1 00:00:00,280 --> 00:00:02,840 Speaker 1: Brought to you by the reinvented two thousand twelve camera. 2 00:00:03,160 --> 00:00:06,880 Speaker 1: It's ready. Are you hey there, Text Stuff listeners, This 3 00:00:06,920 --> 00:00:09,200 Speaker 1: is Jonathan Strickland and I have got a request for 4 00:00:09,240 --> 00:00:11,440 Speaker 1: all of you. Now, Chris and I have decided that 5 00:00:11,440 --> 00:00:13,720 Speaker 1: we're going to try and experiment. We're doing our first 6 00:00:13,920 --> 00:00:17,400 Speaker 1: crowd sourced episode of tech Stuff and we want to 7 00:00:17,400 --> 00:00:21,480 Speaker 1: know what your pick is for the worst video game 8 00:00:21,720 --> 00:00:25,600 Speaker 1: of all time. Now, nominations you can. You can make 9 00:00:25,680 --> 00:00:28,479 Speaker 1: one nomination. You nominate one game, and you need to 10 00:00:28,480 --> 00:00:30,639 Speaker 1: tell us the name of the game and the platform 11 00:00:30,760 --> 00:00:32,839 Speaker 1: it was on. And it could be any platform. It 12 00:00:32,840 --> 00:00:37,000 Speaker 1: could be an arcade game, it could be a PC, Mac, Xbox, 13 00:00:37,040 --> 00:00:41,360 Speaker 1: PS three, Nintendo handheld console. It can be web based 14 00:00:41,840 --> 00:00:43,839 Speaker 1: if you like. But just you let us know what 15 00:00:43,840 --> 00:00:45,560 Speaker 1: the platform is so we can make sure we count 16 00:00:45,600 --> 00:00:49,440 Speaker 1: that as the votes. So you can nominate your game 17 00:00:49,600 --> 00:00:53,920 Speaker 1: either through email, which is tech Stuff at how stuff 18 00:00:53,920 --> 00:00:58,320 Speaker 1: works dot com, or you can nominate through Twitter or Facebook. 19 00:00:58,720 --> 00:01:01,560 Speaker 1: And we're gonna put a cut off date on this. 20 00:01:01,680 --> 00:01:03,640 Speaker 1: I want to have the episode go up by the 21 00:01:03,720 --> 00:01:07,720 Speaker 1: end of September of eleven. So let's say you need 22 00:01:07,800 --> 00:01:12,960 Speaker 1: to get your nominations in by September eleven, So if 23 00:01:12,959 --> 00:01:15,880 Speaker 1: you get those nominations into us, we will make sure 24 00:01:15,920 --> 00:01:19,240 Speaker 1: we include those in the process and we will have 25 00:01:19,280 --> 00:01:22,640 Speaker 1: an episode where we give you the worst video games 26 00:01:22,800 --> 00:01:25,800 Speaker 1: of all time based upon the votes of our listeners. 27 00:01:26,040 --> 00:01:30,840 Speaker 1: Thanks a lot. Can't wait to hear from you. Get 28 00:01:30,840 --> 00:01:34,000 Speaker 1: in touch with technology with tech Stuff from how stuff 29 00:01:34,040 --> 00:01:43,280 Speaker 1: works dot com. Hello, everyone, welcome to tex Stuff. My 30 00:01:43,360 --> 00:01:45,319 Speaker 1: name is Chris Poulette and I am an editor at 31 00:01:45,360 --> 00:01:47,880 Speaker 1: how stuff works dot com sitting in a a cross from 32 00:01:47,880 --> 00:01:51,400 Speaker 1: me as always a senior writer, Jonathan Strickland. You just 33 00:01:51,520 --> 00:01:53,960 Speaker 1: call out my name and you know wherever I am, 34 00:01:54,040 --> 00:02:02,280 Speaker 1: I'll come running a yes. So that's sort of pertinent. Yeah, 35 00:02:02,320 --> 00:02:04,640 Speaker 1: it's pertinent to our discussion. But before we get into it, 36 00:02:04,720 --> 00:02:13,120 Speaker 1: let's start off with a little listener mail. This listener 37 00:02:13,160 --> 00:02:15,679 Speaker 1: mail comes from Michael, who says, Hi, Chris and Jonathan, 38 00:02:15,880 --> 00:02:17,960 Speaker 1: I've been listening to your podcast for about seven months 39 00:02:17,960 --> 00:02:20,000 Speaker 1: and enjoy them immensely, and I figured I should write 40 00:02:20,000 --> 00:02:22,400 Speaker 1: in to not only tell you this, but also suggest 41 00:02:22,480 --> 00:02:25,280 Speaker 1: an idea for a podcast topic. I'm writing this email 42 00:02:25,280 --> 00:02:27,680 Speaker 1: on the day after more riots in London and as 43 00:02:27,720 --> 00:02:30,040 Speaker 1: I watched the Rolling News coverage I keep hearing people 44 00:02:30,040 --> 00:02:32,680 Speaker 1: suggesting that social media was integral to the way the 45 00:02:32,760 --> 00:02:35,520 Speaker 1: looting and violence played out. They say Twitter is being 46 00:02:35,600 --> 00:02:37,560 Speaker 1: used to plan and suggest places to go and loot, 47 00:02:37,760 --> 00:02:40,600 Speaker 1: and that BlackBerry messengers being used to privately distribute this 48 00:02:40,680 --> 00:02:43,360 Speaker 1: info to hundreds of people at a time, as is 49 00:02:43,400 --> 00:02:46,120 Speaker 1: the way with the mainstream media. They're quick to jump 50 00:02:46,160 --> 00:02:49,200 Speaker 1: to conclusions that only social media could have possibly caused 51 00:02:49,240 --> 00:02:52,440 Speaker 1: these displays of thuggery and violence, and forget the fact 52 00:02:52,480 --> 00:02:55,000 Speaker 1: that social media can be used for both harm and 53 00:02:55,120 --> 00:02:59,680 Speaker 1: for good. In recent months, the Arab Spring has similar commentary. 54 00:02:59,720 --> 00:03:02,880 Speaker 1: Twitter has been blocked in certain countries and many rallies 55 00:03:02,919 --> 00:03:05,680 Speaker 1: have been organized using only Twitter. What do you guys 56 00:03:05,720 --> 00:03:08,600 Speaker 1: make of this? As social media been as integral as 57 00:03:08,600 --> 00:03:10,720 Speaker 1: everyone is saying it has been, What about in the 58 00:03:10,800 --> 00:03:13,600 Speaker 1: days before social media? What tech was used back then 59 00:03:13,639 --> 00:03:16,280 Speaker 1: to organize protests and uprisings? Is all of this in 60 00:03:16,400 --> 00:03:18,400 Speaker 1: urban myth? I hope you'll be able to explain this 61 00:03:18,480 --> 00:03:21,240 Speaker 1: to all of us peaceful tech stuff listeners. Thanks for 62 00:03:21,280 --> 00:03:24,680 Speaker 1: all the fun, Michael. Michael, we are going to talk 63 00:03:24,720 --> 00:03:28,200 Speaker 1: about technology and its role in the recent London and 64 00:03:28,280 --> 00:03:32,160 Speaker 1: well really riots across the United Kingdom. UM. And by recent, 65 00:03:32,200 --> 00:03:34,519 Speaker 1: I mean we are recording this in early August of 66 00:03:34,560 --> 00:03:37,600 Speaker 1: twenty eleven, So as of the recording of this podcast, 67 00:03:37,640 --> 00:03:41,040 Speaker 1: there are still disturbances in the UK that are related 68 00:03:41,080 --> 00:03:46,920 Speaker 1: to these riots and hopefully they will be resolved soon. UM. Yeah. UM. 69 00:03:47,040 --> 00:03:51,240 Speaker 1: Of course we have brought up similar topics UM in 70 00:03:51,280 --> 00:03:55,040 Speaker 1: the past. We talked about how Twitter was being used 71 00:03:55,080 --> 00:03:59,840 Speaker 1: in Iran UM to help people communicate with one another. 72 00:04:00,120 --> 00:04:03,760 Speaker 1: I think we also mentioned Egypt, Egypt, Yep and UM 73 00:04:03,800 --> 00:04:06,520 Speaker 1: and some of the other countries to where people were 74 00:04:06,680 --> 00:04:12,000 Speaker 1: using social media fit specifically Facebook and Twitter UM to 75 00:04:12,200 --> 00:04:16,800 Speaker 1: help them organize their efforts. UM. And I would I 76 00:04:16,839 --> 00:04:20,120 Speaker 1: would say that, I mean it's it's certainly in those cases. 