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Speaker 1: So the big question is this, how do investors like

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Speaker 1: us get access to the ideas, information, and most importantly,

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Speaker 1: the right people that give us the tools and information

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Speaker 1: we need to make informed and educated decisions to have success.

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Speaker 1: That is the question, and this podcast will give us

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Speaker 1: the answers. This is Mark Moss, your host. Let's get

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Speaker 1: this started. Welcome to another episode of the Market Disruptors podcast. Today,

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Speaker 1: I'm sitting down with Jake Yo coom pat from Zero

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Speaker 1: LLC and the project lead of Decred. We get into

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Speaker 1: what it takes to be a project lead, what it

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Speaker 1: takes to build in the blockchain space, and how he's

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Speaker 1: going about doing that. We get into decred project. We

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Speaker 1: talk about the changes in governance that they think are

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Speaker 1: working really well for them, where that may go into

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Speaker 1: the future. We talk about privacy, why we need it,

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Speaker 1: why we should have it, and what they're doing about

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Speaker 1: bringing privacy back to the blockchain. Some really cool stuff there.

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Speaker 1: Some other stuff that we talk about includes um buying,

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Speaker 1: selling and exchanging in pure privacy, including a new d

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Speaker 1: e X and new decks at their building. Lots of

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Speaker 1: other good conversations with Jake. So it's going to just

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Speaker 1: jump right into it. Everyone, Welcome to another episode of

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Speaker 1: the Market Disruptors podcast. Today, I am joined by Jake

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Speaker 1: yocum Piet. He is the project lead over at de

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Speaker 1: cred and has been writing some cool articles working on

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Speaker 1: a lot of cool stuff. I can't wait to talk

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Speaker 1: to him. So welcome Jake. Thanks for having me Mark,

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Speaker 1: It's a pleasure to be here. Great. So, um, yeah,

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Speaker 1: I kind of gave a little bit of an intro,

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Speaker 1: but why don't you just kind of fill us in

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Speaker 1: a little bit on on who you are and and

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Speaker 1: uh maybe how you got to where you at right

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Speaker 1: now and working on decred on the project for sure. Um,

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Speaker 1: I'm Jacocompi. I'm the project lead for decred, and I've

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Speaker 1: been working in the cryptocurrency space since late twelve early

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Speaker 1: and my history is really, you know, to keep it

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Speaker 1: really brief, is I started working in the bitcoin spased

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Speaker 1: on an alternative full note bitcoin implementation called btc suite

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Speaker 1: and worked on that for a while. And my perception

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Speaker 1: of bitcoin is that, despite being you know, excellent technology

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Speaker 1: and and really, you know, really a great project, is

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Speaker 1: that I felt that the governance system of it was

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Speaker 1: pretty unfair and I found that pretty you know, pretty

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Speaker 1: jarring and not exactly the best user experience from my position.

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Speaker 1: So I ended up working with two a couple other

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Speaker 1: people to create a you know, a set of changes

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Speaker 1: on top of Bitcoin that we felt would make Bitcoin

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Speaker 1: a you know, a fairer game. That is that not

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Speaker 1: just make it fairer from storing and transmitting value, but

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Speaker 1: make it fairer from the perspective of governance. So that

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Speaker 1: was really what we launched the project with a focus on.

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Speaker 1: And that's sort of you know, that's our main focused

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Speaker 1: And and uh, when when was that that you launched

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Speaker 1: the decredit project. Oh yeah, that was a February, So

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Speaker 1: that's like three and a half a little over three

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Speaker 1: and a half years ago now. So we've been in

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Speaker 1: production since February sixteen, and the work to create decred

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Speaker 1: started back in February fourteen, so it took us a

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Speaker 1: couple of years to get everything, you know, set and ready,

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Speaker 1: and then we launched with a working code and everything.

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Speaker 1: So like the first four years you were kind of

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Speaker 1: in in and around bitcoin cryptocurrency space, Um, you were

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Speaker 1: fascinated by bitcoin and then working on bitcoin with with

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Speaker 1: some other projects, kind of learning to code and develop

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Speaker 1: on it. Yeah, yeah, and and I myself, I'm not

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Speaker 1: a developer, but I worked with I've worked with a

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Speaker 1: team of developers now for you know, over ten years.

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Speaker 1: And we had approached bitcoin from the perspective of saying,

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Speaker 1: you know, what could we really bring to the table,

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Speaker 1: And what we felt we could bring to the table

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Speaker 1: was some diversity in terms of the ecosystem for full

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Speaker 1: note clients, because in the case that you know, let's

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Speaker 1: just say something bad were to happen to say, Bitcoin

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Speaker 1: Corps hits a nasty bug, then there's you know, at

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Speaker 1: least one implementation that presumably wouldn't have those same bugs,

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Speaker 1: so that the network can keep ticking over and people

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Speaker 1: can fix their bugs and get everything back online without

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Speaker 1: it being a sort of a coordination mess. M hmm. Now, um,

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Speaker 1: when when you first kind of came in in two

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Speaker 1: thousand twelve and and as we kind of say, like

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Speaker 1: fell down the rabbit hole, so to speak, Um, where

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Speaker 1: there are a couple of core kind of principles that

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Speaker 1: really grabbed you and and pulled you in. What was

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Speaker 1: that like for you? Yeah, I mean what really drew me?

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Speaker 1: And I think, you know, whether people realize it or not,

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Speaker 1: you know, drew them to the bitcoin game was that

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Speaker 1: it's that it's a fairer game. You know, if you've

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Speaker 1: been if you've been using fiat currency for you know,

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Speaker 1: most of your life, and then you see something like cryptocurrency.

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Speaker 1: It really is striking in that it it avoids many

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Speaker 1: many problems that you end up having with banks. Anyone

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Speaker 1: who's ever had a problem with a you know, with

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Speaker 1: a bank, whether it's losing an account or you know

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Speaker 1: exactly or or any other kinds of problems, recognizes how

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Speaker 1: much power banks have over you. And and what bitcoin

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Speaker 1: did that I thought was really amazing is that it

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Speaker 1: distilled out what banks, you know, the sort of the

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Speaker 1: leverage the banks have, which is that they can create

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Speaker 1: a time stamp on your transactions and no one else can.

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Speaker 1: So what they did is they decentralized the time stamping process.

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Speaker 1: And that's you know, that really drew me in and

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Speaker 1: you know, and kept my attention. Yeah, okay, yeah. So, um,

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Speaker 1: there's so many different facets to bitcoin and cryptocurrencies. And

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Speaker 1: obviously with bitcoin and and being censorship resistant is one,

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Speaker 1: so the banks can't seize it or steal it. And

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Speaker 1: then obviously the hard cap so it can't be inflated

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Speaker 1: and manipulated, and you like those core principles about bitcoin,

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Speaker 1: you just thought maybe there were some tweaks in the

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Speaker 1: governance that that could be made. Yeah, yeah, I mean

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Speaker 1: it's clear that bitcoin works, right. You know, proof of

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Speaker 1: work is a really effective means of coming to a consensus,

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Speaker 1: even you know, you know centralization problems with hardware aside.

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Speaker 1: You know, it really does change the game, and it

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Speaker 1: makes the process at least nominally permission lists you can

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Speaker 1: you can store and transmit value without anyone going hey,

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Speaker 1: I don't like you. We're gonna you know, close your

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Speaker 1: bitcoin account, and and that is really just uh, you know,

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Speaker 1: that all worked. The thing that I felt like really

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Speaker 1: didn't work was the component where you go, Okay, what

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Speaker 1: changes are we going to make to the network? Are

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Speaker 1: we gonna make consensus changes? Are they gonna be software changes?

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Speaker 1: Are they're gonna be hard fork changes? That process is

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Speaker 1: incredibly messy, and uh, the one cpu, one vote mechanism

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Speaker 1: that was proposed by Cistosi originally doesn't work out so

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Speaker 1: great when you know, all, let's say the bulk of

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Speaker 1: the hash power is in warehouses in one jurisdiction, which

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Speaker 1: would be China, mm hmm. Yeah. Did a lot of

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Speaker 1: that come from I mean, I guess you started working

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Speaker 1: on this previous to the forks that happened in seventeen,

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Speaker 1: so you had kind of maybe seen some issues with

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Speaker 1: the consensus before before all that forking the four cores

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Speaker 1: or the nerd wars happened. Yeah. I mean what the

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Speaker 1: pattern we saw was this is that is that the

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Speaker 1: existing Bitcoin corps and then you know what what became

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Speaker 1: block stream is that that group of developers, while you know,

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Speaker 1: while very talented and you know, they have a lot

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Speaker 1: of chops and they've delivered a lot of great code,

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Speaker 1: it ends up being a small central planning committee. So

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Speaker 1: as much as bitcoin, you know, with the ability to

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Speaker 1: you know, uh, store and transmit value without censorship is great,

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Speaker 1: the system itself going Okay, where is this system going

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Speaker 1: to go in the future, is you know, controlled by

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Speaker 1: a central planning committee, which is a small number of

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Speaker 1: people have an outsized amount of influence over the repository

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Speaker 1: for the bitcoin, you know, for bitcoin corps. And then

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Speaker 1: as a function of that, they are the people who

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Speaker 1: are in charge of the government or you know, what's

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Speaker 1: effectively the government of bitcoin. And I felt like that

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Speaker 1: system was. You know, something I've never really liked about

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Speaker 1: the Federal Reserve is that it's a central planning committee.

