1 00:00:02,759 --> 00:00:05,800 Speaker 1: This is Bloomberg Crypto, a daily Bloomberg I HUD podcast, 2 00:00:05,880 --> 00:00:08,760 Speaker 1: and I'm Stacy Marie Ishmael, Managing editor of Crypto for 3 00:00:08,760 --> 00:00:26,800 Speaker 1: Bloomberg News. It's Thursday, February twenty third. Want to hear 4 00:00:26,840 --> 00:00:31,840 Speaker 1: a big number? How about three point eight billion with 5 00:00:32,120 --> 00:00:35,200 Speaker 1: a b yep, that's the amount of crypto that hacker 6 00:00:35,240 --> 00:00:37,400 Speaker 1: has managed to steal last year and it's a new 7 00:00:37,479 --> 00:00:41,880 Speaker 1: record the company behind that number. Cha analysis also found 8 00:00:41,920 --> 00:00:45,640 Speaker 1: that one specific hacking group was responsible for a huge 9 00:00:45,720 --> 00:00:48,839 Speaker 1: chunk of that stolen crypto. If you guessed that the 10 00:00:48,840 --> 00:00:51,199 Speaker 1: hacking group was Lazarus and you know that they're connected 11 00:00:51,200 --> 00:00:54,240 Speaker 1: to North Korea, congratulations, you're probably a regular listener of 12 00:00:54,280 --> 00:00:59,000 Speaker 1: this podcast. Lazarus allegedly stole one point seven billion dollars 13 00:00:59,000 --> 00:01:02,400 Speaker 1: in twenty twenty two, with compares with less than half 14 00:01:02,440 --> 00:01:06,160 Speaker 1: a billion dollars the year before. This further solidifies the 15 00:01:06,200 --> 00:01:10,400 Speaker 1: notion that North Korean hackers are seeing the cryptocurrency sector 16 00:01:10,480 --> 00:01:13,440 Speaker 1: as a way to raise funds and revenue in the 17 00:01:13,440 --> 00:01:17,240 Speaker 1: face of international sanctions. Now, what does all of this 18 00:01:17,360 --> 00:01:19,360 Speaker 1: mean for the crypto markets and what does it mean 19 00:01:19,400 --> 00:01:22,360 Speaker 1: for you? If you hold crypto? Can anything to be 20 00:01:22,360 --> 00:01:25,199 Speaker 1: done to prevent these kinds of hacks from happening. Joining 21 00:01:25,240 --> 00:01:38,240 Speaker 1: me now is Bloomberg REPORTO Jeff Stone with more. Jeff, 22 00:01:38,280 --> 00:01:40,200 Speaker 1: welcome back to the podcast. Thank you for having me. 23 00:01:40,560 --> 00:01:42,360 Speaker 1: We are once again I'm going to talk about hackers. 24 00:01:42,800 --> 00:01:44,280 Speaker 1: I love it. That's what I'm here for. Happy to 25 00:01:44,319 --> 00:01:47,760 Speaker 1: do it. I continue to be fascinated by the fact 26 00:01:48,200 --> 00:01:53,680 Speaker 1: that the North Koreans in particular seem to have emerged 27 00:01:54,320 --> 00:02:00,400 Speaker 1: as the most profitable hackers in the entire old. Is 28 00:02:00,440 --> 00:02:04,640 Speaker 1: that a fair assessment, I think so. It's a difficult 29 00:02:04,640 --> 00:02:09,440 Speaker 1: thing to quantify candidly, but in very broad terms. If 30 00:02:09,480 --> 00:02:15,000 Speaker 1: you think about the big nation state hacking groups, North 31 00:02:15,080 --> 00:02:19,720 Speaker 1: Korea is singularly focused on generating revenue for Pyongyang. We 32 00:02:19,800 --> 00:02:24,799 Speaker 1: know that they're under intense international sanctions, so raising money 33 00:02:24,880 --> 00:02:28,919 Speaker 1: via hacking is a key part of their existence. Really, 34 00:02:29,120 --> 00:02:32,240 Speaker 1: whereas like a Chinese hacking group might be more focused 35 00:02:32,280 --> 00:02:35,280 Speaker 1: on stealing intellectual