77 00:04:20,160 --> 00:04:22,920 Speaker 1: I mean even the United States government sort of gotten involved, 78 00:04:23,600 --> 00:04:28,000 Speaker 1: UM because supporting UM the efforts of people to use 79 00:04:28,080 --> 00:04:30,680 Speaker 1: these services right right. As a matter of fact, Twitter 80 00:04:30,800 --> 00:04:33,840 Speaker 1: was planning on going undergoing some maintenance and taking down 81 00:04:33,839 --> 00:04:39,839 Speaker 1: the service UM following the Iranian elections and their unrest 82 00:04:39,920 --> 00:04:43,520 Speaker 1: that followed the protests, and the Obama administration requested that 83 00:04:43,600 --> 00:04:47,720 Speaker 1: they hold off on that maintenance. Yes, yes, which Twitter 84 00:04:47,800 --> 00:04:54,479 Speaker 1: agreed to do. UM. I would say that integral might 85 00:04:54,560 --> 00:04:57,400 Speaker 1: be kind of a strong word. I might say that 86 00:04:57,440 --> 00:05:01,920 Speaker 1: it that that using these technology ease um may have 87 00:05:01,960 --> 00:05:05,119 Speaker 1: been integral to the way they were carried out. Yeah, 88 00:05:05,200 --> 00:05:11,279 Speaker 1: it's the We have to separate the reasons for the 89 00:05:11,400 --> 00:05:15,479 Speaker 1: unrest and the methodology they used to carry it out. 90 00:05:15,520 --> 00:05:18,279 Speaker 1: We have to separate those two things, because the technology 91 00:05:18,279 --> 00:05:21,960 Speaker 1: did not cause these riots. And in fact, to to 92 00:05:22,000 --> 00:05:24,600 Speaker 1: try and sum up what these riots were caused by 93 00:05:24,640 --> 00:05:26,800 Speaker 1: in a sound bite or two is doing it a 94 00:05:27,080 --> 00:05:31,320 Speaker 1: terrible disservice. The first of all, I cannot even pretend 95 00:05:31,320 --> 00:05:37,040 Speaker 1: to understand the full social and political culture in the 96 00:05:37,160 --> 00:05:41,800 Speaker 1: UK that kind of led up to this event. We 97 00:05:41,800 --> 00:05:45,720 Speaker 1: we know, of course that the precipitating event was the 98 00:05:45,720 --> 00:05:49,599 Speaker 1: the the death of a man at the hands of 99 00:05:49,600 --> 00:05:54,200 Speaker 1: the police, the Metropolitan London Police UM, and that that 100 00:05:54,320 --> 00:05:57,400 Speaker 1: kind of was the spark that started everything. But the 101 00:05:57,480 --> 00:06:01,320 Speaker 1: riots of course far out a clip that initial event, 102 00:06:01,400 --> 00:06:04,200 Speaker 1: and it's clear, or at least it appears to be clear, 103 00:06:04,720 --> 00:06:07,520 Speaker 1: that the motivations behind the people who are carrying out 104 00:06:07,560 --> 00:06:12,120 Speaker 1: these riots have little if anything to do with that spark. 105 00:06:13,040 --> 00:06:16,599 Speaker 1: I get the sense that some of the rioters may 106 00:06:16,680 --> 00:06:21,800 Speaker 1: have had that event in mind um when they started, 107 00:06:22,400 --> 00:06:28,359 Speaker 1: but that other people may just be rioting to loot, 108 00:06:29,400 --> 00:06:31,599 Speaker 1: use it as an excuse to loot. And this happens 109 00:06:32,080 --> 00:06:34,400 Speaker 1: in a lot of cases when there is rioting. So 110 00:06:34,520 --> 00:06:38,080 Speaker 1: I I don't think everyone's motivation for participating is the same. 111 00:06:38,279 --> 00:06:40,880 Speaker 1: I think what you have is you have a population 112 00:06:40,920 --> 00:06:45,320 Speaker 1: of people who feel uh, some sort of deep resentment 113 00:06:45,360 --> 00:06:48,480 Speaker 1: and anger which even they may not even be necessarily 114 00:06:48,520 --> 00:06:52,880 Speaker 1: conscious of, or they may be unable to articulate that. Uh. 115 00:06:52,880 --> 00:06:57,280 Speaker 1: They some of them have been articulating their their feelings 116 00:06:57,520 --> 00:07:03,040 Speaker 1: towards the media, but in ways that seem maybe disingenuous 117 00:07:03,160 --> 00:07:07,480 Speaker 1: or at least it's it's hard to connect the feelings 118 00:07:07,520 --> 00:07:10,240 Speaker 1: with the actions, right because the actions we're talking about 119 00:07:10,280 --> 00:07:13,520 Speaker 1: in London in the UK in general are more about 120 00:07:13,960 --> 00:07:18,160 Speaker 1: very destructive behavior about looting, and the targets for this 121 00:07:18,360 --> 00:07:22,920 Speaker 1: behavior tend to be small businesses, family owned businesses. We're 122 00:07:22,960 --> 00:07:27,160 Speaker 1: not talking about institutions, right because you would say that, well, 123 00:07:27,200 --> 00:07:29,600 Speaker 1: this is a if this is truly a political statement, 124 00:07:30,000 --> 00:07:33,400 Speaker 1: then you would think you would target institutions that represent 125 00:07:33,560 --> 00:07:37,720 Speaker 1: whatever the opposing ideology is, right, Like if you were 126 00:07:37,800 --> 00:07:40,800 Speaker 1: going to attack say Parliament to represent the government, or 127 00:07:41,560 --> 00:07:43,960 Speaker 1: the police station because you didn't like the police right, 128 00:07:44,120 --> 00:07:48,680 Speaker 1: or or large banks because that represents the government as well. 129 00:07:49,080 --> 00:07:51,280 Speaker 1: Then you you know that then you could argue, well, 130 00:07:51,320 --> 00:07:54,840 Speaker 1: that's a very or at least a clearer political statement 131 00:07:55,080 --> 00:07:59,760 Speaker 1: than attacking a family owned, community based business. In that case, 132 00:07:59,800 --> 00:08:02,680 Speaker 1: what saying is that, well, we have rioters who are 133 00:08:02,680 --> 00:08:06,600 Speaker 1: attacking businesses within their own community, so they are ultimately 134 00:08:06,720 --> 00:08:11,560 Speaker 1: hurting their own community. This is not pushing forward any 135 00:08:11,560 --> 00:08:15,200 Speaker 1: sort of political ideology. This looks more like an example 136 00:08:15,240 --> 00:08:19,840 Speaker 1: of someone who desires certain things in their life that 137 00:08:19,880 --> 00:08:24,360 Speaker 1: they otherwise are unable to to obtain, and they're taking 138 00:08:24,400 --> 00:08:28,400 Speaker 1: the opportunity of chaos to slip in and grab those things. 139 00:08:28,400 --> 00:08:31,640 Speaker 1: So we're getting really philosophical here, but it's it's kind 140 00:08:31,640 --> 00:08:34,480 Speaker 1: of like, um, one of the great discussions I've seen 141 00:08:34,520 --> 00:08:38,400 Speaker 1: online kind of talked about how we have created this 142 00:08:38,400 --> 00:08:43,280 Speaker 1: this UH environment of consumerism. Right, consumerism is considered something 143 00:08:43,320 --> 00:08:47,480 Speaker 1: that's a good thing, you know, beck when after the 144 00:08:47,480 --> 00:08:51,319 Speaker 1: the nine eleven UH tragedy here in the United States, 145 00:08:51,720 --> 00:08:55,040 Speaker 1: we had government officials saying the best thing we can 146 00:08:55,080 --> 00:08:58,000 Speaker 1: do is go out there and business as usual, go 147 00:08:58,040 --> 00:09:01,120 Speaker 1: out and buy stuff, I mean by things. Was definitely 148 00:09:01,200 --> 00:09:04,439 Speaker 1: part of the strategy to continue to combat this terrorism, 149 00:09:04,480 --> 00:09:08,760 Speaker 1: which is saying that consumerism is like a foundation of 150 00:09:08,840 --> 00:09:11,080 Speaker 1: what our society is right now. So we have promoted 151 00:09:11,120 --> 00:09:13,959 Speaker 1: this idea that to make your life better, you should 152 00:09:13,960 --> 00:09:16,120 Speaker 1: go out and buy stuff. And I'm not saying whether 153 00:09:16,200 --> 00:09:18,679 Speaker 1: or not that's good or bad. I'm not passing judgment 154 00:09:18,720 --> 00:09:22,719 Speaker 1: on that. Because I'm a consumer. I have lots of 155 00:09:22,840 --> 00:09:26,319 Speaker 1: things that uh that if you were to step outside 156 00:09:26,320 --> 00:09:28,840 Speaker 1: and be objective, you'd say, all right, that's a luxury, 157 00:09:28,880 --> 00:09:32,160 Speaker 1: that's not a that's not something you have to have, right. 