WEBVTT - TechStuff Checks the Flame

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<v Speaker 1>Brought to you by the reinvented two thousand twelve Camray.

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<v Speaker 1>It's ready. Are you get in touch with technology? With

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<v Speaker 1>tech Stuff from how stuff works dot com. Hello everyone,

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<v Speaker 1>and welcome to tech Stuff. My name is Chris Poulette,

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<v Speaker 1>and I'm an editor at how stuff works dot com.

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<v Speaker 1>Sitting across from me as usual as senior writer Jonathan Strickland.

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<v Speaker 1>Hey there, all right, then, so we're going to talk

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<v Speaker 1>about the latest except it's not malware to make headlines

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<v Speaker 1>all over the world and and and cause international incidents

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<v Speaker 1>and all of that. As of the recording of this podcast. Anyway,

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<v Speaker 1>by the time this podcast goes live, there may be

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<v Speaker 1>even worse news. It's it's funny because we were talking

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<v Speaker 1>about what we wanted to call this and and uh

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<v Speaker 1>we we thought of all of our flame metaphors and

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<v Speaker 1>jokes and puns and puns um and I was going

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<v Speaker 1>to make the joke about it being our old flame

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<v Speaker 1>even like except it's new. Except it, as it turns out,

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<v Speaker 1>it's not this. This malware has been making headlines over

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<v Speaker 1>the past few weeks as of the date of recording

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<v Speaker 1>on June one and two thousand twelve. But as it

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<v Speaker 1>turns out um this brand new, latest um Um malware.

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<v Speaker 1>I was going to call it a virus, but let's

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<v Speaker 1>just call it malware. UM isn't new at all, and

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<v Speaker 1>that's one of the fascinating things about it. But there

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<v Speaker 1>are many fascinating things. Yeah. The the component file name,

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<v Speaker 1>the main part the foundation of this malware made date

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<v Speaker 1>back as early as two thousand seven, possibly even earlier.

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<v Speaker 1>And one of the reasons why this is a really

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<v Speaker 1>fascinating uh, well, there's so many reasons why this is

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<v Speaker 1>fascinating malware. One is that it was able to escape

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<v Speaker 1>attention for so long. Yes, because you're talking about a

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<v Speaker 1>file that is capable of doing lots and lots of

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<v Speaker 1>stuff depending upon what you add to it, which is

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<v Speaker 1>brings us to fascinating thing number two. It's a modular

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<v Speaker 1>kind of malware. Now, in general, when someone creates some malware,

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<v Speaker 1>there is there tends to be a specific goal in

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<v Speaker 1>mind of the person who's designing it. Right, They're thinking,

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<v Speaker 1>I want to design this malware because what it'll do

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<v Speaker 1>is it allow me to get backdoor access to another

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<v Speaker 1>person's computer, and I'll be able to get administrative control

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<v Speaker 1>over that machine, and then I can create a button

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<v Speaker 1>net that that would be one example. Or I want

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<v Speaker 1>to record key strokes so that I can get user

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<v Speaker 1>names and passwords for people's accounts and maybe commit identity

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<v Speaker 1>theft right, Or I want to create a piece of

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<v Speaker 1>code that will propagate itself across a network, which you know,

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<v Speaker 1>on its own is just one thing like so you

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<v Speaker 1>might want to add more to it. And and historically

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<v Speaker 1>hackers and malware programmers have been doing that. They've been

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<v Speaker 1>creating malware that either complements some other piece of code

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<v Speaker 1>or it acts as the first step to another piece

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<v Speaker 1>of code that can, in combination create whatever the effect

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<v Speaker 1>is that the hacker wants. So there might be one

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<v Speaker 1>part of the code that is designed to help get

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<v Speaker 1>access to a network, or perhaps it's designed to UH

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<v Speaker 1>to copy itself once it gets on a network. It

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<v Speaker 1>might even be to copy itself multiple times on the

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<v Speaker 1>same machine in order to fill up that machine's memory

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<v Speaker 1>and and hard drive space so that you brick the machine.

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<v Speaker 1>It all depends on what the goal is for the hacker, UH,

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<v Speaker 1>and then there might be some other component that does

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<v Speaker 1>something else on top of it. Well. What makes flames

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<v Speaker 1>so interesting is that it takes this concept to a

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<v Speaker 1>new level. It's a modular kind of malware, meaning that

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<v Speaker 1>the basis of Flame is so that you can infect

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<v Speaker 1>a machine and then you can send a modular tweak

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<v Speaker 1>to that malware that's now living on the victims machine

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<v Speaker 1>and give its specific abilities. So think of it in

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<v Speaker 1>a way as kind of a very very much scaled

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<v Speaker 1>down operating system. Kind of it's a platform. Yeah, So

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<v Speaker 1>it's not not a full operating system in the traditional sense.

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<v Speaker 1>It's not like it's uh, taking over your operating system

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<v Speaker 1>and and interacting with your computer's hardware. It's just sort

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<v Speaker 1>of on a on a high level, the same basic concept.

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<v Speaker 1>It's acting as a platform that other applications can operate

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<v Speaker 1>on top of and affect how your computer behaves. And

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<v Speaker 1>it all depends on which modules you send to the

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<v Speaker 1>Flame foundation that will allow it to do whatever it

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<v Speaker 1>is he wanted to do. Right right. Um. When we

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<v Speaker 1>talked about hackers before on the show, we've we've discussed

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<v Speaker 1>people who are known as script kitties, and that that's

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<v Speaker 1>what they sort of, uh that it's sort of a

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<v Speaker 1>derogatory term for people who are very very basic, um

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<v Speaker 1>hackers who you are intent on causing mischief and the

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<v Speaker 1>reason they're called that is not UM. Well, the reason

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<v Speaker 1>I want to talk about why they're called that is

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<v Speaker 1>because in order to create malware, it doesn't take a

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<v Speaker 1>whole lot of code. To do this. UM you could

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<v Speaker 1>basically say write a script that says, look, I want

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<v Speaker 1>you to erase you know, I want you to copy

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<v Speaker 1>all the the addresses in the address book, email a

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<v Speaker 1>copy of this script to everybody in the address book,

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<v Speaker 1>and then wipe the hard drive clean. Ha ha. It

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<v Speaker 1>really doesn't have to be that complex. And and one

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<v Speaker 1>of the things that uh uh is also interesting about

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<v Speaker 1>flame is that, as Jonathan said, it's modular, but it

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<v Speaker 1>takes up twenty megabytes of space now and and our

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<v Speaker 1>terms today, that's not a particularly large file. A lot

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<v Speaker 1>of people have broadband, it's not an an issue to

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<v Speaker 1>download a twenty megabyte file. But you really don't need

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<v Speaker 1>that much code to have a basic virus or trojan. UM.

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<v Speaker 1>This is extensively written code. It's very sophisticated code to

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<v Speaker 1>allow additional modules to operate on the main system. And

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<v Speaker 1>that's why organizations that have been affected by it believe

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<v Speaker 1>that it might be state sponsored. We we should point

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<v Speaker 1>out to that this is not something that you're likely

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<v Speaker 1>to get on your PC. This is aimed at very

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<v Speaker 1>high level government run systems. Apparently, Yeah, if you're a

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<v Speaker 1>high level government official, then maybe your PC would be

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<v Speaker 1>at risk if you're and to be more specific, if

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<v Speaker 1>you're a high level government official in a country in

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<v Speaker 1>the Middle East, because that tends to be the possibly Hungary,

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<v Speaker 1>because those that those tend to be the countries that

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<v Speaker 1>have been targeted. Specifically, Iran and Israel have had the

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<v Speaker 1>largest number of infected computers, but there are other countries

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<v Speaker 1>that also seem to have it, or at least those

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<v Speaker 1>are the the countries that have computers running this software.

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<v Speaker 1>I'm sorry, go ahead, go ahead, I was gonna say.

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<v Speaker 1>Also the West Bank, Palestinian West Bank and uh Lebanon

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<v Speaker 1>are are known to be places, and then oddly enough

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<v Speaker 1>in Hungary, although I you know that's I was about

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<v Speaker 1>to go into a Renaissance festival speak. I've managed to

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<v Speaker 1>avoid it this entire season, and I almost said, I

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<v Speaker 1>know not why that is so? Austria, Russia, Hong Kong. Yeah, Now,

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<v Speaker 1>some of these may be unintentional targets, right, they may

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<v Speaker 1>not be the targeted computers because you would The conclusion

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<v Speaker 1>we draw is whichever countries seem to have the highest

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<v Speaker 1>rates of infection are more likely to be the targeted countries.

