1 00:00:04,240 --> 00:00:07,200 Speaker 1: Get in touch with technology with Text Stuff from how 2 00:00:07,240 --> 00:00:14,920 Speaker 1: Stuff Works dot Com. Hey there, and welcome to Text Stuff. 3 00:00:14,960 --> 00:00:18,360 Speaker 1: I'm Jonathan Strickland, and today I have a special treat 4 00:00:18,880 --> 00:00:22,560 Speaker 1: for me and for you. I have kidnapped one of 5 00:00:22,600 --> 00:00:26,120 Speaker 1: the other podcast teams here at How Stuff Works, not 6 00:00:26,200 --> 00:00:30,000 Speaker 1: just a host, an entire team stuff they don't want 7 00:00:30,080 --> 00:00:35,800 Speaker 1: you to know represent yea, yeah, all right, and that's 8 00:00:35,880 --> 00:00:40,760 Speaker 1: Matt and I'm Ben. As always, thanks for having us. 9 00:00:41,000 --> 00:00:44,720 Speaker 1: Listeners probably recalled that both Matt and I have appeared 10 00:00:44,840 --> 00:00:48,760 Speaker 1: in different episodes in the past. That's correct, different episodes 11 00:00:48,800 --> 00:00:51,000 Speaker 1: of tech stuff, some of the same episodes of stuff 12 00:00:51,000 --> 00:00:52,960 Speaker 1: they don't want you to know, though, Yes, yes, there 13 00:00:53,040 --> 00:00:55,920 Speaker 1: is a little bit of overlap for that. But we 14 00:00:55,920 --> 00:00:59,840 Speaker 1: were super excited to hear about today's topic because it's 15 00:00:59,840 --> 00:01:01,760 Speaker 1: been something that Matt and I have been talking about 16 00:01:01,760 --> 00:01:05,160 Speaker 1: off air. Is that correct? Absolutely, This kind of technology 17 00:01:05,400 --> 00:01:07,800 Speaker 1: that we're going to get into a little later. Uh, 18 00:01:07,840 --> 00:01:11,920 Speaker 1: it piques our interest, you could say, yeah, mine as well. Uh, 19 00:01:11,959 --> 00:01:14,240 Speaker 1: you know, the stuff they don't want you to know 20 00:01:14,319 --> 00:01:17,240 Speaker 1: shows great show. If you guys haven't checked it out, 21 00:01:17,280 --> 00:01:19,640 Speaker 1: you need to go and and check it out. Check 22 00:01:19,840 --> 00:01:24,679 Speaker 1: check out how you guys are looking into various types 23 00:01:24,959 --> 00:01:30,880 Speaker 1: of conspiracies, things that are happening below the surface level 24 00:01:30,920 --> 00:01:33,760 Speaker 1: that people may not be aware of, and kind of 25 00:01:34,200 --> 00:01:38,039 Speaker 1: sifting through the information to show which parts of it 26 00:01:38,280 --> 00:01:42,000 Speaker 1: are you know, are really solid. You know, these are 27 00:01:42,000 --> 00:01:44,520 Speaker 1: the things that we know for sure. And here's the 28 00:01:44,560 --> 00:01:47,319 Speaker 1: conjecture that's been said about it. You guys do a 29 00:01:47,319 --> 00:01:49,600 Speaker 1: great job with it. And as it turns out, there's 30 00:01:49,640 --> 00:01:52,080 Speaker 1: a lot of stuff out there that can really fuel 31 00:01:52,800 --> 00:01:57,000 Speaker 1: that kind of kind of talk for good reason. And 32 00:01:57,040 --> 00:01:59,400 Speaker 1: I typically am one of those more you know, I 33 00:01:59,400 --> 00:02:02,480 Speaker 1: am a little are conservative and skeptical with my approach 34 00:02:02,520 --> 00:02:05,760 Speaker 1: to these things. But this is a technology we're gonna 35 00:02:05,840 --> 00:02:10,520 Speaker 1: talk about today that I don't know how you could 36 00:02:10,560 --> 00:02:14,079 Speaker 1: go to it being skeptical and say, oh, everything is fine. 37 00:02:14,520 --> 00:02:19,520 Speaker 1: We are talking about sting ray or I AM s 38 00:02:19,560 --> 00:02:23,040 Speaker 1: I catchers, and so stingray is the one that I 39 00:02:23,120 --> 00:02:25,120 Speaker 1: think most people have heard about. That's the one that 40 00:02:25,280 --> 00:02:28,440 Speaker 1: was brought up in a lawsuit in Arizona, UM. So 41 00:02:28,480 --> 00:02:31,680 Speaker 1: I think that that is what most people think about 42 00:02:31,720 --> 00:02:34,000 Speaker 1: when they hear I M. S I catchers, if they 43 00:02:34,040 --> 00:02:36,720 Speaker 1: are aware of that term at all. But of course 44 00:02:36,720 --> 00:02:40,600 Speaker 1: sting stingray is just one version of that, and we'll 45 00:02:40,600 --> 00:02:43,680 Speaker 1: talk about some of the other ones as well. So 46 00:02:43,760 --> 00:02:49,600 Speaker 1: I am s I catchers stands for International Mobile Subscriber 47 00:02:49,600 --> 00:02:55,520 Speaker 1: Identity catchers or locators, and that is a fancy way 48 00:02:55,520 --> 00:02:58,720 Speaker 1: of saying. This is a technology that is able to 49 00:02:59,040 --> 00:03:05,720 Speaker 1: intercept signals from cell phones, ostensibly so that uh a 50 00:03:05,880 --> 00:03:10,440 Speaker 1: law enforcement official could locate a person based upon that 51 00:03:10,520 --> 00:03:15,040 Speaker 1: person's cell phone signaling. And it does this, and we'll 52 00:03:15,040 --> 00:03:18,840 Speaker 1: talk about specifics in a bit, by mimicking a cell 53 00:03:18,880 --> 00:03:22,080 Speaker 1: phone tower. So in other words, your cell phone is 54 00:03:22,120 --> 00:03:26,600 Speaker 1: communicating with this device thinking that this is the actual 55 00:03:26,760 --> 00:03:31,040 Speaker 1: part of the infrastructure that it would normally operate inside. Yeah. Yeah, 56 00:03:31,040 --> 00:03:33,440 Speaker 1: it's sort of the same way that were similar at 57 00:03:33,480 --> 00:03:37,200 Speaker 1: least to the ways in which some animals have evolved 58 00:03:37,200 --> 00:03:39,520 Speaker 1: to have camouflage that makes them appear to be a 59 00:03:39,520 --> 00:03:43,280 Speaker 1: different type of creature, right. Yeah. And one thing that 60 00:03:43,360 --> 00:03:45,120 Speaker 1: I just want to get this out so I don't 61 00:03:45,680 --> 00:03:49,480 Speaker 1: uh moan and complain about it for the whole episode. 62 00:03:49,720 --> 00:03:52,480 Speaker 1: If you ever lost a cell phone or had one 63 00:03:52,560 --> 00:03:56,880 Speaker 1: stolen and had the sneaking suspicion that there might be 64 00:03:56,920 --> 00:04:00,520 Speaker 1: a way for law enforcement to catch it, well, far radically, 65 00:04:00,960 --> 00:04:03,760 Speaker 1: there is. It's just it's just they can't do that 66 00:04:03,840 --> 00:04:07,040 Speaker 1: for everybody because so many people lose their cell phones 67 00:04:07,120 --> 00:04:09,280 Speaker 1: or have them stolen, you know, as long as it's 68 00:04:09,280 --> 00:04:12,040 Speaker 1: turned on right, right, yeah, and as long as well, 69 00:04:12,080 --> 00:04:14,240 Speaker 1: and it also depends on a couple of other things too, Right, 70 00:04:14,600 --> 00:04:17,960 Speaker 1: they have to have the if they're looking for your 71 00:04:18,000 --> 00:04:20,560 Speaker 1: cell phones specifically, they kind of need to know a 72 00:04:20,600 --> 00:04:23,520 Speaker 1: little bit more information, like they need to know something 73 00:04:23,560 --> 00:04:28,599 Speaker 1: specific about that phone or to identify it versus all 74 00:04:28,680 --> 00:04:31,120 Speaker 1: the other phones that will connect to it, right, right, 75 00:04:31,520 --> 00:04:33,600 Speaker 1: because otherwise they just be like, well, it may be 76 00:04:33,800 --> 00:04:36,599 Speaker 1: one of the phones here, and there are different ways 77 00:04:36,640 --> 00:04:38,680 Speaker 1: of looking into that, right. It all depends on what 78 00:04:38,720 --> 00:04:40,840 Speaker 1: the investigation is. And we'll we'll talk more about how 79 00:04:40,839 --> 00:04:46,160 Speaker 1: it's used in investigations. So basically, this is a technology 80 00:04:46,440 --> 00:04:52,120 Speaker 1: meant to help Again, ostensibly law enforcement tracked down the 81 00:04:52,160 --> 00:04:57,120 Speaker 1: bad guys or counter terrorism officials to identify potential terrorist 82 00:04:57,160 --> 00:05:00,560 Speaker 1: threats before they become a reality. That's what it supposed 83 00:05:00,600 --> 00:05:02,320 Speaker 1: to be used for. There are a lot of people 84 00:05:02,360 --> 00:05:05,680 Speaker 1: who have objected to it because it is it is 85 00:05:05,720 --> 00:05:10,360 Speaker 1: taking a very wide approach to targeting something very specific, 86 00:05:10,760 --> 00:05:13,679 Speaker 1: and that can be dangerous for the sting Ray its self. 87 00:05:13,720 --> 00:05:16,599 Speaker 1: It costs between sixty eight thousand dollars and a hundred 88 00:05:16,640 --> 00:05:20,040 Speaker 1: thirty five thousand dollars last I checked. Because there are 89 00:05:20,040 --> 00:05:22,719 Speaker 1: two different models of the sting ray, there's the sting 90 00:05:22,800 --> 00:05:24,880 Speaker 1: ray and sting Ray. To sting Ray two came out 91 00:05:24,880 --> 00:05:27,440 Speaker 1: a few years ago. The sting ray obviously came out 92 00:05:27,640 --> 00:05:32,560 Speaker 1: before that. Because we move in a chronological order, they 93 00:05:32,600 --> 00:05:35,440 Speaker 1: haven't gotten to that quantum effect where the sequel comes 94 00:05:35,440 --> 00:05:38,840 Speaker 1: out before the original. Um. Now it's made by a 95 00:05:38,880 --> 00:05:43,599 Speaker 1: company called Harris Corporation out of Melbourne, Florida, and uh 96 00:05:43,680 --> 00:05:47,479 Speaker 1: and this company makes a lot of technology that falls 97 00:05:47,560 --> 00:05:51,640 Speaker 1: into this general category. Some of the products that they 98 00:05:51,680 --> 00:05:55,039 Speaker 1: make are similar to sting Ray and do similar things 99 00:05:55,080 --> 00:05:58,640 Speaker 1: to that device. Others are more specific and are meant 100 00:05:58,680 --> 00:06:04,480 Speaker 1: to be used in conjunction with a gadget like stingray. Yeah. Yeah, 101 00:06:04,560 --> 00:06:06,520 Speaker 1: you know, it's like a console, you know, like you've 102 00:06:06,520 --> 00:06:08,600 Speaker 1: got your connect, you've got your you know, your your 103 00:06:08,680 --> 00:06:11,600 Speaker 1: dance pad, You've got all these other things sort of 104 00:06:11,600 --> 00:06:16,320 Speaker 1: the similar thing here, except the devices that Harris Corporation makes, 105 00:06:17,200 --> 00:06:21,920 Speaker 1: some of them boost the signal catching ability of the 106 00:06:21,920 --> 00:06:26,560 Speaker 1: basic technology, like the stingray some of them allow for 107 00:06:26,640 --> 00:06:30,920 Speaker 1: better tracking technology. It all depends on the thing. But 108 00:06:30,920 --> 00:06:32,279 Speaker 1: but you know, you may have heard some of the 109 00:06:32,279 --> 00:06:40,560 Speaker 1: other names. Some of the other names that include trigger fish, kingfish, amberjack, gossamer, harpoon, 110 00:06:40,720 --> 00:06:45,560 Speaker 1: and hail storm. Uh. And not only these are not 111 00:06:45,680 --> 00:06:49,279 Speaker 1: types of stingray. These are all individual devices that work 112 00:06:49,400 --> 00:06:51,520 Speaker 1: in a similar way to sting ray. Some of them 113 00:06:51,720 --> 00:06:54,600 Speaker 1: copy the functionality of stingray, some of them go beyond that. 114 00:06:54,640 --> 00:07:01,840 Speaker 1: In fact, trigger fish is particularly troubling. Um. But uh, 115 00:07:02,200 --> 00:07:04,359 Speaker 1: sting rate self can be really troubling too, if you 116 00:07:04,400 --> 00:07:07,160 Speaker 1: just do a simple upgrade to it. And then you're right. 117 00:07:07,720 --> 00:07:11,120 Speaker 1: The all of these have things in common and that 118 00:07:11,200 --> 00:07:14,960 Speaker 1: they all are meant to detect cell phone usage in 119 00:07:15,040 --> 00:07:18,280 Speaker 1: some way and either identify it or locate it and 120 00:07:18,440 --> 00:07:22,040 Speaker 1: or track it. Um. And it's how you use these 121 00:07:22,080 --> 00:07:26,360 Speaker 1: in combination with one another that determines your ability to 122 00:07:26,440 --> 00:07:29,760 Speaker 1: do that. Now, clearly we're talking about something that's mimicking 123 00:07:29,800 --> 00:07:32,120 Speaker 1: a cell phone tower. You have to have it be 124 00:07:32,360 --> 00:07:37,400 Speaker 1: mobile because otherwise you just have to hope that the 125 00:07:37,400 --> 00:07:39,840 Speaker 1: bad guys happened to go across your part of town. 126 00:07:39,880 --> 00:07:42,440 Speaker 1: You can't take it to them if it's not mobile right. 