WEBVTT - Biotechnology

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<v Speaker 1>Probably more than any other field that poses an existential risk.

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<v Speaker 1>The dangers of the biotech field are the easiest to understand.

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<v Speaker 1>The field deals with bugs, viruses, bacteria, pathogens that can

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<v Speaker 1>kill us if we're infected by them. And every one

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<v Speaker 1>of us has experienced infectious disease firsthand, like the preschooler

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<v Speaker 1>catching the flu and bringing it home and making the

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<v Speaker 1>whole family sick, or having to cancel your vacation because

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<v Speaker 1>the place you were going has become a zeke a

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<v Speaker 1>hot spot. It's pretty basic stuff, and it's relatable to us.

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<v Speaker 1>But when you dig deeper into the biotech field, it

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<v Speaker 1>becomes clear that the risks it poses are maybe the

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<v Speaker 1>most immediate of all the existential risks. The pathogens the

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<v Speaker 1>field studies in the hopes of creating vaccines that can

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<v Speaker 1>save lives pose a pretty severe threat as they are

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<v Speaker 1>not too long ago. Wild viruses like small pox and

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<v Speaker 1>influenza killed a lot of people, as we'll see in

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<v Speaker 1>this episode, and bugs like that can still kill a

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<v Speaker 1>lot of people, and that's threat enough. But the existential

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<v Speaker 1>threat from biotech comes from the type of research that

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<v Speaker 1>began to proliferate in the early twenty one century. When

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<v Speaker 1>high containment labs begin to mushroom around the world, and

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<v Speaker 1>a type of research called gain of function really took off.

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<v Speaker 1>No longer were researchers dealing with wild viruses and bacteria.

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<v Speaker 1>They were forcing evolution in them by speeding up mutations

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<v Speaker 1>and altering them genetically to be deadlier and more contagious.

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<v Speaker 1>This kind of research is extremely dangerous. If a genetically

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<v Speaker 1>altered bug escapes from a lab, it could kill a

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<v Speaker 1>potentially staggering amount of people before it is contained. If

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<v Speaker 1>it is contained, but if done right, the risks from

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<v Speaker 1>these experiments can be minimized. The trouble is they're frequently

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<v Speaker 1>not done right. As you'll see, the biotech field has

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<v Speaker 1>a shocking track record of accidents and a willingness to

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<v Speaker 1>take huge, possibly unnecessary risks. And what's most unsettling is

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<v Speaker 1>that there is precious little oversight on the risky experiments

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<v Speaker 1>being carried out around the world. Even seemingly innocuous experiments

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<v Speaker 1>have the potential to produce catastrophic results. And I can

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<v Speaker 1>show you now if you'll follow me to Canberra, the

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<v Speaker 1>capital of Australia. We're back in two thousand. A pair

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<v Speaker 1>of researchers named Ron Jackson and Ian Ramshaw are unpleasantly

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<v Speaker 1>surprised with the results of an experiment they've just conducted.

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<v Speaker 1>Australia has a significant mouse problem. Mice were probably introduced

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<v Speaker 1>to the country as stowaways among the ships of the

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<v Speaker 1>British settlers in the eighteenth century, and when they arrived,

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<v Speaker 1>they began to spread and grow to unusually large numbers.

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<v Speaker 1>Especial slee in the southeast, where Australia grows its grain.

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<v Speaker 1>During what the country calls its mouse plagues, farms are

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<v Speaker 1>overrun with mice that streamed from seemingly everywhere. The ground

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<v Speaker 1>ripples with them. The mice are so abundant and aggressive

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<v Speaker 1>that they can chew through the tires of farm equipment,

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<v Speaker 1>and they attack pigs and poultry. On mouse plague caused

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<v Speaker 1>nearly one hundred million dollars worth of damage to crops

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<v Speaker 1>and farms. What Ramshaw and Jackson were looking for was

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<v Speaker 1>a way to sterilize female mice by training their immune

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<v Speaker 1>systems to attack their own eggs. To do that, the

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<v Speaker 1>two biologists created a vaccine that contained a gene which

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<v Speaker 1>codes for the production of something called inter luken four,

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<v Speaker 1>which is a naturally occurring protein i L four stimulates

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<v Speaker 1>mammals to produce antibodies to deliver the genes to the

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<v Speaker 1>mice's DNA. The researchers used a virus because of a

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<v Speaker 1>virus's unique ability to insert its own genetic information into

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<v Speaker 1>a cell's DNA and hijack a cells normal processes. They

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<v Speaker 1>make ideal vehicles to deliver the main ingredient in a vaccine.

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<v Speaker 1>The virus adds it into the cells genetic code along

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<v Speaker 1>with its own genetic material. The cell produces whatever it

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<v Speaker 1>finds in its genetic code, whether it was added there

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<v Speaker 1>by a virus or by a human. It's pretty impressive

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<v Speaker 1>researchers hijack a virus's ability to hijack a cell. Jackson

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<v Speaker 1>and Ramshaw chose the virus that causes mousepox ectromelia as

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<v Speaker 1>the vehicle for their vaccine. Normally, mousepox would kill a

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<v Speaker 1>lot of the mice that were exposed to it in

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<v Speaker 1>the study, but the researchers were using mice that had

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<v Speaker 1>been previously vaccinated against mousepox, along with other mice that

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<v Speaker 1>had been genetically altered to be totally immune to the disease. Few,

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<v Speaker 1>if any, of the mice used in the study works

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<v Speaker 1>to die from exposure to the mousepox, but within nine

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<v Speaker 1>days of receiving the vaccine, every single mouse in the

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<v Speaker 1>study was dead. The mousepox had a one hundred percent

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<v Speaker 1>mortality rate. It killed every mouse that had been exposed

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<v Speaker 1>to it. The researchers found that the i L for

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<v Speaker 1>gene had indeed increased anybody production in the mice as intended,

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<v Speaker 1>but the increased inner lucan had another unanticipated effect. It

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<v Speaker 1>also suppressed the mice's cell mediated response, a function of

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<v Speaker 1>the immune system which wards off infections by viruses. By

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<v Speaker 1>adding the i L four gene to the mouse pox virus,

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<v Speaker 1>the surge of inter luken told the mice's immune system

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<v Speaker 1>to lay down its arms, which paved the way for

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<v Speaker 1>total annihilation by the mousepox virus, even among mice that

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<v Speaker 1>had been genetically designed to be immune to the disease.

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<v Speaker 1>Jackson and Ramshaw had x dently created a perfect killer

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<v Speaker 1>of mice. Mousepox bears a resemblance to smallpox and humans.

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<v Speaker 1>The two viruses are distantly related, and it was not

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<v Speaker 1>lost on Ramshaw and Jackson what would happen if their

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<v Speaker 1>technique was used with smallpox instead of mousepox. Jackson told

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<v Speaker 1>new scientists, it would be safe to assume that if

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<v Speaker 1>some idiot did put human ill four into human smallpox,

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<v Speaker 1>they'd increase the lethality quite dramatically. Something like that would

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<v Speaker 1>be monumentally bad. Smallpox is caused by the very ola virus.

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<v Speaker 1>It's an ancient virus that has plagued humans for possibly

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<v Speaker 1>as long as ten thousand years, and it's believed to

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<v Speaker 1>have made the jump from either camels or gerbils, or

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<v Speaker 1>possibly some extinct animal we don't know about, over to

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<v Speaker 1>humans and spread along trade routes that crossed the Middle

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<v Speaker 1>East to Asia and then eventually west over to Europe.

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<v Speaker 1>Our earliest defend native evidence of smallpox dates back at

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<v Speaker 1>least three thousand years, found on mummies of people who

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<v Speaker 1>lived millennia ago, including the Egyptian pharaoh Ramsey's the fifth

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<v Speaker 1>Ramsey's appears to bear the sign of the virus, the

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<v Speaker 1>pox marks that are left behind when the pustules that

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<v Speaker 1>cover the body scab and fall off. Those pustules come

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<v Speaker 1>at the final stage of a very difficult disease. Within

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<v Speaker 1>a couple of days of being exposed to smallpox for

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<v Speaker 1>the first time, you will be leveled by a fever

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<v Speaker 1>and flu like symptoms that incapacitate you for days. Sores

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<v Speaker 1>develop in your mouth and they fill with fluid, and

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<v Speaker 1>just as you overcome the fever and begin to feel better,

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<v Speaker 1>the mouth sores erupt, which releases the virus filled fluid

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<v Speaker 1>into the rest of your body, where it reappears as

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<v Speaker 1>those pustules masses of tiny bumps that cover the skin

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<v Speaker 1>and concentrate around your extremities. The uestull scab over and

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<v Speaker 1>eventually they fall off, and when the last one falls,

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<v Speaker 1>you are no longer contagious. If you survived the disease

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<v Speaker 1>that is, smallpox kills by overwhelming your immune system with

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<v Speaker 1>the protein that counteracts anybodies that would normally prevent infected

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<v Speaker 1>cells from replicating the virus. To catch smallpox, it takes

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<v Speaker 1>close contact with a person who is actively suffering from it,

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<v Speaker 1>which meant that people who cared for the ill were

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<v Speaker 1>usually the ones who came down with it. Once a

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<v Speaker 1>person comes down with smallpox and survives, they are conferred

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<v Speaker 1>a lifelong immunity to the disease, and even though they

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<v Speaker 1>may still carry the virus, they aren't contagious to others.

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<v Speaker 1>Even people who have never had smallpox before. By the

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<v Speaker 1>Middle Ages, smallpox had settled into Europe, becoming endemic, which

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<v Speaker 1>means it settled into the human population kind of made

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<v Speaker 1>itself comfortable. It went into hiding and made the rounds

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<v Speaker 1>when new comers who had never been exposed to the

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<v Speaker 1>virus entered the towns of people who are already immune

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<v Speaker 1>to it. So in Europe smallpox became mostly a disease

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<v Speaker 1>of children and immigrants. The local adults had all either

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<v Speaker 1>died from it or survived it and become immune. Once

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<v Speaker 1>it became endemic, the mortality rate for smallpox hovered around

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<v Speaker 1>It killed about three out of every ten people who

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<v Speaker 1>came in contact with it. But in the fifteenth century,

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<v Speaker 1>Europe began to spill over its banks, and it brought

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<v Speaker 1>the disease to places that had never encountered it before.

