WEBVTT - A Stingray Operation

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<v Speaker 1>Get in touch with technology with Text Stuff from how

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<v Speaker 1>Stuff Works dot Com. Hey there, and welcome to Text Stuff.

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<v Speaker 1>I'm Jonathan Strickland, and today I have a special treat

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<v Speaker 1>for me and for you. I have kidnapped one of

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<v Speaker 1>the other podcast teams here at How Stuff Works, not

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<v Speaker 1>just a host, an entire team stuff they don't want

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<v Speaker 1>you to know represent yea, yeah, all right, and that's

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<v Speaker 1>Matt and I'm Ben. As always, thanks for having us.

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<v Speaker 1>Listeners probably recalled that both Matt and I have appeared

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<v Speaker 1>in different episodes in the past. That's correct, different episodes

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<v Speaker 1>of tech stuff, some of the same episodes of stuff

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<v Speaker 1>they don't want you to know, though, Yes, yes, there

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<v Speaker 1>is a little bit of overlap for that. But we

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<v Speaker 1>were super excited to hear about today's topic because it's

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<v Speaker 1>been something that Matt and I have been talking about

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<v Speaker 1>off air. Is that correct? Absolutely, This kind of technology

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<v Speaker 1>that we're going to get into a little later. Uh,

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<v Speaker 1>it piques our interest, you could say, yeah, mine as well. Uh,

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<v Speaker 1>you know, the stuff they don't want you to know

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<v Speaker 1>shows great show. If you guys haven't checked it out,

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<v Speaker 1>you need to go and and check it out. Check

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<v Speaker 1>check out how you guys are looking into various types

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<v Speaker 1>of conspiracies, things that are happening below the surface level

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<v Speaker 1>that people may not be aware of, and kind of

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<v Speaker 1>sifting through the information to show which parts of it

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<v Speaker 1>are you know, are really solid. You know, these are

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<v Speaker 1>the things that we know for sure. And here's the

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<v Speaker 1>conjecture that's been said about it. You guys do a

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<v Speaker 1>great job with it. And as it turns out, there's

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<v Speaker 1>a lot of stuff out there that can really fuel

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<v Speaker 1>that kind of kind of talk for good reason. And

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<v Speaker 1>I typically am one of those more you know, I

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<v Speaker 1>am a little are conservative and skeptical with my approach

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<v Speaker 1>to these things. But this is a technology we're gonna

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<v Speaker 1>talk about today that I don't know how you could

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<v Speaker 1>go to it being skeptical and say, oh, everything is fine.

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<v Speaker 1>We are talking about sting ray or I AM s

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<v Speaker 1>I catchers, and so stingray is the one that I

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<v Speaker 1>think most people have heard about. That's the one that

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<v Speaker 1>was brought up in a lawsuit in Arizona, UM. So

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<v Speaker 1>I think that that is what most people think about

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<v Speaker 1>when they hear I M. S I catchers, if they

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<v Speaker 1>are aware of that term at all. But of course

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<v Speaker 1>sting stingray is just one version of that, and we'll

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<v Speaker 1>talk about some of the other ones as well. So

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<v Speaker 1>I am s I catchers stands for International Mobile Subscriber

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<v Speaker 1>Identity catchers or locators, and that is a fancy way

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<v Speaker 1>of saying. This is a technology that is able to

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<v Speaker 1>intercept signals from cell phones, ostensibly so that uh a

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<v Speaker 1>law enforcement official could locate a person based upon that

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<v Speaker 1>person's cell phone signaling. And it does this, and we'll

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<v Speaker 1>talk about specifics in a bit, by mimicking a cell

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<v Speaker 1>phone tower. So in other words, your cell phone is

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<v Speaker 1>communicating with this device thinking that this is the actual

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<v Speaker 1>part of the infrastructure that it would normally operate inside. Yeah. Yeah,

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<v Speaker 1>it's sort of the same way that were similar at

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<v Speaker 1>least to the ways in which some animals have evolved

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<v Speaker 1>to have camouflage that makes them appear to be a

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<v Speaker 1>different type of creature, right. Yeah. And one thing that

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<v Speaker 1>I just want to get this out so I don't

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<v Speaker 1>uh moan and complain about it for the whole episode.

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<v Speaker 1>If you ever lost a cell phone or had one

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<v Speaker 1>stolen and had the sneaking suspicion that there might be

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<v Speaker 1>a way for law enforcement to catch it, well, far radically,

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<v Speaker 1>there is. It's just it's just they can't do that

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<v Speaker 1>for everybody because so many people lose their cell phones

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<v Speaker 1>or have them stolen, you know, as long as it's

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<v Speaker 1>turned on right, right, yeah, and as long as well,

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<v Speaker 1>and it also depends on a couple of other things too, Right,

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<v Speaker 1>they have to have the if they're looking for your

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<v Speaker 1>cell phones specifically, they kind of need to know a

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<v Speaker 1>little bit more information, like they need to know something

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<v Speaker 1>specific about that phone or to identify it versus all

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<v Speaker 1>the other phones that will connect to it, right, right,

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<v Speaker 1>because otherwise they just be like, well, it may be

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<v Speaker 1>one of the phones here, and there are different ways

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<v Speaker 1>of looking into that, right. It all depends on what

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<v Speaker 1>the investigation is. And we'll we'll talk more about how

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<v Speaker 1>it's used in investigations. So basically, this is a technology

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<v Speaker 1>meant to help Again, ostensibly law enforcement tracked down the

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<v Speaker 1>bad guys or counter terrorism officials to identify potential terrorist

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<v Speaker 1>threats before they become a reality. That's what it supposed

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<v Speaker 1>to be used for. There are a lot of people

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<v Speaker 1>who have objected to it because it is it is

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<v Speaker 1>taking a very wide approach to targeting something very specific,

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<v Speaker 1>and that can be dangerous for the sting Ray its self.

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<v Speaker 1>It costs between sixty eight thousand dollars and a hundred

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<v Speaker 1>thirty five thousand dollars last I checked. Because there are

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<v Speaker 1>two different models of the sting ray, there's the sting

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<v Speaker 1>ray and sting Ray. To sting Ray two came out

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<v Speaker 1>a few years ago. The sting ray obviously came out

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<v Speaker 1>before that. Because we move in a chronological order, they

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<v Speaker 1>haven't gotten to that quantum effect where the sequel comes

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<v Speaker 1>out before the original. Um. Now it's made by a

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<v Speaker 1>company called Harris Corporation out of Melbourne, Florida, and uh

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<v Speaker 1>and this company makes a lot of technology that falls

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<v Speaker 1>into this general category. Some of the products that they

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<v Speaker 1>make are similar to sting Ray and do similar things

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<v Speaker 1>to that device. Others are more specific and are meant

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<v Speaker 1>to be used in conjunction with a gadget like stingray. Yeah. Yeah,

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<v Speaker 1>you know, it's like a console, you know, like you've

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<v Speaker 1>got your connect, you've got your you know, your your

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<v Speaker 1>dance pad, You've got all these other things sort of

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<v Speaker 1>the similar thing here, except the devices that Harris Corporation makes,

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<v Speaker 1>some of them boost the signal catching ability of the

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<v Speaker 1>basic technology, like the stingray some of them allow for

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<v Speaker 1>better tracking technology. It all depends on the thing. But

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<v Speaker 1>but you know, you may have heard some of the

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<v Speaker 1>other names. Some of the other names that include trigger fish, kingfish, amberjack, gossamer, harpoon,

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<v Speaker 1>and hail storm. Uh. And not only these are not

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<v Speaker 1>types of stingray. These are all individual devices that work

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<v Speaker 1>in a similar way to sting ray. Some of them

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<v Speaker 1>copy the functionality of stingray, some of them go beyond that.

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<v Speaker 1>In fact, trigger fish is particularly troubling. Um. But uh,

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<v Speaker 1>sting rate self can be really troubling too, if you

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<v Speaker 1>just do a simple upgrade to it. And then you're right.

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<v Speaker 1>The all of these have things in common and that

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<v Speaker 1>they all are meant to detect cell phone usage in

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<v Speaker 1>some way and either identify it or locate it and

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<v Speaker 1>or track it. Um. And it's how you use these

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<v Speaker 1>in combination with one another that determines your ability to

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<v Speaker 1>do that. Now, clearly we're talking about something that's mimicking

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<v Speaker 1>a cell phone tower. You have to have it be

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<v Speaker 1>mobile because otherwise you just have to hope that the

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<v Speaker 1>bad guys happened to go across your part of town.

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<v Speaker 1>You can't take it to them if it's not mobile right.

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<v Speaker 1>So uh. One of the things that this is really

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<v Speaker 1>helpful for as far as law enforcement are concerned, is

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<v Speaker 1>that they can go to a part of town where

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<v Speaker 1>they suspect someone is. They can put out their ears,

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<v Speaker 1>listen for it, look to see if they have any

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<v Speaker 1>hits that relate back to the target they're specifically looking for,

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<v Speaker 1>and if not, they can move on to a different

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<v Speaker 1>part of town. Um. That's also one of the drawbacks,

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<v Speaker 1>as it turns out, at least from from the perspective

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<v Speaker 1>of some people. Now let's see one other thing. Oh,

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<v Speaker 1>I forgot to mention. Gossamer is one of the exceptions

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<v Speaker 1>to this. Gossamer is not about tracking or locating cell phone. Yeah,

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<v Speaker 1>but this is the one that freaks me out the most. Yeah,

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<v Speaker 1>this is not passive. Now, Gossamer is about denial of

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<v Speaker 1>service attacks on a mobile phone. So it's about it's

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<v Speaker 1>essentially a jammer. Now, this is great for all of

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<v Speaker 1>the paranoid people in the audience. Are you getting bad

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<v Speaker 1>reception or are you being gossamer? I actually, and and

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<v Speaker 1>another thing to to mention. I didn't put it in

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<v Speaker 1>our notes, but one of the things these devices typically

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<v Speaker 1>can do, the stingray in particular, can do this is

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<v Speaker 1>it can boost your the signal coming from your phone

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<v Speaker 1>to connect to the tower. It can essentially say I

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<v Speaker 1>need a stronger signal your phone. Then, even though you're

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<v Speaker 1>not using it, like it's just in your pocket, there's

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<v Speaker 1>no vibrating, there's no ringing, there's nothing going on, your

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<v Speaker 1>phone starts sending stronger signals. This drains your battery. So

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<v Speaker 1>if you're the paranoid persuasion, you may also think my

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<v Speaker 1>phone's battery just won't even last like a full day anymore.

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<v Speaker 1>And it might not be because your phone is old.

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<v Speaker 1>It might be because you're getting you're getting sting rayed.

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<v Speaker 1>You guys, I'm not kidding. That's happening to me right now. Well,

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<v Speaker 1>I'm sorry, Matt, but you should take more care when

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<v Speaker 1>you are browsing on your phone. Also, Matt, Matt, I

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<v Speaker 1>mean not to make you worried or anything, but you're

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<v Speaker 1>definitely on some lists. So I mean you're on our

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<v Speaker 1>list of favorite people. Yeah, there's one right there. So okay,

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<v Speaker 1>So I love this idea about it being mobile. So

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<v Speaker 1>if we take that paranoid example, uh, in the vast majority,

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<v Speaker 1>virtually every time somebody has poor reception or poor battery life.

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<v Speaker 1>It is never going to be something like this, But

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<v Speaker 1>there is a very small chance that if you are

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<v Speaker 1>a victim of this, you could literally have someone following

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<v Speaker 1>you around, right, yeah, I mean, okay, to be fair,

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<v Speaker 1>this technology we're talking about is at a level of

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<v Speaker 1>expense where it's not likely to happen to you. And

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<v Speaker 1>if you are someone who is either hanging out with

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<v Speaker 1>questionable people or you yourself are engaged in some questionable activities,

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<v Speaker 1>then you'd be more likely to have this actually target you. Now,

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<v Speaker 1>because we know that law enforcement agencies across the United

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<v Speaker 1>States and in other parts of the world have used

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<v Speaker 1>this kind of technology, they're the they're the customers, they're

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<v Speaker 1>ones that are purchasing the stuff from Harris Corporation. It's

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<v Speaker 1>very possible you would come into contact with this, and

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<v Speaker 1>it's not that you are being targeted, but you're still

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<v Speaker 1>being affected because it's so broad. Yeah, it's like it's

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<v Speaker 1>mimicking a cellphone tower. It's not mimicking a cell phone

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<v Speaker 1>tower for a single phone. It's been making a cell

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<v Speaker 1>phone tower for the broadcast range of that device. And

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<v Speaker 1>so okay, so their mobile but what what would they

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<v Speaker 1>look like if you just saw one. So they look

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<v Speaker 1>kind of like, uh, I mean, if you've ever seen

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<v Speaker 1>one of those servers, like it looks like just a

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<v Speaker 1>basic computer with lots of ports on it. It's kind

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<v Speaker 1>of like that. It's usually a little bit uh, stumpy looking,

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<v Speaker 1>like it's not as wide as your typical server is.

