WEBVTT - This Week at the Supreme Court 0:00:02.759 --> 0:00:07.000 This is Bloomberg Law with June Grossel from Bloomberg Radio. 0:00:08.600 --> 0:00:13.000 The Supreme Court's conservatives appear poised to give the president 0:00:13.160 --> 0:00:18.439 control over dozens of independent federal agencies. At oral arguments 0:00:18.480 --> 0:00:23.320 on Monday, they suggested they will allow President Trump to 0:00:23.440 --> 0:00:27.920 fire Rebecca Kelly Slaughter from the Federal Trade Commission, despite 0:00:27.920 --> 0:00:31.160 a law that says commissioners can only be fired for 0:00:31.240 --> 0:00:36.000 specific reasons. The liberal justices, like Sonya so to Mayor 0:00:36.040 --> 0:00:40.480 and Elena Kagan, expressed alarm at giving the president such 0:00:40.720 --> 0:00:47.120 unchecked authority over agencies that overlook crucial areas like nuclear energy, 0:00:47.320 --> 0:00:50.440 consumer products safety, and labor relations. 0:00:51.080 --> 0:00:55.600 You're asking us to destroy the structure of government and 0:00:55.680 --> 0:01:01.280 to take away from Congress its ability to protect its 0:01:01.400 --> 0:01:07.080 idea that the government is better structured with some agencies 0:01:07.440 --> 0:01:08.360 that are independent. 0:01:09.360 --> 0:01:12.720 So the result of what you want is that the 0:01:12.760 --> 0:01:17.679 president is going to have massive, unchecked, uncontrolled power not 0:01:17.760 --> 0:01:21.320 only to do traditional execution but to make law. 0:01:21.600 --> 0:01:26.440 But the conservative justice is, like Brett Kavanaugh and Neil Gorsuch, say, 0:01:26.480 --> 0:01:31.480 the real concern is Congress's creation of agencies that exercise 0:01:31.600 --> 0:01:35.120 executive power but can't be held accountable. 0:01:35.680 --> 0:01:40.440 Independent agencies are not accountable to the people. They're not elected, 0:01:41.600 --> 0:01:44.679 as Congress and the President are and are exercising massive 0:01:45.400 --> 0:01:50.680 power over individual liberty and billion dollar industries, whether it's 0:01:50.680 --> 0:01:52.920 the FCC or the FTC or whatever it might be. 0:01:54.040 --> 0:01:57.680 Tomorrow, we could have the Labor Commission, the Education Commission, 0:01:58.760 --> 0:02:04.000 the Environmental Commission, and rather than Departments of Interior and 0:02:04.040 --> 0:02:04.639 so forth. 0:02:05.240 --> 0:02:09.360 In allowing the president to fire the heads of independent agencies, 0:02:09.639 --> 0:02:13.360 the court would be overturning a ninety year old president 0:02:13.680 --> 0:02:18.640 called Humphreys executor that protects their independence. My guest is 0:02:18.720 --> 0:02:23.560 constitutional law expert William Traynor, a professor at Georgetown Law 0:02:23.960 --> 0:02:28.200 Bill tell us about the issues in Rebecca Slaughter's case 0:02:28.240 --> 0:02:29.960 against Trump for firing her. 0:02:30.480 --> 0:02:33.640 The issue before the screen Court is that Congress puts 0:02:33.639 --> 0:02:38.120 the limits on when the president and fire the heads 0:02:38.160 --> 0:02:41.520 of independent agencies. So an independent agency is like the 0:02:41.560 --> 0:02:45.919 Federal Trade Commission or the Federal Reserve. So really, since 0:02:46.080 --> 0:02:49.200 the start of the Constitution, Congress has imposed limits on 0:02:49.840 --> 0:02:52.440 when the president can fired these people. The question in 0:02:52.520 --> 0:02:56.120 the case is whether that's unconstitutional, Whether the president can 0:02:56.240 --> 0:02:59.320 fire the head of an independent agency for any reason, 0:02:59.600 --> 0:03:02.400 even if Congress has said they can only fire them, 0:03:02.600 --> 0:03:06.000 you know, if they're engaged in bad behavior. So this 0:03:06.040 --> 0:03:08.640 is a very big deal. So much of a government 0:03:08.680 --> 0:03:11.840 structure that protects people in different ways or regulates the 0:03:11.880 --> 0:03:15.560 economy is done through independent agencies. Congress has wanted to 0:03:15.760 --> 0:03:20.079 insulate them from total executive control, and the Supreme Court 0:03:20.160 --> 0:03:23.040 is deciding right now whether, in fact, the president has 0:03:23.040 --> 0:03:25.160 the kind of control that comes with being able to 0:03:25.200 --> 0:03:26.720 fire the leaders of the agencies. 