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<v Speaker 1>Of course, we can't know that for sure. It may

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<v Speaker 1>be based upon just the behaviors of the people who

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<v Speaker 1>work within that that that country, but it's a it's

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<v Speaker 1>a fair indicator. Now, let's talk a little bit about

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<v Speaker 1>what this malware can actually do and then why someone

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<v Speaker 1>might use it to target those particular countries. Well, some

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<v Speaker 1>people feel that it's a relative of stocks net or

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<v Speaker 1>or Dooku, both of which have been known to circulate

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<v Speaker 1>in the same part of the world. Um stucks net

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<v Speaker 1>was aimed apparently at power plants and other structure stuff.

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<v Speaker 1>I think it's safe to say stocks net was specifically

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<v Speaker 1>engineered to target Iranian nuclear power facilities. That that's the way.

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<v Speaker 1>That's that's the way it's presented. Yet because I didn't

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<v Speaker 1>write it, so I don't know. One of the functions

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<v Speaker 1>of stocks net was to change the the rate of

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<v Speaker 1>revolutions per per minute for centrifuges, and the whole idea

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<v Speaker 1>was that by changing that, that speed at which the

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<v Speaker 1>centrifugure turns within a nuclear power facility you could cause

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<v Speaker 1>a failure of that part of the facility, thus effectively

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<v Speaker 1>shutting it down out um. Presumably if you could get

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<v Speaker 1>it to spin uh erratically enough, you could cause more

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<v Speaker 1>of a catastrophic failure than just you know, slowing down

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<v Speaker 1>the program. But that appears to be what stucks net

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<v Speaker 1>was all about. Now now we still don't have official

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<v Speaker 1>news of who was behind it, although of course there

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<v Speaker 1>are a lot of um, there are a lot of

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<v Speaker 1>likely candidates. But but along those lines, Flame is a

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<v Speaker 1>little different. Stucks Now, of course, was was looking at,

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<v Speaker 1>at least from what we understand, physically, sabotaging a power facility.

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<v Speaker 1>Flame looks like it's more about spying upon various targets.

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<v Speaker 1>That's that's true. Um it is uh. It is also written,

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<v Speaker 1>like those other two pieces of malware, using a h

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<v Speaker 1>scripting language called Lua. I haven't ever heard that pronounced

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<v Speaker 1>l u a, which is often used actually for in

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<v Speaker 1>the gaming industry. Yeah, and Lua is an obscure enough

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<v Speaker 1>language that it might actually be. One of the reasons

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<v Speaker 1>why the hackers may have chosen Lua as one of

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<v Speaker 1>the languages they worked in is because it was obscure

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<v Speaker 1>enough to not raise red flags immediately. It wouldn't look

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<v Speaker 1>like other kinds of malware just at first glance, and

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<v Speaker 1>so that might be a reason why the hackers chose it,

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<v Speaker 1>or may just be that the hackers were really really

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<v Speaker 1>familiar with that particular language and it could do what

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<v Speaker 1>they needed it to do. But Uh, a lot of

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<v Speaker 1>the analysis I've read suggests that perhaps the reason for

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<v Speaker 1>picking it was because it was less recognizable. But it does.

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<v Speaker 1>Flame does record system information about the systems that it's on.

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<v Speaker 1>Boy howdy does it. It's it's kind of an uh

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<v Speaker 1>catch all when and again a lot of this depends

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<v Speaker 1>on what modules are installed on top of Flame. You know,

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<v Speaker 1>think about think about Flame in a way like uh,

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<v Speaker 1>you would and operating system like iOS, and that you know,

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<v Speaker 1>iOS can do lots of stuff, but it can do

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<v Speaker 1>more stuff when you add apps to it. The apps

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<v Speaker 1>give you very specific features. It's the basically the way

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<v Speaker 1>that computers work exactly. So so, uh, Chris and I

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<v Speaker 1>both happen to have an Android phone, different Android phones,

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<v Speaker 1>and that I would wager that many of the apps

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<v Speaker 1>that Chris has I do not have, and vice versa,

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<v Speaker 1>and there are a few that we might have in common.

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<v Speaker 1>And that that's because Chris wants this phone to do

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<v Speaker 1>a certain set of things, and I want my phone

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<v Speaker 1>to do a certain set of things. Hackers are the

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<v Speaker 1>same way. They may want their their malware to do

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<v Speaker 1>certain things in certain situations, and they don't necessarily need everything.

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<v Speaker 1>It doesn't have to be a kitchen sink approach. So

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<v Speaker 1>that's kind of the idea behind Flame. So some of

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<v Speaker 1>the things that can do as far as cyber espionage go. Uh.

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<v Speaker 1>It can do keyboard activities, So a key logger function,

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<v Speaker 1>like Chris was talking about earlier, This is what tracks

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<v Speaker 1>what keys are being pressed. Usually you use this so

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<v Speaker 1>that you can find out things like passwords and that

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<v Speaker 1>sort of stuff. It can monitor network traffic, so we

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<v Speaker 1>can actually see what computers the infect the computer is

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<v Speaker 1>communicating with and possibly even sniff out those that data.

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<v Speaker 1>It can take screenshots, so the person on the other

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<v Speaker 1>end of this uh, this connection can get a look

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<v Speaker 1>at what the user is is looking at whenever they're

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<v Speaker 1>using the computer. Also very important if that particular computer

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<v Speaker 1>is used in a high security environment. It can even

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<v Speaker 1>record audio. It can use a computer's microphone and record audio.

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<v Speaker 1>So just imagine it's like bugging a a an office,

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<v Speaker 1>except you don't have to put a bug in there,

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<v Speaker 1>which is amazing how you think about it. There are

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<v Speaker 1>you know, there are offices that are in such high

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<v Speaker 1>security areas that there are frequent bug sweeps where the

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<v Speaker 1>company or government agency will have someone come through and

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<v Speaker 1>search for any electronic bugs that might have been planted

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<v Speaker 1>there in order to record conversations. Well, this gets around

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<v Speaker 1>that it turns the person's own computer into that recording instrument.

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<v Speaker 1>It can even do things like a record Skype conversations.

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<v Speaker 1>And the one I saw that I thought was particularly

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<v Speaker 1>clever was there's apparently a module that will allow if

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<v Speaker 1>the computer has Bluetooth capability, it will become a beacon,

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<v Speaker 1>a Bluetooth beacon, and we'll try to connect with Bluetooth

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<v Speaker 1>devices that are within range and download information from them. Interesting,

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<v Speaker 1>So if you have a smartphone, you're a government official,

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<v Speaker 1>and you've got a smartphone, you've got Bluetooth enabled so

0:13:49.320 --> 0:13:52.920
<v Speaker 1>that you can use your cyborg earpiece that everyone tends

0:13:52.960 --> 0:13:56.520
<v Speaker 1>to use, then that your computer might try to do

0:13:56.559 --> 0:14:00.760
<v Speaker 1>a Bluetooth handshake with your device and pull information from

0:14:00.760 --> 0:14:04.079
<v Speaker 1>your device into the computer so it can send it

0:14:04.120 --> 0:14:08.920
<v Speaker 1>off to the hacker so it's all about gathering information.

0:14:09.200 --> 0:14:16.400
<v Speaker 1>There's also been some some uh suggestions that perhaps this

0:14:16.480 --> 0:14:20.040
<v Speaker 1>is related as well to another kind of malware. In fact,

0:14:20.080 --> 0:14:22.000
<v Speaker 1>that malware may just be a module on top of

0:14:22.040 --> 0:14:26.480
<v Speaker 1>Flame called Wiper, which does exactly what you would think

0:14:26.480 --> 0:14:29.600
<v Speaker 1>it does. It wipes data from a device. So it

0:14:29.640 --> 0:14:32.800
<v Speaker 1>may also not just be about data collection, but also

0:14:33.760 --> 0:14:36.960
<v Speaker 1>destroying data. And in fact, it does look like there's

0:14:37.000 --> 0:14:41.320
<v Speaker 1>been some some data loss, uh, particularly in Iran that

0:14:41.520 --> 0:14:46.000
<v Speaker 1>may be due to this particular malware. UM. It is

0:14:46.040 --> 0:14:48.080
<v Speaker 1>important to note too that this is not the only

0:14:48.120 --> 0:14:52.640
<v Speaker 1>piece of modular mountainware out there. UM. It is just

0:14:53.400 --> 0:14:57.600
<v Speaker 1>it is especially unusual in the size of this malware

0:14:57.640 --> 0:15:04.120
<v Speaker 1>sophification and sophistication. UM. But yeah, it uh this is