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<v Speaker 1>It's a little more narrow a little tall. But it's

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<v Speaker 1>meant to fit into racks because you can, you know,

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<v Speaker 1>end up pairing these with other technologies. But it's essentially

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<v Speaker 1>a computer and you hook it up to a laptop,

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<v Speaker 1>so you've got really the basic parts you have are

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<v Speaker 1>the antenna, which is important because obviously it has to

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<v Speaker 1>receive signals sent from cell phones um and a transmitter

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<v Speaker 1>so that you can send stuff back through if you

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<v Speaker 1>need to. You've got the computer itself, which is processing

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<v Speaker 1>the signals and identifying where those signals are coming from,

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<v Speaker 1>both what type of phone it is by you know,

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<v Speaker 1>giving you the identification numbers of that phone, the phone

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<v Speaker 1>number that's associated with that phone, and the location of

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<v Speaker 1>that phone based upon some triangulation. You might actually have

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<v Speaker 1>to physically move the technology around to get the triangulation.

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<v Speaker 1>You could theoretically communicate with another cell phone tower, and

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<v Speaker 1>by getting comparing numbers, you know you know you can

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<v Speaker 1>generally tell the direction from which the signal comes and

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<v Speaker 1>its strength. That gives you an idea of it's it's

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<v Speaker 1>general location in that like you know roughly what distance

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<v Speaker 1>it is from your your base station. So it's one

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<v Speaker 1>of those things where if the signal gets stronger, it's

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<v Speaker 1>closer to you, right, and if it's if it's if

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<v Speaker 1>the signal, if the cell phone signal is getting weaker

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<v Speaker 1>than you know that the target cell phone is moving away.

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<v Speaker 1>If you were to move the van to a second

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<v Speaker 1>location and do those measure a mints, then because you

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<v Speaker 1>have the two points on a on one part of

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<v Speaker 1>a triangle, the cell phones the third point, then you

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<v Speaker 1>know where the person is. It's the same way that

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<v Speaker 1>cell phone towers are able to give an approximation of

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<v Speaker 1>where you are, even if your phone doesn't have GPS. Right,

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<v Speaker 1>it's sending the signals and based upon the strength of

0:13:20.160 --> 0:13:22.319
<v Speaker 1>the signal, how long it takes to get there, all

0:13:22.320 --> 0:13:26.520
<v Speaker 1>of these sort of things, it can approximate where you are. Now.

0:13:26.800 --> 0:13:30.440
<v Speaker 1>By by approximate, I mean within a few you know, meters,

0:13:30.480 --> 0:13:33.640
<v Speaker 1>So it's not like as as a specific as GPS

0:13:33.720 --> 0:13:37.680
<v Speaker 1>can be, but it's still good enough for law enforcement

0:13:37.760 --> 0:13:40.679
<v Speaker 1>to hone in on a on a particular location and

0:13:40.720 --> 0:13:43.960
<v Speaker 1>people can sent to the use of GPS. But yeah,

0:13:44.320 --> 0:13:46.120
<v Speaker 1>uh So there's a question that I'm sure a lot

0:13:46.160 --> 0:13:49.439
<v Speaker 1>of people are wondering, which is this stuff sounds kind

0:13:49.440 --> 0:13:53.400
<v Speaker 1>of space a g but how how new? Is it

0:13:53.640 --> 0:13:58.640
<v Speaker 1>not that new? Uh? The the information I found said

0:13:58.679 --> 0:14:02.200
<v Speaker 1>that at least the giger Fish version of this technology

0:14:02.240 --> 0:14:04.680
<v Speaker 1>has been in use since the late nineteen nineties, Like,

0:14:06.480 --> 0:14:08.600
<v Speaker 1>uh yeah, And to keep keep in mind, like this

0:14:08.640 --> 0:14:12.120
<v Speaker 1>technology has been in some form of development or another

0:14:12.200 --> 0:14:16.720
<v Speaker 1>and been available to different types of agencies, specifically the

0:14:16.800 --> 0:14:20.160
<v Speaker 1>FBI would be a big one. Um. And it's just

0:14:20.240 --> 0:14:22.960
<v Speaker 1>that over the past few years it has become more

0:14:23.200 --> 0:14:27.920
<v Speaker 1>common for local law enforcement to get their hands on this.

0:14:28.360 --> 0:14:31.360
<v Speaker 1>Before it was something that only you know, the federal

0:14:32.240 --> 0:14:36.680
<v Speaker 1>law enforcement officials were able to access. But now we're

0:14:36.680 --> 0:14:40.560
<v Speaker 1>seeing local law enforcement. Not everybody's owning up to it,

0:14:40.560 --> 0:14:43.239
<v Speaker 1>but we're seeing a lot of local law enforcement offices

0:14:43.720 --> 0:14:46.640
<v Speaker 1>adopt this technology, and they're doing it in kind of

0:14:46.640 --> 0:14:52.080
<v Speaker 1>a kind of a back door Shenanigan's way, I would say, yeah,

0:14:52.520 --> 0:14:55.760
<v Speaker 1>so uh, you know, these things can be pretty expensive,

0:14:55.880 --> 0:14:58.560
<v Speaker 1>and obviously law enforcement has a budget that they have

0:14:58.600 --> 0:15:01.800
<v Speaker 1>to answer to, so some of them are funding the

0:15:01.880 --> 0:15:06.000
<v Speaker 1>purchase of this material by filing it under counter terrorism

0:15:06.320 --> 0:15:12.120
<v Speaker 1>uh um strategies. Yeah. Essentially they say, we want to

0:15:12.160 --> 0:15:14.520
<v Speaker 1>participate in this, you know, we want to make sure

0:15:14.560 --> 0:15:18.560
<v Speaker 1>we help protect national security doing it on a local level. Uh.

0:15:18.560 --> 0:15:22.000
<v Speaker 1>And then they get the federal grant to purchase this stuff.

0:15:22.040 --> 0:15:25.680
<v Speaker 1>But then they're using it on a much broader scale.

0:15:25.800 --> 0:15:29.280
<v Speaker 1>So it's not like they're not using it specifically for

0:15:29.440 --> 0:15:31.840
<v Speaker 1>counter terrorism. They're using it in all sorts of cases.

0:15:31.880 --> 0:15:35.480
<v Speaker 1>There was a story about a sheriff whose own vehicle

0:15:35.600 --> 0:15:39.720
<v Speaker 1>got broken into and uh and whose phone was stolen,

0:15:40.040 --> 0:15:43.160
<v Speaker 1>who decided to use this stuff to try and ostensibly

0:15:43.320 --> 0:15:47.200
<v Speaker 1>to try and stop the the string of car break ins.

0:15:47.240 --> 0:15:50.720
<v Speaker 1>Some people would say that perhaps it was more personal

0:15:50.760 --> 0:15:53.960
<v Speaker 1>than that, but the point being that this was not

0:15:54.040 --> 0:15:57.120
<v Speaker 1>a counter terrorism issue. This was you know, someone breaking

0:15:57.120 --> 0:15:59.840
<v Speaker 1>and entering into cars, which is you know, that's that's

0:15:59.840 --> 0:16:03.400
<v Speaker 1>a crime. But you people have been arguing, like what

0:16:03.520 --> 0:16:07.240
<v Speaker 1>at what level of crime do you consider the use

0:16:07.320 --> 0:16:12.000
<v Speaker 1>of this particular type of technology necessary to employ? Yeah,

0:16:12.080 --> 0:16:15.400
<v Speaker 1>especially given the expense not just in financial terms, but

0:16:15.520 --> 0:16:20.400
<v Speaker 1>in terms of manpower or time. So that's that's one problem,

0:16:20.480 --> 0:16:23.720
<v Speaker 1>but it's my spider sense is telling me that you

0:16:23.760 --> 0:16:26.440
<v Speaker 1>have a bigger problem. I've got so many problems with this,

0:16:27.080 --> 0:16:29.880
<v Speaker 1>So let's let's talk about how it works first, because

0:16:29.920 --> 0:16:32.400
<v Speaker 1>this is this is what leads into where the biggest

0:16:32.400 --> 0:16:36.640
<v Speaker 1>problems that I have where the technology come from. So uh,

0:16:36.960 --> 0:16:39.000
<v Speaker 1>to understand how this works, you've got to know how

0:16:39.080 --> 0:16:42.640
<v Speaker 1>cell phone works, all right, And we're gonna be super

0:16:42.720 --> 0:16:45.160
<v Speaker 1>high level here because I could do a full episode

0:16:45.160 --> 0:16:48.680
<v Speaker 1>on how cell phones work, and you guys would be

0:16:48.880 --> 0:16:52.280
<v Speaker 1>stabbing me because you're wondering why I've pulled you in UM.

0:16:52.320 --> 0:16:55.480
<v Speaker 1>But typically the easiest way of explaining it as cell

0:16:55.480 --> 0:16:59.200
<v Speaker 1>phones broadcast over radio frequencies, and you have cell phone

0:16:59.240 --> 0:17:03.280
<v Speaker 1>towers that present a broadcast area. The towers are able

0:17:03.360 --> 0:17:07.080
<v Speaker 1>to accept the incoming signals from a cell phone and

0:17:07.119 --> 0:17:09.480
<v Speaker 1>outgoing signals that are going to cell phones within that

0:17:10.200 --> 0:17:13.720
<v Speaker 1>UM service area. They're doing so over specific frequency to

0:17:13.800 --> 0:17:17.880
<v Speaker 1>the phones. Your phone knows which frequency quote unquote knows

0:17:18.000 --> 0:17:20.320
<v Speaker 1>which frequency to be in because there's a master control

0:17:20.359 --> 0:17:23.600
<v Speaker 1>system that's telling the phone tune into this frequency so

0:17:23.640 --> 0:17:27.280
<v Speaker 1>that you can receive and transmit information. Technically you're using

0:17:27.320 --> 0:17:29.560
<v Speaker 1>too frequencies so you can receive and transmit at the

0:17:29.600 --> 0:17:33.920
<v Speaker 1>same time. Then as you leave one cell phone service

0:17:34.040 --> 0:17:37.240
<v Speaker 1>area and you're starting to get closer to another, then

0:17:37.400 --> 0:17:40.440
<v Speaker 1>you have to be handed off right because if if not,

0:17:41.040 --> 0:17:43.240
<v Speaker 1>once you move too far away from the base station,

0:17:43.359 --> 0:17:45.959
<v Speaker 1>you would no longer have service. So this is similar

0:17:46.000 --> 0:17:48.000
<v Speaker 1>to when you move into an area that doesn't have

0:17:48.400 --> 0:17:52.159
<v Speaker 1>the towers that support the service you use. So if

0:17:52.160 --> 0:17:53.879
<v Speaker 1>you're like an a T and T customer and you

0:17:53.920 --> 0:17:56.240
<v Speaker 1>go into an area that's not supported by a T

0:17:56.320 --> 0:17:58.960
<v Speaker 1>and T, then you're out of luck. Your phone becomes

0:17:59.000 --> 0:18:02.160
<v Speaker 1>a brick, right, or whatever's on your phone, that's all

0:18:02.160 --> 0:18:06.160
<v Speaker 1>you can use. So you have to have this handoff

0:18:06.160 --> 0:18:11.160
<v Speaker 1>technology for one tower to hand off the the service

0:18:11.280 --> 0:18:14.400
<v Speaker 1>to another tower as you're moving between them. So what's

0:18:14.400 --> 0:18:17.720
<v Speaker 1>happening is your phone is constantly sending little signals even

0:18:17.720 --> 0:18:22.440
<v Speaker 1>when it's not directly in use to to say here

0:18:22.480 --> 0:18:27.520
<v Speaker 1>I am. It's essentially saying I'm here almost yeah, it's

0:18:27.520 --> 0:18:30.320
<v Speaker 1>exactly like paying a server. It's doing this about every

0:18:30.359 --> 0:18:33.600
<v Speaker 1>seven to fifteen seconds. So this is why even if

0:18:33.600 --> 0:18:37.880
<v Speaker 1>you don't use your phone, the battery life gradually decreases.

0:18:38.600 --> 0:18:42.040
<v Speaker 1>So the reason it does this is very important because

0:18:42.040 --> 0:18:44.840
<v Speaker 1>if it didn't tell the cell phone towers, hey here

0:18:44.880 --> 0:18:47.200
<v Speaker 1>I am, you would never get texts or cell phone

0:18:47.600 --> 0:18:49.840
<v Speaker 1>or you never get a call. You couldn't you just

0:18:49.880 --> 0:18:53.879
<v Speaker 1>play solitaire or whatever. Yeah, because because the system wouldn't

0:18:53.920 --> 0:18:55.520
<v Speaker 1>know where your phone is, so it wouldn't be able

0:18:55.560 --> 0:18:58.240
<v Speaker 1>to send the signal like it doesn't when someone dials

0:18:58.280 --> 0:19:02.040
<v Speaker 1>your number. It doesn't magically connect to your phone. The

0:19:02.119 --> 0:19:04.280
<v Speaker 1>system has to be aware of where you are, and

0:19:04.320 --> 0:19:07.320
<v Speaker 1>it has this constant game of Marco Polo to ensure

0:19:07.359 --> 0:19:10.719
<v Speaker 1>that there's this seamless transition. Right because you as a person,

0:19:11.480 --> 0:19:14.760
<v Speaker 1>you are mobile, so you can move from location to location.

