take, and

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Speaker 3: so they are playing in. But I can't say much

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Speaker 3: more than that, but I.

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Speaker 2: Can say that, well, that's pretty interesting because the Air

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Speaker 2: Force has sort of been is partner in all of this,

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Speaker 2: all the revelations of stuff coming out from the Navy

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Speaker 2: Space Command talking about it, NASA, but nothing from the

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Speaker 2: Air Force, which you would assume has the biggest collection

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Speaker 2: of stuff, of info, of files of cases, right.

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Speaker 3: Yeah, and so you know, of course, you know, I

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Speaker 3: know that they are playing but I mean, at the

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Speaker 3: same time, you know, they don't they come up with

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Speaker 3: public statements saying that they don't really want to get

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Speaker 3: into it. You know that they're kind of like, you know,

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Speaker 3: pushing it off, and they didn't want to dismiss it,

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Speaker 3: and there's probably good reasons for that. They were pretty

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Speaker 3: embarrassed as a result of you know, Project Bluebook, I think,

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Speaker 3: you know, and just that whole thing and trying to

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Speaker 3: get out of it at that time took them a

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Speaker 3: long time. At the same time, you have the situation

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Speaker 3: where they want to be low key. I think that

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Speaker 3: they want to not really they're hasard about that because

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Speaker 3: you think about it. You know, if you're your funding

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Speaker 3: is tied into being able to defend the airspace around

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Speaker 3: and then you can't really defend the airspace because objects

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Speaker 3: are an excess moving an excess of like hypersonic speed

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Speaker 3: and doing all kinds of things like hanging in the

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Speaker 3: air and in one minute and then shooting off instantaneously.

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Speaker 3: How do you defend the airspace?

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Speaker 2: And it's embarrassing to say that you can't do anything

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Speaker 2: about it. Precisely, let me ask you this, as has

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Speaker 2: SEU already of your scientists are affiliate and members done

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Speaker 2: any analysis on so called meta materials, either on or

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Speaker 2: off the record.

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Speaker 1: Kind of a thing.

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Speaker 3: Well, we've looked at materials in terms of meta materials.

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Speaker 3: I think, you know, probably the only one that I'm

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Speaker 3: aware of course is you know Gary Nolan, who has

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Speaker 3: been involved in the meta materials type of thing and

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Speaker 3: looking at you know, the the isotopic ratios for example,

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Speaker 3: the many of the materials that he's received. The big

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Speaker 3: problem with materials is knowing the exact you know, providence

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Speaker 3: of the material at the same time having the materials,

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Speaker 3: you know, in terms of handling of the custody being

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Speaker 3: recorded in terms of how it was passed, who had it,

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Speaker 3: who touched it, where it was and then if you recall,

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Speaker 3: the TTSA was also engaging with an organization in the

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Speaker 3: Army to utilize labs that was it used to be

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Speaker 3: called Tacom's Car Deck, which was a research and development

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Speaker 3: lab that was up in Warren, Michigan, and it's been

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Speaker 3: since renamed because they actually, you know, the Army moved

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Speaker 3: all those our decks or those those research and development

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Speaker 3: things under a Capabilities Command and stuff like that that

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Speaker 3: the few Army Futures Command that was basically positioning all

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Speaker 3: of them to be able to help support acquisition into

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Speaker 3: more advanced level of things quicker, getting better case abilities,

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Speaker 3: and putting them out much quicker for soldiers. So that

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Speaker 3: but they were probably engaged in doing some of that

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Speaker 3: work as well. But we would again it because it's

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Speaker 3: in the military world, we probably wouldn't know about it.

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Speaker 3: Because you could literally walk in some of these buildings

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Speaker 3: and go from room to room in a building, and

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Speaker 3: each one of those rooms is a lab and the

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Speaker 3: people in that room don't even know what's happening in

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Speaker 3: the room next door to them. It's kept that classified

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Speaker 3: and you know, sequestered if you would, so you could

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Speaker 3: you could basically have this whole building, and we have

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Speaker 3: it over here at Redstone for example, where one of

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Speaker 3: those R decks was there, but everybody that was in

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Speaker 3: it had no clue. They didn't talk about it, and

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Speaker 3: they went on their side. And I've also been in

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Speaker 3: where MYTHIC is, which is Missile Space Intelligence Center. And

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Speaker 3: if you think back to what you know NASIK is,

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Speaker 3: it used to be called Foreign Technology Division at right

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Speaker 3: Patterson Air Force Base, and then before that it was

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Speaker 3: called ATTIC, which was their Technical Intelligence Center. But it

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Speaker 3: was it was looking at doing that R and D

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Speaker 3: re engineering kind of work up there, but here Missile

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Speaker 3: and Space Intelligence Center is looking at all the rockets

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Speaker 3: that are collected around them, you know, from whatever, let's say,

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Speaker 3: all those scuds and things like that. They would bring

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Speaker 3: it over here, and then these guys would tear it

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Speaker 3: apart and look and bolt by bolt and try to

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Speaker 3: figure out how it was operated and then use it

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Speaker 3: for their own advantage.

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Speaker 2: Yeah, and there's a lot of speculation that those those folks,

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Speaker 2: those same organizations took a part and analyze some really

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Speaker 2: foreign material, not just foreign countries, but foreign planets kind

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Speaker 2: of a thing. So you lived there around that, you

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Speaker 2: heard those stories growing up, you dealt with lend Stringfield.

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Speaker 2: You think that there's anything like that, those kinds of materials,

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Speaker 2: exotic craft from way way out somewhere that are still

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Speaker 2: there somewhere.

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Speaker 3: I believe that that's probably the case. I think, you know,

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Speaker 3: again going on the basis of belief based upon you know,

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Speaker 3: my years of talking with people at the base, my

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Speaker 3: years of having some people confide in me that you

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Speaker 3: know that this is what they had going on. Again,

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Speaker 3: the problem comes up that they didn't, you know, hand

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Speaker 3: me a document that said this or that. Right becomes

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Speaker 3: like when he's you know, I'm listening to the story.

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