127 00:07:42,720 --> 00:07:47,160 Speaker 1: So uh. One of the things that this is really 128 00:07:47,200 --> 00:07:50,040 Speaker 1: helpful for as far as law enforcement are concerned, is 129 00:07:50,080 --> 00:07:52,360 Speaker 1: that they can go to a part of town where 130 00:07:52,360 --> 00:07:56,160 Speaker 1: they suspect someone is. They can put out their ears, 131 00:07:56,240 --> 00:07:58,240 Speaker 1: listen for it, look to see if they have any 132 00:07:58,280 --> 00:08:01,960 Speaker 1: hits that relate back to the target they're specifically looking for, 133 00:08:02,280 --> 00:08:04,200 Speaker 1: and if not, they can move on to a different 134 00:08:04,200 --> 00:08:08,000 Speaker 1: part of town. Um. That's also one of the drawbacks, 135 00:08:08,120 --> 00:08:10,600 Speaker 1: as it turns out, at least from from the perspective 136 00:08:10,600 --> 00:08:15,280 Speaker 1: of some people. Now let's see one other thing. Oh, 137 00:08:15,320 --> 00:08:19,280 Speaker 1: I forgot to mention. Gossamer is one of the exceptions 138 00:08:19,320 --> 00:08:24,240 Speaker 1: to this. Gossamer is not about tracking or locating cell phone. Yeah, 139 00:08:24,240 --> 00:08:26,200 Speaker 1: but this is the one that freaks me out the most. Yeah, 140 00:08:26,200 --> 00:08:29,120 Speaker 1: this is not passive. Now, Gossamer is about denial of 141 00:08:29,120 --> 00:08:33,120 Speaker 1: service attacks on a mobile phone. So it's about it's 142 00:08:33,200 --> 00:08:36,240 Speaker 1: essentially a jammer. Now, this is great for all of 143 00:08:36,280 --> 00:08:39,320 Speaker 1: the paranoid people in the audience. Are you getting bad 144 00:08:39,360 --> 00:08:44,160 Speaker 1: reception or are you being gossamer? I actually, and and 145 00:08:44,559 --> 00:08:47,120 Speaker 1: another thing to to mention. I didn't put it in 146 00:08:47,160 --> 00:08:49,800 Speaker 1: our notes, but one of the things these devices typically 147 00:08:49,800 --> 00:08:52,640 Speaker 1: can do, the stingray in particular, can do this is 148 00:08:52,679 --> 00:08:56,320 Speaker 1: it can boost your the signal coming from your phone 149 00:08:57,200 --> 00:09:00,040 Speaker 1: to connect to the tower. It can essentially say I 150 00:09:00,160 --> 00:09:03,400 Speaker 1: need a stronger signal your phone. Then, even though you're 151 00:09:03,400 --> 00:09:05,760 Speaker 1: not using it, like it's just in your pocket, there's 152 00:09:05,800 --> 00:09:09,040 Speaker 1: no vibrating, there's no ringing, there's nothing going on, your 153 00:09:09,080 --> 00:09:13,080 Speaker 1: phone starts sending stronger signals. This drains your battery. So 154 00:09:13,440 --> 00:09:16,200 Speaker 1: if you're the paranoid persuasion, you may also think my 155 00:09:16,320 --> 00:09:20,480 Speaker 1: phone's battery just won't even last like a full day anymore. 156 00:09:20,600 --> 00:09:22,800 Speaker 1: And it might not be because your phone is old. 157 00:09:22,840 --> 00:09:26,240 Speaker 1: It might be because you're getting you're getting sting rayed. 158 00:09:26,480 --> 00:09:30,319 Speaker 1: You guys, I'm not kidding. That's happening to me right now. Well, 159 00:09:30,440 --> 00:09:34,000 Speaker 1: I'm sorry, Matt, but you should take more care when 160 00:09:34,000 --> 00:09:37,360 Speaker 1: you are browsing on your phone. Also, Matt, Matt, I 161 00:09:37,360 --> 00:09:39,200 Speaker 1: mean not to make you worried or anything, but you're 162 00:09:39,240 --> 00:09:44,000 Speaker 1: definitely on some lists. So I mean you're on our 163 00:09:44,040 --> 00:09:48,680 Speaker 1: list of favorite people. Yeah, there's one right there. So okay, 164 00:09:48,720 --> 00:09:51,719 Speaker 1: So I love this idea about it being mobile. So 165 00:09:51,840 --> 00:09:57,880 Speaker 1: if we take that paranoid example, uh, in the vast majority, 166 00:09:57,960 --> 00:10:02,000 Speaker 1: virtually every time somebody has poor reception or poor battery life. 167 00:10:02,200 --> 00:10:04,120 Speaker 1: It is never going to be something like this, But 168 00:10:04,200 --> 00:10:07,160 Speaker 1: there is a very small chance that if you are 169 00:10:07,160 --> 00:10:10,280 Speaker 1: a victim of this, you could literally have someone following 170 00:10:10,280 --> 00:10:15,120 Speaker 1: you around, right, yeah, I mean, okay, to be fair, 171 00:10:15,320 --> 00:10:18,760 Speaker 1: this technology we're talking about is at a level of 172 00:10:18,800 --> 00:10:21,120 Speaker 1: expense where it's not likely to happen to you. And 173 00:10:21,559 --> 00:10:25,400 Speaker 1: if you are someone who is either hanging out with 174 00:10:25,520 --> 00:10:30,600 Speaker 1: questionable people or you yourself are engaged in some questionable activities, 175 00:10:31,120 --> 00:10:36,240 Speaker 1: then you'd be more likely to have this actually target you. Now, 176 00:10:37,160 --> 00:10:40,960 Speaker 1: because we know that law enforcement agencies across the United 177 00:10:40,960 --> 00:10:44,720 Speaker 1: States and in other parts of the world have used 178 00:10:44,920 --> 00:10:47,680 Speaker 1: this kind of technology, they're the they're the customers, they're 179 00:10:47,720 --> 00:10:51,080 Speaker 1: ones that are purchasing the stuff from Harris Corporation. It's 180 00:10:51,160 --> 00:10:53,640 Speaker 1: very possible you would come into contact with this, and 181 00:10:53,679 --> 00:10:56,240 Speaker 1: it's not that you are being targeted, but you're still 182 00:10:56,280 --> 00:11:00,160 Speaker 1: being affected because it's so broad. Yeah, it's like it's 183 00:11:00,160 --> 00:11:03,040 Speaker 1: mimicking a cellphone tower. It's not mimicking a cell phone 184 00:11:03,040 --> 00:11:06,120 Speaker 1: tower for a single phone. It's been making a cell 185 00:11:06,160 --> 00:11:11,240 Speaker 1: phone tower for the broadcast range of that device. And 186 00:11:11,360 --> 00:11:15,240 Speaker 1: so okay, so their mobile but what what would they 187 00:11:15,360 --> 00:11:17,319 Speaker 1: look like if you just saw one. So they look 188 00:11:17,400 --> 00:11:19,440 Speaker 1: kind of like, uh, I mean, if you've ever seen 189 00:11:19,520 --> 00:11:23,120 Speaker 1: one of those servers, like it looks like just a 190 00:11:23,160 --> 00:11:26,400 Speaker 1: basic computer with lots of ports on it. It's kind 191 00:11:26,400 --> 00:11:29,959 Speaker 1: of like that. It's usually a little bit uh, stumpy looking, 192 00:11:30,000 --> 00:11:32,240 Speaker 1: like it's not as wide as your typical server is. 193 00:11:32,280 --> 00:11:34,559 Speaker 1: It's a little more narrow a little tall. But it's 194 00:11:34,600 --> 00:11:37,960 Speaker 1: meant to fit into racks because you can, you know, 195 00:11:38,080 --> 00:11:41,400 Speaker 1: end up pairing these with other technologies. But it's essentially 196 00:11:41,440 --> 00:11:43,960 Speaker 1: a computer and you hook it up to a laptop, 197 00:11:44,200 --> 00:11:46,600 Speaker 1: so you've got really the basic parts you have are 198 00:11:46,720 --> 00:11:49,320 Speaker 1: the antenna, which is important because obviously it has to 199 00:11:49,440 --> 00:11:52,920 Speaker 1: receive signals sent from cell phones um and a transmitter 200 00:11:53,000 --> 00:11:54,679 Speaker 1: so that you can send stuff back through if you 201 00:11:54,720 --> 00:12:00,640 Speaker 1: need to. You've got the computer itself, which is processing 202 00:12:00,640 --> 00:12:03,920 Speaker 1: the signals and identifying where those signals are coming from, 203 00:12:03,960 --> 00:12:06,560 Speaker 1: both what type of phone it is by you know, 204 00:12:06,600 --> 00:12:09,800 Speaker 1: giving you the identification numbers of that phone, the phone 205 00:12:09,880 --> 00:12:14,000 Speaker 1: number that's associated with that phone, and the location of 206 00:12:14,040 --> 00:12:16,920 Speaker 1: that phone based upon some triangulation. You might actually have 207 00:12:17,000 --> 00:12:21,720 Speaker 1: to physically move the technology around to get the triangulation. 208 00:12:23,040 --> 00:12:27,000 Speaker 1: You could theoretically communicate with another cell phone tower, and 209 00:12:27,040 --> 00:12:30,079 Speaker 1: by getting comparing numbers, you know you know you can 210 00:12:30,120 --> 00:12:34,160 Speaker 1: generally tell the direction from which the signal comes and 211 00:12:34,280 --> 00:12:37,240 Speaker 1: its strength. That gives you an idea of it's it's 212 00:12:37,360 --> 00:12:41,800 Speaker 1: general location in that like you know roughly what distance 213 00:12:41,840 --> 00:12:45,040 Speaker 1: it is from your your base station. So it's one 214 00:12:45,040 --> 00:12:47,440 Speaker 1: of those things where if the signal gets stronger, it's 215 00:12:47,440 --> 00:12:51,080 Speaker 1: closer to you, right, and if it's if it's if 216 00:12:51,080 --> 00:12:53,400 Speaker 1: the signal, if the cell phone signal is getting weaker 217 00:12:53,440 --> 00:12:55,880 Speaker 1: than you know that the target cell phone is moving away. 218 00:12:56,520 --> 00:12:58,560 Speaker 1: If you were to move the van to a second 219 00:12:58,600 --> 00:13:01,800 Speaker 1: location and do those measure a mints, then because you 220 00:13:01,880 --> 00:13:04,200 Speaker 1: have the two points on a on one part of 221 00:13:04,200 --> 00:13:06,800 Speaker 1: a triangle, the cell phones the third point, then you 222 00:13:06,880 --> 00:13:10,360 Speaker 1: know where the person is. It's the same way that 223 00:13:10,760 --> 00:13:13,800 Speaker 1: cell phone towers are able to give an approximation of 224 00:13:13,880 --> 00:13:17,080 Speaker 1: where you are, even if your phone doesn't have GPS. Right, 225 00:13:17,280 --> 00:13:20,120 Speaker 1: it's sending the signals and based upon the strength of 226 00:13:20,160 --> 00:13:22,319 Speaker 1: the signal, how long it takes to get there, all 227 00:13:22,320 --> 00:13:26,520 Speaker 1: of these sort of things, it can approximate where you are. Now. 228 00:13:26,800 --> 00:13:30,440 Speaker 1: By by approximate, I mean within a few you know, meters, 229 00:13:30,480 --> 00:13:33,640 Speaker 1: So it's not like as as a specific as GPS 230 00:13:33,720 --> 00:13:37,680 Speaker 1: can be, but it's still good enough for law enforcement 231 00:13:37,760 --> 00:13:40,679 Speaker 1: to hone in on a on a particular location and 232 00:13:40,720 --> 00:13:43,960 Speaker 1: people can sent to the use of GPS. But yeah, 233 00:13:44,320 --> 00:13:46,120 Speaker 1: uh So there's a question that I'm sure a lot 234 00:13:46,160 --> 00:13:49,439 Speaker 1: of people are wondering, which is this stuff sounds kind 235 00:13:49,440 --> 00:13:53,400 Speaker 1: of space a g but how how new? Is it 236 00:13:53,640 --> 00:13:58,640 Speaker 1: not that new? Uh? The the information I found said 237 00:13:58,679 --> 00:14:02,200 Speaker 1: that at least the giger Fish version of this technology 238 00:14:02,240 --> 00:14:04,680 Speaker 1: has been in use since the late nineteen nineties, Like, 239 00:14:06,480 --> 00:14:08,600 Speaker 1: uh yeah, And to keep keep in mind, like this 240 00:14:08,640 --> 00:14:12,120 Speaker 1: technology has been in some form of development or another 241 00:14:12,200 --> 00:14:16,720 Speaker 1: and been available to different types of agencies, specifically the 242 00:14:16,800 --> 00:14:20,160 Speaker 1: FBI would be a big one. Um. And it's just 243 00:14:20,240 --> 00:14:22,960 Speaker 1: that over the past few years it has become more 244 00:14:23,200 --> 00:14:27,920 Speaker 1: common for local law enforcement to get their hands on this. 245 00:14:28,360 --> 00:14:31,360 Speaker 1: Before it was something that only you know, the federal 246 00:14:32,240 --> 00:14:36,680 Speaker 1: law enforcement officials were able to access. But now we're 247 00:14:36,680 --> 00:14:40,560 Speaker 1: seeing local law enforcement. Not everybody's owning up to it, 248 00:14:40,560 --> 00:14:43,239 Speaker 1: but we're seeing a lot of local law enforcement offices 249 00:14:43,720 --> 00:14:46,640 Speaker 1: adopt this technology, and they're doing it in kind of 250 00:14:46,640 --> 00:14:52,080 Speaker 1: a kind of a back door Shenanigan's way, I would say, yeah, 251 00:14:52,520 --> 00:14:55,760 Speaker 1: so uh, you know, these things can be pretty expensive, 252 00:14:55,880 --> 00:14:58,560 Speaker 1: and obviously law enforcement has a budget that they have 253 00:14:58,600 --> 00:15:01,800 Speaker 1: to answer to, so some of them are funding the 254 00:15:01,880 --> 00:15:06,000 Speaker 1: purchase of this material by filing it under counter terrorism 255 00:15:06,320 --> 00:15:12,120 Speaker 1: uh um strategies. Yeah. Essentially they say, we want to 256 00:15:12,160 --> 00:15:14,520 Speaker 1: participate in this, you know, we want to make sure 257 00:15:14,560 --> 00:15:18,560 Speaker 1: we help protect national security doing it on a local level. Uh. 258 00:15:18,560 --> 00:15:22,000 Speaker 1: And then they get the federal grant to purchase this stuff. 