0:19:14.800 --> 0:19:17.399
<v Speaker 1>You are not always going to be next to the

0:19:17.520 --> 0:19:21.240
<v Speaker 1>same cell phone tower all the time. So your phone

0:19:21.240 --> 0:19:24.680
<v Speaker 1>has to constantly, like every seven to fifteen seconds, say

0:19:24.760 --> 0:19:27.480
<v Speaker 1>I'm here. Because if you're in a car and you're

0:19:27.520 --> 0:19:30.320
<v Speaker 1>traveling down the road, you're moving in and out of

0:19:30.400 --> 0:19:34.359
<v Speaker 1>different you know, cell tower ranges, so the different cell

0:19:34.359 --> 0:19:36.679
<v Speaker 1>towers have to be aware of where your phone is

0:19:36.720 --> 0:19:39.480
<v Speaker 1>so that you can continue to receive messages, phone calls.

0:19:39.520 --> 0:19:42.639
<v Speaker 1>That kind of stuff or make them. Yeah, the problem

0:19:42.720 --> 0:19:44.840
<v Speaker 1>is that because of this technology, you know that this

0:19:44.920 --> 0:19:48.760
<v Speaker 1>is what makes cell phones useful, but because of that

0:19:48.840 --> 0:19:53.280
<v Speaker 1>same technology, it's also what makes this sting ray technology possible. So,

0:19:54.000 --> 0:19:56.719
<v Speaker 1>because your phone is sending out these messages and your

0:19:56.760 --> 0:19:59.480
<v Speaker 1>phone doesn't know where the next cell phone tower is,

0:19:59.600 --> 0:20:02.359
<v Speaker 1>it's podcasting these little messages and the cell phone towers

0:20:02.400 --> 0:20:04.680
<v Speaker 1>pick it up. Based upon the signal strength, the cell

0:20:04.720 --> 0:20:07.080
<v Speaker 1>phone tower knows if you are moving toward it or

0:20:07.119 --> 0:20:11.280
<v Speaker 1>moving away from it. The sting ray ends up mimicking

0:20:11.520 --> 0:20:14.000
<v Speaker 1>the cell phone towers. So your little cell phone sends

0:20:14.000 --> 0:20:16.240
<v Speaker 1>out a message and the stingray picks it up. Sting

0:20:16.280 --> 0:20:18.040
<v Speaker 1>ray now knows where your phone is, or at least

0:20:18.240 --> 0:20:21.600
<v Speaker 1>knows that your phone is in that area. As the

0:20:21.640 --> 0:20:23.919
<v Speaker 1>signal gets stronger, the stingray knows that your phone is

0:20:23.920 --> 0:20:27.800
<v Speaker 1>getting closer to it. If you have triangulated this, then

0:20:27.920 --> 0:20:30.040
<v Speaker 1>it knows where you are. Or if you have one

0:20:30.040 --> 0:20:33.159
<v Speaker 1>of the other devices that pair with the sting ray

0:20:33.240 --> 0:20:36.280
<v Speaker 1>that can help track and locate, the sting ray knows

0:20:36.280 --> 0:20:38.520
<v Speaker 1>where you are. There's a laptop that you would connect

0:20:38.600 --> 0:20:41.199
<v Speaker 1>to this device that would give you the redoubt that

0:20:41.200 --> 0:20:43.399
<v Speaker 1>would be useful for a human being because right now

0:20:43.440 --> 0:20:46.880
<v Speaker 1>we're talking all about technology that and data that machines

0:20:46.880 --> 0:20:49.320
<v Speaker 1>could use, but it's not useful to us because we

0:20:49.359 --> 0:20:52.719
<v Speaker 1>wouldn't be able to see it. But the laptop expresses

0:20:52.760 --> 0:20:57.480
<v Speaker 1>that in ways that make it possible for you to see.

0:20:57.760 --> 0:21:02.760
<v Speaker 1>Maybe with mapping software, it's plotting the location against a map,

0:21:03.280 --> 0:21:07.639
<v Speaker 1>as well as identification of the phone numbers UM and

0:21:07.800 --> 0:21:12.639
<v Speaker 1>the I D number that's unique to that particular mobile phone.

0:21:13.640 --> 0:21:19.800
<v Speaker 1>So the issue here is that this this sting ray,

0:21:20.840 --> 0:21:25.600
<v Speaker 1>well accept all of those incoming messages, all those Yeah,

0:21:25.640 --> 0:21:29.159
<v Speaker 1>anything that's within the area that that the sensitivity of

0:21:29.160 --> 0:21:32.360
<v Speaker 1>that antenna, it will pick that up. So is it like,

0:21:32.520 --> 0:21:37.560
<v Speaker 1>is it just metadata? Well yes, originally, first it's just,

0:21:38.560 --> 0:21:46.320
<v Speaker 1>first of all, just metadata, just metadata, because metadata you

0:21:46.359 --> 0:21:48.480
<v Speaker 1>don't need very much of it to start making some

0:21:48.680 --> 0:21:53.080
<v Speaker 1>very scary conclusions. You can start to really narrow down

0:21:53.080 --> 0:21:56.960
<v Speaker 1>who a person is based upon some metadata routines what

0:21:57.000 --> 0:21:59.199
<v Speaker 1>they do in the real world and when they do it,

0:21:59.280 --> 0:22:02.800
<v Speaker 1>the phone numbers they might be in contact with at

0:22:02.840 --> 0:22:05.159
<v Speaker 1>that time. The phone number of the device itself obviously

0:22:05.200 --> 0:22:08.400
<v Speaker 1>would be very important. So let's say that you two

0:22:09.119 --> 0:22:15.200
<v Speaker 1>YouTube and Ben you are you are. You are the cops. Okay, okay,

0:22:15.240 --> 0:22:18.560
<v Speaker 1>you're in your van power Yeah, I know, it's not

0:22:18.640 --> 0:22:22.800
<v Speaker 1>go crazy. You do not have a tank. We're not

0:22:23.200 --> 0:22:27.679
<v Speaker 1>We're not in Swanny. Was Swanny? Wasn't it? I was

0:22:27.680 --> 0:22:31.480
<v Speaker 1>thinking Swanny? By the way, listeners, is is just to

0:22:31.560 --> 0:22:34.400
<v Speaker 1>the northeast of Atlanta. It's a little part of Metro

0:22:34.480 --> 0:22:39.320
<v Speaker 1>Atlanta area. Um and they have a tank. So anyway,

0:22:39.720 --> 0:22:42.919
<v Speaker 1>you are in a van. You have heard about tanks,

0:22:42.960 --> 0:22:45.840
<v Speaker 1>but you do not currently own one. You've got plenty

0:22:45.840 --> 0:22:48.800
<v Speaker 1>of donuts to get you through the day. By the way,

0:22:48.800 --> 0:22:50.919
<v Speaker 1>if you are in law enforcement, and I am offending you,

0:22:50.960 --> 0:22:55.119
<v Speaker 1>dear listeners, I'm merely poking fun. I love you guys

0:22:55.320 --> 0:22:57.239
<v Speaker 1>at any rate. So you guys are are looking at

0:22:57.280 --> 0:23:00.800
<v Speaker 1>the incoming messages that are being hit. We're on our laptop.

0:23:00.920 --> 0:23:04.880
<v Speaker 1>You are looking specifically for a phone number associated with

0:23:04.920 --> 0:23:08.280
<v Speaker 1>a suspect, a person of interest. You want to be

0:23:08.359 --> 0:23:11.399
<v Speaker 1>able to track this person down, but so far have

0:23:11.600 --> 0:23:14.159
<v Speaker 1>been unable to do so. You have heard that this

0:23:14.240 --> 0:23:16.560
<v Speaker 1>person may in fact be in this particular part of town,

0:23:16.600 --> 0:23:19.040
<v Speaker 1>which is why you have parked your van, And all

0:23:19.119 --> 0:23:21.280
<v Speaker 1>you are doing is looking for a hit of that

0:23:21.320 --> 0:23:24.760
<v Speaker 1>particular number as it moves through, and once you do,

0:23:24.840 --> 0:23:28.280
<v Speaker 1>you then try to triangulate, you locate, and then your

0:23:28.480 --> 0:23:32.920
<v Speaker 1>your send people out there to talk to this suspect

0:23:33.000 --> 0:23:36.119
<v Speaker 1>or person of interest. Now that that alone, that sounds

0:23:36.160 --> 0:23:39.400
<v Speaker 1>like that's okay. I mean, there might be some problems

0:23:39.480 --> 0:23:43.000
<v Speaker 1>we have here, but you're specifically looking for the hit.

0:23:43.119 --> 0:23:46.000
<v Speaker 1>You're not looking at the massive amount of information that's

0:23:46.000 --> 0:23:52.840
<v Speaker 1>coming in. You're looking for something specific. Yeah, now, Matt,

0:23:52.880 --> 0:23:56.200
<v Speaker 1>I know that, I know that, dude, I know, I

0:23:56.280 --> 0:23:58.600
<v Speaker 1>know it's the pencil pushers who really are to blame.

0:23:59.320 --> 0:24:04.920
<v Speaker 1>Don't don't, don't bust my chops um so at any rate. Yeah,

0:24:04.960 --> 0:24:08.080
<v Speaker 1>in this case, you are specifically looking for a particular

0:24:08.080 --> 0:24:10.639
<v Speaker 1>phone number. It's a little more tricky if you don't

0:24:10.800 --> 0:24:14.600
<v Speaker 1>know the number though, right Like now you're looking for patterns.

0:24:15.320 --> 0:24:20.480
<v Speaker 1>Now you're looking specifically for activities that match what you

0:24:20.600 --> 0:24:25.040
<v Speaker 1>suspect your target is already doing. You're also possibly looking

0:24:25.440 --> 0:24:28.240
<v Speaker 1>to find out what phone numbers are being used in

0:24:28.280 --> 0:24:30.119
<v Speaker 1>an area. Now, this is where it really gets tricky

0:24:30.200 --> 0:24:33.520
<v Speaker 1>because some of these devices, not all of them, but

0:24:33.640 --> 0:24:36.920
<v Speaker 1>the sting ray and the trigger fish included both can

0:24:36.960 --> 0:24:41.280
<v Speaker 1>tell you if someone makes a call from within that

0:24:41.400 --> 0:24:44.239
<v Speaker 1>area that the sting ray covers, you can see what

0:24:44.359 --> 0:24:48.919
<v Speaker 1>number they called. Now now, at least with the basic

0:24:48.960 --> 0:24:53.879
<v Speaker 1>sting ray, you can't listen in on the call. You

0:24:53.960 --> 0:24:58.280
<v Speaker 1>just know the time, the UH number, and the duration

0:24:58.359 --> 0:25:00.919
<v Speaker 1>of the call. Hold on. Sounds like we're getting to

0:25:00.960 --> 0:25:02.800
<v Speaker 1>a point where we can listen to these calls the

0:25:03.000 --> 0:25:07.159
<v Speaker 1>basic sting Yeah, okay, So remember when I said you

0:25:07.160 --> 0:25:11.119
<v Speaker 1>can upgrade. So sting ray is it's a computer, is

0:25:11.359 --> 0:25:13.159
<v Speaker 1>what it boils down to. I mean, it's more than

0:25:13.200 --> 0:25:15.800
<v Speaker 1>a computer, but it has elements of a computer. It

0:25:15.920 --> 0:25:21.000
<v Speaker 1>runs software. There is software that you can install on

0:25:21.040 --> 0:25:25.119
<v Speaker 1>the sting ray that does allow you to listen in uh.

0:25:25.240 --> 0:25:28.159
<v Speaker 1>There is fish Hawk, which is software that allows you

0:25:28.200 --> 0:25:32.160
<v Speaker 1>to eavesdrop upon conversations. And there's also Porpoise. You might

0:25:32.200 --> 0:25:35.440
<v Speaker 1>have noticed a theme I was gonna ask you about

0:25:35.520 --> 0:25:40.320
<v Speaker 1>that they're in Florida. I guess that makes sense. But anyway,

0:25:40.440 --> 0:25:45.439
<v Speaker 1>so the porpoise allows you to uh see texts that

0:25:45.480 --> 0:25:50.840
<v Speaker 1>are sent through here. So it's again it's messages or

0:25:50.920 --> 0:25:54.240
<v Speaker 1>phone calls that are sent from the phone out through

0:25:54.880 --> 0:25:59.560
<v Speaker 1>the the sting ray that go on. Now, this obviously

0:26:00.119 --> 0:26:04.239
<v Speaker 1>raises a lot of very tricky questions, particularly when it

0:26:04.280 --> 0:26:09.960
<v Speaker 1>comes to basic rights, because if you are just taking

0:26:09.960 --> 0:26:13.879
<v Speaker 1>in everything and you can potentially read all the text

0:26:13.880 --> 0:26:16.440
<v Speaker 1>messages or listening on any of the conversations that are

0:26:16.440 --> 0:26:20.040
<v Speaker 1>going through and remember this is just based on geography.

