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Speaker 1: Brought to you by the reinvented two thousand twelve Camray.

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Speaker 1: It's ready. Are you get in touch with technology? With

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Speaker 1: tech Stuff from how stuff works dot com. Hello everyone,

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Speaker 1: and welcome to tech Stuff. My name is Chris Poulette,

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Speaker 1: and I'm an editor at how stuff works dot com.

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Speaker 1: Sitting across from me as usual as senior writer Jonathan Strickland.

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Speaker 1: Hey there, all right, then, so we're going to talk

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Speaker 1: about the latest except it's not malware to make headlines

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Speaker 1: all over the world and and and cause international incidents

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Speaker 1: and all of that. As of the recording of this podcast. Anyway,

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Speaker 1: by the time this podcast goes live, there may be

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Speaker 1: even worse news. It's it's funny because we were talking

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Speaker 1: about what we wanted to call this and and uh

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Speaker 1: we we thought of all of our flame metaphors and

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Speaker 1: jokes and puns and puns um and I was going

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Speaker 1: to make the joke about it being our old flame

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Speaker 1: even like except it's new. Except it, as it turns out,

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Speaker 1: it's not this. This malware has been making headlines over

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Speaker 1: the past few weeks as of the date of recording

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Speaker 1: on June one and two thousand twelve. But as it

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Speaker 1: turns out um this brand new, latest um Um malware.

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Speaker 1: I was going to call it a virus, but let's

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Speaker 1: just call it malware. UM isn't new at all, and

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Speaker 1: that's one of the fascinating things about it. But there

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Speaker 1: are many fascinating things. Yeah. The the component file name,

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Speaker 1: the main part the foundation of this malware made date

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Speaker 1: back as early as two thousand seven, possibly even earlier.

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Speaker 1: And one of the reasons why this is a really

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Speaker 1: fascinating uh, well, there's so many reasons why this is

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Speaker 1: fascinating malware. One is that it was able to escape

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Speaker 1: attention for so long. Yes, because you're talking about a

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Speaker 1: file that is capable of doing lots and lots of

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Speaker 1: stuff depending upon what you add to it, which is

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Speaker 1: brings us to fascinating thing number two. It's a modular

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Speaker 1: kind of malware. Now, in general, when someone creates some malware,

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Speaker 1: there is there tends to be a specific goal in

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Speaker 1: mind of the person who's designing it. Right, They're thinking,

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Speaker 1: I want to design this malware because what it'll do

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Speaker 1: is it allow me to get backdoor access to another

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Speaker 1: person's computer, and I'll be able to get administrative control

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Speaker 1: over that machine, and then I can create a button

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Speaker 1: net that that would be one example. Or I want

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Speaker 1: to record key strokes so that I can get user

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Speaker 1: names and passwords for people's accounts and maybe commit identity

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Speaker 1: theft right, Or I want to create a piece of

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Speaker 1: code that will propagate itself across a network, which you know,

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Speaker 1: on its own is just one thing like so you

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Speaker 1: might want to add more to it. And and historically

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Speaker 1: hackers and malware programmers have been doing that. They've been

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Speaker 1: creating malware that either complements some other piece of code

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Speaker 1: or it acts as the first step to another piece

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Speaker 1: of code that can, in combination create whatever the effect

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Speaker 1: is that the hacker wants. So there might be one

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Speaker 1: part of the code that is designed to help get

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Speaker 1: access to a network, or perhaps it's designed to UH

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Speaker 1: to copy itself once it gets on a network. It

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Speaker 1: might even be to copy itself multiple times on the

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Speaker 1: same machine in order to fill up that machine's memory

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Speaker 1: and and hard drive space so that you brick the machine.

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Speaker 1: It all depends on what the goal is for the hacker, UH,

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Speaker 1: and then there might be some other component that does

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Speaker 1: something else on top of it. Well. What makes flames

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Speaker 1: so interesting is that it takes this concept to a

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Speaker 1: new level. It's a modular kind of malware, meaning that

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Speaker 1: the basis of Flame is so that you can infect

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Speaker 1: a machine and then you can send a modular tweak

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Speaker 1: to that malware that's now living on the victims machine

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Speaker 1: and give its specific abilities. So think of it in

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Speaker 1: a way as kind of a very very much scaled

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Speaker 1: down operating system. Kind of it's a platform. Yeah, So

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Speaker 1: it's not not a full operating system in the traditional sense.

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Speaker 1: It's not like it's uh, taking over your operating system

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Speaker 1: and and interacting with your computer's hardware. It's just sort

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Speaker 1: of on a on a high level, the same basic concept.

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Speaker 1: It's acting as a platform that other applications can operate

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Speaker 1: on top of and affect how your computer behaves. And

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Speaker 1: it all depends on which modules you send to the

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Speaker 1: Flame foundation that will allow it to do whatever it

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Speaker 1: is he wanted to do. Right right. Um. When we

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Speaker 1: talked about hackers before on the show, we've we've discussed

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Speaker 1: people who are known as script kitties, and that that's

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Speaker 1: what they sort of, uh that it's sort of a

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Speaker 1: derogatory term for people who are very very basic, um

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Speaker 1: hackers who you are intent on causing mischief and the

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Speaker 1: reason they're called that is not UM. Well, the reason

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Speaker 1: I want to talk about why they're called that is

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Speaker 1: because in order to create malware, it doesn't take a

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Speaker 1: whole lot of code. To do this. UM you could

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Speaker 1: basically say write a script that says, look, I want

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Speaker 1: you to erase you know, I want you to copy

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Speaker 1: all the the addresses in the address book, email a

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Speaker 1: copy of this script to everybody in the address book,

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Speaker 1: and then wipe the hard drive clean. Ha ha. It

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Speaker 1: really doesn't have to be that complex. And and one

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Speaker 1: of the things that uh uh is also interesting about

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Speaker 1: flame is that, as Jonathan said, it's modular, but it

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Speaker 1: takes up twenty megabytes of space now and and our

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Speaker 1: terms today, that's not a particularly large file. A lot

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Speaker 1: of people have broadband, it's not an an issue to

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Speaker 1: download a twenty megabyte file. But you really don't need

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Speaker 1: that much code to have a basic virus or trojan. UM.

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Speaker 1: This is extensively written code. It's very sophisticated code to

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Speaker 1: allow additional modules to operate on the main system. And

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Speaker 1: that's why organizations that have been affected by it believe

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Speaker 1: that it might be state sponsored. We we should point

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Speaker 1: out to that this is not something that you're likely

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Speaker 1: to get on your PC. This is aimed at very

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Speaker 1: high level government run systems. Apparently, Yeah, if you're a

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Speaker 1: high level government official, then maybe your PC would be

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Speaker 1: at risk if you're and to be more specific, if

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Speaker 1: you're a high level government official in a country in

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Speaker 1: the Middle East, because that tends to be the possibly Hungary,

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Speaker 1: because those that those tend to be the countries that

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Speaker 1: have been targeted. Specifically, Iran and Israel have had the

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Speaker 1: largest number of infected computers, but there are other countries

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Speaker 1: that also seem to have it, or at least those

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Speaker 1: are the the countries that have computers running this software.

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Speaker 1: I'm sorry, go ahead, go ahead, I was gonna say.