259 00:15:22,040 --> 00:15:25,680 Speaker 1: But then they're using it on a much broader scale. 260 00:15:25,800 --> 00:15:29,280 Speaker 1: So it's not like they're not using it specifically for 261 00:15:29,440 --> 00:15:31,840 Speaker 1: counter terrorism. They're using it in all sorts of cases. 262 00:15:31,880 --> 00:15:35,480 Speaker 1: There was a story about a sheriff whose own vehicle 263 00:15:35,600 --> 00:15:39,720 Speaker 1: got broken into and uh and whose phone was stolen, 264 00:15:40,040 --> 00:15:43,160 Speaker 1: who decided to use this stuff to try and ostensibly 265 00:15:43,320 --> 00:15:47,200 Speaker 1: to try and stop the the string of car break ins. 266 00:15:47,240 --> 00:15:50,720 Speaker 1: Some people would say that perhaps it was more personal 267 00:15:50,760 --> 00:15:53,960 Speaker 1: than that, but the point being that this was not 268 00:15:54,040 --> 00:15:57,120 Speaker 1: a counter terrorism issue. This was you know, someone breaking 269 00:15:57,120 --> 00:15:59,840 Speaker 1: and entering into cars, which is you know, that's that's 270 00:15:59,840 --> 00:16:03,400 Speaker 1: a crime. But you people have been arguing, like what 271 00:16:03,520 --> 00:16:07,240 Speaker 1: at what level of crime do you consider the use 272 00:16:07,320 --> 00:16:12,000 Speaker 1: of this particular type of technology necessary to employ? Yeah, 273 00:16:12,080 --> 00:16:15,400 Speaker 1: especially given the expense not just in financial terms, but 274 00:16:15,520 --> 00:16:20,400 Speaker 1: in terms of manpower or time. So that's that's one problem, 275 00:16:20,480 --> 00:16:23,720 Speaker 1: but it's my spider sense is telling me that you 276 00:16:23,760 --> 00:16:26,440 Speaker 1: have a bigger problem. I've got so many problems with this, 277 00:16:27,080 --> 00:16:29,880 Speaker 1: So let's let's talk about how it works first, because 278 00:16:29,920 --> 00:16:32,400 Speaker 1: this is this is what leads into where the biggest 279 00:16:32,400 --> 00:16:36,640 Speaker 1: problems that I have where the technology come from. So uh, 280 00:16:36,960 --> 00:16:39,000 Speaker 1: to understand how this works, you've got to know how 281 00:16:39,080 --> 00:16:42,640 Speaker 1: cell phone works, all right, And we're gonna be super 282 00:16:42,720 --> 00:16:45,160 Speaker 1: high level here because I could do a full episode 283 00:16:45,160 --> 00:16:48,680 Speaker 1: on how cell phones work, and you guys would be 284 00:16:48,880 --> 00:16:52,280 Speaker 1: stabbing me because you're wondering why I've pulled you in UM. 285 00:16:52,320 --> 00:16:55,480 Speaker 1: But typically the easiest way of explaining it as cell 286 00:16:55,480 --> 00:16:59,200 Speaker 1: phones broadcast over radio frequencies, and you have cell phone 287 00:16:59,240 --> 00:17:03,280 Speaker 1: towers that present a broadcast area. The towers are able 288 00:17:03,360 --> 00:17:07,080 Speaker 1: to accept the incoming signals from a cell phone and 289 00:17:07,119 --> 00:17:09,480 Speaker 1: outgoing signals that are going to cell phones within that 290 00:17:10,200 --> 00:17:13,720 Speaker 1: UM service area. They're doing so over specific frequency to 291 00:17:13,800 --> 00:17:17,880 Speaker 1: the phones. Your phone knows which frequency quote unquote knows 292 00:17:18,000 --> 00:17:20,320 Speaker 1: which frequency to be in because there's a master control 293 00:17:20,359 --> 00:17:23,600 Speaker 1: system that's telling the phone tune into this frequency so 294 00:17:23,640 --> 00:17:27,280 Speaker 1: that you can receive and transmit information. Technically you're using 295 00:17:27,320 --> 00:17:29,560 Speaker 1: too frequencies so you can receive and transmit at the 296 00:17:29,600 --> 00:17:33,920 Speaker 1: same time. Then as you leave one cell phone service 297 00:17:34,040 --> 00:17:37,240 Speaker 1: area and you're starting to get closer to another, then 298 00:17:37,400 --> 00:17:40,440 Speaker 1: you have to be handed off right because if if not, 299 00:17:41,040 --> 00:17:43,240 Speaker 1: once you move too far away from the base station, 300 00:17:43,359 --> 00:17:45,959 Speaker 1: you would no longer have service. So this is similar 301 00:17:46,000 --> 00:17:48,000 Speaker 1: to when you move into an area that doesn't have 302 00:17:48,400 --> 00:17:52,159 Speaker 1: the towers that support the service you use. So if 303 00:17:52,160 --> 00:17:53,879 Speaker 1: you're like an a T and T customer and you 304 00:17:53,920 --> 00:17:56,240 Speaker 1: go into an area that's not supported by a T 305 00:17:56,320 --> 00:17:58,960 Speaker 1: and T, then you're out of luck. Your phone becomes 306 00:17:59,000 --> 00:18:02,160 Speaker 1: a brick, right, or whatever's on your phone, that's all 307 00:18:02,160 --> 00:18:06,160 Speaker 1: you can use. So you have to have this handoff 308 00:18:06,160 --> 00:18:11,160 Speaker 1: technology for one tower to hand off the the service 309 00:18:11,280 --> 00:18:14,400 Speaker 1: to another tower as you're moving between them. So what's 310 00:18:14,400 --> 00:18:17,720 Speaker 1: happening is your phone is constantly sending little signals even 311 00:18:17,720 --> 00:18:22,440 Speaker 1: when it's not directly in use to to say here 312 00:18:22,480 --> 00:18:27,520 Speaker 1: I am. It's essentially saying I'm here almost yeah, it's 313 00:18:27,520 --> 00:18:30,320 Speaker 1: exactly like paying a server. It's doing this about every 314 00:18:30,359 --> 00:18:33,600 Speaker 1: seven to fifteen seconds. So this is why even if 315 00:18:33,600 --> 00:18:37,880 Speaker 1: you don't use your phone, the battery life gradually decreases. 316 00:18:38,600 --> 00:18:42,040 Speaker 1: So the reason it does this is very important because 317 00:18:42,040 --> 00:18:44,840 Speaker 1: if it didn't tell the cell phone towers, hey here 318 00:18:44,880 --> 00:18:47,200 Speaker 1: I am, you would never get texts or cell phone 319 00:18:47,600 --> 00:18:49,840 Speaker 1: or you never get a call. You couldn't you just 320 00:18:49,880 --> 00:18:53,879 Speaker 1: play solitaire or whatever. Yeah, because because the system wouldn't 321 00:18:53,920 --> 00:18:55,520 Speaker 1: know where your phone is, so it wouldn't be able 322 00:18:55,560 --> 00:18:58,240 Speaker 1: to send the signal like it doesn't when someone dials 323 00:18:58,280 --> 00:19:02,040 Speaker 1: your number. It doesn't magically connect to your phone. The 324 00:19:02,119 --> 00:19:04,280 Speaker 1: system has to be aware of where you are, and 325 00:19:04,320 --> 00:19:07,320 Speaker 1: it has this constant game of Marco Polo to ensure 326 00:19:07,359 --> 00:19:10,719 Speaker 1: that there's this seamless transition. Right because you as a person, 327 00:19:11,480 --> 00:19:14,760 Speaker 1: you are mobile, so you can move from location to location. 328 00:19:14,800 --> 00:19:17,399 Speaker 1: You are not always going to be next to the 329 00:19:17,520 --> 00:19:21,240 Speaker 1: same cell phone tower all the time. So your phone 330 00:19:21,240 --> 00:19:24,680 Speaker 1: has to constantly, like every seven to fifteen seconds, say 331 00:19:24,760 --> 00:19:27,480 Speaker 1: I'm here. Because if you're in a car and you're 332 00:19:27,520 --> 00:19:30,320 Speaker 1: traveling down the road, you're moving in and out of 333 00:19:30,400 --> 00:19:34,359 Speaker 1: different you know, cell tower ranges, so the different cell 334 00:19:34,359 --> 00:19:36,679 Speaker 1: towers have to be aware of where your phone is 335 00:19:36,720 --> 00:19:39,480 Speaker 1: so that you can continue to receive messages, phone calls. 336 00:19:39,520 --> 00:19:42,639 Speaker 1: That kind of stuff or make them. Yeah, the problem 337 00:19:42,720 --> 00:19:44,840 Speaker 1: is that because of this technology, you know that this 338 00:19:44,920 --> 00:19:48,760 Speaker 1: is what makes cell phones useful, but because of that 339 00:19:48,840 --> 00:19:53,280 Speaker 1: same technology, it's also what makes this sting ray technology possible. So, 340 00:19:54,000 --> 00:19:56,719 Speaker 1: because your phone is sending out these messages and your 341 00:19:56,760 --> 00:19:59,480 Speaker 1: phone doesn't know where the next cell phone tower is, 342 00:19:59,600 --> 00:20:02,359 Speaker 1: it's podcasting these little messages and the cell phone towers 343 00:20:02,400 --> 00:20:04,680 Speaker 1: pick it up. Based upon the signal strength, the cell 344 00:20:04,720 --> 00:20:07,080 Speaker 1: phone tower knows if you are moving toward it or 345 00:20:07,119 --> 00:20:11,280 Speaker 1: moving away from it. The sting ray ends up mimicking 346 00:20:11,520 --> 00:20:14,000 Speaker 1: the cell phone towers. So your little cell phone sends 347 00:20:14,000 --> 00:20:16,240 Speaker 1: out a message and the stingray picks it up. Sting 348 00:20:16,280 --> 00:20:18,040 Speaker 1: ray now knows where your phone is, or at least 349 00:20:18,240 --> 00:20:21,600 Speaker 1: knows that your phone is in that area. As the 350 00:20:21,640 --> 00:20:23,919 Speaker 1: signal gets stronger, the stingray knows that your phone is 351 00:20:23,920 --> 00:20:27,800 Speaker 1: getting closer to it. If you have triangulated this, then 352 00:20:27,920 --> 00:20:30,040 Speaker 1: it knows where you are. Or if you have one 353 00:20:30,040 --> 00:20:33,159 Speaker 1: of the other devices that pair with the sting ray 354 00:20:33,240 --> 00:20:36,280 Speaker 1: that can help track and locate, the sting ray knows 355 00:20:36,280 --> 00:20:38,520 Speaker 1: where you are. There's a laptop that you would connect 356 00:20:38,600 --> 00:20:41,199 Speaker 1: to this device that would give you the redoubt that 357 00:20:41,200 --> 00:20:43,399 Speaker 1: would be useful for a human being because right now 358 00:20:43,440 --> 00:20:46,880 Speaker 1: we're talking all about technology that and data that machines 359 00:20:46,880 --> 00:20:49,320 Speaker 1: could use, but it's not useful to us because we 360 00:20:49,359 --> 00:20:52,719 Speaker 1: wouldn't be able to see it. But the laptop expresses 361 00:20:52,760 --> 00:20:57,480 Speaker 1: that in ways that make it possible for you to see. 362 00:20:57,760 --> 00:21:02,760 Speaker 1: Maybe with mapping software, it's plotting the location against a map, 363 00:21:03,280 --> 00:21:07,639 Speaker 1: as well as identification of the phone numbers UM and 364 00:21:07,800 --> 00:21:12,639 Speaker 1: the I D number that's unique to that particular mobile phone. 365 00:21:13,640 --> 00:21:19,800 Speaker 1: So the issue here is that this this sting ray, 366 00:21:20,840 --> 00:21:25,600 Speaker 1: well accept all of those incoming messages, all those Yeah, 367 00:21:25,640 --> 00:21:29,159 Speaker 1: anything that's within the area that that the sensitivity of 368 00:21:29,160 --> 00:21:32,360 Speaker 1: that antenna, it will pick that up. So is it like, 369 00:21:32,520 --> 00:21:37,560 Speaker 1: is it just metadata? Well yes, originally, first it's just, 370 00:21:38,560 --> 00:21:46,320 Speaker 1: first of all, just metadata, just metadata, because metadata you 371 00:21:46,359 --> 00:21:48,480 Speaker 1: don't need very much of it to start making some 372 00:21:48,680 --> 00:21:53,080 Speaker 1: very scary conclusions. You can start to really narrow down 373 00:21:53,080 --> 00:21:56,960 Speaker 1: who a person is based upon some metadata routines what 374 00:21:57,000 --> 00:21:59,199 Speaker 1: they do in the real world and when they do it, 375 00:21:59,280 --> 00:22:02,800 Speaker 1: the phone numbers they might be in contact with at 376 00:22:02,840 --> 00:22:05,159 Speaker 1: that time. The phone number of the device itself obviously 377 00:22:05,200 --> 00:22:08,400 Speaker 1: would be very important. So let's say that you two 378 00:22:09,119 --> 00:22:15,200 Speaker 1: YouTube and Ben you are you are. You are the cops. Okay, okay, 379 00:22:15,240 --> 00:22:18,560 Speaker 1: you're in your van power Yeah, I know, it's not 380 00:22:18,640 --> 00:22:22,800 Speaker 1: go crazy. You do not have a tank. We're not 381 00:22:23,200 --> 00:22:27,679 Speaker 1: We're not in Swanny. Was Swanny? Wasn't it? I was 382 00:22:27,680 --> 00:22:31,480 Speaker 1: thinking Swanny? By the way, listeners, is is just to 383 00:22:31,560 --> 00:22:34,400 Speaker 1: the northeast of Atlanta. It's a little part of Metro 384 00:22:34,480 --> 00:22:39,320 Speaker 1: Atlanta area. Um and they have a tank. So anyway, 385 00:22:39,720 --> 00:22:42,919 Speaker 1: you are in a van. You have heard about tanks, 386 00:22:42,960 --> 00:22:45,840 Speaker 1: but you do not currently own one. You've got plenty 387 00:22:45,840 --> 00:22:48,800 Speaker 1: of donuts to get you through the day. By the way, 388 00:22:48,800 --> 00:22:50,919 Speaker 1: if you are in law enforcement, and I am offending you, 389 00:22:50,960 --> 00:22:55,119 Speaker 1: dear listeners, I'm merely poking fun. I love you guys 390 00:22:55,320 --> 00:22:57,239 Speaker 1: at any rate. So you guys are are looking at 391 00:22:57,280 --> 00:23:00,800 Speaker 1: the incoming messages that are being hit. We're on our laptop. 