0:03:27.040 --> 0:03:29.640 In these oral arguments, you often hear the Supreme Court 0:03:29.919 --> 0:03:33.480 justices say, well, that's a job for Congress. You know, 0:03:33.639 --> 0:03:36.960 that's not something that we should be interfering in. So 0:03:37.080 --> 0:03:40.360 why are they interfering here where Congress has set up 0:03:40.400 --> 0:03:42.480 these agencies and the rules. 0:03:43.080 --> 0:03:45.320 That's a great question. There had been so many times 0:03:45.320 --> 0:03:48.560 in which the Court is saying, this is a political matter, 0:03:49.280 --> 0:03:52.360 we shouldn't be deciding. But at the same time, the 0:03:52.480 --> 0:03:57.080 conservative justices of the Court are very dedicated to what's 0:03:57.120 --> 0:04:01.120 called the unitary executive theory, which means that the president 0:04:01.320 --> 0:04:05.080 is in total charge of the executive branch. So what 0:04:05.120 --> 0:04:08.520 they're saying here is Congress doesn't get to be involved. 0:04:08.720 --> 0:04:11.880 The president is in total charge of the executive branch, 0:04:11.960 --> 0:04:15.680 including what have historically been things like the independent agencies. 0:04:15.760 --> 0:04:18.440 That is kind of one of the core commitments that 0:04:18.640 --> 0:04:21.920 has really been at the basis of what Keef Justice 0:04:22.000 --> 0:04:24.760 Roberts has thought really going back to when he was 0:04:24.800 --> 0:04:27.279 a young attorney, and that's the same thing for most 0:04:27.279 --> 0:04:29.720 of the members of the whole conservative wing. 0:04:30.200 --> 0:04:34.719 What kind of concerns did the conservative justices express during 0:04:34.760 --> 0:04:40.760 the oral arguments about this ninety year old President Humphrey's executor. 0:04:41.360 --> 0:04:44.360 There are two things that we're seeing the conservative wing 0:04:44.400 --> 0:04:47.560 of the Court struggle with. One is they want the 0:04:47.720 --> 0:04:52.720 Federal Reserve to continue to be independent. They don't want 0:04:52.880 --> 0:04:55.680 the president to be able to fire somebody on the 0:04:55.680 --> 0:04:58.520 Federal Reserve. And they don't want that because you know, 0:04:58.680 --> 0:05:01.880 that would be terrible for the economy. If the Federal 0:05:01.920 --> 0:05:04.800 Reserve is setting interest rates just in order to help 0:05:04.839 --> 0:05:07.680 the president rather than to help the economy, that would 0:05:07.720 --> 0:05:10.560 be a disaster, be a disaster for the market, the 0:05:10.600 --> 0:05:13.680 disaster for the economy as a whole. So the conservative 0:05:13.680 --> 0:05:17.480 wing of the Court i think wants to overturn Humphrey's executor, 0:05:17.640 --> 0:05:20.800 but they're trying to come up with some rationale in 0:05:20.920 --> 0:05:24.200 which they can say the president can fire somebody on 0:05:24.240 --> 0:05:28.040 the FTC, but he can't fire somebody on the Federal Reserve. 0:05:28.480 --> 0:05:30.880 And they're going to be looking at the Federal Reserve 0:05:31.200 --> 0:05:34.560 later in the term. That's a big concern for them. 0:05:34.600 --> 0:05:37.719 So I think that animates all of the conservative justices 0:05:37.720 --> 0:05:40.080 of the Court. I think also, you know, what I'm 0:05:40.080 --> 0:05:43.240 hearing with the Chief Justices, what he's trying to do 0:05:43.440 --> 0:05:45.960 is to come up with some way in which there's 0:05:46.040 --> 0:05:50.919 some agencies where Congress can in fact limit the president's 0:05:50.960 --> 0:05:54.479 ability to fire people. And he's thinking about, you know, 0:05:54.560 --> 0:05:57.279 are the ones that are essentially kind of judicial in 0:05:57.360 --> 0:06:00.480 their function, and you know, that may be an area 0:06:00.600 --> 0:06:04.159 in which Congress can establish requirements or when the prison 0:06:04.200 --> 0:06:07.200 can terminate somebody, but that's not the Federal Trade Commission. 