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Speaker 1: Also the West Bank, Palestinian West Bank and uh Lebanon

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Speaker 1: are are known to be places, and then oddly enough

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Speaker 1: in Hungary, although I you know that's I was about

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Speaker 1: to go into a Renaissance festival speak. I've managed to

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Speaker 1: avoid it this entire season, and I almost said, I

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Speaker 1: know not why that is so? Austria, Russia, Hong Kong. Yeah, Now,

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Speaker 1: some of these may be unintentional targets, right, they may

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Speaker 1: not be the targeted computers because you would The conclusion

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Speaker 1: we draw is whichever countries seem to have the highest

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Speaker 1: rates of infection are more likely to be the targeted countries.

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Speaker 1: Of course, we can't know that for sure. It may

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Speaker 1: be based upon just the behaviors of the people who

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Speaker 1: work within that that that country, but it's a it's

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Speaker 1: a fair indicator. Now, let's talk a little bit about

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Speaker 1: what this malware can actually do and then why someone

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Speaker 1: might use it to target those particular countries. Well, some

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Speaker 1: people feel that it's a relative of stocks net or

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Speaker 1: or Dooku, both of which have been known to circulate

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Speaker 1: in the same part of the world. Um stucks net

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Speaker 1: was aimed apparently at power plants and other structure stuff.

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Speaker 1: I think it's safe to say stocks net was specifically

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Speaker 1: engineered to target Iranian nuclear power facilities. That that's the way.

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Speaker 1: That's that's the way it's presented. Yet because I didn't

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Speaker 1: write it, so I don't know. One of the functions

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Speaker 1: of stocks net was to change the the rate of

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Speaker 1: revolutions per per minute for centrifuges, and the whole idea

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Speaker 1: was that by changing that, that speed at which the

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Speaker 1: centrifugure turns within a nuclear power facility you could cause

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Speaker 1: a failure of that part of the facility, thus effectively

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Speaker 1: shutting it down out um. Presumably if you could get

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Speaker 1: it to spin uh erratically enough, you could cause more

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Speaker 1: of a catastrophic failure than just you know, slowing down

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Speaker 1: the program. But that appears to be what stucks net

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Speaker 1: was all about. Now now we still don't have official

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Speaker 1: news of who was behind it, although of course there

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Speaker 1: are a lot of um, there are a lot of

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Speaker 1: likely candidates. But but along those lines, Flame is a

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Speaker 1: little different. Stucks Now, of course, was was looking at,

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Speaker 1: at least from what we understand, physically, sabotaging a power facility.

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Speaker 1: Flame looks like it's more about spying upon various targets.

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Speaker 1: That's that's true. Um it is uh. It is also written,

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Speaker 1: like those other two pieces of malware, using a h

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Speaker 1: scripting language called Lua. I haven't ever heard that pronounced

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Speaker 1: l u a, which is often used actually for in

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Speaker 1: the gaming industry. Yeah, and Lua is an obscure enough

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Speaker 1: language that it might actually be. One of the reasons

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Speaker 1: why the hackers may have chosen Lua as one of

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Speaker 1: the languages they worked in is because it was obscure

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Speaker 1: enough to not raise red flags immediately. It wouldn't look

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Speaker 1: like other kinds of malware just at first glance, and

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Speaker 1: so that might be a reason why the hackers chose it,

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Speaker 1: or may just be that the hackers were really really

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Speaker 1: familiar with that particular language and it could do what

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Speaker 1: they needed it to do. But Uh, a lot of

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Speaker 1: the analysis I've read suggests that perhaps the reason for

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Speaker 1: picking it was because it was less recognizable. But it does.

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Speaker 1: Flame does record system information about the systems that it's on.

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Speaker 1: Boy howdy does it. It's it's kind of an uh

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Speaker 1: catch all when and again a lot of this depends

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Speaker 1: on what modules are installed on top of Flame. You know,

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Speaker 1: think about think about Flame in a way like uh,

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Speaker 1: you would and operating system like iOS, and that you know,

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Speaker 1: iOS can do lots of stuff, but it can do

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Speaker 1: more stuff when you add apps to it. The apps

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Speaker 1: give you very specific features. It's the basically the way

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Speaker 1: that computers work exactly. So so, uh, Chris and I

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Speaker 1: both happen to have an Android phone, different Android phones,

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Speaker 1: and that I would wager that many of the apps

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Speaker 1: that Chris has I do not have, and vice versa,

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Speaker 1: and there are a few that we might have in common.

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Speaker 1: And that that's because Chris wants this phone to do

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Speaker 1: a certain set of things, and I want my phone

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Speaker 1: to do a certain set of things. Hackers are the

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Speaker 1: same way. They may want their their malware to do

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Speaker 1: certain things in certain situations, and they don't necessarily need everything.

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Speaker 1: It doesn't have to be a kitchen sink approach. So

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Speaker 1: that's kind of the idea behind Flame. So some of

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Speaker 1: the things that can do as far as cyber espionage go. Uh.

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Speaker 1: It can do keyboard activities, So a key logger function,

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Speaker 1: like Chris was talking about earlier, This is what tracks

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Speaker 1: what keys are being pressed. Usually you use this so

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Speaker 1: that you can find out things like passwords and that

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Speaker 1: sort of stuff. It can monitor network traffic, so we

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Speaker 1: can actually see what computers the infect the computer is

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Speaker 1: communicating with and possibly even sniff out those that data.

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Speaker 1: It can take screenshots, so the person on the other

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Speaker 1: end of this uh, this connection can get a look

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Speaker 1: at what the user is is looking at whenever they're

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Speaker 1: using the computer. Also very important if that particular computer

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Speaker 1: is used in a high security environment. It can even

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Speaker 1: record audio. It can use a computer's microphone and record audio.

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Speaker 1: So just imagine it's like bugging a a an office,

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Speaker 1: except you don't have to put a bug in there,

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Speaker 1: which is amazing how you think about it. There are

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Speaker 1: you know, there are offices that are in such high

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Speaker 1: security areas that there are frequent bug sweeps where the

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Speaker 1: company or government agency will have someone come through and

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Speaker 1: search for any electronic bugs that might have been planted

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Speaker 1: there in order to record conversations. Well, this gets around

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Speaker 1: that it turns the person's own computer into that recording instrument.

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Speaker 1: It can even do things like a record Skype conversations.

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Speaker 1: And the one I saw that I thought was particularly

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Speaker 1: clever was there's apparently a module that will allow if

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Speaker 1: the computer has Bluetooth capability, it will become a beacon,

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Speaker 1: a Bluetooth beacon, and we'll try to connect with Bluetooth

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Speaker 1: devices that are within range and download information from them. Interesting,

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Speaker 1: So if you have a smartphone, you're a government official,

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Speaker 1: and you've got a smartphone, you've got Bluetooth enabled so

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Speaker 1: that you can use your cyborg earpiece that everyone tends

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Speaker 1: to use, then that your computer might try to do

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Speaker 1: a Bluetooth handshake with your device and pull information from

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Speaker 1: your device into the computer so it can send it

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Speaker 1: off to the hacker so it's all about gathering information.