392 00:23:00,920 --> 00:23:04,880 Speaker 1: You are looking specifically for a phone number associated with 393 00:23:04,920 --> 00:23:08,280 Speaker 1: a suspect, a person of interest. You want to be 394 00:23:08,359 --> 00:23:11,399 Speaker 1: able to track this person down, but so far have 395 00:23:11,600 --> 00:23:14,159 Speaker 1: been unable to do so. You have heard that this 396 00:23:14,240 --> 00:23:16,560 Speaker 1: person may in fact be in this particular part of town, 397 00:23:16,600 --> 00:23:19,040 Speaker 1: which is why you have parked your van, And all 398 00:23:19,119 --> 00:23:21,280 Speaker 1: you are doing is looking for a hit of that 399 00:23:21,320 --> 00:23:24,760 Speaker 1: particular number as it moves through, and once you do, 400 00:23:24,840 --> 00:23:28,280 Speaker 1: you then try to triangulate, you locate, and then your 401 00:23:28,480 --> 00:23:32,920 Speaker 1: your send people out there to talk to this suspect 402 00:23:33,000 --> 00:23:36,119 Speaker 1: or person of interest. Now that that alone, that sounds 403 00:23:36,160 --> 00:23:39,400 Speaker 1: like that's okay. I mean, there might be some problems 404 00:23:39,480 --> 00:23:43,000 Speaker 1: we have here, but you're specifically looking for the hit. 405 00:23:43,119 --> 00:23:46,000 Speaker 1: You're not looking at the massive amount of information that's 406 00:23:46,000 --> 00:23:52,840 Speaker 1: coming in. You're looking for something specific. Yeah, now, Matt, 407 00:23:52,880 --> 00:23:56,200 Speaker 1: I know that, I know that, dude, I know, I 408 00:23:56,280 --> 00:23:58,600 Speaker 1: know it's the pencil pushers who really are to blame. 409 00:23:59,320 --> 00:24:04,920 Speaker 1: Don't don't, don't bust my chops um so at any rate. Yeah, 410 00:24:04,960 --> 00:24:08,080 Speaker 1: in this case, you are specifically looking for a particular 411 00:24:08,080 --> 00:24:10,639 Speaker 1: phone number. It's a little more tricky if you don't 412 00:24:10,800 --> 00:24:14,600 Speaker 1: know the number though, right Like now you're looking for patterns. 413 00:24:15,320 --> 00:24:20,480 Speaker 1: Now you're looking specifically for activities that match what you 414 00:24:20,600 --> 00:24:25,040 Speaker 1: suspect your target is already doing. You're also possibly looking 415 00:24:25,440 --> 00:24:28,240 Speaker 1: to find out what phone numbers are being used in 416 00:24:28,280 --> 00:24:30,119 Speaker 1: an area. Now, this is where it really gets tricky 417 00:24:30,200 --> 00:24:33,520 Speaker 1: because some of these devices, not all of them, but 418 00:24:33,640 --> 00:24:36,920 Speaker 1: the sting ray and the trigger fish included both can 419 00:24:36,960 --> 00:24:41,280 Speaker 1: tell you if someone makes a call from within that 420 00:24:41,400 --> 00:24:44,239 Speaker 1: area that the sting ray covers, you can see what 421 00:24:44,359 --> 00:24:48,919 Speaker 1: number they called. Now now, at least with the basic 422 00:24:48,960 --> 00:24:53,879 Speaker 1: sting ray, you can't listen in on the call. You 423 00:24:53,960 --> 00:24:58,280 Speaker 1: just know the time, the UH number, and the duration 424 00:24:58,359 --> 00:25:00,919 Speaker 1: of the call. Hold on. Sounds like we're getting to 425 00:25:00,960 --> 00:25:02,800 Speaker 1: a point where we can listen to these calls the 426 00:25:03,000 --> 00:25:07,159 Speaker 1: basic sting Yeah, okay, So remember when I said you 427 00:25:07,160 --> 00:25:11,119 Speaker 1: can upgrade. So sting ray is it's a computer, is 428 00:25:11,359 --> 00:25:13,159 Speaker 1: what it boils down to. I mean, it's more than 429 00:25:13,200 --> 00:25:15,800 Speaker 1: a computer, but it has elements of a computer. It 430 00:25:15,920 --> 00:25:21,000 Speaker 1: runs software. There is software that you can install on 431 00:25:21,040 --> 00:25:25,119 Speaker 1: the sting ray that does allow you to listen in uh. 432 00:25:25,240 --> 00:25:28,159 Speaker 1: There is fish Hawk, which is software that allows you 433 00:25:28,200 --> 00:25:32,160 Speaker 1: to eavesdrop upon conversations. And there's also Porpoise. You might 434 00:25:32,200 --> 00:25:35,440 Speaker 1: have noticed a theme I was gonna ask you about 435 00:25:35,520 --> 00:25:40,320 Speaker 1: that they're in Florida. I guess that makes sense. But anyway, 436 00:25:40,440 --> 00:25:45,439 Speaker 1: so the porpoise allows you to uh see texts that 437 00:25:45,480 --> 00:25:50,840 Speaker 1: are sent through here. So it's again it's messages or 438 00:25:50,920 --> 00:25:54,240 Speaker 1: phone calls that are sent from the phone out through 439 00:25:54,880 --> 00:25:59,560 Speaker 1: the the sting ray that go on. Now, this obviously 440 00:26:00,119 --> 00:26:04,239 Speaker 1: raises a lot of very tricky questions, particularly when it 441 00:26:04,280 --> 00:26:09,960 Speaker 1: comes to basic rights, because if you are just taking 442 00:26:09,960 --> 00:26:13,879 Speaker 1: in everything and you can potentially read all the text 443 00:26:13,880 --> 00:26:16,440 Speaker 1: messages or listening on any of the conversations that are 444 00:26:16,440 --> 00:26:20,040 Speaker 1: going through and remember this is just based on geography. 445 00:26:20,240 --> 00:26:24,040 Speaker 1: You know, you're not targeting, you're getting everything. There's no 446 00:26:24,080 --> 00:26:27,560 Speaker 1: probable cause, there's no probable cause, there's no warrant. So 447 00:26:27,600 --> 00:26:31,160 Speaker 1: back back in our scenario, Ben and I in our readout, Well, okay, 448 00:26:31,160 --> 00:26:34,399 Speaker 1: I'm driving, so Ben, you're alright, so you're the wheel man, 449 00:26:34,520 --> 00:26:37,640 Speaker 1: get it so you can see. Then we'll be able 450 00:26:37,680 --> 00:26:40,200 Speaker 1: to see all of this on a readout a Mett 451 00:26:40,359 --> 00:26:43,399 Speaker 1: Look look at his number. It's been going back and 452 00:26:43,440 --> 00:26:47,240 Speaker 1: forth in these two cell phone towers every freaking Thursday. Yeah. 453 00:26:47,520 --> 00:26:50,760 Speaker 1: Or it could be Ben saying, hey, Matt, look this 454 00:26:50,920 --> 00:26:54,720 Speaker 1: dufus over here thinks his girlfriend's gonna make him dinner tonight, 455 00:26:54,760 --> 00:26:57,480 Speaker 1: and we already know she ain't gonna do that, right buddy, 456 00:26:57,800 --> 00:27:02,480 Speaker 1: You guys are so good. Later of this comes out, 457 00:27:03,040 --> 00:27:14,240 Speaker 1: so I'll just be stopped on the street. Uh that's 458 00:27:14,280 --> 00:27:18,640 Speaker 1: funny until it happened, alright, So at any rate, Uh yeah, yeah, 459 00:27:18,760 --> 00:27:22,600 Speaker 1: I mean technically, if you have the right technology, right 460 00:27:22,640 --> 00:27:25,920 Speaker 1: being the the appropriate one for this, uh, and you 461 00:27:26,000 --> 00:27:29,199 Speaker 1: have the correct software on it, then you could be 462 00:27:29,560 --> 00:27:33,600 Speaker 1: you could start filtering through you could potentially read anything 463 00:27:33,640 --> 00:27:36,840 Speaker 1: that's coming through that that stingray device. So again, it 464 00:27:36,880 --> 00:27:39,119 Speaker 1: would be any phone that was within that range of 465 00:27:39,160 --> 00:27:44,399 Speaker 1: the antenna. Um you wouldn't necessarily I mean you probably 466 00:27:44,440 --> 00:27:47,119 Speaker 1: wouldn't be storing at all. I mean you could if 467 00:27:47,160 --> 00:27:48,600 Speaker 1: you had a large enough hard drive. That would be 468 00:27:48,640 --> 00:27:52,679 Speaker 1: another thing you would need to have in your array 469 00:27:52,880 --> 00:27:57,760 Speaker 1: of technology piling up very quickly. Yeah, and and so 470 00:27:58,000 --> 00:28:00,520 Speaker 1: this is starting to sound probably very similar to the 471 00:28:00,600 --> 00:28:02,720 Speaker 1: discussions we've had about the n s A. You know, 472 00:28:02,800 --> 00:28:06,600 Speaker 1: the fact that they have been collecting cell phone data 473 00:28:06,680 --> 00:28:10,480 Speaker 1: at the they're doing it at the provider level, right 474 00:28:10,560 --> 00:28:16,080 Speaker 1: like they're there, they've got their years on this national 475 00:28:16,400 --> 00:28:19,960 Speaker 1: or even global level, whereas we're really talking about very 476 00:28:20,080 --> 00:28:24,760 Speaker 1: regional effects here. Yes, still very concerning. So how much 477 00:28:24,800 --> 00:28:29,000 Speaker 1: how much information can it actually capture? Um? Well, you 478 00:28:29,000 --> 00:28:32,720 Speaker 1: know it's here all right. Here's the thing. We don't 479 00:28:32,800 --> 00:28:37,000 Speaker 1: know the full extent of what it can capture because 480 00:28:37,840 --> 00:28:41,360 Speaker 1: secrets have to be kept for your safety from the 481 00:28:42,680 --> 00:28:45,920 Speaker 1: creators of stingray or from the police departments. In the 482 00:28:46,200 --> 00:28:50,600 Speaker 1: law enforcement, I'm just gonna say yes from both. So 483 00:28:51,920 --> 00:28:54,160 Speaker 1: there was a story recently. I think it was I 484 00:28:54,200 --> 00:28:56,520 Speaker 1: want to say it was Santa Clarat, California, but I 485 00:28:56,560 --> 00:28:58,400 Speaker 1: could be wrong. It was a It was a town 486 00:28:58,440 --> 00:29:03,920 Speaker 1: in California, however, that recently declined to purchase from Harris 487 00:29:03,920 --> 00:29:08,120 Speaker 1: Corporation because they said there were agreements that they would 488 00:29:08,120 --> 00:29:12,880 Speaker 1: have been forced to enter into that would prevent them 489 00:29:12,920 --> 00:29:17,640 Speaker 1: from releasing any information about the product, even in the 490 00:29:17,680 --> 00:29:20,479 Speaker 1: face of a Freedom of Information Act request. So an 491 00:29:20,520 --> 00:29:26,160 Speaker 1: ironclad yes like a nondisclosure agreement to trump all nondisclosure. 492 00:29:26,440 --> 00:29:30,760 Speaker 1: How the heck do you get around You mostly just 493 00:29:30,880 --> 00:29:33,160 Speaker 1: drag your heels as long as possible and hope that 494 00:29:33,200 --> 00:29:36,280 Speaker 1: the judge that ends up hearing any case about it 495 00:29:36,360 --> 00:29:40,120 Speaker 1: is not savvy enough to understand the implications of this technology. 