0:26:20.240 --> 0:26:24.040
<v Speaker 1>You know, you're not targeting, you're getting everything. There's no

0:26:24.080 --> 0:26:27.560
<v Speaker 1>probable cause, there's no probable cause, there's no warrant. So

0:26:27.600 --> 0:26:31.160
<v Speaker 1>back back in our scenario, Ben and I in our readout, Well, okay,

0:26:31.160 --> 0:26:34.399
<v Speaker 1>I'm driving, so Ben, you're alright, so you're the wheel man,

0:26:34.520 --> 0:26:37.640
<v Speaker 1>get it so you can see. Then we'll be able

0:26:37.680 --> 0:26:40.200
<v Speaker 1>to see all of this on a readout a Mett

0:26:40.359 --> 0:26:43.399
<v Speaker 1>Look look at his number. It's been going back and

0:26:43.440 --> 0:26:47.240
<v Speaker 1>forth in these two cell phone towers every freaking Thursday. Yeah.

0:26:47.520 --> 0:26:50.760
<v Speaker 1>Or it could be Ben saying, hey, Matt, look this

0:26:50.920 --> 0:26:54.720
<v Speaker 1>dufus over here thinks his girlfriend's gonna make him dinner tonight,

0:26:54.760 --> 0:26:57.480
<v Speaker 1>and we already know she ain't gonna do that, right buddy,

0:26:57.800 --> 0:27:02.480
<v Speaker 1>You guys are so good. Later of this comes out,

0:27:03.040 --> 0:27:14.240
<v Speaker 1>so I'll just be stopped on the street. Uh that's

0:27:14.280 --> 0:27:18.640
<v Speaker 1>funny until it happened, alright, So at any rate, Uh yeah, yeah,

0:27:18.760 --> 0:27:22.600
<v Speaker 1>I mean technically, if you have the right technology, right

0:27:22.640 --> 0:27:25.920
<v Speaker 1>being the the appropriate one for this, uh, and you

0:27:26.000 --> 0:27:29.199
<v Speaker 1>have the correct software on it, then you could be

0:27:29.560 --> 0:27:33.600
<v Speaker 1>you could start filtering through you could potentially read anything

0:27:33.640 --> 0:27:36.840
<v Speaker 1>that's coming through that that stingray device. So again, it

0:27:36.880 --> 0:27:39.119
<v Speaker 1>would be any phone that was within that range of

0:27:39.160 --> 0:27:44.399
<v Speaker 1>the antenna. Um you wouldn't necessarily I mean you probably

0:27:44.440 --> 0:27:47.119
<v Speaker 1>wouldn't be storing at all. I mean you could if

0:27:47.160 --> 0:27:48.600
<v Speaker 1>you had a large enough hard drive. That would be

0:27:48.640 --> 0:27:52.679
<v Speaker 1>another thing you would need to have in your array

0:27:52.880 --> 0:27:57.760
<v Speaker 1>of technology piling up very quickly. Yeah, and and so

0:27:58.000 --> 0:28:00.520
<v Speaker 1>this is starting to sound probably very similar to the

0:28:00.600 --> 0:28:02.720
<v Speaker 1>discussions we've had about the n s A. You know,

0:28:02.800 --> 0:28:06.600
<v Speaker 1>the fact that they have been collecting cell phone data

0:28:06.680 --> 0:28:10.480
<v Speaker 1>at the they're doing it at the provider level, right

0:28:10.560 --> 0:28:16.080
<v Speaker 1>like they're there, they've got their years on this national

0:28:16.400 --> 0:28:19.960
<v Speaker 1>or even global level, whereas we're really talking about very

0:28:20.080 --> 0:28:24.760
<v Speaker 1>regional effects here. Yes, still very concerning. So how much

0:28:24.800 --> 0:28:29.000
<v Speaker 1>how much information can it actually capture? Um? Well, you

0:28:29.000 --> 0:28:32.720
<v Speaker 1>know it's here all right. Here's the thing. We don't

0:28:32.800 --> 0:28:37.000
<v Speaker 1>know the full extent of what it can capture because

0:28:37.840 --> 0:28:41.360
<v Speaker 1>secrets have to be kept for your safety from the

0:28:42.680 --> 0:28:45.920
<v Speaker 1>creators of stingray or from the police departments. In the

0:28:46.200 --> 0:28:50.600
<v Speaker 1>law enforcement, I'm just gonna say yes from both. So

0:28:51.920 --> 0:28:54.160
<v Speaker 1>there was a story recently. I think it was I

0:28:54.200 --> 0:28:56.520
<v Speaker 1>want to say it was Santa Clarat, California, but I

0:28:56.560 --> 0:28:58.400
<v Speaker 1>could be wrong. It was a It was a town

0:28:58.440 --> 0:29:03.920
<v Speaker 1>in California, however, that recently declined to purchase from Harris

0:29:03.920 --> 0:29:08.120
<v Speaker 1>Corporation because they said there were agreements that they would

0:29:08.120 --> 0:29:12.880
<v Speaker 1>have been forced to enter into that would prevent them

0:29:12.920 --> 0:29:17.640
<v Speaker 1>from releasing any information about the product, even in the

0:29:17.680 --> 0:29:20.479
<v Speaker 1>face of a Freedom of Information Act request. So an

0:29:20.520 --> 0:29:26.160
<v Speaker 1>ironclad yes like a nondisclosure agreement to trump all nondisclosure.

0:29:26.440 --> 0:29:30.760
<v Speaker 1>How the heck do you get around You mostly just

0:29:30.880 --> 0:29:33.160
<v Speaker 1>drag your heels as long as possible and hope that

0:29:33.200 --> 0:29:36.280
<v Speaker 1>the judge that ends up hearing any case about it

0:29:36.360 --> 0:29:40.120
<v Speaker 1>is not savvy enough to understand the implications of this technology.

0:29:40.240 --> 0:29:43.840
<v Speaker 1>You can appeal for national security I think right, well,

0:29:43.880 --> 0:29:45.960
<v Speaker 1>that's essentially what they say is that if we were

0:29:46.000 --> 0:29:50.000
<v Speaker 1>to tell you what the capabilities of this technology were,

0:29:50.440 --> 0:29:53.160
<v Speaker 1>then the bad guys would be able to work around it,

0:29:53.280 --> 0:29:56.200
<v Speaker 1>thus making the technology useless and we'd only be getting

0:29:56.200 --> 0:29:59.640
<v Speaker 1>your boring text messages instead of the bad guys stuff. Well,

0:29:59.680 --> 0:30:04.200
<v Speaker 1>it's okay, just to play the advocate here, that kind

0:30:04.240 --> 0:30:08.720
<v Speaker 1>of reasoning, which is incredibly slippery and dangerous, It does

0:30:08.840 --> 0:30:12.680
<v Speaker 1>make sense if you think again about the ostensible purpose, right,

0:30:12.840 --> 0:30:16.200
<v Speaker 1>the the idea that this stuff could be rendered useless

0:30:16.600 --> 0:30:18.720
<v Speaker 1>if it wasn't a secret. But also, I'm just gonna

0:30:18.800 --> 0:30:21.680
<v Speaker 1>say the word I'm going to say is convenient. It's

0:30:21.720 --> 0:30:26.120
<v Speaker 1>a convenient reason. Well, and it's it's yeah, when you

0:30:26.160 --> 0:30:29.520
<v Speaker 1>have like a rubber stamp that's a secret, then how

0:30:29.560 --> 0:30:32.280
<v Speaker 1>do you have oversight? How can you make certain that

0:30:32.360 --> 0:30:37.480
<v Speaker 1>the figures that have been put into authority positions in

0:30:37.640 --> 0:30:41.320
<v Speaker 1>order to help the citizens, how can you make sure

0:30:41.360 --> 0:30:44.600
<v Speaker 1>that they are doing that that duty that they've been

0:30:45.120 --> 0:30:48.600
<v Speaker 1>they've been tasked with, as opposed to abusing it or

0:30:48.720 --> 0:30:51.640
<v Speaker 1>misusing it, maybe not even abusing it on purpose, but

0:30:51.760 --> 0:30:58.400
<v Speaker 1>perhaps through you know, no no maliciousness, have been using

0:30:58.400 --> 0:31:02.760
<v Speaker 1>it incorrectly. And there have been arguments that judges have

0:31:02.880 --> 0:31:08.000
<v Speaker 1>allowed this kind of technology to be used because the

0:31:08.040 --> 0:31:12.040
<v Speaker 1>explanations they were given about what the technology did were

0:31:12.240 --> 0:31:17.200
<v Speaker 1>purposefully vague and limited, so that they would not know

0:31:17.440 --> 0:31:20.840
<v Speaker 1>the full extent of what this technology does. So, in

0:31:20.880 --> 0:31:23.400
<v Speaker 1>other words, here's where we're going to kind of transition

0:31:23.440 --> 0:31:26.520
<v Speaker 1>into more of the policy stuff, because you know, that's

0:31:26.560 --> 0:31:28.360
<v Speaker 1>really why I got you guys to come on here.

0:31:28.640 --> 0:31:31.160
<v Speaker 1>The technology we've kind of covered, you know, the very

0:31:31.160 --> 0:31:34.200
<v Speaker 1>basic ideas that it's a man in the middle kind

0:31:34.200 --> 0:31:37.840
<v Speaker 1>of attack. The reason why I brought you on here

0:31:37.880 --> 0:31:42.080
<v Speaker 1>is because this is my own personal perspective, my own opinion.

0:31:42.600 --> 0:31:47.800
<v Speaker 1>But my opinion is that this technology is dangerously close,

0:31:47.920 --> 0:31:52.520
<v Speaker 1>if not identical, to the concept of issuing a general warrant,

0:31:53.080 --> 0:31:56.160
<v Speaker 1>which is precisely what the Fourth Amendment was supposed to

0:31:56.400 --> 0:31:59.520
<v Speaker 1>protect us from. So the idea being that here in

0:31:59.520 --> 0:32:02.360
<v Speaker 1>the units dates by the way, this technology is being

0:32:02.440 --> 0:32:04.240
<v Speaker 1>used in other places. In fact, one of the reasons

0:32:04.240 --> 0:32:06.440
<v Speaker 1>that I brought it up is because recently Sky News

0:32:06.480 --> 0:32:09.600
<v Speaker 1>was reporting about how it's being used in the UK. Uh.

0:32:09.680 --> 0:32:12.960
<v Speaker 1>It had been thought to have been used in the

0:32:13.040 --> 0:32:15.320
<v Speaker 1>UK for a while, but now there's kind of essentially

0:32:15.360 --> 0:32:19.000
<v Speaker 1>ironclad evidence that yes, it's being used as the UK. Yeah.

0:32:19.040 --> 0:32:22.920
<v Speaker 1>So the reason why, uh, you know, I brought you

0:32:22.920 --> 0:32:26.680
<v Speaker 1>guys in as this this idea of one of the

0:32:26.680 --> 0:32:29.600
<v Speaker 1>founding principles of the United States of America was that

0:32:31.000 --> 0:32:34.320
<v Speaker 1>the colonists didn't they weren't so crazy about the British

0:32:34.360 --> 0:32:38.560
<v Speaker 1>coming up and going into every single house looking for

0:32:38.600 --> 0:32:43.160
<v Speaker 1>a specific person, with no reason to suspect that the

0:32:43.200 --> 0:32:45.720
<v Speaker 1>person of interest was actually in the houses they were stopping.

0:32:45.720 --> 0:32:50.280
<v Speaker 1>It's just a general blanket search, right, So search and seizure,

0:32:50.320 --> 0:32:53.600
<v Speaker 1>the idea being that we're looking for this person. This

0:32:53.640 --> 0:32:57.400
<v Speaker 1>person is is bad and so you have no rights

0:32:57.760 --> 0:33:00.080
<v Speaker 1>until we find this person. So we're gonna go to

0:33:00.120 --> 0:33:02.920
<v Speaker 1>your house and turn it upside down looking for this person.

