Speaker 1: So the big question is this, how do investors like
Speaker 1: us get access to the ideas, information, and most importantly,
Speaker 1: the right people that give us the tools and information
Speaker 1: we need to make informed and educated decisions to have success.
Speaker 1: That is the question, and this podcast will give us
Speaker 1: the answers. This is Mark Moss, your host. Let's get
Speaker 1: this started. Welcome to another episode of the Market Disruptors podcast. Today,
Speaker 1: I'm sitting down with Jake Yo coom pat from Zero
Speaker 1: LLC and the project lead of Decred. We get into
Speaker 1: what it takes to be a project lead, what it
Speaker 1: takes to build in the blockchain space, and how he's
Speaker 1: going about doing that. We get into decred project. We
Speaker 1: talk about the changes in governance that they think are
Speaker 1: working really well for them, where that may go into
Speaker 1: the future. We talk about privacy, why we need it,
Speaker 1: why we should have it, and what they're doing about
Speaker 1: bringing privacy back to the blockchain. Some really cool stuff there.
Speaker 1: Some other stuff that we talk about includes um buying,
Speaker 1: selling and exchanging in pure privacy, including a new d
Speaker 1: e X and new decks at their building. Lots of
Speaker 1: other good conversations with Jake. So it's going to just
Speaker 1: jump right into it. Everyone, Welcome to another episode of
Speaker 1: the Market Disruptors podcast. Today, I am joined by Jake
Speaker 1: yocum Piet. He is the project lead over at de
Speaker 1: cred and has been writing some cool articles working on
Speaker 1: a lot of cool stuff. I can't wait to talk
Speaker 1: to him. So welcome Jake. Thanks for having me Mark,
Speaker 1: It's a pleasure to be here. Great. So, um, yeah,
Speaker 1: I kind of gave a little bit of an intro,
Speaker 1: but why don't you just kind of fill us in
Speaker 1: a little bit on on who you are and and
Speaker 1: uh maybe how you got to where you at right
Speaker 1: now and working on decred on the project for sure. Um,
Speaker 1: I'm Jacocompi. I'm the project lead for decred, and I've
Speaker 1: been working in the cryptocurrency space since late twelve early
Speaker 1: and my history is really, you know, to keep it
Speaker 1: really brief, is I started working in the bitcoin spased
Speaker 1: on an alternative full note bitcoin implementation called btc suite
Speaker 1: and worked on that for a while. And my perception
Speaker 1: of bitcoin is that, despite being you know, excellent technology
Speaker 1: and and really, you know, really a great project, is
Speaker 1: that I felt that the governance system of it was
Speaker 1: pretty unfair and I found that pretty you know, pretty
Speaker 1: jarring and not exactly the best user experience from my position.
Speaker 1: So I ended up working with two a couple other
Speaker 1: people to create a you know, a set of changes
Speaker 1: on top of Bitcoin that we felt would make Bitcoin
Speaker 1: a you know, a fairer game. That is that not
Speaker 1: just make it fairer from storing and transmitting value, but
Speaker 1: make it fairer from the perspective of governance. So that
Speaker 1: was really what we launched the project with a focus on.
Speaker 1: And that's sort of you know, that's our main focused
Speaker 1: And and uh, when when was that that you launched
Speaker 1: the decredit project. Oh yeah, that was a February, So
Speaker 1: that's like three and a half a little over three
Speaker 1: and a half years ago now. So we've been in
Speaker 1: production since February sixteen, and the work to create decred
Speaker 1: started back in February fourteen, so it took us a
Speaker 1: couple of years to get everything, you know, set and ready,
Speaker 1: and then we launched with a working code and everything.
Speaker 1: So like the first four years you were kind of
Speaker 1: in in and around bitcoin cryptocurrency space, Um, you were
Speaker 1: fascinated by bitcoin and then working on bitcoin with with
Speaker 1: some other projects, kind of learning to code and develop
Speaker 1: on it. Yeah, yeah, and and I myself, I'm not
Speaker 1: a developer, but I worked with I've worked with a
Speaker 1: team of developers now for you know, over ten years.
Speaker 1: And we had approached bitcoin from the perspective of saying,
Speaker 1: you know, what could we really bring to the table,
Speaker 1: And what we felt we could bring to the table
Speaker 1: was some diversity in terms of the ecosystem for full
Speaker 1: note clients, because in the case that you know, let's
Speaker 1: just say something bad were to happen to say, Bitcoin
Speaker 1: Corps hits a nasty bug, then there's you know, at
Speaker 1: least one implementation that presumably wouldn't have those same bugs,
Speaker 1: so that the network can keep ticking over and people
Speaker 1: can fix their bugs and get everything back online without
Speaker 1: it being a sort of a coordination mess. M hmm. Now, um,
Speaker 1: when when you first kind of came in in two
Speaker 1: thousand twelve and and as we kind of say, like
Speaker 1: fell down the rabbit hole, so to speak, Um, where
Speaker 1: there are a couple of core kind of principles that
Speaker 1: really grabbed you and and pulled you in. What was
Speaker 1: that like for you? Yeah, I mean what really drew me?
Speaker 1: And I think, you know, whether people realize it or not,
Speaker 1: you know, drew them to the bitcoin game was that
Speaker 1: it's that it's a fairer game. You know, if you've
Speaker 1: been if you've been using fiat currency for you know,
Speaker 1: most of your life, and then you see something like cryptocurrency.
Speaker 1: It really is striking in that it it avoids many
Speaker 1: many problems that you end up having with banks. Anyone
Speaker 1: who's ever had a problem with a you know, with
Speaker 1: a bank, whether it's losing an account or you know
Speaker 1: exactly or or any other kinds of problems, recognizes how
Speaker 1: much power banks have over you. And and what bitcoin
Speaker 1: did that I thought was really amazing is that it
Speaker 1: distilled out what banks, you know, the sort of the
Speaker 1: leverage the banks have, which is that they can create
Speaker 1: a time stamp on your transactions and no one else can.
Speaker 1: So what they did is they decentralized the time stamping process.
