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Speaker 1: Ah, it's it could happen here a podcast about things

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Speaker 1: falling apart, and today I'm I'm happy that we're we're

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Speaker 1: recording this right now, James and Garrison, because we all

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Speaker 1: just got a historic example of something falling apart. Elon

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Speaker 1: Musk's Big silly rocket. We're recording this about a day

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Speaker 1: or so after it exploded in mid air over the

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Speaker 1: Gulf Coast, showering a turtle sanctuary with toxic waste. It's

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Speaker 1: such a such a fun news.

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Speaker 2: It's comically perfect.

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Speaker 1: It is. Really, it is pretty cool.

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Speaker 2: Perfect unless it crash landed in a kitten farm. That

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Speaker 2: couldn't really be Yeah perfect, No, I mean it. What's

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Speaker 2: nice is that it's given me. It's made me feel

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Speaker 2: young again because when I was a wee lad, I

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Speaker 2: was attending a speech a debate rally in Cooper, Texas,

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Speaker 2: when the last Space Shuttle to explode exploded directly over us,

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Speaker 2: blowing out a bunch of the windows in the building

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Speaker 2: and raining.

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Speaker 1: Yeah, yeah, it was, it was. It was. Yeah. So

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Speaker 1: I whenever whenever a Space shuttle explodes over of some sort,

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Speaker 1: explodes over Texas, I get powerful nostalgia.

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Speaker 2: Well, they they slipped the surly bonds of Verse to

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Speaker 2: blow out the windows in a high school in Kobe, Texas.

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Speaker 1: That's that's how the line goes. It makes me think

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Speaker 1: of all the other things I was doing that day,

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Speaker 1: which was namely playing Lord of the Rings risk in

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Speaker 1: a high school gym as we as we were wont

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Speaker 1: to do great game, one of the better, one of

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Speaker 1: the better risk covers. What are we talking about today, friendos, buddies,

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Speaker 1: well shaple pals.

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Speaker 2: Yeah, we're talking.

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Speaker 3: About talking about one one man having having a fun

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Speaker 3: time on Discord dot com.

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Speaker 1: Yeah, doing the human equivalent of being a space ship

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Speaker 1: that explodes in the sky.

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Speaker 3: Yes, I suppose Discord's not really a dot com. It's

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Speaker 3: it's more, it's more, it's more of a more of

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Speaker 3: an application now, but yes, it is what.

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Speaker 2: Good Discord and that I'm permanently banned from.

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Speaker 1: Please what did you do to Discord? You get from Discord?

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Speaker 1: I should a video?

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Speaker 4: Who's on Discord?

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Speaker 1: Right? Like the worst people?

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Speaker 4: All of the worst people?

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Speaker 3: You know.

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Speaker 2: We tried to start a Discord for the fundraising live show,

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Speaker 2: and I tried with several emails, and every time it

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Speaker 2: came back with ban evasion.

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Speaker 4: Wow, that is extremely funny James.

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Speaker 2: Yeah, I posted with chickens and it has never forgiven me.

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Speaker 1: Wow. Well, I mean, you know, those chickens didn't consent

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Speaker 1: and they were technically naked, so I think it does

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Speaker 1: count as revenge point.

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Speaker 2: My chickens are always close. Little chicken pe.

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Speaker 1: Oh yeah, you're one of the pansies. There's a big

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Speaker 1: conflict in chicken owners and James has taken aside. So

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Speaker 1: we're talking this week about the discord, and this is

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Speaker 1: one of those things we came into this kind of

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Speaker 1: debating how much detail to go into. But when we

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Speaker 1: brought this up, like this is something that gare, James

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Speaker 1: and I is like a major thing in our bubble

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Speaker 1: for the last like week, so we've all been following it.

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Speaker 1: But when we brought this up in the work chat,

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Speaker 1: Daniel had no idea that this had gone on. So

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Speaker 1: we're going to start with a pretty basic overview of

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Speaker 1: what what people are calling the largest leak of top

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Speaker 1: secret US military and defense data since you know Snowden.

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Speaker 1: So we're we're going to go over all of that

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Speaker 1: right now. I think I want to start by talking

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Speaker 1: about an MMO RPG called war Thunder.

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Speaker 2: This is a can you break down MMO RPG for

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Speaker 2: those of us.

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Speaker 1: It's it's a it's like World of Warcraft. It's a

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Speaker 1: big video game that is play you play online with

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Speaker 1: a bunch of strangers. It's a free game. You use

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Speaker 1: like modern military weapons to like fight other players. And

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Speaker 1: it's kind of well known for having extremely realistic renderings

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Speaker 1: and sort of depictions of the functionality of modern tanks

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Speaker 1: and armored transports and fighter planes and naval vessels. Right so,

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Speaker 1: and it's like it's it's a game for war nerds, right,

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Speaker 1: Like you utilize like radar in a way that's broadly realistic,

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Speaker 1: Like if you shoot, you know, if one tank shoots

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Speaker 1: in another, the tank's weaponry works the way it's supposed

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Speaker 1: to be in the real world. The armor is vulnerable

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Speaker 1: where it's vulnerable in the real world. And this is

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Speaker 1: like the appeal to the kind of nerds who play

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Speaker 1: this game, and as you might guess, from a bunch

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Speaker 1: of people who really want to, like in the most

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Speaker 1: realistic way possible render and fight each other with modern

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Speaker 1: military vehicles. A significant number of these dudes are members

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Speaker 1: of various different like defense departments, right or at least

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Speaker 1: are employed in some degree of various different national military

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Speaker 1: forces several different As a result, like when arguments happen,

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Speaker 1: you know, with any MMORPG, if you're playing like World

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Speaker 1: of Warcraft right and like something gets nerved or something

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Speaker 1: isn't working as well as it's supposed to, you'll get

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Speaker 1: these like massive threads in the forums where people are

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Speaker 1: like arguing about how something needs to be changed or

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Speaker 1: changed back, or how there's a glitch or whatever. And

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Speaker 1: because war Thunder is so based in realism, when you

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Speaker 1: have these arguments online, it's often like, well, you know,

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Speaker 1: the F fifteen shouldn't work this way, it should work

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Speaker 1: this way, and people will get into arguments about that,

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Speaker 1: and then someone will as happened like a couple of

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Speaker 1: weeks ago, I think one we'll post sensitive information about

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Speaker 1: the F fifteen strike Egle in order to like prove

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Speaker 1: that it would function the way that they are arguing

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Speaker 1: it should function in this forum debate. That happened earlier

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Speaker 1: this year, and I think with the F fifteen, it

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Speaker 1: wasn't technically top secret information. It was information that US

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Speaker 1: citizens were allowed to have but not allowed to post

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Speaker 1: online because that's a violation of something called ear which

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Speaker 1: is a thing that governs the export essentially of military

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Speaker 1: information and technology. But on another situation, I think, like

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Speaker 1: a year or so ago information of it. I believe

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Speaker 1: the F twenty two was posted that was extremely sensitive,

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Speaker 1: that was like top secret. And these are again like

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Speaker 1: some dude who's got some sort of military job and

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Speaker 1: has a clearance and thinks that the right way to

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Speaker 1: use it is arguing about the video game War Thunder.

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Speaker 1: These are not just Americans. I want to be clear

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Speaker 1: about that. In July of twenty twenty one, there was

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Speaker 1: a player arguing about a Challenger two tank who claimed

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Speaker 1: to have been a former tank commander with the British Army,

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Speaker 1: and he shared information from the Army Equipment Support publication.

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Speaker 1: The information had been labeled unclassified, but it was actually classified.

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Speaker 1: And other lakes has been a little more gall A

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Speaker 1: French Army soldier leaked information on the Clerk main battle

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Speaker 1: tank that was top secret, and a Chinese user leaked

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Speaker 1: capabilities of the Chinese Armies DTC ten one hundred and

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Speaker 1: twenty five millimeters anti tank round that should not have

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Speaker 1: been leaked. So this shit keeps happening in war Thunder.

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Speaker 1: It's like a joke like the war th Under account

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Speaker 1: when these discord leaks happened a week or so ago,

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Speaker 1: like joked about it. But like the thing that the

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Speaker 1: game is known for, Yeah, is these like different people

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Speaker 1: in different national defense apparati can't stop themselves from like

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Speaker 1: leaking stop secret info about vehicles.

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Speaker 2: It's very funny. It gets the only reason I know

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Speaker 2: why war th Under exists. I think it's the only

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Speaker 2: reason why we know a decent amount of what like

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Speaker 2: by we here and meaning that could like I guess

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Speaker 2: Western militries no, which of course we are all members of.

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Speaker 2: No about the Russian main battle tanks is from war

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Speaker 2: th Under leaks.

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Speaker 1: Yeah, very funny.

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Speaker 5: Yeah, and you have to assume I would be surprised

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Speaker 5: if no one had tried just like having you know,

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Speaker 5: an agent from a national security agency in uh oh,

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Speaker 5: for sure they're trying to like be like trying to

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Speaker 5: like provoke arguments about Chinese tanks or whatever.

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Speaker 1: I'd be shocked if that hasn't happened.

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Speaker 2: Yeah, Like the overlap between like people who might play

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Speaker 2: warth Under anyway and people who might work for a

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Speaker 2: national security agency, like those Van diagrams are.

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Speaker 1: A circle, yeah, exactly, So it's one of those things

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Speaker 1: where this happens a bunch on war thunder, but it's

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Speaker 1: just kind of something that people joke about because these

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Speaker 1: leaks like they're meaningful, I guess to like militaries care

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Speaker 1: about them, but like you sitting at home, you hear like, oh, hey,

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Speaker 1: details of like the couple of construction of the new

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Speaker 1: abrams like models as leak. That's not like the same

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Speaker 1: as I don't know, Chelsea Manning leaking information about like

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Speaker 1: war crimes by the US military in Iraq, or Edward

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Speaker 1: Snowden leaking info about like the NSSA, Like it's a

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Speaker 1: little less relevant to most. What we started seeing a

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Speaker 1: couple of weeks ago is documents top secret labeled documents,

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Speaker 1: like actual pictures of straight up unredacted top secret US

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Speaker 1: Defense Department documents just kind of filtering out over various discords,

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Speaker 1: and they were kind of appearing in random little bits.

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Speaker 1: You'd see one that was like an update on the

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Speaker 1: war in Ukraine that was kind of showing concerns that

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Speaker 1: the US military had about the ability of the Ukrainian

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Speaker 1: military to carry out the counter offensive that everybody's expecting

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Speaker 1: in the near future. You had like casualty estimates from

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Speaker 1: the US military. Another document that was leak had like

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Speaker 1: a bunch of information inside the Russian General staff. So

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Speaker 1: these are number one, very serious leaks, right you're talking about,

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Speaker 1: especially with the leaks from inside Putin's kind of inner circle.