158 00:09:32,360 --> 00:09:34,520 Speaker 1: I mean, I've got those things. I've got some of 159 00:09:34,520 --> 00:09:37,760 Speaker 1: them sitting in front of me. Um. But the promotion 160 00:09:37,800 --> 00:09:42,280 Speaker 1: of consumerism to a a population of people who don't 161 00:09:42,280 --> 00:09:46,480 Speaker 1: have the the income to spend on that consumerism can 162 00:09:46,559 --> 00:09:50,959 Speaker 1: create a level of frustration and anger and greed. You've 163 00:09:51,000 --> 00:09:53,480 Speaker 1: got these people who are being told over and over again, 164 00:09:53,840 --> 00:09:57,360 Speaker 1: buying this will make you happy, you know, owning this 165 00:09:57,440 --> 00:09:59,960 Speaker 1: will make you a better person. That kind of mess 166 00:10:00,000 --> 00:10:02,040 Speaker 1: and she gets put forth, and then they have no 167 00:10:02,600 --> 00:10:06,800 Speaker 1: avenue where they can actually purchase said product, and then 168 00:10:06,840 --> 00:10:08,840 Speaker 1: they have this opportunity to just take things and be 169 00:10:08,960 --> 00:10:14,160 Speaker 1: part of this consumer uh environment. By passing the whole 170 00:10:14,960 --> 00:10:18,280 Speaker 1: being you know, earning the money and purchasing things on 171 00:10:18,320 --> 00:10:21,160 Speaker 1: your own, using your own money, that kind of thing. Now, 172 00:10:21,160 --> 00:10:23,200 Speaker 1: I'm not saying that's the cause of the riots either. 173 00:10:23,559 --> 00:10:28,600 Speaker 1: That's just one factor and it's such a complex issue 174 00:10:28,640 --> 00:10:32,160 Speaker 1: that you can't boil it down to because of this 175 00:10:32,160 --> 00:10:35,960 Speaker 1: this happened. It's far more complex. But I'm just that 176 00:10:36,080 --> 00:10:37,680 Speaker 1: was just my way of pointing out that this is 177 00:10:37,720 --> 00:10:41,520 Speaker 1: a really complicated problem. You can't just say, uh, oh, 178 00:10:41,559 --> 00:10:44,400 Speaker 1: it's technology's fault, and you can't even say it's just 179 00:10:44,440 --> 00:10:46,559 Speaker 1: the government's fault. There's so many I mean, there are 180 00:10:46,600 --> 00:10:49,560 Speaker 1: personal choices that are involved here too. You can't you 181 00:10:49,640 --> 00:10:54,560 Speaker 1: cannot absolve the rioters from personal responsibility either. But at 182 00:10:54,600 --> 00:10:56,720 Speaker 1: the same time, you can't just say, oh, these are 183 00:10:56,760 --> 00:10:58,920 Speaker 1: these are bad people, because if you just say they're 184 00:10:58,920 --> 00:11:02,080 Speaker 1: bad people, you're just missing them and you're ultimately saying 185 00:11:02,440 --> 00:11:05,000 Speaker 1: this is always going to happen because some people are 186 00:11:05,000 --> 00:11:09,080 Speaker 1: just bad. So you resolved yourself to future riots, you know, 187 00:11:09,160 --> 00:11:13,760 Speaker 1: there's no solution there because you've just made a label. Well, um, 188 00:11:13,800 --> 00:11:16,240 Speaker 1: I'm sorry, my soapbox is getting a little unsteady livings 189 00:11:16,240 --> 00:11:21,760 Speaker 1: step down here. So, so as far as technologies role. Um. 190 00:11:21,800 --> 00:11:24,240 Speaker 1: You know that the web services that people are using, 191 00:11:24,280 --> 00:11:29,360 Speaker 1: you know, Twitter and Facebook and and specifically smartphone BlackBerry. 192 00:11:29,840 --> 00:11:34,960 Speaker 1: Um in this case, uh have been blamed by some 193 00:11:35,120 --> 00:11:40,800 Speaker 1: in the media. I think, Um, but again, these technologies, Yeah, 194 00:11:41,559 --> 00:11:45,800 Speaker 1: but these I mean, I think it's important, as Michael 195 00:11:45,800 --> 00:11:49,680 Speaker 1: points out, to note that these these services are basically 196 00:11:50,120 --> 00:11:52,960 Speaker 1: neither good nor evil. They're just tools that can be 197 00:11:53,080 --> 00:11:56,480 Speaker 1: used for anything, right. Um. I mean in a lot 198 00:11:56,559 --> 00:11:59,680 Speaker 1: of cases, they're used to you know, communicate with friends 199 00:11:59,760 --> 00:12:04,880 Speaker 1: or or you know, used for consumers to find new deals. 200 00:12:04,880 --> 00:12:07,160 Speaker 1: That happens a lot on Twitter, especially you know, hey, 201 00:12:07,760 --> 00:12:11,040 Speaker 1: uh mentioned this tweet and get a thing, or to 202 00:12:11,160 --> 00:12:13,440 Speaker 1: disseminate news or to disseminate news. I mean, they can 203 00:12:13,480 --> 00:12:15,600 Speaker 1: be used for all kinds of things. Um. They can 204 00:12:15,640 --> 00:12:19,319 Speaker 1: also be used to communicate hate speech. Um. It's not 205 00:12:19,360 --> 00:12:22,160 Speaker 1: the again, it's not the tools fault. Yeah, no, it's 206 00:12:22,200 --> 00:12:25,920 Speaker 1: it's just it's just a medium of communication, right. So, 207 00:12:26,040 --> 00:12:29,920 Speaker 1: and and in the uh um Iranian elections and the 208 00:12:30,240 --> 00:12:34,120 Speaker 1: aftermath that followed, people were using uh these tools to 209 00:12:34,240 --> 00:12:39,000 Speaker 1: organize themselves and stay a step ahead of the authorities 210 00:12:39,000 --> 00:12:41,719 Speaker 1: who are trying to shut them down. So it was 211 00:12:41,840 --> 00:12:45,560 Speaker 1: very much like a flash mob might be again another 212 00:12:45,720 --> 00:12:47,920 Speaker 1: another something you can use these tools for that can 213 00:12:47,960 --> 00:12:50,920 Speaker 1: be a lot of fun um. But they were using 214 00:12:50,920 --> 00:12:54,320 Speaker 1: it basically to arrange to be in a certain place 215 00:12:54,360 --> 00:12:57,320 Speaker 1: at a certain time. They would meet, you know, they 216 00:12:57,320 --> 00:12:58,880 Speaker 1: would all take their own path to get there. They 217 00:12:58,920 --> 00:13:01,480 Speaker 1: would meet, they would do a demonstration, and then they 218 00:13:01,480 --> 00:13:04,240 Speaker 1: would leave to organize again in another location. And by 219 00:13:04,280 --> 00:13:06,959 Speaker 1: the time the authorities were able to catch up with them, 220 00:13:07,080 --> 00:13:09,360 Speaker 1: or they thought they would catch up with them, they 221 00:13:09,360 --> 00:13:12,560 Speaker 1: were gone. The crowd. Crowd had dispersed, and that wasn't 222 00:13:12,640 --> 00:13:15,400 Speaker 1: you know, I mean, And they were getting their point 223 00:13:15,440 --> 00:13:17,760 Speaker 1: across by getting a lot of media attention and and 224 00:13:18,120 --> 00:13:21,760 Speaker 1: showing solidarity that they were also being very careful not 225 00:13:21,840 --> 00:13:24,800 Speaker 1: to become an easy target, right right, And in the 226 00:13:24,960 --> 00:13:27,000 Speaker 1: in this case, you know, a lot of people in 227 00:13:27,040 --> 00:13:29,480 Speaker 1: the media said, this is a good thing. Look how 228 00:13:29,880 --> 00:13:32,560 Speaker 1: advanced this is, and how this wouldn't have been when 229 00:13:32,679 --> 00:13:35,840 Speaker 1: possible without it, And it really you would have had 230 00:13:35,880 --> 00:13:39,920 Speaker 1: to have met with everyone and agreed to everything upfront. 