496 00:29:40,240 --> 00:29:43,840 Speaker 1: You can appeal for national security I think right, well, 497 00:29:43,880 --> 00:29:45,960 Speaker 1: that's essentially what they say is that if we were 498 00:29:46,000 --> 00:29:50,000 Speaker 1: to tell you what the capabilities of this technology were, 499 00:29:50,440 --> 00:29:53,160 Speaker 1: then the bad guys would be able to work around it, 500 00:29:53,280 --> 00:29:56,200 Speaker 1: thus making the technology useless and we'd only be getting 501 00:29:56,200 --> 00:29:59,640 Speaker 1: your boring text messages instead of the bad guys stuff. Well, 502 00:29:59,680 --> 00:30:04,200 Speaker 1: it's okay, just to play the advocate here, that kind 503 00:30:04,240 --> 00:30:08,720 Speaker 1: of reasoning, which is incredibly slippery and dangerous, It does 504 00:30:08,840 --> 00:30:12,680 Speaker 1: make sense if you think again about the ostensible purpose, right, 505 00:30:12,840 --> 00:30:16,200 Speaker 1: the the idea that this stuff could be rendered useless 506 00:30:16,600 --> 00:30:18,720 Speaker 1: if it wasn't a secret. But also, I'm just gonna 507 00:30:18,800 --> 00:30:21,680 Speaker 1: say the word I'm going to say is convenient. It's 508 00:30:21,720 --> 00:30:26,120 Speaker 1: a convenient reason. Well, and it's it's yeah, when you 509 00:30:26,160 --> 00:30:29,520 Speaker 1: have like a rubber stamp that's a secret, then how 510 00:30:29,560 --> 00:30:32,280 Speaker 1: do you have oversight? How can you make certain that 511 00:30:32,360 --> 00:30:37,480 Speaker 1: the figures that have been put into authority positions in 512 00:30:37,640 --> 00:30:41,320 Speaker 1: order to help the citizens, how can you make sure 513 00:30:41,360 --> 00:30:44,600 Speaker 1: that they are doing that that duty that they've been 514 00:30:45,120 --> 00:30:48,600 Speaker 1: they've been tasked with, as opposed to abusing it or 515 00:30:48,720 --> 00:30:51,640 Speaker 1: misusing it, maybe not even abusing it on purpose, but 516 00:30:51,760 --> 00:30:58,400 Speaker 1: perhaps through you know, no no maliciousness, have been using 517 00:30:58,400 --> 00:31:02,760 Speaker 1: it incorrectly. And there have been arguments that judges have 518 00:31:02,880 --> 00:31:08,000 Speaker 1: allowed this kind of technology to be used because the 519 00:31:08,040 --> 00:31:12,040 Speaker 1: explanations they were given about what the technology did were 520 00:31:12,240 --> 00:31:17,200 Speaker 1: purposefully vague and limited, so that they would not know 521 00:31:17,440 --> 00:31:20,840 Speaker 1: the full extent of what this technology does. So, in 522 00:31:20,880 --> 00:31:23,400 Speaker 1: other words, here's where we're going to kind of transition 523 00:31:23,440 --> 00:31:26,520 Speaker 1: into more of the policy stuff, because you know, that's 524 00:31:26,560 --> 00:31:28,360 Speaker 1: really why I got you guys to come on here. 525 00:31:28,640 --> 00:31:31,160 Speaker 1: The technology we've kind of covered, you know, the very 526 00:31:31,160 --> 00:31:34,200 Speaker 1: basic ideas that it's a man in the middle kind 527 00:31:34,200 --> 00:31:37,840 Speaker 1: of attack. The reason why I brought you on here 528 00:31:37,880 --> 00:31:42,080 Speaker 1: is because this is my own personal perspective, my own opinion. 529 00:31:42,600 --> 00:31:47,800 Speaker 1: But my opinion is that this technology is dangerously close, 530 00:31:47,920 --> 00:31:52,520 Speaker 1: if not identical, to the concept of issuing a general warrant, 531 00:31:53,080 --> 00:31:56,160 Speaker 1: which is precisely what the Fourth Amendment was supposed to 532 00:31:56,400 --> 00:31:59,520 Speaker 1: protect us from. So the idea being that here in 533 00:31:59,520 --> 00:32:02,360 Speaker 1: the units dates by the way, this technology is being 534 00:32:02,440 --> 00:32:04,240 Speaker 1: used in other places. In fact, one of the reasons 535 00:32:04,240 --> 00:32:06,440 Speaker 1: that I brought it up is because recently Sky News 536 00:32:06,480 --> 00:32:09,600 Speaker 1: was reporting about how it's being used in the UK. Uh. 537 00:32:09,680 --> 00:32:12,960 Speaker 1: It had been thought to have been used in the 538 00:32:13,040 --> 00:32:15,320 Speaker 1: UK for a while, but now there's kind of essentially 539 00:32:15,360 --> 00:32:19,000 Speaker 1: ironclad evidence that yes, it's being used as the UK. Yeah. 540 00:32:19,040 --> 00:32:22,920 Speaker 1: So the reason why, uh, you know, I brought you 541 00:32:22,920 --> 00:32:26,680 Speaker 1: guys in as this this idea of one of the 542 00:32:26,680 --> 00:32:29,600 Speaker 1: founding principles of the United States of America was that 543 00:32:31,000 --> 00:32:34,320 Speaker 1: the colonists didn't they weren't so crazy about the British 544 00:32:34,360 --> 00:32:38,560 Speaker 1: coming up and going into every single house looking for 545 00:32:38,600 --> 00:32:43,160 Speaker 1: a specific person, with no reason to suspect that the 546 00:32:43,200 --> 00:32:45,720 Speaker 1: person of interest was actually in the houses they were stopping. 547 00:32:45,720 --> 00:32:50,280 Speaker 1: It's just a general blanket search, right, So search and seizure, 548 00:32:50,320 --> 00:32:53,600 Speaker 1: the idea being that we're looking for this person. This 549 00:32:53,640 --> 00:32:57,400 Speaker 1: person is is bad and so you have no rights 550 00:32:57,760 --> 00:33:00,080 Speaker 1: until we find this person. So we're gonna go to 551 00:33:00,120 --> 00:33:02,920 Speaker 1: your house and turn it upside down looking for this person. 552 00:33:02,960 --> 00:33:05,400 Speaker 1: If they're not there, too, well, okay, well good for you, 553 00:33:05,480 --> 00:33:06,880 Speaker 1: too bad for us. We're gonna go do it to 554 00:33:06,920 --> 00:33:13,320 Speaker 1: the next family. Ah. Yeah. So this approach of using 555 00:33:13,320 --> 00:33:17,760 Speaker 1: a device to pull in all incoming data, even if 556 00:33:17,760 --> 00:33:21,160 Speaker 1: you're looking for a really bad person, you're getting everything, 557 00:33:21,720 --> 00:33:25,320 Speaker 1: and it doesn't seem that different to me than the 558 00:33:25,360 --> 00:33:28,239 Speaker 1: approach of there's this bad person out there, we're going 559 00:33:28,280 --> 00:33:31,040 Speaker 1: to go through everybody's house until we find that person. 560 00:33:31,840 --> 00:33:33,240 Speaker 1: So for me, there're a couple of things you have 561 00:33:33,280 --> 00:33:36,000 Speaker 1: to establish. One of them is does that data that 562 00:33:36,080 --> 00:33:39,320 Speaker 1: you're sending out belong to you? Is it really yours 563 00:33:40,800 --> 00:33:43,000 Speaker 1: or you know, is it the companies that you're using 564 00:33:43,240 --> 00:33:46,120 Speaker 1: just to ostensibly send the information to a cell tower 565 00:33:46,160 --> 00:33:50,280 Speaker 1: to another person. Um. And then for me, if you 566 00:33:50,280 --> 00:33:52,680 Speaker 1: look at things like when the Boston bombing occurred, and 567 00:33:52,720 --> 00:33:55,600 Speaker 1: then the search for the Sarnive brothers afterwards, and when 568 00:33:55,840 --> 00:33:58,920 Speaker 1: the police were going through and essentially doing what you're saying, 569 00:33:59,200 --> 00:34:03,120 Speaker 1: searching through, how is yeah, with just it's not really 570 00:34:03,160 --> 00:34:05,760 Speaker 1: a general warrant, but something kind of similar to that 571 00:34:05,880 --> 00:34:08,759 Speaker 1: where yeah, I mean they didn't have a they didn't 572 00:34:08,800 --> 00:34:11,239 Speaker 1: have a warrant for each specific house they went through, 573 00:34:11,600 --> 00:34:15,680 Speaker 1: which they're supposed to if if I mean, your rights 574 00:34:15,760 --> 00:34:17,680 Speaker 1: as a citizen are supposed to say, listen, if you 575 00:34:17,719 --> 00:34:20,000 Speaker 1: don't have a warrant, you cannot come into my house. 576 00:34:20,120 --> 00:34:23,399 Speaker 1: That is a constitutional right guaranteed to me. Yeah, it's 577 00:34:23,440 --> 00:34:27,160 Speaker 1: the old, the old ticking time bomb reasoning, which I 578 00:34:27,280 --> 00:34:32,920 Speaker 1: find fairly disingenuous. Uh. When the idea we heard it before, 579 00:34:33,000 --> 00:34:37,000 Speaker 1: with the idea of using torture to obtain some sort 580 00:34:37,040 --> 00:34:40,319 Speaker 1: of confession or insider information, where people would say, well, 581 00:34:40,680 --> 00:34:43,839 Speaker 1: torture is not ordinarily allowed, but if there is a 582 00:34:43,840 --> 00:34:45,719 Speaker 1: bomb that is going to go off in a set 583 00:34:45,719 --> 00:34:48,080 Speaker 1: amount of time, and we have one person who knows 584 00:34:48,120 --> 00:34:53,600 Speaker 1: the information in custody, then shouldn't we torture somebody to 585 00:34:53,640 --> 00:34:56,040 Speaker 1: save a hundred people or whatever the number is. And 586 00:34:56,120 --> 00:34:59,160 Speaker 1: this what what's similar to me about this is that 587 00:34:59,200 --> 00:35:04,000 Speaker 1: this encounter is um so many ways to bend rules 588 00:35:04,040 --> 00:35:06,720 Speaker 1: that are that exists for a reason, as you said, 589 00:35:06,800 --> 00:35:12,239 Speaker 1: and it doesn't really provide a way to bend those 590 00:35:12,360 --> 00:35:15,600 Speaker 1: rules back to their original shape. I mean, Jonathan, I 591 00:35:15,640 --> 00:35:19,799 Speaker 1: can think of already, uh, several scenarios wherein this gild 592 00:35:19,840 --> 00:35:23,040 Speaker 1: get sticky very quickly. Matt. I love that you mentioned. Uh. 593 00:35:23,120 --> 00:35:27,040 Speaker 1: It might not be the person actually using the phone, right, 594 00:35:27,040 --> 00:35:29,879 Speaker 1: It might be someone else, uh took a phone right 595 00:35:30,160 --> 00:35:33,200 Speaker 1: and used it as a burner. But the person, the 596 00:35:33,239 --> 00:35:37,320 Speaker 1: innocent person whose name is uh tied to that number 597 00:35:37,480 --> 00:35:41,800 Speaker 1: that I d they're going to be automatically suspect number 598 00:35:41,800 --> 00:35:44,960 Speaker 1: one or maybe even public enemy number one. Another question 599 00:35:45,040 --> 00:35:48,399 Speaker 1: is what if? What if this search? Right? So let's 600 00:35:48,400 --> 00:35:51,960 Speaker 1: go back in, Um, Matt, you and I are still cops, Jonathan, 601 00:35:52,000 --> 00:35:56,399 Speaker 1: your FBI, your special investigator. Right you came in, you said, 602 00:35:56,400 --> 00:35:58,720 Speaker 1: I'm taking over this investigation. I got a little flip 603 00:35:58,760 --> 00:36:01,120 Speaker 1: phone because I'm from the later seasons of X Files. 604 00:36:01,200 --> 00:36:04,680 Speaker 1: Right exactly right, black suit, black tie, whole thing, and 605 00:36:05,280 --> 00:36:09,440 Speaker 1: you say that we are looking for you know, insert 606 00:36:09,520 --> 00:36:14,839 Speaker 1: bad guy's name here. Uh. And while we're looking though, however, uh, 607 00:36:14,880 --> 00:36:19,279 Speaker 1: there are our search, our vacuum cleaner approach brings in 608 00:36:19,320 --> 00:36:24,640 Speaker 1: another number that pings on your radar because you were 609 00:36:25,680 --> 00:36:29,280 Speaker 1: already suspicious of one person doing, you know, a federal 610 00:36:29,360 --> 00:36:33,360 Speaker 1: level crime. So this person who we were not looking for, 611 00:36:33,760 --> 00:36:37,120 Speaker 1: just showed up. What happens then, Uh, well, I mean, 612 00:36:37,160 --> 00:36:39,879 Speaker 1: obviously I got to take over the investigation. I've seen 613 00:36:39,960 --> 00:36:43,799 Speaker 1: a lot of episodes of various crime dramas, and that's 614 00:36:43,800 --> 00:36:45,680 Speaker 1: what the That's the only thing the FBI is around 615 00:36:45,719 --> 00:36:49,800 Speaker 1: to do is to push the local police force out 616 00:36:49,840 --> 00:36:53,759 Speaker 1: of this was well, you have to keep putting your 617 00:36:53,760 --> 00:36:56,279 Speaker 1: sunglasses on and taking them off. Occasionally you just hear 618 00:36:56,320 --> 00:37:00,759 Speaker 1: the who, Well, I've got a are you kind of 619 00:37:00,800 --> 00:37:04,360 Speaker 1: like that? Unless you want to answer no, no, I 620 00:37:04,840 --> 00:37:07,640 Speaker 1: The only answer to that I have is that I 621 00:37:07,680 --> 00:37:13,560 Speaker 1: would imagine that at least until there are some strong 622 00:37:13,680 --> 00:37:18,400 Speaker 1: precedents set in in court about the actual use of 623 00:37:18,440 --> 00:37:21,759 Speaker 1: this technology, what it really can do, and whether or 624 00:37:21,800 --> 00:37:24,799 Speaker 1: not it truly is constitutional to use it in the 625 00:37:24,840 --> 00:37:27,800 Speaker 1: way that it's being used, I would imagine at least 626 00:37:28,000 --> 00:37:31,560 Speaker 1: until that happens, the FBI acts on that act on 627 00:37:31,600 --> 00:37:34,400 Speaker 1: that information because if there if no one has come 628 00:37:34,400 --> 00:37:38,480 Speaker 1: out and said you can't do that, they're going to 629 00:37:38,600 --> 00:37:43,400 Speaker 1: do that. And I don't mean to cast aspersions on 630 00:37:43,480 --> 00:37:47,440 Speaker 1: law enforcement in the FBI. I realized that they have 631 00:37:47,960 --> 00:37:53,600 Speaker 1: incredibly difficult and very high stakes jobs, right and in 632 00:37:53,760 --> 00:37:55,880 Speaker 1: order for them to be able to do those jobs 633 00:37:56,200 --> 00:38:01,359 Speaker 1: in an increasingly complex technological world, there are some very 634 00:38:01,360 --> 00:38:04,279 Speaker 1: tough questions we have to answer. But the problem I 635 00:38:04,360 --> 00:38:07,120 Speaker 1: have is that these are questions that that seem to 636 00:38:07,120 --> 00:38:09,239 Speaker 1: already have been answered in the past. We just haven't 637 00:38:09,280 --> 00:38:13,520 Speaker 1: applied the answer yet, or people judges in particular, haven't 638 00:38:13,560 --> 00:38:18,200 Speaker 1: understood the implications of this technology, and that we're seeing 639 00:38:18,239 --> 00:38:23,800 Speaker 1: some civil liberties fade away as a result or get less, 640 00:38:24,239 --> 00:38:26,880 Speaker 1: you know, like like it's like you are protected against this, 641 00:38:27,080 --> 00:38:31,520 Speaker 1: except in all of these other newer situations, many of 642 00:38:31,520 --> 00:38:35,560 Speaker 1: which we cannot legally tell you about because national security, right, 643 00:38:35,600 --> 00:38:38,000 Speaker 1: because if we told you about how we're violating your 644 00:38:38,000 --> 00:38:41,960 Speaker 1: civil liberties, then the bad guys would win. Like, well, technically, 645 00:38:41,960 --> 00:38:44,400 Speaker 1: if you're telling me that my civil liberties are being violated, 646 00:38:44,400 --> 00:38:47,160 Speaker 1: but you can't tell me how the bad guys have one. Yeah, 647 00:38:47,239 --> 00:38:49,799 Speaker 1: it's it's an interesting deliminate is one that we keep 648 00:38:49,880 --> 00:38:52,759 Speaker 1: running into. And this is not the first time. I 649 00:38:52,800 --> 00:38:56,160 Speaker 1: love that you mentioned there's precedent through about this throughout history. 