Speaker 1: And that's you know, that really drew me in and
Speaker 1: you know, and kept my attention. Yeah, okay, yeah. So, um,
Speaker 1: there's so many different facets to bitcoin and cryptocurrencies. And
Speaker 1: obviously with bitcoin and and being censorship resistant is one,
Speaker 1: so the banks can't seize it or steal it. And
Speaker 1: then obviously the hard cap so it can't be inflated
Speaker 1: and manipulated, and you like those core principles about bitcoin,
Speaker 1: you just thought maybe there were some tweaks in the
Speaker 1: governance that that could be made. Yeah, yeah, I mean
Speaker 1: it's clear that bitcoin works, right. You know, proof of
Speaker 1: work is a really effective means of coming to a consensus,
Speaker 1: even you know, you know centralization problems with hardware aside.
Speaker 1: You know, it really does change the game, and it
Speaker 1: makes the process at least nominally permission lists you can
Speaker 1: you can store and transmit value without anyone going hey,
Speaker 1: I don't like you. We're gonna you know, close your
Speaker 1: bitcoin account, and and that is really just uh, you know,
Speaker 1: that all worked. The thing that I felt like really
Speaker 1: didn't work was the component where you go, Okay, what
Speaker 1: changes are we going to make to the network? Are
Speaker 1: we gonna make consensus changes? Are they gonna be software changes?
Speaker 1: Are they're gonna be hard fork changes? That process is
Speaker 1: incredibly messy, and uh, the one cpu, one vote mechanism
Speaker 1: that was proposed by Cistosi originally doesn't work out so
Speaker 1: great when you know, all, let's say the bulk of
Speaker 1: the hash power is in warehouses in one jurisdiction, which
Speaker 1: would be China, mm hmm. Yeah. Did a lot of
Speaker 1: that come from I mean, I guess you started working
Speaker 1: on this previous to the forks that happened in seventeen,
Speaker 1: so you had kind of maybe seen some issues with
Speaker 1: the consensus before before all that forking the four cores
Speaker 1: or the nerd wars happened. Yeah. I mean what the
Speaker 1: pattern we saw was this is that is that the
Speaker 1: existing Bitcoin corps and then you know what what became
Speaker 1: block stream is that that group of developers, while you know,
Speaker 1: while very talented and you know, they have a lot
Speaker 1: of chops and they've delivered a lot of great code,
Speaker 1: it ends up being a small central planning committee. So
Speaker 1: as much as bitcoin, you know, with the ability to
Speaker 1: you know, uh, store and transmit value without censorship is great,
Speaker 1: the system itself going Okay, where is this system going
Speaker 1: to go in the future, is you know, controlled by
Speaker 1: a central planning committee, which is a small number of
Speaker 1: people have an outsized amount of influence over the repository
Speaker 1: for the bitcoin, you know, for bitcoin corps. And then
Speaker 1: as a function of that, they are the people who
Speaker 1: are in charge of the government or you know, what's
Speaker 1: effectively the government of bitcoin. And I felt like that
Speaker 1: system was. You know, something I've never really liked about
Speaker 1: the Federal Reserve is that it's a central planning committee.
Speaker 1: You know, you and I we might no matter how
Speaker 1: much money we have, we can complain all day, or
Speaker 1: you know, we might know somebody at the Fed, but
Speaker 1: we're not going to be able to influence their policy.
Speaker 1: And I and that that was roughly the situation that
Speaker 1: I found myself in back in I guess it was
Speaker 1: really like late when that really all started to sink
Speaker 1: in for me. So, so give me a rough overview
Speaker 1: of how that how how you've kind of tried to
Speaker 1: fix that, Like what does the consensus mechanism look like
Speaker 1: on on the decred project? Yeah, so, so what I
Speaker 1: recognize as I recognized there were really three shortcomings to
Speaker 1: you know, to bitcoin in my mind, one of them
Speaker 1: being that h that miners had too much power. That is,
Speaker 1: you know, if you looked at what happened with you know,
Speaker 1: and from I think it wasteen until seventeen with the
Speaker 1: seguate change set. So SegWit is a set of consensus
Speaker 1: changes everyone not everyone, but it seemed like the vast
Speaker 1: majority of people wanted them implemented. But the the community
Speaker 1: of miners did not, so they effectively blocked that consensus
Speaker 1: change from being implemented for the better part of three years.
Speaker 1: And uh and you know, seeing that miners just have
Speaker 1: too much power. The other thing that, uh, that I
Speaker 1: experienced was is because uh, you know, I built out
Speaker 1: BTC suite and I I financed it myself, was there's
Speaker 1: a real tragedy of the commons with respected development work, right,
Speaker 1: you know, you want to let's say, you know, there's
Speaker 1: a team of a hundred people who want to make
Speaker 1: bitcoin grade. It's like becomes a question, Okay, who's gonna
Speaker 1: pay you? And then what are the you know, what
Speaker 1: what is your what's your paymaster's agenda? And then you
Speaker 1: know that's a question mark and then the you know,
Speaker 1: the other thing is is that there's really just no sovereignty,
Speaker 1: you know, no matter how many big you know, even
Speaker 1: if Statoshi wanted to change things, Satoshi couldn't really change
Speaker 1: anything because the governance, mechanimics mechanism is all vested in
Speaker 1: the you know, in the miners. So I felt like
Speaker 1: there was a misalignment of interest there because somebody could
Speaker 1: mine and just dump all their coins and and still
Speaker 1: have an enormous amount of sovereignty in that system, and
Speaker 1: I felt like that was a fundamental misalignment. So these things,
Speaker 1: combined with reading about a hybrid proof of workproof of stake, uh,
Speaker 1: you know consensus system is what led me to say this.
Speaker 1: You know, this hybridized consensus algorithm is really what I
Speaker 1: see as the future of you know, of of consensus.
Speaker 1: Doesn't a lot of the power lie in the nodes
Speaker 1: who actually decide which version of the software to run,
Speaker 1: and not the miners. There's something to be said for
Speaker 1: sovereignty being vested outside of the miners, but you know,
Speaker 1: when it comes down to it, someone has to mind
Speaker 1: the currency, and the mining is where the security comes from.