231 00:13:39,960 --> 00:13:43,360 Speaker 1: So no, technology is not essential to making this happen, 232 00:13:43,400 --> 00:13:45,839 Speaker 1: but it does make it a whole lot easier. And 233 00:13:46,760 --> 00:13:50,200 Speaker 1: that you again also raises the question of for for 234 00:13:51,240 --> 00:13:53,960 Speaker 1: especially for countries where you have civil disobedience in response 235 00:13:54,000 --> 00:13:56,760 Speaker 1: to some sort of oppressive government. However, you wanted to 236 00:13:56,800 --> 00:14:01,599 Speaker 1: find that the question comes comes up like, well, why 237 00:14:01,600 --> 00:14:04,480 Speaker 1: why now, right? Why does this happen now as opposed 238 00:14:04,480 --> 00:14:06,719 Speaker 1: to ten years ago? And part of that is that 239 00:14:06,840 --> 00:14:10,319 Speaker 1: technology has made it easier for people to organize these 240 00:14:10,400 --> 00:14:13,040 Speaker 1: kind of protests and to communicate with one another and 241 00:14:13,120 --> 00:14:17,080 Speaker 1: to get the word out so that the world at 242 00:14:17,160 --> 00:14:20,920 Speaker 1: large knows what's going on. It's not just a regional thing. 243 00:14:21,480 --> 00:14:23,560 Speaker 1: And so in a way you could say that technology 244 00:14:23,600 --> 00:14:27,640 Speaker 1: has helped uh these sort of things happen, but again 245 00:14:27,680 --> 00:14:30,120 Speaker 1: it's not it's just because technology is a tool that's 246 00:14:30,160 --> 00:14:32,400 Speaker 1: been used, and it's not that the desire wasn't there 247 00:14:32,400 --> 00:14:34,680 Speaker 1: ten years ago. It's just that maybe the opportunity was 248 00:14:35,400 --> 00:14:39,040 Speaker 1: had a higher barrier to it, and so getting over 249 00:14:39,080 --> 00:14:42,640 Speaker 1: that barrier was was what was preventing these sort of 250 00:14:43,160 --> 00:14:48,080 Speaker 1: uh outbreaks of civil disobedience if you prefer, from happening. Yeah, 251 00:14:48,080 --> 00:14:50,920 Speaker 1: these these tools are far more available to people now 252 00:14:50,960 --> 00:14:53,960 Speaker 1: than they were in the pasture. Um So now in 253 00:14:53,960 --> 00:14:57,640 Speaker 1: the case with the UK riots, that to differentiate them 254 00:14:57,680 --> 00:15:01,040 Speaker 1: between those and the political uh protests that we've seen 255 00:15:01,120 --> 00:15:04,280 Speaker 1: other places of the world. The big problem here is 256 00:15:04,280 --> 00:15:06,160 Speaker 1: that a lot of the people who are who have 257 00:15:06,200 --> 00:15:09,240 Speaker 1: been using these or at least the publicized uses of 258 00:15:09,560 --> 00:15:13,120 Speaker 1: social media and blackberries and things like that, have been 259 00:15:13,360 --> 00:15:18,640 Speaker 1: for people in the riots to coordinate attacks on certain businesses. 260 00:15:18,960 --> 00:15:20,920 Speaker 1: So essentially, what happens is you've got a couple of 261 00:15:20,920 --> 00:15:22,800 Speaker 1: people who are casing a place and they see that 262 00:15:22,840 --> 00:15:25,360 Speaker 1: there's not a very strong police presence in a particular 263 00:15:25,360 --> 00:15:27,840 Speaker 1: part of London, so they send out the word and 264 00:15:27,880 --> 00:15:30,400 Speaker 1: in that word gets sent out wider and wider and wider, 265 00:15:30,440 --> 00:15:32,040 Speaker 1: and then next thing you know, you've got a full, 266 00:15:32,600 --> 00:15:36,000 Speaker 1: full blown riot on your hands. People breaking into those 267 00:15:36,040 --> 00:15:39,520 Speaker 1: businesses because they know based on those messages that there's 268 00:15:39,560 --> 00:15:41,800 Speaker 1: not a real police presence, so there's not there's not 269 00:15:41,840 --> 00:15:45,480 Speaker 1: really much of a chance of getting caught, so they 270 00:15:45,520 --> 00:15:49,400 Speaker 1: take the advantage of the situation and they break in 271 00:15:49,480 --> 00:15:53,160 Speaker 1: and they looked essentially and uh, then you've got some 272 00:15:53,200 --> 00:15:57,320 Speaker 1: people who go even further than that, who are burning buildings, 273 00:15:57,760 --> 00:16:01,480 Speaker 1: which I can't even get into the psychology of that. 274 00:16:01,520 --> 00:16:04,200 Speaker 1: I mean, it's so foreign to me that not only 275 00:16:04,240 --> 00:16:10,360 Speaker 1: are you like, I don't understand the motivations behind it. 276 00:16:10,400 --> 00:16:12,680 Speaker 1: I don't know if it's anger. I don't know if 277 00:16:12,760 --> 00:16:17,400 Speaker 1: it's just something else that is really indefinable and I 278 00:16:17,440 --> 00:16:19,400 Speaker 1: can't pretend to understand. So I'm not really going to 279 00:16:19,520 --> 00:16:22,400 Speaker 1: go into it. But at any rate, UM, you've got 280 00:16:22,440 --> 00:16:26,440 Speaker 1: the the use of this technology to organize these uh 281 00:16:26,480 --> 00:16:29,680 Speaker 1: and organizes really kind of kind of too strong a word. 282 00:16:29,680 --> 00:16:32,080 Speaker 1: It's more like a call to arms saying, hey, guys, 283 00:16:32,120 --> 00:16:34,200 Speaker 1: if you want free stuff, come here and break in 284 00:16:34,240 --> 00:16:36,440 Speaker 1: and you can take it from this place. It's not 285 00:16:36,520 --> 00:16:40,040 Speaker 1: really so much organizing as it is just uh snatching 286 00:16:40,120 --> 00:16:43,720 Speaker 1: up an opportunity because the police are otherwise occupied and 287 00:16:43,760 --> 00:16:47,120 Speaker 1: you've got a very mobile group out there. I mean, 288 00:16:47,160 --> 00:16:49,520 Speaker 1: these are all for the most part, you know, if 289 00:16:49,520 --> 00:16:51,960 Speaker 1: you see the news, they all talk about being youths. 