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<v Speaker 1>West Africa was first visited by slave traders from Portugal

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<v Speaker 1>and Spain, who brought pandemics with them. Many of the

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<v Speaker 1>villages that were rated had never been exposed to the disease,

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<v Speaker 1>and so it spread quickly. The people suffering those outbreaks

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<v Speaker 1>were stolen from their homes and they were taken to

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<v Speaker 1>holding camps along the coast, where the disease spread even

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<v Speaker 1>more quickly. Those people were forced onto ships while they

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<v Speaker 1>were actively ill, making the horrific experience of being enslaved

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<v Speaker 1>even more brutal. Each time a ship set sail from

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<v Speaker 1>Africa to the America's over stuffed with people ill from smallpox,

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<v Speaker 1>it was like tossing a lit match onto a powder cake.

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<v Speaker 1>At first, the ships were too slow to make it

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<v Speaker 1>to the New World before the smallpox burned itself out.

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<v Speaker 1>The human cargo aboard were either no longer contagious what

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<v Speaker 1>We're dead from it by the time they made land.

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<v Speaker 1>But as ocean going technology improved, those ships got faster,

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<v Speaker 1>and eventually one of those matches stayed lit and it

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<v Speaker 1>set off the powder keg of the America's It is

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<v Speaker 1>difficult to overstate the effect that European disease had on

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<v Speaker 1>North and South America. Not just smallpox, but a number

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<v Speaker 1>of contagious disease began to rage at once, forming overlapping

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<v Speaker 1>epidemics called sindemics. The Native Americans had never been exposed

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<v Speaker 1>to these kinds of pathogens, and so they had no

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<v Speaker 1>natural defenses against them, which allowed the diseases to spread

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<v Speaker 1>at unimaginable rates. And kill untold numbers of people. It

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<v Speaker 1>appears to have all started in what is now Mexico City.

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<v Speaker 1>The Aztecs suffered losses of up to half of their

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<v Speaker 1>population when the Spanish brought smallpox. A short An African

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<v Speaker 1>slave whose name is lost to history, was suffering from

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<v Speaker 1>smallpox when he landed with an expedition led by the

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<v Speaker 1>conquistador Panfello de Navarrees. In writing five years after the

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<v Speaker 1>outbreak began, a Spanish fire who traveled to Mexico wrote

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<v Speaker 1>of the devastation the diet inhapes like bed box. Many

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<v Speaker 1>all theirs died of a starvation, because I said, we're

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<v Speaker 1>all taken secret of more. And they could not care

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<v Speaker 1>for each other, nor was there anyone to give them

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<v Speaker 1>bread or anything else. In many places it happened that

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<v Speaker 1>everyone in the house died, and as it was impossible

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<v Speaker 1>to vary the great number of dead, they pulled down

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<v Speaker 1>their houses over them in order to check the stinch

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<v Speaker 1>that rushed from the dead bodies, so that their homes

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<v Speaker 1>became their tombs. The disease spread like wildfire into the

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<v Speaker 1>interior of the American continent. In the America's smallpox found

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<v Speaker 1>what's called Virgin Territory a population that had no immunity,

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<v Speaker 1>so everyone who came in contact with it fell ill.

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<v Speaker 1>This left no one to care for people suffering from

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<v Speaker 1>the disease, which increased the mortality right even further. As

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<v Speaker 1>the sick fled their dead villages to look for helping

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<v Speaker 1>others nearby, they brought the infection with them, and the

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<v Speaker 1>cycle of disease began again and again. This happened over

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<v Speaker 1>and over for centuries, leaving the Great Native American cultures

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<v Speaker 1>in rubble. Explorers who came in later waves found destroyed,

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<v Speaker 1>abandoned settlements filled with the dead. In places the virus appeared,

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<v Speaker 1>the population fell by half two thirds. In some places,

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<v Speaker 1>nine out of every ten members of the Native American

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<v Speaker 1>groups in contact with the Massachusetts Bay settlers died from

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<v Speaker 1>sixteen seventeen to sixteen nineteen. The English Puritans, who arrived

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<v Speaker 1>the following year took it that God had cleared the

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<v Speaker 1>land for them. During the sixteen thirties, half of the

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<v Speaker 1>Iroquois Confederation and the Huron around the Great Lakes died

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<v Speaker 1>half in a decade. A single seventeen thirty eight outbreak

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<v Speaker 1>killed half of the Cherokee tribe in the Carolinas and

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<v Speaker 1>george Ja. In real numbers, these epidemics killed hundreds of

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<v Speaker 1>thousands to millions of people at a time. Imagine a

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<v Speaker 1>disease that can kill off of the people in your town.

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<v Speaker 1>It's no wonder, then, that smallpox is considered one of

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<v Speaker 1>the deadliest viruses in the history of humanity. It is

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<v Speaker 1>credited with killing half a billion people in the twentieth

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<v Speaker 1>century alone, the first eight tenths of the twentieth century,

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<v Speaker 1>I should say. Back in nineteen sixty six, the World

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<v Speaker 1>Health Organization of the u N led a global vaccination

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<v Speaker 1>campaign and by it declared smallpox eradicated from planet Earth.

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<v Speaker 1>This is a pretty big deal. Along with a cattle

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<v Speaker 1>disease called render pest that's related to the virus that

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<v Speaker 1>causes measles and humans, smallpox is the only contagious disease

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<v Speaker 1>humanity has ever managed to eradicate. Right now, there is

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<v Speaker 1>no living person earth who has a case of smallpox.

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<v Speaker 1>But that's not to say that the very ola virus

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<v Speaker 1>isn't still alive and well after the eradication campaign, the

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<v Speaker 1>u N persuaded the global scientific community to give up

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<v Speaker 1>its stocks of smallpox, and they were almost entirely successful,

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<v Speaker 1>save for two nations which just happened to be the

0:15:22.000 --> 0:15:25.560
<v Speaker 1>two most powerful on the planet, the nuclear superpowers the

0:15:25.560 --> 0:15:30.240
<v Speaker 1>Soviet Union in the United States. Those two nations decided

0:15:30.280 --> 0:15:32.560
<v Speaker 1>that it would be better for them to keep their

0:15:32.600 --> 0:15:37.880
<v Speaker 1>stocks rather than destroy them. Ostensibly this was for scientific research,

0:15:38.600 --> 0:15:41.840
<v Speaker 1>but both nations have been known to run illegal biological

0:15:41.840 --> 0:15:45.720
<v Speaker 1>warfare programs, and the idea of them maintaining stocks of

0:15:45.760 --> 0:15:49.640
<v Speaker 1>smallpox made the rest of the world uneasy. But this

0:15:49.800 --> 0:15:52.560
<v Speaker 1>being the height of the Cold War, no other nation

0:15:52.720 --> 0:15:55.760
<v Speaker 1>was in much of a position to argue, so all

0:15:55.800 --> 0:15:59.320
<v Speaker 1>smallpox samples on Earth would be stored under secure conditions

0:15:59.400 --> 0:16:03.360
<v Speaker 1>in two occasions. In Russia, they are stored at the

0:16:03.400 --> 0:16:08.280
<v Speaker 1>State Center for Research on Virology and Biotechnology in Siberia.

0:16:08.520 --> 0:16:10.760
<v Speaker 1>In the US, they are held at the Centers for

0:16:10.840 --> 0:16:16.080
<v Speaker 1>Disease Control and Prevention in Atlanta. Those two stockpiles still

0:16:16.120 --> 0:16:21.080
<v Speaker 1>exist today. On a number of occasions, the U n

0:16:21.120 --> 0:16:25.400
<v Speaker 1>again called for those stockpiles to be destroyed in two

0:16:25.400 --> 0:16:29.240
<v Speaker 1>thousand seven and most recently in two thousand eleven, and

0:16:29.240 --> 0:16:32.440
<v Speaker 1>it also tried to create a global agreement that once

0:16:32.520 --> 0:16:36.760
<v Speaker 1>those final stocks were destroyed, any nation caught with smallpox

0:16:36.840 --> 0:16:41.160
<v Speaker 1>could be charged with the crime against humanity. Unfortunately, in

0:16:41.200 --> 0:16:45.760
<v Speaker 1>all cases, the un failed and the smallpox stocks remained intact.

0:16:47.360 --> 0:16:51.280
<v Speaker 1>Contagious disease researchers are divided on the wisdom of keeping

0:16:51.320 --> 0:16:55.120
<v Speaker 1>these stocks. The US and Russia continue to argue that

0:16:55.160 --> 0:16:58.360
<v Speaker 1>we need to study Bariola so we can understand how

0:16:58.400 --> 0:17:03.160
<v Speaker 1>the virus coevolved with our immune system. Hopefully we can

0:17:03.240 --> 0:17:07.119
<v Speaker 1>use that knowledge to cure and prevent other diseases. The

0:17:07.200 --> 0:17:11.360
<v Speaker 1>logic goes that if nature made smallpox from say, camel pox,

0:17:11.840 --> 0:17:16.280
<v Speaker 1>it could create another pox on humanity. Studying smallpox could

0:17:16.320 --> 0:17:20.480
<v Speaker 1>help us prepare for that. To plenty of other researchers, though,

0:17:20.680 --> 0:17:23.639
<v Speaker 1>eradicating the very ola virus from the wild only to

0:17:23.720 --> 0:17:27.800
<v Speaker 1>keep hundreds of samples of it in laboratories is madness.

0:17:28.840 --> 0:17:32.600
<v Speaker 1>But regardless of where contagious disease researchers fall on the matter,

0:17:33.280 --> 0:17:36.880
<v Speaker 1>most dismissed the idea of a small pox epidemic as

0:17:36.920 --> 0:17:40.640
<v Speaker 1>being a genuine threat to humanity. It could be utterly

0:17:40.720 --> 0:17:44.359
<v Speaker 1>catastrophic for any community where the virus showed up, true,

0:17:44.760 --> 0:17:48.720
<v Speaker 1>and that is bad enough. But because smallpox requires close

0:17:48.760 --> 0:17:52.800
<v Speaker 1>contact for transmission, it would be relatively easy to contain

0:17:52.840 --> 0:17:55.760
<v Speaker 1>an outbreak and cut off the possibility of a pandemic.