0:15:04.360 --> 0:15:08.520
<v Speaker 1>sort of an indication that, uh, the game might be

0:15:08.600 --> 0:15:14.920
<v Speaker 1>afoot if you will, basically exactly what what what what's

0:15:14.920 --> 0:15:17.400
<v Speaker 1>going on is And I think this is part of

0:15:17.400 --> 0:15:20.360
<v Speaker 1>the reason that people are so if you if you

0:15:20.400 --> 0:15:24.880
<v Speaker 1>follow the tech press or the tech media, let's say, um,

0:15:25.000 --> 0:15:27.240
<v Speaker 1>you've probably seen a lot about this in the past

0:15:27.240 --> 0:15:30.920
<v Speaker 1>few weeks. And I think the reason for that is

0:15:31.000 --> 0:15:33.640
<v Speaker 1>because it's captured our imagination and it's it's made us

0:15:33.680 --> 0:15:40.040
<v Speaker 1>all realize that, uh, electronic espionage is here. People are

0:15:40.120 --> 0:15:42.760
<v Speaker 1>using it, and it's and it's not uh, it's not

0:15:42.840 --> 0:15:46.560
<v Speaker 1>the exception anymore. I have the feeling that uh, and

0:15:46.880 --> 0:15:50.000
<v Speaker 1>basically I am certainly not the only one from my

0:15:50.000 --> 0:15:54.840
<v Speaker 1>my reading that uh, people seem to feel that this

0:15:54.920 --> 0:15:58.520
<v Speaker 1>is state sponsored espionage and that this kind of thing

0:15:58.560 --> 0:16:01.560
<v Speaker 1>is going to become more and more more common as

0:16:02.080 --> 0:16:04.440
<v Speaker 1>the years go on, because this is the way the

0:16:04.480 --> 0:16:09.720
<v Speaker 1>world does business um, and I mean all kinds of business. Um. Personally,

0:16:09.760 --> 0:16:13.600
<v Speaker 1>I think the reason that it's designed to capture webcam

0:16:13.800 --> 0:16:17.480
<v Speaker 1>stuff is so that they can postum videos on YouTube

0:16:17.640 --> 0:16:22.040
<v Speaker 1>of high level officials dancing to Lady Gaga, videos in

0:16:22.080 --> 0:16:24.360
<v Speaker 1>their closed offices that they've had swept for bugs so

0:16:24.360 --> 0:16:28.920
<v Speaker 1>that they won't get caught doing it. That's ridiculous. That's

0:16:28.960 --> 0:16:34.320
<v Speaker 1>Taylor Swift videos. But now the the the other thing

0:16:34.360 --> 0:16:36.800
<v Speaker 1>about this is that I think it's interesting if you

0:16:36.840 --> 0:16:39.320
<v Speaker 1>think that this this malware may have been around since

0:16:39.800 --> 0:16:44.120
<v Speaker 1>two thousand seven, it shows that hackers were of the

0:16:44.200 --> 0:16:49.160
<v Speaker 1>same mindset as Steve Jobs because they saw that apps

0:16:49.200 --> 0:16:52.800
<v Speaker 1>were the next big thing. No really, seriously, when you

0:16:52.840 --> 0:16:54.520
<v Speaker 1>think about it, it it is kind of amazing because they

0:16:54.520 --> 0:16:58.400
<v Speaker 1>were thinking, well, let's make this a very flexible, adaptable

0:16:58.480 --> 0:17:01.560
<v Speaker 1>malware system so that we can use it in multiple

0:17:02.000 --> 0:17:05.480
<v Speaker 1>uh use cases and we don't have to again, we

0:17:05.520 --> 0:17:09.359
<v Speaker 1>don't have to send the whole thing to everyone. Um

0:17:09.400 --> 0:17:12.440
<v Speaker 1>it did you know? Just like other malware, it attempts

0:17:12.440 --> 0:17:14.679
<v Speaker 1>to cover its tracks as much as possible, so that

0:17:14.720 --> 0:17:17.920
<v Speaker 1>way you know that it can stay on an infected

0:17:17.960 --> 0:17:20.439
<v Speaker 1>computer as long as possible. And it's very good at

0:17:20.440 --> 0:17:23.359
<v Speaker 1>it if it's been around for years um and just

0:17:23.480 --> 0:17:27.639
<v Speaker 1>now we're talking about it. Uh. And also it's it

0:17:27.800 --> 0:17:32.280
<v Speaker 1>spreads kind of in a way similar to other types

0:17:32.320 --> 0:17:34.159
<v Speaker 1>of malware. You might think, well, how does how do

0:17:34.240 --> 0:17:38.399
<v Speaker 1>they get How is that initial entry into a system?

0:17:38.440 --> 0:17:40.600
<v Speaker 1>How is that accomplished? Well, there are a couple of

0:17:40.640 --> 0:17:44.480
<v Speaker 1>different ways you could do it. Um. There's some suggestion

0:17:44.520 --> 0:17:48.720
<v Speaker 1>that perhaps it was a spear fishing attempt, which is

0:17:48.760 --> 0:17:52.240
<v Speaker 1>where you have a specific target in mind and you know,

0:17:53.080 --> 0:17:55.199
<v Speaker 1>you know, you have enough information about that target to

0:17:55.200 --> 0:17:57.639
<v Speaker 1>be able to create an email that could tempt that

0:17:57.720 --> 0:18:03.600
<v Speaker 1>target into executing a file that they probably shouldn't have done. Right.

0:18:03.680 --> 0:18:08.760
<v Speaker 1>Phishing is uh with a pH is a social engineering

0:18:09.080 --> 0:18:12.960
<v Speaker 1>tool to gather information you've probably just about everybody I'm

0:18:13.000 --> 0:18:16.040
<v Speaker 1>sure who is listening to this has had a phishing

0:18:16.040 --> 0:18:19.240
<v Speaker 1>email show up in their spam box where it says, hey,

0:18:19.480 --> 0:18:24.080
<v Speaker 1>you've uh, your bank account has been compromised and we

0:18:24.160 --> 0:18:28.159
<v Speaker 1>need you to send us your information. Um, and you go,

0:18:28.880 --> 0:18:30.720
<v Speaker 1>you know, I haven't. I don't have an account at

0:18:30.720 --> 0:18:32.560
<v Speaker 1>this bank and I've never had an account at this bank.

0:18:32.560 --> 0:18:36.680
<v Speaker 1>I always chuckle at those because I think, nice try, um,

0:18:36.720 --> 0:18:38.840
<v Speaker 1>but that that but that isn't what what fishing is

0:18:38.880 --> 0:18:40.959
<v Speaker 1>known for. If you if you were to click on

0:18:41.000 --> 0:18:45.280
<v Speaker 1>that link and go further and um enter your private

0:18:45.320 --> 0:18:47.399
<v Speaker 1>information in there, they would be able to use that

0:18:47.440 --> 0:18:53.400
<v Speaker 1>in identity theft um operation. But spear fishing is specifically

0:18:53.440 --> 0:18:57.479
<v Speaker 1>targeted um as Jonathan said to a certain person. So

0:18:57.520 --> 0:19:00.560
<v Speaker 1>it is especially effective because it says, hey, Jonathan in Strickland,

0:19:00.640 --> 0:19:03.720
<v Speaker 1>we know that you have an account here. Uh and uh,

0:19:03.840 --> 0:19:05.800
<v Speaker 1>this is a problem with your account. You need to

0:19:05.880 --> 0:19:09.960
<v Speaker 1>enter your information stuff. There's been some unusual activity on

0:19:09.960 --> 0:19:14.520
<v Speaker 1>your account. Which is even better because the unusual activity

0:19:15.080 --> 0:19:18.280
<v Speaker 1>comes true. Yeah, because you go and you check your

0:19:18.320 --> 0:19:20.280
<v Speaker 1>account and the next thing you know, you have actually

0:19:20.320 --> 0:19:22.680
<v Speaker 1>given over the information to the people who will generate

0:19:22.720 --> 0:19:27.119
<v Speaker 1>the unusual activity on your account. Don't ever follow those links. Yeah, no, no,

0:19:27.200 --> 0:19:30.240
<v Speaker 1>it's better to it's better to go to those those

0:19:30.280 --> 0:19:34.680
<v Speaker 1>sites directly through your your browser. Uh, as long as

0:19:34.720 --> 0:19:39.639
<v Speaker 1>you don't have um the DNS changer now where on

0:19:39.800 --> 0:19:42.919
<v Speaker 1>your computer, which leads you to the wrong browser anyway

0:19:42.920 --> 0:19:46.600
<v Speaker 1>around wrong site rather anyway. So anyway, getting back to this,