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Speaker 1: You know, you and I we might no matter how

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Speaker 1: much money we have, we can complain all day, or

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Speaker 1: you know, we might know somebody at the Fed, but

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Speaker 1: we're not going to be able to influence their policy.

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Speaker 1: And I and that that was roughly the situation that

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Speaker 1: I found myself in back in I guess it was

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Speaker 1: really like late when that really all started to sink

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Speaker 1: in for me. So, so give me a rough overview

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Speaker 1: of how that how how you've kind of tried to

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Speaker 1: fix that, Like what does the consensus mechanism look like

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Speaker 1: on on the decred project? Yeah, so, so what I

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Speaker 1: recognize as I recognized there were really three shortcomings to

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Speaker 1: you know, to bitcoin in my mind, one of them

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Speaker 1: being that h that miners had too much power. That is,

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Speaker 1: you know, if you looked at what happened with you know,

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Speaker 1: and from I think it wasteen until seventeen with the

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Speaker 1: seguate change set. So SegWit is a set of consensus

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Speaker 1: changes everyone not everyone, but it seemed like the vast

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Speaker 1: majority of people wanted them implemented. But the the community

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Speaker 1: of miners did not, so they effectively blocked that consensus

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Speaker 1: change from being implemented for the better part of three years.

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Speaker 1: And uh and you know, seeing that miners just have

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Speaker 1: too much power. The other thing that, uh, that I

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Speaker 1: experienced was is because uh, you know, I built out

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Speaker 1: BTC suite and I I financed it myself, was there's

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Speaker 1: a real tragedy of the commons with respected development work, right,

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Speaker 1: you know, you want to let's say, you know, there's

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Speaker 1: a team of a hundred people who want to make

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Speaker 1: bitcoin grade. It's like becomes a question, Okay, who's gonna

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Speaker 1: pay you? And then what are the you know, what

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Speaker 1: what is your what's your paymaster's agenda? And then you

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Speaker 1: know that's a question mark and then the you know,

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Speaker 1: the other thing is is that there's really just no sovereignty,

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Speaker 1: you know, no matter how many big you know, even

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Speaker 1: if Statoshi wanted to change things, Satoshi couldn't really change

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Speaker 1: anything because the governance, mechanimics mechanism is all vested in

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Speaker 1: the you know, in the miners. So I felt like

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Speaker 1: there was a misalignment of interest there because somebody could

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Speaker 1: mine and just dump all their coins and and still

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Speaker 1: have an enormous amount of sovereignty in that system, and

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Speaker 1: I felt like that was a fundamental misalignment. So these things,

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Speaker 1: combined with reading about a hybrid proof of workproof of stake, uh,

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Speaker 1: you know consensus system is what led me to say this.

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Speaker 1: You know, this hybridized consensus algorithm is really what I

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Speaker 1: see as the future of you know, of of consensus.

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Speaker 1: Doesn't a lot of the power lie in the nodes

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Speaker 1: who actually decide which version of the software to run,

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Speaker 1: and not the miners. There's something to be said for

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Speaker 1: sovereignty being vested outside of the miners, but you know,

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Speaker 1: when it comes down to it, someone has to mind

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Speaker 1: the currency, and the mining is where the security comes from.

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Speaker 1: So I would argue that the miners have a lot

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Speaker 1: of a lot of sovereignty, the people developing the software

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Speaker 1: have a lot of sovereignty, but the people holding the

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Speaker 1: coins really don't have a whole lot of sovereignty. And

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Speaker 1: then when it comes to note operators, it depends on

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Speaker 1: which a note operators you're talking about. Like, like, let's

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Speaker 1: say I'm a random person and I have a note running,

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Speaker 1: and I go, I'm gonna you know, I'm gonna not

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Speaker 1: follow these consensus rules. Everyone else is like yeah, I

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Speaker 1: don't care, bye by, and I feel like you know, However,

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Speaker 1: there are other nodes that are economic nodes, like say,

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Speaker 1: you know, nodes a major exchanges and payment processors that

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Speaker 1: have you know, and an outsized amount of power implicitly,

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Speaker 1: um you know, as a function of their role in

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Speaker 1: the ecosystem compared to uh, you know, just random people

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Speaker 1: operating full notes. So there is there is a little

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Speaker 1: bit of sovereignty all spread around, right, we can all

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Speaker 1: do the user activated software thing and threatened to walk

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Speaker 1: out of the room and be like funk this, I'm

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Speaker 1: out of here. But but you know, I don't think

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Speaker 1: I don't really view that as much. Uh sort of,

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Speaker 1: it's sort of like a it's like a riot switch,

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Speaker 1: like if if you do the wrong thing, everybody's gonna

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Speaker 1: riot and leave or flip over cars. But it's it's

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Speaker 1: not a very good government's mechanism, got it. And so

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Speaker 1: through through the governance mechanism that you've done, you you

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Speaker 1: you touched on a couple of things. Um. One, we

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Speaker 1: talked about the consensus and and having some sort of

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Speaker 1: like a hybrid pow POS system of proof of work

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Speaker 1: and a proof of steak. So the proof of steak

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Speaker 1: that people who hold the coins you said who don't

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Speaker 1: have a vote, I guess now they're staking those coins

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Speaker 1: that they do have skin in the game. Now they

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Speaker 1: do have a vote. Yeah that yeah, that's right. So

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Speaker 1: so each block subsidy in our system is split three ways,

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Speaker 1: proof of work, proof of steake, ten percent treasury. And

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Speaker 1: the way it works is is that the miners proof

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Speaker 1: of work create the blocks. And then what proof of

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Speaker 1: steak does is that you you opt into a ticket system,

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Speaker 1: so you lock your coins, you timelock them for a

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Speaker 1: pseudorandom amount of time, and then your your your coins

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Speaker 1: turning to tick gets. The tickets go into a rolling

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Speaker 1: lottery and every block, five of these tickets are chosen

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Speaker 1: to vote. And what you're voting on is you're voting

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Speaker 1: on the validity of the prior block. And so if

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Speaker 1: there's a proof of work miner and their misbehaving, it

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Speaker 1: is conceivable that you can strip them of their mining

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Speaker 1: reward uh from the previous block. So that so that

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Speaker 1: what this does is this puts the proof of stake miners,

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Speaker 1: you know, firmly in control of what does and doesn't

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Speaker 1: happen on the network, so that if there's a malicious

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Speaker 1: or a group of malicious proof of work miners, the

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Speaker 1: proof of you know, the stakeholders can effectively censure them

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Speaker 1: and deprive them of income to sort of tow at

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Speaker 1: best discourage their continued sort of you know, bad behavior,

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Speaker 1: and would then be done by some sort of like

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Speaker 1: a majority vote. Yeah. Yeah, So so, uh, every block

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Speaker 1: there's five tickets called, you need at least three of

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Speaker 1: them to vote or to be included in order for

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Speaker 1: the block to be valid. So if or more, uh yeah,

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Speaker 1: or more of the votes are yes, the block is valid.

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Speaker 1: If there's fifty or more no votes, the block is

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Speaker 1: in valid. So um, you know, if enough of the

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Speaker 1: stakeholders on a on a rolling basis disapprove of things

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Speaker 1: done by certain proof of work miners, they can go

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Speaker 1: through and start, you know, invalidating the proof of work

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Speaker 1: rewards that those miners receive. Right, But who who's who's

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Speaker 1: actually voting though? Like like today, I mean who's voting?

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Speaker 1: Is there like a small group of people who are

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Speaker 1: actually paying attention to taking time to vote or how

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Speaker 1: how is that being done? Yeah? So, so the way

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Speaker 1: it works is this is that as blocks, people run

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Speaker 1: things called voting wallets, so that as let's say block

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Speaker 1: N is mind and then it propagates across the network.

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Speaker 1: What that does is that sets a you know, that

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Speaker 1: sets a pseudorandom uh sortition of the tickets, so that

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Speaker 1: block and its header go, these are the tickets that

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Speaker 1: are going to vote in block N plus one excuse me,

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Speaker 1: and then those votes end up getting cast. So so

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Speaker 1: people have wallets that are online continuously that are ready

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Speaker 1: to vote when the blocks are published. And that and

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Speaker 1: what you do is whether we're talking about voting on

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Speaker 1: the validity of the prior blocks, proof of work, or

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Speaker 1: we're talking about making consensus changes, people can pre program

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Speaker 1: their you know there how they would like their voting

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Speaker 1: whilets to vote. So if there's a certain behavior that

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Speaker 1: you want to vote against. For example, let's say you

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Speaker 1: saw the mem pool and it has a bunch of transactions,

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Speaker 1: and and then you see a block that's been mined

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Speaker 1: has no transactions in it, you can have a policy

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Speaker 1: set such that you vote no to that block and

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Speaker 1: and you know, correspondingly strip the minor of their rewards.