0:33:02.960 --> 0:33:05.400
<v Speaker 1>If they're not there, too, well, okay, well good for you,

0:33:05.480 --> 0:33:06.880
<v Speaker 1>too bad for us. We're gonna go do it to

0:33:06.920 --> 0:33:13.320
<v Speaker 1>the next family. Ah. Yeah. So this approach of using

0:33:13.320 --> 0:33:17.760
<v Speaker 1>a device to pull in all incoming data, even if

0:33:17.760 --> 0:33:21.160
<v Speaker 1>you're looking for a really bad person, you're getting everything,

0:33:21.720 --> 0:33:25.320
<v Speaker 1>and it doesn't seem that different to me than the

0:33:25.360 --> 0:33:28.239
<v Speaker 1>approach of there's this bad person out there, we're going

0:33:28.280 --> 0:33:31.040
<v Speaker 1>to go through everybody's house until we find that person.

0:33:31.840 --> 0:33:33.240
<v Speaker 1>So for me, there're a couple of things you have

0:33:33.280 --> 0:33:36.000
<v Speaker 1>to establish. One of them is does that data that

0:33:36.080 --> 0:33:39.320
<v Speaker 1>you're sending out belong to you? Is it really yours

0:33:40.800 --> 0:33:43.000
<v Speaker 1>or you know, is it the companies that you're using

0:33:43.240 --> 0:33:46.120
<v Speaker 1>just to ostensibly send the information to a cell tower

0:33:46.160 --> 0:33:50.280
<v Speaker 1>to another person. Um. And then for me, if you

0:33:50.280 --> 0:33:52.680
<v Speaker 1>look at things like when the Boston bombing occurred, and

0:33:52.720 --> 0:33:55.600
<v Speaker 1>then the search for the Sarnive brothers afterwards, and when

0:33:55.840 --> 0:33:58.920
<v Speaker 1>the police were going through and essentially doing what you're saying,

0:33:59.200 --> 0:34:03.120
<v Speaker 1>searching through, how is yeah, with just it's not really

0:34:03.160 --> 0:34:05.760
<v Speaker 1>a general warrant, but something kind of similar to that

0:34:05.880 --> 0:34:08.759
<v Speaker 1>where yeah, I mean they didn't have a they didn't

0:34:08.800 --> 0:34:11.239
<v Speaker 1>have a warrant for each specific house they went through,

0:34:11.600 --> 0:34:15.680
<v Speaker 1>which they're supposed to if if I mean, your rights

0:34:15.760 --> 0:34:17.680
<v Speaker 1>as a citizen are supposed to say, listen, if you

0:34:17.719 --> 0:34:20.000
<v Speaker 1>don't have a warrant, you cannot come into my house.

0:34:20.120 --> 0:34:23.399
<v Speaker 1>That is a constitutional right guaranteed to me. Yeah, it's

0:34:23.440 --> 0:34:27.160
<v Speaker 1>the old, the old ticking time bomb reasoning, which I

0:34:27.280 --> 0:34:32.920
<v Speaker 1>find fairly disingenuous. Uh. When the idea we heard it before,

0:34:33.000 --> 0:34:37.000
<v Speaker 1>with the idea of using torture to obtain some sort

0:34:37.040 --> 0:34:40.319
<v Speaker 1>of confession or insider information, where people would say, well,

0:34:40.680 --> 0:34:43.839
<v Speaker 1>torture is not ordinarily allowed, but if there is a

0:34:43.840 --> 0:34:45.719
<v Speaker 1>bomb that is going to go off in a set

0:34:45.719 --> 0:34:48.080
<v Speaker 1>amount of time, and we have one person who knows

0:34:48.120 --> 0:34:53.600
<v Speaker 1>the information in custody, then shouldn't we torture somebody to

0:34:53.640 --> 0:34:56.040
<v Speaker 1>save a hundred people or whatever the number is. And

0:34:56.120 --> 0:34:59.160
<v Speaker 1>this what what's similar to me about this is that

0:34:59.200 --> 0:35:04.000
<v Speaker 1>this encounter is um so many ways to bend rules

0:35:04.040 --> 0:35:06.720
<v Speaker 1>that are that exists for a reason, as you said,

0:35:06.800 --> 0:35:12.239
<v Speaker 1>and it doesn't really provide a way to bend those

0:35:12.360 --> 0:35:15.600
<v Speaker 1>rules back to their original shape. I mean, Jonathan, I

0:35:15.640 --> 0:35:19.799
<v Speaker 1>can think of already, uh, several scenarios wherein this gild

0:35:19.840 --> 0:35:23.040
<v Speaker 1>get sticky very quickly. Matt. I love that you mentioned. Uh.

0:35:23.120 --> 0:35:27.040
<v Speaker 1>It might not be the person actually using the phone, right,

0:35:27.040 --> 0:35:29.879
<v Speaker 1>It might be someone else, uh took a phone right

0:35:30.160 --> 0:35:33.200
<v Speaker 1>and used it as a burner. But the person, the

0:35:33.239 --> 0:35:37.320
<v Speaker 1>innocent person whose name is uh tied to that number

0:35:37.480 --> 0:35:41.800
<v Speaker 1>that I d they're going to be automatically suspect number

0:35:41.800 --> 0:35:44.960
<v Speaker 1>one or maybe even public enemy number one. Another question

0:35:45.040 --> 0:35:48.399
<v Speaker 1>is what if? What if this search? Right? So let's

0:35:48.400 --> 0:35:51.960
<v Speaker 1>go back in, Um, Matt, you and I are still cops, Jonathan,

0:35:52.000 --> 0:35:56.399
<v Speaker 1>your FBI, your special investigator. Right you came in, you said,

0:35:56.400 --> 0:35:58.720
<v Speaker 1>I'm taking over this investigation. I got a little flip

0:35:58.760 --> 0:36:01.120
<v Speaker 1>phone because I'm from the later seasons of X Files.

0:36:01.200 --> 0:36:04.680
<v Speaker 1>Right exactly right, black suit, black tie, whole thing, and

0:36:05.280 --> 0:36:09.440
<v Speaker 1>you say that we are looking for you know, insert

0:36:09.520 --> 0:36:14.839
<v Speaker 1>bad guy's name here. Uh. And while we're looking though, however, uh,

0:36:14.880 --> 0:36:19.279
<v Speaker 1>there are our search, our vacuum cleaner approach brings in

0:36:19.320 --> 0:36:24.640
<v Speaker 1>another number that pings on your radar because you were

0:36:25.680 --> 0:36:29.280
<v Speaker 1>already suspicious of one person doing, you know, a federal

0:36:29.360 --> 0:36:33.360
<v Speaker 1>level crime. So this person who we were not looking for,

0:36:33.760 --> 0:36:37.120
<v Speaker 1>just showed up. What happens then, Uh, well, I mean,

0:36:37.160 --> 0:36:39.879
<v Speaker 1>obviously I got to take over the investigation. I've seen

0:36:39.960 --> 0:36:43.799
<v Speaker 1>a lot of episodes of various crime dramas, and that's

0:36:43.800 --> 0:36:45.680
<v Speaker 1>what the That's the only thing the FBI is around

0:36:45.719 --> 0:36:49.800
<v Speaker 1>to do is to push the local police force out

0:36:49.840 --> 0:36:53.759
<v Speaker 1>of this was well, you have to keep putting your

0:36:53.760 --> 0:36:56.279
<v Speaker 1>sunglasses on and taking them off. Occasionally you just hear

0:36:56.320 --> 0:37:00.759
<v Speaker 1>the who, Well, I've got a are you kind of

0:37:00.800 --> 0:37:04.360
<v Speaker 1>like that? Unless you want to answer no, no, I

0:37:04.840 --> 0:37:07.640
<v Speaker 1>The only answer to that I have is that I

0:37:07.680 --> 0:37:13.560
<v Speaker 1>would imagine that at least until there are some strong

0:37:13.680 --> 0:37:18.400
<v Speaker 1>precedents set in in court about the actual use of

0:37:18.440 --> 0:37:21.759
<v Speaker 1>this technology, what it really can do, and whether or

0:37:21.800 --> 0:37:24.799
<v Speaker 1>not it truly is constitutional to use it in the

0:37:24.840 --> 0:37:27.800
<v Speaker 1>way that it's being used, I would imagine at least

0:37:28.000 --> 0:37:31.560
<v Speaker 1>until that happens, the FBI acts on that act on

0:37:31.600 --> 0:37:34.400
<v Speaker 1>that information because if there if no one has come

0:37:34.400 --> 0:37:38.480
<v Speaker 1>out and said you can't do that, they're going to

0:37:38.600 --> 0:37:43.400
<v Speaker 1>do that. And I don't mean to cast aspersions on

0:37:43.480 --> 0:37:47.440
<v Speaker 1>law enforcement in the FBI. I realized that they have

0:37:47.960 --> 0:37:53.600
<v Speaker 1>incredibly difficult and very high stakes jobs, right and in

0:37:53.760 --> 0:37:55.880
<v Speaker 1>order for them to be able to do those jobs

0:37:56.200 --> 0:38:01.359
<v Speaker 1>in an increasingly complex technological world, there are some very

0:38:01.360 --> 0:38:04.279
<v Speaker 1>tough questions we have to answer. But the problem I

0:38:04.360 --> 0:38:07.120
<v Speaker 1>have is that these are questions that that seem to

0:38:07.120 --> 0:38:09.239
<v Speaker 1>already have been answered in the past. We just haven't

0:38:09.280 --> 0:38:13.520
<v Speaker 1>applied the answer yet, or people judges in particular, haven't

0:38:13.560 --> 0:38:18.200
<v Speaker 1>understood the implications of this technology, and that we're seeing

0:38:18.239 --> 0:38:23.800
<v Speaker 1>some civil liberties fade away as a result or get less,

0:38:24.239 --> 0:38:26.880
<v Speaker 1>you know, like like it's like you are protected against this,

0:38:27.080 --> 0:38:31.520
<v Speaker 1>except in all of these other newer situations, many of

0:38:31.520 --> 0:38:35.560
<v Speaker 1>which we cannot legally tell you about because national security, right,

0:38:35.600 --> 0:38:38.000
<v Speaker 1>because if we told you about how we're violating your

0:38:38.000 --> 0:38:41.960
<v Speaker 1>civil liberties, then the bad guys would win. Like, well, technically,

0:38:41.960 --> 0:38:44.400
<v Speaker 1>if you're telling me that my civil liberties are being violated,

0:38:44.400 --> 0:38:47.160
<v Speaker 1>but you can't tell me how the bad guys have one. Yeah,

0:38:47.239 --> 0:38:49.799
<v Speaker 1>it's it's an interesting deliminate is one that we keep

0:38:49.880 --> 0:38:52.759
<v Speaker 1>running into. And this is not the first time. I

0:38:52.800 --> 0:38:56.160
<v Speaker 1>love that you mentioned there's precedent through about this throughout history.

0:38:56.200 --> 0:38:58.520
<v Speaker 1>I mean back when it was just the post office,

0:38:58.640 --> 0:39:01.840
<v Speaker 1>right uh. There there were still these ongoing debates about

0:39:01.880 --> 0:39:05.080
<v Speaker 1>what kind of right to privacy should someone expect when

0:39:05.080 --> 0:39:11.440
<v Speaker 1>they're using the postal system. But you also mentioned advocacy groups,

0:39:12.160 --> 0:39:15.359
<v Speaker 1>So is there some organized opposition to There's quite quite

0:39:15.400 --> 0:39:18.080
<v Speaker 1>a lot. There's a lot of disorganized opposition too. But

0:39:18.120 --> 0:39:21.680
<v Speaker 1>the organized opposition includes like the Electronic Frontier Foundation, the

0:39:21.840 --> 0:39:26.319
<v Speaker 1>f E F f UH, there's the American Civil Liberties Union,

0:39:26.360 --> 0:39:29.640
<v Speaker 1>the a c l u uh, there's EPIC there. There

0:39:29.640 --> 0:39:32.680
<v Speaker 1>are all these different groups that are all about privacy

0:39:32.719 --> 0:39:38.160
<v Speaker 1>and civil rights that have identified problem areas with this technology,

0:39:38.400 --> 0:39:40.560
<v Speaker 1>some of which have been they've kind of some of

0:39:40.600 --> 0:39:44.120
<v Speaker 1>them have couched their arguments, largely because they say, we

0:39:44.239 --> 0:39:48.520
<v Speaker 1>can't come out and say how strongly strongly we feel

0:39:48.520 --> 0:39:53.520
<v Speaker 1>about this because of the secrecy involved. Without knowing everything,

0:39:54.400 --> 0:39:57.160
<v Speaker 1>we we don't want to suspect the worst. But we

0:39:57.280 --> 0:40:00.799
<v Speaker 1>can't discount it either because you won't tell us what

0:40:00.880 --> 0:40:04.759
<v Speaker 1>it does or how it's being used. Um, you know,

0:40:04.800 --> 0:40:06.600
<v Speaker 1>but there there are a lot who are saying you

0:40:06.680 --> 0:40:10.239
<v Speaker 1>need to have rules set in place on how this

0:40:10.320 --> 0:40:13.000
<v Speaker 1>technology can be used, if in fact it is legal