0:06:07.279 --> 0:06:10.960 Federal Trade Commission is not making the judicial decisions, you know, 0:06:11.040 --> 0:06:14.720 it's very much deciding executive type rules. So I think 0:06:14.720 --> 0:06:17.320 we're seeing two things on the conservative wing of the Court. 0:06:17.800 --> 0:06:20.360 One is they're trying to come up with some way 0:06:20.400 --> 0:06:22.880 in which they can say the President can fire somebody 0:06:22.960 --> 0:06:25.720 the FDC, but not at the FED. And I think 0:06:25.920 --> 0:06:28.159 the Chief is trying to come up with some way 0:06:28.160 --> 0:06:31.160 in which there's some type of agencies in which the 0:06:31.200 --> 0:06:34.320 president can be limited by Congress, but those would be 0:06:34.320 --> 0:06:37.680 ones that are really deciding kind of fuzzi judicial matters, 0:06:38.120 --> 0:06:38.960 not the FDC. 0:06:39.440 --> 0:06:42.680 The liberals painted a dire picture of what would happen 0:06:42.720 --> 0:06:45.800 if Trump wins here. Just as Soto Mayor said to 0:06:45.880 --> 0:06:49.560 the Solicitor General, you're asking us to destroy the structure 0:06:49.640 --> 0:06:52.400 of government. Do you think it's that serious. 0:06:53.160 --> 0:06:56.239 I think that's absolutely right. You know, we have had 0:06:56.440 --> 0:07:01.200 independent agencies which largely exists to protect peace with limited power, 0:07:01.640 --> 0:07:04.120 you know, and they've been in place really for one 0:07:04.200 --> 0:07:07.240 hundred years. And the idea is that these should be 0:07:07.320 --> 0:07:12.160 basically bipartisan or apolitical. They should not just be tools 0:07:12.160 --> 0:07:14.640 of the president. So what the court is considering right 0:07:14.680 --> 0:07:17.640 now is whether that whole kind of structure gets got it. 0:07:17.960 --> 0:07:20.480 So the stakes on this are huge. 0:07:20.840 --> 0:07:26.400 Well, President Trump wasn't specifically mentioned by name, two of 0:07:26.440 --> 0:07:32.360 the liberal justices, Elina Kagan and Katanji Brown Jackson, did 0:07:32.440 --> 0:07:37.280 make broad references to his firing of experts and dismantling 0:07:37.360 --> 0:07:39.080 of the Department of Education. 0:07:39.800 --> 0:07:43.360 That the more realistic danger here is that we'll have 0:07:43.400 --> 0:07:47.800 an education department, as authorized by Congress by law that 0:07:47.920 --> 0:07:49.640 won't have any employees in it. 0:07:50.920 --> 0:07:55.400 Having a president come in and fire all the scientists 0:07:55.440 --> 0:07:58.520 and the doctors and the economists and the PhDs and 0:07:58.560 --> 0:08:03.280 replacing them with loyalists and people who don't know anything 0:08:03.520 --> 0:08:06.280 is actually not in the best interest of the citizens 0:08:06.280 --> 0:08:07.640 of the United States. 0:08:07.720 --> 0:08:09.880 You know, what we're seeing right now is that in 0:08:09.920 --> 0:08:14.400 the Trump administration, you know, the independent agencies and all 0:08:14.440 --> 0:08:17.800 of the government washtoogs, there's an attempt to politicize them 0:08:17.840 --> 0:08:20.320 in a way that you know, we've never seen before. 0:08:20.520 --> 0:08:23.440 So the stakes are very different, and they're much higher. 0:08:23.960 --> 0:08:29.200 If Humphrey's executor has been overturned in President bush forty 0:08:29.240 --> 0:08:32.960 threes administration, the stakes would have been very different because 0:08:33.240 --> 0:08:37.600 President Bush was not focused on making independent agencies kind 0:08:37.600 --> 0:08:40.040 of the tool for his politics. But that's what we're 0:08:40.040 --> 0:08:42.880 seeing with President Trump, and that's why the stakes are 0:08:42.880 --> 0:08:46.720 so high. They've always been big, but in this administration, 0:08:47.040 --> 0:08:50.280 where there's such an attempt to kind of move away 0:08:50.400 --> 0:08:55.480 from scientific expertise and neutral decision making to control every 0:08:55.559 --> 0:08:59.040 part of the executive branch, the stakes are huge. And 0:08:59.080 --> 0:09:03.760 that's really part of what those three liberal justices we're questioning. 