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Speaker 1: There's also been some some uh suggestions that perhaps this

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Speaker 1: is related as well to another kind of malware. In fact,

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Speaker 1: that malware may just be a module on top of

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Speaker 1: Flame called Wiper, which does exactly what you would think

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Speaker 1: it does. It wipes data from a device. So it

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Speaker 1: may also not just be about data collection, but also

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Speaker 1: destroying data. And in fact, it does look like there's

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Speaker 1: been some some data loss, uh, particularly in Iran that

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Speaker 1: may be due to this particular malware. UM. It is

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Speaker 1: important to note too that this is not the only

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Speaker 1: piece of modular mountainware out there. UM. It is just

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Speaker 1: it is especially unusual in the size of this malware

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Speaker 1: sophification and sophistication. UM. But yeah, it uh this is

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Speaker 1: sort of an indication that, uh, the game might be

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Speaker 1: afoot if you will, basically exactly what what what what's

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Speaker 1: going on is And I think this is part of

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Speaker 1: the reason that people are so if you if you

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Speaker 1: follow the tech press or the tech media, let's say, um,

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Speaker 1: you've probably seen a lot about this in the past

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Speaker 1: few weeks. And I think the reason for that is

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Speaker 1: because it's captured our imagination and it's it's made us

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Speaker 1: all realize that, uh, electronic espionage is here. People are

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Speaker 1: using it, and it's and it's not uh, it's not

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Speaker 1: the exception anymore. I have the feeling that uh, and

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Speaker 1: basically I am certainly not the only one from my

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Speaker 1: my reading that uh, people seem to feel that this

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Speaker 1: is state sponsored espionage and that this kind of thing

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Speaker 1: is going to become more and more more common as

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Speaker 1: the years go on, because this is the way the

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Speaker 1: world does business um, and I mean all kinds of business. Um. Personally,

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Speaker 1: I think the reason that it's designed to capture webcam

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Speaker 1: stuff is so that they can postum videos on YouTube

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Speaker 1: of high level officials dancing to Lady Gaga, videos in

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Speaker 1: their closed offices that they've had swept for bugs so

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Speaker 1: that they won't get caught doing it. That's ridiculous. That's

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Speaker 1: Taylor Swift videos. But now the the the other thing

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Speaker 1: about this is that I think it's interesting if you

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Speaker 1: think that this this malware may have been around since

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Speaker 1: two thousand seven, it shows that hackers were of the

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Speaker 1: same mindset as Steve Jobs because they saw that apps

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Speaker 1: were the next big thing. No really, seriously, when you

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Speaker 1: think about it, it it is kind of amazing because they

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Speaker 1: were thinking, well, let's make this a very flexible, adaptable

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Speaker 1: malware system so that we can use it in multiple

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Speaker 1: uh use cases and we don't have to again, we

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Speaker 1: don't have to send the whole thing to everyone. Um

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Speaker 1: it did you know? Just like other malware, it attempts

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Speaker 1: to cover its tracks as much as possible, so that

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Speaker 1: way you know that it can stay on an infected

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Speaker 1: computer as long as possible. And it's very good at

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Speaker 1: it if it's been around for years um and just

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Speaker 1: now we're talking about it. Uh. And also it's it

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Speaker 1: spreads kind of in a way similar to other types

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Speaker 1: of malware. You might think, well, how does how do

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Speaker 1: they get How is that initial entry into a system?

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Speaker 1: How is that accomplished? Well, there are a couple of

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Speaker 1: different ways you could do it. Um. There's some suggestion

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Speaker 1: that perhaps it was a spear fishing attempt, which is

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Speaker 1: where you have a specific target in mind and you know,

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Speaker 1: you know, you have enough information about that target to

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Speaker 1: be able to create an email that could tempt that

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Speaker 1: target into executing a file that they probably shouldn't have done. Right.

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Speaker 1: Phishing is uh with a pH is a social engineering

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Speaker 1: tool to gather information you've probably just about everybody I'm

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Speaker 1: sure who is listening to this has had a phishing

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Speaker 1: email show up in their spam box where it says, hey,

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Speaker 1: you've uh, your bank account has been compromised and we

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Speaker 1: need you to send us your information. Um, and you go,

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Speaker 1: you know, I haven't. I don't have an account at

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Speaker 1: this bank and I've never had an account at this bank.

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Speaker 1: I always chuckle at those because I think, nice try, um,

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Speaker 1: but that that but that isn't what what fishing is

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Speaker 1: known for. If you if you were to click on

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Speaker 1: that link and go further and um enter your private

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Speaker 1: information in there, they would be able to use that

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Speaker 1: in identity theft um operation. But spear fishing is specifically

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Speaker 1: targeted um as Jonathan said to a certain person. So

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Speaker 1: it is especially effective because it says, hey, Jonathan in Strickland,

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Speaker 1: we know that you have an account here. Uh and uh,

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Speaker 1: this is a problem with your account. You need to

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Speaker 1: enter your information stuff. There's been some unusual activity on

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Speaker 1: your account. Which is even better because the unusual activity

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Speaker 1: comes true. Yeah, because you go and you check your

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Speaker 1: account and the next thing you know, you have actually

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Speaker 1: given over the information to the people who will generate

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Speaker 1: the unusual activity on your account. Don't ever follow those links. Yeah, no, no,

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Speaker 1: it's better to it's better to go to those those

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Speaker 1: sites directly through your your browser. Uh, as long as

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Speaker 1: you don't have um the DNS changer now where on

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Speaker 1: your computer, which leads you to the wrong browser anyway

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Speaker 1: around wrong site rather anyway. So anyway, getting back to this,

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Speaker 1: spear fishing is a very very possible way that this

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Speaker 1: initially got out into the wild. However, it can also

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Speaker 1: be spread through USB thumbsticks, which means getting physical access

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Speaker 1: to someone's computer. Not always the easiest method, no, but

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Speaker 1: that's that's exactly what they did with stucks Neat apparently,

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Speaker 1: was they snuck it into nuclear power facilities on a

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Speaker 1: USB flash drive, which you know it's not necessarily the

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Speaker 1: easiest way, but it is. I mean, I guess it

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Speaker 1: all depends on your target, because you could either do

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Speaker 1: it yourself where you are. You know, you pose as

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Speaker 1: say a technician saying I have to install this new

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Speaker 1: software onto your computer so that we can maintain security,

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Speaker 1: perhaps your Klaus Hergersheimer checking radiation shields, or you could

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Speaker 1: uh actually mail thumbstick to a person and say here

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Speaker 1: is the file you wanted and have them install it themselves.

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Speaker 1: Sometimes it's that easy. Yeah, sometimes it sometimes that that works.

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Speaker 1: I mean, because you know, people don't necessarily think, oh,

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Speaker 1: there could be something bad on this thumb drive. By

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Speaker 1: the way, there could be something bad on that thumb drive. Um,

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Speaker 1: so you know that's another possibility. And also once it

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Speaker 1: gets in the network, there were other ways of leveraging

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Speaker 1: the network to help infect other computers. One of which

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Speaker 1: I saw was using a printer spooling UH protocol where

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Speaker 1: certain printers, you know, you could send the malware through

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Speaker 1: the printer queue, and other computers as they connect to

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Speaker 1: the printer queue could be infected that way, which is

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Speaker 1: kind of interesting. But that means that you already have

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Speaker 1: to get into the network initially in order to take

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Speaker 1: advantage of something like that. So in other words, you

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Speaker 1: can't just necessarily attack straight through the printer, although I

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Speaker 1: suppose you could if it was a printer that had

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Speaker 1: Internet connectivity and you had the password to get into that.