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Speaker 1: So so this process is generic. And then and then

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Speaker 1: the same thing goes. If you're voting on consensus changes,

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Speaker 1: you can vote yes or no or abstain from votes,

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Speaker 1: depending on you know, what votements are available to you. Yeah,

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Speaker 1: there's definitely a lot to unpack there, and I can

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Speaker 1: keep asking questions, but I kind of want to move

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Speaker 1: on past that. UM. One thing that I do want

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Speaker 1: to touch on before we dig into some other stuff

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Speaker 1: I was kind of looking forward to, is as you

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Speaker 1: mentioned about the UH ten percent goes to like the

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Speaker 1: development fund, I guess, And so I think you kind

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Speaker 1: of said, like with bitcoin, the problem is is that

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Speaker 1: developers aren't getting paid. So I guess everybody's kind of

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Speaker 1: doing it for free UM. And so what kind of

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Speaker 1: long term problems could that have in development on bitcoin?

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Speaker 1: Whereas UH, your project decred has um a reward going

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Speaker 1: to pay developers. Is that kind of what you were

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Speaker 1: talking about? UM? All right, So what I was saying

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Speaker 1: is we could spend we could we could spend a

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Speaker 1: lot of time talking about UH, talking talking about those

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Speaker 1: that that area of government. I don't really want to

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Speaker 1: dig too much deeper into that, but you did mention

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Speaker 1: something about the UM tem per cent of the of

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Speaker 1: the inflation going to fund the treasury or to fund

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Speaker 1: the development, and how other projects like bitcoin don't have

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Speaker 1: any payments going to developers. Um. And so I guess

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Speaker 1: you're saying that Bitcoin potentially could be stunted because eventually

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Speaker 1: it could run out of people willing to work for free.

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Speaker 1: And de credit has a model where people get paid

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Speaker 1: to work on it. Yeah, that's right. So we have

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Speaker 1: a we have a contractor model where where for example,

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Speaker 1: there's a company that that I own and I'm the

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Speaker 1: CEO of Company zero LLC, and it's a development contractor

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Speaker 1: and it's one of you know, many contractors that work

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Speaker 1: for the project, whereas with bitcoin, bitcoin is dependent on

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Speaker 1: you know, mostly venture capital money at this point. I

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Speaker 1: don't think there's any shortage of the venture capital money

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Speaker 1: at this point, but in the few that, you know,

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Speaker 1: there's no guarantee that in the future there you know,

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Speaker 1: that those funds won't run out. So um. So, what

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Speaker 1: the way Decred handles is ten percent of every block

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Speaker 1: goes to a centralist corporate entity, and then that corporate entity,

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Speaker 1: decred Holding UH Decred Holdings Group LLC, pays out to

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Speaker 1: contractors who build for the work that they perform, which

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Speaker 1: includes you know, company zero and and you know, probably

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Speaker 1: about fifty other contractors. Yeah, and we can definitely see

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Speaker 1: that UM decredit is working on a lot more projects

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Speaker 1: than bitcoin. So some of the projects I've seen you

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Speaker 1: working on, which I saw one was voted in by

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Speaker 1: the community to build a deckx right, a decentralized exchange,

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Speaker 1: which I thought was pretty cool. Um, you're also working

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Speaker 1: on some privacy US, some lightning UM stuff, atomic swaps,

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Speaker 1: So I guess that kind of allows you the community

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Speaker 1: to kind of work on more projects like that. Yeah.

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Speaker 1: When when we when we started decredit, we started it

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Speaker 1: intention We made a constitution to to try to manage

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Speaker 1: people's expectations a bit. And one of the things we

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Speaker 1: said as we said we would continue building open source

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Speaker 1: software that's you know, related to the cryptocurrency space, and

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Speaker 1: the decks is a great example of that where we're

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Speaker 1: trying to sort of, you know, the same way were

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Speaker 1: we we main effort to make the governance process fairer.

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Speaker 1: We're trying to make the exchange process fairer. So there's

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Speaker 1: no you know, ks m L, there's no h you know,

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Speaker 1: there's no requirements about you know, things you have to do.

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Speaker 1: You pay an upfront fee to get on a server,

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Speaker 1: and then you can trade, and then the order matching

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Speaker 1: is pseudorandom, so no one can gain you on a

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Speaker 1: first in, first out basis like they do on most

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Speaker 1: uh FIAT exchanges. And then you know, you know, with

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Speaker 1: privacy and all of these other things. The funding does

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Speaker 1: give us latitude to do, you know, to do new stuff.

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Speaker 1: And we also don't have to do pend on the

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Speaker 1: approval of you know, the venture capitalists who would otherwise

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Speaker 1: fund this saying the same way that bitcoin does. Did

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Speaker 1: you see today, um, the group Anonymous pledged to donate

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Speaker 1: seventy five million dollars for bitcoin development for privacy. That

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Speaker 1: was pretty amazing. I was surprised to see that. I

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Speaker 1: think it's pretty interesting. I I did see that as well,

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Speaker 1: and and I guess my you know, my feeling is it's, uh,

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Speaker 1: we've seen so many I c O s who have

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Speaker 1: you know, a mega pile of money, and you know

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Speaker 1: they just sort of you know, uh piss it away

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Speaker 1: on random stuff or they don't really get a whole

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Speaker 1: lot of work done. It's gonna be interesting to see

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Speaker 1: what comes out of that, you know, one, whether the

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Speaker 1: funds are you know, do exist, and you know, to

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Speaker 1: whether people actually build useful stuff. There's you know, there's

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Speaker 1: there's a lot of good that could come out of it,

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Speaker 1: but it remains to be seen. I'm always skeptical. I'm

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Speaker 1: a I'm a deliverables before promise this kind of guy. Sure.

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Speaker 1: I just thought it was interesting because they want to

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Speaker 1: donate it towards privacy focused stuff, and that's kind of

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Speaker 1: where I wanted to focus our conversation today because as

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Speaker 1: I saw, you released a paper a few months ago

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Speaker 1: talking about privacy and how uh kind of kind of

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Speaker 1: some of the shortcomings you see or some of the

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Speaker 1: needs of privacy in the industry, and how you want

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Speaker 1: to start optimizing for that. So um, I I personally

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Speaker 1: like to see more companies such as yourself, seeing seeing

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Speaker 1: the need for that and optimizing towards that. But tell me,

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Speaker 1: tell me how you look at privacy maybe as as

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Speaker 1: something that we need and and something that maybe D

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Speaker 1: credit can help solve for sure. Yeah, I mean when

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Speaker 1: we launched, our focus was just on the government stuff,

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Speaker 1: but we always had an eye to adding privacy. I'm

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Speaker 1: a total privacy nut. I'm probably way more of a

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Speaker 1: computer security nut than than most of the people who

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Speaker 1: work on the privacy projects, and um, I feel like

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Speaker 1: privacy is really important in the context of cryptocurrency because it's,

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Speaker 1: you know, it's it's a value transfer system. If you

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Speaker 1: don't have privacy and value transfer system, somebody can use, say,

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Speaker 1: you know, something like chain or chain analysis to look

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Speaker 1: at your entire networth, all the transactions you have head

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Speaker 1: and then figure out who the people are who are

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Speaker 1: interacting with you, and so on and so on. So

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Speaker 1: I feel like, you know, privacy is really about preventing

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Speaker 1: people from knowing more, you know, learning things about you

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Speaker 1: without your consent, and and and and that I view

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Speaker 1: as something very you know, very important because if we

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Speaker 1: if we look at a world without privacy, which is

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Speaker 1: really kind of where things have been heading for the

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Speaker 1: past decade or two or or five and uh yeah, yeah, yeah,

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Speaker 1: ever since the development of radio so uh so, privacy

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Speaker 1: has been diminishing. And and the issue there is is

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Speaker 1: that when you have no privacy, people can always tell

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Speaker 1: what you're doing currently. And you know, humans are creatures

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Speaker 1: a habit. If you know what someone is doing currently,

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Speaker 1: you have a pretty good idea of what they're going

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Speaker 1: to be doing in the near future. Or in the

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Speaker 1: or in the distant future. So privacy matters from the

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Speaker 1: perspective of control. Someone knows what you're going to do

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Speaker 1: before you do it, even if it's just a you know,

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Speaker 1: probabilistic relationship. They can outmaneuver you. They can manipulate what

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Speaker 1: you what you believe, or what you you know, or

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Speaker 1: or how you feel about things. So, so privacy matters

430
00:21:02,080 --> 00:21:05,720
Speaker 1: in the context of us creating a society that functions

431
00:21:05,760 --> 00:21:08,879
Speaker 1: with a bunch of independent, you know, elements, as opposed

432
00:21:08,920 --> 00:21:11,679
Speaker 1: to sort of a top down society where somebody with

433
00:21:11,720 --> 00:21:14,760
Speaker 1: a satellite can tell you know where everybody's going, where

434
00:21:14,760 --> 00:21:17,080
Speaker 1: everybody has been, and where they will go. So, you know,

435
00:21:17,320 --> 00:21:19,280
Speaker 1: it's really it's really about freedom and what kind of