0:17:56.520 --> 0:18:00.120
<v Speaker 1>It almost certainly does not pose an existential threat to humanity.

0:18:00.960 --> 0:18:04.480
<v Speaker 1>One that does, the one that keeps researchers awake at night,

0:18:05.320 --> 0:18:20.000
<v Speaker 1>is the flu. Influenza is a common virus among humans.

0:18:20.560 --> 0:18:27.160
<v Speaker 1>It also infects a lot of other animals too, like pigs, birds, seals, bats, horses, rodents,

0:18:27.480 --> 0:18:31.520
<v Speaker 1>among others. The different types of flu are described and

0:18:31.560 --> 0:18:35.000
<v Speaker 1>classified based on the two types of proteins found on

0:18:35.080 --> 0:18:40.440
<v Speaker 1>the viruses outer envelope he magluten in and neuraminides. It's

0:18:40.480 --> 0:18:44.879
<v Speaker 1>called the h X n Y naming convention, so you

0:18:45.000 --> 0:18:48.000
<v Speaker 1>end up with flu names like H five and two.

0:18:49.240 --> 0:18:52.119
<v Speaker 1>The flu typically has one of two traits when it

0:18:52.200 --> 0:18:56.920
<v Speaker 1>comes to infecting us. It's either extremely deadly or it's

0:18:57.000 --> 0:19:01.680
<v Speaker 1>extremely contagious. But once in a while, those two traits

0:19:01.760 --> 0:19:05.640
<v Speaker 1>co evolved within a single virus, and the results can

0:19:05.680 --> 0:19:13.720
<v Speaker 1>be catastrophic. November eleventh, nineteen eighteen, was a chilly, drizzly

0:19:13.800 --> 0:19:17.200
<v Speaker 1>day in Compiegne, a town in the north of France,

0:19:17.600 --> 0:19:21.119
<v Speaker 1>where representatives of the Allied Nations met with the leaders

0:19:21.119 --> 0:19:24.119
<v Speaker 1>of Germany to sign the armistice that ended the First

0:19:24.160 --> 0:19:28.600
<v Speaker 1>World War from nineteen fourteen and nineteen eighteen, what was

0:19:28.640 --> 0:19:31.160
<v Speaker 1>then called the Great War, claimed the lives of more

0:19:31.200 --> 0:19:37.080
<v Speaker 1>than eighteen million people, soldiers and civilians. But as the

0:19:37.200 --> 0:19:41.879
<v Speaker 1>armistice was being signed, another even deadlier killer than warfare

0:19:42.359 --> 0:19:45.160
<v Speaker 1>was making short work of human lives around the globe.

0:19:45.840 --> 0:19:50.600
<v Speaker 1>Type A H one and one influenza, the Spanish flu.

0:19:52.440 --> 0:19:56.960
<v Speaker 1>In the span of just four months from September through

0:19:57.000 --> 0:20:03.919
<v Speaker 1>December eighteen, fifty million people perhaps more died around the

0:20:03.960 --> 0:20:08.439
<v Speaker 1>world from this new and deadly strain of flu. It

0:20:08.600 --> 0:20:12.160
<v Speaker 1>killed like a bird flu and spread like a seasonal flu,

0:20:12.359 --> 0:20:17.080
<v Speaker 1>and those two qualities combined made it an extraordinarily dangerous virus.

0:20:17.840 --> 0:20:21.280
<v Speaker 1>As much as one third of the entire population of

0:20:21.280 --> 0:20:25.359
<v Speaker 1>the world was infected by it that season. It took

0:20:25.440 --> 0:20:29.160
<v Speaker 1>its heaviest toll on the young people under twenty five,

0:20:29.320 --> 0:20:32.159
<v Speaker 1>whose immune systems had never been exposed to an H

0:20:32.240 --> 0:20:35.920
<v Speaker 1>one and one strain before. Many young people who had

0:20:35.960 --> 0:20:40.080
<v Speaker 1>been the picture of health just days before died suffocating

0:20:40.080 --> 0:20:42.600
<v Speaker 1>on a bloody froth that they were too weak to

0:20:42.720 --> 0:20:47.000
<v Speaker 1>cough from their airways. In some cases, people died within

0:20:47.119 --> 0:20:52.200
<v Speaker 1>hours of their symptoms first appearing, then just as fast

0:20:52.200 --> 0:20:55.720
<v Speaker 1>as it began. The epidemic ended by the summer of

0:20:55.800 --> 0:20:59.640
<v Speaker 1>nineteen the flu had burned itself through the global population,

0:21:00.000 --> 0:21:03.800
<v Speaker 1>and it disappeared. It almost certainly evolved into a new

0:21:03.880 --> 0:21:06.679
<v Speaker 1>strain of flu that was far less deadly, and for

0:21:06.720 --> 0:21:10.119
<v Speaker 1>all intents and purposes, the Spanish flu that had been

0:21:10.160 --> 0:21:14.960
<v Speaker 1>such a killer of people went extinct. Where the Spanish

0:21:14.960 --> 0:21:19.000
<v Speaker 1>flu came from remains a mystery. Initially, it was thought

0:21:19.000 --> 0:21:23.360
<v Speaker 1>to have originated in Spain, hence the name. Other research

0:21:23.440 --> 0:21:27.960
<v Speaker 1>that came later implicated China. China and Southeast Asia are

0:21:28.000 --> 0:21:31.280
<v Speaker 1>commonly the source of bird flues the type that includes

0:21:31.320 --> 0:21:35.680
<v Speaker 1>the Spanish flu. But one theory traces the eighteen flu

0:21:35.960 --> 0:21:38.879
<v Speaker 1>back to Haskell County, Missouri, to one of the area's

0:21:38.920 --> 0:21:44.360
<v Speaker 1>plentiful chicken farms, where it disappeared to is equally mysterious.

0:21:45.240 --> 0:21:49.199
<v Speaker 1>For decades, researchers pined for a sample of the eighteen

0:21:49.280 --> 0:21:52.639
<v Speaker 1>strain to study in search of answers to questions about it.

0:21:53.400 --> 0:21:56.119
<v Speaker 1>The Spanish flu was the one that got away, a

0:21:56.200 --> 0:22:00.840
<v Speaker 1>vicious killer that the epidemiological and medical communities were helpless

0:22:00.880 --> 0:22:04.840
<v Speaker 1>to defend against, leaving no trace of itself aside from

0:22:04.880 --> 0:22:10.600
<v Speaker 1>the dead in its wake. And then in nine microbiologist

0:22:10.760 --> 0:22:14.560
<v Speaker 1>Johann Holton recovered a sample of the nineteen eighteen Spanish

0:22:14.600 --> 0:22:18.320
<v Speaker 1>flu from where it was entombed in the Alaskan tundra.

0:22:20.560 --> 0:22:24.000
<v Speaker 1>The tiny town of Brevig Mission, Alaska, had just eighty

0:22:24.040 --> 0:22:27.240
<v Speaker 1>residents when the Spanish flu came to town in nineteen eighteen,

0:22:27.640 --> 0:22:31.399
<v Speaker 1>mostly Native and up at Eskimos. In just a couple

0:22:31.440 --> 0:22:35.879
<v Speaker 1>of months, seventy two of the eighty died. A group

0:22:35.920 --> 0:22:38.800
<v Speaker 1>of gold miners were hired by the survivors to come

0:22:38.840 --> 0:22:41.720
<v Speaker 1>dig a mass grave for the bodies and enter them

0:22:41.720 --> 0:22:46.680
<v Speaker 1>in the perma frost. They lay undisturbed until nineteen fifty one.

0:22:47.600 --> 0:22:51.520
<v Speaker 1>That year, Johan Holton arrived and asked the tribe's permission

0:22:51.800 --> 0:22:55.600
<v Speaker 1>to break the grave open. In their frozen tomb, the

0:22:55.680 --> 0:22:59.920
<v Speaker 1>victims were preserved mummified in a way, and Holton reasoned

0:23:00.040 --> 0:23:02.400
<v Speaker 1>that the flu virus that killed them maybe as well.

0:23:03.520 --> 0:23:06.600
<v Speaker 1>Through a slow process. In nineteen fifty one and then

0:23:06.640 --> 0:23:11.919
<v Speaker 1>again in Holton opened the grave twice. He built a

0:23:11.960 --> 0:23:15.560
<v Speaker 1>fire to thaw the permafrost below, Then he excavated the

0:23:15.600 --> 0:23:19.320
<v Speaker 1>thawed soil. When he reached frozen ground again, he built

0:23:19.359 --> 0:23:24.920
<v Speaker 1>another fire. Finally, on his second attempt, in he managed

0:23:24.960 --> 0:23:28.320
<v Speaker 1>to call a living sample of the H one and

0:23:28.400 --> 0:23:31.440
<v Speaker 1>one virus from the lung tissue of one of its

0:23:31.440 --> 0:23:36.679
<v Speaker 1>preserved victims. In a few years, researchers cobbled together the

0:23:36.720 --> 0:23:40.879
<v Speaker 1>genome of the virus. They synthesized it, and inserted the

0:23:40.920 --> 0:23:46.600
<v Speaker 1>genetic material into a living cell. The Spanish flu lived

0:23:46.680 --> 0:23:50.840
<v Speaker 1>once more. That researcher thought that was a useful line

0:23:50.840 --> 0:23:56.199
<v Speaker 1>of inquiry, and there were other researchers who vehemently disagreed

0:23:56.440 --> 0:24:02.280
<v Speaker 1>and thought it was a um an extraordinarily reckless thing

0:24:02.359 --> 0:24:06.600
<v Speaker 1>to do. That is Beth Willis. She founded an organization

0:24:06.760 --> 0:24:11.960
<v Speaker 1>that agitated for increased transparency from the government's biological labs

0:24:11.960 --> 0:24:17.040
<v Speaker 1>in Frederick, Maryland, her community. The biotech field is not

0:24:17.240 --> 0:24:21.920
<v Speaker 1>like other fields that pose existential risks. Like other fields,

0:24:21.960 --> 0:24:24.760
<v Speaker 1>the research is dual use. It can be used to

0:24:24.800 --> 0:24:29.080
<v Speaker 1>help or harm humanity. But unlike research in other fields

0:24:29.119 --> 0:24:32.080
<v Speaker 1>like AI, which has yet to become clear to most