0:40:13.040 --> 0:40:17.280
<v Speaker 1>to use it at all. So, for example, perhaps before

0:40:17.360 --> 0:40:20.239
<v Speaker 1>you use this you have to secure a warrant that

0:40:20.440 --> 0:40:25.279
<v Speaker 1>specifies who you are looking for and and narrows that

0:40:25.440 --> 0:40:28.000
<v Speaker 1>down to a point where you can't just throw out

0:40:28.200 --> 0:40:31.959
<v Speaker 1>a net and everybody who's caught in the net, their

0:40:32.000 --> 0:40:34.600
<v Speaker 1>lives are turned upside down for the duration of you

0:40:34.760 --> 0:40:37.759
<v Speaker 1>sorting out which person is the one you actually are

0:40:37.800 --> 0:40:41.919
<v Speaker 1>interested in. But they'll never know the collateral damage isn't

0:40:41.920 --> 0:40:45.640
<v Speaker 1>really collateral if they have no idea, Well, they might

0:40:45.680 --> 0:40:48.759
<v Speaker 1>not ever know. And you know, you could argue that

0:40:48.800 --> 0:40:51.040
<v Speaker 1>in a world where you never know that this is

0:40:51.080 --> 0:40:56.600
<v Speaker 1>happening and it's never affecting you. Stick with me. If

0:40:56.640 --> 0:40:59.239
<v Speaker 1>you're in a world where you you don't know that's

0:40:59.239 --> 0:41:02.160
<v Speaker 1>happening to you and it's not having any noticeable effect

0:41:02.160 --> 0:41:05.200
<v Speaker 1>on your life, ultimately you might be able to go

0:41:05.239 --> 0:41:07.720
<v Speaker 1>to sleep at night and think, well, it doesn't really matter,

0:41:07.760 --> 0:41:11.000
<v Speaker 1>because if it is not affecting my life, then I mean,

0:41:11.120 --> 0:41:12.920
<v Speaker 1>I don't want it to happen, and I'm still going

0:41:12.960 --> 0:41:15.359
<v Speaker 1>to protest it happening because I don't think it's right.

0:41:15.400 --> 0:41:17.440
<v Speaker 1>But if it doesn't have a noticeable effect on my

0:41:17.480 --> 0:41:19.919
<v Speaker 1>life at the end of the day, when I draw

0:41:20.000 --> 0:41:23.880
<v Speaker 1>my last breath, it hasn't really made a difference. Who cares.

0:41:25.360 --> 0:41:27.880
<v Speaker 1>But we might also live in a world where sometimes

0:41:27.880 --> 0:41:30.880
<v Speaker 1>it does affect us, even if we are perfectly innocent

0:41:30.960 --> 0:41:33.600
<v Speaker 1>in all in the eyes of the law. Let's just

0:41:33.640 --> 0:41:35.680
<v Speaker 1>throw out some examples of the n S A for

0:41:35.680 --> 0:41:38.880
<v Speaker 1>for instance, like a person who decides to use the

0:41:39.000 --> 0:41:42.920
<v Speaker 1>n S as wide array of of surveillance techniques to

0:41:42.960 --> 0:41:45.920
<v Speaker 1>look in on an ex girlfriend. That's exactly the scenario

0:41:45.960 --> 0:41:47.680
<v Speaker 1>I was going to bring up. If you and I

0:41:48.120 --> 0:41:50.640
<v Speaker 1>back in our scenario, I decided to go back and

0:41:50.719 --> 0:41:52.520
<v Speaker 1>use the machine for a little bit because we parked

0:41:52.520 --> 0:41:55.719
<v Speaker 1>to get some coffee or something, and I see a

0:41:55.880 --> 0:42:00.000
<v Speaker 1>number that I recognize pop up. Yeah, and I'm just like, oh,

0:42:00.200 --> 0:42:02.719
<v Speaker 1>what is my ex wife's new husband talking about? Oh,

0:42:02.800 --> 0:42:05.160
<v Speaker 1>and then blah blah blah blah blah. There you go

0:42:05.440 --> 0:42:09.520
<v Speaker 1>down the rabbit hole into weird personal things. Then, and

0:42:09.560 --> 0:42:13.640
<v Speaker 1>this is the thing, it's it's you know, the technology

0:42:13.840 --> 0:42:18.279
<v Speaker 1>allows that to happen, and humans being human are going

0:42:18.360 --> 0:42:21.240
<v Speaker 1>to do it right. Like it's it's not a question

0:42:21.239 --> 0:42:24.160
<v Speaker 1>of whether the technology itself is good or bad because

0:42:24.200 --> 0:42:27.040
<v Speaker 1>it's a tool. Uh, you might say, is it a

0:42:27.080 --> 0:42:30.239
<v Speaker 1>tool that is appropriate? Is there any is there are

0:42:30.280 --> 0:42:33.200
<v Speaker 1>there appropriate use cases for this tool? And if so,

0:42:33.280 --> 0:42:36.480
<v Speaker 1>how are they defined? I think that's the important step.

0:42:36.960 --> 0:42:40.080
<v Speaker 1>We have to come to the conclusion of does this

0:42:40.200 --> 0:42:44.480
<v Speaker 1>tool make sense? If so, in which contexts does it

0:42:44.640 --> 0:42:47.800
<v Speaker 1>make sense? And how can we be certain that in

0:42:48.000 --> 0:42:51.839
<v Speaker 1>any given use case it fits those contexts? And if

0:42:51.880 --> 0:42:55.040
<v Speaker 1>it if we can answer all those to our satisfaction, fine,

0:42:55.920 --> 0:43:00.080
<v Speaker 1>I question whether that's possible particular technology. But but the

0:43:00.120 --> 0:43:03.239
<v Speaker 1>problem is that people they'll behave outside of that, right.

0:43:03.320 --> 0:43:06.160
<v Speaker 1>I mean, if there is the capability of someone to

0:43:06.239 --> 0:43:11.239
<v Speaker 1>do this, you know, use this technology in a selfish,

0:43:11.480 --> 0:43:15.680
<v Speaker 1>possibly harmful way, for then someone will do it. It's

0:43:15.680 --> 0:43:17.480
<v Speaker 1>not a question of if, it's a question of when

0:43:17.760 --> 0:43:21.440
<v Speaker 1>and how frequently and uh, because we've seen it with

0:43:21.520 --> 0:43:24.080
<v Speaker 1>the n s A. It's again, you know, you have

0:43:24.160 --> 0:43:26.520
<v Speaker 1>to remember that at the end of the day, they're

0:43:26.600 --> 0:43:31.040
<v Speaker 1>real human beings in charge of using this technology, and

0:43:31.120 --> 0:43:35.600
<v Speaker 1>real human beings have real motivations that happen every single

0:43:35.680 --> 0:43:39.240
<v Speaker 1>day of their lives. Just like you and me. We

0:43:39.239 --> 0:43:41.919
<v Speaker 1>we go through our lives and we realize, oh man,

0:43:41.960 --> 0:43:44.000
<v Speaker 1>if only I knew what was going on in that

0:43:44.040 --> 0:43:47.640
<v Speaker 1>person's head. Oh wait, I could figure it out because

0:43:47.680 --> 0:43:51.919
<v Speaker 1>I've got access to this technology. It happens, right, it does.

0:43:52.480 --> 0:43:55.400
<v Speaker 1>One thing immediately that we could say that might be

0:43:56.440 --> 0:44:00.799
<v Speaker 1>a glimmer of hope with this is that many of

0:44:01.160 --> 0:44:07.000
<v Speaker 1>the surveillance technologies or proprietary systems rather do have strict

0:44:07.160 --> 0:44:10.520
<v Speaker 1>usage logs where wherein you know, any user with an

0:44:10.560 --> 0:44:15.319
<v Speaker 1>I D dis tract, So, uh, Lieutenant Frederick would be

0:44:15.520 --> 0:44:18.480
<v Speaker 1>pinned up for they would say, hey, lieutenant, why were

0:44:18.480 --> 0:44:25.000
<v Speaker 1>you running uh private in the police force? Have you

0:44:25.080 --> 0:44:29.200
<v Speaker 1>militarized the entire police force for several years in the future.

0:44:29.239 --> 0:44:33.000
<v Speaker 1>He's not a rookie, he's a private all right. Well, anyhow,

0:44:33.080 --> 0:44:35.920
<v Speaker 1>whatever your position would be, you know, there would be

0:44:35.960 --> 0:44:39.440
<v Speaker 1>somebody over you, ideally who would say, hey, we noticed

0:44:39.480 --> 0:44:42.319
<v Speaker 1>that you were searching this number which is not part

0:44:42.360 --> 0:44:44.920
<v Speaker 1>of it, and you went pretty in depth. So so

0:44:45.000 --> 0:44:47.600
<v Speaker 1>that's one thing. But then again it relies, as you said,

0:44:47.600 --> 0:44:49.879
<v Speaker 1>on the policy on the system. I'd like to take

0:44:49.880 --> 0:44:54.120
<v Speaker 1>the danger even further because one of the most dangerous

0:44:54.120 --> 0:44:56.840
<v Speaker 1>potential things about the n s A program and possibly

0:44:56.920 --> 0:45:01.839
<v Speaker 1>Stingray and it's other accoutrement, is the idea that this

0:45:01.920 --> 0:45:05.200
<v Speaker 1>could be used by corrupt people with access to the

0:45:05.239 --> 0:45:10.399
<v Speaker 1>technology to do things like smear campaigns, to do blackmail,

0:45:10.560 --> 0:45:14.719
<v Speaker 1>or even extortion. And the most frightening thing to me,

0:45:15.680 --> 0:45:18.920
<v Speaker 1>although it is it is offensive, the idea that an

0:45:18.920 --> 0:45:24.040
<v Speaker 1>innocent person's uh terrible late night you up text messages

0:45:24.160 --> 0:45:28.440
<v Speaker 1>might be collected and saved for posterity, it's more frightening

0:45:28.880 --> 0:45:33.919
<v Speaker 1>that this could be used to curtail people who were

0:45:34.680 --> 0:45:39.160
<v Speaker 1>fighting against it. Yeah, I mean, there's there's that possibilities. Well,

0:45:39.160 --> 0:45:42.720
<v Speaker 1>I mean, granted this would a lot of that responsibility

0:45:42.760 --> 0:45:45.520
<v Speaker 1>falls on the Harris Corporation and how they deal with

0:45:45.640 --> 0:45:50.360
<v Speaker 1>the orders. I imagine that they mostly, I mean before

0:45:51.239 --> 0:45:56.319
<v Speaker 1>they were really working with the FBI and some military

0:45:57.120 --> 0:46:01.200
<v Speaker 1>companies or military organizations I should say, um, and it

0:46:01.239 --> 0:46:05.520
<v Speaker 1>was only relatively recently, in the last maybe five to

0:46:05.600 --> 0:46:08.400
<v Speaker 1>ten years, that they started really working with the local

0:46:08.480 --> 0:46:16.680
<v Speaker 1>law enforcement agencies. UM. I don't know what there are

0:46:16.719 --> 0:46:20.839
<v Speaker 1>other customers are like or who they are, but you

0:46:20.840 --> 0:46:23.680
<v Speaker 1>could presumably I mean even if even if it's not

0:46:23.800 --> 0:46:26.959
<v Speaker 1>made by Harris Corporation, because it's out there and because

0:46:27.000 --> 0:46:30.120
<v Speaker 1>people know about it, then that's enough for someone to say, hey,

0:46:30.480 --> 0:46:33.000
<v Speaker 1>let's pour some money into making one of these of

0:46:33.160 --> 0:46:37.160
<v Speaker 1>our own so we can spy on people in the CIA,

0:46:37.360 --> 0:46:40.320
<v Speaker 1>or the CIA might say let's use it so we

0:46:40.360 --> 0:46:44.359
<v Speaker 1>can spy on people in other countries. I mean, it's

0:46:44.400 --> 0:46:52.319
<v Speaker 1>definitely a difficult, difficult subject. It's tricky, uh. I mean,

0:46:52.560 --> 0:46:57.120
<v Speaker 1>obviously spying throughout history has all been about let's find

0:46:57.160 --> 0:47:00.080
<v Speaker 1>out what they know without letting them know. We know.

0:47:00.320 --> 0:47:02.880
<v Speaker 1>At some point you're like, well, if we if we

0:47:02.920 --> 0:47:06.760
<v Speaker 1>assume that the premise that spies are necessary is true,

0:47:07.320 --> 0:47:09.560
<v Speaker 1>then these other technologies need to exist for us to

0:47:09.560 --> 0:47:11.840
<v Speaker 1>be able to do that. Yeah, but maybe maybe you

0:47:11.880 --> 0:47:14.719
<v Speaker 1>would argue that spying is not something that should happen

0:47:14.719 --> 0:47:16.920
<v Speaker 1>in the first place. Okay, this this is something that

0:47:16.960 --> 0:47:19.400
<v Speaker 1>I know we really wanted your opinion on. Okay for

0:47:19.760 --> 0:47:22.920
<v Speaker 1>a while, so have we? And we asked Alex Winter

0:47:23.200 --> 0:47:26.440
<v Speaker 1>the same question. Is a filmmaker made the Deep Web.