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Speaker 1: You're talking about leaks that could potentially expose a major

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Speaker 1: US source inside the Russian government. And you're also talking

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Speaker 1: about leaks that just kind of reveal the degree to

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Speaker 1: which the CIA has an enormous amount of information apparently

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Speaker 1: at least about what's happening inside the Kremlin. You know.

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Speaker 1: So these are very significant leaks, but they didn't appear.

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Speaker 1: They weren't being like you know, kind of filtered out

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Speaker 1: and released by an agency like Wiki leaks, They weren't

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Speaker 1: being sent to journalists. They were just kind of showing

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Speaker 1: up in these you know, Discord is basically a series

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Speaker 1: of chat rooms, and they were just kind of showing

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Speaker 1: up in different discords. So this is, you know, a mystery,

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Speaker 1: and it's the kind of mystery that like a certain

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Speaker 1: kind of person who is extremely online is not going

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Speaker 1: to be able to get out of their head and

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Speaker 1: is going to kind of try to trace back to

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Speaker 1: its origin and in the case of this specific mystery.

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Speaker 1: The nerd who could not get it out of their

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Speaker 1: head and decided to trace it back to its origin

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Speaker 1: was my former boss at Bellingcat, Eric Tohler. Eric is

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Speaker 1: a very nice guy, probably the most talented and skilled

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Speaker 1: researcher that I've ever met in my life. And you know,

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Speaker 1: Eric started seeing these, like everyone else, these top secret documents,

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Speaker 1: and was like, where the fuck are these coming from?

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Speaker 1: And this is one of those things we'll talk about.

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Speaker 1: It's become extremely controversial among a certain set of people

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Speaker 1: in the day since. But when this kind of started,

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Speaker 1: Number one, you can't really deny there was an intense

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Speaker 1: public interest in figuring out what the origin point of

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Speaker 1: these was, because that was the only way to figure

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Speaker 1: out are the these actual leaks. When you see something

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Speaker 1: that's just like listed as a top secret document randomly

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Speaker 1: on the internet, if you call up the US government

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Speaker 1: and you say, hey, is this real top secret in

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Speaker 1: They're not going to say yes, right Like, you don't

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Speaker 1: get that response from them, I mean.

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Speaker 3: And especially right now with all of like the AI

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Speaker 3: chat generation tools, generating fake documents is one of the

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Speaker 3: main things people are doing for disinfo. Generating like fake

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Speaker 3: soce fake documents. Of course, you can like edit things

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Speaker 3: the further to like make them seem more realistic. But yes,

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Speaker 3: someone who was extremely curious is going to wonder if

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Speaker 3: this is actually like a real thing or if this

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Speaker 3: is just some like bullshit prank or something.

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Speaker 1: And there were edits of these documents did also go violin.

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Speaker 1: In fact, Tucker Carlson, one of the original documents shows

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Speaker 1: kind of US estimates for killed in action on Ukraine's

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Speaker 1: on the Ukrainian side and on the Russian side in

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Speaker 1: the war. Obviously, it showed more Russian casualties than Ukrainian casualties,

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Speaker 1: which is consistent with all previous reporting, but the edit

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Speaker 1: of it showed something like many times as many Ukrainian

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Speaker 1: dead as Russian dead, which is, you know, something that

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Speaker 1: was valuable for the people who are trying to argue that,

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Speaker 1: like this war is unwinnable on behalf of the Ukrainians.

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Speaker 1: Guys like Tucker Carlson, who covered the leaks on his

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Speaker 1: show and knowingly used the fake edit of the league,

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Speaker 1: I can't imagine. I have to assume it was knowingly

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Speaker 1: because it had been very well exposed by that point.

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Speaker 1: So there's really no other explanation I think. But anyway,

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Speaker 1: the fact that there were edits of these documents that

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Speaker 1: were not legitimate going around, it's just kind of part

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Speaker 1: of why there was a legitimate public interest in trying

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Speaker 1: to figure out where the fuck are these things coming from.

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Speaker 1: Eric is again an extremely good researcher, and through a

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Speaker 1: mix of open source intelligence and eventually just kind of

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Speaker 1: like calling up people and talking to them, he found

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Speaker 1: what appeared to be the source of these leaks, which

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Speaker 1: was an invitation only clubhouse on discord of like thirty

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Speaker 1: ish people, most of whom were teenagers. Over time, it

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Speaker 1: kind of became clear that this group was a bunch

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Speaker 1: of kind of young people who had gotten together during

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Speaker 1: the pandemic to talk about, you know, games. These guys

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Speaker 1: are all gamers. Most of them were like kids in

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Speaker 1: high school. They kind of were cut off from their friends,

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Speaker 1: so they wanted a place to be social. They would

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Speaker 1: share memes, including like extremely racist, you know, borderline Nazi shit.

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Speaker 1: They would like watch movies over and like chat over

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Speaker 1: kind of the voice app. They were all what you

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Speaker 1: call trad cats, which is like basically weirdo Catholic fundamentalists,

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Speaker 1: like I think a lot of them deny Vatican two,

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Speaker 1: that sort of shit. It's like a whole thing. A

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Speaker 1: lot of them were that at least, so there were

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Speaker 1: a lot of like praying in anyway, a bunch of weirdos.

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Speaker 1: And the head of this group of weirdos was the

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Speaker 1: oldest of them, a guy who was known on like

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Speaker 1: in the discord as og and Og. He's a was

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Speaker 1: you know, in the Land of the teenagers, the person

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Speaker 1: in their early twenties who can buy an AR fifteen

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Speaker 1: is king. And so this guy is in his early twenties.

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Speaker 1: He's in the military, which he talks about. He posts

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Speaker 1: videos of him like shooting guns and like you know,

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Speaker 1: saying racial slurs and like signposting to these like you know,

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Speaker 1: weird memes and stuff that they're all into, which to

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Speaker 1: them like makes him seem extremely cool. Right. It's one

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Speaker 1: of those things when you kind of read the different

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Speaker 1: coverage of this, it's there's a little bit of like

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Speaker 1: weird culty stuff going on. I don't know if I'd

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Speaker 1: say that it was a cult in more than just like.

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Speaker 4: In every discord server is a cult exactly.

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Speaker 1: The insular online communities like this very often reproduce aspects

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Speaker 1: of cult dynamics.

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Speaker 6: Right, Hey, everybody, Robert here.

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Speaker 1: We had a little audio error obviously in the recording.

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Speaker 1: I wanted to clarify this section because it was kind

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Speaker 1: of garbled. The name of the discord server they were

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Speaker 1: in was thug Shaker Central, which is potentially a reference

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Speaker 1: to one of a couple of things. You'll find some

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Speaker 1: disagreement about this online, but it's not really relevant. That's

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Speaker 1: the discord name that they've worked under. You get, like

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Speaker 1: the overall point of this, it's a bunch of like

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Speaker 1: kids who are fans of games. They're fans of like

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Speaker 1: this this YouTuber Oxide. It's like a little group of

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Speaker 1: dudes who got together via fandom and the pandemic and

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Speaker 1: over the course of years developed like a shared culture.

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Speaker 1: And part of the shared culture is this guy og

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Speaker 1: who's the older one of them, you know, trying to

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Speaker 1: keep them aware of what he thought was important about

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Speaker 1: kind of global politics, and that particularly included aspects of

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Speaker 1: like battlefield conditions in Ukraine, information about North Korean ballistic missiles,

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Speaker 1: all of this kind of stuff that he had access

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Speaker 1: to because spoilers. He was in an Air National Guard

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Speaker 1: wing as an intelligence and like it was in the

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Speaker 1: intelligence sector of like an air National Guard ring, and

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Speaker 1: he had a security classification, right, And once this all

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Speaker 1: got revealed, people are like, why the fuck is a

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Speaker 1: twenty one year old because that's this guy's age have

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Speaker 1: access to top secret data, And everyone who knows anything

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Speaker 1: about the way our government classifies information was like, most

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Speaker 1: of the people access are like twenty Yeah, fights are

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Speaker 1: wars fifty year olds.

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Speaker 2: Yeah, I think it does genuinely like you know, like

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Speaker 2: if we've been around war and conflict of the people

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Speaker 2: who do it quite long, I think most people would

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Speaker 2: be genuinely burn away that most people doing it are children.

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Speaker 1: Yeah, And this has caused like obviously some problems before

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Speaker 1: for the Defense Department, but it's also like it's kind

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Speaker 1: of a thorny problem because like most of your workforce

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Speaker 1: are always going to be young kids. These are spoilers

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Speaker 1: shitty jobs often and that's the only one who will

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Speaker 1: do a.

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Speaker 6: Lot of them.

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Speaker 1: And also, just like if you're fighting a war, most

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Speaker 1: of the people you have that are going to be

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Speaker 1: tasked with field intelligence are going to be in this age.

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Speaker 1: And see, it's not at all weird that this guy

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Speaker 1: had access to this shit. What is weird is that.

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Speaker 1: So he starts off kind of like arguing, you know,

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Speaker 1: sometimes he'll bring up stuff that he knows that's from

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Speaker 1: classified documents while he's arguing, you know, about the war

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Speaker 1: in Ukraine or whatever with these friends online, and then

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Speaker 1: he starts doing like a series of regular updates where

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Speaker 1: he'll basically he'll type out details from like a bunch

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Speaker 1: of different top secret documents and these massive, long and

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Speaker 1: apparently kind of hard to read posts, and he'll just

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Speaker 1: like post them into the chat to kind of keep

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Speaker 1: his friends abreast of what he thinks is, you know, important.

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Speaker 1: But he gets frustrated over time that like they're not

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Speaker 1: reading this shit because it's really boring and like kind

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Speaker 1: of weird to just infoed up top secret info, and

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Speaker 1: they don't. These kids don't again, like these other folks

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Speaker 1: are like in high school. They don't really realize where

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Speaker 1: he's getting the info or what he has, but they do.

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Speaker 1: The folks who do pay attention recognize over time that

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Speaker 1: like stuff will happen in the real world that corresponds

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Speaker 1: to something, and he posted a couple of weeks ago

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Speaker 1: and they're like, wow, he seems to have like actually

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Speaker 1: really good information. Eventually, og gets frustrated because he's not

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Speaker 1: no one's paying attention to his posts, so he starts

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Speaker 1: taking photos of just the top secret documents themselves and

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Speaker 1: posting them in the discord day.

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Speaker 2: Amazing.

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Speaker 1: Now this is unbelievably illegal.

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Speaker 2: Yeah, he really crossed a line there. I just don't

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Speaker 2: believe it would be dumb by the way it was

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Speaker 2: illegal before, but this is really illegal in terms of

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Speaker 2: like allowing yourself making it so much easier for the

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Speaker 2: consequences of you're fucking around to find you like that.

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Speaker 2: He crushed the rubicon right there.

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Speaker 3: Yeah, so, and and now we have to face the

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Speaker 3: hard question is this guy an illegalist king or is

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Speaker 3: he more problematic? And this is this is the question

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Speaker 3: that we have to actually focus on now stop because

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Speaker 3: it is. It is, on one hand, pretty funny. It's

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Speaker 3: exceedingly funny.