Speaker 1: So I would argue that the miners have a lot
Speaker 1: of a lot of sovereignty, the people developing the software
Speaker 1: have a lot of sovereignty, but the people holding the
Speaker 1: coins really don't have a whole lot of sovereignty. And
Speaker 1: then when it comes to note operators, it depends on
Speaker 1: which a note operators you're talking about. Like, like, let's
Speaker 1: say I'm a random person and I have a note running,
Speaker 1: and I go, I'm gonna you know, I'm gonna not
Speaker 1: follow these consensus rules. Everyone else is like yeah, I
Speaker 1: don't care, bye by, and I feel like you know, However,
Speaker 1: there are other nodes that are economic nodes, like say,
Speaker 1: you know, nodes a major exchanges and payment processors that
Speaker 1: have you know, and an outsized amount of power implicitly,
Speaker 1: um you know, as a function of their role in
Speaker 1: the ecosystem compared to uh, you know, just random people
Speaker 1: operating full notes. So there is there is a little
Speaker 1: bit of sovereignty all spread around, right, we can all
Speaker 1: do the user activated software thing and threatened to walk
Speaker 1: out of the room and be like funk this, I'm
Speaker 1: out of here. But but you know, I don't think
Speaker 1: I don't really view that as much. Uh sort of,
Speaker 1: it's sort of like a it's like a riot switch,
Speaker 1: like if if you do the wrong thing, everybody's gonna
Speaker 1: riot and leave or flip over cars. But it's it's
Speaker 1: not a very good government's mechanism, got it. And so
Speaker 1: through through the governance mechanism that you've done, you you
Speaker 1: you touched on a couple of things. Um. One, we
Speaker 1: talked about the consensus and and having some sort of
Speaker 1: like a hybrid pow POS system of proof of work
Speaker 1: and a proof of steak. So the proof of steak
Speaker 1: that people who hold the coins you said who don't
Speaker 1: have a vote, I guess now they're staking those coins
Speaker 1: that they do have skin in the game. Now they
Speaker 1: do have a vote. Yeah that yeah, that's right. So
Speaker 1: so each block subsidy in our system is split three ways,
Speaker 1: proof of work, proof of steake, ten percent treasury. And
Speaker 1: the way it works is is that the miners proof
Speaker 1: of work create the blocks. And then what proof of
Speaker 1: steak does is that you you opt into a ticket system,
Speaker 1: so you lock your coins, you timelock them for a
Speaker 1: pseudorandom amount of time, and then your your your coins
Speaker 1: turning to tick gets. The tickets go into a rolling
Speaker 1: lottery and every block, five of these tickets are chosen
Speaker 1: to vote. And what you're voting on is you're voting
Speaker 1: on the validity of the prior block. And so if
Speaker 1: there's a proof of work miner and their misbehaving, it
Speaker 1: is conceivable that you can strip them of their mining
Speaker 1: reward uh from the previous block. So that so that
Speaker 1: what this does is this puts the proof of stake miners,
Speaker 1: you know, firmly in control of what does and doesn't
Speaker 1: happen on the network, so that if there's a malicious
Speaker 1: or a group of malicious proof of work miners, the
Speaker 1: proof of you know, the stakeholders can effectively censure them
Speaker 1: and deprive them of income to sort of tow at
Speaker 1: best discourage their continued sort of you know, bad behavior,
Speaker 1: and would then be done by some sort of like
Speaker 1: a majority vote. Yeah. Yeah, So so, uh, every block
Speaker 1: there's five tickets called, you need at least three of
Speaker 1: them to vote or to be included in order for
Speaker 1: the block to be valid. So if or more, uh yeah,
Speaker 1: or more of the votes are yes, the block is valid.
Speaker 1: If there's fifty or more no votes, the block is
Speaker 1: in valid. So um, you know, if enough of the
Speaker 1: stakeholders on a on a rolling basis disapprove of things
Speaker 1: done by certain proof of work miners, they can go
Speaker 1: through and start, you know, invalidating the proof of work
Speaker 1: rewards that those miners receive. Right, But who who's who's
Speaker 1: actually voting though? Like like today, I mean who's voting?
Speaker 1: Is there like a small group of people who are
Speaker 1: actually paying attention to taking time to vote or how
Speaker 1: how is that being done? Yeah? So, so the way
Speaker 1: it works is this is that as blocks, people run
Speaker 1: things called voting wallets, so that as let's say block
Speaker 1: N is mind and then it propagates across the network.
Speaker 1: What that does is that sets a you know, that
Speaker 1: sets a pseudorandom uh sortition of the tickets, so that
Speaker 1: block and its header go, these are the tickets that
Speaker 1: are going to vote in block N plus one excuse me,
Speaker 1: and then those votes end up getting cast. So so
Speaker 1: people have wallets that are online continuously that are ready
Speaker 1: to vote when the blocks are published. And that and
Speaker 1: what you do is whether we're talking about voting on
Speaker 1: the validity of the prior blocks, proof of work, or
Speaker 1: we're talking about making consensus changes, people can pre program
Speaker 1: their you know there how they would like their voting
Speaker 1: whilets to vote. So if there's a certain behavior that
Speaker 1: you want to vote against. For example, let's say you
Speaker 1: saw the mem pool and it has a bunch of transactions,
Speaker 1: and and then you see a block that's been mined
Speaker 1: has no transactions in it, you can have a policy
Speaker 1: set such that you vote no to that block and
Speaker 1: and you know, correspondingly strip the minor of their rewards.
Speaker 1: So so this process is generic. And then and then
Speaker 1: the same thing goes. If you're voting on consensus changes,
Speaker 1: you can vote yes or no or abstain from votes,
Speaker 1: depending on you know, what votements are available to you. Yeah,
Speaker 1: there's definitely a lot to unpack there, and I can
Speaker 1: keep asking questions, but I kind of want to move
Speaker 1: on past that. UM. One thing that I do want
Speaker 1: to touch on before we dig into some other stuff
Speaker 1: I was kind of looking forward to, is as you
Speaker 1: mentioned about the UH ten percent goes to like the
Speaker 1: development fund, I guess, And so I think you kind
Speaker 1: of said, like with bitcoin, the problem is is that
Speaker 1: developers aren't getting paid. So I guess everybody's kind of
Speaker 1: doing it for free UM. And so what kind of
Speaker 1: long term problems could that have in development on bitcoin?
Speaker 1: Whereas UH, your project decred has um a reward going
Speaker 1: to pay developers. Is that kind of what you were
Speaker 1: talking about? UM? All right, So what I was saying
Speaker 1: is we could spend we could we could spend a
Speaker 1: lot of time talking about UH, talking talking about those
Speaker 1: that that area of government. I don't really want to
Speaker 1: dig too much deeper into that, but you did mention
Speaker 1: something about the UM tem per cent of the of
Speaker 1: the inflation going to fund the treasury or to fund
Speaker 1: the development, and how other projects like bitcoin don't have
Speaker 1: any payments going to developers. Um. And so I guess
Speaker 1: you're saying that Bitcoin potentially could be stunted because eventually
Speaker 1: it could run out of people willing to work for free.