0:24:32.080 --> 0:24:36.080
<v Speaker 1>people that it poses an existential risk, working with deadly

0:24:36.119 --> 0:24:40.600
<v Speaker 1>pathogens is understood as dangerous work by people inside the

0:24:40.600 --> 0:24:46.439
<v Speaker 1>biotech field and out. There's no ambiguity. But despite the

0:24:46.480 --> 0:24:50.560
<v Speaker 1>inherent danger of working with deadly pathogens. The field has

0:24:50.560 --> 0:24:54.600
<v Speaker 1>shown that it's willing to take potentially catastrophic risks in

0:24:54.640 --> 0:24:58.520
<v Speaker 1>the name of research, and it's frequently divided over what

0:24:58.720 --> 0:25:03.359
<v Speaker 1>risks are acceptable and which are not. One area that

0:25:03.440 --> 0:25:08.240
<v Speaker 1>divides the field is gain of function research. Wherever the

0:25:08.280 --> 0:25:11.920
<v Speaker 1>Spanish flu came from, it almost certainly evolved from an

0:25:11.920 --> 0:25:15.119
<v Speaker 1>avian variety of flu that mixed with one more common

0:25:15.119 --> 0:25:20.040
<v Speaker 1>to humans through a process called reassortment. That's the ability

0:25:20.040 --> 0:25:23.639
<v Speaker 1>of viruses to swap genetic material with other viruses that

0:25:23.680 --> 0:25:27.000
<v Speaker 1>are also living in the same host. What comes out

0:25:27.040 --> 0:25:29.760
<v Speaker 1>can be a virus that is a genetic failure, which

0:25:29.800 --> 0:25:33.240
<v Speaker 1>may be unable to survive or copy itself, or it

0:25:33.240 --> 0:25:36.600
<v Speaker 1>could produce a deadly inefficient killer of humans. It's a

0:25:36.640 --> 0:25:40.840
<v Speaker 1>genetic crap shoot. When a virus mutates or adapts in

0:25:40.880 --> 0:25:44.200
<v Speaker 1>some way that makes it more efficient at infecting hosts,

0:25:44.560 --> 0:25:48.760
<v Speaker 1>it is said to have gained function. Studying these mutations,

0:25:49.040 --> 0:25:53.200
<v Speaker 1>how they take place, what mutations lead to which characteristics.

0:25:53.240 --> 0:25:57.880
<v Speaker 1>That's gain of function research. By studying how influenza evolves,

0:25:58.320 --> 0:26:02.879
<v Speaker 1>epidemiologists can get better at predicting what flu viruses have

0:26:03.040 --> 0:26:08.040
<v Speaker 1>pandemic potential before they reach that level of deadliness, and

0:26:08.040 --> 0:26:10.960
<v Speaker 1>there are two ways to do this. The most common

0:26:11.000 --> 0:26:14.560
<v Speaker 1>method is to capture wild flu viruses in store them

0:26:14.600 --> 0:26:19.439
<v Speaker 1>in a state of suspended animation, which usually involves freezing them.

0:26:19.560 --> 0:26:22.360
<v Speaker 1>Later on, when new viruses are caught that have evolved

0:26:22.359 --> 0:26:26.280
<v Speaker 1>from that same genetic line, researchers can compare the genomes

0:26:26.280 --> 0:26:29.160
<v Speaker 1>of the older strain to the current strain and see

0:26:29.160 --> 0:26:33.400
<v Speaker 1>how the virus has mutated. This is slow and laborious

0:26:33.440 --> 0:26:37.200
<v Speaker 1>work and frustrating lee it relies on the rate of

0:26:37.320 --> 0:26:42.320
<v Speaker 1>nature for evolutionary changes to take place, so some researchers

0:26:42.359 --> 0:26:46.960
<v Speaker 1>are increasingly using another method where they hasten evolution and

0:26:47.040 --> 0:26:50.040
<v Speaker 1>they forced the mutation of new and novel flu strains

0:26:50.080 --> 0:26:55.040
<v Speaker 1>to study gain a function. Research itself is uh effort

0:26:55.080 --> 0:27:02.320
<v Speaker 1>by researchers to increase the virulence or the infectiousness of

0:27:02.359 --> 0:27:09.399
<v Speaker 1>a panthogen and potentially to decrease its ability to respond

0:27:09.640 --> 0:27:15.800
<v Speaker 1>to countermeasures to treatment. That second, riskier method has become

0:27:15.800 --> 0:27:20.439
<v Speaker 1>a hot button issue in microbiology lately. In two thousand eleven,

0:27:20.720 --> 0:27:25.480
<v Speaker 1>two separate research groups working independently, one Dutch and one American,

0:27:26.000 --> 0:27:29.480
<v Speaker 1>stunned the world when they announced that each had forced

0:27:29.520 --> 0:27:33.359
<v Speaker 1>the mutation of an extremely deadly strain of flu, the

0:27:33.680 --> 0:27:38.080
<v Speaker 1>H five and one avian flu, and created an entirely

0:27:38.160 --> 0:27:42.199
<v Speaker 1>new version that is easily transmitted from mammal to mammal.

0:27:43.160 --> 0:27:47.600
<v Speaker 1>In nature, the H five N one virus mainly infects birds.

0:27:47.720 --> 0:27:50.320
<v Speaker 1>It has rarely made the jump to humans, and even

0:27:50.359 --> 0:27:53.439
<v Speaker 1>then only to those who have spent prolonged periods in

0:27:53.440 --> 0:27:58.000
<v Speaker 1>close contact with sick birds, like poultry workers when it

0:27:58.040 --> 0:28:01.800
<v Speaker 1>has made the jump. Though the virus has been astoundingly lethal,

0:28:02.680 --> 0:28:05.760
<v Speaker 1>H five and one has a mortality rate among humans

0:28:06.040 --> 0:28:10.840
<v Speaker 1>of between sixty eight. The only upside to H five

0:28:10.920 --> 0:28:14.000
<v Speaker 1>and one is that it doesn't easily spread among people.

0:28:15.200 --> 0:28:18.119
<v Speaker 1>In the late nine nineties, the world held its breath

0:28:18.440 --> 0:28:21.320
<v Speaker 1>when several hundred cases of H five and one avian

0:28:21.359 --> 0:28:25.119
<v Speaker 1>flu broke out among poultry workers in Asia, but the

0:28:25.160 --> 0:28:29.520
<v Speaker 1>global avian flu pandemic never came, and aside from the

0:28:29.520 --> 0:28:32.879
<v Speaker 1>obvious that the virus just simply lack the ability to

0:28:32.960 --> 0:28:37.640
<v Speaker 1>transmit from person to person, researchers couldn't exactly say why

0:28:37.760 --> 0:28:42.680
<v Speaker 1>the pandemic never happened, So microbiologists began to look for

0:28:42.760 --> 0:28:46.560
<v Speaker 1>answers by forcing a gain of function in H five

0:28:46.720 --> 0:28:50.160
<v Speaker 1>and one. One of the two groups that did this

0:28:50.520 --> 0:28:54.520
<v Speaker 1>was from the University of Rotterdam in the Netherlands. They

0:28:54.560 --> 0:28:58.880
<v Speaker 1>forced multiple mutations within the virus, speeding up its evolution,

0:28:59.520 --> 0:29:03.320
<v Speaker 1>and then inserted the mutated virus into the noses of ferrets.

0:29:04.080 --> 0:29:06.920
<v Speaker 1>Ferrets are commonly seen as one of the best animals

0:29:06.960 --> 0:29:11.320
<v Speaker 1>to model humans. Then they transferred nasal fluid from those

0:29:11.360 --> 0:29:16.040
<v Speaker 1>infected ferrets to the noses of other ferrets. That second

0:29:16.080 --> 0:29:20.520
<v Speaker 1>group of ferrets became sick as expected, but alarmingly, the

0:29:20.640 --> 0:29:23.800
<v Speaker 1>second group passed the virus along to others without the

0:29:23.840 --> 0:29:29.120
<v Speaker 1>aid of researchers through sneezes and costs, just like humans would.

0:29:30.040 --> 0:29:33.640
<v Speaker 1>That really alarmed the virology community. I would say that

0:29:33.680 --> 0:29:36.080
<v Speaker 1>at least four to one people are against doing that

0:29:36.160 --> 0:29:39.360
<v Speaker 1>kind of research. This is Dr Lynn Clots. He's a

0:29:39.440 --> 0:29:42.960
<v Speaker 1>senior Science Fellow for Biosecurity at the Center for Arms

0:29:43.000 --> 0:29:47.280
<v Speaker 1>Control and Non Proliferation. Those two labs had brought to

0:29:47.360 --> 0:29:50.600
<v Speaker 1>life a novel lab created strain of one of the

0:29:50.720 --> 0:29:54.400
<v Speaker 1>deadliest flus known on Earth and given it the entirely

0:29:54.480 --> 0:29:58.800
<v Speaker 1>new ability to pass easily from person to person, and

0:29:58.920 --> 0:30:05.960
<v Speaker 1>now it's sat in their freezers. When the labs announced

0:30:06.000 --> 0:30:11.640
<v Speaker 1>their experiments, outrage erupted. In reaction, the field of microbiology

0:30:11.760 --> 0:30:15.080
<v Speaker 1>issued a two year long ban on high risk experiments

0:30:15.320 --> 0:30:19.800
<v Speaker 1>with flu viruses, and the fault line developed between scientists

0:30:19.880 --> 0:30:23.040
<v Speaker 1>who believed that force mutation gain of function research was

0:30:23.120 --> 0:30:27.800
<v Speaker 1>needed and necessary to stave off potential pandemics and those

0:30:27.840 --> 0:30:32.280
<v Speaker 1>who considered the research unjustifiably risky. The people who carried

0:30:32.320 --> 0:30:36.680
<v Speaker 1>out these experiments were cowboys, in the words of one microbiologist.