650 00:38:56,200 --> 00:38:58,520 Speaker 1: I mean back when it was just the post office, 651 00:38:58,640 --> 00:39:01,840 Speaker 1: right uh. There there were still these ongoing debates about 652 00:39:01,880 --> 00:39:05,080 Speaker 1: what kind of right to privacy should someone expect when 653 00:39:05,080 --> 00:39:11,440 Speaker 1: they're using the postal system. But you also mentioned advocacy groups, 654 00:39:12,160 --> 00:39:15,359 Speaker 1: So is there some organized opposition to There's quite quite 655 00:39:15,400 --> 00:39:18,080 Speaker 1: a lot. There's a lot of disorganized opposition too. But 656 00:39:18,120 --> 00:39:21,680 Speaker 1: the organized opposition includes like the Electronic Frontier Foundation, the 657 00:39:21,840 --> 00:39:26,319 Speaker 1: f E F f UH, there's the American Civil Liberties Union, 658 00:39:26,360 --> 00:39:29,640 Speaker 1: the a c l u uh, there's EPIC there. There 659 00:39:29,640 --> 00:39:32,680 Speaker 1: are all these different groups that are all about privacy 660 00:39:32,719 --> 00:39:38,160 Speaker 1: and civil rights that have identified problem areas with this technology, 661 00:39:38,400 --> 00:39:40,560 Speaker 1: some of which have been they've kind of some of 662 00:39:40,600 --> 00:39:44,120 Speaker 1: them have couched their arguments, largely because they say, we 663 00:39:44,239 --> 00:39:48,520 Speaker 1: can't come out and say how strongly strongly we feel 664 00:39:48,520 --> 00:39:53,520 Speaker 1: about this because of the secrecy involved. Without knowing everything, 665 00:39:54,400 --> 00:39:57,160 Speaker 1: we we don't want to suspect the worst. But we 666 00:39:57,280 --> 00:40:00,799 Speaker 1: can't discount it either because you won't tell us what 667 00:40:00,880 --> 00:40:04,759 Speaker 1: it does or how it's being used. Um, you know, 668 00:40:04,800 --> 00:40:06,600 Speaker 1: but there there are a lot who are saying you 669 00:40:06,680 --> 00:40:10,239 Speaker 1: need to have rules set in place on how this 670 00:40:10,320 --> 00:40:13,000 Speaker 1: technology can be used, if in fact it is legal 671 00:40:13,040 --> 00:40:17,280 Speaker 1: to use it at all. So, for example, perhaps before 672 00:40:17,360 --> 00:40:20,239 Speaker 1: you use this you have to secure a warrant that 673 00:40:20,440 --> 00:40:25,279 Speaker 1: specifies who you are looking for and and narrows that 674 00:40:25,440 --> 00:40:28,000 Speaker 1: down to a point where you can't just throw out 675 00:40:28,200 --> 00:40:31,959 Speaker 1: a net and everybody who's caught in the net, their 676 00:40:32,000 --> 00:40:34,600 Speaker 1: lives are turned upside down for the duration of you 677 00:40:34,760 --> 00:40:37,759 Speaker 1: sorting out which person is the one you actually are 678 00:40:37,800 --> 00:40:41,919 Speaker 1: interested in. But they'll never know the collateral damage isn't 679 00:40:41,920 --> 00:40:45,640 Speaker 1: really collateral if they have no idea, Well, they might 680 00:40:45,680 --> 00:40:48,759 Speaker 1: not ever know. And you know, you could argue that 681 00:40:48,800 --> 00:40:51,040 Speaker 1: in a world where you never know that this is 682 00:40:51,080 --> 00:40:56,600 Speaker 1: happening and it's never affecting you. Stick with me. If 683 00:40:56,640 --> 00:40:59,239 Speaker 1: you're in a world where you you don't know that's 684 00:40:59,239 --> 00:41:02,160 Speaker 1: happening to you and it's not having any noticeable effect 685 00:41:02,160 --> 00:41:05,200 Speaker 1: on your life, ultimately you might be able to go 686 00:41:05,239 --> 00:41:07,720 Speaker 1: to sleep at night and think, well, it doesn't really matter, 687 00:41:07,760 --> 00:41:11,000 Speaker 1: because if it is not affecting my life, then I mean, 688 00:41:11,120 --> 00:41:12,920 Speaker 1: I don't want it to happen, and I'm still going 689 00:41:12,960 --> 00:41:15,359 Speaker 1: to protest it happening because I don't think it's right. 690 00:41:15,400 --> 00:41:17,440 Speaker 1: But if it doesn't have a noticeable effect on my 691 00:41:17,480 --> 00:41:19,919 Speaker 1: life at the end of the day, when I draw 692 00:41:20,000 --> 00:41:23,880 Speaker 1: my last breath, it hasn't really made a difference. Who cares. 693 00:41:25,360 --> 00:41:27,880 Speaker 1: But we might also live in a world where sometimes 694 00:41:27,880 --> 00:41:30,880 Speaker 1: it does affect us, even if we are perfectly innocent 695 00:41:30,960 --> 00:41:33,600 Speaker 1: in all in the eyes of the law. Let's just 696 00:41:33,640 --> 00:41:35,680 Speaker 1: throw out some examples of the n S A for 697 00:41:35,680 --> 00:41:38,880 Speaker 1: for instance, like a person who decides to use the 698 00:41:39,000 --> 00:41:42,920 Speaker 1: n S as wide array of of surveillance techniques to 699 00:41:42,960 --> 00:41:45,920 Speaker 1: look in on an ex girlfriend. That's exactly the scenario 700 00:41:45,960 --> 00:41:47,680 Speaker 1: I was going to bring up. If you and I 701 00:41:48,120 --> 00:41:50,640 Speaker 1: back in our scenario, I decided to go back and 702 00:41:50,719 --> 00:41:52,520 Speaker 1: use the machine for a little bit because we parked 703 00:41:52,520 --> 00:41:55,719 Speaker 1: to get some coffee or something, and I see a 704 00:41:55,880 --> 00:42:00,000 Speaker 1: number that I recognize pop up. Yeah, and I'm just like, oh, 705 00:42:00,200 --> 00:42:02,719 Speaker 1: what is my ex wife's new husband talking about? Oh, 706 00:42:02,800 --> 00:42:05,160 Speaker 1: and then blah blah blah blah blah. There you go 707 00:42:05,440 --> 00:42:09,520 Speaker 1: down the rabbit hole into weird personal things. Then, and 708 00:42:09,560 --> 00:42:13,640 Speaker 1: this is the thing, it's it's you know, the technology 709 00:42:13,840 --> 00:42:18,279 Speaker 1: allows that to happen, and humans being human are going 710 00:42:18,360 --> 00:42:21,240 Speaker 1: to do it right. Like it's it's not a question 711 00:42:21,239 --> 00:42:24,160 Speaker 1: of whether the technology itself is good or bad because 712 00:42:24,200 --> 00:42:27,040 Speaker 1: it's a tool. Uh, you might say, is it a 713 00:42:27,080 --> 00:42:30,239 Speaker 1: tool that is appropriate? Is there any is there are 714 00:42:30,280 --> 00:42:33,200 Speaker 1: there appropriate use cases for this tool? And if so, 715 00:42:33,280 --> 00:42:36,480 Speaker 1: how are they defined? I think that's the important step. 716 00:42:36,960 --> 00:42:40,080 Speaker 1: We have to come to the conclusion of does this 717 00:42:40,200 --> 00:42:44,480 Speaker 1: tool make sense? If so, in which contexts does it 718 00:42:44,640 --> 00:42:47,800 Speaker 1: make sense? And how can we be certain that in 719 00:42:48,000 --> 00:42:51,839 Speaker 1: any given use case it fits those contexts? And if 720 00:42:51,880 --> 00:42:55,040 Speaker 1: it if we can answer all those to our satisfaction, fine, 721 00:42:55,920 --> 00:43:00,080 Speaker 1: I question whether that's possible particular technology. But but the 722 00:43:00,120 --> 00:43:03,239 Speaker 1: problem is that people they'll behave outside of that, right. 723 00:43:03,320 --> 00:43:06,160 Speaker 1: I mean, if there is the capability of someone to 724 00:43:06,239 --> 00:43:11,239 Speaker 1: do this, you know, use this technology in a selfish, 725 00:43:11,480 --> 00:43:15,680 Speaker 1: possibly harmful way, for then someone will do it. It's 726 00:43:15,680 --> 00:43:17,480 Speaker 1: not a question of if, it's a question of when 727 00:43:17,760 --> 00:43:21,440 Speaker 1: and how frequently and uh, because we've seen it with 728 00:43:21,520 --> 00:43:24,080 Speaker 1: the n s A. It's again, you know, you have 729 00:43:24,160 --> 00:43:26,520 Speaker 1: to remember that at the end of the day, they're 730 00:43:26,600 --> 00:43:31,040 Speaker 1: real human beings in charge of using this technology, and 731 00:43:31,120 --> 00:43:35,600 Speaker 1: real human beings have real motivations that happen every single 732 00:43:35,680 --> 00:43:39,240 Speaker 1: day of their lives. Just like you and me. We 733 00:43:39,239 --> 00:43:41,919 Speaker 1: we go through our lives and we realize, oh man, 734 00:43:41,960 --> 00:43:44,000 Speaker 1: if only I knew what was going on in that 735 00:43:44,040 --> 00:43:47,640 Speaker 1: person's head. Oh wait, I could figure it out because 736 00:43:47,680 --> 00:43:51,919 Speaker 1: I've got access to this technology. It happens, right, it does. 737 00:43:52,480 --> 00:43:55,400 Speaker 1: One thing immediately that we could say that might be 738 00:43:56,440 --> 00:44:00,799 Speaker 1: a glimmer of hope with this is that many of 739 00:44:01,160 --> 00:44:07,000 Speaker 1: the surveillance technologies or proprietary systems rather do have strict 740 00:44:07,160 --> 00:44:10,520 Speaker 1: usage logs where wherein you know, any user with an 741 00:44:10,560 --> 00:44:15,319 Speaker 1: I D dis tract, So, uh, Lieutenant Frederick would be 742 00:44:15,520 --> 00:44:18,480 Speaker 1: pinned up for they would say, hey, lieutenant, why were 743 00:44:18,480 --> 00:44:25,000 Speaker 1: you running uh private in the police force? Have you 744 00:44:25,080 --> 00:44:29,200 Speaker 1: militarized the entire police force for several years in the future. 745 00:44:29,239 --> 00:44:33,000 Speaker 1: He's not a rookie, he's a private all right. Well, anyhow, 746 00:44:33,080 --> 00:44:35,920 Speaker 1: whatever your position would be, you know, there would be 747 00:44:35,960 --> 00:44:39,440 Speaker 1: somebody over you, ideally who would say, hey, we noticed 748 00:44:39,480 --> 00:44:42,319 Speaker 1: that you were searching this number which is not part 749 00:44:42,360 --> 00:44:44,920 Speaker 1: of it, and you went pretty in depth. So so 750 00:44:45,000 --> 00:44:47,600 Speaker 1: that's one thing. But then again it relies, as you said, 751 00:44:47,600 --> 00:44:49,879 Speaker 1: on the policy on the system. I'd like to take 752 00:44:49,880 --> 00:44:54,120 Speaker 1: the danger even further because one of the most dangerous 753 00:44:54,120 --> 00:44:56,840 Speaker 1: potential things about the n s A program and possibly 754 00:44:56,920 --> 00:45:01,839 Speaker 1: Stingray and it's other accoutrement, is the idea that this 755 00:45:01,920 --> 00:45:05,200 Speaker 1: could be used by corrupt people with access to the 756 00:45:05,239 --> 00:45:10,399 Speaker 1: technology to do things like smear campaigns, to do blackmail, 757 00:45:10,560 --> 00:45:14,719 Speaker 1: or even extortion. And the most frightening thing to me, 758 00:45:15,680 --> 00:45:18,920 Speaker 1: although it is it is offensive, the idea that an 759 00:45:18,920 --> 00:45:24,040 Speaker 1: innocent person's uh terrible late night you up text messages 760 00:45:24,160 --> 00:45:28,440 Speaker 1: might be collected and saved for posterity, it's more frightening 761 00:45:28,880 --> 00:45:33,919 Speaker 1: that this could be used to curtail people who were 762 00:45:34,680 --> 00:45:39,160 Speaker 1: fighting against it. Yeah, I mean, there's there's that possibilities. Well, 763 00:45:39,160 --> 00:45:42,720 Speaker 1: I mean, granted this would a lot of that responsibility 764 00:45:42,760 --> 00:45:45,520 Speaker 1: falls on the Harris