Speaker 1: And de credit has a model where people get paid
Speaker 1: to work on it. Yeah, that's right. So we have
Speaker 1: a we have a contractor model where where for example,
Speaker 1: there's a company that that I own and I'm the
Speaker 1: CEO of Company zero LLC, and it's a development contractor
Speaker 1: and it's one of you know, many contractors that work
Speaker 1: for the project, whereas with bitcoin, bitcoin is dependent on
Speaker 1: you know, mostly venture capital money at this point. I
Speaker 1: don't think there's any shortage of the venture capital money
Speaker 1: at this point, but in the few that, you know,
Speaker 1: there's no guarantee that in the future there you know,
Speaker 1: that those funds won't run out. So um. So, what
Speaker 1: the way Decred handles is ten percent of every block
Speaker 1: goes to a centralist corporate entity, and then that corporate entity,
Speaker 1: decred Holding UH Decred Holdings Group LLC, pays out to
Speaker 1: contractors who build for the work that they perform, which
Speaker 1: includes you know, company zero and and you know, probably
Speaker 1: about fifty other contractors. Yeah, and we can definitely see
Speaker 1: that UM decredit is working on a lot more projects
Speaker 1: than bitcoin. So some of the projects I've seen you
Speaker 1: working on, which I saw one was voted in by
Speaker 1: the community to build a deckx right, a decentralized exchange,
Speaker 1: which I thought was pretty cool. Um, you're also working
Speaker 1: on some privacy US, some lightning UM stuff, atomic swaps,
Speaker 1: So I guess that kind of allows you the community
Speaker 1: to kind of work on more projects like that. Yeah.
Speaker 1: When when we when we started decredit, we started it
Speaker 1: intention We made a constitution to to try to manage
Speaker 1: people's expectations a bit. And one of the things we
Speaker 1: said as we said we would continue building open source
Speaker 1: software that's you know, related to the cryptocurrency space, and
Speaker 1: the decks is a great example of that where we're
Speaker 1: trying to sort of, you know, the same way were
Speaker 1: we we main effort to make the governance process fairer.
Speaker 1: We're trying to make the exchange process fairer. So there's
Speaker 1: no you know, ks m L, there's no h you know,
Speaker 1: there's no requirements about you know, things you have to do.
Speaker 1: You pay an upfront fee to get on a server,
Speaker 1: and then you can trade, and then the order matching
Speaker 1: is pseudorandom, so no one can gain you on a
Speaker 1: first in, first out basis like they do on most
Speaker 1: uh FIAT exchanges. And then you know, you know, with
Speaker 1: privacy and all of these other things. The funding does
Speaker 1: give us latitude to do, you know, to do new stuff.
Speaker 1: And we also don't have to do pend on the
Speaker 1: approval of you know, the venture capitalists who would otherwise
Speaker 1: fund this saying the same way that bitcoin does. Did
Speaker 1: you see today, um, the group Anonymous pledged to donate
Speaker 1: seventy five million dollars for bitcoin development for privacy. That
Speaker 1: was pretty amazing. I was surprised to see that. I
Speaker 1: think it's pretty interesting. I I did see that as well,
Speaker 1: and and I guess my you know, my feeling is it's, uh,
Speaker 1: we've seen so many I c O s who have
Speaker 1: you know, a mega pile of money, and you know
Speaker 1: they just sort of you know, uh piss it away
Speaker 1: on random stuff or they don't really get a whole
Speaker 1: lot of work done. It's gonna be interesting to see
Speaker 1: what comes out of that, you know, one, whether the
Speaker 1: funds are you know, do exist, and you know, to
Speaker 1: whether people actually build useful stuff. There's you know, there's
Speaker 1: there's a lot of good that could come out of it,
Speaker 1: but it remains to be seen. I'm always skeptical. I'm
Speaker 1: a I'm a deliverables before promise this kind of guy. Sure.
Speaker 1: I just thought it was interesting because they want to
Speaker 1: donate it towards privacy focused stuff, and that's kind of
Speaker 1: where I wanted to focus our conversation today because as
Speaker 1: I saw, you released a paper a few months ago
Speaker 1: talking about privacy and how uh kind of kind of
Speaker 1: some of the shortcomings you see or some of the
Speaker 1: needs of privacy in the industry, and how you want
Speaker 1: to start optimizing for that. So um, I I personally
Speaker 1: like to see more companies such as yourself, seeing seeing
Speaker 1: the need for that and optimizing towards that. But tell me,
Speaker 1: tell me how you look at privacy maybe as as
Speaker 1: something that we need and and something that maybe D
Speaker 1: credit can help solve for sure. Yeah, I mean when
Speaker 1: we launched, our focus was just on the government stuff,
Speaker 1: but we always had an eye to adding privacy. I'm
Speaker 1: a total privacy nut. I'm probably way more of a
Speaker 1: computer security nut than than most of the people who
Speaker 1: work on the privacy projects, and um, I feel like
Speaker 1: privacy is really important in the context of cryptocurrency because it's,
Speaker 1: you know, it's it's a value transfer system. If you
Speaker 1: don't have privacy and value transfer system, somebody can use, say,
Speaker 1: you know, something like chain or chain analysis to look
Speaker 1: at your entire networth, all the transactions you have head
Speaker 1: and then figure out who the people are who are
Speaker 1: interacting with you, and so on and so on. So
Speaker 1: I feel like, you know, privacy is really about preventing
Speaker 1: people from knowing more, you know, learning things about you
Speaker 1: without your consent, and and and and that I view
Speaker 1: as something very you know, very important because if we
Speaker 1: if we look at a world without privacy, which is
Speaker 1: really kind of where things have been heading for the
Speaker 1: past decade or two or or five and uh yeah, yeah, yeah,
Speaker 1: ever since the development of radio so uh so, privacy
Speaker 1: has been diminishing. And and the issue there is is
Speaker 1: that when you have no privacy, people can always tell
Speaker 1: what you're doing currently. And you know, humans are creatures
Speaker 1: a habit. If you know what someone is doing currently,
Speaker 1: you have a pretty good idea of what they're going
Speaker 1: to be doing in the near future. Or in the