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Speaker 1: There's zero argument there among people who aren't shiptheads. It's

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Speaker 1: very funny. Yeah, it's very.

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Speaker 2: Funny that like he could be doing an illegalism with

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Speaker 2: that with with zero intention of doing so.

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Speaker 1: Now, I do think there's a some people have kind

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Speaker 1: of errantly called him a whistleblower.

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Speaker 4: I just not that's not active. That is that is

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Speaker 4: not what he's doing.

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Speaker 3: He's a Nazi who's posting topsycret information to impress children online.

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Speaker 1: That's right, Garrison. I do think we have to. I

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Speaker 1: think we have to. Let's let's dig into that a

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Speaker 1: little bit, because a whistleblower is somebody who exposes information

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Speaker 1: from inside of an organization for some sort of purpose. Right.

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Speaker 1: They believe that what's going on is wrong. They think that,

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Speaker 1: like there's they believe there's some sort of public interest

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Speaker 1: in information that is being kind of siloed inside of

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Speaker 1: an organization that they're a part of, and they release

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Speaker 1: that organization. Right, Fundamentally, that's what a whistleblower is. This

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Speaker 1: guy was telling his friends and this thirty person discord,

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Speaker 1: do not post these anywhere else. This is not stuff

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Speaker 1: that you're allowed to share. This is just for your

385
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Speaker 1: eyes because we're friends. Right. He does not intend for

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Speaker 1: this to get out. But here's the thing. All of

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Speaker 1: his friends in this group are like dumb kids, and

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Speaker 1: just like those people on war Thunder, they start getting

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Speaker 1: into arguments with people outside of the discords yet and

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Speaker 1: other discords discords. One of them is a fan discord

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Speaker 1: for some other YouTuber. One of them is the discord

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Speaker 1: is a Minecraft discord, and they get into arguments with

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Speaker 1: random other users about like the war in Ukraine and stuff.

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Speaker 1: And when they're having those arguments, they'll hear someone make

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Speaker 1: a point and they'll think back to a top secret

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Speaker 1: document that OG posted, and they'll be like, well, I

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Speaker 1: know you're wrong because I've seen some CIA like satellite

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Speaker 1: footage that shows that this isn't accurate. And rather than

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Speaker 1: being like, well, I guess I can't prove this person

400
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Speaker 1: wrong on the Internet without exposing my friend in our

401
00:22:03,880 --> 00:22:10,199
Speaker 1: private discord to being imprisoned for the decade, they just

402
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Speaker 1: grabbed top secret documents that he posted and they post

403
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Speaker 1: them in these other discords, and that's how this shit

404
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Speaker 1: breaks containment right now. It's one of those things I

405
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Speaker 1: do want to note that, like, these are not generally speaking,

406
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Speaker 1: super pleasant people. OG is the kind of guy who,

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Speaker 1: like one of his big arguments that he tries to

408
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Speaker 1: like make to these kids, he like claims that based

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Speaker 1: on the top secret info he has, which he posts,

410
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Speaker 1: nothing that proves this. The mass shooting in Buffalo, New

411
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Speaker 1: York by that Nazi at that majority you know, black

412
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Speaker 1: frequented grocery store, that that was like a government plot

413
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Speaker 1: to institute gun control, and shit, it was a false flag.

414
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Speaker 1: So he's not just posting good. He's like lying here too,

415
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Speaker 1: because obviously there's no intelligence to post backing that up.

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Speaker 1: He just he's just kind of trying to It's a

417
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Speaker 1: mix of he's trying to like prove that, you know,

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Speaker 1: he's trying to make arguments about like what's happening, you know,

419
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Speaker 1: in various overseas conflicts using a US intel, But he's

420
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Speaker 1: also just like spreading different kind of conspiracy theories that

421
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Speaker 1: he has to these kids who are by and large

422
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Speaker 1: looking up to him. There's a couple like the Washington

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Speaker 1: Post has done some really deep reporting where they talk

424
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Speaker 1: to some of these kids where they're like, yeah, man,

425
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Speaker 1: we loved him. Like when you realize this shit had

426
00:23:28,560 --> 00:23:30,800
Speaker 1: broken containment, he like called us and we were all

427
00:23:30,840 --> 00:23:32,919
Speaker 1: crying because we knew he was going to go to prison.

428
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Speaker 1: Like there they seem legitimately distraught. Yeah, there's like lines

429
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Speaker 1: like he said something had happened and he prayed to

430
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Speaker 1: God that this event would not happen, but now it's

431
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Speaker 1: in God's hands. Like these are like weirdo, ashy kids

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Speaker 1: I hesitate to, like condemn like the literal children too

433
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Speaker 1: much because they're very vulnerable. This guy is like, this

434
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Speaker 1: guy is a bad person who is deep, like in

435
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Speaker 1: a very fucked up way, influencing this group of like

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Speaker 1: thirty ish teenagers on the internet in his like weird politics.

437
00:24:08,880 --> 00:24:11,040
Speaker 1: It's not great. Now, that's separate from the question of,

438
00:24:11,119 --> 00:24:14,040
Speaker 1: like is there a value to these leagues, which we

439
00:24:14,080 --> 00:24:16,400
Speaker 1: can talk about in a little bit. But so as

440
00:24:16,440 --> 00:24:20,200
Speaker 1: we've talked about, Eric Tohler tracks down where this is happening,

441
00:24:20,280 --> 00:24:23,720
Speaker 1: tracks down like the name og publishes a piece on

442
00:24:23,840 --> 00:24:26,600
Speaker 1: Belling Cat. It's sort of ripped off by like, I

443
00:24:26,640 --> 00:24:29,960
Speaker 1: don't know, it does like every other newspaper in the world,

444
00:24:29,960 --> 00:24:34,399
Speaker 1: and then additional reporting is done. Belling Cat and the

445
00:24:34,400 --> 00:24:37,200
Speaker 1: New York Times team up and they eventually like track

446
00:24:37,320 --> 00:24:40,280
Speaker 1: down and publish an article on who this guy is

447
00:24:40,720 --> 00:24:46,439
Speaker 1: an airman named Jack Tik Sarah, And they publish an

448
00:24:46,560 --> 00:24:50,919
Speaker 1: article about that about a day before this guy gets

449
00:24:51,080 --> 00:24:55,159
Speaker 1: arrested by the FBI. And it's one of those things,

450
00:24:55,320 --> 00:24:58,080
Speaker 1: one of the if you look at the FBI Affi David,

451
00:24:59,160 --> 00:25:02,080
Speaker 1: it kind of makes clear how the FBI cracked this

452
00:25:02,160 --> 00:25:05,239
Speaker 1: guy down and found him because they did so you know,

453
00:25:05,680 --> 00:25:09,000
Speaker 1: using the resources they had before The Times did online.

454
00:25:09,119 --> 00:25:11,320
Speaker 1: People have been going after The Times and Eric for

455
00:25:11,440 --> 00:25:14,800
Speaker 1: like revealing this guy to the government, which is not

456
00:25:14,960 --> 00:25:18,240
Speaker 1: the case. Basically, once it became clear what had gotten leaked,

457
00:25:18,680 --> 00:25:22,119
Speaker 1: the FBI, because they had access to you know, the

458
00:25:22,240 --> 00:25:26,920
Speaker 1: systems by which people utilize and get access to sensitive

459
00:25:26,960 --> 00:25:31,600
Speaker 1: compartmented information, found out who had most recently, like on

460
00:25:31,680 --> 00:25:34,240
Speaker 1: the days that kind of correspond to the leaks, pulled

461
00:25:34,320 --> 00:25:38,080
Speaker 1: up information about that and narrowed it down to this

462
00:25:38,119 --> 00:25:43,080
Speaker 1: guy Jack, and they had access to Like one of

463
00:25:43,119 --> 00:25:45,640
Speaker 1: the things they did is they called Discord and talked

464
00:25:45,640 --> 00:25:48,320
Speaker 1: to Discord, and Discord helped them track down where the

465
00:25:48,400 --> 00:25:52,120
Speaker 1: leaks were originating from. And then because they could see

466
00:25:52,119 --> 00:25:54,640
Speaker 1: that the account that had posted you know, the top

467
00:25:54,680 --> 00:25:57,640
Speaker 1: secret data originally was a paid account, they were able

468
00:25:57,680 --> 00:25:59,840
Speaker 1: to like provide the FBI with this guy's home, a

469
00:26:00,080 --> 00:26:02,200
Speaker 1: dress and shit. This is exactly what you'd expect for

470
00:26:02,280 --> 00:26:02,560
Speaker 1: the f.

471
00:26:02,640 --> 00:26:05,160
Speaker 3: Yeah, I mean, the FBI has a lot of non

472
00:26:05,280 --> 00:26:08,360
Speaker 3: open source means to do this type of investigation.

473
00:26:08,720 --> 00:26:10,919
Speaker 1: Yeah, they are not doing what Eric is doing and

474
00:26:11,000 --> 00:26:13,320
Speaker 1: just kind of like clicking through shit for hours and

475
00:26:13,359 --> 00:26:15,960
Speaker 1: hours and hours until they figure out where it's come from,

476
00:26:16,000 --> 00:26:18,800
Speaker 1: Like they have they are the FBI, they have access

477
00:26:18,880 --> 00:26:21,000
Speaker 1: to other things, and.

478
00:26:20,920 --> 00:26:23,520
Speaker 2: It's what you'd expect from discord too, right, Like they

479
00:26:23,600 --> 00:26:25,000
Speaker 2: will comply with whatever.

480
00:26:25,440 --> 00:26:28,560
Speaker 1: Yes, they absolutely these are top secret that like if

481
00:26:28,640 --> 00:26:31,399
Speaker 1: they don't have a legal choice here, they're a gigantic company,

482
00:26:31,400 --> 00:26:34,800
Speaker 1: they're going to comply. So this is the kind of

483
00:26:34,840 --> 00:26:37,880
Speaker 1: thing where like one of the there's this big argument,

484
00:26:38,480 --> 00:26:40,560
Speaker 1: I don't even even though it's big, but there's definitely

485
00:26:40,560 --> 00:26:42,639
Speaker 1: like a weird chunk of the left that has like

486
00:26:43,960 --> 00:26:46,800
Speaker 1: leaned on because the right has immediately started calling this

487
00:26:46,840 --> 00:26:50,720
Speaker 1: guy a whistleblower, fucking Marjorie Taylor Green was like he's

488
00:26:50,720 --> 00:26:53,840
Speaker 1: a Christian and he's a leaker trying to expose crucial

489
00:26:53,840 --> 00:26:56,879
Speaker 1: details about our government, And no he wasn't. He was

490
00:26:56,920 --> 00:27:01,080
Speaker 1: like trying to fucking groom some teenagers and they posted

491
00:27:01,240 --> 00:27:02,160
Speaker 1: without as permission.