436
00:21:19,320 --> 00:21:21,760
Speaker 1: a society we want to live in the future. Yeah,

437
00:21:21,800 --> 00:21:23,440
Speaker 1: And I think one thing that's important for most people

438
00:21:23,440 --> 00:21:26,160
Speaker 1: to understand is it's not just about like secrecy. It's

439
00:21:26,160 --> 00:21:28,119
Speaker 1: not just like I don't want this drug deal to

440
00:21:28,160 --> 00:21:31,320
Speaker 1: be known. UM. Let's say that I I'm a manufacturer

441
00:21:31,359 --> 00:21:34,840
Speaker 1: of a product and I have multiple companies buying from it. UM,

442
00:21:34,880 --> 00:21:37,600
Speaker 1: and I do a transaction with with company A. I

443
00:21:37,640 --> 00:21:39,560
Speaker 1: don't maybe want all the other companies to know what

444
00:21:39,600 --> 00:21:41,359
Speaker 1: I sold that product price? You know what the price

445
00:21:41,359 --> 00:21:43,560
Speaker 1: of that product was sold for. So like that that

446
00:21:43,560 --> 00:21:45,840
Speaker 1: should be that should be private, right, nobody needs to

447
00:21:45,880 --> 00:21:48,800
Speaker 1: know what that deal was. Um, And so I think

448
00:21:48,800 --> 00:21:51,919
Speaker 1: everybody could understand, like you wouldn't want everybody in the

449
00:21:51,960 --> 00:21:53,880
Speaker 1: world to be able to look into your bank account

450
00:21:53,880 --> 00:21:55,760
Speaker 1: and see exactly how much money you have in your

451
00:21:55,800 --> 00:21:58,080
Speaker 1: banking and what you were spending, and not because you

452
00:21:58,080 --> 00:22:00,800
Speaker 1: want to buy drugs, but just because you want to

453
00:22:00,840 --> 00:22:05,399
Speaker 1: privacy there, right, um and so that's the thing with bitcoin,

454
00:22:05,440 --> 00:22:07,560
Speaker 1: I guess, being being open to everybody, you can see

455
00:22:07,560 --> 00:22:10,200
Speaker 1: all of that and and so um, so so how

456
00:22:10,240 --> 00:22:12,800
Speaker 1: does how how are you approaching privacy and what are

457
00:22:12,800 --> 00:22:15,919
Speaker 1: you looking to do to solve that? So our approach

458
00:22:15,920 --> 00:22:19,880
Speaker 1: of privacy was based on, you know, having the luxury

459
00:22:19,920 --> 00:22:22,440
Speaker 1: of observing what everyone else did and for several years

460
00:22:22,480 --> 00:22:26,880
Speaker 1: before we really made a move. So we saw we saw,

461
00:22:27,200 --> 00:22:29,240
Speaker 1: you know, a couple of the two biggest projects for

462
00:22:29,320 --> 00:22:33,719
Speaker 1: privacy are probably you know, z cash and Monaro. Monaro

463
00:22:33,800 --> 00:22:36,399
Speaker 1: was first in the game and they did ring signatures

464
00:22:36,440 --> 00:22:39,320
Speaker 1: and then they added confidential transactions afterwards, and then they

465
00:22:39,400 --> 00:22:42,199
Speaker 1: turned it into bulletproofs and the problem you know that

466
00:22:42,280 --> 00:22:45,359
Speaker 1: I saw with with Monaro was I like ring signatures,

467
00:22:45,400 --> 00:22:49,679
Speaker 1: I like confidential transactions. But um, the thing that occurred

468
00:22:49,680 --> 00:22:51,080
Speaker 1: to me right away when I first saw it in

469
00:22:51,280 --> 00:22:54,280
Speaker 1: you know, early fourteen, was as soon as you create

470
00:22:54,359 --> 00:22:58,520
Speaker 1: ring signatures, you create uh, you know, deniability about how

471
00:22:58,800 --> 00:23:02,359
Speaker 1: um about which transactions are spent and which are not.

472
00:23:02,640 --> 00:23:05,600
Speaker 1: So once you don't know which transactions are spent um,

473
00:23:05,680 --> 00:23:08,520
Speaker 1: you end up in a in a scenario where you

474
00:23:08,560 --> 00:23:10,680
Speaker 1: can't prune the blockchain. So if I want to go

475
00:23:11,040 --> 00:23:13,480
Speaker 1: if I just want to throw away all the spent transactions,

476
00:23:13,520 --> 00:23:15,080
Speaker 1: I can do that with Bitcoin, and I can do

477
00:23:15,119 --> 00:23:17,280
Speaker 1: it with decred, but I can't do it with with

478
00:23:17,359 --> 00:23:19,320
Speaker 1: mo narrow. And that's sort of you know, it's it's

479
00:23:19,359 --> 00:23:21,840
Speaker 1: by construction. So they have something they call pruning, but

480
00:23:21,880 --> 00:23:25,040
Speaker 1: it's really kind of like it's more database charting. It's uh,

481
00:23:25,160 --> 00:23:26,800
Speaker 1: you know, it's it's great, you know, it's a great

482
00:23:26,800 --> 00:23:29,359
Speaker 1: project for privacy, but not for pruning. And then you know,

483
00:23:29,480 --> 00:23:32,000
Speaker 1: ze cash has actually the same problem, which is that

484
00:23:32,040 --> 00:23:34,200
Speaker 1: if you're using shield of trans and pruning, the pruning

485
00:23:34,359 --> 00:23:37,520
Speaker 1: is being able to cut the database size down so

486
00:23:37,560 --> 00:23:39,879
Speaker 1: that it's uh, it's stays small enough for people to

487
00:23:39,960 --> 00:23:42,200
Speaker 1: run nodes on. Is that what the pruning? Yeah, yeah,

488
00:23:42,240 --> 00:23:44,560
Speaker 1: that's part of it. But I think that the term pruning,

489
00:23:44,720 --> 00:23:47,120
Speaker 1: at least, you know, it comes from the context of bitcoin,

490
00:23:47,440 --> 00:23:50,080
Speaker 1: where you can always determine whether something is spent or not.

491
00:23:50,520 --> 00:23:52,560
Speaker 1: So what it really is is it's throwing out the

492
00:23:52,600 --> 00:23:55,760
Speaker 1: old transactions that have already been spent. Like you know,

493
00:23:56,119 --> 00:23:59,159
Speaker 1: for example, you don't care where every penny that you

494
00:23:59,480 --> 00:24:01,040
Speaker 1: have in your po it came from. You just care

495
00:24:01,240 --> 00:24:04,560
Speaker 1: that you have them, and and and correspondingly than you know,

496
00:24:04,600 --> 00:24:06,880
Speaker 1: the database for the network should only care about where

497
00:24:06,920 --> 00:24:09,199
Speaker 1: that penny is as opposed to where that penny was.

498
00:24:09,720 --> 00:24:12,119
Speaker 1: And and you know, when you use ring signatures or

499
00:24:12,160 --> 00:24:15,200
Speaker 1: you use shielded transactions with z cash, you can't tell

500
00:24:15,280 --> 00:24:18,040
Speaker 1: where that penny was because it could have been any

501
00:24:18,080 --> 00:24:20,040
Speaker 1: of these various pennies that are on you know that

502
00:24:20,200 --> 00:24:23,200
Speaker 1: use privacy, so you can't tell where you know, where

503
00:24:23,240 --> 00:24:25,399
Speaker 1: things have come from, where they're going, and then also

504
00:24:25,480 --> 00:24:27,880
Speaker 1: whether they're spent or not. And that's something that really

505
00:24:27,960 --> 00:24:30,840
Speaker 1: drove our you know, the decisions we ended up making,

506
00:24:30,880 --> 00:24:34,280
Speaker 1: which is because we saw the consequences and and sort

507
00:24:34,280 --> 00:24:38,080
Speaker 1: of of these other systems we thought, we really want

508
00:24:38,080 --> 00:24:41,240
Speaker 1: to do privacy, but we really want to avoid uh

509
00:24:41,320 --> 00:24:44,439
Speaker 1: anything that breaks pruning. So so what we ended up

510
00:24:44,480 --> 00:24:47,320
Speaker 1: doing is we ended up implementing coin shuffle plus plus,

511
00:24:47,359 --> 00:24:51,320
Speaker 1: which is based on a paper by um uh roughing Merino,

512
00:24:51,400 --> 00:24:54,320
Speaker 1: Sanchez and Katte and um. What that is is it's

513
00:24:54,359 --> 00:24:57,120
Speaker 1: you know, it's it's a it's a way of shuffling coins.