290 00:16:52,440 --> 00:16:55,080 Speaker 1: So they're young people, you know, in their teens and 291 00:16:55,120 --> 00:16:58,160 Speaker 1: twenties mostly. I've I've heard some as young as ten. 292 00:16:58,720 --> 00:17:01,640 Speaker 1: So you've got the yeah, young people who are in 293 00:17:01,680 --> 00:17:05,560 Speaker 1: a city that has a lot of UH ways of 294 00:17:05,560 --> 00:17:10,679 Speaker 1: getting around, particularly using the underground system that the tube. UM. 295 00:17:10,800 --> 00:17:14,560 Speaker 1: So there's been talking about possibly shutting down just the 296 00:17:14,560 --> 00:17:19,399 Speaker 1: the uh the cell networks around tube stations. So in 297 00:17:19,400 --> 00:17:22,000 Speaker 1: other words, turning those towers off or shutting it down 298 00:17:22,000 --> 00:17:25,160 Speaker 1: so that people can't communicate when they're near a tube station, 299 00:17:25,200 --> 00:17:27,720 Speaker 1: because part of it is that, you know, they want 300 00:17:27,720 --> 00:17:30,359 Speaker 1: to stay as mobile as possible so they can jump 301 00:17:30,400 --> 00:17:33,080 Speaker 1: on the next opportunity. And if you you know, so, 302 00:17:33,119 --> 00:17:35,720 Speaker 1: that means they're normally staying pretty close to the various 303 00:17:35,720 --> 00:17:37,480 Speaker 1: tube stations in order to be able to get to 304 00:17:37,520 --> 00:17:40,480 Speaker 1: whatever part of London is going to be the next target. 305 00:17:40,800 --> 00:17:42,960 Speaker 1: And if you shut that down then you really kind 306 00:17:42,960 --> 00:17:47,159 Speaker 1: of uh, the theory is that you would you would 307 00:17:47,160 --> 00:17:49,480 Speaker 1: silence them. The same sort of thing with some of 308 00:17:49,520 --> 00:17:53,040 Speaker 1: those social networks and the services. There's been some discussion 309 00:17:53,240 --> 00:17:57,359 Speaker 1: in British government about what to do about the the 310 00:17:57,400 --> 00:18:00,720 Speaker 1: text messaging and the BlackBerry messaging and and using social 311 00:18:00,760 --> 00:18:02,840 Speaker 1: networks like Twitter and Facebook. What do you do about 312 00:18:02,840 --> 00:18:06,160 Speaker 1: that and how do you stop those from being tools 313 00:18:06,320 --> 00:18:12,160 Speaker 1: of destruction? And uh, there's a lot of debate on that. Yeah, 314 00:18:12,160 --> 00:18:13,760 Speaker 1: I was I was gonna say, let's talk a little 315 00:18:13,760 --> 00:18:17,840 Speaker 1: bit about the tools specifically, UM, Facebook and Twitter sort 316 00:18:17,840 --> 00:18:20,760 Speaker 1: of no brainers, um, And they're easy for people to 317 00:18:20,840 --> 00:18:24,480 Speaker 1: use there, they're available via smartphones and and all sorts 318 00:18:24,520 --> 00:18:28,720 Speaker 1: of devices of course, UM, but they're not encrypted in 319 00:18:28,760 --> 00:18:33,119 Speaker 1: any way. UM. So it's it's easy enough to post 320 00:18:33,119 --> 00:18:35,879 Speaker 1: those messages, but it's also easy enough for people in 321 00:18:35,960 --> 00:18:39,560 Speaker 1: law enforcement to keep their eyes on it. UM. In fact, 322 00:18:39,640 --> 00:18:42,600 Speaker 1: I have seen some reports that went so far as 323 00:18:42,640 --> 00:18:48,919 Speaker 1: to suggest that they believe that people were posting messages 324 00:18:49,280 --> 00:18:54,720 Speaker 1: deliberately intended to mislead the authorities to going to another 325 00:18:54,760 --> 00:19:00,159 Speaker 1: location and then the real target was somewhere else that 326 00:19:00,200 --> 00:19:02,960 Speaker 1: they wanted to hit. UM, that the writers wanted to 327 00:19:03,000 --> 00:19:06,320 Speaker 1: attack UM. And I just I don't know whether that's 328 00:19:06,320 --> 00:19:08,800 Speaker 1: accurate or not. That was that that is a a 329 00:19:09,359 --> 00:19:11,160 Speaker 1: uh you know, I thought that they had had at 330 00:19:11,160 --> 00:19:12,600 Speaker 1: one point. And I just want to point out that 331 00:19:12,680 --> 00:19:15,399 Speaker 1: Facebook has said that, you know, their policy is that 332 00:19:15,440 --> 00:19:19,720 Speaker 1: they don't allow uh, hate speech or messages that condone 333 00:19:19,840 --> 00:19:22,840 Speaker 1: violence or or our call to violence or anything like 334 00:19:22,840 --> 00:19:25,560 Speaker 1: that on their network, so that if they, if anyone 335 00:19:26,000 --> 00:19:29,439 Speaker 1: working for Facebook sees that, they will remove that post. 336 00:19:30,000 --> 00:19:33,800 Speaker 1: So at least Facebook already is saying that, you know, uh, 337 00:19:33,960 --> 00:19:37,399 Speaker 1: we don't need government intervention necessarily because we already do 338 00:19:37,480 --> 00:19:40,920 Speaker 1: that this ourselves. So though one might wonder how effective 339 00:19:40,920 --> 00:19:43,240 Speaker 1: that can be, I mean, how this that that raises 340 00:19:43,320 --> 00:19:45,200 Speaker 1: another question that we'll get to in a minute about 341 00:19:45,200 --> 00:19:48,760 Speaker 1: how viable would a solution be to to limit or 342 00:19:48,800 --> 00:19:52,399 Speaker 1: shut down these social networking services. But that's we'll have 343 00:19:52,440 --> 00:19:55,879 Speaker 1: to get into that discussion before, I mean, after we 344 00:19:55,920 --> 00:20:00,720 Speaker 1: talk about all the different specific services, the most interesting 345 00:20:01,240 --> 00:20:06,720 Speaker 1: one to me as the BlackBerry messenger. UM. Apparently, according 346 00:20:06,760 --> 00:20:13,520 Speaker 1: to Offcom, Blackberries are more common phones among teens in 347 00:20:13,560 --> 00:20:17,320 Speaker 1: the United Kingdom between the ages of thirteen and eighteen. 348 00:20:17,400 --> 00:20:23,800 Speaker 1: It's more about thirty seven percent of kids have a BlackBerry. Now. 349 00:20:23,840 --> 00:20:27,840 Speaker 1: I think it's funny because again, on many occasions, you 350 00:20:27,920 --> 00:20:31,480 Speaker 1: and I have talked about how uh BlackBerry has been 351 00:20:31,520 --> 00:20:36,919 Speaker 1: sort of left behind by other handset manufacturers and and 352 00:20:37,440 --> 00:20:44,000 Speaker 1: operating system manufacturers, most specifically Android and Apple's iOS. But um, 353 00:20:44,040 --> 00:20:47,560 Speaker 1: you know, even the Windows phone is more of a 354 00:20:47,600 --> 00:20:51,640 Speaker 1: consumer device, so I don't think of the BlackBerry as 355 00:20:51,680 --> 00:20:55,400 Speaker 1: being a consumer device. But apparently it is especially popular 356 00:20:55,440 --> 00:20:57,760 Speaker 1: among this age group in the United Kingdom. And the 357 00:20:57,800 --> 00:21:03,120 Speaker 1: reason this is interesting is simply because the BlackBerry, since 358 00:21:03,160 --> 00:21:07,160 Speaker 1: it is intended originally to be uh an enterprise level 359 00:21:07,200 --> 00:21:14,000 Speaker 1: basically a corporate messaging service. Um it's encrypted, so uh, 360 00:21:14,080 --> 00:21:15,959 Speaker 1: you know, and you may not see that with the 361 00:21:16,040 --> 00:21:20,720 Speaker 1: text messaging UM on your local phone or smartphone. So 362 00:21:21,200 --> 00:21:25,399 Speaker 1: those messages are going over an encrypted private network Blackberries network, 363 00:21:26,000 --> 00:21:31,560 Speaker 1: and therefore the police cannot see what these people who 364 00:21:31,560 --> 00:21:34,400 Speaker 1: are using those devices are are saying. It could be 365 00:21:34,440 --> 00:21:38,000 Speaker 1: talking about, you know, anything, but they could also be 366 00:21:38,119 --> 00:21:43,760 Speaker 1: used for uh coordination of activities by people who are 367 00:21:43,800 --> 00:21:49,240 Speaker 1: involved with the riots. So um, the the British government 368 00:21:49,280 --> 00:21:53,280 