Speaker 1: or in the distant future. So privacy matters from the
Speaker 1: perspective of control. Someone knows what you're going to do
Speaker 1: before you do it, even if it's just a you know,
Speaker 1: probabilistic relationship. They can outmaneuver you. They can manipulate what
Speaker 1: you what you believe, or what you you know, or
Speaker 1: or how you feel about things. So, so privacy matters
Speaker 1: in the context of us creating a society that functions
Speaker 1: with a bunch of independent, you know, elements, as opposed
Speaker 1: to sort of a top down society where somebody with
Speaker 1: a satellite can tell you know where everybody's going, where
Speaker 1: everybody has been, and where they will go. So, you know,
Speaker 1: it's really it's really about freedom and what kind of
Speaker 1: a society we want to live in the future. Yeah,
Speaker 1: And I think one thing that's important for most people
Speaker 1: to understand is it's not just about like secrecy. It's
Speaker 1: not just like I don't want this drug deal to
Speaker 1: be known. UM. Let's say that I I'm a manufacturer
Speaker 1: of a product and I have multiple companies buying from it. UM,
Speaker 1: and I do a transaction with with company A. I
Speaker 1: don't maybe want all the other companies to know what
Speaker 1: I sold that product price? You know what the price
Speaker 1: of that product was sold for. So like that that
Speaker 1: should be that should be private, right, nobody needs to
Speaker 1: know what that deal was. Um, And so I think
Speaker 1: everybody could understand, like you wouldn't want everybody in the
Speaker 1: world to be able to look into your bank account
Speaker 1: and see exactly how much money you have in your
Speaker 1: banking and what you were spending, and not because you
Speaker 1: want to buy drugs, but just because you want to
Speaker 1: privacy there, right, um and so that's the thing with bitcoin,
Speaker 1: I guess, being being open to everybody, you can see
Speaker 1: all of that and and so um, so so how
Speaker 1: does how how are you approaching privacy and what are
Speaker 1: you looking to do to solve that? So our approach
Speaker 1: of privacy was based on, you know, having the luxury
Speaker 1: of observing what everyone else did and for several years
Speaker 1: before we really made a move. So we saw we saw,
Speaker 1: you know, a couple of the two biggest projects for
Speaker 1: privacy are probably you know, z cash and Monaro. Monaro
Speaker 1: was first in the game and they did ring signatures
Speaker 1: and then they added confidential transactions afterwards, and then they
Speaker 1: turned it into bulletproofs and the problem you know that
Speaker 1: I saw with with Monaro was I like ring signatures,
Speaker 1: I like confidential transactions. But um, the thing that occurred
Speaker 1: to me right away when I first saw it in
Speaker 1: you know, early fourteen, was as soon as you create
Speaker 1: ring signatures, you create uh, you know, deniability about how
Speaker 1: um about which transactions are spent and which are not.
Speaker 1: So once you don't know which transactions are spent um,
Speaker 1: you end up in a in a scenario where you
Speaker 1: can't prune the blockchain. So if I want to go
Speaker 1: if I just want to throw away all the spent transactions,
Speaker 1: I can do that with Bitcoin, and I can do
Speaker 1: it with decred, but I can't do it with with
Speaker 1: mo narrow. And that's sort of you know, it's it's
Speaker 1: by construction. So they have something they call pruning, but
Speaker 1: it's really kind of like it's more database charting. It's uh,
Speaker 1: you know, it's it's great, you know, it's a great
Speaker 1: project for privacy, but not for pruning. And then you know,
Speaker 1: ze cash has actually the same problem, which is that
Speaker 1: if you're using shield of trans and pruning, the pruning
Speaker 1: is being able to cut the database size down so
Speaker 1: that it's uh, it's stays small enough for people to
Speaker 1: run nodes on. Is that what the pruning? Yeah, yeah,
Speaker 1: that's part of it. But I think that the term pruning,
Speaker 1: at least, you know, it comes from the context of bitcoin,
Speaker 1: where you can always determine whether something is spent or not.
Speaker 1: So what it really is is it's throwing out the
Speaker 1: old transactions that have already been spent. Like you know,
Speaker 1: for example, you don't care where every penny that you
Speaker 1: have in your po it came from. You just care
Speaker 1: that you have them, and and and correspondingly than you know,
Speaker 1: the database for the network should only care about where
Speaker 1: that penny is as opposed to where that penny was.
Speaker 1: And and you know, when you use ring signatures or
Speaker 1: you use shielded transactions with z cash, you can't tell
Speaker 1: where that penny was because it could have been any
Speaker 1: of these various pennies that are on you know that
Speaker 1: use privacy, so you can't tell where you know, where
Speaker 1: things have come from, where they're going, and then also
Speaker 1: whether they're spent or not. And that's something that really
Speaker 1: drove our you know, the decisions we ended up making,
Speaker 1: which is because we saw the consequences and and sort
Speaker 1: of of these other systems we thought, we really want
Speaker 1: to do privacy, but we really want to avoid uh
Speaker 1: anything that breaks pruning. So so what we ended up
Speaker 1: doing is we ended up implementing coin shuffle plus plus,
Speaker 1: which is based on a paper by um uh roughing Merino,
Speaker 1: Sanchez and Katte and um. What that is is it's
Speaker 1: you know, it's it's a it's a way of shuffling coins.
Speaker 1: That doesn't right, That's like that's like a coin join. Yeah, exactly. Yeah,
Speaker 1: So it's a special kind of coin join. So it's
Speaker 1: a it's a dice mixed coin join. The idea of
Speaker 1: being when you have a coin join, right, you know,
Speaker 1: a whole bunch of it. Let's say seven people show
Speaker 1: up and they all join their transactions together, and they
Speaker 1: do it either through a central server through peer to
Speaker 1: peer network, so that those seven people and possibly a
Speaker 1: server know where the where the funds came from, and
Speaker 1: where they're going. Now that's obviously not great because you know,
Speaker 1: then all of us, you know, everyone who participated, knows
Speaker 1: where things went. So that's not great from a privacy perspective.