514
00:24:57,119 --> 00:25:01,760
Speaker 1: That doesn't right, That's like that's like a coin join. Yeah, exactly. Yeah,

515
00:25:01,800 --> 00:25:03,560
Speaker 1: So it's a special kind of coin join. So it's

516
00:25:03,600 --> 00:25:06,240
Speaker 1: a it's a dice mixed coin join. The idea of

517
00:25:06,280 --> 00:25:08,440
Speaker 1: being when you have a coin join, right, you know,

518
00:25:08,480 --> 00:25:10,400
Speaker 1: a whole bunch of it. Let's say seven people show

519
00:25:10,520 --> 00:25:12,800
Speaker 1: up and they all join their transactions together, and they

520
00:25:12,840 --> 00:25:14,520
Speaker 1: do it either through a central server through peer to

521
00:25:14,560 --> 00:25:17,280
Speaker 1: peer network, so that those seven people and possibly a

522
00:25:17,320 --> 00:25:20,359
Speaker 1: server know where the where the funds came from, and

523
00:25:20,359 --> 00:25:23,919
Speaker 1: where they're going. Now that's obviously not great because you know,

524
00:25:24,000 --> 00:25:26,600
Speaker 1: then all of us, you know, everyone who participated, knows

525
00:25:26,760 --> 00:25:29,520
Speaker 1: where things went. So that's not great from a privacy perspective.

526
00:25:29,560 --> 00:25:31,400
Speaker 1: All you need is one person spying on the mix

527
00:25:31,400 --> 00:25:34,720
Speaker 1: and it's in its toast. From a privacy perspective. So

528
00:25:34,880 --> 00:25:37,480
Speaker 1: what coin shuffle the coin shuffle element does is it

529
00:25:37,520 --> 00:25:41,439
Speaker 1: is it is it allows everyone participating to to to

530
00:25:42,040 --> 00:25:47,639
Speaker 1: communicate cryptographically, exchange keys, exchange some some blinded cryptographic information,

531
00:25:48,119 --> 00:25:51,479
Speaker 1: and then the outputs become decoupled from the inputs. So

532
00:25:51,520 --> 00:25:53,320
Speaker 1: while let's say there's seven of us, and we might

533
00:25:53,359 --> 00:25:55,920
Speaker 1: be able to identify here's this cluster of inputs, here's

534
00:25:55,920 --> 00:25:58,359
Speaker 1: this cluster of inputs and so on, what we can't

535
00:25:58,520 --> 00:26:00,600
Speaker 1: do is we can't determine where the ones went, and

536
00:26:00,680 --> 00:26:04,040
Speaker 1: neither can the servers. So that's sort of the that's

537
00:26:04,080 --> 00:26:06,880
Speaker 1: why we were drawn to coin shuffle and then your

538
00:26:06,920 --> 00:26:10,360
Speaker 1: coin shuffle plus plus and it didn't break pruning. So

539
00:26:10,480 --> 00:26:14,359
Speaker 1: it's a straightforward process that uses basic cryptographic primitives and

540
00:26:14,480 --> 00:26:17,280
Speaker 1: allows you to shuffle coins in a way that uh,

541
00:26:17,359 --> 00:26:19,879
Speaker 1: you know, in addition to uh, in addition to it

542
00:26:19,920 --> 00:26:22,080
Speaker 1: being anonymous to or you know what, is it private

543
00:26:22,080 --> 00:26:25,480
Speaker 1: to everyone in the transaction, including the server. It also

544
00:26:25,560 --> 00:26:28,640
Speaker 1: doesn't depend on network privacy, which is you know, which

545
00:26:28,680 --> 00:26:30,399
Speaker 1: is something that I feel like is a shortcoming of

546
00:26:31,080 --> 00:26:33,720
Speaker 1: schemes that use blind signatures. For example, was SABI while

547
00:26:33,720 --> 00:26:36,400
Speaker 1: it does that, and I think that the Wasabi walt

548
00:26:36,440 --> 00:26:38,960
Speaker 1: system is really it's really quite great because it's even

549
00:26:39,160 --> 00:26:42,280
Speaker 1: I would argue it's even simpler than coin shuffle plus plus.

550
00:26:42,320 --> 00:26:44,480
Speaker 1: But it has the downside that if somebody can undo

551
00:26:44,560 --> 00:26:50,440
Speaker 1: your network path, then they can de anonymize you. So um,

552
00:26:50,520 --> 00:26:52,720
Speaker 1: like with a SABI which would be used with bitcoin

553
00:26:52,920 --> 00:26:54,919
Speaker 1: for for the listeners that aren't keeping up with that

554
00:26:55,160 --> 00:26:58,760
Speaker 1: technical explanation. Therefore, with saby, it's like an external application,

555
00:26:58,840 --> 00:27:01,240
Speaker 1: so I could use as my wallet and the bitcoin

556
00:27:01,320 --> 00:27:03,960
Speaker 1: I receive, I can shuffle through there or mix them

557
00:27:04,280 --> 00:27:06,320
Speaker 1: and then put them into my wallet. Um, but you're

558
00:27:06,359 --> 00:27:10,119
Speaker 1: talking about taking this a similar situation system but different,

559
00:27:10,600 --> 00:27:13,440
Speaker 1: but building it into the protocol as opposed to having

560
00:27:13,440 --> 00:27:16,320
Speaker 1: it be an external system. That's right. So what we

561
00:27:16,359 --> 00:27:19,000
Speaker 1: did is we integrated with our directly with our wallet.

562
00:27:19,400 --> 00:27:21,159
Speaker 1: And then what we also did is remember how I

563
00:27:21,200 --> 00:27:23,640
Speaker 1: was talking about, um this ticket process where you lock

564
00:27:23,800 --> 00:27:26,560
Speaker 1: coins to to buy tickets. The tickets are involved in

565
00:27:26,600 --> 00:27:30,680
Speaker 1: the in the staking is we intentionally overlaid the system

566
00:27:30,760 --> 00:27:34,080
Speaker 1: with our staking system because on any on any given day,

567
00:27:34,119 --> 00:27:36,000
Speaker 1: about I want to say, it's like one point so

568
00:27:36,240 --> 00:27:38,080
Speaker 1: it's either one point in between one point six and

569
00:27:38,080 --> 00:27:41,040
Speaker 1: two percent of our of our entire issuance is being

570
00:27:41,119 --> 00:27:43,800
Speaker 1: used to buy new tickets every day. So we figured

571
00:27:43,840 --> 00:27:45,879
Speaker 1: that by having a system like this and then also

572
00:27:45,920 --> 00:27:48,879
Speaker 1: being able to overlay it with our existing steak you know,

573
00:27:49,200 --> 00:27:53,080
Speaker 1: with our existing existing stake infrastructure, we would get a

574
00:27:53,119 --> 00:27:56,120
Speaker 1: lot of transaction volume that you wouldn't otherwise be able

575
00:27:56,160 --> 00:27:58,640
Speaker 1: to get with the normal mixer, say with with bitcoins.

576
00:27:58,760 --> 00:28:00,760
Speaker 1: In the case of Bitcoin, gonna have a bunch of

577
00:28:00,760 --> 00:28:03,800
Speaker 1: coins moving through it, but those coins are are you know,

578
00:28:03,800 --> 00:28:05,719
Speaker 1: it's only gonna be so much of the you know,

579
00:28:05,800 --> 00:28:07,560
Speaker 1: the total issuance. There's gonna be a lot of people

580
00:28:07,560 --> 00:28:10,080
Speaker 1: who just don't use it. Whereas with the way we've

581
00:28:10,119 --> 00:28:13,879
Speaker 1: set it up is all the coins are staked, and

582
00:28:13,920 --> 00:28:15,840
Speaker 1: I think at this point I want to say, it's like,

583
00:28:16,080 --> 00:28:20,320
Speaker 1: uh like twenty percent or twenty five percent of the

584
00:28:21,080 --> 00:28:24,240
Speaker 1: of the staked coins are moving through this system already.

585
00:28:24,320 --> 00:28:27,119
Speaker 1: So then back to the Bitcoin analogy, So then they

586
00:28:27,160 --> 00:28:29,960
Speaker 1: have an external mix it mixer like with SABI, and

587
00:28:30,000 --> 00:28:32,280
Speaker 1: if there's not enough people using it, there's not enough

588
00:28:32,280 --> 00:28:34,679
Speaker 1: coins to mix together, so it's not really mixed up

589
00:28:34,720 --> 00:28:36,480
Speaker 1: as well as it could be. Versus you're staying with

590
00:28:36,560 --> 00:28:39,480
Speaker 1: decred because people are staking on the system and you're

591
00:28:39,560 --> 00:28:42,480
Speaker 1: doing the mixing on the protocol, you have a larger

592
00:28:42,520 --> 00:28:46,160
Speaker 1: percentage of coins to mix through. Yeah, exactly, so, so

593
00:28:46,440 --> 00:28:48,520
Speaker 1: you know, I I'd expect it in absolute terms, I

594
00:28:48,560 --> 00:28:50,840
Speaker 1: wouldn't be surprised if say was Sabi, Well it's you know,

595
00:28:50,960 --> 00:28:54,160
Speaker 1: net net amount mixed and sort of fraction of the

596
00:28:54,240 --> 00:28:55,959
Speaker 1: U t x O set and then the value of

597
00:28:56,000 --> 00:28:58,320
Speaker 1: that it's I wouldn't be surprised if it's greater than

598
00:28:58,360 --> 00:29:02,120
Speaker 1: de credits, but de credit market capital still lowish, and uh,

599
00:29:02,160 --> 00:29:05,880
Speaker 1: you know, I want to say we're let's say it's

600
00:29:06,000 --> 00:29:09,800
Speaker 1: of all of the coins staked, is that's ten percent.