property, for instance. We know that Russia 36 00:02:35,320 --> 00:02:37,359 Speaker 1: has been involved in all kinds of political stuff as 37 00:02:37,400 --> 00:02:40,280 Speaker 1: well as just different kinds of mayhem, but that's really 38 00:02:40,600 --> 00:02:44,280 Speaker 1: North Korea and hacker's singular focus. You know, you recently 39 00:02:44,320 --> 00:02:49,119 Speaker 1: published a story about the fact that crypto hacks in general, right, 40 00:02:49,240 --> 00:02:52,080 Speaker 1: so anything that you could mention, and this is based 41 00:02:52,120 --> 00:02:55,800 Speaker 1: on a report by ch Analysis, had reached nearly four 42 00:02:55,840 --> 00:02:59,640 Speaker 1: billion dollars in twenty twenty two, which was an increase 43 00:02:59,639 --> 00:03:01,440 Speaker 1: from the year before when it was about three point 44 00:03:01,440 --> 00:03:04,040 Speaker 1: three billion dollars. But the thing again that blew me 45 00:03:04,080 --> 00:03:07,440 Speaker 1: away was how much of that was directly attributable to 46 00:03:07,480 --> 00:03:11,079 Speaker 1: this one particular North Korean group. Me too, I mean, 47 00:03:11,080 --> 00:03:13,720 Speaker 1: that was the biggest surprise, you know. I think everyone, 48 00:03:13,760 --> 00:03:15,760 Speaker 1: probably all your listeners spent a lot of last year 49 00:03:15,800 --> 00:03:19,920 Speaker 1: reading about different hacks and major hundreds of millions of 50 00:03:19,919 --> 00:03:24,160 Speaker 1: dollars worth of theft in cryptocurrency. It's pretty staggering to 51 00:03:24,600 --> 00:03:27,839 Speaker 1: think about almost half of that, half of that three 52 00:03:27,840 --> 00:03:30,920 Speaker 1: point eight billion being the work of North Koreans and 53 00:03:30,919 --> 00:03:33,480 Speaker 1: then the rest being various other parties. I think a 54 00:03:33,520 --> 00:03:36,200 Speaker 1: lot of those are still under investigation, but this relatively 55 00:03:36,280 --> 00:03:41,960 Speaker 1: small apparently military intelligence hacking units has taken the vast 56 00:03:42,040 --> 00:03:44,640 Speaker 1: majority of the sum of virtual currency last year. It 57 00:03:44,720 --> 00:03:47,520 Speaker 1: seems like they really sharpened their focus on crypto because 58 00:03:47,520 --> 00:03:51,160 Speaker 1: the year before, hacks attributed to Lazarus, which is what 59 00:03:51,160 --> 00:03:54,000 Speaker 1: they're called, were like less than five hundred million dollars, right, 60 00:03:54,560 --> 00:03:57,800 Speaker 1: that's a pretty dramatic increase. Like what's driving that, It's 61 00:03:57,840 --> 00:04:02,000 Speaker 1: difficult to know from sitting outside Telligence Agency. It seems 62 00:04:02,000 --> 00:04:03,880 Speaker 1: like they were successful and they found a way to 63 00:04:03,920 --> 00:04:05,360 Speaker 1: do it, and they're going to continue to do it. 64 00:04:05,760 --> 00:04:09,640 Speaker 1: If you think back to previous generations, we know that 65 00:04:09,840 --> 00:04:13,880 Speaker 1: North Koreans were accused of counterfeiting cash, you know, American 66 00:04:14,160 --> 00:04:16,920 Speaker 1: US dollars and using that in the black market to 67 00:04:17,000 --> 00:04:19,040 Speaker 1: raise money. We know that they have a history of 68 00:04:19,120 --> 00:04:22,120 Speaker 1: using counterfeit cigarettes and kind of propping up a lot 69 00:04:22,120 --> 00:04:25,560 Speaker 1: of that trade over the past couple