0:47:28.200 --> 0:47:31.560
<v Speaker 1>Have we reached the point of no return with technology?

0:47:31.640 --> 0:47:36.319
<v Speaker 1>Has technology rendered the concept of individual privacy obsolete? Or

0:47:36.360 --> 0:47:40.880
<v Speaker 1>will it do. So, Okay, well this is super complicated, right, Sorry,

0:47:42.280 --> 0:47:44.880
<v Speaker 1>I mean it's a great question. It's a great question.

0:47:45.200 --> 0:47:47.839
<v Speaker 1>On the one hand, you have stuff like this, the

0:47:47.880 --> 0:47:52.799
<v Speaker 1>technology specifically meant to intercept and perhaps even uh not

0:47:52.880 --> 0:47:55.399
<v Speaker 1>just not just intercept in the sense of finding out

0:47:55.440 --> 0:47:58.640
<v Speaker 1>who is talking to whom, but what they are saying. Right,

0:47:58.640 --> 0:48:02.640
<v Speaker 1>You've got that technology, that one thing, and you could

0:48:02.680 --> 0:48:05.560
<v Speaker 1>argue that as long as that technology exists, then privacy

0:48:05.680 --> 0:48:07.880
<v Speaker 1>might only be an illusion. It might be something you

0:48:07.880 --> 0:48:11.680
<v Speaker 1>believe you have, but in reality, your information is being

0:48:12.600 --> 0:48:15.799
<v Speaker 1>collected somewhere. And of course we know that anything we

0:48:15.920 --> 0:48:19.280
<v Speaker 1>post or call or text through or whatever, it's going

0:48:19.400 --> 0:48:22.960
<v Speaker 1>through an infrastructure. So there is at least one entity

0:48:23.040 --> 0:48:25.000
<v Speaker 1>out there that has the access to it. The question

0:48:25.040 --> 0:48:28.000
<v Speaker 1>is whether anyone is looking at it or if it's

0:48:28.120 --> 0:48:32.200
<v Speaker 1>just if it's just a conduit. Right, So you could

0:48:32.280 --> 0:48:34.319
<v Speaker 1>argue that privacy is just an illusion in that case.

0:48:34.400 --> 0:48:36.520
<v Speaker 1>There's another argument to make that has nothing to do

0:48:36.600 --> 0:48:44.640
<v Speaker 1>with surveillance. Facebook. Twitter, we are we are voluntarily sharing

0:48:44.680 --> 0:48:49.360
<v Speaker 1>more and more of our lives, Instagram, Pinterest, really anything

0:48:49.400 --> 0:48:52.320
<v Speaker 1>you can think of where you are allowed a platform.

0:48:52.400 --> 0:48:56.560
<v Speaker 1>People are taking advantage of it. YouTube, another great example periscope.

0:48:58.360 --> 0:49:04.560
<v Speaker 1>So you're you're volunteering to share a lot more information

0:49:04.800 --> 0:49:08.479
<v Speaker 1>and you don't necessarily think while you're doing it, this

0:49:08.719 --> 0:49:13.240
<v Speaker 1>could potentially put other things in my life at risk

0:49:13.400 --> 0:49:16.799
<v Speaker 1>of becoming public knowledge, whether it's because you're not paying

0:49:16.880 --> 0:49:19.640
<v Speaker 1>enough attention or you just don't realize how much information

0:49:19.680 --> 0:49:24.920
<v Speaker 1>you are revealing every time you post something. Um So,

0:49:25.320 --> 0:49:28.799
<v Speaker 1>you could argue in that case, privacy might also be

0:49:28.840 --> 0:49:31.920
<v Speaker 1>an illusion, not because there are all these ways of

0:49:31.960 --> 0:49:35.720
<v Speaker 1>staring at what's really going on, but because we're actually

0:49:36.600 --> 0:49:39.960
<v Speaker 1>giving everything away and we're just not aware of it.

0:49:40.000 --> 0:49:43.000
<v Speaker 1>We're not aware of the consequences of what we our

0:49:43.040 --> 0:49:47.400
<v Speaker 1>own actions happened to be um I would argue we

0:49:47.520 --> 0:49:51.800
<v Speaker 1>haven't gone too far in the sense that we could,

0:49:52.480 --> 0:49:57.200
<v Speaker 1>if motivated to do so and given the authority to

0:49:57.280 --> 0:49:59.719
<v Speaker 1>do so, reverse a lot of the things that have

0:50:00.000 --> 0:50:04.680
<v Speaker 1>and happening. The question of whether that's a reality or not,

0:50:04.760 --> 0:50:06.319
<v Speaker 1>I mean, that's kind of like the pie in the

0:50:06.320 --> 0:50:09.640
<v Speaker 1>sky optimistic idealism, the idea that people could actually be

0:50:09.719 --> 0:50:15.360
<v Speaker 1>motivated to take action, specifically through voting and through campaigning,

0:50:15.360 --> 0:50:18.480
<v Speaker 1>and through bringing things to attention and getting the word

0:50:18.480 --> 0:50:22.319
<v Speaker 1>out there and getting people behind the argument, Hey, we

0:50:22.400 --> 0:50:25.040
<v Speaker 1>need to address this, and we need to have an

0:50:25.080 --> 0:50:29.040
<v Speaker 1>addressed to our satisfaction, not just it's secret. You can't know.

0:50:30.520 --> 0:50:34.480
<v Speaker 1>I think it's possible, I think it would be really hard,

0:50:35.120 --> 0:50:37.440
<v Speaker 1>and I don't even though I think it's possible, I

0:50:37.480 --> 0:50:42.600
<v Speaker 1>don't think it's the plausible outcome. If I'm being perfectly honest, Um,

0:50:42.640 --> 0:50:49.000
<v Speaker 1>it would require enormous changes in momentum among vast, huge

0:50:49.360 --> 0:50:52.400
<v Speaker 1>entities out there that are bigger than any one person is.

0:50:53.000 --> 0:50:54.839
<v Speaker 1>So even if you let's say that you have an

0:50:54.840 --> 0:50:57.600
<v Speaker 1>ideal candidate for president of the United States in mind,

0:50:57.640 --> 0:51:01.279
<v Speaker 1>someone that you truly believe has the best interests of

0:51:01.320 --> 0:51:05.240
<v Speaker 1>the citizens at heart and wants to protect constitutional rights.

0:51:05.520 --> 0:51:09.120
<v Speaker 1>So they want to do right by the citizens and

0:51:09.160 --> 0:51:11.560
<v Speaker 1>make sure that the things they do truly do protect

0:51:11.600 --> 0:51:14.160
<v Speaker 1>them and do so in a way that follows the rules.

0:51:14.719 --> 0:51:18.239
<v Speaker 1>Even if that person exists and has put into the

0:51:18.239 --> 0:51:23.799
<v Speaker 1>position of president, you still have everything else that from

0:51:23.840 --> 0:51:27.520
<v Speaker 1>the local level to n s A TOI you know,

0:51:27.640 --> 0:51:30.680
<v Speaker 1>organizations that do not directly answer to the president. It's

0:51:30.719 --> 0:51:36.120
<v Speaker 1>not like the president is capable of changing everything by

0:51:36.200 --> 0:51:38.319
<v Speaker 1>flicking a wand in fact, they're not supposed to be

0:51:38.360 --> 0:51:40.280
<v Speaker 1>able to do that. That's why they have the position

0:51:40.280 --> 0:51:45.360
<v Speaker 1>of president. Yeah. So uh, this is why until I

0:51:45.440 --> 0:51:49.600
<v Speaker 1>become benevolent dictator, we're going to have these problems. Yeah,

0:51:49.760 --> 0:51:52.960
<v Speaker 1>you know, you've you've been saying that more and more often.

0:51:53.000 --> 0:51:57.160
<v Speaker 1>I appreciate the posters that you've put up around the office.

0:51:57.719 --> 0:52:00.879
<v Speaker 1>Uh they're they're a little bit stark. I don't know.

0:52:01.120 --> 0:52:03.600
<v Speaker 1>I you know, I think there might be a bit

0:52:03.640 --> 0:52:07.560
<v Speaker 1>too Soviet. Yeah. I mean, it would help if they

0:52:07.600 --> 0:52:10.920
<v Speaker 1>were in English. But there's a lot of like crush

0:52:11.120 --> 0:52:14.120
<v Speaker 1>this thing beneath the boot. I just like I thought

0:52:14.120 --> 0:52:18.680
<v Speaker 1>the fist looked really like empowering and now I oh man,

0:52:18.920 --> 0:52:21.680
<v Speaker 1>it does. It does look good. It does. The style

0:52:21.840 --> 0:52:25.839
<v Speaker 1>is nice. You're both on a list now, alright, so

0:52:26.040 --> 0:52:28.759
<v Speaker 1>ut any rate? No, but this is this was the

0:52:28.840 --> 0:52:30.560
<v Speaker 1>reason why why did you guys on here is because

0:52:30.560 --> 0:52:34.719
<v Speaker 1>I know you guys. I assume you feel similarly to

0:52:34.719 --> 0:52:36.960
<v Speaker 1>to what I've stated. But I mean, if there's if

0:52:37.000 --> 0:52:41.720
<v Speaker 1>I have in any way misconstrued, I would I definitely

0:52:41.760 --> 0:52:44.120
<v Speaker 1>want you to have the opportunity to address it. Well,

0:52:44.160 --> 0:52:47.319
<v Speaker 1>I will let Ben finish this idea that I'm going

0:52:47.400 --> 0:52:49.400
<v Speaker 1>to start. But when we spoke with Mr. Winter, he

0:52:49.520 --> 0:52:54.640
<v Speaker 1>had a surprisingly positive outlookture of privacy. That's wonderful, he did.

0:52:54.880 --> 0:52:57.839
<v Speaker 1>The people that he's been speaking with and communicating with

0:52:58.120 --> 0:53:01.000
<v Speaker 1>in his research on this subject of the deep web.

0:53:01.360 --> 0:53:03.719
<v Speaker 1>He's finding that there are a lot of people who

0:53:03.719 --> 0:53:09.920
<v Speaker 1>are freely focused on encrypting data and finding ways to

0:53:10.000 --> 0:53:13.640
<v Speaker 1>encrypt almost all communication that is done from a private

0:53:13.640 --> 0:53:16.920
<v Speaker 1>person's level, so that a company that is even handling

0:53:16.960 --> 0:53:19.319
<v Speaker 1>your data won't be able to decrypt it. Right. So,

0:53:19.360 --> 0:53:22.919
<v Speaker 1>in other words, the the the company that handles it,

0:53:22.920 --> 0:53:26.520
<v Speaker 1>it literally is just the conduit. It cannot it cannot

0:53:26.560 --> 0:53:29.279
<v Speaker 1>see the content. At most, it will see where it's

0:53:29.280 --> 0:53:31.839
<v Speaker 1>coming from and where it's going, but beyond that not

0:53:31.920 --> 0:53:35.839
<v Speaker 1>what the actual information is. He used the phrase. One

0:53:35.840 --> 0:53:40.040
<v Speaker 1>phrase I remember that he used was a renaissance of privacy,

0:53:40.080 --> 0:53:45.440
<v Speaker 1>which which I found inspiring because the the old argument

0:53:45.640 --> 0:53:48.960
<v Speaker 1>of well, if you have nothing to worry about, worried

0:53:48.960 --> 0:53:52.400
<v Speaker 1>about hiding, right, it's kind of silly when you consider

0:53:52.560 --> 0:53:57.400
<v Speaker 1>that we do live in a world now where let's say, Jonathan,

0:53:57.480 --> 0:54:00.279
<v Speaker 1>let's say that you as an FBI agent of the

0:54:00.280 --> 0:54:02.439
<v Speaker 1>part of town and so much. You said, you know what, guys,

0:54:02.440 --> 0:54:05.520
<v Speaker 1>I'm gonna pull up my tent stakes from Langley, and

0:54:05.560 --> 0:54:08.359
<v Speaker 1>I'm gonna come down here, and I am gonna I'm

0:54:08.360 --> 0:54:11.200
<v Speaker 1>gonna live here, and a matter of fact, I'm gonna

0:54:11.280 --> 0:54:15.399
<v Speaker 1>run for city commissioner because I think, uh, this kind

0:54:15.400 --> 0:54:17.960
<v Speaker 1>of stuff needs to be dealt with in the public eye.