0:09:04.120 --> 0:09:06.480 You know, the other thing that they really are focusing 0:09:06.520 --> 0:09:09.720 in an honor. First of all, it's very very hard 0:09:10.040 --> 0:09:13.200 to come up with some line where you can say, 0:09:13.240 --> 0:09:16.720 Congress can limit the president's ability to fire the heads 0:09:16.760 --> 0:09:20.120 of the sec they can't fire at will the heads 0:09:20.120 --> 0:09:22.160 of the set. And I can't think of any kind 0:09:22.200 --> 0:09:25.839 of coherent way to distinguish those two cases. And that's 0:09:25.880 --> 0:09:28.240 one of the things that the liberals were pressing on. 0:09:28.559 --> 0:09:30.560 You know, I think they're also pressing on the history. 0:09:30.640 --> 0:09:32.720 If you look at the constitutions, the text of the 0:09:32.760 --> 0:09:35.840 constitutions doesn't say that the president gets to fire people 0:09:35.920 --> 0:09:38.800 in the executive rection. It doesn't deal with removal at all. 0:09:39.000 --> 0:09:42.240 So there's not a text that really helps the conservative 0:09:42.240 --> 0:09:45.600 way of the Court and Congress really, starting in the 0:09:45.760 --> 0:09:50.440 Washington administration, limited the president's ability to fire people running 0:09:50.480 --> 0:09:53.440 agencies kind of what was analogous to modern agencies at 0:09:53.440 --> 0:09:55.800 the time. So I think what the liberals on the 0:09:55.840 --> 0:09:59.040 Court are focusing on are the text, the original understanding, 0:09:59.320 --> 0:10:03.240 as well as the huge consequences of essentially giving the 0:10:03.320 --> 0:10:06.319 president the power to politicize all of the dependent agencies. 0:10:06.400 --> 0:10:09.480 I wonder what happens when there is a democratic president. 0:10:09.840 --> 0:10:13.800 Do the conservatives then try to limit the ruling they're 0:10:13.840 --> 0:10:14.559 expected to make. 0:10:14.640 --> 0:10:14.840 Here. 0:10:15.200 --> 0:10:17.720 You know, one of the reasons why I think that 0:10:18.120 --> 0:10:22.160 the Court should not overturn Humphrey's Executor is to the 0:10:22.200 --> 0:10:25.560 extent that you have any kind of political terms, you're 0:10:25.600 --> 0:10:28.800 giving a democratic president the power to do exactly what 0:10:28.920 --> 0:10:32.680 President Trump is doing, to politicize every independent agency in 0:10:32.679 --> 0:10:35.000 the way that that president wants, you know. And then 0:10:35.240 --> 0:10:38.280 how does a conservative court say, well, you know, Humphrey 0:10:38.320 --> 0:10:41.640 Executors is back. Once you establish a rule, you know, 0:10:41.679 --> 0:10:44.600 it applies to everybody. And that's something that they really 0:10:44.640 --> 0:10:47.320 have to think true because of the long term consequences, 0:10:47.400 --> 0:10:50.280 because I don't think they would feel comfortable, you know, 0:10:50.360 --> 0:10:54.680 with limiting a democratic president after they allow President Trump 0:10:54.800 --> 0:10:56.559 to fire people whenever he wants. 0:10:56.880 --> 0:11:00.000 So then you think this is the end of Humphrey's executs. 0:11:00.800 --> 0:11:04.360 Yeah, I think they will completely overrule Humphrey's Executor. I 0:11:04.360 --> 0:11:08.600 think the one question for me is whether the Chief 0:11:08.960 --> 0:11:13.199 comes up with some limiting principle in which if there 0:11:13.280 --> 0:11:18.040 are you know, quasi judicial independent agencies, then Congress can 0:11:18.080 --> 0:11:21.120 put limitations on the president's ability to fire. But you know, 0:11:21.200 --> 0:11:23.520 the basic point is I think they're going to overturn 0:11:23.600 --> 0:11:26.760 Humphrey's executive So I think what the Court will try 0:11:26.800 --> 0:11:30.200 to do is to say the president can't fire Jerome Power, 0:11:30.400 --> 0:11:32.600 can't fire at least a cook. But you know, I 0:11:32.600 --> 0:11:35.439 don't think that that is a coherent approach, you know, 0:11:35.480 --> 0:11:37.560 because I think it would be based on history, but 0:11:37.640 --> 0:11:38.880 the history doesn't support it. 0:11:39.240 --> 0:11:42.960 Well. We often see some strained interpretations of history from 0:11:42.960 --> 0:11:47.199 this court. Thanks so much, Bill. That's Georgetown law professor 0:11:47.240 --> 0:11:51.360 William Trainor coming up next. The Court grapples with caps 0:11:51.440 --> 0:11:55.520 on campaign spending. I'm June Grosso and you're listening to Bloomberg. 