492
00:27:02,680 --> 00:27:04,800
Speaker 3: And a lot of a lot of the more conspiracy

493
00:27:04,800 --> 00:27:09,080
Speaker 3: type stuff is like trying to call out like you know,

494
00:27:09,119 --> 00:27:12,199
Speaker 3: it's a lot of the more conspiracy related stuff is

495
00:27:12,520 --> 00:27:16,040
Speaker 3: related to the Russian invasion of Ukraine and making it

496
00:27:16,040 --> 00:27:20,000
Speaker 3: seem like the US is doing things that are wrong

497
00:27:20,119 --> 00:27:23,560
Speaker 3: and secretly helping the Ukrainians too much, and it kind

498
00:27:23,560 --> 00:27:26,000
Speaker 3: of it it plays into this weird, weird thing that

499
00:27:26,040 --> 00:27:29,320
Speaker 3: people have against the way Biden has been handling the

500
00:27:30,000 --> 00:27:33,159
Speaker 3: geopolitics around the Russian invasion, and it's like it it

501
00:27:33,480 --> 00:27:35,800
Speaker 3: plays into a whole bunch of right when you're talking

502
00:27:35,800 --> 00:27:38,080
Speaker 3: points we've seen around Russia.

503
00:27:38,200 --> 00:27:38,919
Speaker 4: You know, we've seen this.

504
00:27:38,920 --> 00:27:42,240
Speaker 3: Type of stuff get talked about by Tucker Carlson quite often.

505
00:27:43,320 --> 00:27:44,520
Speaker 4: There' there's a there's a whole bunch.

506
00:27:44,400 --> 00:27:47,080
Speaker 3: Of like little nodes that this that that this touches on,

507
00:27:47,520 --> 00:27:49,560
Speaker 3: and we even see we even see stuff like that

508
00:27:49,800 --> 00:27:53,960
Speaker 3: among like you know people who are authoritarian communists, right,

509
00:27:54,000 --> 00:27:57,359
Speaker 3: who are who are still pro Russia despite Russia not

510
00:27:57,400 --> 00:28:02,240
Speaker 3: being a communist country, but still like being like oh there,

511
00:28:02,520 --> 00:28:05,240
Speaker 3: you know, this is something he's trying to expose the

512
00:28:06,080 --> 00:28:09,040
Speaker 3: things that are people are doing wrong to Russia.

513
00:28:09,040 --> 00:28:10,600
Speaker 4: And it's like okay, all right.

514
00:28:10,800 --> 00:28:13,480
Speaker 1: Yeah, yeah, and to me it's one of them. And

515
00:28:13,560 --> 00:28:17,240
Speaker 1: there's also you've gotten among some chunks of this attitude

516
00:28:17,240 --> 00:28:19,080
Speaker 1: that like well, you know, I don't care why he

517
00:28:19,119 --> 00:28:21,639
Speaker 1: did it or like what he is in his personal life.

518
00:28:21,680 --> 00:28:25,199
Speaker 1: Any leak you know of the US military machine is

519
00:28:25,280 --> 00:28:27,679
Speaker 1: good and should be you know protected. And it's like,

520
00:28:27,720 --> 00:28:30,719
Speaker 1: for one thing, this guy like nobody knew where these

521
00:28:30,720 --> 00:28:32,720
Speaker 1: things were coming from. There was a vested need in

522
00:28:32,800 --> 00:28:34,960
Speaker 1: sort of figuring out what the origin point was, to

523
00:28:35,000 --> 00:28:38,520
Speaker 1: figure out if they were accurate. But for like another thing,

524
00:28:38,600 --> 00:28:41,240
Speaker 1: I don't know, Man, you can argue about like what

525
00:28:41,400 --> 00:28:44,720
Speaker 1: point you know, the digging, whether or not, like the

526
00:28:45,640 --> 00:28:48,240
Speaker 1: it's ethical to dig this shit back to its source.

527
00:28:49,400 --> 00:28:51,600
Speaker 1: I would argue that, like people also have a right

528
00:28:51,640 --> 00:28:54,480
Speaker 1: to know if there's some sort of fucking like like

529
00:28:54,840 --> 00:28:57,120
Speaker 1: if the documents were fake or altered in some way,

530
00:28:57,160 --> 00:28:59,000
Speaker 1: there was a reason to be trying to figure out

531
00:28:59,000 --> 00:29:01,240
Speaker 1: the providence of this shit. But more to the point,

532
00:29:01,280 --> 00:29:04,760
Speaker 1: like I think it's good to have access to like

533
00:29:04,920 --> 00:29:08,160
Speaker 1: data from inside of our military. I think that's that's

534
00:29:08,200 --> 00:29:11,160
Speaker 1: broadly positive. And when I look at these data, or

535
00:29:11,200 --> 00:29:13,000
Speaker 1: when I look at what's been leaked, I don't think

536
00:29:13,000 --> 00:29:15,960
Speaker 1: most of it's you know, one of the concerns that's

537
00:29:16,000 --> 00:29:17,959
Speaker 1: always that always exist when you're talking about a leak

538
00:29:18,000 --> 00:29:20,520
Speaker 1: of data is like, is this going to expose like

539
00:29:20,600 --> 00:29:23,880
Speaker 1: potentially innocent people to any kind of harm. And there

540
00:29:23,960 --> 00:29:26,320
Speaker 1: is a potential for that with some of this, because

541
00:29:26,360 --> 00:29:29,800
Speaker 1: some of it dealt with Ukrainian military readiness for the

542
00:29:29,920 --> 00:29:33,440
Speaker 1: upcoming offensive, and like, well, like I don't really care

543
00:29:33,600 --> 00:29:37,560
Speaker 1: if some guy inside the Kremlin who's like a member

544
00:29:37,600 --> 00:29:39,480
Speaker 1: of the Russian General Staff and a double I don't

545
00:29:39,480 --> 00:29:41,520
Speaker 1: care if that guy, like something bad happens to him.

546
00:29:41,680 --> 00:29:46,080
Speaker 1: He's probably not a great dude. But I do care

547
00:29:46,160 --> 00:29:49,480
Speaker 1: about like a bunch of random Ukrainian soldiers potentially getting harmed. Now,

548
00:29:49,640 --> 00:29:51,600
Speaker 1: I will say, from what I can tell from this,

549
00:29:51,680 --> 00:29:53,440
Speaker 1: I think the odds of that are pretty low. It

550
00:29:53,440 --> 00:29:57,440
Speaker 1: looks like this has impacted kind of the timetable for

551
00:29:57,720 --> 00:30:00,600
Speaker 1: the counter offensive, but I don't know that it's I

552
00:30:00,640 --> 00:30:03,120
Speaker 1: haven't seen any evidence that it's exposed things in a

553
00:30:03,120 --> 00:30:06,160
Speaker 1: way that's like going to cause loss of life, although

554
00:30:06,160 --> 00:30:08,600
Speaker 1: it's a little bit unclears to whether that not that

555
00:30:08,680 --> 00:30:12,200
Speaker 1: might happen. But also while I think it's accurate to say,

556
00:30:12,320 --> 00:30:14,520
Speaker 1: I'm not saying evidence that like a lot of people's

557
00:30:14,960 --> 00:30:18,000
Speaker 1: safety have been harmed by these leaks, it's also not

558
00:30:18,920 --> 00:30:22,040
Speaker 1: you know, it's not anything like what Snowden did or

559
00:30:22,080 --> 00:30:26,840
Speaker 1: what Manning did. Right again, Manning revealed you know, videos

560
00:30:26,840 --> 00:30:30,760
Speaker 1: like the Collateral murder video, evidence of like breakdowns of

561
00:30:31,480 --> 00:30:33,600
Speaker 1: order and things that I think are accurate to call

562
00:30:33,680 --> 00:30:36,480
Speaker 1: war crimes that were being kind of hidden by our government.

563
00:30:37,360 --> 00:30:41,280
Speaker 1: Whereas Snowden revealed intense details about an n Essay spying program,

564
00:30:41,360 --> 00:30:44,680
Speaker 1: all of that's extremely relevant to the average American. Most

565
00:30:44,680 --> 00:30:48,600
Speaker 1: of this is just kind of like wonky inside baseball

566
00:30:48,680 --> 00:30:52,560
Speaker 1: military stuff, which again I'm not like sad that it's

567
00:30:52,640 --> 00:30:56,800
Speaker 1: gotten out, but it's also not It really does seem

568
00:30:56,840 --> 00:30:59,200
Speaker 1: like a bunch of shit that like a guy pulled

569
00:30:59,200 --> 00:31:02,240
Speaker 1: out based on his own kind of like weird interest.

570
00:31:02,400 --> 00:31:06,320
Speaker 1: It's not there's not like a strong unifying theme around them.

571
00:31:06,320 --> 00:31:08,520
Speaker 1: And again, most of it's most of its shit that's

572
00:31:08,560 --> 00:31:10,800
Speaker 1: not going to be interesting to the average person. One

573
00:31:10,840 --> 00:31:13,640
Speaker 1: of the documents I just read an article about because like,

574
00:31:13,840 --> 00:31:16,400
Speaker 1: we don't entirely know everything that was leaked right now,

575
00:31:16,640 --> 00:31:18,760
Speaker 1: right there's been there's like the Post in the Time

576
00:31:18,840 --> 00:31:21,160
Speaker 1: seem to have a pretty complete archive of what was leaked,

577
00:31:21,200 --> 00:31:24,360
Speaker 1: but they haven't published anything because you know they're reading

578
00:31:24,360 --> 00:31:26,959
Speaker 1: through it and you know, actually reporting it out. One

579
00:31:27,000 --> 00:31:28,640
Speaker 1: of the articles that just came out was about the

580
00:31:29,000 --> 00:31:32,720
Speaker 1: fact that the Ukrainians made some overtures to the Kurdish

581
00:31:32,840 --> 00:31:39,200
Speaker 1: led self administration in in northern northeast Syria to Rojaba

582
00:31:39,240 --> 00:31:42,400
Speaker 1: to the SDF in order to talk about the potential

583
00:31:42,440 --> 00:31:48,320
Speaker 1: for them attacking Russian assets in elsewhere in Syria. When

584
00:31:48,320 --> 00:31:51,320
Speaker 1: this has kind of gotten out over like Twitter, it's

585
00:31:51,360 --> 00:31:54,360
Speaker 1: often been like described as, oh, the Ukrainians were going

586
00:31:54,400 --> 00:31:56,640
Speaker 1: to team up with the Courage to attack Russia in Syria,

587
00:31:56,800 --> 00:32:01,120
Speaker 1: like like this was an actual like Siria plan would

588
00:32:01,240 --> 00:32:04,720
Speaker 1: actually set the document. It seems a lot less inciting

589
00:32:05,000 --> 00:32:08,000
Speaker 1: than that. Basically, what happened was some folks on the

590
00:32:08,120 --> 00:32:12,440
Speaker 1: Ukrainian General staff or whatever were like looking into the possibility, Hey,