0:54:18.320 --> 0:54:21.320
<v Speaker 1>And then all of a sudden, all of this stuff,

0:54:21.360 --> 0:54:23.680
<v Speaker 1>every time you have used your phone in that region

0:54:23.719 --> 0:54:27.520
<v Speaker 1>got leaked by somebody. Or maybe you're running for sheriff, right,

0:54:27.600 --> 0:54:30.239
<v Speaker 1>because we do know that the sheriff's uh, at least

0:54:30.239 --> 0:54:34.719
<v Speaker 1>into Cab County once played played a corrupt game here, yeah, well,

0:54:35.000 --> 0:54:39.719
<v Speaker 1>or or even just something that, like, you know, a

0:54:39.800 --> 0:54:43.120
<v Speaker 1>mistake that you make at some point, sure, and it

0:54:43.200 --> 0:54:45.239
<v Speaker 1>may be it may be one that you you know,

0:54:45.440 --> 0:54:48.040
<v Speaker 1>it could be that something you consciously did, or not

0:54:48.120 --> 0:54:51.680
<v Speaker 1>even a conscious mistake, something that due to your actions

0:54:51.680 --> 0:54:54.759
<v Speaker 1>has accidentally happened, and that you have already taken care

0:54:54.800 --> 0:54:57.480
<v Speaker 1>of it, You have fixed whatever problems there are, whatever

0:54:57.560 --> 0:54:59.880
<v Speaker 1>the nature of that thing is, you have you know,

0:55:00.120 --> 0:55:04.000
<v Speaker 1>you've done your time. However that that might be for

0:55:04.080 --> 0:55:06.000
<v Speaker 1>something like that to like, let's say that you do

0:55:06.120 --> 0:55:10.120
<v Speaker 1>want to run for a local local position and it

0:55:10.200 --> 0:55:13.399
<v Speaker 1>has no bearing whatsoever on your ability to carry out

0:55:13.400 --> 0:55:16.360
<v Speaker 1>your duties. We live in a world now where that

0:55:16.360 --> 0:55:19.720
<v Speaker 1>stuff comes back, I mean, like big time comes back.

0:55:20.280 --> 0:55:22.960
<v Speaker 1>And none of us are saints, you know, no one,

0:55:23.600 --> 0:55:27.239
<v Speaker 1>no one has gone through life completely unsullied. Even if

0:55:27.280 --> 0:55:30.800
<v Speaker 1>you you know or have the best of intentions, something

0:55:30.840 --> 0:55:33.399
<v Speaker 1>has happened some point in your life. Maybe you were

0:55:33.440 --> 0:55:35.359
<v Speaker 1>just in the wrong place at the wrong time, but

0:55:35.480 --> 0:55:38.160
<v Speaker 1>that can be bad enough. Yeah, that's true. I I

0:55:38.760 --> 0:55:42.360
<v Speaker 1>do want to say, Um, I really enjoyed I always

0:55:42.440 --> 0:55:45.319
<v Speaker 1>enjoy being on this show, And um, I don't want

0:55:45.320 --> 0:55:47.320
<v Speaker 1>to speak for you, Matt, but I'm I'm grateful that

0:55:47.480 --> 0:55:53.200
<v Speaker 1>hates it. Yeah, I'm grateful that for me. You guys,

0:55:53.360 --> 0:55:55.560
<v Speaker 1>you would be so impressed by that's ability to silently

0:55:55.600 --> 0:55:59.680
<v Speaker 1>weep in this room. But salty, salty beard. But the

0:55:59.719 --> 0:56:01.680
<v Speaker 1>only thing I would add to what we were saying

0:56:01.960 --> 0:56:04.600
<v Speaker 1>is that I love that we were talking about how

0:56:04.600 --> 0:56:09.160
<v Speaker 1>we are not casting aspersion on the individuals working in

0:56:09.239 --> 0:56:14.040
<v Speaker 1>law enforcement, which is so often an incredibly thankless job,

0:56:14.160 --> 0:56:17.719
<v Speaker 1>a fatally at times thankless job. And when you're when

0:56:17.760 --> 0:56:23.000
<v Speaker 1>you are representing the good guys right, the force of

0:56:23.360 --> 0:56:26.960
<v Speaker 1>the force of crime prevention in our society, then the

0:56:26.960 --> 0:56:30.320
<v Speaker 1>thing is that the game you are playing is stacked

0:56:30.400 --> 0:56:33.320
<v Speaker 1>against you because the bad guys, whomever they may be,

0:56:33.800 --> 0:56:37.799
<v Speaker 1>do not have to follow the same rules. So I

0:56:38.280 --> 0:56:43.320
<v Speaker 1>while I think that, while I think that it's often easy,

0:56:43.360 --> 0:56:46.319
<v Speaker 1>at least in our field, for people to demonize law

0:56:46.400 --> 0:56:48.960
<v Speaker 1>enforcement as a faceless entity rather than a group of

0:56:49.040 --> 0:56:58.160
<v Speaker 1>human beings, I do completely believe that this is horrible technology.

0:56:57.600 --> 0:57:01.520
<v Speaker 1>I don't see a lot out of cases of it

0:57:01.600 --> 0:57:04.000
<v Speaker 1>being successful. The a c l U has tried their

0:57:04.000 --> 0:57:06.880
<v Speaker 1>best to make a map of all the police areas

0:57:06.920 --> 0:57:09.879
<v Speaker 1>they're using this, but they still they had to say

0:57:09.920 --> 0:57:15.400
<v Speaker 1>that this map is incomplete. This is I believe, very

0:57:15.640 --> 0:57:18.200
<v Speaker 1>very close to a kind of Pandora's box because, as

0:57:18.280 --> 0:57:21.960
<v Speaker 1>we know, the price of technology continually decreases, right, Yeah,

0:57:22.160 --> 0:57:24.720
<v Speaker 1>so what happens when it's a stingray is the price

0:57:24.720 --> 0:57:27.120
<v Speaker 1>of a PS four? Well, I mean, you know, it's

0:57:27.160 --> 0:57:30.360
<v Speaker 1>it's being made in such limited amounts. I mean, you

0:57:30.440 --> 0:57:32.360
<v Speaker 1>have to have the demand there and you have to

0:57:32.400 --> 0:57:34.680
<v Speaker 1>have I would imagine there will also be laws that

0:57:34.720 --> 0:57:37.960
<v Speaker 1>will limit the use of this, because you have the

0:57:38.000 --> 0:57:41.800
<v Speaker 1>giant phone companies that will lobby very hard. They don't

0:57:41.840 --> 0:57:44.120
<v Speaker 1>want the ability for someone to spoof a cell phone

0:57:44.160 --> 0:57:46.280
<v Speaker 1>tower to fall into the hands of an average citizen

0:57:46.480 --> 0:57:50.480
<v Speaker 1>that their their business depends upon that not happening. But

0:57:50.640 --> 0:57:54.360
<v Speaker 1>you're not the average citizen. No, No, I'm the future

0:57:54.360 --> 0:57:57.360
<v Speaker 1>benevolent dictator of the New World Order. I think you

0:57:57.400 --> 0:58:00.640
<v Speaker 1>need a tank. I think the the you can need

0:58:00.640 --> 0:58:06.760
<v Speaker 1>a tank on speed dial. Yeah, yeah, but they yeah,

0:58:06.800 --> 0:58:09.520
<v Speaker 1>this is this is fantastic and I really appreciate the

0:58:09.560 --> 0:58:13.520
<v Speaker 1>opportunity to let more people know about this. Yeah, And

0:58:13.760 --> 0:58:15.520
<v Speaker 1>like I said, this technology has been around for a while.

0:58:15.560 --> 0:58:17.920
<v Speaker 1>In fact that the sting ray stuff really started hitting

0:58:18.160 --> 0:58:20.920
<v Speaker 1>headlines a couple of years ago, back in that's when

0:58:20.920 --> 0:58:23.240
<v Speaker 1>it was really starting to get noticed. And keep in

0:58:23.280 --> 0:58:27.400
<v Speaker 1>mind it's been used more than a decade before that. So, uh,

0:58:27.600 --> 0:58:29.400
<v Speaker 1>it's it's good to be aware of it. It's good

0:58:29.400 --> 0:58:32.320
<v Speaker 1>to ask these questions. And like I said, we may

0:58:32.520 --> 0:58:34.560
<v Speaker 1>at some point come to a point where we are

0:58:34.720 --> 0:58:37.720
<v Speaker 1>able to answer the questions I've been asking, to a

0:58:37.720 --> 0:58:40.840
<v Speaker 1>point where maybe I would be like, Okay, I understand

0:58:40.880 --> 0:58:43.040
<v Speaker 1>that in the world we live in, the reality of

0:58:43.080 --> 0:58:47.000
<v Speaker 1>the world we live in that under these situations, this

0:58:47.120 --> 0:58:51.000
<v Speaker 1>might be an acceptable use of the technology. Uh, it's

0:58:51.040 --> 0:58:53.520
<v Speaker 1>just right now, we haven't. We don't have those answers

0:58:53.560 --> 0:58:58.280
<v Speaker 1>because of secrecy. So yeah, it's it's it's definitely something

0:58:58.320 --> 0:59:01.080
<v Speaker 1>to be aware of. I I don't want to be

0:59:01.120 --> 0:59:04.600
<v Speaker 1>a fearmonger or anything like that, but um, it is

0:59:04.640 --> 0:59:08.919
<v Speaker 1>important that you know about it because I mean, it's

0:59:08.960 --> 0:59:11.200
<v Speaker 1>it's out there. Whether you know or not, it is there,

0:59:11.320 --> 0:59:14.520
<v Speaker 1>so it's better to know. All right, Well, guys, thank

0:59:14.560 --> 0:59:18.240
<v Speaker 1>you so much for joining the show. Obviously you can

0:59:18.320 --> 0:59:21.720
<v Speaker 1>find Matt and Ben's work at stuff they don't want

0:59:21.800 --> 0:59:27.480
<v Speaker 1>you to know, a show that I titled that's true.

0:59:27.520 --> 0:59:31.000
<v Speaker 1>It's true, It's all true. You can also, ladies and gentlemen,

0:59:31.080 --> 0:59:35.760
<v Speaker 1>find Jonathan on more than a few of our episodes.

0:59:35.880 --> 0:59:42.640
<v Speaker 1>That's true as well. So much truth right now, you guys. Yeah, Yes,

0:59:43.200 --> 0:59:45.440
<v Speaker 1>one thing before we go, I just want to recommend

0:59:45.440 --> 0:59:47.680
<v Speaker 1>to everyone. This is a little something that I'm going

0:59:47.760 --> 0:59:50.320
<v Speaker 1>to start doing today, in fact, because of this conversation.

0:59:50.960 --> 0:59:54.200
<v Speaker 1>Go go down to your local magic shop by as

0:59:54.400 --> 0:59:57.919
<v Speaker 1>much flash paper as you possibly can and do all

0:59:57.920 --> 1:00:01.040
<v Speaker 1>of your communications solely on a flash paper and just

1:00:01.120 --> 1:00:04.440
<v Speaker 1>keep lots of lighters handy. Yeah, so essentially tell people

1:00:04.480 --> 1:00:06.840
<v Speaker 1>you know, the message will not self destruct, but you

1:00:06.880 --> 1:00:09.960
<v Speaker 1>will yourself will need to destroy the message once upon

1:00:10.480 --> 1:00:13.400
<v Speaker 1>receiving it, and hower is yours. Yeah, and then all

1:00:13.440 --> 1:00:15.600
<v Speaker 1>the all these problems are solved. I had a great

1:00:15.640 --> 1:00:18.720
<v Speaker 1>time hanging out in that van with you, guys. Came out.

1:00:18.960 --> 1:00:23.000
<v Speaker 1>It's pretty awesome. Guys. I'm sorry I took your case

1:00:23.040 --> 1:00:27.720
<v Speaker 1>away from you. It's okay, jerk move al right, guys. Well,

1:00:27.720 --> 1:00:30.840
<v Speaker 1>if you have any suggestions for future episodes of tech Stuff,

1:00:30.840 --> 1:00:34.280
<v Speaker 1>whether it is a subject or a guest I should

1:00:34.360 --> 1:00:37.560
<v Speaker 1>have on the show, maybe someone I should interview, anything

1:00:37.600 --> 1:00:39.800
<v Speaker 1>like that, or just a comment on what we had

1:00:39.840 --> 1:00:43.280
<v Speaker 1>to say here today, send me a message. The email

1:00:43.360 --> 1:00:46.480
<v Speaker 1>is tech Stuff at how stuff works dot com, or

1:00:46.520 --> 1:00:49.480
<v Speaker 1>you can drop me a line on Twitter or Facebook

1:00:49.600 --> 1:00:52.200
<v Speaker 1>or tumbler at all three. I use the handle of

1:00:52.280 --> 1:00:55.560
<v Speaker 1>text Stuff H s W. And I'll talk to you

1:00:55.600 --> 1:01:03.000
<v Speaker 1>guys again really soon. For more on this and thousands

1:01:03.000 --> 1:01:14.720
<v Speaker 1>of other topics, visit houstock works dot com.