Speaker 1: All you need is one person spying on the mix
Speaker 1: and it's in its toast. From a privacy perspective. So
Speaker 1: what coin shuffle the coin shuffle element does is it
Speaker 1: is it is it allows everyone participating to to to
Speaker 1: communicate cryptographically, exchange keys, exchange some some blinded cryptographic information,
Speaker 1: and then the outputs become decoupled from the inputs. So
Speaker 1: while let's say there's seven of us, and we might
Speaker 1: be able to identify here's this cluster of inputs, here's
Speaker 1: this cluster of inputs and so on, what we can't
Speaker 1: do is we can't determine where the ones went, and
Speaker 1: neither can the servers. So that's sort of the that's
Speaker 1: why we were drawn to coin shuffle and then your
Speaker 1: coin shuffle plus plus and it didn't break pruning. So
Speaker 1: it's a straightforward process that uses basic cryptographic primitives and
Speaker 1: allows you to shuffle coins in a way that uh,
Speaker 1: you know, in addition to uh, in addition to it
Speaker 1: being anonymous to or you know what, is it private
Speaker 1: to everyone in the transaction, including the server. It also
Speaker 1: doesn't depend on network privacy, which is you know, which
Speaker 1: is something that I feel like is a shortcoming of
Speaker 1: schemes that use blind signatures. For example, was SABI while
Speaker 1: it does that, and I think that the Wasabi walt
Speaker 1: system is really it's really quite great because it's even
Speaker 1: I would argue it's even simpler than coin shuffle plus plus.
Speaker 1: But it has the downside that if somebody can undo
Speaker 1: your network path, then they can de anonymize you. So um,
Speaker 1: like with a SABI which would be used with bitcoin
Speaker 1: for for the listeners that aren't keeping up with that
Speaker 1: technical explanation. Therefore, with saby, it's like an external application,
Speaker 1: so I could use as my wallet and the bitcoin
Speaker 1: I receive, I can shuffle through there or mix them
Speaker 1: and then put them into my wallet. Um, but you're
Speaker 1: talking about taking this a similar situation system but different,
Speaker 1: but building it into the protocol as opposed to having
Speaker 1: it be an external system. That's right. So what we
Speaker 1: did is we integrated with our directly with our wallet.
Speaker 1: And then what we also did is remember how I
Speaker 1: was talking about, um this ticket process where you lock
Speaker 1: coins to to buy tickets. The tickets are involved in
Speaker 1: the in the staking is we intentionally overlaid the system
Speaker 1: with our staking system because on any on any given day,
Speaker 1: about I want to say, it's like one point so
Speaker 1: it's either one point in between one point six and
Speaker 1: two percent of our of our entire issuance is being
Speaker 1: used to buy new tickets every day. So we figured
Speaker 1: that by having a system like this and then also
Speaker 1: being able to overlay it with our existing steak you know,
Speaker 1: with our existing existing stake infrastructure, we would get a
Speaker 1: lot of transaction volume that you wouldn't otherwise be able
Speaker 1: to get with the normal mixer, say with with bitcoins.
Speaker 1: In the case of Bitcoin, gonna have a bunch of
Speaker 1: coins moving through it, but those coins are are you know,
Speaker 1: it's only gonna be so much of the you know,
Speaker 1: the total issuance. There's gonna be a lot of people
Speaker 1: who just don't use it. Whereas with the way we've
Speaker 1: set it up is all the coins are staked, and
Speaker 1: I think at this point I want to say, it's like,
Speaker 1: uh like twenty percent or twenty five percent of the
Speaker 1: of the staked coins are moving through this system already.
Speaker 1: So then back to the Bitcoin analogy, So then they
Speaker 1: have an external mix it mixer like with SABI, and
Speaker 1: if there's not enough people using it, there's not enough
Speaker 1: coins to mix together, so it's not really mixed up
Speaker 1: as well as it could be. Versus you're staying with
Speaker 1: decred because people are staking on the system and you're
Speaker 1: doing the mixing on the protocol, you have a larger
Speaker 1: percentage of coins to mix through. Yeah, exactly, so, so
Speaker 1: you know, I I'd expect it in absolute terms, I
Speaker 1: wouldn't be surprised if say was Sabi, Well it's you know,
Speaker 1: net net amount mixed and sort of fraction of the
Speaker 1: U t x O set and then the value of
Speaker 1: that it's I wouldn't be surprised if it's greater than
Speaker 1: de credits, but de credit market capital still lowish, and uh,
Speaker 1: you know, I want to say we're let's say it's
Speaker 1: of all of the coins staked, is that's ten percent.
Speaker 1: I think our market cap is something like, you know,
Speaker 1: uh something like two or two or forty million, and
Speaker 1: that's like two million dollars worth of worth of you know,
Speaker 1: coins that are all being mixed together, on and on.
Speaker 1: And this isn't just you know, one shot and then
Speaker 1: they then they go dormant. In most cases, these coins
Speaker 1: are continuously or semi continuously mixed. Yeah, what do you
Speaker 1: think about the future. I mean, I guess you're obviously
Speaker 1: building for this right now, but like the future of
Speaker 1: the coin mixing, the coin joining the privacy type coins.
Speaker 1: I mean, we're starting to see so much crackdown and
Speaker 1: regulation on that right now. I mean, you're obviously building
Speaker 1: into it. How do you think about that, like the
Speaker 1: increasing regulation but also the you know, increasing demand for that,
Speaker 1: how do you balance that? I mean, we, you know,
Speaker 1: we did create the system as an opt in system
Speaker 1: on purpose so that you know, people aren't necessarily forced
Speaker 1: to use it. But in terms of regulation, I mean,
Speaker 1: my sense of it is is that it seems like
Speaker 1: people are going to the exchanges first and they're trying
Speaker 1: to sort of create liquidity problems, which in part of
Speaker 1: this is why we you know, we decided to build
Speaker 1: the decks, which is that the DECKS allows us to
Speaker 1: sidestep things like, let's say, at some point in the future, uh,
Speaker 1: anyone operating and regulated centralized exchange is pressured by their
Speaker 1: local nation state government to not list dcred um. The
Speaker 1: deck side steps that the DECKS is effectively something like
Speaker 1: an email server anyone can set up anywhere there's no
Speaker 1: custody involved, and it's you know, it's it's low risk
Speaker 1: to operate or low to no risk to operate. So
Speaker 1: so this process of dealing with regulations is that. The
Speaker 1: way I view it is is that it's it's really
Speaker 1: all about on ramps and off ramps. They're trying to
Speaker 1: restrict the on ramps and off ramps, and we're already
Speaker 1: working on building a solution that won't just work for us.
Speaker 1: But hey, let's say z cash and monero experience issues
Speaker 1: with they're on and off ramps. They are absolutely welcome
Speaker 1: to get support added to our decks and then you know,
Speaker 1: do their own things. Yeah. And then part of the
Speaker 1: big thing with coin joining and or coin mixing uh
Speaker 1: if you will, or even with the privacy coins is
Speaker 1: is UH to promote the fungibility, which means that they're
Speaker 1: all equal to be exchanged like a dollar bill would be.