601
00:29:10,200 --> 00:29:12,040
Speaker 1: I think our market cap is something like, you know,

602
00:29:12,280 --> 00:29:15,840
Speaker 1: uh something like two or two or forty million, and

603
00:29:15,880 --> 00:29:19,160
Speaker 1: that's like two million dollars worth of worth of you know,

604
00:29:19,480 --> 00:29:21,800
Speaker 1: coins that are all being mixed together, on and on.

605
00:29:22,080 --> 00:29:24,040
Speaker 1: And this isn't just you know, one shot and then

606
00:29:24,040 --> 00:29:26,240
Speaker 1: they then they go dormant. In most cases, these coins

607
00:29:26,240 --> 00:29:30,320
Speaker 1: are continuously or semi continuously mixed. Yeah, what do you

608
00:29:30,360 --> 00:29:33,720
Speaker 1: think about the future. I mean, I guess you're obviously

609
00:29:33,720 --> 00:29:36,280
Speaker 1: building for this right now, but like the future of

610
00:29:36,320 --> 00:29:39,440
Speaker 1: the coin mixing, the coin joining the privacy type coins.

611
00:29:39,720 --> 00:29:41,480
Speaker 1: I mean, we're starting to see so much crackdown and

612
00:29:41,560 --> 00:29:44,760
Speaker 1: regulation on that right now. I mean, you're obviously building

613
00:29:44,800 --> 00:29:47,440
Speaker 1: into it. How do you think about that, like the

614
00:29:47,480 --> 00:29:51,040
Speaker 1: increasing regulation but also the you know, increasing demand for that,

615
00:29:51,480 --> 00:29:53,720
Speaker 1: how do you balance that? I mean, we, you know,

616
00:29:53,800 --> 00:29:56,120
Speaker 1: we did create the system as an opt in system

617
00:29:56,200 --> 00:29:59,080
Speaker 1: on purpose so that you know, people aren't necessarily forced

618
00:29:59,080 --> 00:30:02,360
Speaker 1: to use it. But in terms of regulation, I mean,

619
00:30:02,400 --> 00:30:04,960
Speaker 1: my sense of it is is that it seems like

620
00:30:05,000 --> 00:30:09,040
Speaker 1: people are going to the exchanges first and they're trying

621
00:30:09,080 --> 00:30:12,040
Speaker 1: to sort of create liquidity problems, which in part of

622
00:30:12,080 --> 00:30:14,480
Speaker 1: this is why we you know, we decided to build

623
00:30:14,480 --> 00:30:16,880
Speaker 1: the decks, which is that the DECKS allows us to

624
00:30:16,960 --> 00:30:21,360
Speaker 1: sidestep things like, let's say, at some point in the future, uh,

625
00:30:21,400 --> 00:30:25,440
Speaker 1: anyone operating and regulated centralized exchange is pressured by their

626
00:30:25,480 --> 00:30:29,440
Speaker 1: local nation state government to not list dcred um. The

627
00:30:29,520 --> 00:30:32,360
Speaker 1: deck side steps that the DECKS is effectively something like

628
00:30:32,400 --> 00:30:35,160
Speaker 1: an email server anyone can set up anywhere there's no

629
00:30:35,200 --> 00:30:37,920
Speaker 1: custody involved, and it's you know, it's it's low risk

630
00:30:37,960 --> 00:30:41,080
Speaker 1: to operate or low to no risk to operate. So

631
00:30:41,440 --> 00:30:45,160
Speaker 1: so this process of dealing with regulations is that. The

632
00:30:45,160 --> 00:30:47,320
Speaker 1: way I view it is is that it's it's really

633
00:30:47,320 --> 00:30:49,280
Speaker 1: all about on ramps and off ramps. They're trying to

634
00:30:49,320 --> 00:30:51,760
Speaker 1: restrict the on ramps and off ramps, and we're already

635
00:30:51,840 --> 00:30:54,240
Speaker 1: working on building a solution that won't just work for us.

636
00:30:54,280 --> 00:30:57,360
Speaker 1: But hey, let's say z cash and monero experience issues

637
00:30:57,400 --> 00:31:00,280
Speaker 1: with they're on and off ramps. They are absolutely welcome

638
00:31:00,360 --> 00:31:03,280
Speaker 1: to get support added to our decks and then you know,

639
00:31:03,360 --> 00:31:06,200
Speaker 1: do their own things. Yeah. And then part of the

640
00:31:06,240 --> 00:31:09,240
Speaker 1: big thing with coin joining and or coin mixing uh

641
00:31:09,280 --> 00:31:12,000
Speaker 1: if you will, or even with the privacy coins is

642
00:31:12,000 --> 00:31:15,400
Speaker 1: is UH to promote the fungibility, which means that they're

643
00:31:15,440 --> 00:31:18,800
Speaker 1: all equal to be exchanged like a dollar bill would be.

644
00:31:19,200 --> 00:31:20,560
Speaker 1: And a dollar bill, I don't know what does A

645
00:31:20,720 --> 00:31:23,320
Speaker 1: nine percent of dollar bills have cocaine on them? For example?

646
00:31:23,440 --> 00:31:25,040
Speaker 1: So if they said, hey, if that dollar bill was

647
00:31:25,040 --> 00:31:27,280
Speaker 1: ever used for a drug deal, it's no good anymore.

648
00:31:27,280 --> 00:31:30,120
Speaker 1: We can't the bank can't take it. But they're trying.

649
00:31:30,160 --> 00:31:33,120
Speaker 1: I think maybe some exchanges might already or some people

650
00:31:33,160 --> 00:31:34,840
Speaker 1: might say, hey, we don't want to accept that bitcoin

651
00:31:34,960 --> 00:31:38,760
Speaker 1: if it came from some blacklisted wallet or something. Um

652
00:31:38,840 --> 00:31:40,600
Speaker 1: so is that is that something big that you're seeing there,

653
00:31:40,640 --> 00:31:42,440
Speaker 1: that's why that's what you think. Well, yeah, I mean

654
00:31:42,480 --> 00:31:44,560
Speaker 1: that's that's the direction I think things are going, which

655
00:31:44,560 --> 00:31:47,720
Speaker 1: is that, um, you know, the way nation state governments

656
00:31:47,760 --> 00:31:50,880
Speaker 1: have chosen to deal with bad actors is rather than

657
00:31:50,920 --> 00:31:53,560
Speaker 1: try to catch bad actors in the act doing bad things,

658
00:31:53,800 --> 00:31:55,520
Speaker 1: what they've done is they've tried to turn all of

659
00:31:55,560 --> 00:31:57,960
Speaker 1: the sort of the systems that we use to advance

660
00:31:58,000 --> 00:32:01,520
Speaker 1: ourselves as a human society into surveillance tools so that,

661
00:32:01,840 --> 00:32:03,920
Speaker 1: you know, uh, if they could they put a camera

662
00:32:03,920 --> 00:32:05,600
Speaker 1: and microphone in every pair of shoes and have it

663
00:32:05,680 --> 00:32:07,680
Speaker 1: spin on you to just make sure you're not misusing

664
00:32:07,720 --> 00:32:09,600
Speaker 1: the shoes. I mean, that's how things work with you know,

665
00:32:09,640 --> 00:32:12,440
Speaker 1: both our financial system. You know what, what is it

666
00:32:12,520 --> 00:32:15,480
Speaker 1: traveling anywhere? It's the same deal. It's a treat. You know.

667
00:32:15,520 --> 00:32:18,000
Speaker 1: They assume everyone's a criminal until you prove that you're not.

668
00:32:18,080 --> 00:32:21,160
Speaker 1: And it's like it's it's these kinds of systems, in

669
00:32:21,200 --> 00:32:24,000
Speaker 1: my view, build a society that is not uh, you know,

670
00:32:24,040 --> 00:32:25,600
Speaker 1: it's not the kind of society I want to live

671
00:32:25,640 --> 00:32:27,440
Speaker 1: in the future. I want to build a society where,

672
00:32:27,600 --> 00:32:29,600
Speaker 1: you know, you assume most people are good and most

673
00:32:29,600 --> 00:32:31,520
Speaker 1: people are nice, and you know, you don't assume that

674
00:32:31,560 --> 00:32:34,360
Speaker 1: people are gonna misuse the shoes to kill people and

675
00:32:34,480 --> 00:32:36,840
Speaker 1: you know things like that. Okay, So UM, so that

676
00:32:36,920 --> 00:32:38,560
Speaker 1: you were talking about with the coin shuffle and the

677
00:32:38,600 --> 00:32:41,840
Speaker 1: coin joint and basically we're breaking that history so there's

678
00:32:41,840 --> 00:32:45,360
Speaker 1: nothing to be traced back and it doesn't cause harm

679
00:32:45,400 --> 00:32:47,760
Speaker 1: to everybody else, right, So I was kind of giving

680
00:32:47,760 --> 00:32:51,360
Speaker 1: the example that, UM, recently we saw bitmax they have

681
00:32:51,480 --> 00:32:54,400
Speaker 1: to capture k y C you know, your customer on everybody,

682
00:32:54,560 --> 00:32:57,280
Speaker 1: and then they accidentally sent customer data out or we've

683
00:32:57,320 --> 00:32:59,680
Speaker 1: seen like with Experience, they were hacked and all those

684
00:32:59,680 --> 00:33:03,360
Speaker 1: people data got hacked. And so I'm really putting the

685
00:33:03,360 --> 00:33:08,680
Speaker 1: people at risk to potentially catch one percent of malicious actors. UM.