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Speaker 1: But at any rate, it propagates through those ways, and

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Speaker 1: apparently it will only do so under the direction of

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Speaker 1: the hackers, So this is not the kind of malware

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Speaker 1: that will just copy itself an infinite number of times

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Speaker 1: and just send it to every single contact within a

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Speaker 1: computers database. Instead, it's a very controlled attack, which is

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Speaker 1: again another another reason why UH the analysts think this

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Speaker 1: could be state sponsored, because typically if you have someone

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Speaker 1: who's just interested in either creating as much trouble as

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Speaker 1: possible or just trying to make a profit off whatever

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Speaker 1: that is they're doing, they're probably less likely to have

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Speaker 1: this sort of controlled approach where they're targeting specific computers,

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Speaker 1: because why do that when you could go with a

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Speaker 1: blanket bomb approach and just infect everyone you possibly can. UH.

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Speaker 1: This appears to be much more of a precision attack,

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Speaker 1: so that tends to suggest a state sponsored approach. Now

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Speaker 1: by that we mean that some government has gone out

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Speaker 1: and hired programmers to create this malware with the intent

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Speaker 1: of using it on some other nations computers, possibly possibly

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Speaker 1: computers within the own their own nation. I mean, it

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Speaker 1: all depends on what the government's UH motives are, and

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Speaker 1: then they're going to gather information and analyze it and

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Speaker 1: make their own plans based upon what they see. So

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Speaker 1: typical spy stuff as opposed to say a group of

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Speaker 1: of you know, just just a group of hackers that

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Speaker 1: just want to get as much information as possible in

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Speaker 1: order to make as much money or as much trouble

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Speaker 1: as they can. Yeah. The the country that has asserted

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Speaker 1: the state sponsored claim more than any that I've seen

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Speaker 1: is Iran, who blames Israel and the United States for

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Speaker 1: the attack. And there was a statement from an Israeli

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Speaker 1: government official that I think inadvertently kind of gave the

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Speaker 1: the implication that Israel was directly involved. But I don't

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Speaker 1: think that was the intention of the statement. Well, one

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Speaker 1: way or the other. I'm sure it wasn't right, but

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Speaker 1: the but the government official essentially said, we would you know,

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Speaker 1: this is this is sort of that I'm paraphrasing here,

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Speaker 1: this is the world we're in, and if if we

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Speaker 1: think these tactics are going to work, we're going to

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Speaker 1: use them, which essentially sounded like an admission. But the

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Speaker 1: Israeli government very quickly said, no, no, no, we deny

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Speaker 1: that we have anything to do with this. However, we

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Speaker 1: could write a much more sophisticated program than that. Now

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Speaker 1: I'm I'm kidding um, but yeah, I mean he they're

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Speaker 1: saying that they they wouldn't uh, just because they did

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Speaker 1: or did not launch this. This is the kind of

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Speaker 1: thing that we're going to see more of, which is

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Speaker 1: which is what the analysts have been saying too. Um.

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Speaker 1: It was very unusual too, because the the organization known

404
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Speaker 1: as f Secure, which is a h an anti known

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Speaker 1: anti virus organization in Europe, was contacted by the Iranian

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Speaker 1: Computer Emergency Response Team UH for assistance with that, but

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Speaker 1: apparently it never never went through. But they did contact them,

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Speaker 1: which is kind of unusual because usually they uh, Iran

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Speaker 1: is kind of uh tight lipped about these kinds of

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Speaker 1: things until you know, they can they can say something

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Speaker 1: about it. But they were asking for help initially. Um.

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Speaker 1: But yeah, as Jonathan was saying a minute ago, UM,

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Speaker 1: that the attacks have been very targeted, and there we're

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Speaker 1: not talking about hundreds of thousands or millions of computers

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Speaker 1: that are infected like other malware has. We're talking about

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Speaker 1: a few thousand at most now. There may be fewer

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Speaker 1: than a thousand in fact, across the entire world, with

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Speaker 1: the greatest concentration, like we said, being in the Middle East.

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Speaker 1: And uh yeah, so it's you know, it's very possible

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Speaker 1: that um that this is uh, this is not necessarily

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Speaker 1: one of those global things that everyone should freak out about.

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Speaker 1: What they should freak out about, rather than the nature

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Speaker 1: of the threat that flame poses, is the nature of

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Speaker 1: the threat that the type of malware flame is poses. So,

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Speaker 1: in other words, in other words, it's not flame we

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Speaker 1: need to worry about. It's the fact that now we

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Speaker 1: know actually I guess it's better than we know. But

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Speaker 1: right there's a proof of concept here. There's this malware

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Speaker 1: that can exist, that can be incredibly effective at gathering information.

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Speaker 1: And who's to say that the next version of this

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Speaker 1: isn't already out there. In fact, it very well maybe

432
00:26:34,080 --> 00:26:36,919
Speaker 1: out there right now. I'd be amazed if it weren't

433
00:26:36,960 --> 00:26:38,919
Speaker 1: out there right now, to tell you the truth. And

434
00:26:38,960 --> 00:26:42,440
Speaker 1: it's possible that it could be spying on more than

435
00:26:42,560 --> 00:26:50,119
Speaker 1: just government or or infrastructure type of agencies. And also,

436
00:26:50,320 --> 00:26:53,639
Speaker 1: even though this particular kind of malware it's all about

437
00:26:53,640 --> 00:26:58,440
Speaker 1: gathering information that would be you know, espionage type stuff,

438
00:26:58,480 --> 00:27:01,840
Speaker 1: there's nothing stopping any and else from taking that same

439
00:27:01,920 --> 00:27:07,640
Speaker 1: model and applying it for things like stealing identities, stealing

440
00:27:07,720 --> 00:27:10,960
Speaker 1: bank account information. You know that you could you could

441
00:27:11,000 --> 00:27:15,560
Speaker 1: easily take the same approach and apply it to the

442
00:27:15,800 --> 00:27:21,040
Speaker 1: very uh stereotypical means of you know what malware tends

443
00:27:21,119 --> 00:27:25,080
Speaker 1: to do, and it could wreak a lot of havoc.