0:11:57.000 --> 0:12:00.720 The Supreme Court is considering a Republican led effort to 0:12:00.800 --> 0:12:05.760 erase yet another campaign finance regulation, this time the federal 0:12:05.800 --> 0:12:09.240 caps that limit how much political parties can spend in 0:12:09.320 --> 0:12:13.200 coordination with candidates. It's the latest in a line of 0:12:13.280 --> 0:12:18.840 cases where the conservative majority has upended congressionally enacted limits 0:12:18.840 --> 0:12:22.920 on raising and spending money to influence elections, and two 0:12:23.000 --> 0:12:27.800 hours of arguments on Tuesday showed the entrenched divisions between 0:12:27.840 --> 0:12:33.400 the liberal and conservative justices over campaign finance restrictions. Liberal 0:12:33.640 --> 0:12:38.040 Justice Sonya Sotomayor said that every time the Court interferes 0:12:38.280 --> 0:12:43.600 weakening campaign finance rules, it makes matters worse. While conservative 0:12:43.800 --> 0:12:48.000 Justice Brett Kavanaugh said that spending limits have hurt political 0:12:48.080 --> 0:12:52.439 parties in an era of unlimited spending by other organizations. 0:12:53.440 --> 0:12:58.120 You're telling us that Citizens United and McCutcheon ended up 0:12:58.720 --> 0:13:03.679 yes in ample find the voice of corporations, but diminishing 0:13:03.800 --> 0:13:07.280 another voice, that of the party. Now you want to 0:13:07.360 --> 0:13:12.200 now tinker some more and try to raise the voice 0:13:12.200 --> 0:13:16.000 of one party. Our tinkering causes more harm than it 0:13:16.040 --> 0:13:16.600 does good. 0:13:17.400 --> 0:13:19.880 That's the real source of the disadvantage. Right, you can 0:13:19.880 --> 0:13:23.160 give huge money to the outside group, but you can't 0:13:23.200 --> 0:13:25.320 give huge money of the party. So the parties are 0:13:25.400 --> 0:13:27.720 very much weakened compared to the outside groups. 0:13:28.200 --> 0:13:32.640 Chief Justice John Roberts, a potentially pivotal vote, said he 0:13:32.679 --> 0:13:36.839 didn't see much difference between contribution limits, which the Court 0:13:36.880 --> 0:13:40.920 has long upheld, and the caps on coordinated expenditures. 0:13:41.480 --> 0:13:44.800 It seems to me that that's kind of a fiction that, oh, 0:13:44.880 --> 0:13:49.200 you know, they're just coordinating expenditures, they're not making direct contributions. 0:13:49.240 --> 0:13:51.160 I don't know in substance what the difference is. 0:13:51.640 --> 0:13:55.280 Doing away with the caps would overturn a quarter century 0:13:55.320 --> 0:13:58.680 old precedent. In the same week, the court appears ready 0:13:58.720 --> 0:14:02.560 to overturn an ninety year old president and allow President 0:14:02.600 --> 0:14:06.440 Trump to fire the heads of independent agencies. Joining me 0:14:06.520 --> 0:14:10.360 is an expert on campaign finance reform, Richard Brofald, a 0:14:10.440 --> 0:14:14.000 professor at Columbia Law School. Rich Well, you start by 0:14:14.040 --> 0:14:18.760 explaining the federal caps on spending by political parties in 0:14:18.840 --> 0:14:20.359 coordination with candidates. 0:14:20.880 --> 0:14:23.440 So the Federal Russian Campaign Act, going back to the 0:14:23.600 --> 0:14:27.200 nineteen seventies when it was enacted in the aftermath of Artegate, 0:14:27.440 --> 0:14:31.640 places limits on donations to candidates, and it also places 0:14:31.680 --> 0:14:34.800 limits on donations to parties. It does something else, It 0:14:34.840 --> 0:14:38.480 places limits on how much parties can give to candidates, 0:14:38.760 --> 0:14:41.840 on the theory that donors, once they max out on 0:14:41.880 --> 0:14:43.840 how much the donor can give directly to a candidate, 0:14:43.960 --> 0:14:46.040 will then just give to a party to chanting the 0:14:46.080 --> 0:14:48.040 money to a