Speaker 1: And a dollar bill, I don't know what does A
Speaker 1: nine percent of dollar bills have cocaine on them? For example?
Speaker 1: So if they said, hey, if that dollar bill was
Speaker 1: ever used for a drug deal, it's no good anymore.
Speaker 1: We can't the bank can't take it. But they're trying.
Speaker 1: I think maybe some exchanges might already or some people
Speaker 1: might say, hey, we don't want to accept that bitcoin
Speaker 1: if it came from some blacklisted wallet or something. Um
Speaker 1: so is that is that something big that you're seeing there,
Speaker 1: that's why that's what you think. Well, yeah, I mean
Speaker 1: that's that's the direction I think things are going, which
Speaker 1: is that, um, you know, the way nation state governments
Speaker 1: have chosen to deal with bad actors is rather than
Speaker 1: try to catch bad actors in the act doing bad things,
Speaker 1: what they've done is they've tried to turn all of
Speaker 1: the sort of the systems that we use to advance
Speaker 1: ourselves as a human society into surveillance tools so that,
Speaker 1: you know, uh, if they could they put a camera
Speaker 1: and microphone in every pair of shoes and have it
Speaker 1: spin on you to just make sure you're not misusing
Speaker 1: the shoes. I mean, that's how things work with you know,
Speaker 1: both our financial system. You know what, what is it
Speaker 1: traveling anywhere? It's the same deal. It's a treat. You know.
Speaker 1: They assume everyone's a criminal until you prove that you're not.
Speaker 1: And it's like it's it's these kinds of systems, in
Speaker 1: my view, build a society that is not uh, you know,
Speaker 1: it's not the kind of society I want to live
Speaker 1: in the future. I want to build a society where,
Speaker 1: you know, you assume most people are good and most
Speaker 1: people are nice, and you know, you don't assume that
Speaker 1: people are gonna misuse the shoes to kill people and
Speaker 1: you know things like that. Okay, So UM, so that
Speaker 1: you were talking about with the coin shuffle and the
Speaker 1: coin joint and basically we're breaking that history so there's
Speaker 1: nothing to be traced back and it doesn't cause harm
Speaker 1: to everybody else, right, So I was kind of giving
Speaker 1: the example that, UM, recently we saw bitmax they have
Speaker 1: to capture k y C you know, your customer on everybody,
Speaker 1: and then they accidentally sent customer data out or we've
Speaker 1: seen like with Experience, they were hacked and all those
Speaker 1: people data got hacked. And so I'm really putting the
Speaker 1: people at risk to potentially catch one percent of malicious actors. UM.
Speaker 1: And I was just kind of saying, that's kind of
Speaker 1: like the original ideology I think of the cipher punks
Speaker 1: right to um not have to capture more information than
Speaker 1: you need and so UM, I like that initiative that
Speaker 1: you guys are doing. Yeah, and I think it's I
Speaker 1: think it's important to uh, you know, to to build
Speaker 1: systems where you're you're not taking custody of people's data.
Speaker 1: It's just it's just a better way to build the
Speaker 1: infrastructure so that at no point can you know, somebody
Speaker 1: put screws to me and having you know ruined, you know,
Speaker 1: ruin your personal information, or have people you know identity
Speaker 1: you know, steal your identity. Yeah. So, I mean, I
Speaker 1: like a lot of the stuff that you guys are doing.
Speaker 1: I'm curious, is how how do you look at it? UM?
Speaker 1: Is it kind of like a competition to see who
Speaker 1: can build the best product out there? Or you know,
Speaker 1: is it is it kind of are you taking an
Speaker 1: approach like almost like with your decks, were like, hey,
Speaker 1: we're doing what we're doing, but we're also doing it
Speaker 1: for the good of the community. Well, I think that
Speaker 1: the pattern with to say bitcoin, what bitcoin did is
Speaker 1: bitcoin UH removed the oracle of time stampers. You know,
Speaker 1: normally used to used to have go to a bank
Speaker 1: and they would be the the official time stamper of
Speaker 1: transactions and that's just how it was. And everywhere else
Speaker 1: that you went to get have time stamping done, there
Speaker 1: was one person who did it, and they turned time
Speaker 1: stamping into a game. We turned decred at its launch,
Speaker 1: turned UH turned um voting into a game. So we
Speaker 1: turned decision making into a game, or instead of it
Speaker 1: just being me making all the decisions as the project lead,
Speaker 1: we collectively make decisions together. And then you know the
Speaker 1: decks is uh making a fairer game out of the
Speaker 1: exchange process. So you know, the exchange process is one
Speaker 1: way right now and you know our our our vision
Speaker 1: is to turn it into a fairer game in the future.
Speaker 1: And I expect that. You know, it's fair for you
Speaker 1: and your viewers to expect more of that kind of
Speaker 1: material out of decred whether everyone else benefits or not.
Speaker 1: You know, there's there's a path that we take and
Speaker 1: we remove oracles. If you get in our way and
Speaker 1: cause this grief, we will we will engineer you out
Speaker 1: of the equation and so and and I don't mean
Speaker 1: that is like a veiled threat, uh, you know, a
Speaker 1: physical violence. Uh, It's more it's more just a question
Speaker 1: of how, you know, what kind of a society do
Speaker 1: we want to live in. Do we want to live
Speaker 1: in a society where an old guy behind the desk
Speaker 1: can tell can you know, remove all of your your
Speaker 1: your money from your account, or do we want to
Speaker 1: live in a society where where it's fairer and more
Speaker 1: balanced than people are you know self software? Yeah, yeah
Speaker 1: for sure. Um. Now, one last thing I want to
Speaker 1: kind of get into is just um, you you kind
Speaker 1: of mentioned how the market cap is pretty small today
Speaker 1: compared to to bitcoin. I mean, it's obviously much larger
Speaker 1: than a lot of the other all coins that are
Speaker 1: out there. Um. But but um, I know, you have
Speaker 1: this hybrid system of PW and POS. So how do
Speaker 1: you look at withstanding attacks against the network, you know,
Speaker 1: seeing as you do have a smaller network or market cap,
Speaker 1: but you have this hybrid consensus. So like, do you
Speaker 1: guys look at that? Well, what it does is that
Speaker 1: the hybrid consensus algorithm, beyond the fact that it puts
Speaker 1: the stakeholders in charge versus the miner, you know, as
Speaker 1: opposed to the miners in pure proof of work, it
Speaker 1: also create makes it much more expensive to run majority
Speaker 1: attacks also known as fifty one percent attacks or the
Speaker 1: you know, the fine it's attack is that you know,
Speaker 1: you can't mind a chain in private without the stakeholders.