0:19:47.680 --> 0:19:52.400
<v Speaker 1>spear fishing is a very very possible way that this

0:19:52.560 --> 0:19:55.160
<v Speaker 1>initially got out into the wild. However, it can also

0:19:55.200 --> 0:19:59.000
<v Speaker 1>be spread through USB thumbsticks, which means getting physical access

0:19:59.040 --> 0:20:02.159
<v Speaker 1>to someone's computer. Not always the easiest method, no, but

0:20:02.280 --> 0:20:04.840
<v Speaker 1>that's that's exactly what they did with stucks Neat apparently,

0:20:05.480 --> 0:20:09.800
<v Speaker 1>was they snuck it into nuclear power facilities on a

0:20:09.960 --> 0:20:13.639
<v Speaker 1>USB flash drive, which you know it's not necessarily the

0:20:13.680 --> 0:20:15.639
<v Speaker 1>easiest way, but it is. I mean, I guess it

0:20:15.680 --> 0:20:19.080
<v Speaker 1>all depends on your target, because you could either do

0:20:19.119 --> 0:20:22.840
<v Speaker 1>it yourself where you are. You know, you pose as

0:20:22.880 --> 0:20:26.160
<v Speaker 1>say a technician saying I have to install this new

0:20:26.200 --> 0:20:30.200
<v Speaker 1>software onto your computer so that we can maintain security,

0:20:30.520 --> 0:20:34.320
<v Speaker 1>perhaps your Klaus Hergersheimer checking radiation shields, or you could

0:20:34.520 --> 0:20:38.600
<v Speaker 1>uh actually mail thumbstick to a person and say here

0:20:38.680 --> 0:20:42.400
<v Speaker 1>is the file you wanted and have them install it themselves.

0:20:42.480 --> 0:20:45.600
<v Speaker 1>Sometimes it's that easy. Yeah, sometimes it sometimes that that works.

0:20:45.640 --> 0:20:48.360
<v Speaker 1>I mean, because you know, people don't necessarily think, oh,

0:20:48.400 --> 0:20:51.920
<v Speaker 1>there could be something bad on this thumb drive. By

0:20:51.920 --> 0:20:54.760
<v Speaker 1>the way, there could be something bad on that thumb drive. Um,

0:20:54.920 --> 0:20:57.720
<v Speaker 1>so you know that's another possibility. And also once it

0:20:57.760 --> 0:21:00.920
<v Speaker 1>gets in the network, there were other ways of leveraging

0:21:00.960 --> 0:21:03.640
<v Speaker 1>the network to help infect other computers. One of which

0:21:03.640 --> 0:21:10.399
<v Speaker 1>I saw was using a printer spooling UH protocol where

0:21:10.440 --> 0:21:13.920
<v Speaker 1>certain printers, you know, you could send the malware through

0:21:13.960 --> 0:21:16.840
<v Speaker 1>the printer queue, and other computers as they connect to

0:21:16.840 --> 0:21:19.520
<v Speaker 1>the printer queue could be infected that way, which is

0:21:19.600 --> 0:21:21.520
<v Speaker 1>kind of interesting. But that means that you already have

0:21:21.600 --> 0:21:25.040
<v Speaker 1>to get into the network initially in order to take

0:21:25.080 --> 0:21:28.000
<v Speaker 1>advantage of something like that. So in other words, you

0:21:28.040 --> 0:21:31.359
<v Speaker 1>can't just necessarily attack straight through the printer, although I

0:21:31.359 --> 0:21:33.680
<v Speaker 1>suppose you could if it was a printer that had

0:21:34.080 --> 0:21:37.880
<v Speaker 1>Internet connectivity and you had the password to get into that.

0:21:38.440 --> 0:21:42.679
<v Speaker 1>But at any rate, it propagates through those ways, and

0:21:42.760 --> 0:21:47.399
<v Speaker 1>apparently it will only do so under the direction of

0:21:47.440 --> 0:21:50.760
<v Speaker 1>the hackers, So this is not the kind of malware

0:21:50.800 --> 0:21:54.520
<v Speaker 1>that will just copy itself an infinite number of times

0:21:54.520 --> 0:21:57.440
<v Speaker 1>and just send it to every single contact within a

0:21:57.560 --> 0:22:02.960
<v Speaker 1>computers database. Instead, it's a very controlled attack, which is

0:22:03.119 --> 0:22:08.960
<v Speaker 1>again another another reason why UH the analysts think this

0:22:09.080 --> 0:22:13.240
<v Speaker 1>could be state sponsored, because typically if you have someone

0:22:13.280 --> 0:22:16.239
<v Speaker 1>who's just interested in either creating as much trouble as

0:22:16.280 --> 0:22:19.600
<v Speaker 1>possible or just trying to make a profit off whatever

0:22:19.640 --> 0:22:23.119
<v Speaker 1>that is they're doing, they're probably less likely to have

0:22:23.320 --> 0:22:26.800
<v Speaker 1>this sort of controlled approach where they're targeting specific computers,

0:22:27.240 --> 0:22:29.720
<v Speaker 1>because why do that when you could go with a

0:22:29.760 --> 0:22:35.280
<v Speaker 1>blanket bomb approach and just infect everyone you possibly can. UH.

0:22:35.320 --> 0:22:39.000
<v Speaker 1>This appears to be much more of a precision attack,

0:22:39.119 --> 0:22:44.040
<v Speaker 1>so that tends to suggest a state sponsored approach. Now

0:22:44.160 --> 0:22:47.760
<v Speaker 1>by that we mean that some government has gone out

0:22:48.680 --> 0:22:53.840
<v Speaker 1>and hired programmers to create this malware with the intent

0:22:54.000 --> 0:22:59.320
<v Speaker 1>of using it on some other nations computers, possibly possibly

0:22:59.320 --> 0:23:01.679
<v Speaker 1>computers within the own their own nation. I mean, it

0:23:01.680 --> 0:23:06.119
<v Speaker 1>all depends on what the government's UH motives are, and

0:23:06.160 --> 0:23:10.600
<v Speaker 1>then they're going to gather information and analyze it and

0:23:11.240 --> 0:23:13.639
<v Speaker 1>make their own plans based upon what they see. So

0:23:13.960 --> 0:23:18.800
<v Speaker 1>typical spy stuff as opposed to say a group of

0:23:18.800 --> 0:23:22.240
<v Speaker 1>of you know, just just a group of hackers that

0:23:22.359 --> 0:23:24.159
<v Speaker 1>just want to get as much information as possible in

0:23:24.240 --> 0:23:26.679
<v Speaker 1>order to make as much money or as much trouble

0:23:26.760 --> 0:23:34.240
<v Speaker 1>as they can. Yeah. The the country that has asserted

0:23:34.640 --> 0:23:37.359
<v Speaker 1>the state sponsored claim more than any that I've seen

0:23:37.680 --> 0:23:42.960
<v Speaker 1>is Iran, who blames Israel and the United States for

0:23:43.040 --> 0:23:46.160
<v Speaker 1>the attack. And there was a statement from an Israeli

0:23:46.240 --> 0:23:51.960
<v Speaker 1>government official that I think inadvertently kind of gave the

0:23:51.960 --> 0:23:57.040
<v Speaker 1>the implication that Israel was directly involved. But I don't

0:23:57.080 --> 0:24:00.840
<v Speaker 1>think that was the intention of the statement. Well, one

0:24:00.880 --> 0:24:03.280
<v Speaker 1>way or the other. I'm sure it wasn't right, but

0:24:03.400 --> 0:24:06.359
<v Speaker 1>the but the government official essentially said, we would you know,

0:24:06.760 --> 0:24:09.120
<v Speaker 1>this is this is sort of that I'm paraphrasing here,

0:24:09.359 --> 0:24:12.560
<v Speaker 1>this is the world we're in, and if if we

0:24:12.640 --> 0:24:14.639
<v Speaker 1>think these tactics are going to work, we're going to

0:24:14.760 --> 0:24:21.040
<v Speaker 1>use them, which essentially sounded like an admission. But the

0:24:21.119 --> 0:24:26.000
<v Speaker 1>Israeli government very quickly said, no, no, no, we deny

0:24:26.080 --> 0:24:28.760
<v Speaker 1>that we have anything to do with this. However, we

0:24:28.800 --> 0:24:31.440
<v Speaker 1>could write a much more sophisticated program than that. Now

0:24:31.480 --> 0:24:34.720
<v Speaker 1>I'm I'm kidding um, but yeah, I mean he they're

0:24:34.720 --> 0:24:39.360
<v Speaker 1>saying that they they wouldn't uh, just because they did

0:24:39.480 --> 0:24:42.119
<v Speaker 1>or did not launch this. This is the kind of

0:24:42.119 --> 0:24:43.600
<v Speaker 1>thing that we're going to see more of, which is

0:24:43.760 --> 0:24:47.040
<v Speaker 1>which is what the analysts have been saying too. Um.