444
00:27:25,440 --> 00:27:28,440
Speaker 1: And I think, I think when it comes to gathering

445
00:27:28,440 --> 00:27:31,760
Speaker 1: information like all that information like listening into phone calls

446
00:27:31,760 --> 00:27:35,919
Speaker 1: and stuff, I think that's probably not something that the

447
00:27:36,000 --> 00:27:38,920
Speaker 1: average person needs to worry about, simply because if you're

448
00:27:39,000 --> 00:27:43,479
Speaker 1: using a typical virus attack where you're trying to hit

449
00:27:43,520 --> 00:27:47,520
Speaker 1: as wide a an audience as possible, it doesn't make

450
00:27:47,560 --> 00:27:50,119
Speaker 1: a whole lot of sense to be filtering through that

451
00:27:50,200 --> 00:27:53,320
Speaker 1: much information. You would have so much information hitting you

452
00:27:54,119 --> 00:27:57,120
Speaker 1: that it would be the signal to noise ratio would

453
00:27:57,119 --> 00:27:59,880
Speaker 1: be out of control, right, So you don't have Well,

454
00:28:00,400 --> 00:28:03,240
Speaker 1: I was really hoping to get something I could use

455
00:28:03,280 --> 00:28:05,520
Speaker 1: as blackmail for this guy, but I have to first

456
00:28:05,520 --> 00:28:08,320
Speaker 1: sit through this three hour conversation he had with his

457
00:28:08,400 --> 00:28:12,800
Speaker 1: grandmother about the sweater she knitted for him, And uh,

458
00:28:12,840 --> 00:28:15,760
Speaker 1: that really is not giving me the juicy details I

459
00:28:15,840 --> 00:28:18,440
Speaker 1: need in order to put the screws to this guy.

460
00:28:18,560 --> 00:28:21,720
Speaker 1: So I mean, it's a it's a very real problem. Now. Granted,

461
00:28:21,720 --> 00:28:23,600
Speaker 1: when you're talking about state sponsored you've got an entire

462
00:28:23,600 --> 00:28:26,000
Speaker 1: departments again stuff through that, not to mention access to

463
00:28:26,119 --> 00:28:29,520
Speaker 1: possible computers that can filter through data much more effectively

464
00:28:29,520 --> 00:28:32,880
Speaker 1: than people can. But when you're talking about like hackers

465
00:28:32,880 --> 00:28:35,600
Speaker 1: who are just trying to get data, you know, about

466
00:28:35,640 --> 00:28:38,880
Speaker 1: a person, it's a different story. Now what they could

467
00:28:38,960 --> 00:28:42,400
Speaker 1: do is if they wanted to infect a lot of

468
00:28:42,400 --> 00:28:46,640
Speaker 1: computers and just cause mischief, then you're talking about some

469
00:28:46,680 --> 00:28:49,520
Speaker 1: pretty serious issues too, Like you could talk about, you know,

470
00:28:50,160 --> 00:28:54,080
Speaker 1: having computers have failures, talking about botton nets, that kind

471
00:28:54,080 --> 00:28:59,760
Speaker 1: of thing. Um, Now do we need to worry that

472
00:28:59,760 --> 00:29:03,160
Speaker 1: our computers are all infected? Well, what you need to

473
00:29:03,200 --> 00:29:06,480
Speaker 1: do is do the same thing that we recommend in

474
00:29:06,560 --> 00:29:09,680
Speaker 1: every podcast we ever talk about when it comes to malware.

475
00:29:10,240 --> 00:29:13,720
Speaker 1: Back up your hard drive and use virus protection, virus

476
00:29:13,760 --> 00:29:19,080
Speaker 1: protection software, use a firewall, anti virus protection, protect those viruses. Wait, no,

477
00:29:19,240 --> 00:29:21,680
Speaker 1: that's not what I meant protect yourself from viruses. Yes,

478
00:29:21,760 --> 00:29:25,720
Speaker 1: you want anti virus software, reliable antivirus software. You want

479
00:29:25,720 --> 00:29:27,040
Speaker 1: to keep it up to date. You want to keep

480
00:29:27,040 --> 00:29:30,640
Speaker 1: your operatings system up to date, because as you patch

481
00:29:30,680 --> 00:29:33,960
Speaker 1: your operating system, it plugs up vulnerabilities that get discovered

482
00:29:34,000 --> 00:29:37,880
Speaker 1: over time. Because that's that's what they're doing, really, Um,

483
00:29:37,960 --> 00:29:40,600
Speaker 1: a hacker is not necessarily somebody who's evil, but it's

484
00:29:40,640 --> 00:29:45,440
Speaker 1: somebody who takes something apart two uh re engineer it,

485
00:29:45,640 --> 00:29:47,520
Speaker 1: or or to find a different use for it, or

486
00:29:47,520 --> 00:29:49,840
Speaker 1: to find something that's wrong with it. Um And in

487
00:29:49,880 --> 00:29:53,160
Speaker 1: this case, what the computer hackers are doing is finding

488
00:29:53,760 --> 00:29:56,440
Speaker 1: flaws in an operating system, and it can be any

489
00:29:56,520 --> 00:30:00,480
Speaker 1: operating system in the case of Flame. And we should

490
00:30:00,520 --> 00:30:03,080
Speaker 1: point out these are Windows based machines that are being

491
00:30:03,120 --> 00:30:05,120
Speaker 1: attacked by Flame. We didn't talk about that in your

492
00:30:05,560 --> 00:30:08,840
Speaker 1: first of all the podcast A Windows based machines, but yes,

493
00:30:09,200 --> 00:30:14,640
Speaker 1: there are Any upbring system has vulnerabilities because operating systems

494
00:30:14,640 --> 00:30:18,280
Speaker 1: are built by humans, and humans don't always think of

495
00:30:18,520 --> 00:30:22,600
Speaker 1: every contingency. It's just impossible to do. And while you

496
00:30:22,640 --> 00:30:26,760
Speaker 1: are building an operating system, or building any system, you're

497
00:30:26,800 --> 00:30:29,520
Speaker 1: looking at it from one perspective. You're thinking, how can

498
00:30:29,560 --> 00:30:32,680
Speaker 1: I make this as secure as possible? The hackers looking

499
00:30:32,680 --> 00:30:36,040
Speaker 1: at thinking how can I get into that system? And

500
00:30:36,080 --> 00:30:38,040
Speaker 1: they're going to start looking at ways that you could

501
00:30:38,080 --> 00:30:40,040
Speaker 1: not have thought of, because they're going to see what

502
00:30:40,120 --> 00:30:43,240
Speaker 1: you have thought of and go beyond that. It's it's

503
00:30:43,280 --> 00:30:45,560
Speaker 1: just that's the way the game works. But then as

504
00:30:45,640 --> 00:30:49,680
Speaker 1: vulnerabilities are are discovered, then you have the flip flop.

505
00:30:49,720 --> 00:30:51,920
Speaker 1: You know, you've got the reaction to it where you

506
00:30:51,960 --> 00:30:55,880
Speaker 1: plug that vulnerability. Now that might create other vulnerabilities, or

507
00:30:55,920 --> 00:30:59,440
Speaker 1: maybe that other vulnerabilities exist that you have not yet discovered.