0:30:38.160 --> 0:30:41.720
<v Speaker 1>There was also the issue of censorship. Both of the

0:30:41.800 --> 0:30:45.560
<v Speaker 1>experiments were expected to be published, which would provide, in

0:30:45.600 --> 0:30:49.640
<v Speaker 1>the opinion of some researchers, essentially a how to guide

0:30:49.960 --> 0:30:54.960
<v Speaker 1>to creating the experimental extraordinarily deadly virus. So there were

0:30:55.000 --> 0:30:58.960
<v Speaker 1>calls for the two major English language scientific journals, Science

0:30:59.320 --> 0:31:03.600
<v Speaker 1>and Nature not to publish the studies, and those calls

0:31:03.640 --> 0:31:07.760
<v Speaker 1>were heated for a time. But scientists tend to bristle

0:31:07.920 --> 0:31:11.920
<v Speaker 1>at the idea of science being censored, and understandably so,

0:31:12.720 --> 0:31:15.720
<v Speaker 1>findings are meant to be shared among everyone in order

0:31:15.760 --> 0:31:20.320
<v Speaker 1>to advance human understanding. That's how science works. The trouble is,

0:31:20.760 --> 0:31:24.600
<v Speaker 1>once it's out there, the information can be accessed by anyone,

0:31:24.880 --> 0:31:28.000
<v Speaker 1>including people who would use it to inflict harm, and

0:31:28.080 --> 0:31:31.080
<v Speaker 1>in the case of the detailed description of exactly how

0:31:31.120 --> 0:31:34.520
<v Speaker 1>to transform H five and one virus into one that

0:31:34.680 --> 0:31:38.440
<v Speaker 1>is easily transmitted among mammals, that harm could be profound.

0:31:39.480 --> 0:31:43.680
<v Speaker 1>The experiments were the very definition of dual use research.

0:31:45.920 --> 0:31:48.880
<v Speaker 1>But repressed knowledge has a way of getting out, regardless

0:31:49.040 --> 0:31:52.560
<v Speaker 1>of our greatest efforts, a point that was proven shortly

0:31:52.600 --> 0:31:56.600
<v Speaker 1>after the moratorium ended when a team of microbiologists in

0:31:56.720 --> 0:32:00.680
<v Speaker 1>China announced they had successfully crossed the hive and one

0:32:00.800 --> 0:32:04.640
<v Speaker 1>virus with the less deadly but easily transmitted H one

0:32:04.680 --> 0:32:09.600
<v Speaker 1>and one virus, creating a genetically altered superbug of their own.

0:32:10.880 --> 0:32:13.400
<v Speaker 1>If any of the virus is created by the Chinese,

0:32:13.640 --> 0:32:17.760
<v Speaker 1>American or Dutch groups were introduced into the general population,

0:32:18.400 --> 0:32:22.960
<v Speaker 1>the effects would be monumentally bad, potentially on the order

0:32:23.080 --> 0:32:28.400
<v Speaker 1>of an extinction level event for humanity, and so with

0:32:28.480 --> 0:32:31.880
<v Speaker 1>the aim of preventing just such a catastrophe, the field

0:32:31.920 --> 0:32:35.520
<v Speaker 1>of biosecurity has emerged to consider how something like that

0:32:35.560 --> 0:32:39.959
<v Speaker 1>could happen. There is the obvious, the ever looming specter

0:32:40.040 --> 0:32:44.080
<v Speaker 1>of terrorism. A radicalized lab employee or one who is

0:32:44.120 --> 0:32:48.600
<v Speaker 1>desperate for money, a disgruntled researcher or someone looking to

0:32:48.640 --> 0:32:52.320
<v Speaker 1>prove their abilities. Any of these people could make an

0:32:52.320 --> 0:32:55.480
<v Speaker 1>excellent candidate for the release of what are called potential

0:32:55.600 --> 0:33:00.440
<v Speaker 1>pandemic pathogens, which are exactly what they sound like. Some

0:33:00.600 --> 0:33:04.760
<v Speaker 1>biosecurity experts are also concerned that some of the smallpox

0:33:04.880 --> 0:33:10.840
<v Speaker 1>in the Soviet Union stockpiles was lost after the country dissolved. Really, though,

0:33:11.000 --> 0:33:13.640
<v Speaker 1>a bio terrorists doesn't need to have access to a

0:33:13.720 --> 0:33:18.200
<v Speaker 1>lab that stockpiles pathogens. The main concern over publishing that

0:33:18.480 --> 0:33:21.400
<v Speaker 1>H five and one how to Guide the journal Science

0:33:21.440 --> 0:33:24.960
<v Speaker 1>eventually published it in full, was that the information would

0:33:25.000 --> 0:33:28.960
<v Speaker 1>fall into the hands of someone well versed in microbiology

0:33:29.000 --> 0:33:32.960
<v Speaker 1>with enough resources and few enough scruples to create the

0:33:33.040 --> 0:33:37.040
<v Speaker 1>virus outside of any formal lab or oversight and then

0:33:37.160 --> 0:33:43.920
<v Speaker 1>release it. That idea is rather unsettling, but many microbiologists

0:33:44.080 --> 0:33:47.640
<v Speaker 1>considered it barely more than an urban legend, something the

0:33:47.680 --> 0:33:50.840
<v Speaker 1>media ran with to scare the public into watching the news.

0:33:51.760 --> 0:33:55.800
<v Speaker 1>That is until two thousand and sixteen, when scientists from

0:33:55.840 --> 0:33:59.240
<v Speaker 1>the University of Alberta announced that they had created the

0:33:59.320 --> 0:34:03.720
<v Speaker 1>virus that as his horse pox from scratch, using only

0:34:03.760 --> 0:34:08.600
<v Speaker 1>snippets of genetic material called oglio nucleotides that they ordered

0:34:08.760 --> 0:34:12.760
<v Speaker 1>retail over the internet. It costs the team a hundred

0:34:12.760 --> 0:34:16.120
<v Speaker 1>thousand dollars and took six months to create a living,

0:34:16.400 --> 0:34:22.440
<v Speaker 1>infectious virus. The University of Alberta experiment showed that it

0:34:22.480 --> 0:34:25.719
<v Speaker 1>was now possible for a d I Y biologist to

0:34:25.840 --> 0:34:30.480
<v Speaker 1>create viruses in bacteria through the emerging field of synthetic biology.

0:34:31.960 --> 0:34:35.759
<v Speaker 1>Rather than attempting expensive and time consuming experiments to force

0:34:35.840 --> 0:34:38.880
<v Speaker 1>mutations in a virus over and over and hope that

0:34:38.960 --> 0:34:42.080
<v Speaker 1>it evolves in a way that you wanted to, synthetic

0:34:42.080 --> 0:34:46.000
<v Speaker 1>biology allows researchers to create exactly the kind of organism

0:34:46.040 --> 0:34:50.240
<v Speaker 1>they're looking for by designing and building it denovo, which

0:34:50.400 --> 0:34:55.759
<v Speaker 1>essentially means in Latin from scratch. Synthetic biology emerged from

0:34:55.800 --> 0:34:59.920
<v Speaker 1>genetic engineering, which revolutionized the world by creating the ability

0:35:00.080 --> 0:35:05.560
<v Speaker 1>to cut and splice genes between organisms. Synthetic biology combines

0:35:05.640 --> 0:35:10.000
<v Speaker 1>genetic engineering with the goal of streamlining life into a

0:35:10.080 --> 0:35:14.280
<v Speaker 1>more predictable, reliable, efficient version of what's found in nature.

0:35:15.200 --> 0:35:19.480
<v Speaker 1>What synthetic biology does actually is make literal use of

0:35:19.520 --> 0:35:25.040
<v Speaker 1>the building blocks of life. Eventually, synthetic biology aims to

0:35:25.080 --> 0:35:28.919
<v Speaker 1>create a database of genomic codes that, when inserted into

0:35:28.960 --> 0:35:33.440
<v Speaker 1>an organism will produce a predictable trait. So this snippet

0:35:33.560 --> 0:35:37.000
<v Speaker 1>is a gene that codes for proteins that creates bioluminescence,

0:35:37.440 --> 0:35:39.759
<v Speaker 1>and when you insert it into E. Col I, it

0:35:39.800 --> 0:35:42.920
<v Speaker 1>will make the bacterium glow like a firefly, which is

0:35:42.960 --> 0:35:47.960
<v Speaker 1>pretty neat. The common analogy is lego bricks. The synthetic

0:35:48.000 --> 0:35:52.880
<v Speaker 1>biology community calls their genetic snippets bio bricks, but instead

0:35:52.920 --> 0:35:58.239
<v Speaker 1>of plastic blocks, synthetic biologists use genes snapped together, as

0:35:58.239 --> 0:36:02.840
<v Speaker 1>it were, to radically alter existing species, or to even

0:36:02.880 --> 0:36:08.520
<v Speaker 1>create entirely new ones that have never existed before. Synthetic

0:36:08.520 --> 0:36:13.960
<v Speaker 1>biology will eventually democratize biotechnology, making it easier for people

0:36:14.000 --> 0:36:18.040
<v Speaker 1>to enter the field, and this effort is already underway.

0:36:18.400 --> 0:36:21.560
<v Speaker 1>M I T maintains a database of bio bricks that

0:36:21.640 --> 0:36:25.040
<v Speaker 1>anyone can access. Find the gene that produces the trade

0:36:25.040 --> 0:36:28.480
<v Speaker 1>you're looking for, copy the genomic code of that gene,

0:36:28.560 --> 0:36:31.480
<v Speaker 1>and paste it into the order form of an online

0:36:31.480 --> 0:36:35.600
<v Speaker 1>genetic synthesis lab. They will produce those snippets of DNA

0:36:35.840 --> 0:36:39.840
<v Speaker 1>or glio nucleotides from simple sugars, which you can then

0:36:39.920 --> 0:36:43.920
<v Speaker 1>insert into a host organism, transforming it into a creation

0:36:44.640 --> 0:36:49.759
<v Speaker 1>utterly outside of nature. This ability to create organisms from

0:36:49.800 --> 0:36:55.080
<v Speaker 1>scratch at home basically could be very beneficial for humanity,

0:36:55.960 --> 0:36:59.200
<v Speaker 1>but it also poses huge new risks that have yet

0:36:59.239 --> 0:37:03.840
<v Speaker 1>to be explored. Still, the idea of something like a

0:37:03.960 --> 0:37:09.160
<v Speaker 1>rogue biologist creating a lethal virus DiNovo and releasing it

0:37:09.320 --> 0:37:14.080
<v Speaker 1>under the human population occupies a very small place among

0:37:14.120 --> 0:37:17.680
<v Speaker 1>the worries of people in the bio security field. An