0:24:47.080 --> 0:24:52.160
<v Speaker 1>It was very unusual too, because the the organization known

0:24:52.200 --> 0:24:55.720
<v Speaker 1>as f Secure, which is a h an anti known

0:24:55.760 --> 0:25:02.440
<v Speaker 1>anti virus organization in Europe, was contacted by the Iranian

0:25:02.680 --> 0:25:06.800
<v Speaker 1>Computer Emergency Response Team UH for assistance with that, but

0:25:06.840 --> 0:25:10.000
<v Speaker 1>apparently it never never went through. But they did contact them,

0:25:10.000 --> 0:25:13.680
<v Speaker 1>which is kind of unusual because usually they uh, Iran

0:25:13.920 --> 0:25:17.000
<v Speaker 1>is kind of uh tight lipped about these kinds of

0:25:17.000 --> 0:25:19.359
<v Speaker 1>things until you know, they can they can say something

0:25:19.359 --> 0:25:23.520
<v Speaker 1>about it. But they were asking for help initially. Um.

0:25:23.560 --> 0:25:27.760
<v Speaker 1>But yeah, as Jonathan was saying a minute ago, UM,

0:25:27.800 --> 0:25:30.880
<v Speaker 1>that the attacks have been very targeted, and there we're

0:25:30.880 --> 0:25:34.359
<v Speaker 1>not talking about hundreds of thousands or millions of computers

0:25:34.359 --> 0:25:38.400
<v Speaker 1>that are infected like other malware has. We're talking about

0:25:38.400 --> 0:25:40.680
<v Speaker 1>a few thousand at most now. There may be fewer

0:25:40.760 --> 0:25:44.040
<v Speaker 1>than a thousand in fact, across the entire world, with

0:25:44.240 --> 0:25:47.240
<v Speaker 1>the greatest concentration, like we said, being in the Middle East.

0:25:47.720 --> 0:25:51.680
<v Speaker 1>And uh yeah, so it's you know, it's very possible

0:25:51.720 --> 0:25:57.119
<v Speaker 1>that um that this is uh, this is not necessarily

0:25:57.119 --> 0:25:59.840
<v Speaker 1>one of those global things that everyone should freak out about.

0:26:00.080 --> 0:26:02.840
<v Speaker 1>What they should freak out about, rather than the nature

0:26:02.960 --> 0:26:06.919
<v Speaker 1>of the threat that flame poses, is the nature of

0:26:06.960 --> 0:26:11.320
<v Speaker 1>the threat that the type of malware flame is poses. So,

0:26:11.359 --> 0:26:13.280
<v Speaker 1>in other words, in other words, it's not flame we

0:26:13.320 --> 0:26:15.359
<v Speaker 1>need to worry about. It's the fact that now we

0:26:15.480 --> 0:26:18.960
<v Speaker 1>know actually I guess it's better than we know. But

0:26:20.520 --> 0:26:23.080
<v Speaker 1>right there's a proof of concept here. There's this malware

0:26:23.119 --> 0:26:26.960
<v Speaker 1>that can exist, that can be incredibly effective at gathering information.

0:26:27.680 --> 0:26:31.440
<v Speaker 1>And who's to say that the next version of this

0:26:31.680 --> 0:26:34.040
<v Speaker 1>isn't already out there. In fact, it very well maybe

0:26:34.080 --> 0:26:36.919
<v Speaker 1>out there right now. I'd be amazed if it weren't

0:26:36.960 --> 0:26:38.919
<v Speaker 1>out there right now, to tell you the truth. And

0:26:38.960 --> 0:26:42.440
<v Speaker 1>it's possible that it could be spying on more than

0:26:42.560 --> 0:26:50.119
<v Speaker 1>just government or or infrastructure type of agencies. And also,

0:26:50.320 --> 0:26:53.639
<v Speaker 1>even though this particular kind of malware it's all about

0:26:53.640 --> 0:26:58.440
<v Speaker 1>gathering information that would be you know, espionage type stuff,

0:26:58.480 --> 0:27:01.840
<v Speaker 1>there's nothing stopping any and else from taking that same

0:27:01.920 --> 0:27:07.640
<v Speaker 1>model and applying it for things like stealing identities, stealing

0:27:07.720 --> 0:27:10.960
<v Speaker 1>bank account information. You know that you could you could

0:27:11.000 --> 0:27:15.560
<v Speaker 1>easily take the same approach and apply it to the

0:27:15.800 --> 0:27:21.040
<v Speaker 1>very uh stereotypical means of you know what malware tends

0:27:21.119 --> 0:27:25.080
<v Speaker 1>to do, and it could wreak a lot of havoc.

0:27:25.440 --> 0:27:28.440
<v Speaker 1>And I think, I think when it comes to gathering

0:27:28.440 --> 0:27:31.760
<v Speaker 1>information like all that information like listening into phone calls

0:27:31.760 --> 0:27:35.919
<v Speaker 1>and stuff, I think that's probably not something that the

0:27:36.000 --> 0:27:38.920
<v Speaker 1>average person needs to worry about, simply because if you're

0:27:39.000 --> 0:27:43.479
<v Speaker 1>using a typical virus attack where you're trying to hit

0:27:43.520 --> 0:27:47.520
<v Speaker 1>as wide a an audience as possible, it doesn't make

0:27:47.560 --> 0:27:50.119
<v Speaker 1>a whole lot of sense to be filtering through that

0:27:50.200 --> 0:27:53.320
<v Speaker 1>much information. You would have so much information hitting you

0:27:54.119 --> 0:27:57.120
<v Speaker 1>that it would be the signal to noise ratio would

0:27:57.119 --> 0:27:59.880
<v Speaker 1>be out of control, right, So you don't have Well,

0:28:00.400 --> 0:28:03.240
<v Speaker 1>I was really hoping to get something I could use

0:28:03.280 --> 0:28:05.520
<v Speaker 1>as blackmail for this guy, but I have to first

0:28:05.520 --> 0:28:08.320
<v Speaker 1>sit through this three hour conversation he had with his

0:28:08.400 --> 0:28:12.800
<v Speaker 1>grandmother about the sweater she knitted for him, And uh,

0:28:12.840 --> 0:28:15.760
<v Speaker 1>that really is not giving me the juicy details I

0:28:15.840 --> 0:28:18.440
<v Speaker 1>need in order to put the screws to this guy.

0:28:18.560 --> 0:28:21.720
<v Speaker 1>So I mean, it's a it's a very real problem. Now. Granted,

0:28:21.720 --> 0:28:23.600
<v Speaker 1>when you're talking about state sponsored you've got an entire

0:28:23.600 --> 0:28:26.000
<v Speaker 1>departments again stuff through that, not to mention access to

0:28:26.119 --> 0:28:29.520
<v Speaker 1>possible computers that can filter through data much more effectively

0:28:29.520 --> 0:28:32.880
<v Speaker 1>than people can. But when you're talking about like hackers

0:28:32.880 --> 0:28:35.600
<v Speaker 1>who are just trying to get data, you know, about

0:28:35.640 --> 0:28:38.880
<v Speaker 1>a person, it's a different story. Now what they could

0:28:38.960 --> 0:28:42.400
<v Speaker 1>do is if they wanted to infect a lot of

0:28:42.400 --> 0:28:46.640
<v Speaker 1>computers and just cause mischief, then you're talking about some

0:28:46.680 --> 0:28:49.520
<v Speaker 1>pretty serious issues too, Like you could talk about, you know,

0:28:50.160 --> 0:28:54.080
<v Speaker 1>having computers have failures, talking about botton nets, that kind

0:28:54.080 --> 0:28:59.760
<v Speaker 1>of thing. Um, Now do we need to worry that

0:28:59.760 --> 0:29:03.160
<v Speaker 1>our computers are all infected? Well, what you need to

0:29:03.200 --> 0:29:06.480
<v Speaker 1>do is do the same thing that we recommend in

0:29:06.560 --> 0:29:09.680
<v Speaker 1>every podcast we ever talk about when it comes to malware.