508
00:31:00,000 --> 00:31:02,320
Speaker 1: That's why it's important for you to make sure that

509
00:31:02,440 --> 00:31:05,800
Speaker 1: you update your operating system as updates become available. Yes,

510
00:31:06,200 --> 00:31:07,920
Speaker 1: I know it can be irritating, especially if you're on

511
00:31:07,920 --> 00:31:10,920
Speaker 1: a slower connection, to have to update your operating system

512
00:31:10,960 --> 00:31:13,720
Speaker 1: every week and you're shutting down your computer and it

513
00:31:13,720 --> 00:31:18,680
Speaker 1: says installing update one of thirty three, I wanted to

514
00:31:18,760 --> 00:31:22,560
Speaker 1: go home. Um, But still it's better to do it

515
00:31:22,760 --> 00:31:25,960
Speaker 1: and to maintain as high a level of security as

516
00:31:26,000 --> 00:31:29,840
Speaker 1: you can. And ultimately, the most important thing I think,

517
00:31:29,920 --> 00:31:34,400
Speaker 1: besides the antivirus software and plugging the operating system, is

518
00:31:34,640 --> 00:31:39,080
Speaker 1: engage in good behavior in the sense of don't open

519
00:31:39,240 --> 00:31:43,040
Speaker 1: strange links, don't execute files that are sent to you

520
00:31:43,160 --> 00:31:45,640
Speaker 1: from people you don't know. If it's sent to you

521
00:31:45,640 --> 00:31:48,640
Speaker 1: by someone who does you do know, make sure that

522
00:31:48,720 --> 00:31:51,520
Speaker 1: you contact that person first and say, hey, I got

523
00:31:51,520 --> 00:31:53,560
Speaker 1: this email from you and had this file in it.

524
00:31:53,600 --> 00:31:55,240
Speaker 1: Is this what I think it is? Is it cool?

525
00:31:56,080 --> 00:31:58,640
Speaker 1: Because it may be that your friends computer has been

526
00:31:58,640 --> 00:32:03,240
Speaker 1: infected and that you're getting a file that is automatically

527
00:32:03,280 --> 00:32:05,920
Speaker 1: generated because it's gone through that friends contact list and

528
00:32:05,920 --> 00:32:09,200
Speaker 1: you have to be on it. You know, think of

529
00:32:09,280 --> 00:32:13,200
Speaker 1: the think the way hackers think, and make sure you

530
00:32:13,280 --> 00:32:17,160
Speaker 1: don't engage in those high risk behaviors that hackers target

531
00:32:17,280 --> 00:32:20,520
Speaker 1: because they're they've proven to be effective tools. And if

532
00:32:20,560 --> 00:32:22,600
Speaker 1: you managed to do that, if you avoid the high

533
00:32:22,680 --> 00:32:26,000
Speaker 1: risk behaviors and you keep your antivirus software up to date,

534
00:32:26,000 --> 00:32:28,360
Speaker 1: and you keep your oberating system out to date, you

535
00:32:28,560 --> 00:32:32,360
Speaker 1: have done as much as you can to prevent this

536
00:32:32,480 --> 00:32:35,440
Speaker 1: sort of stuff from infecting your computer. Doesn't mean that

537
00:32:35,480 --> 00:32:40,680
Speaker 1: it's full proof, but it it dramatically decreases those chances. Yes,

538
00:32:40,840 --> 00:32:45,880
Speaker 1: as Jonathan was was saying, there there could be uh contingencies.

539
00:32:46,240 --> 00:32:51,800
Speaker 1: Flame actually looks for anti virus software, especially the more

540
00:32:51,880 --> 00:32:56,760
Speaker 1: common manufacturers software, and it looks for things that are

541
00:32:56,760 --> 00:33:02,320
Speaker 1: going to report unusual activity online activity their applications for

542
00:33:02,600 --> 00:33:06,840
Speaker 1: I think pretty much every operating system that will say, hey, uh,

543
00:33:06,880 --> 00:33:10,000
Speaker 1: this program is sending message out? Is it supposed to

544
00:33:10,040 --> 00:33:13,760
Speaker 1: be sending a message out? UM? And I've seen malware

545
00:33:13,840 --> 00:33:17,960
Speaker 1: for for multiple operating systems be able to detect that.

546
00:33:18,280 --> 00:33:21,360
Speaker 1: So it's looking for anything that's going to report on

547
00:33:21,400 --> 00:33:25,360
Speaker 1: its activity or or try to eliminate it UM. And

548
00:33:25,400 --> 00:33:29,240
Speaker 1: of course, if it's something as sophisticated as Flame UM,

549
00:33:29,280 --> 00:33:33,440
Speaker 1: the software can be updated by the hackers to get

550
00:33:33,480 --> 00:33:39,080
Speaker 1: around virus detection software UM. So the vulnerabilities UM that

551
00:33:39,080 --> 00:33:42,560
Speaker 1: that initially allowed Flame to operate apparently been patched and

552
00:33:42,640 --> 00:33:45,960
Speaker 1: more some time ago. Again, if if if the people

553
00:33:46,040 --> 00:33:49,120
Speaker 1: who UM had been using those operating systems had patched

554
00:33:49,160 --> 00:33:51,920
Speaker 1: their software would have made it a lot more difficult. Now,

555
00:33:51,960 --> 00:33:55,160
Speaker 1: if if the hacker has a backdoor into that software,

556
00:33:55,560 --> 00:33:58,760
Speaker 1: then he or she can say, okay, uh, this vulnerability

557
00:33:58,800 --> 00:34:00,600
Speaker 1: has been patched, but this one is still open from

558
00:34:00,600 --> 00:34:03,920
Speaker 1: now on, use this door out into the internet instead

559
00:34:03,960 --> 00:34:06,200
Speaker 1: of the one that you were using before and stay.

560
00:34:06,600 --> 00:34:09,560
Speaker 1: And that allows them to stay one step ahead. But again,

561
00:34:09,600 --> 00:34:12,480
Speaker 1: if you if you take those steps UH to keep

562
00:34:12,480 --> 00:34:16,400
Speaker 1: your anti virus in your operating system patched as often

563
00:34:16,480 --> 00:34:19,520
Speaker 1: as you can, as as it's done regularly, then you

564
00:34:19,760 --> 00:34:22,080
Speaker 1: you stand a much better chance at at preventing something

565
00:34:22,120 --> 00:34:26,799
Speaker 1: like this from happening. Yeah, again, not full proof, but

566
00:34:26,840 --> 00:34:29,960
Speaker 1: at least it decreases that percentage. It's fascinating to to

567
00:34:29,960 --> 00:34:33,480
Speaker 1: look at these modules because you it's it's such an

568
00:34:33,480 --> 00:34:38,399
Speaker 1: amazing architecture. UM. It's it's obvious that the people who

569
00:34:38,440 --> 00:34:41,840
Speaker 1: wrote the software UH intended to set up shop and

570
00:34:41,920 --> 00:34:45,480
Speaker 1: the operating systems of the people whose infect whose computers

571
00:34:45,480 --> 00:34:48,959
Speaker 1: were infected by the software by this malware, and and

572
00:34:49,400 --> 00:34:51,719
Speaker 1: UH they intended to stay there for as long as

573
00:34:51,719 --> 00:34:53,880
Speaker 1: they could and record as much information as they could

574
00:34:54,160 --> 00:34:58,759
Speaker 1: about the operating system, about anything that they can connect to. UM.

575
00:34:59,200 --> 00:35:02,200
Speaker 1: So they they were playing for real. Yeah. The only

576
00:35:02,239 --> 00:35:04,960
Speaker 1: thing I think, the only indicator that shows that they

577
00:35:05,000 --> 00:35:10,719
Speaker 1: were not completely fully baked when when it rolled out

578
00:35:10,840 --> 00:35:14,120
Speaker 1: is that it does not let you play angry Birds.

579
00:35:15,560 --> 00:35:20,160
Speaker 1: Otherwise I think it was a pretty strong modular system.