0:37:17.680 --> 0:37:32.839
<v Speaker 1>accidental release, they say, is much more likely. Imagine that

0:37:32.960 --> 0:37:36.759
<v Speaker 1>you're working in a bio safety level for research lab

0:37:37.120 --> 0:37:41.520
<v Speaker 1>that's the highest level containment facilitians, and you don't notice

0:37:41.800 --> 0:37:44.759
<v Speaker 1>that the space suit you're wearing in the lab has

0:37:44.800 --> 0:37:48.239
<v Speaker 1>a small terr in it. While you're working with a

0:37:48.280 --> 0:37:51.799
<v Speaker 1>genetically altered virus. You don't notice that it comes in

0:37:51.880 --> 0:37:55.560
<v Speaker 1>contact with the bare skin of your hand. After leaving

0:37:55.560 --> 0:37:58.640
<v Speaker 1>the lab, you take off your suit and you scratch

0:37:58.840 --> 0:38:02.680
<v Speaker 1>an itch around your nostril with your infected hand, and

0:38:02.760 --> 0:38:06.600
<v Speaker 1>the virus makes its toy into your body. You are

0:38:06.640 --> 0:38:12.400
<v Speaker 1>now infected. This particular virus has been altered to have

0:38:12.480 --> 0:38:16.480
<v Speaker 1>a short incubation period, the time between when you're infected

0:38:16.840 --> 0:38:21.120
<v Speaker 1>and when you can infect other people. Inside your lung tissue,

0:38:21.560 --> 0:38:25.080
<v Speaker 1>the virus has entered a respiratory cell and injected its

0:38:25.120 --> 0:38:29.800
<v Speaker 1>own genetic material. The cell begins to replicate the virus.

0:38:30.640 --> 0:38:32.960
<v Speaker 1>In the matter of a second, a million or more

0:38:33.000 --> 0:38:36.800
<v Speaker 1>copies of the virus are produced. They rupture the hijack

0:38:36.920 --> 0:38:41.640
<v Speaker 1>cell and spread out, infecting other nearby respiratory cells, where

0:38:41.640 --> 0:38:47.760
<v Speaker 1>the process begins again. Now you're contagious. With each breath

0:38:47.920 --> 0:38:52.680
<v Speaker 1>you expel respiratory aerosols water vapor laced with the virus

0:38:52.719 --> 0:38:57.000
<v Speaker 1>from your body into the air where others breathe. Your

0:38:57.080 --> 0:39:01.160
<v Speaker 1>saliva and your nasal fluid are both infectious, but with

0:39:01.200 --> 0:39:05.240
<v Speaker 1>this particular virus. The time between when you become infectious

0:39:05.280 --> 0:39:08.000
<v Speaker 1>and the padrome, the time when you first begin to

0:39:08.000 --> 0:39:12.000
<v Speaker 1>feel symptoms, is more than twenty four hours, And during

0:39:12.040 --> 0:39:15.760
<v Speaker 1>that time you live your life. You take the subway

0:39:15.800 --> 0:39:19.200
<v Speaker 1>to work and back. You hold onto poles in the

0:39:19.239 --> 0:39:23.600
<v Speaker 1>train cars. You chat and laugh with your coworkers. You

0:39:23.680 --> 0:39:27.120
<v Speaker 1>spend time with friends in a crowded bar. All the

0:39:27.120 --> 0:39:32.800
<v Speaker 1>while you shake hands, give hugs, touch door handles, breathe, laugh,

0:39:33.840 --> 0:39:38.200
<v Speaker 1>You spread the virus to other people. By the time

0:39:38.239 --> 0:39:41.560
<v Speaker 1>the first signs of illness appear, you have infected five

0:39:41.600 --> 0:39:44.719
<v Speaker 1>of the people you've come in contact with. Each of

0:39:44.760 --> 0:39:47.719
<v Speaker 1>those people spread out and infect an average of three

0:39:47.800 --> 0:39:52.000
<v Speaker 1>more people, and so on and so on. Some of

0:39:52.000 --> 0:39:58.200
<v Speaker 1>those infected people have business overseas in Europe, South America, Asia,

0:39:58.640 --> 0:40:02.680
<v Speaker 1>they leave the country, they cough in airplanes, they shake

0:40:02.719 --> 0:40:06.440
<v Speaker 1>hands too, they drink from cups that get cleared away.

0:40:06.920 --> 0:40:10.280
<v Speaker 1>They spread the virus to other people around the world.

0:40:11.640 --> 0:40:15.000
<v Speaker 1>Each of the infected people creates a new branch in

0:40:15.040 --> 0:40:19.840
<v Speaker 1>an ever expanding chain of infection that epidemiologists have a

0:40:20.120 --> 0:40:25.000
<v Speaker 1>very short time to contain. If that genetically altered virus

0:40:25.160 --> 0:40:31.560
<v Speaker 1>is easily spread, the epidemiologists may fail a pandemic magnite,

0:40:32.360 --> 0:40:35.400
<v Speaker 1>and if that virus is also highly virulent with a

0:40:35.480 --> 0:40:40.160
<v Speaker 1>high mortality rate, the pandemic could be an existential threat.

0:40:43.239 --> 0:40:46.960
<v Speaker 1>What makes this worst case scenario so unnerving is the

0:40:47.000 --> 0:40:52.000
<v Speaker 1>biotech field's real life track record of accidental releases. In

0:40:52.040 --> 0:40:55.520
<v Speaker 1>addition to a willingness to take huge risks in its research,

0:40:55.960 --> 0:41:01.200
<v Speaker 1>the field is also dangerously accident prone. That very situation

0:41:01.239 --> 0:41:04.920
<v Speaker 1>I've just described happened in two thousand four when a

0:41:05.000 --> 0:41:08.520
<v Speaker 1>worker handling the coronavirus at a c DC lab in

0:41:08.600 --> 0:41:14.240
<v Speaker 1>Beijing became infective with Stars, a deadly and contagious respiratory illness.

0:41:15.160 --> 0:41:18.319
<v Speaker 1>Although the virus killed only one person, it managed to

0:41:18.360 --> 0:41:20.719
<v Speaker 1>make it all the way to Hong Kong and Canada

0:41:21.080 --> 0:41:25.280
<v Speaker 1>before it was contained. The two thousand four Stars outbreak

0:41:25.640 --> 0:41:32.680
<v Speaker 1>resulted from an incorrectly inactivated virus in a biosafety level

0:41:32.760 --> 0:41:36.080
<v Speaker 1>three or four lab. The suits that workers have to

0:41:36.080 --> 0:41:39.080
<v Speaker 1>wear and the safety equipment they have to use is

0:41:39.200 --> 0:41:43.920
<v Speaker 1>cumbersome to say the least, but those protocols are necessary

0:41:43.960 --> 0:41:48.000
<v Speaker 1>for handling the deadliest pathogens, both to prevent the people

0:41:48.080 --> 0:41:51.680
<v Speaker 1>working with those pathogens from getting infected and to prevent

0:41:51.760 --> 0:41:55.760
<v Speaker 1>the pathogens from escaping the lab. So to get around

0:41:55.840 --> 0:41:59.919
<v Speaker 1>those highest level safety protocols, labs sometimes kill the path

0:42:00.040 --> 0:42:03.520
<v Speaker 1>legions they're working with, say by exposing them to dry

0:42:03.560 --> 0:42:08.400
<v Speaker 1>heat or changing their pH but the virus or bacterium

0:42:08.400 --> 0:42:13.000
<v Speaker 1>itself remains intact, so since it's now dead, it can

0:42:13.040 --> 0:42:16.680
<v Speaker 1>be rendered non infectious and studied in a lower level

0:42:16.719 --> 0:42:21.480
<v Speaker 1>containment lab, where safety requirements are much less stringent, making

0:42:21.520 --> 0:42:26.800
<v Speaker 1>the pathogen easier to work with. The problem is inactivation

0:42:27.000 --> 0:42:32.360
<v Speaker 1>isn't always effective. Some viruses simply don't die, and the

0:42:32.440 --> 0:42:38.239
<v Speaker 1>process is prone to human error. Accidental releases of incorrectly

0:42:38.400 --> 0:42:44.239
<v Speaker 1>inactivated viruses is disturbingly common. In fact, labs that work

0:42:44.280 --> 0:42:49.360
<v Speaker 1>with potential pandemic pathogens have a breathtakingly bad record of

0:42:49.400 --> 0:42:54.319
<v Speaker 1>accidental releases of all kinds. Just to pick a few,

0:42:55.400 --> 0:42:59.879
<v Speaker 1>in the flu season featured a strain of H one

0:43:00.040 --> 0:43:03.240
<v Speaker 1>and one that was almost genetically identical to a strain

0:43:03.560 --> 0:43:06.920
<v Speaker 1>that had last made the rounds about three decades earlier.

0:43:08.000 --> 0:43:11.839
<v Speaker 1>In evolutionary terms for a virus, three decades is an

0:43:11.840 --> 0:43:16.520
<v Speaker 1>epoch to us, any strain related to one from NIF

0:43:16.920 --> 0:43:20.319
<v Speaker 1>should have mutated so many times that it was no

0:43:20.440 --> 0:43:24.319
<v Speaker 1>longer even remotely possible it could be genetically identical to

0:43:24.360 --> 0:43:29.960
<v Speaker 1>the previous one. For years, scientists puzzled over this surprise reappearance,

0:43:30.480 --> 0:43:34.319
<v Speaker 1>considering and discarding theories, until they finally came to an

0:43:34.400 --> 0:43:39.680
<v Speaker 1>unsettling conclusion. The only reasonable way such a thing could

0:43:39.719 --> 0:43:43.160
<v Speaker 1>have happened as if the virus had entered some form

0:43:43.239 --> 0:43:47.640
<v Speaker 1>of suspended animation and then made its way back into nature,

0:43:48.840 --> 0:43:52.480
<v Speaker 1>and the most reasonable explanation for that was that it

0:43:52.560 --> 0:43:56.360
<v Speaker 1>had been frozen and kept in a lab and then released.

0:43:58.280 --> 0:44:01.680
<v Speaker 1>Researchers eventually settled on the theory that the strain had

0:44:01.719 --> 0:44:06.320
<v Speaker 1>probably been released in a vaccine that wasn't inactivated properly.