candidate. So there's a limit on how 0:14:48.120 --> 0:14:50.080 much the parties can give to their candidates. And that 0:14:50.120 --> 0:14:52.560 comes up in two ways. One is a literal limit 0:14:52.600 --> 0:14:56.040 on contributions actually writing a check, but the parties are 0:14:56.080 --> 0:14:59.800 also allowed to engage in their own spending in support 0:14:59.840 --> 0:15:03.560 of candidates, and that's called coordinated expenditures. In other words, 0:15:03.560 --> 0:15:05.800 the party does the spending, they don't give the candidate 0:15:05.840 --> 0:15:08.480 a check, but they do spending to promote the candidate. 0:15:08.600 --> 0:15:11.120 Parties are allowed to do that, but the law places 0:15:11.240 --> 0:15:15.400 a limit on how much money they can spend supporting candidates. 0:15:15.800 --> 0:15:18.360 And again for the same idea that if there is 0:15:18.400 --> 0:15:21.400 no limit on how much they could support candidates through spending. 0:15:21.880 --> 0:15:24.400 Once again, donors who once they max out on the 0:15:24.440 --> 0:15:26.760 direct donation to the candidate would then just give to 0:15:26.800 --> 0:15:29.360 the parties and the parties could then use that money 0:15:29.400 --> 0:15:32.680 to basically support their candidates. But parties are allowed to 0:15:32.720 --> 0:15:34.880 do this in a way that other organizations are not. 0:15:35.160 --> 0:15:38.000 Packs are not allowed to coordinate at all with candidates, 0:15:38.320 --> 0:15:42.200 so parties get this extra permission to support the candidates directly, 0:15:42.600 --> 0:15:45.000 but with a cap on it, and it varies from 0:15:45.040 --> 0:15:47.760 state to state based on the population of the state. 0:15:48.040 --> 0:15:49.840 And what's going on in this case is. 0:15:49.800 --> 0:15:53.480 The National Republican Senate Campaign Committee and JD. Vance, who 0:15:53.800 --> 0:15:56.400 this case began was a Senator and a congressman from 0:15:56.400 --> 0:15:59.760 Ohio has since retired, have all brought suit challenging this 0:15:59.840 --> 0:16:03.720 limit on the ability of parties to coordinate their spending 0:16:03.760 --> 0:16:05.200 with candidates. 0:16:04.880 --> 0:16:07.120 And there's a longstanding precedent here. 0:16:07.720 --> 0:16:09.240 Almost twenty five years ago. 0:16:09.320 --> 0:16:12.120 The Supreme Court upheld this limit in a case called 0:16:12.200 --> 0:16:14.720 Colorado Republican Sided in two thousand and one, and the 0:16:14.800 --> 0:16:18.240 Court said yes, because of the danger of conduits a 0:16:18.320 --> 0:16:22.360 party serving as conduits for donor support, these limits make 0:16:22.400 --> 0:16:25.160 sense and are constitutional. Well, the Supreme Court is being 0:16:25.160 --> 0:16:28.280 asked basically now, is to overturn that decision. 0:16:28.560 --> 0:16:32.120 One of the concerns of the liberal justices was that 0:16:32.320 --> 0:16:36.080 lifting the limits on party spending would lead to quid 0:16:36.120 --> 0:16:41.160 pro quo bribery, so wealthy donors could bypass the individual 0:16:41.280 --> 0:16:44.920 contribution limits by donating through parties instead. 0:16:45.440 --> 0:16:47.080 I mean, that is the major concern of the liberal 0:16:47.200 --> 0:16:51.120 justices and of a call the campaign finance reform community 0:16:51.360 --> 0:16:54.600 as a whole, is that this will put another hole 0:16:54.920 --> 0:16:57.680 in the campaign finance laws and make it easier for 0:16:57.880 --> 0:17:01.280 wealthy donors to channel money to candidates. There's still limits 0:17:01.320 --> 0:17:04.280 on their ability to give directly, but this would enable 0:17:04.320 --> 0:17:06.680 them to give through the parties and so that money 0:17:06.680 --> 0:17:07.679 would still get to candidate. 0:17:07.760 --> 0:17:09.520 So yeah, that is the core concern. 