0:29:10.240 --> 0:29:13.720
<v Speaker 1>Back up your hard drive and use virus protection, virus

0:29:13.760 --> 0:29:19.080
<v Speaker 1>protection software, use a firewall, anti virus protection, protect those viruses. Wait, no,

0:29:19.240 --> 0:29:21.680
<v Speaker 1>that's not what I meant protect yourself from viruses. Yes,

0:29:21.760 --> 0:29:25.720
<v Speaker 1>you want anti virus software, reliable antivirus software. You want

0:29:25.720 --> 0:29:27.040
<v Speaker 1>to keep it up to date. You want to keep

0:29:27.040 --> 0:29:30.640
<v Speaker 1>your operatings system up to date, because as you patch

0:29:30.680 --> 0:29:33.960
<v Speaker 1>your operating system, it plugs up vulnerabilities that get discovered

0:29:34.000 --> 0:29:37.880
<v Speaker 1>over time. Because that's that's what they're doing, really, Um,

0:29:37.960 --> 0:29:40.600
<v Speaker 1>a hacker is not necessarily somebody who's evil, but it's

0:29:40.640 --> 0:29:45.440
<v Speaker 1>somebody who takes something apart two uh re engineer it,

0:29:45.640 --> 0:29:47.520
<v Speaker 1>or or to find a different use for it, or

0:29:47.520 --> 0:29:49.840
<v Speaker 1>to find something that's wrong with it. Um And in

0:29:49.880 --> 0:29:53.160
<v Speaker 1>this case, what the computer hackers are doing is finding

0:29:53.760 --> 0:29:56.440
<v Speaker 1>flaws in an operating system, and it can be any

0:29:56.520 --> 0:30:00.480
<v Speaker 1>operating system in the case of Flame. And we should

0:30:00.520 --> 0:30:03.080
<v Speaker 1>point out these are Windows based machines that are being

0:30:03.120 --> 0:30:05.120
<v Speaker 1>attacked by Flame. We didn't talk about that in your

0:30:05.560 --> 0:30:08.840
<v Speaker 1>first of all the podcast A Windows based machines, but yes,

0:30:09.200 --> 0:30:14.640
<v Speaker 1>there are Any upbring system has vulnerabilities because operating systems

0:30:14.640 --> 0:30:18.280
<v Speaker 1>are built by humans, and humans don't always think of

0:30:18.520 --> 0:30:22.600
<v Speaker 1>every contingency. It's just impossible to do. And while you

0:30:22.640 --> 0:30:26.760
<v Speaker 1>are building an operating system, or building any system, you're

0:30:26.800 --> 0:30:29.520
<v Speaker 1>looking at it from one perspective. You're thinking, how can

0:30:29.560 --> 0:30:32.680
<v Speaker 1>I make this as secure as possible? The hackers looking

0:30:32.680 --> 0:30:36.040
<v Speaker 1>at thinking how can I get into that system? And

0:30:36.080 --> 0:30:38.040
<v Speaker 1>they're going to start looking at ways that you could

0:30:38.080 --> 0:30:40.040
<v Speaker 1>not have thought of, because they're going to see what

0:30:40.120 --> 0:30:43.240
<v Speaker 1>you have thought of and go beyond that. It's it's

0:30:43.280 --> 0:30:45.560
<v Speaker 1>just that's the way the game works. But then as

0:30:45.640 --> 0:30:49.680
<v Speaker 1>vulnerabilities are are discovered, then you have the flip flop.

0:30:49.720 --> 0:30:51.920
<v Speaker 1>You know, you've got the reaction to it where you

0:30:51.960 --> 0:30:55.880
<v Speaker 1>plug that vulnerability. Now that might create other vulnerabilities, or

0:30:55.920 --> 0:30:59.440
<v Speaker 1>maybe that other vulnerabilities exist that you have not yet discovered.

0:31:00.000 --> 0:31:02.320
<v Speaker 1>That's why it's important for you to make sure that

0:31:02.440 --> 0:31:05.800
<v Speaker 1>you update your operating system as updates become available. Yes,

0:31:06.200 --> 0:31:07.920
<v Speaker 1>I know it can be irritating, especially if you're on

0:31:07.920 --> 0:31:10.920
<v Speaker 1>a slower connection, to have to update your operating system

0:31:10.960 --> 0:31:13.720
<v Speaker 1>every week and you're shutting down your computer and it

0:31:13.720 --> 0:31:18.680
<v Speaker 1>says installing update one of thirty three, I wanted to

0:31:18.760 --> 0:31:22.560
<v Speaker 1>go home. Um, But still it's better to do it

0:31:22.760 --> 0:31:25.960
<v Speaker 1>and to maintain as high a level of security as

0:31:26.000 --> 0:31:29.840
<v Speaker 1>you can. And ultimately, the most important thing I think,

0:31:29.920 --> 0:31:34.400
<v Speaker 1>besides the antivirus software and plugging the operating system, is

0:31:34.640 --> 0:31:39.080
<v Speaker 1>engage in good behavior in the sense of don't open

0:31:39.240 --> 0:31:43.040
<v Speaker 1>strange links, don't execute files that are sent to you

0:31:43.160 --> 0:31:45.640
<v Speaker 1>from people you don't know. If it's sent to you

0:31:45.640 --> 0:31:48.640
<v Speaker 1>by someone who does you do know, make sure that

0:31:48.720 --> 0:31:51.520
<v Speaker 1>you contact that person first and say, hey, I got

0:31:51.520 --> 0:31:53.560
<v Speaker 1>this email from you and had this file in it.

0:31:53.600 --> 0:31:55.240
<v Speaker 1>Is this what I think it is? Is it cool?

0:31:56.080 --> 0:31:58.640
<v Speaker 1>Because it may be that your friends computer has been

0:31:58.640 --> 0:32:03.240
<v Speaker 1>infected and that you're getting a file that is automatically

0:32:03.280 --> 0:32:05.920
<v Speaker 1>generated because it's gone through that friends contact list and

0:32:05.920 --> 0:32:09.200
<v Speaker 1>you have to be on it. You know, think of

0:32:09.280 --> 0:32:13.200
<v Speaker 1>the think the way hackers think, and make sure you

0:32:13.280 --> 0:32:17.160
<v Speaker 1>don't engage in those high risk behaviors that hackers target

0:32:17.280 --> 0:32:20.520
<v Speaker 1>because they're they've proven to be effective tools. And if

0:32:20.560 --> 0:32:22.600
<v Speaker 1>you managed to do that, if you avoid the high

0:32:22.680 --> 0:32:26.000
<v Speaker 1>risk behaviors and you keep your antivirus software up to date,

0:32:26.000 --> 0:32:28.360
<v Speaker 1>and you keep your oberating system out to date, you

0:32:28.560 --> 0:32:32.360
<v Speaker 1>have done as much as you can to prevent this

0:32:32.480 --> 0:32:35.440
<v Speaker 1>sort of stuff from infecting your computer. Doesn't mean that

0:32:35.480 --> 0:32:40.680
<v Speaker 1>it's full proof, but it it dramatically decreases those chances. Yes,

0:32:40.840 --> 0:32:45.880
<v Speaker 1>as Jonathan was was saying, there there could be uh contingencies.

0:32:46.240 --> 0:32:51.800
<v Speaker 1>Flame actually looks for anti virus software, especially the more

0:32:51.880 --> 0:32:56.760
<v Speaker 1>common manufacturers software, and it looks for things that are

0:32:56.760 --> 0:33:02.320
<v Speaker 1>going to report unusual activity online activity their applications for

0:33:02.600 --> 0:33:06.840
<v Speaker 1>I think pretty much every operating system that will say, hey, uh,

0:33:06.880 --> 0:33:10.000
<v Speaker 1>this program is sending message out? Is it supposed to

0:33:10.040 --> 0:33:13.760
<v Speaker 1>be sending a message out? UM? And I've seen malware

0:33:13.840 --> 0:33:17.960
<v Speaker 1>for for multiple operating systems be able to detect that.

0:33:18.280 --> 0:33:21.360
<v Speaker 1>So it's looking for anything that's going to report on

0:33:21.400 --> 0:33:25.360
<v Speaker 1>its activity or or try to eliminate it UM. And

0:33:25.400 --> 0:33:29.240
<v Speaker 1>of course, if it's something as sophisticated as Flame UM,

0:33:29.280 --> 0:33:33.440
<v Speaker 1>the software can be updated by the hackers to get

0:33:33.480 --> 0:33:39.080
<v Speaker 1>around virus detection software UM. So the vulnerabilities UM that

0:33:39.080 --> 0:33:42.560
<v Speaker 1>that initially allowed Flame to operate apparently been patched and

0:33:42.640 --> 0:33:45.960
<v Speaker 1>more some time ago. Again, if if if the people

0:33:46.040 --> 0:33:49.120
<v Speaker 1>who UM had been using those operating systems had patched

0:33:49.160 --> 0:33:51.920
<v Speaker 1>their software would have made it a lot more difficult. Now,

0:33:51.960 --> 0:33:55.160
<v Speaker 1>if if the hacker has a backdoor into that software,

0:33:55.560 --> 0:33:58.760
<v Speaker 1>then he or she can say, okay, uh, this vulnerability

0:33:58.800 --> 0:34:00.600
<v Speaker 1>has been patched, but this one is still open from

0:34:00.600 --> 0:34:03.920
<v Speaker 1>now on, use this door out into the internet instead

0:34:03.960 --> 0:34:06.200
<v Speaker 1>of the one that you were using before and stay.