decades. Cryptocurrency seems 70 00:04:25,600 --> 00:04:30,679 Speaker 1: to be their next mL And is that because people 71 00:04:30,720 --> 00:04:33,839 Speaker 1: in crypto are like uniquely prone to being bamboozled? Is 72 00:04:33,880 --> 00:04:36,760 Speaker 1: it because the crypto company security isn't great? Is it 73 00:04:36,839 --> 00:04:39,159 Speaker 1: kind of a culmination of things. I think there's a 74 00:04:39,240 --> 00:04:42,520 Speaker 1: scramble to get rich in crypto. Certainly over the past 75 00:04:42,560 --> 00:04:45,719 Speaker 1: couple of years. I think that has led to a 76 00:04:45,839 --> 00:04:49,920 Speaker 1: reduction in the amount of perhaps scrutiny that people are 77 00:04:49,920 --> 00:04:53,880 Speaker 1: putting on different projects and really rushing to kind of 78 00:04:53,920 --> 00:04:56,800 Speaker 1: monetize in this space. There's a new currency we have 79 00:04:56,839 --> 00:04:59,120 Speaker 1: to jump on this, there's a new market. We have 80 00:04:59,160 --> 00:05:01,000 Speaker 1: to jump on this. There's lot of speculation, as you 81 00:05:01,040 --> 00:05:04,480 Speaker 1: know better than anyone, and North Korea is honing their 82 00:05:04,480 --> 00:05:08,280 Speaker 1: craft at really inserting themselves into that process. Well, so 83 00:05:08,440 --> 00:05:10,520 Speaker 1: that point, you know, I think a lot of folks 84 00:05:10,880 --> 00:05:14,320 Speaker 1: have this very stereotypical idea that all hacking is just 85 00:05:14,400 --> 00:05:17,839 Speaker 1: like someone probably a dude, hovering in front of a 86 00:05:17,880 --> 00:05:21,560 Speaker 1: computer in which like green text on a black background 87 00:05:21,720 --> 00:05:24,679 Speaker 1: is flashing before their very eyes. But you've also reported 88 00:05:24,720 --> 00:05:28,239 Speaker 1: on the ones that like there are folks doing fake 89 00:05:28,320 --> 00:05:32,480 Speaker 1: interviews to try to get intelligence at crypto companies, say 90 00:05:32,520 --> 00:05:35,680 Speaker 1: more about some of these strategies. Yeah, that kind of 91 00:05:35,680 --> 00:05:39,640 Speaker 1: hacker in abasement stereotype is no longer the case. There 92 00:05:39,640 --> 00:05:43,440 Speaker 1: have been US indictments against alleged North Kreen hackers, while 93 00:05:43,480 --> 00:05:46,160 Speaker 1: one came out in twenty twenty one that was really 94 00:05:46,600 --> 00:05:51,119 Speaker 1: revelatory in some of the scope of these efforts. These 95 00:05:51,240 --> 00:05:56,880 Speaker 1: are professional soldiers who spend their lives going to international 96 00:05:56,880 --> 00:06:01,560 Speaker 1: competitions abroad. They are working very carefully night and day 97 00:06:01,600 --> 00:06:04,520 Speaker 1: to get as good as they can at using Western 98 00:06:04,640 --> 00:06:07,480 Speaker 1: languages online. They're very good at programming. It's the same 99 00:06:07,560 --> 00:06:10,719 Speaker 1: kind of programming that you would learn at Stanford or 100 00:06:10,760 --> 00:06:14,400 Speaker 1: Harvard in a kind of coding program. And the reason 101 00:06:14,440 --> 00:06:16,560 Speaker 1: that they're so motivated and the reason that they're so 102 00:06:16,839 --> 00:06:20,120 Speaker 1: crafty is because a lot of their life depends on it. 103 00:06:20,839 --> 00:06:24,400 Speaker 1: They are supporting families, you know, according to an analysis 104 00:06:24,400 --> 00:06:26,760 Speaker 1: of these some of these