591
00:32:12,800 --> 00:32:14,400
Speaker 1: you know, is there any way that we could kind

592
00:32:14,440 --> 00:32:17,720
Speaker 1: of anything we could pay the Kurds over in Syria

593
00:32:17,760 --> 00:32:20,040
Speaker 1: to carry out an attack on the Russians. And apparently

594
00:32:20,040 --> 00:32:23,240
Speaker 1: they had access to somebody who claimed to be in

595
00:32:23,280 --> 00:32:25,880
Speaker 1: the SDF at least, and that person was like, we

596
00:32:26,000 --> 00:32:28,040
Speaker 1: might be able to do something if you can get

597
00:32:28,120 --> 00:32:31,520
Speaker 1: us some anti air defenses, right, which I don't know

598
00:32:31,560 --> 00:32:34,760
Speaker 1: how Ukraine could possibly ship meaningful anti air defenses to

599
00:32:34,840 --> 00:32:39,040
Speaker 1: northeast Syria. It's kind of bordered on all sides. There

600
00:32:39,080 --> 00:32:40,560
Speaker 1: is some stuff. If you're a walk in the region,

601
00:32:40,560 --> 00:32:42,840
Speaker 1: there's some interesting stuff about this, which is that the

602
00:32:42,920 --> 00:32:46,200
Speaker 1: SDF basically responded, like, we could potentially do this, we

603
00:32:46,280 --> 00:32:49,120
Speaker 1: couldn't attack Russian assets that are within the borders of

604
00:32:49,160 --> 00:32:53,760
Speaker 1: the self administration. Russians are acting as peacekeepers there between

605
00:32:54,520 --> 00:32:58,040
Speaker 1: Turkey and you know, it's kind of desire to invade

606
00:32:58,040 --> 00:33:02,000
Speaker 1: the entire region. They're not great as peacekeepers. The Armenians

607
00:33:02,040 --> 00:33:05,040
Speaker 1: will tell you that Russian soldiers are not great, great givers.

608
00:33:05,280 --> 00:33:07,320
Speaker 1: But the SDF didn't want to, like shit where they

609
00:33:07,320 --> 00:33:10,200
Speaker 1: were eating, right, so there was some debate about where

610
00:33:10,560 --> 00:33:12,080
Speaker 1: they might be able to attack. One of the things

611
00:33:12,120 --> 00:33:14,480
Speaker 1: that is really interesting about this week is that apparently

612
00:33:14,920 --> 00:33:18,480
Speaker 1: Ukraine like talk to Turkey about this, because obviously the

613
00:33:18,480 --> 00:33:21,880
Speaker 1: Turks consider the core of the SDF the YPG to

614
00:33:21,960 --> 00:33:26,800
Speaker 1: be a terrorist organization. But when Ukraine was talking to them,

615
00:33:26,800 --> 00:33:29,800
Speaker 1: they're like, hey, we might basically bribe these people to

616
00:33:29,840 --> 00:33:32,600
Speaker 1: carry out an attack on Russian assets elsewhere in Syria.

617
00:33:32,840 --> 00:33:34,560
Speaker 1: Turkey was like, okay, well, don't do it here or

618
00:33:34,600 --> 00:33:36,240
Speaker 1: here here, because that's kind of close to some our

619
00:33:36,280 --> 00:33:39,880
Speaker 1: guys might like that. That party is interesting. But again,

620
00:33:40,120 --> 00:33:44,040
Speaker 1: none of this matters all that much because nothing happened

621
00:33:44,120 --> 00:33:47,800
Speaker 1: as far as we know in December, Zelenski was like, no,

622
00:33:48,080 --> 00:33:51,560
Speaker 1: don't proceed with looking into this. This is the kind

623
00:33:51,600 --> 00:33:54,040
Speaker 1: of thing like the US military has, like plans for

624
00:33:54,120 --> 00:33:56,160
Speaker 1: what happens if we have to fight Canada. This is

625
00:33:56,200 --> 00:33:58,760
Speaker 1: the kind of thing defense departments do. And as far

626
00:33:58,760 --> 00:34:00,880
Speaker 1: as I can tell, there's there's no evidence that went

627
00:34:00,960 --> 00:34:04,200
Speaker 1: much for them, like a series of phone calls right which,

628
00:34:04,240 --> 00:34:06,640
Speaker 1: by the way, the SDF denies ever happened. I don't

629
00:34:06,640 --> 00:34:09,480
Speaker 1: know what exactly occurred. I don't know if it's hard

630
00:34:09,480 --> 00:34:11,480
Speaker 1: for me to tell. Did the Ukrainians were they talking

631
00:34:11,480 --> 00:34:14,320
Speaker 1: to someone who is actually a representative of the sdfs

632
00:34:14,320 --> 00:34:17,920
Speaker 1: like military hierarchy, or was this like some guy that

633
00:34:18,000 --> 00:34:20,800
Speaker 1: they thought was because maybe Ukraine doesn't have great context

634
00:34:20,880 --> 00:34:23,200
Speaker 1: into the air like or did the US. And it's

635
00:34:23,200 --> 00:34:25,120
Speaker 1: it's not kind of clear. Did the US maybe like

636
00:34:25,160 --> 00:34:28,640
Speaker 1: hook them up with somebody, but it doesn't like at

637
00:34:28,640 --> 00:34:31,120
Speaker 1: the at the end of the day, you can argue,

638
00:34:31,360 --> 00:34:33,040
Speaker 1: as someone who follows the region, I find this kind

639
00:34:33,040 --> 00:34:38,680
Speaker 1: of interesting. It's not exactly like groundbreaking, you know, in

640
00:34:38,719 --> 00:34:41,960
Speaker 1: its importance, because nothing happened, no one did anything. This

641
00:34:42,080 --> 00:34:44,920
Speaker 1: is like some guys in Ukraine thought about doing a

642
00:34:44,960 --> 00:34:48,000
Speaker 1: thing and then decided not to, which is, you know,

643
00:34:48,280 --> 00:34:51,440
Speaker 1: potentially interesting context, but we're not talking about the manning

644
00:34:51,520 --> 00:34:52,600
Speaker 1: or the snowed in lakes here.

645
00:34:53,920 --> 00:34:57,239
Speaker 2: Yeah, yeah, it's yeah, it's that particular document I think

646
00:34:57,320 --> 00:35:00,480
Speaker 2: is kind of clearly they have access to people who

647
00:35:00,480 --> 00:35:04,360
Speaker 2: have formally fought in Syria with the YPG right there.

648
00:35:04,400 --> 00:35:05,279
Speaker 6: There are probably.

649
00:35:05,160 --> 00:35:08,880
Speaker 2: Dozens of them now fighting in Ukraine without a volunteer units.

650
00:35:08,920 --> 00:35:11,239
Speaker 2: Like it's it's not hard to see how this thought

651
00:35:11,320 --> 00:35:13,560
Speaker 2: came up. But like you said, nothing really happened. It

652
00:35:13,640 --> 00:35:15,080
Speaker 2: was just some people like spitboarling.

653
00:35:25,200 --> 00:35:28,920
Speaker 1: So I don't know. There's some other like bits and

654
00:35:28,960 --> 00:35:31,680
Speaker 1: stuff in here that are kind of interesting. One of

655
00:35:31,719 --> 00:35:34,680
Speaker 1: them was there was a document in there about how

656
00:35:34,680 --> 00:35:38,320
Speaker 1: the US had kind of like interfered in peace negotiations

657
00:35:38,440 --> 00:35:42,839
Speaker 1: in Yemen due to like kind of concerns that they

658
00:35:42,880 --> 00:35:45,040
Speaker 1: had about the fact that China was kind of brokering

659
00:35:45,120 --> 00:35:48,040
Speaker 1: a degree of peace between the Houthi rebels in between

660
00:35:48,200 --> 00:35:52,400
Speaker 1: the Saudi government. There's definitely some like slightly some somewhat

661
00:35:52,440 --> 00:35:54,480
Speaker 1: shady shit from the US in there, but at the

662
00:35:54,520 --> 00:35:57,240
Speaker 1: end of the day, it didn't derail the peace negotiations.

663
00:35:57,280 --> 00:36:00,239
Speaker 1: It's just like, yeah, they were like like like and

664
00:36:00,280 --> 00:36:02,279
Speaker 1: a lot of it's like that where it's kind of like,

665
00:36:02,320 --> 00:36:06,160
Speaker 1: this is useful context. I'm glad historians or journalists reporting

666
00:36:06,160 --> 00:36:08,040
Speaker 1: it out will have that. But at the end of

667
00:36:08,040 --> 00:36:10,120
Speaker 1: the day, like the fact that like, oh hey, at

668
00:36:10,160 --> 00:36:12,920
Speaker 1: one point in these peace negotiations the US was like,

669
00:36:13,719 --> 00:36:15,960
Speaker 1: you know, being being kind of a kind of a

670
00:36:16,000 --> 00:36:21,120
Speaker 1: dick isn't exactly like shocking. You know, It's not going

671
00:36:21,160 --> 00:36:24,960
Speaker 1: to like change your overall concept of what's happening over there.

672
00:36:25,080 --> 00:36:28,319
Speaker 1: It's not stuff that like is most of it's not

673
00:36:28,320 --> 00:36:32,240
Speaker 1: stuff that's like massively important important. It is really interesting

674
00:36:32,360 --> 00:36:37,680
Speaker 1: that the detail that our defense establishment apparently has from

675
00:36:37,719 --> 00:36:40,280
Speaker 1: within the Russian government. I do think it's worth noting

676
00:36:40,280 --> 00:36:42,480
Speaker 1: because we're talking, like when we talk about sort of

677
00:36:42,520 --> 00:36:47,120
Speaker 1: the provenance of these and the reliability of these leaks

678
00:36:47,160 --> 00:36:50,759
Speaker 1: as they regard the war in Ukraine, there's been a

679
00:36:50,760 --> 00:36:53,000
Speaker 1: lot of talk about like, oh, this reveals that like

680
00:36:53,040 --> 00:36:55,279
Speaker 1: the Ukraine doesn't have the capacity to carry out a

681
00:36:55,320 --> 00:36:58,480
Speaker 1: counter offensive, or that the war's gone much worse for

682
00:36:58,520 --> 00:37:01,960
Speaker 1: them than they think. It is kind of worth noting that, like,

683
00:37:04,040 --> 00:37:08,560
Speaker 1: prior to the expanded Russian invasion, all US military intelligence

684
00:37:08,560 --> 00:37:11,520
Speaker 1: suggested that the Ukrainian government was going to fold in

685
00:37:11,560 --> 00:37:14,840
Speaker 1: a matter of days. So even though a lot of

686
00:37:14,880 --> 00:37:17,239
Speaker 1: this is top secret info, that doesn't mean it's like

687
00:37:17,280 --> 00:37:20,520
Speaker 1: one hundred percent accurate. Right Like our guys, like think

688
00:37:20,560 --> 00:37:24,240
Speaker 1: back to the Iraq War, our dudes get shipped round constantly.