0:34:06.600 --> 0:34:09.560
<v Speaker 1>And that allows them to stay one step ahead. But again,

0:34:09.600 --> 0:34:12.480
<v Speaker 1>if you if you take those steps UH to keep

0:34:12.480 --> 0:34:16.400
<v Speaker 1>your anti virus in your operating system patched as often

0:34:16.480 --> 0:34:19.520
<v Speaker 1>as you can, as as it's done regularly, then you

0:34:19.760 --> 0:34:22.080
<v Speaker 1>you stand a much better chance at at preventing something

0:34:22.120 --> 0:34:26.799
<v Speaker 1>like this from happening. Yeah, again, not full proof, but

0:34:26.840 --> 0:34:29.960
<v Speaker 1>at least it decreases that percentage. It's fascinating to to

0:34:29.960 --> 0:34:33.480
<v Speaker 1>look at these modules because you it's it's such an

0:34:33.480 --> 0:34:38.399
<v Speaker 1>amazing architecture. UM. It's it's obvious that the people who

0:34:38.440 --> 0:34:41.840
<v Speaker 1>wrote the software UH intended to set up shop and

0:34:41.920 --> 0:34:45.480
<v Speaker 1>the operating systems of the people whose infect whose computers

0:34:45.480 --> 0:34:48.959
<v Speaker 1>were infected by the software by this malware, and and

0:34:49.400 --> 0:34:51.719
<v Speaker 1>UH they intended to stay there for as long as

0:34:51.719 --> 0:34:53.880
<v Speaker 1>they could and record as much information as they could

0:34:54.160 --> 0:34:58.759
<v Speaker 1>about the operating system, about anything that they can connect to. UM.

0:34:59.200 --> 0:35:02.200
<v Speaker 1>So they they were playing for real. Yeah. The only

0:35:02.239 --> 0:35:04.960
<v Speaker 1>thing I think, the only indicator that shows that they

0:35:05.000 --> 0:35:10.719
<v Speaker 1>were not completely fully baked when when it rolled out

0:35:10.840 --> 0:35:14.120
<v Speaker 1>is that it does not let you play angry Birds.

0:35:15.560 --> 0:35:20.160
<v Speaker 1>Otherwise I think it was a pretty strong modular system.

0:35:20.200 --> 0:35:22.239
<v Speaker 1>But until the system has Angry Birds on it, I

0:35:22.280 --> 0:35:28.600
<v Speaker 1>considered incomplete all right then all right, So that kind

0:35:28.600 --> 0:35:32.920
<v Speaker 1>of that kind of sums up the the knowledge we

0:35:32.960 --> 0:35:36.160
<v Speaker 1>have as the recording of this podcast about Flame. Of course,

0:35:36.160 --> 0:35:38.600
<v Speaker 1>by the time this publishes, we may have more information,

0:35:39.000 --> 0:35:42.879
<v Speaker 1>such as a stronger indicator of who might be responsible.

0:35:43.080 --> 0:35:45.319
<v Speaker 1>Although I don't know what's duck set. It's been out

0:35:45.360 --> 0:35:47.839
<v Speaker 1>for so long and people still don't know. Although yeah,

0:35:47.960 --> 0:35:51.959
<v Speaker 1>both with stucks neet and with flame. The the most

0:35:52.000 --> 0:35:56.280
<v Speaker 1>of the fingers are pointing towards Israel. In the United States, again,

0:35:56.400 --> 0:35:59.520
<v Speaker 1>no smoking gun, and there's lots of flame, but no

0:35:59.600 --> 0:36:04.719
<v Speaker 1>smoking gun. Well and uh, of course, as we know, um,

0:36:04.920 --> 0:36:08.080
<v Speaker 1>internet hackers have been known to find ways to point

0:36:08.120 --> 0:36:11.640
<v Speaker 1>the finger at someone else. Um. They're very good at

0:36:12.040 --> 0:36:15.440
<v Speaker 1>hiding their tracks and making somebody Well. The names of

0:36:15.440 --> 0:36:20.400
<v Speaker 1>these modules are all in uh, in English and somewhat slangy.

0:36:20.560 --> 0:36:23.520
<v Speaker 1>Some of them are are slang terms, so uh, you

0:36:23.560 --> 0:36:25.359
<v Speaker 1>know it kind of says, oh, well, somebody who's very

0:36:25.400 --> 0:36:29.799
<v Speaker 1>familiar with English probably wrote this software. Um. Yeah, so

0:36:29.920 --> 0:36:31.640
<v Speaker 1>that's why I would want to I want to get

0:36:31.680 --> 0:36:34.600
<v Speaker 1>like if I were to write some malware, I'd want

0:36:34.640 --> 0:36:37.600
<v Speaker 1>to get slang and something like Romanian. Yeah. Well, the

0:36:37.600 --> 0:36:41.120
<v Speaker 1>penguins in Australia who wrote this software very sophisticated and

0:36:41.120 --> 0:36:42.960
<v Speaker 1>and and nobody's going to point a flipper at them.

0:36:43.000 --> 0:36:47.040
<v Speaker 1>So now you're suggesting it's lenox. I see what you're saying. Yeah,

0:36:47.040 --> 0:36:50.759
<v Speaker 1>Tucks and his buddies down there. So well, I think

0:36:50.800 --> 0:36:54.400
<v Speaker 1>that wraps up our discussion here now. Granted, what'll be

0:36:54.400 --> 0:36:57.400
<v Speaker 1>interesting to see is if we see future outbreaks of

0:36:57.480 --> 0:37:05.000
<v Speaker 1>malware that follow in flames smoking footsteps. Uh, because it is.

0:37:05.160 --> 0:37:09.760
<v Speaker 1>It has proven to be a pretty effective tactic. And

0:37:09.840 --> 0:37:12.640
<v Speaker 1>of course, you know, we would expect any future form

0:37:12.800 --> 0:37:15.960
<v Speaker 1>of this sort of attack to take to be different

0:37:16.080 --> 0:37:19.239
<v Speaker 1>enough so that it would not immediately trigger suspicion once

0:37:19.280 --> 0:37:23.440
<v Speaker 1>someone downloaded it. Uh, tony megabyte file is like you said,

0:37:23.640 --> 0:37:27.440
<v Speaker 1>that's significant for malware. It's not still not significant compared

0:37:27.480 --> 0:37:33.800
<v Speaker 1>to say a good music file, but uh, yeah, you

0:37:33.920 --> 0:37:38.640
<v Speaker 1>never know. So guys, be careful out there again. Don't

0:37:38.680 --> 0:37:40.640
<v Speaker 1>need to worry about flame unless you are a high

0:37:40.719 --> 0:37:46.120
<v Speaker 1>ranking government official or you run some sort of important

0:37:46.160 --> 0:37:49.839
<v Speaker 1>facility in the Middle East. And but you know, being

0:37:49.880 --> 0:37:53.520
<v Speaker 1>careful is always good no matter no matter what area

0:37:53.560 --> 0:37:56.440
<v Speaker 1>of life you might fall in. And let us know

0:37:56.520 --> 0:37:59.320
<v Speaker 1>what you would like us to talk about in future episodes.