charges that have come out 105 00:06:26,800 --> 00:06:30,599 Speaker 1: against these alleged hackers, but they're really prolific and they're 106 00:06:30,640 --> 00:06:33,320 Speaker 1: incredibly focused. I had a researcher tell me one of 107 00:06:33,360 --> 00:06:37,120 Speaker 1: the reasons they're so good at using fake resumes, for instance, 108 00:06:37,240 --> 00:06:41,640 Speaker 1: or searching on LinkedIn or indeed for job data they 109 00:06:41,640 --> 00:06:45,920 Speaker 1: can kind of use for themselves is because they need 110 00:06:45,960 --> 00:06:49,720 Speaker 1: to do it. There's not a lot of other options 111 00:06:49,760 --> 00:06:53,039 Speaker 1: that they have to raise revenue online. You know. One 112 00:06:53,080 --> 00:06:56,440 Speaker 1: person mentioned to me that they are doing a lot 113 00:06:56,480 --> 00:06:58,960 Speaker 1: more with a lot less than other hacking groups have 114 00:06:59,080 --> 00:07:02,679 Speaker 1: in terms of technology. Coming up more from Bloomberger posts 115 00:07:02,800 --> 00:07:14,520 Speaker 1: Jeffstone on record breaking cryptoffs. We'll be right back. One 116 00:07:14,520 --> 00:07:17,000 Speaker 1: of the other things that I find interesting about what 117 00:07:17,040 --> 00:07:19,960 Speaker 1: you're describing in terms of like these motivations, you know, 118 00:07:20,000 --> 00:07:22,200 Speaker 1: these are folks with families, These are folks who are 119 00:07:22,480 --> 00:07:26,880 Speaker 1: who are trying to survive. It also seems to me 120 00:07:27,120 --> 00:07:30,680 Speaker 1: that it doesn't seem to be slowing down at all, 121 00:07:30,720 --> 00:07:33,560 Speaker 1: you know, like the numbers are getting bigger every single time, 122 00:07:33,640 --> 00:07:36,640 Speaker 1: like year over year these reports are coming out. Is 123 00:07:36,640 --> 00:07:39,600 Speaker 1: there any way to stop any of this? There's not 124 00:07:39,600 --> 00:07:41,920 Speaker 1: an obvious way to stop it. We know the Department 125 00:07:41,920 --> 00:07:47,360 Speaker 1: of Treasury is engaged in kind of an information tour 126 00:07:47,520 --> 00:07:50,800 Speaker 1: to ensure that organizations, particularly in the cryptocurrency world and 127 00:07:50,800 --> 00:07:54,160 Speaker 1: the financial world and the technology sector, have a stronger 128 00:07:54,240 --> 00:07:57,880 Speaker 1: understanding of what's happening. A lot of your listeners will 129 00:07:57,880 --> 00:08:01,480 Speaker 1: be familiar with the sanctions against Tornado Cash and Blender, 130 00:08:01,520 --> 00:08:05,320 Speaker 1: which are some of these mixing services that these actors 131 00:08:05,320 --> 00:08:09,960 Speaker 1: have used to launder cryptocurrency. We know, according to recent 132 00:08:10,000 --> 00:08:15,239 Speaker 1: reports from just recently, there is a new service called 133 00:08:15,280 --> 00:08:20,000 Speaker 1: Sinbad that has allegedly used to you know, convert a 134 00:08:20,040 --> 00:08:22,120 Speaker 1: lot of these transactions in a way that is more 135 00:08:22,160 --> 00:08:26,680 Speaker 1: difficult for law enforcement and for independent security researchers to track. 