689
00:37:26,520 --> 00:37:29,840
Speaker 1: It is again, this is all really interesting. And I

690
00:37:29,880 --> 00:37:32,480
Speaker 1: will say two things. I think it's very funny that

691
00:37:32,520 --> 00:37:37,040
Speaker 1: this guy nuked his entire life basically to impress children

692
00:37:37,120 --> 00:37:40,440
Speaker 1: on a discord. I think it's extremely funny. I have

693
00:37:40,560 --> 00:37:44,640
Speaker 1: laughed many a time at this. I also think it's like, like,

694
00:37:44,719 --> 00:37:46,960
Speaker 1: as someone who is interested in this stuff, interesting that

695
00:37:47,320 --> 00:37:50,120
Speaker 1: and good that we have this context. I don't think

696
00:37:50,160 --> 00:37:54,759
Speaker 1: any of this is like massively surprising or shocking, Like

697
00:37:54,800 --> 00:37:57,760
Speaker 1: the shit that's in that defense industry or a defense

698
00:37:57,800 --> 00:38:03,120
Speaker 1: intelligence agency analysis of the Ukrainian position right now is

699
00:38:03,239 --> 00:38:05,360
Speaker 1: like stuff that you would know if you were paying

700
00:38:05,360 --> 00:38:08,920
Speaker 1: attention to the good ocent aggregators who have been covering

701
00:38:09,000 --> 00:38:11,000
Speaker 1: the war, and if you've been like just reading good

702
00:38:11,040 --> 00:38:14,160
Speaker 1: reporting on what's going on over there. I'll read a

703
00:38:14,200 --> 00:38:17,600
Speaker 1: little bit of a summary from an article that's kind

704
00:38:17,600 --> 00:38:19,400
Speaker 1: of going over some of the other stuff that appears

705
00:38:19,480 --> 00:38:22,680
Speaker 1: to have been leaked. One details information apparently obtained through

706
00:38:22,760 --> 00:38:25,840
Speaker 1: US eavesdropping on Russia's Foreign intelligence service and suggests that

707
00:38:25,920 --> 00:38:28,279
Speaker 1: China approved the provision of lethal aid to Russia and

708
00:38:28,320 --> 00:38:30,560
Speaker 1: its war in Ukraine early this year and plan to

709
00:38:30,600 --> 00:38:34,720
Speaker 1: disguise its military equipment as civilian items. Another includes details

710
00:38:34,719 --> 00:38:37,880
Speaker 1: of a conducted by Beijing on one of its advanced

711
00:38:37,920 --> 00:38:41,000
Speaker 1: experimental missiles, the DF twenty seven hypersonic light vehicle, on

712
00:38:41,040 --> 00:38:43,640
Speaker 1: February twenty fifth. It says the vehicle flew for twelve

713
00:38:43,640 --> 00:38:45,880
Speaker 1: minutes across thirteen hundred miles and that it possessed a

714
00:38:45,960 --> 00:38:50,480
Speaker 1: high probability of penetrating US ballistic missile defense systems. The

715
00:38:50,560 --> 00:38:53,680
Speaker 1: documents contain new details about a Chinese spy balloon dubbed

716
00:38:53,719 --> 00:38:56,799
Speaker 1: Killeen twenty three by US intelligence agencies, that earlier this

717
00:38:56,880 --> 00:38:59,800
Speaker 1: year flew over the United States. They detail sophisticated so

718
00:39:00,000 --> 00:39:02,799
Speaker 1: aalen's equipment. US intelligence agencies were aware of up to

719
00:39:02,800 --> 00:39:05,840
Speaker 1: four additional Chinese bi balloons. The documents a and another

720
00:39:06,280 --> 00:39:10,439
Speaker 1: previously unreported revelation, and so let's let's kind of break

721
00:39:10,440 --> 00:39:14,240
Speaker 1: that down. One thing we have here is a basically

722
00:39:14,320 --> 00:39:18,560
Speaker 1: an argument through from the US that based on their intercepts.

723
00:39:18,840 --> 00:39:22,680
Speaker 1: They believe that China has approved provisioning weaponry, selling weaponry

724
00:39:22,719 --> 00:39:27,480
Speaker 1: to Russia and disguising it as civilian items. That doesn't

725
00:39:27,520 --> 00:39:30,560
Speaker 1: mean they have done this. It means that, like there's

726
00:39:31,040 --> 00:39:34,840
Speaker 1: sigent that someone in our government has that says that

727
00:39:34,920 --> 00:39:38,239
Speaker 1: they were. That could be disinformation from them. It could

728
00:39:38,280 --> 00:39:40,200
Speaker 1: be out of date, it could be something like with

729
00:39:40,320 --> 00:39:42,640
Speaker 1: this Ukraine and Syria thing that they talked about doing

730
00:39:42,680 --> 00:39:46,160
Speaker 1: and then didn't do. It's interesting, I would say, if

731
00:39:46,200 --> 00:39:48,600
Speaker 1: you are a defense industry reporter, it's something that would

732
00:39:48,760 --> 00:39:51,799
Speaker 1: could should definitely spur you to further reporting because like

733
00:39:52,080 --> 00:39:56,000
Speaker 1: that's really relevant if that's occurring. But it's not the

734
00:39:56,080 --> 00:39:58,879
Speaker 1: final word on the matter. Meanwhile, you've got this thing

735
00:39:58,880 --> 00:40:01,520
Speaker 1: on like, yeah, this hype masonic missile the Chinese had

736
00:40:01,960 --> 00:40:07,120
Speaker 1: is good at shooting shit. Theoretically, this is, you know,

737
00:40:07,200 --> 00:40:09,440
Speaker 1: the kind of thing that's that's interesting and I think

738
00:40:09,560 --> 00:40:14,279
Speaker 1: is probably more accurate than you know, talking about the

739
00:40:15,000 --> 00:40:18,000
Speaker 1: China providing lethal aid because you can kind of you know,

740
00:40:18,280 --> 00:40:21,120
Speaker 1: theoretically you're looking at actual like data on how the

741
00:40:21,160 --> 00:40:23,279
Speaker 1: missile has performed. It just seems like it's something that

742
00:40:23,280 --> 00:40:26,920
Speaker 1: you've got more fidelity on But this is again to

743
00:40:27,000 --> 00:40:30,920
Speaker 1: kind of contrast it with like the snowed and Manning leaks. Well,

744
00:40:30,920 --> 00:40:32,719
Speaker 1: what do you what do you do if like the

745
00:40:32,840 --> 00:40:35,360
Speaker 1: NSSAY is spying on people, Well, you could at least

746
00:40:35,440 --> 00:40:39,919
Speaker 1: attempt to pass laws that restrict their ability to do that. Right,

747
00:40:40,480 --> 00:40:42,640
Speaker 1: What do you do if there have been like war

748
00:40:42,719 --> 00:40:45,440
Speaker 1: crimes committed by your military that were then cover it up, Well,

749
00:40:45,440 --> 00:40:47,600
Speaker 1: you can at least attempt to prosecute people. What do

750
00:40:47,640 --> 00:40:50,240
Speaker 1: you do if some other countries got a better missile? Well,

751
00:40:50,719 --> 00:40:53,000
Speaker 1: there's not a whole lot for you to do sitting

752
00:40:53,080 --> 00:40:56,000
Speaker 1: at home and like New York City or you know,

753
00:40:56,160 --> 00:40:59,920
Speaker 1: fucking Austin, Texas, Right, Like, like, what are we to

754
00:41:00,120 --> 00:41:04,200
Speaker 1: do about China's hyper I don't know. My assumption generally speaking,

755
00:41:04,239 --> 00:41:06,280
Speaker 1: not that this is an interesting but my assumption generally

756
00:41:06,320 --> 00:41:08,840
Speaker 1: speaking is that when you're talking about Russia, China, the

757
00:41:08,960 --> 00:41:11,360
Speaker 1: United States, we can all murder each other if we

758
00:41:11,440 --> 00:41:14,760
Speaker 1: wanted to write like, we've all got real nice missiles

759
00:41:15,040 --> 00:41:17,960
Speaker 1: at this point, and it's this, you know, the Chinese

760
00:41:18,000 --> 00:41:20,920
Speaker 1: by balloon stuff is like interesting. I don't think anyone's

761
00:41:20,920 --> 00:41:23,320
Speaker 1: surprised by this, Like we knew there was a spy balloon.

762
00:41:23,440 --> 00:41:28,480
Speaker 1: I assumed it had sophisticated surveillance technique. It's again, it's

763
00:41:28,480 --> 00:41:31,080
Speaker 1: interesting that there were four other spy balloons in the area.

764
00:41:31,120 --> 00:41:33,600
Speaker 1: But we simply know from older reporting that this happened

765
00:41:33,640 --> 00:41:35,960
Speaker 1: like three or four times while Trump was in office too,

766
00:41:36,000 --> 00:41:38,359
Speaker 1: So like, yeah, this is something we've known about. There's

767
00:41:38,360 --> 00:41:42,799
Speaker 1: been reporting about. This is corroboration. That's interesting. Again, none

768
00:41:42,840 --> 00:41:45,279
Speaker 1: of this is really like a sea change in our

769
00:41:45,400 --> 00:41:48,560
Speaker 1: understanding of any of these conflicts. It is interesting context.

770
00:41:48,920 --> 00:41:52,040
Speaker 1: Some of it's being blown up, you know, into stuff

771
00:41:52,040 --> 00:41:54,239
Speaker 1: that it isn't. There's reporting and like the number of

772
00:41:54,360 --> 00:41:57,040
Speaker 1: US servicemen in Ukraine that's being like spun is like

773
00:41:57,239 --> 00:41:59,239
Speaker 1: we've got boots on the ground there and it's like,

774
00:41:59,280 --> 00:42:01,920
Speaker 1: well they're like the seaguards and stuff. There's like twenty

775
00:42:02,040 --> 00:42:06,359
Speaker 1: nine dudes that this like confirmed. Michael, Yeah, yeah, this

776
00:42:06,480 --> 00:42:09,239
Speaker 1: confirms there's not a lot of US guys on the

777
00:42:09,239 --> 00:42:09,919
Speaker 1: ground there.

778
00:42:10,760 --> 00:42:12,480
Speaker 2: You send a lot of people when we when we're

779
00:42:12,480 --> 00:42:15,080
Speaker 2: doing wars. But yeah, like every embassy in the world

780
00:42:15,280 --> 00:42:18,400
Speaker 2: has a contingent of marines who make sure that it

781
00:42:18,400 --> 00:42:22,040
Speaker 2: doesn't just get Yeah. I don't want to say bang ghazied, but.

782
00:42:22,400 --> 00:42:23,960
Speaker 1: H yeah, yeah, you know, big Ghazzi.