Speaker 1: is particularly concerned about that. I have noticed, um, because 369 00:21:53,320 --> 00:21:56,360 Speaker 1: they cannot see what's going on now. Apparently there are 370 00:21:56,440 --> 00:21:59,320 Speaker 1: laws that say, um, you know they have said we 371 00:21:59,359 --> 00:22:03,960 Speaker 1: are in London is a very camera heavy city. Yeah. Um, 372 00:22:04,000 --> 00:22:07,520 Speaker 1: they're saying that, you know, we we can identify you, 373 00:22:07,920 --> 00:22:09,680 Speaker 1: and we can see that you are involved with this 374 00:22:09,960 --> 00:22:14,160 Speaker 1: and committing these acts. We will bring you to justice. Um. 375 00:22:14,200 --> 00:22:17,880 Speaker 1: Apparently there are some laws that say that, um, they 376 00:22:17,920 --> 00:22:23,320 Speaker 1: can't just subpoena all these messaging records without knowing in 377 00:22:23,400 --> 00:22:26,879 Speaker 1: fact that it is that person up front, and then 378 00:22:26,920 --> 00:22:29,880 Speaker 1: getting the phone records from that person to confirm whether 379 00:22:29,960 --> 00:22:32,200 Speaker 1: or not he or she was involved. Seems kind of interesting. 380 00:22:32,240 --> 00:22:34,680 Speaker 1: I know it's more complicated than that, but then you're 381 00:22:34,720 --> 00:22:38,320 Speaker 1: you're you're you're arguing like that. The argument seems to be, 382 00:22:38,720 --> 00:22:41,400 Speaker 1: you can't get the evidence that they did committed something 383 00:22:41,480 --> 00:22:44,160 Speaker 1: unless you can prove that they committed something already, which 384 00:22:44,160 --> 00:22:47,200 Speaker 1: is a catch twenty two, right, Um, unless you're just 385 00:22:47,240 --> 00:22:49,760 Speaker 1: saying that you wanted more corroborating evidence and you already 386 00:22:49,760 --> 00:22:54,320 Speaker 1: had plenty of evidence to start with, or the alternative 387 00:22:54,359 --> 00:22:57,440 Speaker 1: as you can say, Well, how how strict is that 388 00:22:57,520 --> 00:22:59,879 Speaker 1: if you get an accusation, is that enough for it 389 00:23:00,040 --> 00:23:03,920 Speaker 1: to be to to get a request for the information? Because, uh, 390 00:23:03,960 --> 00:23:05,399 Speaker 1: the way it's word it, it it sounds like you have 391 00:23:05,440 --> 00:23:07,760 Speaker 1: to have more than just an accusation, because otherwise otherwise 392 00:23:07,800 --> 00:23:11,760 Speaker 1: there's no there's no teeth to that at all, right right, um. 393 00:23:11,840 --> 00:23:14,960 Speaker 1: And and apparently Research in Motion, which is the Canadian 394 00:23:15,000 --> 00:23:18,240 Speaker 1: company that UH is behind the BlackBerry I said it 395 00:23:18,280 --> 00:23:23,000 Speaker 1: will cooperate with authorities, which UH caused a group of 396 00:23:23,240 --> 00:23:28,600 Speaker 1: hackers called Team Poison to UH take over the BlackBerry 397 00:23:28,600 --> 00:23:31,440 Speaker 1: blog basically break in, and they posted a message saying 398 00:23:31,440 --> 00:23:35,840 Speaker 1: that um if rim as Research in Motion is known 399 00:23:35,920 --> 00:23:40,080 Speaker 1: popularly UH cooperates with the police, then they will, you know, 400 00:23:40,280 --> 00:23:44,159 Speaker 1: stage an attack against. Team Poison also has a history 401 00:23:44,200 --> 00:23:47,880 Speaker 1: with other anti sec hacker groups like Anonymous and lull 402 00:23:47,960 --> 00:23:51,040 Speaker 1: sec Uh. They're in a way, they're almost like rivals 403 00:23:51,080 --> 00:23:54,119 Speaker 1: to lull sec Um. That's kind of that's probably putting 404 00:23:54,119 --> 00:23:56,600 Speaker 1: it a little too black and white. It's just like 405 00:23:56,640 --> 00:23:59,200 Speaker 1: any of these groups. It's kind of hazy because I mean, 406 00:23:59,240 --> 00:24:04,160 Speaker 1: the very each of the groups themselves are pretty crazy. Um. 407 00:24:04,200 --> 00:24:08,159 Speaker 1: And to add on to this, the the idea that 408 00:24:08,200 --> 00:24:11,960 Speaker 1: the government is looking into the possibility of of limiting 409 00:24:12,040 --> 00:24:15,960 Speaker 1: or shutting down these services has gathered a lot of 410 00:24:15,960 --> 00:24:19,120 Speaker 1: criticism early early on, and there are many reasons why 411 00:24:19,160 --> 00:24:25,120 Speaker 1: the criticisms have been directed at this this potential route 412 00:24:25,160 --> 00:24:28,240 Speaker 1: of action, which I should add, you know, the government 413 00:24:28,280 --> 00:24:30,600 Speaker 1: never said that it was going to do this, is 414 00:24:30,600 --> 00:24:34,560 Speaker 1: that it was looking at it, considering it, which means 415 00:24:34,560 --> 00:24:36,320 Speaker 1: that they could have come to the same conclusions that 416 00:24:36,400 --> 00:24:38,919 Speaker 1: everyone else has, or that a lot of the vocal 417 00:24:39,200 --> 00:24:42,119 Speaker 1: opponents have come to. One of those is just that, 418 00:24:42,960 --> 00:24:46,320 Speaker 1: you know, using this as a blanket approach means that 419 00:24:46,400 --> 00:24:50,440 Speaker 1: you are are eliminating the social rights of innocent people. 420 00:24:51,200 --> 00:24:52,800 Speaker 1: You know, if you were to just shut down these 421 00:24:52,800 --> 00:24:56,880 Speaker 1: services and the all all across the board, then innocent 422 00:24:56,920 --> 00:24:58,840 Speaker 1: people who have nothing to do with the riots would 423 00:24:58,840 --> 00:25:02,400 Speaker 1: also have that avenue of communication taken away from them, 424 00:25:02,440 --> 00:25:05,320 Speaker 1: and so that begins to raise a question of are 425 00:25:05,359 --> 00:25:08,920 Speaker 1: you violating the civil rights of innocent people? Uh? If 426 00:25:08,960 --> 00:25:11,760 Speaker 1: you are trying to identify people and block them based 427 00:25:11,840 --> 00:25:15,639 Speaker 1: upon the identity, that raises the question of how how 428 00:25:16,280 --> 00:25:20,520 Speaker 1: viable is this operation? Because one, you have to identify everyone, 429 00:25:20,520 --> 00:25:23,400 Speaker 1: so that's a huge job. Two you have to block them, 430 00:25:23,440 --> 00:25:25,040 Speaker 1: and then three you have to deal with the fact 431 00:25:25,080 --> 00:25:28,720 Speaker 1: that there are ways around bands and being blocked their 432 00:25:28,800 --> 00:25:33,159 Speaker 1: web proxies. They're changing your your IP address on your device, 433 00:25:33,240 --> 00:25:36,680 Speaker 1: there using other services that weren't covered under the band 434 00:25:36,760 --> 00:25:39,280 Speaker 1: in the first place. There's lots of different ways around it, 435 00:25:39,359 --> 00:25:42,000 Speaker 1: and it's like playing whack a mole. You know, on 436 00:25:42,040 --> 00:25:45,119 Speaker 1: the highest setting, you know, you knocked down one avenue 437 00:25:45,160 --> 00:25:49,160 Speaker 1: of communication, in five more sprung up, So it may 438 00:25:49,200 --> 00:25:52,439 Speaker 1: not even be viable unless again, unless you did an 439 00:25:52,440 --> 00:25:54,359 Speaker 1: all or nothing kind of approach. But in that case, 440 00:25:54,480 --> 00:25:57,159 Speaker 1: you're blanketing everyone. And then how do you respond to 441 00:25:57,240 --> 00:26:00,200 Speaker 1: how do you make an emergency phone call? If they've 442 00:26:00,200 --> 00:26:02,240 Speaker 1: shut down the cell phone system like it means that 443 00:26:02,480 --> 00:26:05,560 Speaker 1: you've cut down the communication of everybody, so it may 444 00:26:05,640 --> 00:26:09,880 Speaker 1: just not even be possible much less you can all 445 00:26:09,960 --> 00:26:15,720 Speaker 1: argue the social reasons, but just the technological UH implementation 446 00:26:16,000 --> 00:26:19,080 Speaker 1: is so complex that it may be off the board. Yeah, 447 00:26:19,119 --> 00:26:21,760 Speaker 1: there are just too many people, including the authorities, who 448 00:26:21,800 --> 00:26:25,560 Speaker 1: are relying on these networks UM for that to be feasible. 