136 00:08:27,240 --> 00:08:31,800 Speaker 1: So those are all really subtle but important indications that 137 00:08:32,280 --> 00:08:36,800 Speaker 1: this phenomenon is going to continue, if not accelerating. You know. 138 00:08:36,840 --> 00:08:40,240 Speaker 1: One of the things that people I remember, I grew 139 00:08:40,320 --> 00:08:41,720 Speaker 1: up in the ins and as am of the generation 140 00:08:41,760 --> 00:08:43,960 Speaker 1: that was like, you know, forget hotmail I had I 141 00:08:43,960 --> 00:08:47,800 Speaker 1: had accounts before hotmail existed. It would be like, don't 142 00:08:47,840 --> 00:08:51,000 Speaker 1: click any links, don't give anybody your credit card details. 143 00:08:51,920 --> 00:08:55,840 Speaker 1: How do you defend against someone who is pretending to 144 00:08:56,040 --> 00:08:59,640 Speaker 1: be not a North Korean hacker in a job interview, 145 00:08:59,840 --> 00:09:03,200 Speaker 1: or who is engaging in some of the more sophisticated 146 00:09:03,240 --> 00:09:06,240 Speaker 1: techniques like cloning your simcard? Like is there anything a 147 00:09:06,280 --> 00:09:09,840 Speaker 1: person can do if even governments configure this out. The 148 00:09:09,920 --> 00:09:13,520 Speaker 1: short answer is no, Unfortunately for a lot of investors 149 00:09:13,679 --> 00:09:16,560 Speaker 1: and a lot of people who might find themselves even 150 00:09:16,600 --> 00:09:19,239 Speaker 1: as the targets of surveillance. A little bit outside this conversation, 151 00:09:19,320 --> 00:09:21,680 Speaker 1: but if there's a nation state hacking group that is 152 00:09:22,360 --> 00:09:26,880 Speaker 1: specifically targeting a certain individual or perhaps in exchange, they 153 00:09:26,920 --> 00:09:30,080 Speaker 1: have the means and motive and opportunity and probably the 154 00:09:30,240 --> 00:09:33,480 Speaker 1: orders to make that happen. You might log into your 155 00:09:33,720 --> 00:09:37,599 Speaker 1: personal cryptocurrency website and it looks completely legitimate, just like 156 00:09:38,160 --> 00:09:40,800 Speaker 1: it did yesterday, asks you to insert your user name 157 00:09:40,800 --> 00:09:44,319 Speaker 1: and password, and you do that, and then you find out, 158 00:09:44,520 --> 00:09:47,320 Speaker 1: once your cryptocurrency is gone, that that was a fake 159 00:09:47,400 --> 00:09:52,120 Speaker 1: page that was the product of eighteen months of reconnaissance 160 00:09:52,280 --> 00:09:57,120 Speaker 1: and intelligence gathering and a really careful attack designed to 161 00:09:57,720 --> 00:10:01,400 Speaker 1: take over as much as they possibly can. I mean, 162 00:10:01,480 --> 00:10:03,480 Speaker 1: hearing things like that is one of the reasons folks 163 00:10:03,520 --> 00:10:06,920 Speaker 1: are like everybody should have a cold wallet and you know, 164 00:10:07,000 --> 00:10:09,400 Speaker 1: only access your crypto and computers that are not connected 165 00:10:09,440 --> 00:10:13,439 Speaker 1: to the Internet. That has never felt like a scalable 166 00:10:13,520 --> 00:10:17,440 Speaker 1: solution for the cryptocurrency world. I mean that advice that 167 00:10:17,440 --> 00:10:20,440 Speaker 1: you're describing sounds to me like the cryptocurrency world is 168 00:10:20,640 --> 00:10:24,560 Speaker 1: experiencing some of the pain that the rest of the 169 00:10:24,600 --> 00:10:27,520 Speaker 1: Internet has gone through. When it comes to changing your 170 00:10:27,520 --> 00:10:31,280 Speaker 1: passwords frequently and making sure that you're not reusing the 171 00:10:31,360 --> 00:10:34,720 Speaker 1: same user name credentials across the Internet. It's a very 172 00:10:34,720 --> 00:10:37,160 Speaker 1: difficult problem to solve, so a lot of organizations are 173 00:10:37,559 --> 00:10:41,280 Speaker 1: not offloading that risk onto users but kind of saying, 174 00:10:41,520 --> 00:10:43,440 Speaker 1: you know, those are subtle ways of saying, we can't 175 00:10:43,440 --> 00:10:45,559 Speaker 1: completely protect you. Here's a couple things that you might 176 00:10:45,559 --> 00:10:48,920 Speaker 1: be able to do, but again, it's just very difficult. 