783
00:42:24,520 --> 00:42:27,680
Speaker 2: Yeah, that's fine, and this is not new news to

784
00:42:27,719 --> 00:42:30,400
Speaker 2: anyone who's been paying attention. But if you are Michael Tracy,

785
00:42:30,760 --> 00:42:32,000
Speaker 2: this is brain melting shit.

786
00:42:32,400 --> 00:42:36,279
Speaker 1: Michael Tracy is a weirdo quasi left journalist who like

787
00:42:36,680 --> 00:42:38,879
Speaker 1: early on in the war, he didn't want to go

788
00:42:39,000 --> 00:42:42,080
Speaker 1: into Ukraine very much, but he like hung out in

789
00:42:42,160 --> 00:42:45,960
Speaker 1: Poland and took pictures of like US soldiers and like

790
00:42:46,360 --> 00:42:49,520
Speaker 1: a facility that they were had been in for years,

791
00:42:49,600 --> 00:42:52,080
Speaker 1: and was like, look, you know, this is evidence of

792
00:42:52,120 --> 00:42:54,399
Speaker 1: the secret US support. And it's like, guys, I mean,

793
00:42:54,440 --> 00:42:56,640
Speaker 1: for one thing, like look at this, Look at how

794
00:42:56,840 --> 00:42:59,120
Speaker 1: much shit just leaked out because some kid wanted to

795
00:42:59,120 --> 00:43:02,960
Speaker 1: impress children. If there were like like secret massive formations

796
00:43:02,960 --> 00:43:06,919
Speaker 1: of US troops or even large like forces of US

797
00:43:07,000 --> 00:43:11,120
Speaker 1: specops guys carrying out operations in Ukraine, how good do

798
00:43:11,200 --> 00:43:13,440
Speaker 1: you think they'd be at keeping that shit secret?

799
00:43:13,880 --> 00:43:14,040
Speaker 6: Right?

800
00:43:14,360 --> 00:43:17,480
Speaker 1: For one thing, like Special Forces guys get killed all

801
00:43:17,480 --> 00:43:20,000
Speaker 1: the fucking time, Like they get killed, they get overrun,

802
00:43:20,080 --> 00:43:23,480
Speaker 1: like like's it's a terrible risk for US to just

803
00:43:23,520 --> 00:43:26,200
Speaker 1: like send Seal Team six in to fight the Russians

804
00:43:26,440 --> 00:43:30,480
Speaker 1: when spoilers the Ukrainians have really good special forces guys

805
00:43:30,520 --> 00:43:33,600
Speaker 1: every bit as good as ours actually, with a lot

806
00:43:33,640 --> 00:43:36,560
Speaker 1: of cases more experience fighting this kind of war. And

807
00:43:36,600 --> 00:43:38,160
Speaker 1: we're given and it's like, if you want to talk

808
00:43:38,200 --> 00:43:41,479
Speaker 1: about US involvement, we're giving them their weapons. Like we're

809
00:43:41,480 --> 00:43:44,400
Speaker 1: involved fucking plenty. There's just not much of a point

810
00:43:44,480 --> 00:43:49,120
Speaker 1: in US like sending the green fucking berets into Bakamut, right,

811
00:43:49,239 --> 00:43:52,799
Speaker 1: Like why that doesn't That doesn't help us at all,

812
00:43:53,560 --> 00:43:56,600
Speaker 1: That doesn't like help our government. That's not like good

813
00:43:56,680 --> 00:44:02,480
Speaker 1: for the military. It would be stupid anyway, whatever, anything

814
00:44:02,480 --> 00:44:03,480
Speaker 1: else to talk about here?

815
00:44:03,880 --> 00:44:06,040
Speaker 2: Do we want to talk about the Israel one?

816
00:44:06,880 --> 00:44:08,879
Speaker 1: Oh? Yeah, no, this is one of the interest although

817
00:44:08,920 --> 00:44:11,879
Speaker 1: it's not. Again, basically one of the things that leaked

818
00:44:11,960 --> 00:44:14,240
Speaker 1: is like the US is spying on all of its allies,

819
00:44:14,280 --> 00:44:17,280
Speaker 1: which this leaks every couple of years. We're always spying

820
00:44:17,320 --> 00:44:21,920
Speaker 1: on our allies, including Israel. Israel has spied on US

821
00:44:21,920 --> 00:44:24,959
Speaker 1: a bunch. That's why they have nuclear weapons. Yeah, James,

822
00:44:25,000 --> 00:44:25,719
Speaker 1: you want to talk about this?

823
00:44:25,920 --> 00:44:30,080
Speaker 2: Yeah, So this is a document that basically what it

824
00:44:30,360 --> 00:44:34,160
Speaker 2: alleges is that what has been alleged, perhaps incorrectly, is

825
00:44:34,440 --> 00:44:38,560
Speaker 2: that it was encouraging Mossad staff to attend protests against

826
00:44:38,640 --> 00:44:43,720
Speaker 2: net Yahoo when he was attempting his like auto goldpe,

827
00:44:44,000 --> 00:44:46,680
Speaker 2: like his coup from within, whatever you want to call that, right,

828
00:44:48,320 --> 00:44:51,160
Speaker 2: he was attempting to centralized power, right, yeah, yeah, yeah.

829
00:44:52,080 --> 00:44:55,680
Speaker 2: Now it's a leaked like you said, it's a document.

830
00:44:56,600 --> 00:45:00,800
Speaker 2: It says that I'm quoting from it or from reporting

831
00:45:00,880 --> 00:45:03,439
Speaker 2: on it. At least senior leaders of the Mossad spy

832
00:45:03,560 --> 00:45:07,200
Speaker 2: service advocated for Mossad officials and Israeli citizens to protest

833
00:45:07,239 --> 00:45:11,600
Speaker 2: the new Israeli governments proposed judicial reforms, including several explicit

834
00:45:11,680 --> 00:45:14,360
Speaker 2: calls to action that decried the Israeli government, according to

835
00:45:14,400 --> 00:45:22,399
Speaker 2: Singet Signals Intelligence the Infamy. So actually Netanyahu himself has

836
00:45:22,400 --> 00:45:26,440
Speaker 2: been asked about this, and it's worth he appointed the

837
00:45:26,520 --> 00:45:29,440
Speaker 2: Mossad director, a guy called David I think it's by Neya,

838
00:45:30,960 --> 00:45:35,240
Speaker 2: and he has also us He's on the record previously

839
00:45:35,280 --> 00:45:38,920
Speaker 2: in news media before this saying that he had clarified

840
00:45:38,920 --> 00:45:43,120
Speaker 2: to Mosad personnel who could attend protests and who could

841
00:45:43,200 --> 00:45:47,799
Speaker 2: not attend, like because at a certain point in any

842
00:45:47,840 --> 00:45:51,239
Speaker 2: of these things that you're not allowed to be explicitly political, right,

843
00:45:51,360 --> 00:45:54,120
Speaker 2: and folks, even at a very low point in the

844
00:45:54,160 --> 00:45:56,320
Speaker 2: US military that you're not supposed to say and do

845
00:45:56,440 --> 00:46:02,640
Speaker 2: certain things. So, uh, there was a petition that went

846
00:46:02,680 --> 00:46:06,760
Speaker 2: out earlier, and again this has already been reported. They

847
00:46:07,480 --> 00:46:11,040
Speaker 2: that were sent by intelligence offices basically saying like, we'll

848
00:46:11,040 --> 00:46:15,360
Speaker 2: go on strike. And there had been again like widely

849
00:46:15,400 --> 00:46:19,759
Speaker 2: reported instances other Israeli military people saying that they would

850
00:46:19,800 --> 00:46:22,160
Speaker 2: go on strike or not shot up for work if

851
00:46:22,440 --> 00:46:26,480
Speaker 2: these judicial reforms went ahead. So I think again it's

852
00:46:26,520 --> 00:46:31,520
Speaker 2: been kind of we've really stretched. What was interesting I

853
00:46:31,560 --> 00:46:35,879
Speaker 2: thought was that it had a Feiser label on fire

854
00:46:35,920 --> 00:46:40,520
Speaker 2: series to Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act and if people aren't familiar,

855
00:46:41,640 --> 00:46:47,160
Speaker 2: basically it allows US intelligence to wire tap things, which

856
00:46:47,880 --> 00:46:49,920
Speaker 2: they can do it without warrant if it doesn't include

857
00:46:49,920 --> 00:46:54,640
Speaker 2: a US person. So a US person is not just

858
00:46:54,680 --> 00:46:57,799
Speaker 2: a citizen but also maybe a permanent resident something like that, right,

859
00:46:57,880 --> 00:47:01,520
Speaker 2: like a person who has more rights than others in

860
00:47:01,560 --> 00:47:04,800
Speaker 2: the United States. But in this case they seem to

861
00:47:04,840 --> 00:47:08,520
Speaker 2: have got a fis a warrant, which it's very easy

862
00:47:08,560 --> 00:47:08,799
Speaker 2: to get.

863
00:47:08,840 --> 00:47:09,000
Speaker 6: Right.

864
00:47:09,040 --> 00:47:11,960
Speaker 2: It's like a closed courtroom procedure where they go to

865
00:47:12,000 --> 00:47:16,080
Speaker 2: a judge and like it's not like an adversarial argument.

866
00:47:16,120 --> 00:47:18,440
Speaker 2: Now's there's no one who argues that you should get

867
00:47:18,480 --> 00:47:22,120
Speaker 2: the warrant, and so in practice they really always get

868
00:47:22,120 --> 00:47:25,719
Speaker 2: these warrants. But what it showed they have to just

869
00:47:25,760 --> 00:47:28,920
Speaker 2: prove its intelligence asset of a foreign power, and so

870
00:47:29,160 --> 00:47:30,560
Speaker 2: it showed that at some point they went for a

871
00:47:30,640 --> 00:47:34,560
Speaker 2: judge and said like, hey, you know, we need to

872
00:47:34,680 --> 00:47:39,799
Speaker 2: wiretap some kind of some kind of communications or I'm

873
00:47:39,880 --> 00:47:43,120
Speaker 2: using wiretap in the broad sense, right specific sense. But

874
00:47:44,000 --> 00:47:47,960
Speaker 2: it's interesting I think that that they have some intelligence

875
00:47:48,000 --> 00:47:49,719
Speaker 2: asset in the United States and said, hey, we know

876
00:47:49,760 --> 00:47:52,799
Speaker 2: this an Israeli intelligence asset, and to be clear that

877
00:47:52,880 --> 00:47:54,279
Speaker 2: this could just be shit that's going in and out

878
00:47:54,280 --> 00:47:59,600
Speaker 2: of the embassy, and they've decided that that they needed

879
00:47:59,640 --> 00:48:01,680
Speaker 2: to wire that and keep an eye on that. Now,

880
00:48:02,719 --> 00:48:07,160
Speaker 2: given given that like it's Rail's foreign policies has been

881
00:48:07,200 --> 00:48:09,799
Speaker 2: talking terrible for decades, but nettan Yahoo is a new

882
00:48:09,840 --> 00:48:14,480
Speaker 2: degree of crazy. Uh, it is it's unsurprising that like

883
00:48:15,120 --> 00:48:19,560
Speaker 2: anyone concerned with I guess international relations would would want

884
00:48:19,600 --> 00:48:21,839
Speaker 2: to know more about what, yeah, is going on.