449 00:26:25,720 --> 00:26:27,360 Speaker 1: But I do want to before we get too far 450 00:26:27,400 --> 00:26:32,199 Speaker 1: into it. These and this is illustrative of h of 451 00:26:32,280 --> 00:26:36,000 Speaker 1: Michael's point to UM there are people who are using 452 00:26:36,119 --> 00:26:40,720 Speaker 1: the exact same services to organize cleanup efforts or even 453 00:26:40,760 --> 00:26:44,359 Speaker 1: to alert that there's trouble brewing. So in some cases 454 00:26:44,400 --> 00:26:46,680 Speaker 1: it's it's some cases you have people who are using 455 00:26:46,720 --> 00:26:50,640 Speaker 1: these same services saying, we need, you know, to bring 456 00:26:50,640 --> 00:26:52,879 Speaker 1: attention to this because there's trouble coming this way. And 457 00:26:52,880 --> 00:26:54,879 Speaker 1: then there's others who are saying, well, the troubles happened, 458 00:26:55,000 --> 00:26:59,560 Speaker 1: let's organize a clean up effort to deal with the damages. 459 00:27:00,040 --> 00:27:02,280 Speaker 1: And it's where you're getting that whole spirit of of 460 00:27:02,560 --> 00:27:04,920 Speaker 1: London and Spirit of UK kind of thing coming out, 461 00:27:05,359 --> 00:27:09,280 Speaker 1: where it's all these these community members banding together to 462 00:27:09,400 --> 00:27:14,359 Speaker 1: rebuild the communities after the destructive riots, and and some 463 00:27:14,440 --> 00:27:18,399 Speaker 1: of these riots have been yes, unthinkably destructive. I mean 464 00:27:18,400 --> 00:27:20,520 Speaker 1: I look at the pictures and I'm thinking this looks 465 00:27:20,560 --> 00:27:22,600 Speaker 1: like if you had shown this picture to me in 466 00:27:22,600 --> 00:27:24,159 Speaker 1: black and white, I would have said, oh, it's a 467 00:27:24,160 --> 00:27:27,160 Speaker 1: photo of London after the Blitz. I mean, that's how 468 00:27:27,200 --> 00:27:30,240 Speaker 1: bad some of these communities have been hit. Yeah, and 469 00:27:30,600 --> 00:27:33,080 Speaker 1: I've seen it compared UM just on some of the 470 00:27:33,119 --> 00:27:36,680 Speaker 1: people that I followed on social networks. You know, people 471 00:27:36,720 --> 00:27:39,479 Speaker 1: have said that it's sort of in cleaning it up. 472 00:27:39,480 --> 00:27:41,159 Speaker 1: It's sort of like the spirit of the Blitz, like 473 00:27:41,200 --> 00:27:45,400 Speaker 1: the you know, pushing back and and and helping clean 474 00:27:45,520 --> 00:27:48,480 Speaker 1: up UM. One one article that I had read on 475 00:27:48,520 --> 00:27:53,240 Speaker 1: the BBC news site UM mentioned Dan Thompson, who's an 476 00:27:53,320 --> 00:27:56,600 Speaker 1: artist and U. He started a Twitter account called at 477 00:27:56,720 --> 00:28:01,080 Speaker 1: riot clean Up UM, and Riot clean Up had when 478 00:28:01,080 --> 00:28:03,040 Speaker 1: I first checked it out, more than eighty six thousand 479 00:28:03,080 --> 00:28:06,080 Speaker 1: followers are down as of this recording to a little 480 00:28:06,160 --> 00:28:11,520 Speaker 1: under about eighty five UM, which suggests to me that 481 00:28:11,560 --> 00:28:14,920 Speaker 1: things may be quieting down a little bit. UM. But yeah, basically, 482 00:28:14,920 --> 00:28:17,600 Speaker 1: and it had spawned other groups to to start their 483 00:28:17,600 --> 00:28:20,040 Speaker 1: own riot clean ups and in other cities, not just 484 00:28:20,359 --> 00:28:24,399 Speaker 1: in London, but people were talking about specific areas where 485 00:28:24,920 --> 00:28:28,159 Speaker 1: UH people needed help UM cleaning up some of the 486 00:28:28,240 --> 00:28:32,000 Speaker 1: mess and the rubble from UH you know, buildings that 487 00:28:32,040 --> 00:28:36,560 Speaker 1: had been broken into and in some cases destroyed. UM. 488 00:28:36,760 --> 00:28:39,720 Speaker 1: And I think that generally what I had read was 489 00:28:39,800 --> 00:28:44,280 Speaker 1: that efforts like this had made people feel like, uh, 490 00:28:44,320 --> 00:28:47,120 Speaker 1: you know, the people a lot of it. Again, people 491 00:28:47,120 --> 00:28:51,160 Speaker 1: that I've read um about on social media were very 492 00:28:51,240 --> 00:28:55,040 Speaker 1: very disturbed and upset. Um, some going so far as 493 00:28:55,040 --> 00:28:56,760 Speaker 1: to say that they were not very proud of their 494 00:28:56,760 --> 00:29:01,560 Speaker 1: country because their uh, their countrymen were doing these things, um, 495 00:29:01,600 --> 00:29:04,840 Speaker 1: which is a very sad statement. UM. But I think 496 00:29:04,880 --> 00:29:07,000 Speaker 1: these kinds of things like the riot clean up account 497 00:29:07,200 --> 00:29:11,120 Speaker 1: are doing a lot to help people feel like they 498 00:29:11,120 --> 00:29:14,240 Speaker 1: can rally and and feel better about themselves and about 499 00:29:14,280 --> 00:29:16,640 Speaker 1: the areas they live in and take care of some 500 00:29:16,720 --> 00:29:20,920 Speaker 1: of the things that were damaged. Um. And hopefully to 501 00:29:20,920 --> 00:29:24,360 Speaker 1: to not give the sense to people who don't use 502 00:29:24,400 --> 00:29:29,480 Speaker 1: Twitter or Facebook or these higher technology uh services that no, 503 00:29:29,600 --> 00:29:32,080 Speaker 1: they're not all you know, they can be used for 504 00:29:32,120 --> 00:29:35,239 Speaker 1: good things, you know, because yeah, I mean, something like 505 00:29:35,280 --> 00:29:39,200 Speaker 1: this gets pressed and people who don't use them don't 506 00:29:39,280 --> 00:29:42,640 Speaker 1: understand that, you know, the technology is not necessarily to 507 00:29:42,720 --> 00:29:47,120 Speaker 1: blame but can be used to enable those people. If 508 00:29:47,160 --> 00:29:49,800 Speaker 1: we took the technology out of this story entirely, the 509 00:29:49,840 --> 00:29:53,040 Speaker 1: thing They're probably still would have been riots, they just 510 00:29:53,240 --> 00:29:57,080 Speaker 1: may not have been as intense and as numerous as 511 00:29:57,120 --> 00:30:00,720 Speaker 1: they have been over the last few days. Um, it 512 00:30:00,800 --> 00:30:03,840 Speaker 1: certainly enabled people to be more agile in their mood. Rights, right, yeah, 513 00:30:03,840 --> 00:30:07,200 Speaker 1: the technology aided, but it did not cause this, and 514 00:30:07,480 --> 00:30:12,040 Speaker 1: the and to suggest otherwise as being pretty naive and shortsighted. Um. 515 00:30:12,160 --> 00:30:17,600 Speaker 1: The the takeaway I get is that what you need 516 00:30:17,680 --> 00:30:21,760 Speaker 1: to do is look at the underlying problems that allowed 517 00:30:21,760 --> 00:30:25,880 Speaker 1: this situation to even start, and it may very well 518 00:30:25,920 --> 00:30:29,120 Speaker 1: be that there is no solution to those underlying problems. 