686
00:33:08,960 --> 00:33:10,320
Speaker 1: And I was just kind of saying, that's kind of

687
00:33:10,360 --> 00:33:13,120
Speaker 1: like the original ideology I think of the cipher punks

688
00:33:13,160 --> 00:33:16,760
Speaker 1: right to um not have to capture more information than

689
00:33:16,800 --> 00:33:19,080
Speaker 1: you need and so UM, I like that initiative that

690
00:33:19,120 --> 00:33:21,800
Speaker 1: you guys are doing. Yeah, and I think it's I

691
00:33:21,840 --> 00:33:24,800
Speaker 1: think it's important to uh, you know, to to build

692
00:33:24,840 --> 00:33:28,080
Speaker 1: systems where you're you're not taking custody of people's data.

693
00:33:28,320 --> 00:33:30,800
Speaker 1: It's just it's just a better way to build the

694
00:33:30,840 --> 00:33:33,960
Speaker 1: infrastructure so that at no point can you know, somebody

695
00:33:34,320 --> 00:33:36,959
Speaker 1: put screws to me and having you know ruined, you know,

696
00:33:37,280 --> 00:33:40,160
Speaker 1: ruin your personal information, or have people you know identity

697
00:33:40,560 --> 00:33:43,640
Speaker 1: you know, steal your identity. Yeah. So, I mean, I

698
00:33:43,680 --> 00:33:45,240
Speaker 1: like a lot of the stuff that you guys are doing.

699
00:33:45,280 --> 00:33:49,080
Speaker 1: I'm curious, is how how do you look at it? UM?

700
00:33:49,200 --> 00:33:51,160
Speaker 1: Is it kind of like a competition to see who

701
00:33:51,160 --> 00:33:54,160
Speaker 1: can build the best product out there? Or you know,

702
00:33:54,400 --> 00:33:55,600
Speaker 1: is it is it kind of are you taking an

703
00:33:55,600 --> 00:33:57,760
Speaker 1: approach like almost like with your decks, were like, hey,

704
00:33:57,800 --> 00:33:59,400
Speaker 1: we're doing what we're doing, but we're also doing it

705
00:33:59,440 --> 00:34:02,920
Speaker 1: for the good of the community. Well, I think that

706
00:34:03,120 --> 00:34:06,080
Speaker 1: the pattern with to say bitcoin, what bitcoin did is

707
00:34:06,120 --> 00:34:10,840
Speaker 1: bitcoin UH removed the oracle of time stampers. You know,

708
00:34:11,080 --> 00:34:12,760
Speaker 1: normally used to used to have go to a bank

709
00:34:12,840 --> 00:34:15,480
Speaker 1: and they would be the the official time stamper of

710
00:34:15,480 --> 00:34:18,520
Speaker 1: transactions and that's just how it was. And everywhere else

711
00:34:18,560 --> 00:34:20,319
Speaker 1: that you went to get have time stamping done, there

712
00:34:20,360 --> 00:34:22,239
Speaker 1: was one person who did it, and they turned time

713
00:34:22,280 --> 00:34:25,680
Speaker 1: stamping into a game. We turned decred at its launch,

714
00:34:25,760 --> 00:34:29,920
Speaker 1: turned UH turned um voting into a game. So we

715
00:34:29,960 --> 00:34:32,360
Speaker 1: turned decision making into a game, or instead of it

716
00:34:32,400 --> 00:34:35,000
Speaker 1: just being me making all the decisions as the project lead,

717
00:34:35,320 --> 00:34:38,880
Speaker 1: we collectively make decisions together. And then you know the

718
00:34:38,920 --> 00:34:42,120
Speaker 1: decks is uh making a fairer game out of the

719
00:34:42,160 --> 00:34:45,279
Speaker 1: exchange process. So you know, the exchange process is one

720
00:34:45,280 --> 00:34:47,719
Speaker 1: way right now and you know our our our vision

721
00:34:47,800 --> 00:34:49,760
Speaker 1: is to turn it into a fairer game in the future.

722
00:34:50,080 --> 00:34:53,160
Speaker 1: And I expect that. You know, it's fair for you

723
00:34:53,239 --> 00:34:56,040
Speaker 1: and your viewers to expect more of that kind of

724
00:34:56,120 --> 00:34:59,440
Speaker 1: material out of decred whether everyone else benefits or not.

725
00:35:00,000 --> 00:35:02,520
Speaker 1: You know, there's there's a path that we take and

726
00:35:02,560 --> 00:35:04,920
Speaker 1: we remove oracles. If you get in our way and

727
00:35:05,000 --> 00:35:08,520
Speaker 1: cause this grief, we will we will engineer you out

728
00:35:08,520 --> 00:35:10,719
Speaker 1: of the equation and so and and I don't mean

729
00:35:10,760 --> 00:35:12,920
Speaker 1: that is like a veiled threat, uh, you know, a

730
00:35:12,920 --> 00:35:16,480
Speaker 1: physical violence. Uh, It's more it's more just a question

731
00:35:16,480 --> 00:35:18,480
Speaker 1: of how, you know, what kind of a society do

732
00:35:18,520 --> 00:35:19,560
Speaker 1: we want to live in. Do we want to live

733
00:35:19,560 --> 00:35:22,080
Speaker 1: in a society where an old guy behind the desk

734
00:35:22,120 --> 00:35:24,480
Speaker 1: can tell can you know, remove all of your your

735
00:35:24,719 --> 00:35:26,600
Speaker 1: your money from your account, or do we want to

736
00:35:26,640 --> 00:35:28,799
Speaker 1: live in a society where where it's fairer and more

737
00:35:28,840 --> 00:35:32,919
Speaker 1: balanced than people are you know self software? Yeah, yeah

738
00:35:33,000 --> 00:35:35,920
Speaker 1: for sure. Um. Now, one last thing I want to

739
00:35:36,000 --> 00:35:37,799
Speaker 1: kind of get into is just um, you you kind

740
00:35:37,800 --> 00:35:40,320
Speaker 1: of mentioned how the market cap is pretty small today

741
00:35:40,360 --> 00:35:43,239
Speaker 1: compared to to bitcoin. I mean, it's obviously much larger

742
00:35:43,239 --> 00:35:44,560
Speaker 1: than a lot of the other all coins that are

743
00:35:44,560 --> 00:35:47,239
Speaker 1: out there. Um. But but um, I know, you have

744
00:35:47,320 --> 00:35:50,719
Speaker 1: this hybrid system of PW and POS. So how do

745
00:35:50,760 --> 00:35:54,160
Speaker 1: you look at withstanding attacks against the network, you know,

746
00:35:54,160 --> 00:35:57,280
Speaker 1: seeing as you do have a smaller network or market cap,

747
00:35:57,760 --> 00:36:00,160
Speaker 1: but you have this hybrid consensus. So like, do you

748
00:36:00,200 --> 00:36:02,719
Speaker 1: guys look at that? Well, what it does is that

749
00:36:03,200 --> 00:36:05,880
Speaker 1: the hybrid consensus algorithm, beyond the fact that it puts

750
00:36:05,880 --> 00:36:08,480
Speaker 1: the stakeholders in charge versus the miner, you know, as

751
00:36:08,520 --> 00:36:11,279
Speaker 1: opposed to the miners in pure proof of work, it

752
00:36:11,320 --> 00:36:13,800
Speaker 1: also create makes it much more expensive to run majority

753
00:36:13,840 --> 00:36:16,040
Speaker 1: attacks also known as fifty one percent attacks or the

754
00:36:16,160 --> 00:36:18,279
Speaker 1: you know, the fine it's attack is that you know,

755
00:36:18,920 --> 00:36:21,640
Speaker 1: you can't mind a chain in private without the stakeholders.