0:44:07.320 --> 0:44:11.239
<v Speaker 1>The result created a pandemic. Fortunately it was not a

0:44:11.280 --> 0:44:15.920
<v Speaker 1>particularly deadly one. Exactly what lab the virus came from

0:44:15.960 --> 0:44:21.839
<v Speaker 1>has never been fully proven. The next year, a photographer

0:44:21.960 --> 0:44:24.799
<v Speaker 1>working at the University of Birmingham Medical School in the

0:44:24.920 --> 0:44:29.240
<v Speaker 1>UK caught smallpox and her mother, who cared for her, died.

0:44:29.960 --> 0:44:32.880
<v Speaker 1>She had contracted it from a lab one floor below.

0:44:33.480 --> 0:44:36.720
<v Speaker 1>The smallpox had traveled through the air duct into her office.

0:44:37.920 --> 0:44:42.880
<v Speaker 1>And in nine in the Soviet city of Sverdlovsk, sixty

0:44:42.960 --> 0:44:46.760
<v Speaker 1>four people died of anthrax infections after an air filter

0:44:46.920 --> 0:44:50.960
<v Speaker 1>was removed and not immediately replaced in a lab that

0:44:51.080 --> 0:44:55.600
<v Speaker 1>was working on illegal weaponized anthrax bacteria, which was carried

0:44:55.760 --> 0:45:00.440
<v Speaker 1>into a village down wind. It was ex it's like

0:45:00.520 --> 0:45:04.200
<v Speaker 1>these that led to the creation of those high biosafety

0:45:04.360 --> 0:45:07.840
<v Speaker 1>level labs and the use of space suits when conducting

0:45:07.880 --> 0:45:13.600
<v Speaker 1>research with the deadliest pathogens, which makes sense in the

0:45:13.719 --> 0:45:16.560
<v Speaker 1>U s Department of Agriculture created a list of the

0:45:16.640 --> 0:45:20.720
<v Speaker 1>deadliest pathogens, which the U S d A calls biological

0:45:20.840 --> 0:45:24.560
<v Speaker 1>and select agents, and the Centers for Disease Control took

0:45:24.600 --> 0:45:29.080
<v Speaker 1>responsibility for monitoring the labs that work with them. But

0:45:29.200 --> 0:45:32.520
<v Speaker 1>it wasn't until two thousand one that bs L three

0:45:32.760 --> 0:45:36.279
<v Speaker 1>and bs L four labs really began to spread. There

0:45:36.280 --> 0:45:39.279
<v Speaker 1>weren't very many of them until two thousand and one

0:45:40.080 --> 0:45:44.160
<v Speaker 1>and after the anthrax letters, which came from Frederick, where

0:45:44.680 --> 0:45:47.960
<v Speaker 1>I live, which is how I got engaged in this issue.

0:45:48.880 --> 0:45:52.360
<v Speaker 1>After that time we went from just a few labs

0:45:53.000 --> 0:45:56.840
<v Speaker 1>to a large number, a very large number of labs.

0:45:56.880 --> 0:46:03.520
<v Speaker 1>It mushroomed tremendously UM with the assumption that um, we

0:46:03.640 --> 0:46:05.440
<v Speaker 1>had to do a lot of research because of the

0:46:05.480 --> 0:46:09.879
<v Speaker 1>threat of bioterrorism. But of course the only incidents we've

0:46:10.200 --> 0:46:14.040
<v Speaker 1>ever experience came from one of our own labs. In

0:46:14.080 --> 0:46:18.160
<v Speaker 1>two thousand one, just a week after the September eleventh attacks,

0:46:18.920 --> 0:46:23.240
<v Speaker 1>members of Congress and the media began receiving strange letters

0:46:23.880 --> 0:46:28.120
<v Speaker 1>with a white powder. Inside the powder was spores of

0:46:28.160 --> 0:46:33.600
<v Speaker 1>Bacillus and thracis, the bacterium that causes anthrax. It had

0:46:33.640 --> 0:46:38.239
<v Speaker 1>been weaponized to make it more easily inhaled and therefore infectious.

0:46:39.320 --> 0:46:42.800
<v Speaker 1>Twenty two people were infected by the spores, and five

0:46:42.840 --> 0:46:46.880
<v Speaker 1>of them died. In in America already gripped by panic.

0:46:47.440 --> 0:46:51.680
<v Speaker 1>The anthrax letters had a profound impact on the country's psyche,

0:46:52.360 --> 0:46:55.319
<v Speaker 1>and it turns out that the source of the anthrax

0:46:55.560 --> 0:46:59.680
<v Speaker 1>was actually a a lab at for Dietrich a scientists

0:46:59.719 --> 0:47:03.560
<v Speaker 1>there who really was somewhat mentally unstable, and I think

0:47:03.600 --> 0:47:06.759
<v Speaker 1>people should have known it. Uh, he was responsible for

0:47:06.800 --> 0:47:09.400
<v Speaker 1>spreading that anthrax. I think that just scared the hell

0:47:09.480 --> 0:47:12.680
<v Speaker 1>out of everybody. The problem is that even with the

0:47:12.719 --> 0:47:16.879
<v Speaker 1>creation of BSL three and four labs, with their astounding

0:47:16.960 --> 0:47:21.080
<v Speaker 1>array of precautionary equipment and procedures, the twenty one century

0:47:21.320 --> 0:47:24.759
<v Speaker 1>has still seen a lot of high profile accidents from

0:47:24.800 --> 0:47:30.000
<v Speaker 1>these labs. Between two thousand four and two, there were

0:47:30.080 --> 0:47:35.360
<v Speaker 1>six hundred and thirty nine reported accidental releases of pathogens

0:47:35.400 --> 0:47:38.359
<v Speaker 1>found on the U s d A's list of Biological

0:47:38.440 --> 0:47:43.760
<v Speaker 1>select agents and toxins. Bacteria and viruses like the Ebola

0:47:43.800 --> 0:47:47.640
<v Speaker 1>virus and the bacteria that causes the plague the virus

0:47:47.640 --> 0:47:51.640
<v Speaker 1>that causes stars are all on the list. Those six

0:47:51.719 --> 0:47:55.239
<v Speaker 1>hundred and thirty nine accidents represent just the ones that

0:47:55.320 --> 0:47:59.800
<v Speaker 1>were reported, and only then among those publicly funded labs

0:48:00.120 --> 0:48:04.480
<v Speaker 1>that are required to report such accidents. Labs that don't

0:48:04.520 --> 0:48:08.360
<v Speaker 1>receive public funding like those run by corporations or private groups,

0:48:09.040 --> 0:48:14.560
<v Speaker 1>don't have to report accidents like that at all. Back

0:48:14.600 --> 0:48:18.359
<v Speaker 1>in two thousand fourteen, a National Institutes of Health lab

0:48:18.520 --> 0:48:23.840
<v Speaker 1>in Bethesda, Maryland, discovered six fials of live Bariola, the

0:48:23.920 --> 0:48:28.920
<v Speaker 1>smallpox virus, in an unsecured freezer. The vials were labeled

0:48:29.120 --> 0:48:32.680
<v Speaker 1>Bariola and have been stored in the nineteen fifties in

0:48:32.719 --> 0:48:36.160
<v Speaker 1>a lab that had gone unused since the nineteen seventies.

0:48:37.000 --> 0:48:39.600
<v Speaker 1>The f d A, which had taken custody of the

0:48:39.719 --> 0:48:43.960
<v Speaker 1>lab from the NAH way back in, had lost track

0:48:44.080 --> 0:48:47.400
<v Speaker 1>of the stocks with smallpox and failed to destroy the

0:48:47.400 --> 0:48:50.759
<v Speaker 1>Bariola or submitted to the CDC as part of that

0:48:51.480 --> 0:48:55.680
<v Speaker 1>eradication campaign. It had just sat forgotten in the freezer.

0:48:57.400 --> 0:49:01.080
<v Speaker 1>Also in two thousand fourteen, a c DC workers ship

0:49:01.200 --> 0:49:05.319
<v Speaker 1>live strains of the bacteria that causes typhoid fever to

0:49:05.440 --> 0:49:09.040
<v Speaker 1>another lab in a reused box that wasn't marked for

0:49:09.080 --> 0:49:13.239
<v Speaker 1>hazardous material. Not to mention, the box was broken open

0:49:13.280 --> 0:49:17.160
<v Speaker 1>in the corner and it was sent using regular ups delivery.

0:49:18.040 --> 0:49:22.120
<v Speaker 1>Some specimens broke during shipping, although the Typhus vile remained

0:49:22.160 --> 0:49:28.120
<v Speaker 1>intact and sealed again. These are just a few randomly

0:49:28.160 --> 0:49:33.360
<v Speaker 1>selected examples, like those ships that carried smallpox between Africa

0:49:33.440 --> 0:49:38.719
<v Speaker 1>and the America's. Each accident involving potential pandemic pathogens is

0:49:38.800 --> 0:49:42.479
<v Speaker 1>like tossing a lit match on a powder keg. Each

0:49:42.520 --> 0:49:45.160
<v Speaker 1>one has a chance for an outbreak to take hold.

0:49:46.400 --> 0:49:50.040
<v Speaker 1>The problem is as more BSL three and four labs

0:49:50.080 --> 0:49:54.560
<v Speaker 1>come online, more of this risky research is being conducted.

0:49:55.360 --> 0:49:59.880
<v Speaker 1>More labs conducting more of this risky research compounds the

0:50:00.040 --> 0:50:04.279
<v Speaker 1>probability of an accidental release of a pathogen that can

0:50:04.320 --> 0:50:09.839
<v Speaker 1>cause a catastrophic pandemic. Even worse, BSL three and four

0:50:09.920 --> 0:50:14.040
<v Speaker 1>labs have mushroomed to a point where no one, not

0:50:14.080 --> 0:50:17.120
<v Speaker 1>the U. S. Government, not the Centers for Disease Control,

0:50:17.560 --> 0:50:21.520
<v Speaker 1>not the National Institutes of Health, not the World Health Organization,

0:50:22.160 --> 0:50:26.680
<v Speaker 1>no one can definitively say how many high containment labs

0:50:26.719 --> 0:50:30.640
<v Speaker 1>are operating around the world. In the US, even there's

0:50:30.640 --> 0:50:34.000
<v Speaker 1>no certainty about how many there are, it has become

0:50:34.080 --> 0:50:39.240
<v Speaker 1>something of a status symbol among nations, universities, and corporations

0:50:39.520 --> 0:50:44.360
<v Speaker 1>to operate high level containment labs. So some people in

0:50:44.400 --> 0:50:48.000
<v Speaker 1>the biotech and bio security fields have called for an

0:50:48.160 --> 0:50:52.400
<v Speaker 1>end to gain a function research of any kind. The

0:50:52.480 --> 0:50:57.760
<v Speaker 1>trouble is there's no regulatory framework overseeing high containment labs.