519 00:30:29,240 --> 00:30:32,360 Speaker 1: It might well be that the problems that exist are 520 00:30:33,280 --> 00:30:39,880 Speaker 1: so so ingrained in our society that there's no real 521 00:30:39,920 --> 00:30:44,200 Speaker 1: way to solve them, which is is unfortunate. It's also 522 00:30:44,840 --> 00:30:48,280 Speaker 1: possibly true, but without actually looking at it, we can't 523 00:30:48,320 --> 00:30:51,360 Speaker 1: really come to that conclusion. And to just jump on 524 00:30:51,440 --> 00:30:56,360 Speaker 1: the technology aspect of this story is to ignore the 525 00:30:56,560 --> 00:31:04,120 Speaker 1: deeper causes that are fueling the riots in the first place. Right. So, yeah, 526 00:31:04,160 --> 00:31:06,200 Speaker 1: the technology part is a problem. I mean, you want 527 00:31:06,400 --> 00:31:08,840 Speaker 1: the government has to do something right, and in fact, 528 00:31:08,880 --> 00:31:11,000 Speaker 1: by the time when we're recording this podcast, they're already 529 00:31:11,320 --> 00:31:14,000 Speaker 1: been some pretty significant strides and the riots do seem 530 00:31:14,080 --> 00:31:18,040 Speaker 1: to be uh to be calming down now, it's seem 531 00:31:18,080 --> 00:31:22,040 Speaker 1: to be under control. But the government had was in 532 00:31:22,120 --> 00:31:25,280 Speaker 1: a tough position because it had to respond. It had 533 00:31:25,280 --> 00:31:28,520 Speaker 1: all these innocent people who are being targeted and through 534 00:31:28,520 --> 00:31:31,520 Speaker 1: no fault of their own, and they had very few 535 00:31:32,840 --> 00:31:37,440 Speaker 1: uh resources at their disposal to be able to respond 536 00:31:37,480 --> 00:31:40,120 Speaker 1: to the this issue. And one of the you know, 537 00:31:40,240 --> 00:31:45,200 Speaker 1: they're looking for a quick and and relatively easy solution 538 00:31:45,320 --> 00:31:48,560 Speaker 1: to a very complex problem. And I'm not saying that 539 00:31:48,800 --> 00:31:51,920 Speaker 1: the government was just focusing on technology or just focusing 540 00:31:51,920 --> 00:31:54,360 Speaker 1: on a quick solution, but that was one of the 541 00:31:54,400 --> 00:31:57,480 Speaker 1: things they had. The government had to consider. So, you know, 542 00:31:57,560 --> 00:31:59,680 Speaker 1: when you're looking at something as widespread as that and 543 00:31:59,720 --> 00:32:05,000 Speaker 1: so apparently out of control, and and it's due to 544 00:32:05,400 --> 00:32:09,600 Speaker 1: very complex factors that are have been boiling up for generations, 545 00:32:10,760 --> 00:32:13,520 Speaker 1: there's no real easy solution in the first place. So 546 00:32:13,800 --> 00:32:17,120 Speaker 1: I think I think one the government said that they 547 00:32:17,120 --> 00:32:20,120 Speaker 1: were looking at that, I think if they had thought 548 00:32:20,120 --> 00:32:23,000 Speaker 1: about it a little bit longer or talked with some experts, 549 00:32:23,000 --> 00:32:25,720 Speaker 1: they would have realized very quickly that that that shutting 550 00:32:25,720 --> 00:32:28,800 Speaker 1: this down is not really a viable choice. Um And 551 00:32:28,880 --> 00:32:32,240 Speaker 1: to the media jumping on the announcement. I think that 552 00:32:32,360 --> 00:32:34,800 Speaker 1: made it more than what it was as far as 553 00:32:34,840 --> 00:32:37,560 Speaker 1: that the technology aspect and what to do about it 554 00:32:37,600 --> 00:32:40,800 Speaker 1: is concerned. It drew a lot of attention to it 555 00:32:40,960 --> 00:32:44,080 Speaker 1: and probably made more of a mountain out of it 556 00:32:44,120 --> 00:32:45,640 Speaker 1: than it should have been. But at the same time, 557 00:32:45,680 --> 00:32:48,080 Speaker 1: I mean, it was very obvious that the technology was 558 00:32:48,080 --> 00:32:49,800 Speaker 1: playing a role. I mean, there's no way of getting 559 00:32:49,840 --> 00:32:53,360 Speaker 1: around it. It's just that again, Uh, if the technology 560 00:32:53,360 --> 00:32:55,360 Speaker 1: hadn't been there, I think we would have still seen 561 00:32:55,600 --> 00:32:58,440 Speaker 1: a disturbance, it just wouldn't have been as coordinated. So 562 00:32:59,040 --> 00:33:03,200 Speaker 1: you can't you shutting down the means of communication wouldn't 563 00:33:03,320 --> 00:33:07,800 Speaker 1: necessarily solve any problems. So thank you so much Michael 564 00:33:07,840 --> 00:33:10,520 Speaker 1: for for sending that question in. And I mean, I 565 00:33:10,600 --> 00:33:12,400 Speaker 1: think this is a good companion piece to our other 566 00:33:12,400 --> 00:33:18,080 Speaker 1: one about using technology in various forms of protests UM, 567 00:33:18,120 --> 00:33:21,040 Speaker 1: because this is kind of like the the opposite right, 568 00:33:21,200 --> 00:33:25,240 Speaker 1: using them in order to cause uh damage and maybe 569 00:33:25,280 --> 00:33:28,480 Speaker 1: for personal gain, as opposed to trying to actually make 570 00:33:28,680 --> 00:33:31,680 Speaker 1: social and political changes. Because I get the feeling that 571 00:33:31,720 --> 00:33:34,640 Speaker 1: these riots really didn't have a goal outside of mayhem 572 00:33:34,720 --> 00:33:38,880 Speaker 1: and looting, UM, at least not one that was clear 573 00:33:38,960 --> 00:33:44,320 Speaker 1: to the average observer. I know that I'm still struggling 574 00:33:44,320 --> 00:33:46,960 Speaker 1: to understand it, and I probably will for quite some time. 575 00:33:47,480 --> 00:33:52,400 Speaker 1: Uh so, great question. If you guys have any suggestions 576 00:33:52,440 --> 00:33:55,680 Speaker 1: for future tech Stuff topics, we highly recommend you get 577 00:33:55,680 --> 00:33:57,760 Speaker 1: in touch with us and let us know. You can 578 00:33:57,800 --> 00:34:00,080 Speaker 1: find us on Twitter and Facebook, assuming you're going but 579 00:34:00,200 --> 00:34:03,719 Speaker 1: hasn't blocked it. Uh. The handle there is tech Stuff 580 00:34:04,000 --> 00:34:07,880 Speaker 1: hs W, and you can email us. Our address is 581 00:34:08,160 --> 00:34:11,040 Speaker 1: tech stuff at how stuff Works dot com. Chris and 582 00:34:11,040 --> 00:34:15,759 Speaker 1: I will talk to you again really soon. Be sure 583 00:34:15,760 --> 00:34:18,680 Speaker 1: to check out our new video podcast, Stuff from the Future. 584 00:34:19,040 --> 00:34:21,359 Speaker 1: Join how Stuff Work staff as we explore the most 585 00:34:21,360 --> 00:34:26,200 Speaker 1: promising and perplexing possibilities of tomorrow. The How Stuff Works 586 00:34:26,200 --> 00:34:34,280 Speaker 1: iPhone app has arrived. Download it today on iTunes, brought 587 00:34:34,280 --> 00:34:37,480 Speaker 1: to you by the reinvented two thousand twelve camera. It's ready, 588 00:34:37,640 --> 00:34:38,080 Speaker 1: are you