0:37:59.440 --> 0:38:02.440
<v Speaker 1>You can untacked us via email our addressed as tech

0:38:02.520 --> 0:38:05.720
<v Speaker 1>stuff at Discovery dot com or less know on Facebook

0:38:05.800 --> 0:38:08.120
<v Speaker 1>or Twitter are handled There is tech stuff hs W

0:38:08.440 --> 0:38:12.880
<v Speaker 1>and Chris and I will talk to you again really soon. Hey. Uh,

0:38:12.920 --> 0:38:17.359
<v Speaker 1>you know when we were recorded this podcast initially, yes,

0:38:17.880 --> 0:38:22.080
<v Speaker 1>we talked about things like who was responsible for the

0:38:22.280 --> 0:38:26.400
<v Speaker 1>flame virus, saying that it could literally be anyone. It

0:38:26.520 --> 0:38:29.719
<v Speaker 1>could literally be anyone and one in the world. And

0:38:29.719 --> 0:38:32.480
<v Speaker 1>it was very similar to stucks net. No no connection

0:38:32.520 --> 0:38:34.840
<v Speaker 1>to stucks net at all. Yeah, but it was awfully

0:38:34.840 --> 0:38:37.480
<v Speaker 1>similar in boy, isn't that weird? Okay? Yeah. So, as

0:38:37.480 --> 0:38:40.520
<v Speaker 1>it turns out, since we recorded that podcast, almost broke

0:38:40.760 --> 0:38:44.960
<v Speaker 1>almost I'm sorry not to interrupt, almost literally right after

0:38:45.000 --> 0:38:47.719
<v Speaker 1>we recorded this, it went like a day, Yeah, exactly

0:38:47.760 --> 0:38:50.279
<v Speaker 1>like it was. By the next week, the news had

0:38:50.360 --> 0:38:57.279
<v Speaker 1>broken that that Flame, the code for Flame resembled to

0:38:57.360 --> 0:39:00.440
<v Speaker 1>the point of identity part of the code or an

0:39:00.480 --> 0:39:07.880
<v Speaker 1>early iteration of stucks net, which is an incredibly strong

0:39:08.080 --> 0:39:12.439
<v Speaker 1>indicator that those responsible for the creation of Flame were

0:39:12.520 --> 0:39:17.880
<v Speaker 1>also involved in creating stucks net. So that narrows down

0:39:17.960 --> 0:39:22.200
<v Speaker 1>that field dramatically. And as Chris said, when we recorded

0:39:22.200 --> 0:39:25.399
<v Speaker 1>the podcast, that information had not become public. But now

0:39:25.440 --> 0:39:29.920
<v Speaker 1>we know that stucks net and Flame share enough similar

0:39:29.960 --> 0:39:34.200
<v Speaker 1>code to give us the confidence in saying the same

0:39:34.239 --> 0:39:38.319
<v Speaker 1>parties were involved in the creation of both, So that

0:39:38.520 --> 0:39:43.120
<v Speaker 1>also limits who could have been behind it in other ways.

0:39:43.520 --> 0:39:48.600
<v Speaker 1>Right now, it the accusations have pretty much centered and

0:39:48.640 --> 0:39:52.759
<v Speaker 1>they have since ducks net became public. They've centered on

0:39:52.800 --> 0:39:57.120
<v Speaker 1>the United States and Israel. Yes, and although neither country

0:39:57.160 --> 0:40:02.160
<v Speaker 1>has officially confirmed anything, the evidence, I can't imagine that

0:40:02.400 --> 0:40:06.920
<v Speaker 1>they would. No, I can't either, but uh, the evidence

0:40:07.120 --> 0:40:11.200
<v Speaker 1>has has pointed even more strongly since then. So I mean,

0:40:11.320 --> 0:40:14.640
<v Speaker 1>I would say it's safe that neither Jonathan nor I

0:40:14.680 --> 0:40:18.880
<v Speaker 1>can confirm or deny any you know, any involvement by

0:40:18.920 --> 0:40:21.520
<v Speaker 1>any government anywhere. I can. I can deny that I

0:40:21.560 --> 0:40:24.799
<v Speaker 1>had any involvement. Yes, that's about that. But as far

0:40:24.920 --> 0:40:28.319
<v Speaker 1>as I can, the evidence is is stronger now to

0:40:28.480 --> 0:40:31.480
<v Speaker 1>suggest that based on based on the information that we've

0:40:31.520 --> 0:40:34.200
<v Speaker 1>received in the media. So, and there was also an

0:40:34.239 --> 0:40:36.799
<v Speaker 1>interesting discussion that popped up, and I think it's one

0:40:36.840 --> 0:40:39.280
<v Speaker 1>that we can have a kind of a quick version

0:40:39.320 --> 0:40:43.480
<v Speaker 1>of it here on our show about stuckx net and

0:40:43.600 --> 0:40:48.320
<v Speaker 1>Flame both existed on computers for years before anyone else

0:40:48.440 --> 0:40:52.600
<v Speaker 1>outside of the operations knew anything was going on. Yeah,

0:40:52.680 --> 0:40:56.600
<v Speaker 1>and it's amazing because it seems very fresh to us,

0:40:56.719 --> 0:40:58.759
<v Speaker 1>but it has been out there for quite some time.

0:40:58.880 --> 0:41:02.440
<v Speaker 1>So right, it remained under tected for years. And in

0:41:02.480 --> 0:41:05.320
<v Speaker 1>the case of Flame, you're talking about a significant file size.

0:41:05.320 --> 0:41:09.520
<v Speaker 1>It's a small piece of code. Uh. The argument I've

0:41:09.520 --> 0:41:12.880
<v Speaker 1>seen says that the era of anti virus software is

0:41:12.960 --> 0:41:16.000
<v Speaker 1>over because if anti virus software can't protect you from

0:41:16.040 --> 0:41:18.960
<v Speaker 1>these things that they can remain hidden for years, then

0:41:19.040 --> 0:41:24.480
<v Speaker 1>it is useless. Now yeah, I think I think that's

0:41:24.760 --> 0:41:28.680
<v Speaker 1>I think that's extremist. Now, I do agree that if

0:41:28.920 --> 0:41:32.960
<v Speaker 1>code goes undetected, anti virus software is of little help

0:41:33.040 --> 0:41:37.320
<v Speaker 1>in that case for something of that variety. Now, uh,

0:41:37.400 --> 0:41:39.880
<v Speaker 1>we're when we're talking about the victims of flame and

0:41:39.960 --> 0:41:43.280
<v Speaker 1>stuck s net. These are not you know, people sitting

0:41:43.320 --> 0:41:46.160
<v Speaker 1>at home, uh, you know, checking the web in their email.

0:41:46.680 --> 0:41:51.040
<v Speaker 1>The targets, yes, these are These are are targeted organizations

0:41:51.080 --> 0:41:55.239
<v Speaker 1>and governments. Um. And it is more likely that you

0:41:55.560 --> 0:41:59.440
<v Speaker 1>or I would be targeted by uh script kitties sending

0:41:59.520 --> 0:42:04.240
<v Speaker 1>virus is by email or by phishing or even spear

0:42:04.280 --> 0:42:08.800
<v Speaker 1>fishing for that matter. So yes, I think for everyday folks,

0:42:08.840 --> 0:42:11.640
<v Speaker 1>protecting their computers is still a very very good idea

0:42:11.760 --> 0:42:16.360
<v Speaker 1>backing them up and using virus protection software. Yes, yes,

0:42:16.440 --> 0:42:21.280
<v Speaker 1>and please and remember I mean these these security firms,

0:42:21.280 --> 0:42:25.120
<v Speaker 1>as soon as they identify malware, they are at work

0:42:25.200 --> 0:42:28.160
<v Speaker 1>to try and incorporate that into the anti virus software

0:42:28.200 --> 0:42:31.040
<v Speaker 1>so that you can detect it. And prevent it from

0:42:31.120 --> 0:42:36.120
<v Speaker 1>infecting your computer. Because just because something has become known

0:42:36.320 --> 0:42:40.080
<v Speaker 1>doesn't mean it's no longer dangerous. It's still dangerous. Uh.

0:42:40.120 --> 0:42:43.600
<v Speaker 1>If it's unknown, then it's extra dangerous because your software

0:42:43.640 --> 0:42:47.000
<v Speaker 1>may not be able to protect you against it. But yeah,

0:42:47.000 --> 0:42:50.200
<v Speaker 1>I agree, Chris. I don't think that anti virus software

0:42:50.719 --> 0:42:53.279
<v Speaker 1>is useless. I think it's still has a place. I

0:42:53.320 --> 0:42:57.280
<v Speaker 1>think you have to couple antivirus software with smart computing

0:42:57.320 --> 0:43:02.040
<v Speaker 1>practices and that will help protect you from malware. Yes,

0:43:02.280 --> 0:43:06.320
<v Speaker 1>all right, Well that wraps up our PostScript, so uh,

0:43:06.480 --> 0:43:10.160
<v Speaker 1>please don't write us telling us that we missed out

0:43:10.239 --> 0:43:13.440
<v Speaker 1>on that fact. We did, but we we fixed it.

0:43:14.560 --> 0:43:17.000
<v Speaker 1>For more on this and thousands of other topics. Is

0:43:17.000 --> 0:43:23.160
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0:43:23.160 --> 0:43:26.600
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