Corporation and how they deal with 765 00:45:45,640 --> 00:45:50,360 Speaker 1: the orders. I imagine that they mostly, I mean before 766 00:45:51,239 --> 00:45:56,319 Speaker 1: they were really working with the FBI and some military 767 00:45:57,120 --> 00:46:01,200 Speaker 1: companies or military organizations I should say, um, and it 768 00:46:01,239 --> 00:46:05,520 Speaker 1: was only relatively recently, in the last maybe five to 769 00:46:05,600 --> 00:46:08,400 Speaker 1: ten years, that they started really working with the local 770 00:46:08,480 --> 00:46:16,680 Speaker 1: law enforcement agencies. UM. I don't know what there are 771 00:46:16,719 --> 00:46:20,839 Speaker 1: other customers are like or who they are, but you 772 00:46:20,840 --> 00:46:23,680 Speaker 1: could presumably I mean even if even if it's not 773 00:46:23,800 --> 00:46:26,959 Speaker 1: made by Harris Corporation, because it's out there and because 774 00:46:27,000 --> 00:46:30,120 Speaker 1: people know about it, then that's enough for someone to say, hey, 775 00:46:30,480 --> 00:46:33,000 Speaker 1: let's pour some money into making one of these of 776 00:46:33,160 --> 00:46:37,160 Speaker 1: our own so we can spy on people in the CIA, 777 00:46:37,360 --> 00:46:40,320 Speaker 1: or the CIA might say let's use it so we 778 00:46:40,360 --> 00:46:44,359 Speaker 1: can spy on people in other countries. I mean, it's 779 00:46:44,400 --> 00:46:52,319 Speaker 1: definitely a difficult, difficult subject. It's tricky, uh. I mean, 780 00:46:52,560 --> 00:46:57,120 Speaker 1: obviously spying throughout history has all been about let's find 781 00:46:57,160 --> 00:47:00,080 Speaker 1: out what they know without letting them know. We know. 782 00:47:00,320 --> 00:47:02,880 Speaker 1: At some point you're like, well, if we if we 783 00:47:02,920 --> 00:47:06,760 Speaker 1: assume that the premise that spies are necessary is true, 784 00:47:07,320 --> 00:47:09,560 Speaker 1: then these other technologies need to exist for us to 785 00:47:09,560 --> 00:47:11,840 Speaker 1: be able to do that. Yeah, but maybe maybe you 786 00:47:11,880 --> 00:47:14,719 Speaker 1: would argue that spying is not something that should happen 787 00:47:14,719 --> 00:47:16,920 Speaker 1: in the first place. Okay, this this is something that 788 00:47:16,960 --> 00:47:19,400 Speaker 1: I know we really wanted your opinion on. Okay for 789 00:47:19,760 --> 00:47:22,920 Speaker 1: a while, so have we? And we asked Alex Winter 790 00:47:23,200 --> 00:47:26,440 Speaker 1: the same question. Is a filmmaker made the Deep Web. 791 00:47:28,200 --> 00:47:31,560 Speaker 1: Have we reached the point of no return with technology? 792 00:47:31,640 --> 00:47:36,319 Speaker 1: Has technology rendered the concept of individual privacy obsolete? Or 793 00:47:36,360 --> 00:47:40,880 Speaker 1: will it do. So, Okay, well this is super complicated, right, Sorry, 794 00:47:42,280 --> 00:47:44,880 Speaker 1: I mean it's a great question. It's a great question. 795 00:47:45,200 --> 00:47:47,839 Speaker 1: On the one hand, you have stuff like this, the 796 00:47:47,880 --> 00:47:52,799 Speaker 1: technology specifically meant to intercept and perhaps even uh not 797 00:47:52,880 --> 00:47:55,399 Speaker 1: just not just intercept in the sense of finding out 798 00:47:55,440 --> 00:47:58,640 Speaker 1: who is talking to whom, but what they are saying. Right, 799 00:47:58,640 --> 00:48:02,640 Speaker 1: You've got that technology, that one thing, and you could 800 00:48:02,680 --> 00:48:05,560 Speaker 1: argue that as long as that technology exists, then privacy 801 00:48:05,680 --> 00:48:07,880 Speaker 1: might only be an illusion. It might be something you 802 00:48:07,880 --> 00:48:11,680 Speaker 1: believe you have, but in reality, your information is being 803 00:48:12,600 --> 00:48:15,799 Speaker 1: collected somewhere. And of course we know that anything we 804 00:48:15,920 --> 00:48:19,280 Speaker 1: post or call or text through or whatever, it's going 805 00:48:19,400 --> 00:48:22,960 Speaker 1: through an infrastructure. So there is at least one entity 806 00:48:23,040 --> 00:48:25,000 Speaker 1: out there that has the access to it. The question 807 00:48:25,040 --> 00:48:28,000 Speaker 1: is whether anyone is looking at it or if it's 808 00:48:28,120 --> 00:48:32,200 Speaker 1: just if it's just a conduit. Right, So you could 809 00:48:32,280 --> 00:48:34,319 Speaker 1: argue that privacy is just an illusion in that case. 810 00:48:34,400 --> 00:48:36,520 Speaker 1: There's another argument to make that has nothing to do 811 00:48:36,600 --> 00:48:44,640 Speaker 1: with surveillance. Facebook. Twitter, we are we are voluntarily sharing 812 00:48:44,680 --> 00:48:49,360 Speaker 1: more and more of our lives, Instagram, Pinterest, really anything 813 00:48:49,400 --> 00:48:52,320 Speaker 1: you can think of where you are allowed a platform. 814 00:48:52,400 --> 00:48:56,560 Speaker 1: People are taking advantage of it. YouTube, another great example periscope. 815 00:48:58,360 --> 00:49:04,560 Speaker 1: So you're you're volunteering to share a lot more information 816 00:49:04,800 --> 00:49:08,479 Speaker 1: and you don't necessarily think while you're doing it, this 817 00:49:08,719 --> 00:49:13,240 Speaker 1: could potentially put other things in my life at risk 818 00:49:13,400 --> 00:49:16,799 Speaker 1: of becoming public knowledge, whether it's because you're not paying 819 00:49:16,880 --> 00:49:19,640 Speaker 1: enough attention or you just don't realize how much information 820 00:49:19,680 --> 00:49:24,920 Speaker 1: you are revealing every time you post something. Um So, 821 00:49:25,320 --> 00:49:28,799 Speaker 1: you could argue in that case, privacy might also be 822 00:49:28,840 --> 00:49:31,920 Speaker 1: an illusion, not because there are all these ways of 823 00:49:31,960 --> 00:49:35,720 Speaker 1: staring at what's really going on, but because we're actually 824 00:49:36,600 --> 00:49:39,960 Speaker 1: giving everything away and we're just not aware of it. 825 00:49:40,000 --> 00:49:43,000 Speaker 1: We're not aware of the consequences of what we our 826 00:49:43,040 --> 00:49:47,400 Speaker 1: own actions happened to be um I would argue we 827 00:49:47,520 --> 00:49:51,800 Speaker 1: haven't gone too far in the sense that we could, 828 00:49:52,480 --> 00:49:57,200 Speaker 1: if motivated to do so and given the authority to 829 00:49:57,280 --> 00:49:59,719 Speaker 1: do so, reverse a lot of the things that have 830 00:50:00,000 --> 00:50:04,680 Speaker 1: and happening. The question of whether that's a reality or not, 831 00:50:04,760 --> 00:50:06,319 Speaker 1: I mean, that's kind of like the pie in the 832 00:50:06,320 --> 00:50:09,640 Speaker 1: sky optimistic idealism, the idea that people could actually be 833 00:50:09,719 --> 00:50:15,360 Speaker 1: motivated to take action, specifically through voting and through campaigning, 834 00:50:15,360 --> 00:50:18,480 Speaker 1: and through bringing things to attention and getting the word 835 00:50:18,480 --> 00:50:22,319 Speaker 1: out there and getting people behind the argument, Hey, we 836 00:50:22,400 --> 00:50:25,040 Speaker 1: need to address this, and we need to have an 837 00:50:25,080 --> 00:50:29,040 Speaker 1: addressed to our satisfaction, not just it's secret. You can't know. 838 00:50:30,520 --> 00:50:34,480 Speaker 1: I think it's possible, I think it would be really hard, 839 00:50:35,120 --> 00:50:37,440 Speaker 1: and I don't even though I think it's possible, I 840 00:50:37,480 --> 00:50:42,600 Speaker 1: don't think it's the plausible outcome. If I'm being perfectly honest, Um, 841 00:50:42,640 --> 00:50:49,000 Speaker 1: it would require enormous changes in momentum among vast, huge 842 00:50:49,360 --> 00:50:52,400 Speaker 1: entities out there that are bigger than any one person is. 843 00:50:53,000 --> 00:50:54,839 Speaker 1: So even if you let's say that you have an 844 00:50:54,840 --> 00:50:57,600 Speaker 1: ideal candidate for president of the United States in mind, 845 00:50:57,640 --> 00:51:01,279 Speaker 1: someone that you truly believe has the best interests of 846 00:51:01,320 --> 00:51:05,240 Speaker 1: the citizens at heart and wants to protect constitutional rights. 847 00:51:05,520 --> 00:51:09,120 Speaker 1: So they want to do right by the citizens and 848 00:51:09,160 --> 00:51:11,560 Speaker 1: make sure that the things they do truly do protect 849 00:51:11,600 --> 00:51:14,160 Speaker 1: them and do so in a way that follows the rules. 850 00:51:14,719 --> 00:51:18,239 Speaker 1: Even if that person exists and has put into the 851 00:51:18,239 --> 00:51:23,799 Speaker 1: position of president, you still have everything else that from 852 00:51:23,840 --> 00:51:27,520 Speaker 1: the local level to n s A TOI you know, 853 00:51:27,640 --> 00:51:30,680 Speaker 1: organizations that do not directly answer to the president. It's 854 00:51:30,719 --> 00:51:36,120 Speaker 1: not like the president is capable of changing everything by 855 00:51:36,200 --> 00:51:38,319 Speaker 1: flicking a wand in fact, they're not supposed to be 856 00:51:38,360 --> 00:51:40,280 Speaker 1: able to do that. That's why they have the position 857 00:51:40,280 --> 00:51:45,360 Speaker 1: of president. Yeah. So uh, this is why until I 858 00:51:45,440 --> 00:51:49,600 Speaker 1: become benevolent dictator, we're going to have these problems. Yeah, 859 00:51:49,760 --> 00:51:52,960 Speaker 1: you know, you've you've been saying that more and more often. 860 00:51:53,000 --> 00:51:57,160 Speaker 1: I appreciate the posters that you've put up around the office. 861 00:51:57,719 --> 00:52:00,879 Speaker 1: Uh they're they're a little bit stark. I don't know. 862 00:52:01,120 --> 00:52:03,600 Speaker 1: I you know, I think there might be a bit 863 00:52:03,640 --> 00:52:07,560 Speaker 1: too Soviet. Yeah. I mean, it would help if they 864 00:52:07,600 --> 00:52:10,920 Speaker 1: were in English. But there's a lot of like crush 865 00:52:11,120 --> 00:52:14,120 Speaker 1: this thing beneath the boot. I just like I thought 866 00:52:14,120 --> 00:52:18,680 Speaker 1: the fist looked really like empowering and now I oh man, 867 00:52:18,920 --> 00:52:21,680 Speaker 1: it does. It does look good. It does. The style 868 00:52:21,840 --> 00:52:25,839 Speaker 1: is nice. You're both on a list now, alright, so 869 00:52:26,040 --> 00:52:28,759 Speaker 1: ut any rate? No, but this is this was the 870 00:52:28,840 --> 00:52:30,560 Speaker 1: reason why why did you guys on here is because 871 00:52:30,560 --> 00:52:34,719 Speaker 1: I know you guys. I assume you feel similarly to 872 00:52:34,719 --> 00:52:36,960 Speaker 1: to what I've stated. But I mean, if there's if 873 00:52:37,000 --> 00:52:41,720 Speaker 1: I have in any way misconstrued, I would I definitely 874 00:52:41,760 --> 00:52:44,120 Speaker 1: want you to have the opportunity to address it. Well, 875 00:52:44,160 --> 00:52:47,319 Speaker 1: I will let Ben finish this idea that I'm going 876 00:52:47,400 --> 00:52:49,400 Speaker 1: to start. But when we spoke with Mr. Winter, he 877 00:52:49,520 --> 00:52:54,640 Speaker 1: had a surprisingly positive outlookture of privacy. That's wonderful, he did. 878 00:52:54,880 --> 00:52:57,839 Speaker 1: The people that he's been speaking with and communicating with 879 00:52:58,120 --> 00:53:01,000 Speaker 1: in his research on this subject of the deep web. 880 00:53:01,360 --> 00:53:03,719 Speaker 1: He's finding that there are a lot of people who 881 00:53:03,719 --> 00:53:09,920 Speaker 1: are freely focused on encrypting data and finding ways to 882 00:53:10,000 --> 00:53:13,640 Speaker 1: encrypt almost all communication that is done from a private 883 00:53:13,640 --> 00:53:16,920 Speaker 1: person's level, so that a company that is even handling 884 00:53:16,960 --> 00:53:19,319 Speaker 1: your data won't be able to decrypt it. Right. So, 885 00:53:19,360 --> 00:53:22,919 Speaker 1: in other words, the the the company that handles it, 886 00:53:22,920 --> 00:53:26,520 Speaker 1: it literally is just the conduit. It cannot it cannot 887 00:53:26,560 --> 00:53:29,279 Speaker 1: see the content. At most, it will see where it's 888 00:53:29,280 --> 00:53:31,839 Speaker 1: coming from and where it's going, but beyond that not 889 00:53:31,920 --> 00:53:35,839 Speaker 1: what the actual information is. He used the phrase. One 890 00:53:35,840 --> 00:53:40,040 Speaker 1: phrase I remember that he used was a renaissance of privacy, 