0:17:09.880 --> 0:17:12.480 A second concern is, depending on how the Court writes 0:17:12.520 --> 0:17:15.639 this decision, it could be the green light for further 0:17:15.800 --> 0:17:19.320 challenges to other aspects of the campaign finance laws, depending 0:17:19.359 --> 0:17:20.399 on exactly how. 0:17:20.280 --> 0:17:20.840 They write this. 0:17:21.400 --> 0:17:25.040 So it's both upfront making it easier to channel money 0:17:25.080 --> 0:17:28.919 from donors to candidates, and also yet one more case 0:17:29.359 --> 0:17:33.480 eroding Congress's ability to place limits on campaign money. 0:17:33.720 --> 0:17:39.000 The Administration and the Republican's argument centers on free speech 0:17:39.080 --> 0:17:45.000 right as these campaign finance cases since Citizens United have done. 0:17:45.359 --> 0:17:47.960 The essential argument is that this is a limit on 0:17:47.960 --> 0:17:50.240 the ability of parties to speak, and that you don't 0:17:50.240 --> 0:17:54.840 need it. That the combination of disclosure laws, anti bribery laws, 0:17:55.040 --> 0:17:59.000 and limits on literally earmarking that's the term, that's use 0:17:59.240 --> 0:18:01.800 a donation that our donor gives to a party to 0:18:01.840 --> 0:18:04.320 be used for a candidate, that that's enough. That those 0:18:04.359 --> 0:18:08.240 three things banning bribes, requiring disclosure, and saying that when 0:18:08.240 --> 0:18:11.120 a donor gives a party a donation, they can't literally 0:18:11.160 --> 0:18:13.360 say this is going to candidate so and so, that 0:18:13.359 --> 0:18:15.919 that's enough, and that to go beyond that is to 0:18:15.960 --> 0:18:18.840 constrain the ability of parties as free speech actors, as 0:18:18.840 --> 0:18:21.360 First Amendment actors, to participate in political process. 0:18:21.840 --> 0:18:25.040 Just as Brett Kavanaugh said, you can give huge money 0:18:25.080 --> 0:18:27.359 to the outside group, but you can't give huge money 0:18:27.359 --> 0:18:30.040 to the party, and so the parties are very much 0:18:30.119 --> 0:18:32.760 weakened compared to the outside group. 0:18:32.560 --> 0:18:33.800 See talking about super PACs. 0:18:33.840 --> 0:18:36.119 And indeed, that is an argument that many people have 0:18:36.240 --> 0:18:38.680 raised who don't like this law, including people who might 0:18:38.760 --> 0:18:41.680 liberals or reformers. They say this law might have made 0:18:41.800 --> 0:18:44.280 some sense when it was first adopted, but given the 0:18:44.320 --> 0:18:47.679 proliferation of super PACs and other outside groups, we'd be 0:18:47.760 --> 0:18:50.119 better off if parties actually had a bigger voice, that 0:18:50.240 --> 0:18:54.280 parties can play a coordination function, that parties maybe can 0:18:54.280 --> 0:18:57.439 be a little less extreme than some outside groups, that 0:18:57.520 --> 0:18:59.719 parties have more of an interest in governance rather than 0:18:59.760 --> 0:19:02.320 being single issue and that actually if we could start 0:19:02.400 --> 0:19:05.439 roll over now that the outside groups have kind of 0:19:05.480 --> 0:19:08.960 unlimited voice, that anything that strengthens the parties is actually 0:19:09.000 --> 0:19:11.160 a good thing, and that you see many people who 0:19:11.160 --> 0:19:14.320 are not conservatives who are taking that position, who are 0:19:14.359 --> 0:19:17.520 not First Amendment absolutists, but think that in fact, the 0:19:17.640 --> 0:19:20.720 campaign financ system has gotten unbalanced and it would actually 0:19:20.760 --> 0:19:22.840 be good to strengthen the role of parties. 0:19:22.520 --> 0:19:23.280 And this could do that. 0:19:24.119 --> 0:19:28.240 There was also an argument about standing made by those 0:19:28.400 --> 0:19:32.879 defending the caps that JD. Vance, who's no longer a 0:19:32.920 --> 0:19:36.400 Senate candidate, doesn't have a stake in the case and 0:19:36.480 --> 0:19:39.480 thus there's no standing. And then there was a lot 0:19:39.480 --> 0:19:43.720 of discussion about, well, is he going to run for president? 