580
00:35:20,200 --> 00:35:22,239
Speaker 1: But until the system has Angry Birds on it, I

581
00:35:22,280 --> 00:35:28,600
Speaker 1: considered incomplete all right then all right, So that kind

582
00:35:28,600 --> 00:35:32,920
Speaker 1: of that kind of sums up the the knowledge we

583
00:35:32,960 --> 00:35:36,160
Speaker 1: have as the recording of this podcast about Flame. Of course,

584
00:35:36,160 --> 00:35:38,600
Speaker 1: by the time this publishes, we may have more information,

585
00:35:39,000 --> 00:35:42,879
Speaker 1: such as a stronger indicator of who might be responsible.

586
00:35:43,080 --> 00:35:45,319
Speaker 1: Although I don't know what's duck set. It's been out

587
00:35:45,360 --> 00:35:47,839
Speaker 1: for so long and people still don't know. Although yeah,

588
00:35:47,960 --> 00:35:51,959
Speaker 1: both with stucks neet and with flame. The the most

589
00:35:52,000 --> 00:35:56,280
Speaker 1: of the fingers are pointing towards Israel. In the United States, again,

590
00:35:56,400 --> 00:35:59,520
Speaker 1: no smoking gun, and there's lots of flame, but no

591
00:35:59,600 --> 00:36:04,719
Speaker 1: smoking gun. Well and uh, of course, as we know, um,

592
00:36:04,920 --> 00:36:08,080
Speaker 1: internet hackers have been known to find ways to point

593
00:36:08,120 --> 00:36:11,640
Speaker 1: the finger at someone else. Um. They're very good at

594
00:36:12,040 --> 00:36:15,440
Speaker 1: hiding their tracks and making somebody Well. The names of

595
00:36:15,440 --> 00:36:20,400
Speaker 1: these modules are all in uh, in English and somewhat slangy.

596
00:36:20,560 --> 00:36:23,520
Speaker 1: Some of them are are slang terms, so uh, you

597
00:36:23,560 --> 00:36:25,359
Speaker 1: know it kind of says, oh, well, somebody who's very

598
00:36:25,400 --> 00:36:29,799
Speaker 1: familiar with English probably wrote this software. Um. Yeah, so

599
00:36:29,920 --> 00:36:31,640
Speaker 1: that's why I would want to I want to get

600
00:36:31,680 --> 00:36:34,600
Speaker 1: like if I were to write some malware, I'd want

601
00:36:34,640 --> 00:36:37,600
Speaker 1: to get slang and something like Romanian. Yeah. Well, the

602
00:36:37,600 --> 00:36:41,120
Speaker 1: penguins in Australia who wrote this software very sophisticated and

603
00:36:41,120 --> 00:36:42,960
Speaker 1: and and nobody's going to point a flipper at them.

604
00:36:43,000 --> 00:36:47,040
Speaker 1: So now you're suggesting it's lenox. I see what you're saying. Yeah,

605
00:36:47,040 --> 00:36:50,759
Speaker 1: Tucks and his buddies down there. So well, I think

606
00:36:50,800 --> 00:36:54,400
Speaker 1: that wraps up our discussion here now. Granted, what'll be

607
00:36:54,400 --> 00:36:57,400
Speaker 1: interesting to see is if we see future outbreaks of

608
00:36:57,480 --> 00:37:05,000
Speaker 1: malware that follow in flames smoking footsteps. Uh, because it is.

609
00:37:05,160 --> 00:37:09,760
Speaker 1: It has proven to be a pretty effective tactic. And

610
00:37:09,840 --> 00:37:12,640
Speaker 1: of course, you know, we would expect any future form

611
00:37:12,800 --> 00:37:15,960
Speaker 1: of this sort of attack to take to be different

612
00:37:16,080 --> 00:37:19,239
Speaker 1: enough so that it would not immediately trigger suspicion once

613
00:37:19,280 --> 00:37:23,440
Speaker 1: someone downloaded it. Uh, tony megabyte file is like you said,

614
00:37:23,640 --> 00:37:27,440
Speaker 1: that's significant for malware. It's not still not significant compared

615
00:37:27,480 --> 00:37:33,800
Speaker 1: to say a good music file, but uh, yeah, you

616
00:37:33,920 --> 00:37:38,640
Speaker 1: never know. So guys, be careful out there again. Don't

617
00:37:38,680 --> 00:37:40,640
Speaker 1: need to worry about flame unless you are a high

618
00:37:40,719 --> 00:37:46,120
Speaker 1: ranking government official or you run some sort of important

619
00:37:46,160 --> 00:37:49,839
Speaker 1: facility in the Middle East. And but you know, being

620
00:37:49,880 --> 00:37:53,520
Speaker 1: careful is always good no matter no matter what area

621
00:37:53,560 --> 00:37:56,440
Speaker 1: of life you might fall in. And let us know

622
00:37:56,520 --> 00:37:59,320
Speaker 1: what you would like us to talk about in future episodes.

623
00:37:59,440 --> 00:38:02,440
Speaker 1: You can untacked us via email our addressed as tech

624
00:38:02,520 --> 00:38:05,720
Speaker 1: stuff at Discovery dot com or less know on Facebook

625
00:38:05,800 --> 00:38:08,120
Speaker 1: or Twitter are handled There is tech stuff hs W

626
00:38:08,440 --> 00:38:12,880
Speaker 1: and Chris and I will talk to you again really soon. Hey. Uh,

627
00:38:12,920 --> 00:38:17,359
Speaker 1: you know when we were recorded this podcast initially, yes,

628
00:38:17,880 --> 00:38:22,080
Speaker 1: we talked about things like who was responsible for the

629
00:38:22,280 --> 00:38:26,400
Speaker 1: flame virus, saying that it could literally be anyone. It

630
00:38:26,520 --> 00:38:29,719
Speaker 1: could literally be anyone and one in the world. And

631
00:38:29,719 --> 00:38:32,480
Speaker 1: it was very similar to stucks net. No no connection

632
00:38:32,520 --> 00:38:34,840
Speaker 1: to stucks net at all. Yeah, but it was awfully

633
00:38:34,840 --> 00:38:37,480
Speaker 1: similar in boy, isn't that weird? Okay? Yeah. So, as

634
00:38:37,480 --> 00:38:40,520
Speaker 1: it turns out, since we recorded that podcast, almost broke

635
00:38:40,760 --> 00:38:44,960
Speaker 1: almost I'm sorry not to interrupt, almost literally right after

636
00:38:45,000 --> 00:38:47,719
Speaker 1: we recorded this, it went like a day, Yeah, exactly

637
00:38:47,760 --> 00:38:50,279
Speaker 1: like it was. By the next week, the news had

638
00:38:50,360 --> 00:38:57,279
Speaker 1: broken that that Flame, the code for Flame resembled to

639
00:38:57,360 --> 00:39:00,440
Speaker 1: the point of identity part of the code or an

640
00:39:00,480 --> 00:39:07,880
Speaker 1: early iteration of stucks net, which is an incredibly strong

641
00:39:08,080 --> 00:39:12,439
Speaker 1: indicator that those responsible for the creation of Flame were

642
00:39:12,520 --> 00:39:17,880
Speaker 1: also involved in creating stucks net. So that narrows down

643
00:39:17,960 --> 00:39:22,200
Speaker 1: that field dramatically. And as Chris said, when we recorded

644
00:39:22,200 --> 00:39:25,399
Speaker 1: the podcast, that information had not become public. But now

645
00:39:25,440 --> 00:39:29,920
Speaker 1: we know that stucks net and Flame share enough similar

646
00:39:29,960 --> 00:39:34,200
Speaker 1: code to give us the confidence in saying the same

647
00:39:34,239 --> 00:39:38,319
Speaker 1: parties were involved in the creation of both, So that

648
00:39:38,520 --> 00:39:43,120
Speaker 1: also limits who could have been behind it in other ways.