Speaker 1: So if you're going to try to you know, make
Speaker 1: a deep reorganization, which is typically the way that you're
Speaker 1: going to make a damaging majority attack, you need a
Speaker 1: really large segment of the steak, and you need a
Speaker 1: really large segment of the proof of you know, of
Speaker 1: the mining power. So it makes it roughly, you know,
Speaker 1: tend you know, tend to tend to thirty x more
Speaker 1: expensive to run a majority attack on decred than say
Speaker 1: on a pure proof of work cryptocurrency. So you know,
Speaker 1: sort of pounds or pound, we're ten x or or
Speaker 1: or more resistant to double spend attacks than than a
Speaker 1: pure proof of work profer currency because they also have
Speaker 1: to stake the clients as well as as that have
Speaker 1: the hashing power. Yeah. Yeah, so you have to you
Speaker 1: have to buy tent of the town just to try
Speaker 1: to burn it down. It's kind of you know, the
Speaker 1: scenario you end up in. So it's like the amount
Speaker 1: of you need a whole bunch of stakeholders will hold
Speaker 1: a bunch of coins to collude with the miners, and
Speaker 1: then what would happen is is if that, you know,
Speaker 1: an attack like that gets executed, the value of the
Speaker 1: coins drop. So then it's like, why would anyone collude
Speaker 1: with the miners to do that? Yeah, So what do
Speaker 1: you see being the future of decred in the next
Speaker 1: you know, one three five, ten years. I mean, are
Speaker 1: you looking to be just another payment coin? Are you
Speaker 1: looking to develop more into a platform that have other
Speaker 1: applications built on it working. Where do you see the future? Well,
Speaker 1: what we're doing is is that you know, we're we're
Speaker 1: you know, we're following in the steps of Bitcoin in
Speaker 1: the sense that we're focusing on being a store of
Speaker 1: value first, um store, the store of value, proper value
Speaker 1: proposition is really what drives most of the value to
Speaker 1: say bitcoin. So I think it's fair that with that
Speaker 1: we continue along that path, the idea of being that
Speaker 1: we're trying to create a you know, a secure, adaptable
Speaker 1: and sustainable store of value for the longer term. And
Speaker 1: then once you know, as that proposition firms up and
Speaker 1: more and more people recognize that, will will transition into
Speaker 1: becoming more of a medium of exchange and hey, if
Speaker 1: we're lucky, even a unit of account. And the future
Speaker 1: that I see is that some people see a winner
Speaker 1: take all future to cryptocurrencies, like, oh, you know, if
Speaker 1: it isn't bitcoin, it's worthless. But you know, my view
Speaker 1: of it is it's going to be similar to banking
Speaker 1: and many other domains that we see, which is that
Speaker 1: there's gonna be several major you know, major players in
Speaker 1: the future and who they are and how they operate
Speaker 1: as you know, that's what's being determined right now and
Speaker 1: you know, in in recent history, just in the past
Speaker 1: few years. So my hope is is that decred can
Speaker 1: continue to evolve in a way that that keeps it
Speaker 1: sufficiently cutting edge, that it acts as a strong store
Speaker 1: of value, and that you know, it's one of the
Speaker 1: few that's left standing at the end of it. And
Speaker 1: our hope is is that the sustainability that comes from
Speaker 1: the you know, the treasury funds is enough to really
Speaker 1: keep us kicking. And you know, there's a few things
Speaker 1: that are coming. Uh. One of the things that's coming
Speaker 1: is that we're fully decentralizing the treasury. It is at
Speaker 1: least nominally centralized in terms of releasing payments. We're going
Speaker 1: to turn that payment release process into a fully decentralized
Speaker 1: thing where people actually vote on the transactions. And then
Speaker 1: there's more privacy stuff on the pipeline. There's there's enough
Speaker 1: of it to you know, probably keep us busy for
Speaker 1: six to twelve months to really sort of close all
Speaker 1: the all the gaps. Yeah, cool, great, well, it's a
Speaker 1: lot of information that we went through. But I love
Speaker 1: the focus that you guys are taking on decentralization and
Speaker 1: privacy and uh and really pushing that forward. I mean,
Speaker 1: it's just something that we need. We're seeing it all
Speaker 1: around the world right now with Hong Kong and China,
Speaker 1: and it's just we need to push back against that tide.
Speaker 1: So I love to see that. I know you have
Speaker 1: a bunch of good information that you update pretty regularly
Speaker 1: on the dcred website, Like you have a pretty good
Speaker 1: blog that's there. Where else do people go to learn
Speaker 1: or keep up with the project for yourself? So the uh,
Speaker 1: the revolution will not be centralized, but our chat but
Speaker 1: our chat platform is so uh you can go to
Speaker 1: chat dot decred dot org. Most of us, who are
Speaker 1: you know, project contractors were on Matrix, but we Bridge,
Speaker 1: Discord and Slack, and I believe we also have some Telegram,
Speaker 1: so we we we cover a whole bunch of different
Speaker 1: platforms for our communications. And then in terms of learning more,
Speaker 1: if you're interested in learning more about you know, the
Speaker 1: details of things that we discussed on here, you can
Speaker 1: go to docs dot decred dot org and uh, you know,
Speaker 1: for everything else so that you can you can hit
Speaker 1: us up on chats and and we can we can
Speaker 1: redirect you where we need to be. Yeah, awesome, Well Jake,
Speaker 1: I appreciate you taking the time to explain that to us.
Speaker 1: Um really interesting stuff and and thank you thanks marking
Speaker 1: for them. Hey, if you like this episode of the
Speaker 1: Market Disruptors podcast, please help us take this to the
Speaker 1: top of the podcast charts. Just please do me a
Speaker 1: favor and rate, review and subscribe. Taking fifteen seconds to
Speaker 1: just leave a quick review goes a long way and
Speaker 1: helping us reach more people and disrupt born markets. I
Speaker 1: really appreciate you listening and I'll see you next time
Speaker 1: on the Market Instructor's podcast.