885
00:48:22,520 --> 00:48:25,560
Speaker 1: And again like that's it's interesting context. As you noted,

886
00:48:25,600 --> 00:48:29,279
Speaker 1: a lot of this had been reported out previously, so yeah,

887
00:48:29,320 --> 00:48:35,880
Speaker 1: we're it's it's just like it's it's it's all interesting again.

888
00:48:35,920 --> 00:48:38,839
Speaker 1: I'm my, my, my. My attitude here is like I'm

889
00:48:38,840 --> 00:48:41,319
Speaker 1: glad this information is out and I don't really care

890
00:48:41,360 --> 00:48:44,680
Speaker 1: what happens to Jack techsi Era. Like, yeah, in my

891
00:48:44,880 --> 00:48:49,560
Speaker 1: in my ideal world, the policing infrastructure that's come down

892
00:48:49,640 --> 00:48:55,319
Speaker 1: on this kid would not exist. But he made this

893
00:48:55,400 --> 00:48:58,759
Speaker 1: decision knowing full well what happens when you leak top

894
00:48:58,760 --> 00:49:00,480
Speaker 1: se Like it's one of those things where it's like,

895
00:49:00,560 --> 00:49:03,279
Speaker 1: just just within the context of shit that's fucked up

896
00:49:03,280 --> 00:49:05,480
Speaker 1: in our country. The thing I'm going to be upset

897
00:49:05,520 --> 00:49:09,480
Speaker 1: about is not a kid leaking top secret info to

898
00:49:09,600 --> 00:49:13,440
Speaker 1: win an online argument and then having it blow up

899
00:49:13,440 --> 00:49:15,960
Speaker 1: on him, right, Like, especially not a kid who's a

900
00:49:15,960 --> 00:49:18,200
Speaker 1: fucking Nazi. At the end of the day, he did

901
00:49:18,280 --> 00:49:20,840
Speaker 1: something that was obviously done. It's like if some guy

902
00:49:21,160 --> 00:49:24,560
Speaker 1: hops on Twitter under his real name and starts posting

903
00:49:24,600 --> 00:49:27,480
Speaker 1: pictures of heroin and saying, hey, guys, this is my

904
00:49:27,560 --> 00:49:31,080
Speaker 1: name and address. I'm selling hella heroin. Here's photos of

905
00:49:31,080 --> 00:49:34,200
Speaker 1: a felony quantity of heroin and guns. Well, I think

906
00:49:34,239 --> 00:49:37,680
Speaker 1: heroin should be legal, but I'm not gonna like, I'm

907
00:49:37,680 --> 00:49:40,160
Speaker 1: not gonna like make a crusade out of that guy's arrest,

908
00:49:40,239 --> 00:49:44,600
Speaker 1: because that's stupid. Like, you know what happens if you post, Hey,

909
00:49:44,800 --> 00:49:47,480
Speaker 1: here is my at home address and name. Here is

910
00:49:47,520 --> 00:49:50,319
Speaker 1: all of the heroin I'm selling. Yeah, you'll probably get

911
00:49:50,320 --> 00:49:54,720
Speaker 1: in trouble because you have posted online a serious crime.

912
00:49:54,840 --> 00:49:57,719
Speaker 1: Obviously that could be a problem for you. That's just

913
00:49:57,800 --> 00:50:00,360
Speaker 1: not my primary concern in the world when people do

914
00:50:00,440 --> 00:50:03,759
Speaker 1: really stupid shit and it blows up on them, and

915
00:50:03,800 --> 00:50:07,759
Speaker 1: it's like again, leakers, you look at the way Manning proceeded,

916
00:50:07,840 --> 00:50:10,880
Speaker 1: You look at the way Snowden proceeded. They were aware

917
00:50:11,000 --> 00:50:13,160
Speaker 1: of the danger of what they were doing. I mean,

918
00:50:13,239 --> 00:50:16,200
Speaker 1: you know, Chelsea did years in fucking prison. Snowden fled

919
00:50:16,239 --> 00:50:16,760
Speaker 1: the country.

920
00:50:18,200 --> 00:50:21,879
Speaker 7: That's there because they were whistleblowers. They under they under

921
00:50:22,000 --> 00:50:25,840
Speaker 7: they understood this is a serious like this is very illegal,

922
00:50:25,840 --> 00:50:27,800
Speaker 7: and I have to try to take steps to protect

923
00:50:27,800 --> 00:50:31,640
Speaker 7: myself because the government's going to come after me. The

924
00:50:31,680 --> 00:50:33,920
Speaker 7: thing about Jack is like just the level of like

925
00:50:34,080 --> 00:50:36,839
Speaker 7: arrogance that like I can post this shit all day

926
00:50:36,880 --> 00:50:39,719
Speaker 7: long and nothing will happen. It was like, well, for

927
00:50:39,760 --> 00:50:43,480
Speaker 7: one thing, this is never going like it's information you're

928
00:50:43,520 --> 00:50:45,719
Speaker 7: posting online, Like I don't care. There's no way to

929
00:50:45,800 --> 00:50:49,440
Speaker 7: keep stuff completely contained within a thirty person discord. It's

930
00:50:49,480 --> 00:50:52,200
Speaker 7: going to leak out, and when it is, the government's

931
00:50:52,200 --> 00:50:54,319
Speaker 7: gonna want to know who the fuck is leaking this ship.

932
00:50:54,760 --> 00:50:57,760
Speaker 7: And you took like took pictures of this shit inside

933
00:50:57,760 --> 00:51:00,960
Speaker 7: his home, like it's just dumb. I'm not gonna like.

934
00:51:01,360 --> 00:51:03,359
Speaker 1: I don't at the end of the day, I have

935
00:51:04,040 --> 00:51:07,120
Speaker 1: no room in my sympathy for like a a fucking

936
00:51:07,200 --> 00:51:10,680
Speaker 1: fascy kid who committed the dumbest crime possible and got

937
00:51:10,719 --> 00:51:12,960
Speaker 1: in trouble. Like I don't know, there's there's people who

938
00:51:13,400 --> 00:51:15,680
Speaker 1: I don't know. For example, we're camping in a forest

939
00:51:15,719 --> 00:51:20,359
Speaker 1: and are getting charged with terrorism and facing longer penalties. Right,

940
00:51:20,680 --> 00:51:22,960
Speaker 1: Jack might do fifteen years at the most, which is

941
00:51:23,000 --> 00:51:26,280
Speaker 1: like fucked up, I guess, But you know, there's people

942
00:51:26,320 --> 00:51:30,680
Speaker 1: facing a lot worse for a lot less and I just,

943
00:51:30,920 --> 00:51:34,200
Speaker 1: you know, whatever, I don't care what happens to this kid.

944
00:51:34,480 --> 00:51:38,360
Speaker 1: He seems like he sucks. I think the leaks are interesting.

945
00:51:38,800 --> 00:51:42,239
Speaker 1: There's nothing in here that's like fundamentally changed my understanding

946
00:51:42,280 --> 00:51:46,319
Speaker 1: of geopolitics, though, Yeah, that's where I am.

947
00:51:46,440 --> 00:51:47,080
Speaker 6: I would agree.

948
00:51:47,120 --> 00:51:49,760
Speaker 2: It is a useful reminder to keep your crime offline.

949
00:51:50,280 --> 00:51:57,760
Speaker 1: Yeah, don't continue, continue to not post crimes on the internet. Again.

950
00:51:57,800 --> 00:52:00,920
Speaker 1: If you're selling Heroin, don't post on Twitter. Here is

951
00:52:00,960 --> 00:52:03,160
Speaker 1: my name and home address. Anyone want to buy some

952
00:52:03,200 --> 00:52:06,760
Speaker 1: fucking China white, that's not a great idea.

953
00:52:07,200 --> 00:52:10,279
Speaker 3: If anyone has any top secret documents, you can find

954
00:52:10,280 --> 00:52:12,280
Speaker 3: me on the Star Wars the Old Republic forums.

955
00:52:13,360 --> 00:52:14,960
Speaker 4: Just just post, just post them there.

956
00:52:15,360 --> 00:52:18,960
Speaker 3: Yeah, I am part of the Jedi Initiative program, so

957
00:52:19,160 --> 00:52:21,320
Speaker 3: just locate that and it'll be you.

958
00:52:21,800 --> 00:52:23,200
Speaker 4: I'm sure, I'm sure I'll see it.

959
00:52:23,520 --> 00:52:27,279
Speaker 1: Yeah, I am on the the the NOZDRMO server on

960
00:52:27,360 --> 00:52:30,160
Speaker 1: World of Warcraft. You can just hit me up under

961
00:52:30,280 --> 00:52:33,160
Speaker 1: my uh my given name. Just d M me and

962
00:52:33,680 --> 00:52:35,360
Speaker 1: we'll figure it out. You can send that ship to

963
00:52:35,400 --> 00:52:38,600
Speaker 1: me over AOL instant messenger. That's how I take all

964
00:52:38,600 --> 00:52:41,200
Speaker 1: of my leaks. Some secure platform.

965
00:52:41,600 --> 00:52:44,040
Speaker 2: You can find me in a Mountain Project comments section

966
00:52:44,080 --> 00:52:45,280
Speaker 2: where only good things happen.

967
00:52:45,400 --> 00:52:49,680
Speaker 1: So we're all on war Thunder too, so you can

968
00:52:49,719 --> 00:52:51,840
Speaker 1: get there too for work reasons.

969
00:52:51,920 --> 00:52:56,080
Speaker 2: Yeah, I'll be shipped talking your your grading problem, but

970
00:52:56,120 --> 00:52:58,280
Speaker 2: also accepting national security leaks.

971
00:52:58,680 --> 00:53:02,040
Speaker 1: Yeah, we do, we do it all, all right, everybody.

972
00:53:02,080 --> 00:53:06,160
Speaker 1: That's an episode.

973
00:53:07,400 --> 00:53:09,880
Speaker 4: It Could Happen Here as a production of cool Zone Media.

974
00:53:09,960 --> 00:53:12,640
Speaker 1: For more podcasts from cool Zone Media, visit our website

975
00:53:12,680 --> 00:53:15,799
Speaker 1: coolzonemedia dot com or check us out on the iHeartRadio app,

976
00:53:15,840 --> 00:53:18,400
Speaker 1: Apple Podcasts, or wherever you listen to podcasts.

977
00:53:18,920 --> 00:53:21,080
Speaker 3: You can find sources for It could Happen Here, updated

978
00:53:21,120 --> 00:53:24,160
Speaker 3: monthly at coolzonemedia dot com slash sources.

979
00:53:24,360 --> 00:53:25,120
Speaker 4: Thanks for listening.