891 00:53:40,080 --> 00:53:45,440 Speaker 1: which which I found inspiring because the the old argument 892 00:53:45,640 --> 00:53:48,960 Speaker 1: of well, if you have nothing to worry about, worried 893 00:53:48,960 --> 00:53:52,400 Speaker 1: about hiding, right, it's kind of silly when you consider 894 00:53:52,560 --> 00:53:57,400 Speaker 1: that we do live in a world now where let's say, Jonathan, 895 00:53:57,480 --> 00:54:00,279 Speaker 1: let's say that you as an FBI agent of the 896 00:54:00,280 --> 00:54:02,439 Speaker 1: part of town and so much. You said, you know what, guys, 897 00:54:02,440 --> 00:54:05,520 Speaker 1: I'm gonna pull up my tent stakes from Langley, and 898 00:54:05,560 --> 00:54:08,359 Speaker 1: I'm gonna come down here, and I am gonna I'm 899 00:54:08,360 --> 00:54:11,200 Speaker 1: gonna live here, and a matter of fact, I'm gonna 900 00:54:11,280 --> 00:54:15,399 Speaker 1: run for city commissioner because I think, uh, this kind 901 00:54:15,400 --> 00:54:17,960 Speaker 1: of stuff needs to be dealt with in the public eye. 902 00:54:18,320 --> 00:54:21,320 Speaker 1: And then all of a sudden, all of this stuff, 903 00:54:21,360 --> 00:54:23,680 Speaker 1: every time you have used your phone in that region 904 00:54:23,719 --> 00:54:27,520 Speaker 1: got leaked by somebody. Or maybe you're running for sheriff, right, 905 00:54:27,600 --> 00:54:30,239 Speaker 1: because we do know that the sheriff's uh, at least 906 00:54:30,239 --> 00:54:34,719 Speaker 1: into Cab County once played played a corrupt game here, yeah, well, 907 00:54:35,000 --> 00:54:39,719 Speaker 1: or or even just something that, like, you know, a 908 00:54:39,800 --> 00:54:43,120 Speaker 1: mistake that you make at some point, sure, and it 909 00:54:43,200 --> 00:54:45,239 Speaker 1: may be it may be one that you you know, 910 00:54:45,440 --> 00:54:48,040 Speaker 1: it could be that something you consciously did, or not 911 00:54:48,120 --> 00:54:51,680 Speaker 1: even a conscious mistake, something that due to your actions 912 00:54:51,680 --> 00:54:54,759 Speaker 1: has accidentally happened, and that you have already taken care 913 00:54:54,800 --> 00:54:57,480 Speaker 1: of it, You have fixed whatever problems there are, whatever 914 00:54:57,560 --> 00:54:59,880 Speaker 1: the nature of that thing is, you have you know, 915 00:55:00,120 --> 00:55:04,000 Speaker 1: you've done your time. However that that might be for 916 00:55:04,080 --> 00:55:06,000 Speaker 1: something like that to like, let's say that you do 917 00:55:06,120 --> 00:55:10,120 Speaker 1: want to run for a local local position and it 918 00:55:10,200 --> 00:55:13,399 Speaker 1: has no bearing whatsoever on your ability to carry out 919 00:55:13,400 --> 00:55:16,360 Speaker 1: your duties. We live in a world now where that 920 00:55:16,360 --> 00:55:19,720 Speaker 1: stuff comes back, I mean, like big time comes back. 921 00:55:20,280 --> 00:55:22,960 Speaker 1: And none of us are saints, you know, no one, 922 00:55:23,600 --> 00:55:27,239 Speaker 1: no one has gone through life completely unsullied. Even if 923 00:55:27,280 --> 00:55:30,800 Speaker 1: you you know or have the best of intentions, something 924 00:55:30,840 --> 00:55:33,399 Speaker 1: has happened some point in your life. Maybe you were 925 00:55:33,440 --> 00:55:35,359 Speaker 1: just in the wrong place at the wrong time, but 926 00:55:35,480 --> 00:55:38,160 Speaker 1: that can be bad enough. Yeah, that's true. I I 927 00:55:38,760 --> 00:55:42,360 Speaker 1: do want to say, Um, I really enjoyed I always 928 00:55:42,440 --> 00:55:45,319 Speaker 1: enjoy being on this show, And um, I don't want 929 00:55:45,320 --> 00:55:47,320 Speaker 1: to speak for you, Matt, but I'm I'm grateful that 930 00:55:47,480 --> 00:55:53,200 Speaker 1: hates it. Yeah, I'm grateful that for me. You guys, 931 00:55:53,360 --> 00:55:55,560 Speaker 1: you would be so impressed by that's ability to silently 932 00:55:55,600 --> 00:55:59,680 Speaker 1: weep in this room. But salty, salty beard. But the 933 00:55:59,719 --> 00:56:01,680 Speaker 1: only thing I would add to what we were saying 934 00:56:01,960 --> 00:56:04,600 Speaker 1: is that I love that we were talking about how 935 00:56:04,600 --> 00:56:09,160 Speaker 1: we are not casting aspersion on the individuals working in 936 00:56:09,239 --> 00:56:14,040 Speaker 1: law enforcement, which is so often an incredibly thankless job, 937 00:56:14,160 --> 00:56:17,719 Speaker 1: a fatally at times thankless job. And when you're when 938 00:56:17,760 --> 00:56:23,000 Speaker 1: you are representing the good guys right, the force of 939 00:56:23,360 --> 00:56:26,960 Speaker 1: the force of crime prevention in our society, then the 940 00:56:26,960 --> 00:56:30,320 Speaker 1: thing is that the game you are playing is stacked 941 00:56:30,400 --> 00:56:33,320 Speaker 1: against you because the bad guys, whomever they may be, 942 00:56:33,800 --> 00:56:37,799 Speaker 1: do not have to follow the same rules. So I 943 00:56:38,280 --> 00:56:43,320 Speaker 1: while I think that, while I think that it's often easy, 944 00:56:43,360 --> 00:56:46,319 Speaker 1: at least in our field, for people to demonize law 945 00:56:46,400 --> 00:56:48,960 Speaker 1: enforcement as a faceless entity rather than a group of 946 00:56:49,040 --> 00:56:58,160 Speaker 1: human beings, I do completely believe that this is horrible technology. 947 00:56:57,600 --> 00:57:01,520 Speaker 1: I don't see a lot out of cases of it 948 00:57:01,600 --> 00:57:04,000 Speaker 1: being successful. The a c l U has tried their 949 00:57:04,000 --> 00:57:06,880 Speaker 1: best to make a map of all the police areas 950 00:57:06,920 --> 00:57:09,879 Speaker 1: they're using this, but they still they had to say 951 00:57:09,920 --> 00:57:15,400 Speaker 1: that this map is incomplete. This is I believe, very 952 00:57:15,640 --> 00:57:18,200 Speaker 1: very close to a kind of Pandora's box because, as 953 00:57:18,280 --> 00:57:21,960 Speaker 1: we know, the price of technology continually decreases, right, Yeah, 954 00:57:22,160 --> 00:57:24,720 Speaker 1: so what happens when it's a stingray is the price 955 00:57:24,720 --> 00:57:27,120 Speaker 1: of a PS four? Well, I mean, you know, it's 956 00:57:27,160 --> 00:57:30,360 Speaker 1: it's being made in such limited amounts. I mean, you 957 00:57:30,440 --> 00:57:32,360 Speaker 1: have to have the demand there and you have to 958 00:57:32,400 --> 00:57:34,680 Speaker 1: have I would imagine there will also be laws that 959 00:57:34,720 --> 00:57:37,960 Speaker 1: will limit the use of this, because you have the 960 00:57:38,000 --> 00:57:41,800 Speaker 1: giant phone companies that will lobby very hard. They don't 961 00:57:41,840 --> 00:57:44,120 Speaker 1: want the ability for someone to spoof a cell phone 962 00:57:44,160 --> 00:57:46,280 Speaker 1: tower to fall into the hands of an average citizen 963 00:57:46,480 --> 00:57:50,480 Speaker 1: that their their business depends upon that not happening. But 964 00:57:50,640 --> 00:57:54,360 Speaker 1: you're not the average citizen. No, No, I'm the future 965 00:57:54,360 --> 00:57:57,360 Speaker 1: benevolent dictator of the New World Order. I think you 966 00:57:57,400 --> 00:58:00,640 Speaker 1: need a tank. I think the the you can need 967 00:58:00,640 --> 00:58:06,760 Speaker 1: a tank on speed dial. Yeah, yeah, but they yeah, 968 00:58:06,800 --> 00:58:09,520 Speaker 1: this is this is fantastic and I really appreciate the 969 00:58:09,560 --> 00:58:13,520 Speaker 1: opportunity to let more people know about this. Yeah, And 970 00:58:13,760 --> 00:58:15,520 Speaker 1: like I said, this technology has been around for a while. 971 00:58:15,560 --> 00:58:17,920 Speaker 1: In fact that the sting ray stuff really started hitting 972 00:58:18,160 --> 00:58:20,920 Speaker 1: headlines a couple of years ago, back in that's when 973 00:58:20,920 --> 00:58:23,240 Speaker 1: it was really starting to get noticed. And keep in 974 00:58:23,280 --> 00:58:27,400 Speaker 1: mind it's been used more than a decade before that. So, uh, 975 00:58:27,600 --> 00:58:29,400 Speaker 1: it's it's good to be aware of it. It's good 976 00:58:29,400 --> 00:58:32,320 Speaker 1: to ask these questions. And like I said, we may 977 00:58:32,520 --> 00:58:34,560 Speaker 1: at some point come to a point where we are 978 00:58:34,720 --> 00:58:37,720 Speaker 1: able to answer the questions I've been asking, to a 979 00:58:37,720 --> 00:58:40,840 Speaker 1: point where maybe I would be like, Okay, I understand 980 00:58:40,880 --> 00:58:43,040 Speaker 1: that in the world we live in, the reality of 981 00:58:43,080 --> 00:58:47,000 Speaker 1: the world we live in that under these situations, this 982 00:58:47,120 --> 00:58:51,000 Speaker 1: might be an acceptable use of the technology. Uh, it's 983 00:58:51,040 --> 00:58:53,520 Speaker 1: just right now, we haven't. We don't have those answers 984 00:58:53,560 --> 00:58:58,280 Speaker 1: because of secrecy. So yeah, it's it's it's definitely something 985 00:58:58,320 --> 00:59:01,080 Speaker 1: to be aware of. I I don't want to be 986 00:59:01,120 --> 00:59:04,600 Speaker 1: a fearmonger or anything like that, but um, it is 987 00:59:04,640 --> 00:59:08,919 Speaker 1: important that you know about it because I mean, it's 988 00:59:08,960 --> 00:59:11,200 Speaker 1: it's out there. Whether you know or not, it is there, 989 00:59:11,320 --> 00:59:14,520 Speaker 1: so it's better to know. All right, Well, guys, thank 990 00:59:14,560 --> 00:59:18,240 Speaker 1: you so much for joining the show. Obviously you can 991 00:59:18,320 --> 00:59:21,720 Speaker 1: find Matt and Ben's work at stuff they don't want 992 00:59:21,800 --> 00:59:27,480 Speaker 1: you to know, a show that I titled that's true. 993 00:59:27,520 --> 00:59:31,000 Speaker 1: It's true, It's all true. You can also, ladies and gentlemen, 994 00:59:31,080 --> 00:59:35,760 Speaker 1: find Jonathan on more than a few of our episodes. 995 00:59:35,880 --> 00:59:42,640 Speaker 1: That's true as well. So much truth right now, you guys. Yeah, Yes, 996 00:59:43,200 --> 00:59:45,440 Speaker 1: one thing before we go, I just want to recommend 997 00:59:45,440 --> 00:59:47,680 Speaker 1: to everyone. This is a little something that I'm going 998 00:59:47,760 --> 00:59:50,320 Speaker 1: to start doing today, in fact, because of this conversation. 999 00:59:50,960 --> 00:59:54,200 Speaker 1: Go go down to your local magic shop by as 1000 00:59:54,400 --> 00:59:57,919 Speaker 1: much flash paper as you possibly can and do all 1001 00:59:57,920 --> 01:00:01,040 Speaker 1: of your communications solely on a flash paper and just 1002 01:00:01,120 --> 01:00:04,440 Speaker 1: keep lots of lighters handy. Yeah, so essentially tell people 1003 01:00:04,480 --> 01:00:06,840 Speaker 1: you know, the message will not self destruct, but you 1004 01:00:06,880 --> 01:00:09,960 Speaker 1: will yourself will need to destroy the message once upon 1005 01:00:10,480 --> 01:00:13,400 Speaker 1: receiving it, and hower is yours. Yeah, and then all 1006 01:00:13,440 --> 01:00:15,600 Speaker 1: the all these problems are solved. I had a great 1007 01:00:15,640 --> 01:00:18,720 Speaker 1: time hanging out in that van with you, guys. Came out. 1008 01:00:18,960 --> 01:00:23,000 Speaker 1: It's pretty awesome. Guys. I'm sorry I took your case 1009 01:00:23,040 --> 01:00:27,720 Speaker 1: away from you. It's okay, jerk move al right, guys. Well, 1010 01:00:27,720 --> 01:00:30,840 Speaker 1: if you have any suggestions for future episodes of tech Stuff, 1011 01:00:30,840 --> 01:00:34,280 Speaker 1: whether it is a subject or a guest I should 1012 01:00:34,360 --> 01:00:37,560 Speaker 1: have on the show, maybe someone I should interview, anything 1013 01:00:37,600 --> 01:00:39,800 Speaker 1: like that, or just a comment on what we had 1014 01:00:39,840 --> 01:00:43,280 Speaker 1: to say here today, send me a message. The email 1015 01:00:43,360 --> 01:00:46,480 Speaker 1: is tech Stuff at how stuff works dot com, or 1016 01:00:46,520 --> 01:00:49,480 Speaker 1: you can drop me a line on Twitter or Facebook 1017 01:00:49,600 --> 01:00:52,200 Speaker 1: or tumbler at all three. I use the handle of 1018 01:00:52,280 --> 01:00:55,560 Speaker 1: text Stuff H s W. And I'll talk to you 1019 01:00:55,600 --> 01:01:03,000 Speaker 1: guys again really soon. For more on this and thousands 1020 01:01:03,000 --> 01:01:14,720 Speaker 1: of other topics, visit houstock works dot com.