0:50:58.440 --> 0:51:01.759
<v Speaker 1>In the US. The National the Institutes for Health is

0:51:01.800 --> 0:51:04.680
<v Speaker 1>the agency that provides funding for this type of work,

0:51:05.280 --> 0:51:09.360
<v Speaker 1>and they have adopted guidelines for best practices and safety,

0:51:09.719 --> 0:51:13.920
<v Speaker 1>but there's no penalty for labs that don't follow those guidelines.

0:51:14.880 --> 0:51:18.920
<v Speaker 1>The most potent weapon the NIH has to curtail reckless

0:51:18.920 --> 0:51:23.480
<v Speaker 1>experiments is to deny funding for further research, and this

0:51:23.600 --> 0:51:28.400
<v Speaker 1>only applies to labs that receive public funding. Privately funded labs,

0:51:28.440 --> 0:51:33.440
<v Speaker 1>like again those found inside corporations, as well as labs overseas,

0:51:33.440 --> 0:51:38.920
<v Speaker 1>operate utterly outside of any jurisdiction. But even if American

0:51:39.000 --> 0:51:43.000
<v Speaker 1>labs had a flawless safety record, which they definitely do not,

0:51:43.680 --> 0:51:46.640
<v Speaker 1>other countries across the rest of the world operate with

0:51:46.680 --> 0:51:50.120
<v Speaker 1>a patchwork of regulations, if any at all. There is

0:51:50.160 --> 0:51:55.160
<v Speaker 1>no global oversight of research with deadly pathogens, and there's

0:51:55.160 --> 0:51:59.200
<v Speaker 1>really no one to say what constitutes a reckless experiment anyway,

0:51:59.800 --> 0:52:03.640
<v Speaker 1>Aside from the institution the researcher is affiliated with. There's

0:52:03.719 --> 0:52:08.040
<v Speaker 1>no one empowered to decide which experiments are simply too

0:52:08.160 --> 0:52:12.560
<v Speaker 1>risky to carry out, and in most cases, the institutions

0:52:12.560 --> 0:52:15.319
<v Speaker 1>that can make that decision air on the side of

0:52:15.360 --> 0:52:18.920
<v Speaker 1>their researchers, since highly visible work that gets lots of

0:52:18.920 --> 0:52:25.440
<v Speaker 1>press brings their institutions prestige. What's probably most disturbing is

0:52:25.520 --> 0:52:29.719
<v Speaker 1>the tendency to downplay or even totally fail to report

0:52:29.960 --> 0:52:35.400
<v Speaker 1>lab accidents. A culture of silence and opaqueness pervades the

0:52:35.400 --> 0:52:39.080
<v Speaker 1>bio labs in the US. For all of the existential

0:52:39.200 --> 0:52:43.080
<v Speaker 1>risk involved, there is almost no public scrutiny of the

0:52:43.120 --> 0:52:48.080
<v Speaker 1>field of biotechnology. If science is never to be censored,

0:52:48.800 --> 0:52:55.359
<v Speaker 1>doesn't that also require it to be fully transparent. There

0:52:55.400 --> 0:52:59.000
<v Speaker 1>are ways to make the system in place safer. Some

0:52:59.080 --> 0:53:02.560
<v Speaker 1>microbiology to argue that the same results can be found

0:53:02.880 --> 0:53:07.200
<v Speaker 1>by using non infectious proteins to study the functions of viruses,

0:53:07.719 --> 0:53:11.200
<v Speaker 1>that those live altered viruses that some labs are creating

0:53:11.680 --> 0:53:17.439
<v Speaker 1>are not only reckless but also totally unnecessary. Others say

0:53:17.480 --> 0:53:20.560
<v Speaker 1>that researchers could be required to add genetic traits to

0:53:20.600 --> 0:53:24.719
<v Speaker 1>their altered specimens that make them reliant on conditions in

0:53:24.800 --> 0:53:28.200
<v Speaker 1>the lab to survive, so that they cannot spread in nature,

0:53:28.760 --> 0:53:33.520
<v Speaker 1>kind of like the dinosaurs in Jurassic Park. Perhaps they

0:53:33.520 --> 0:53:37.239
<v Speaker 1>could engineer a kill switch like a self destruct mechanism

0:53:37.400 --> 0:53:40.439
<v Speaker 1>that is triggered once the cell divides a prescribed number

0:53:40.480 --> 0:53:45.920
<v Speaker 1>of times. In other areas, labs that synthesize DNA and

0:53:46.200 --> 0:53:50.240
<v Speaker 1>RNA could be required to compare the sequences of orders

0:53:50.280 --> 0:53:54.440
<v Speaker 1>that come in against the database of known pathogens and

0:53:54.480 --> 0:53:58.080
<v Speaker 1>report any of those orders that set off alarms to authorities,

0:53:59.280 --> 0:54:03.400
<v Speaker 1>and propose souls. For research that has dual use imposes

0:54:03.440 --> 0:54:07.919
<v Speaker 1>a low probability, high consequence threat to the public could

0:54:08.000 --> 0:54:12.160
<v Speaker 1>undergo review and approval based on its relative benefit to

0:54:12.200 --> 0:54:17.440
<v Speaker 1>science as part of funding requests, and labs both public

0:54:17.520 --> 0:54:21.399
<v Speaker 1>and private in the US and abroad could be put

0:54:21.560 --> 0:54:27.120
<v Speaker 1>under an international regulatory body that both respects and understand science,

0:54:27.680 --> 0:54:33.440
<v Speaker 1>but also equally value safety for humankind. There are holes

0:54:33.480 --> 0:54:37.880
<v Speaker 1>in these safeguards, yes, but even this handful of ideas

0:54:37.960 --> 0:54:42.759
<v Speaker 1>are still vastly better than what's currently in place. When

0:54:42.760 --> 0:54:45.640
<v Speaker 1>you combine the increasing number of labs around the world

0:54:45.840 --> 0:54:50.840
<v Speaker 1>carrying out research on potential pandemic pathogens with the history

0:54:51.239 --> 0:54:54.720
<v Speaker 1>of accidental releases in human error in the biotech field,

0:54:55.320 --> 0:55:00.520
<v Speaker 1>it is extraordinarily difficult not to conclude that the potential

0:55:00.800 --> 0:55:03.799
<v Speaker 1>for an existential threat posed by the release of a

0:55:03.880 --> 0:55:08.200
<v Speaker 1>deadly pathogen is real. This is not a far off

0:55:08.239 --> 0:55:14.239
<v Speaker 1>field of existential risk. It surrounds us right now. Dr

0:55:14.360 --> 0:55:18.680
<v Speaker 1>Lynn Clots, who you met earlier, calculated the probability of

0:55:18.719 --> 0:55:22.560
<v Speaker 1>a lab acquired infection that followed that worst case scenario

0:55:22.640 --> 0:55:26.799
<v Speaker 1>I described based on the current track record of accidental

0:55:26.800 --> 0:55:31.040
<v Speaker 1>releases over the course of a ten year period. Considering

0:55:31.360 --> 0:55:36.040
<v Speaker 1>ten labs with an average safety record, Dr Clots calculated

0:55:36.280 --> 0:55:39.120
<v Speaker 1>that there is a twenty seven percent chance of an

0:55:39.200 --> 0:55:44.680
<v Speaker 1>undetected lab acquired infection creating a global pandemic in the

0:55:44.719 --> 0:55:49.400
<v Speaker 1>next decade. That's better than a one in four chance

0:55:50.160 --> 0:55:54.840
<v Speaker 1>of an existential catastrophe. And that's just considering ten labs.

0:55:56.000 --> 0:55:59.799
<v Speaker 1>No one knows how many labs there actually are. Risk

0:55:59.880 --> 0:56:03.440
<v Speaker 1>is product of two things, the likelihood of something happening

0:56:03.600 --> 0:56:07.719
<v Speaker 1>times consequence. The likelihood of something happening is small, very

0:56:07.760 --> 0:56:10.040
<v Speaker 1>small per lab per year, but you do things in

0:56:10.200 --> 0:56:13.440
<v Speaker 1>enough labs for enough years, it gets bigger. Uh. And

0:56:13.960 --> 0:56:18.480
<v Speaker 1>the consequences, potential consequences are huge in the worst case scenario,

0:56:19.320 --> 0:56:24.120
<v Speaker 1>perhaps killing a large percentage of the world's population. And

0:56:24.200 --> 0:56:27.200
<v Speaker 1>we just don't know. So I just don't think it's

0:56:27.200 --> 0:56:38.680
<v Speaker 1>worth taking the chance on the next episode of the

0:56:38.840 --> 0:56:42.880
<v Speaker 1>End of the World with Josh Clark. Particle physics works

0:56:42.920 --> 0:56:45.560
<v Speaker 1>at the leading edge of human knowledge, at the leading

0:56:45.640 --> 0:56:48.440
<v Speaker 1>edge of theory. That's the whole point of it. Particle

0:56:48.480 --> 0:56:51.800
<v Speaker 1>physics is where science touches the fabric of the universe,

0:56:52.320 --> 0:56:54.880
<v Speaker 1>and it puts us in a dilemma to know if

0:56:54.920 --> 0:56:58.240
<v Speaker 1>the experiments that we're running inside of particle colliders are safe.

0:56:58.600 --> 0:57:00.840
<v Speaker 1>We have to run the experiments in the first place,

0:57:01.440 --> 0:57:04.000
<v Speaker 1>but hoping for the best is not a good strategy

0:57:04.360 --> 0:57:07.480
<v Speaker 1>for an existential risk that could theoretically end the universe

0:57:07.520 --> 0:57:08.600
<v Speaker 1>as we know it. M