177 00:10:48,920 --> 00:10:51,000 Speaker 1: Everyone has busy lives. You can't change your password and 178 00:10:51,040 --> 00:10:53,360 Speaker 1: write it down every day. You have to be able 179 00:10:53,400 --> 00:10:56,840 Speaker 1: to trust systems at a certain point in kind of 180 00:10:56,880 --> 00:11:00,320 Speaker 1: hope that you're not taken for all your worth. You know, 181 00:11:00,360 --> 00:11:02,640 Speaker 1: it's so interesting that so many of these conversations come 182 00:11:02,640 --> 00:11:04,319 Speaker 1: back to trust, because one of the problems of crypto 183 00:11:04,400 --> 00:11:06,920 Speaker 1: was supposed to solve is not having to trust anything 184 00:11:07,160 --> 00:11:09,559 Speaker 1: or anybody, And here we are again talking about having 185 00:11:09,559 --> 00:11:13,440 Speaker 1: to trust systems, just as a kind of a closing question, 186 00:11:13,679 --> 00:11:16,520 Speaker 1: as somebody who has covered cybersecurity for a long time 187 00:11:16,920 --> 00:11:19,760 Speaker 1: and is now kind of a crypto reports as a 188 00:11:19,800 --> 00:11:22,360 Speaker 1: result of that. I really like the analogy that you 189 00:11:22,480 --> 00:11:24,679 Speaker 1: made of you know, this is a problem that's been 190 00:11:24,679 --> 00:11:27,040 Speaker 1: experienced in any other domain that is connected to a 191 00:11:27,080 --> 00:11:30,360 Speaker 1: computer or a silver anywhere in the world. Are there 192 00:11:30,360 --> 00:11:35,240 Speaker 1: things that other domains have done that have helped at all? 193 00:11:35,360 --> 00:11:39,400 Speaker 1: Or is it really just like an intellectual arms race 194 00:11:40,120 --> 00:11:42,960 Speaker 1: over who's going to be more sophisticated, you know, like 195 00:11:43,040 --> 00:11:45,840 Speaker 1: Red team Blue team kind of stuff. The smartest thing 196 00:11:45,840 --> 00:11:49,520 Speaker 1: that you can do is use multi factor authentication. You know, 197 00:11:49,559 --> 00:11:53,200 Speaker 1: from an individual standpoint, it's not going to solve every problem, 198 00:11:53,200 --> 00:11:55,480 Speaker 1: but from an individual standpoint, you want to make sure 199 00:11:55,480 --> 00:11:58,040 Speaker 1: that when you're logging into a website with your password, 200 00:11:58,800 --> 00:12:02,960 Speaker 1: that website verifies you that you are who you say 201 00:12:02,960 --> 00:12:05,360 Speaker 1: you are in a different way, whether that be through 202 00:12:05,360 --> 00:12:09,560 Speaker 1: a text message, which is not the most reliable example anymore, 203 00:12:10,080 --> 00:12:14,120 Speaker 1: or a phone call or a QR code. Make sure 204 00:12:14,160 --> 00:12:18,560 Speaker 1: that that is on all of your accounts, and try 205 00:12:18,600 --> 00:12:22,920 Speaker 1: to be mindful about how far and wide the services 206 00:12:22,960 --> 00:12:25,760 Speaker 1: that you're signing up to are. That's to say, don't 207 00:12:25,800 --> 00:12:27,880 Speaker 1: sign up to every other thing. Try to keep things 208 00:12:27,880 --> 00:12:30,959 