649
00:39:43,520 --> 00:39:48,600
Speaker 1: Right now, it the accusations have pretty much centered and

650
00:39:48,640 --> 00:39:52,759
Speaker 1: they have since ducks net became public. They've centered on

651
00:39:52,800 --> 00:39:57,120
Speaker 1: the United States and Israel. Yes, and although neither country

652
00:39:57,160 --> 00:40:02,160
Speaker 1: has officially confirmed anything, the evidence, I can't imagine that

653
00:40:02,400 --> 00:40:06,920
Speaker 1: they would. No, I can't either, but uh, the evidence

654
00:40:07,120 --> 00:40:11,200
Speaker 1: has has pointed even more strongly since then. So I mean,

655
00:40:11,320 --> 00:40:14,640
Speaker 1: I would say it's safe that neither Jonathan nor I

656
00:40:14,680 --> 00:40:18,880
Speaker 1: can confirm or deny any you know, any involvement by

657
00:40:18,920 --> 00:40:21,520
Speaker 1: any government anywhere. I can. I can deny that I

658
00:40:21,560 --> 00:40:24,799
Speaker 1: had any involvement. Yes, that's about that. But as far

659
00:40:24,920 --> 00:40:28,319
Speaker 1: as I can, the evidence is is stronger now to

660
00:40:28,480 --> 00:40:31,480
Speaker 1: suggest that based on based on the information that we've

661
00:40:31,520 --> 00:40:34,200
Speaker 1: received in the media. So, and there was also an

662
00:40:34,239 --> 00:40:36,799
Speaker 1: interesting discussion that popped up, and I think it's one

663
00:40:36,840 --> 00:40:39,280
Speaker 1: that we can have a kind of a quick version

664
00:40:39,320 --> 00:40:43,480
Speaker 1: of it here on our show about stuckx net and

665
00:40:43,600 --> 00:40:48,320
Speaker 1: Flame both existed on computers for years before anyone else

666
00:40:48,440 --> 00:40:52,600
Speaker 1: outside of the operations knew anything was going on. Yeah,

667
00:40:52,680 --> 00:40:56,600
Speaker 1: and it's amazing because it seems very fresh to us,

668
00:40:56,719 --> 00:40:58,759
Speaker 1: but it has been out there for quite some time.

669
00:40:58,880 --> 00:41:02,440
Speaker 1: So right, it remained under tected for years. And in

670
00:41:02,480 --> 00:41:05,320
Speaker 1: the case of Flame, you're talking about a significant file size.

671
00:41:05,320 --> 00:41:09,520
Speaker 1: It's a small piece of code. Uh. The argument I've

672
00:41:09,520 --> 00:41:12,880
Speaker 1: seen says that the era of anti virus software is

673
00:41:12,960 --> 00:41:16,000
Speaker 1: over because if anti virus software can't protect you from

674
00:41:16,040 --> 00:41:18,960
Speaker 1: these things that they can remain hidden for years, then

675
00:41:19,040 --> 00:41:24,480
Speaker 1: it is useless. Now yeah, I think I think that's

676
00:41:24,760 --> 00:41:28,680
Speaker 1: I think that's extremist. Now, I do agree that if

677
00:41:28,920 --> 00:41:32,960
Speaker 1: code goes undetected, anti virus software is of little help

678
00:41:33,040 --> 00:41:37,320
Speaker 1: in that case for something of that variety. Now, uh,

679
00:41:37,400 --> 00:41:39,880
Speaker 1: we're when we're talking about the victims of flame and

680
00:41:39,960 --> 00:41:43,280
Speaker 1: stuck s net. These are not you know, people sitting

681
00:41:43,320 --> 00:41:46,160
Speaker 1: at home, uh, you know, checking the web in their email.

682
00:41:46,680 --> 00:41:51,040
Speaker 1: The targets, yes, these are These are are targeted organizations

683
00:41:51,080 --> 00:41:55,239
Speaker 1: and governments. Um. And it is more likely that you

684
00:41:55,560 --> 00:41:59,440
Speaker 1: or I would be targeted by uh script kitties sending

685
00:41:59,520 --> 00:42:04,240
Speaker 1: virus is by email or by phishing or even spear

686
00:42:04,280 --> 00:42:08,800
Speaker 1: fishing for that matter. So yes, I think for everyday folks,

687
00:42:08,840 --> 00:42:11,640
Speaker 1: protecting their computers is still a very very good idea

688
00:42:11,760 --> 00:42:16,360
Speaker 1: backing them up and using virus protection software. Yes, yes,

689
00:42:16,440 --> 00:42:21,280
Speaker 1: and please and remember I mean these these security firms,

690
00:42:21,280 --> 00:42:25,120
Speaker 1: as soon as they identify malware, they are at work

691
00:42:25,200 --> 00:42:28,160
Speaker 1: to try and incorporate that into the anti virus software

692
00:42:28,200 --> 00:42:31,040
Speaker 1: so that you can detect it. And prevent it from

693
00:42:31,120 --> 00:42:36,120
Speaker 1: infecting your computer. Because just because something has become known

694
00:42:36,320 --> 00:42:40,080
Speaker 1: doesn't mean it's no longer dangerous. It's still dangerous. Uh.

695
00:42:40,120 --> 00:42:43,600
Speaker 1: If it's unknown, then it's extra dangerous because your software

696
00:42:43,640 --> 00:42:47,000
Speaker 1: may not be able to protect you against it. But yeah,

697
00:42:47,000 --> 00:42:50,200
Speaker 1: I agree, Chris. I don't think that anti virus software

698
00:42:50,719 --> 00:42:53,279
Speaker 1: is useless. I think it's still has a place. I

699
00:42:53,320 --> 00:42:57,280
Speaker 1: think you have to couple antivirus software with smart computing

700
00:42:57,320 --> 00:43:02,040
Speaker 1: practices and that will help protect you from malware. Yes,

701
00:43:02,280 --> 00:43:06,320
Speaker 1: all right, Well that wraps up our PostScript, so uh,

702
00:43:06,480 --> 00:43:10,160
Speaker 1: please don't write us telling us that we missed out

703
00:43:10,239 --> 00:43:13,440
Speaker 1: on that fact. We did, but we we fixed it.

704
00:43:14,560 --> 00:43:17,000
Speaker 1: For more on this and thousands of other topics. Is

705
00:43:17,000 --> 00:43:23,160
Speaker 1: it how staff works dot com? Brought to you by

706
00:43:23,160 --> 00:43:26,600
Speaker 1: the reinvented two thousand twelve camera. It's ready, are you