0:19:44.119 --> 0:19:46.879 I don't think this standing argument is going anywhere, but 0:19:46.920 --> 0:19:48.919 it's interesting, so tell us about it. 0:19:49.280 --> 0:19:52.119 So Ramond Martinez was the man appointed by the court 0:19:52.160 --> 0:19:54.760 to defend the law when the government declined to do so, 0:19:55.040 --> 0:19:57.760 and he opened by saying, this case is a big deal. 0:19:57.840 --> 0:19:59.960 You know, anytime you're being asked to overturn a president 0:20:00.160 --> 0:20:02.440 that's twenty five years old, should be very hesitant, and 0:20:02.560 --> 0:20:04.480 you should make sure that this is a case that's 0:20:04.560 --> 0:20:08.399 jurisdictionally sound, and he basically said it's not. So this 0:20:08.520 --> 0:20:12.160 case was brought by some individuals JD. Vance and Congressman 0:20:12.280 --> 0:20:15.040 Cheveaux from Ohio, and also by the National. 0:20:14.880 --> 0:20:16.080 Republican Senate Committee. 0:20:16.119 --> 0:20:18.520 With respect to the two individuals, one of them is 0:20:18.520 --> 0:20:20.680 actually retired and no longer in politics, So that gets 0:20:20.680 --> 0:20:23.720 it down to Vance. And Vance has pretty clearly said 0:20:24.119 --> 0:20:26.400 I don't know if I'm running, or more than point, 0:20:26.480 --> 0:20:28.800 I don't currently have a plan to run, saying I 0:20:28.880 --> 0:20:32.400 might run, I might not run. So mister Martinez's argument was, well, 0:20:32.480 --> 0:20:34.800 this case isn't right. We don't know if he's running, 0:20:34.920 --> 0:20:38.080 so there's no candidate here to bring it, and therefore 0:20:38.160 --> 0:20:41.240 there's no plaintiff. He's not a good plaintiff because whether 0:20:41.280 --> 0:20:43.320 he's going to run a speculative. He doesn't clearly have 0:20:43.359 --> 0:20:46.240 a stake in this case. So there were some back 0:20:46.280 --> 0:20:49.120 and forth on that, but it does seem unlikely. Well, 0:20:49.240 --> 0:20:51.600 you never know what the Supreme Court, but almost all 0:20:51.640 --> 0:20:54.320 of the oral argument was really focused on the merits 0:20:54.320 --> 0:20:54.800 of the case. 0:20:55.040 --> 0:20:57.000 It doesn't seem as clear as in other cases. But 0:20:57.119 --> 0:21:00.840 can you tell where the justices are on this? Gorsuch 0:21:00.840 --> 0:21:02.080 didn't even ask a question. 0:21:02.440 --> 0:21:05.719 It's worth pointing out that in every single campaign finance 0:21:05.880 --> 0:21:09.840 case the Court has taken since Chief Justice Roberts became 0:21:09.920 --> 0:21:13.359 Chief Justice and Justice Alito joined the court, the attack 0:21:13.440 --> 0:21:15.160 on campaign finance law has won. 0:21:15.400 --> 0:21:16.640 That's about eight cases. 0:21:16.760 --> 0:21:19.080 And turn it around and there's not been a single 0:21:19.119 --> 0:21:21.720 case that the Supreme Court has taken since two thousand 0:21:21.760 --> 0:21:24.119 and five on campaign finance law where the law was 0:21:24.240 --> 0:21:26.240 the state. That's all I think I need to say 0:21:26.240 --> 0:21:26.600 about that. 0:21:27.040 --> 0:21:30.280 Yes, Rich, that about says it all. So in light 0:21:30.359 --> 0:21:34.520 of that, there were also questions about what's next. Justice 0:21:34.560 --> 0:21:39.960 Katanji Brown Jackson basically asked the Republican's lawyer, former Solicitor 0:21:40.080 --> 0:21:45.359 General Nol Francisco, if these caps on coordinated expenditures go down, 0:21:45.760 --> 0:21:48.560 what's next the caps on contribution limits? 0:21:48.880 --> 0:21:52.199 In McCutcheon, your clients filed a brief saying that the 0:21:52.200 --> 0:21:55.840 sky wouldn't fall if the court struck down aggregate limits 0:21:56.400 --> 0:21:59.960 because we still have coordinated expended truths. And now here 0:22:00.119 --> 0:22:04.160 we are today with your clients saying no more coordinate 0:22:04.240 --> 0:22:09.120 expenditure limits. And so I'm wondering if, and I think 0:22:09.200 --> 0:22:13.360 others have sort of raised that concern as well, we're 0:22:13.359 --> 0:22:16.000 going to be back here with the other kinds of 0:22:16.080 --> 0:22:19.120 limits you with you making the same kinds of arguments. 0:22:19.240 --> 0:22:23.040 Well, your honor, I think different limits are on stronger 0:22:23.040 --> 0:22:26.240 footing than others. I am not going to say that 0:22:26.320 --> 0:22:28.360 my clients are not going to come back and try 0:22:28.400 --> 0:22:31.000 to challenge other limitations. 0:22:31.040 --> 0:22:33.920