Speaker 1: relatively concentrated under your control so that it's not a 209 00:12:31,040 --> 00:12:34,040 Speaker 1: huge shock when in two years a website that you 210 00:12:34,080 --> 00:12:38,120 Speaker 1: completely forgot about is breached in your information spills out. Yeah, 211 00:12:38,160 --> 00:12:40,040 Speaker 1: I mean a couple of weeks ago, I got an 212 00:12:40,040 --> 00:12:44,080 Speaker 1: email from a stationary websites like they literally print cards 213 00:12:44,080 --> 00:12:46,920 Speaker 1: and envelopes, and they're like, so sorry, your information has 214 00:12:46,920 --> 00:12:48,920 Speaker 1: been revealed for the entire incident. I was like, are 215 00:12:48,920 --> 00:12:50,960 Speaker 1: you kidding me? Let me ask you this. When you 216 00:12:51,040 --> 00:12:53,959 Speaker 1: read that, were you like, were you just like of course, 217 00:12:54,200 --> 00:12:56,199 Speaker 1: or were you like, you're not even shocked anymore? Right, 218 00:12:56,240 --> 00:12:58,160 Speaker 1: I'm not even shocked anymore. I mean I think after 219 00:12:58,280 --> 00:13:01,200 Speaker 1: like the big Experience debacle in the United States, which 220 00:13:01,360 --> 00:13:04,720 Speaker 1: you know is that that is a company with literally 221 00:13:04,760 --> 00:13:09,479 Speaker 1: one job right, just identity prosection and they were like oopsie. 222 00:13:10,480 --> 00:13:14,000 Speaker 1: So it can feel really demoralizing that It's like, you 223 00:13:14,040 --> 00:13:16,640 Speaker 1: know you, you're screaming into the void of I'm trying 224 00:13:16,679 --> 00:13:20,200 Speaker 1: so hard and yet I wish I had better news. Sorry. 225 00:13:20,920 --> 00:13:22,480 Speaker 1: You know, so much of being a reporter is like, 226 00:13:22,520 --> 00:13:26,320 Speaker 1: let me tell you how bad it is. So sorry, Yeah, 227 00:13:26,600 --> 00:13:29,800 Speaker 1: especially lately. Well, Jeff on that cherry note, thank you 228 00:13:29,840 --> 00:13:32,520 Speaker 1: as always for coming on the show. Thank you such 229 00:13:32,600 --> 00:13:36,120 Speaker 1: a fan. That was Bloomberg Report to Jeff Stone. You 230 00:13:36,160 --> 00:13:38,320 Speaker 1: can find more of his reporting on the Bloomberg Terminal 231 00:13:38,360 --> 00:13:40,760 Speaker 1: and on Bloomberg dot com. And don't forget to sign 232 00:13:40,880 --> 00:13:49,640 Speaker 1: up for twice weekly newsletter, Bloomberg Crypto. This is Bloomberg Crypto, 233 00:13:49,840 --> 00:13:53,720 Speaker 1: a daily podcast from Bloomberg and iHeartRadio. For more shows 234 00:13:53,760 --> 00:13:57,920 Speaker 1: from iHeartRadio, visit the iHeartRadio app, Apple Podcasts, or wherever 235 00:13:57,960 --> 00:14:01,480 Speaker 1: you get your podcasts. Send us your comments, questions, or 236 00:14:01,520 --> 00:14:04,560 Speaker 1: suggestions for the show to Crypto at Bloomberg dot net. 237 00:14:07,720 --> 00:14:11,480 Speaker 1: The supervising producer of Bloomberg Crypto is Vicky Vergelina. Our 238 00:14:11,480 --> 00:14:15,320 Speaker 1: senior producer is Janet Babin. Our producers are Mohammed Farouk 239 00:14:15,400 --> 00:14:18,760 Speaker 1: and Sharon Barrero. Our associate producers are Ty Butler and 240 00:14:18,840 --> 00:14:23,120 Speaker 1: Moses on m Desta wonder At is our engineer. Original 241 00:14:23,200 --> 00:14:27,800 Speaker 1: music by Leo Sidron. I'm Stacy Marie Schml. We'll be 242 00:14:27,840 --> 00:14:28,440 Speaker 1: back tomorrow.