756
00:36:21,880 --> 00:36:24,000
Speaker 1: So if you're going to try to you know, make

757
00:36:24,000 --> 00:36:27,040
Speaker 1: a deep reorganization, which is typically the way that you're

758
00:36:27,080 --> 00:36:30,759
Speaker 1: going to make a damaging majority attack, you need a

759
00:36:30,800 --> 00:36:33,160
Speaker 1: really large segment of the steak, and you need a

760
00:36:33,200 --> 00:36:35,520
Speaker 1: really large segment of the proof of you know, of

761
00:36:35,560 --> 00:36:38,759
Speaker 1: the mining power. So it makes it roughly, you know,

762
00:36:38,920 --> 00:36:42,040
Speaker 1: tend you know, tend to tend to thirty x more

763
00:36:42,080 --> 00:36:45,839
Speaker 1: expensive to run a majority attack on decred than say

764
00:36:45,920 --> 00:36:48,880
Speaker 1: on a pure proof of work cryptocurrency. So you know,

765
00:36:48,920 --> 00:36:51,520
Speaker 1: sort of pounds or pound, we're ten x or or

766
00:36:51,840 --> 00:36:54,960
Speaker 1: or more resistant to double spend attacks than than a

767
00:36:55,040 --> 00:36:58,120
Speaker 1: pure proof of work profer currency because they also have

768
00:36:58,239 --> 00:37:00,400
Speaker 1: to stake the clients as well as as that have

769
00:37:00,440 --> 00:37:02,920
Speaker 1: the hashing power. Yeah. Yeah, so you have to you

770
00:37:03,040 --> 00:37:05,319
Speaker 1: have to buy tent of the town just to try

771
00:37:05,360 --> 00:37:07,080
Speaker 1: to burn it down. It's kind of you know, the

772
00:37:07,600 --> 00:37:10,320
Speaker 1: scenario you end up in. So it's like the amount

773
00:37:10,360 --> 00:37:12,080
Speaker 1: of you need a whole bunch of stakeholders will hold

774
00:37:12,080 --> 00:37:14,400
Speaker 1: a bunch of coins to collude with the miners, and

775
00:37:14,440 --> 00:37:17,160
Speaker 1: then what would happen is is if that, you know,

776
00:37:17,200 --> 00:37:19,080
Speaker 1: an attack like that gets executed, the value of the

777
00:37:19,120 --> 00:37:21,240
Speaker 1: coins drop. So then it's like, why would anyone collude

778
00:37:21,239 --> 00:37:23,960
Speaker 1: with the miners to do that? Yeah, So what do

779
00:37:24,000 --> 00:37:26,480
Speaker 1: you see being the future of decred in the next

780
00:37:26,880 --> 00:37:30,440
Speaker 1: you know, one three five, ten years. I mean, are

781
00:37:30,440 --> 00:37:33,560
Speaker 1: you looking to be just another payment coin? Are you

782
00:37:33,560 --> 00:37:35,359
Speaker 1: looking to develop more into a platform that have other

783
00:37:35,400 --> 00:37:38,960
Speaker 1: applications built on it working. Where do you see the future? Well,

784
00:37:38,960 --> 00:37:41,880
Speaker 1: what we're doing is is that you know, we're we're

785
00:37:41,880 --> 00:37:43,719
Speaker 1: you know, we're following in the steps of Bitcoin in

786
00:37:43,760 --> 00:37:45,640
Speaker 1: the sense that we're focusing on being a store of

787
00:37:45,719 --> 00:37:49,600
Speaker 1: value first, um store, the store of value, proper value

788
00:37:49,600 --> 00:37:52,120
Speaker 1: proposition is really what drives most of the value to

789
00:37:52,200 --> 00:37:54,800
Speaker 1: say bitcoin. So I think it's fair that with that

790
00:37:55,000 --> 00:37:57,920
Speaker 1: we continue along that path, the idea of being that

791
00:37:57,920 --> 00:38:02,000
Speaker 1: we're trying to create a you know, a secure, adaptable

792
00:38:02,040 --> 00:38:05,239
Speaker 1: and sustainable store of value for the longer term. And

793
00:38:05,280 --> 00:38:08,440
Speaker 1: then once you know, as that proposition firms up and

794
00:38:08,480 --> 00:38:11,319
Speaker 1: more and more people recognize that, will will transition into

795
00:38:11,360 --> 00:38:13,920
Speaker 1: becoming more of a medium of exchange and hey, if

796
00:38:13,920 --> 00:38:16,720
Speaker 1: we're lucky, even a unit of account. And the future

797
00:38:16,719 --> 00:38:18,560
Speaker 1: that I see is that some people see a winner

798
00:38:18,560 --> 00:38:21,400
Speaker 1: take all future to cryptocurrencies, like, oh, you know, if

799
00:38:21,440 --> 00:38:24,799
Speaker 1: it isn't bitcoin, it's worthless. But you know, my view

800
00:38:24,800 --> 00:38:26,480
Speaker 1: of it is it's going to be similar to banking

801
00:38:26,520 --> 00:38:29,640
Speaker 1: and many other domains that we see, which is that

802
00:38:30,800 --> 00:38:34,120
Speaker 1: there's gonna be several major you know, major players in

803
00:38:34,120 --> 00:38:36,360
Speaker 1: the future and who they are and how they operate

804
00:38:36,400 --> 00:38:38,799
Speaker 1: as you know, that's what's being determined right now and

805
00:38:38,920 --> 00:38:40,879
Speaker 1: you know, in in recent history, just in the past

806
00:38:40,920 --> 00:38:43,879
Speaker 1: few years. So my hope is is that decred can

807
00:38:43,920 --> 00:38:46,400
Speaker 1: continue to evolve in a way that that keeps it

808
00:38:46,440 --> 00:38:49,440
Speaker 1: sufficiently cutting edge, that it acts as a strong store

809
00:38:49,440 --> 00:38:51,920
Speaker 1: of value, and that you know, it's one of the

810
00:38:52,040 --> 00:38:54,319
Speaker 1: few that's left standing at the end of it. And

811
00:38:54,360 --> 00:38:57,160
Speaker 1: our hope is is that the sustainability that comes from

812
00:38:57,320 --> 00:39:00,600
Speaker 1: the you know, the treasury funds is enough to really

813
00:39:00,680 --> 00:39:02,879
Speaker 1: keep us kicking. And you know, there's a few things

814
00:39:02,920 --> 00:39:05,000
Speaker 1: that are coming. Uh. One of the things that's coming

815
00:39:05,080 --> 00:39:07,680
Speaker 1: is that we're fully decentralizing the treasury. It is at

816
00:39:07,719 --> 00:39:10,560
Speaker 1: least nominally centralized in terms of releasing payments. We're going

817
00:39:10,600 --> 00:39:13,919
Speaker 1: to turn that payment release process into a fully decentralized

818
00:39:13,960 --> 00:39:16,680
Speaker 1: thing where people actually vote on the transactions. And then

819
00:39:16,719 --> 00:39:19,600
Speaker 1: there's more privacy stuff on the pipeline. There's there's enough

820
00:39:19,600 --> 00:39:21,600
Speaker 1: of it to you know, probably keep us busy for

821
00:39:21,640 --> 00:39:23,960
Speaker 1: six to twelve months to really sort of close all

822
00:39:23,960 --> 00:39:28,640
Speaker 1: the all the gaps. Yeah, cool, great, well, it's a

823
00:39:28,680 --> 00:39:30,719
Speaker 1: lot of information that we went through. But I love

824
00:39:30,760 --> 00:39:33,719
Speaker 1: the focus that you guys are taking on decentralization and

825
00:39:33,760 --> 00:39:36,719
Speaker 1: privacy and uh and really pushing that forward. I mean,

826
00:39:36,719 --> 00:39:38,479
Speaker 1: it's just something that we need. We're seeing it all

827
00:39:38,520 --> 00:39:40,880
Speaker 1: around the world right now with Hong Kong and China,

828
00:39:41,239 --> 00:39:44,040
Speaker 1: and it's just we need to push back against that tide.

829
00:39:44,080 --> 00:39:45,799
Speaker 1: So I love to see that. I know you have

830
00:39:45,840 --> 00:39:48,280
Speaker 1: a bunch of good information that you update pretty regularly

831
00:39:48,320 --> 00:39:50,680
Speaker 1: on the dcred website, Like you have a pretty good

832
00:39:50,680 --> 00:39:53,080
Speaker 1: blog that's there. Where else do people go to learn

833
00:39:53,160 --> 00:39:57,080
Speaker 1: or keep up with the project for yourself? So the uh,

834
00:39:57,120 --> 00:39:59,719
Speaker 1: the revolution will not be centralized, but our chat but

835
00:39:59,840 --> 00:40:02,400
Speaker 1: our chat platform is so uh you can go to

836
00:40:02,480 --> 00:40:05,520
Speaker 1: chat dot decred dot org. Most of us, who are

837
00:40:05,560 --> 00:40:09,280
Speaker 1: you know, project contractors were on Matrix, but we Bridge,

838
00:40:09,719 --> 00:40:13,480
Speaker 1: Discord and Slack, and I believe we also have some Telegram,

839
00:40:13,560 --> 00:40:15,440
Speaker 1: so we we we cover a whole bunch of different

840
00:40:15,480 --> 00:40:18,960
Speaker 1: platforms for our communications. And then in terms of learning more,

841
00:40:19,000 --> 00:40:20,960
Speaker 1: if you're interested in learning more about you know, the

842
00:40:21,360 --> 00:40:23,200
Speaker 1: details of things that we discussed on here, you can

843
00:40:23,200 --> 00:40:26,680
Speaker 1: go to docs dot decred dot org and uh, you know,

844
00:40:26,719 --> 00:40:28,520
Speaker 1: for everything else so that you can you can hit

845
00:40:28,560 --> 00:40:30,600
Speaker 1: us up on chats and and we can we can

846
00:40:30,680 --> 00:40:34,359
Speaker 1: redirect you where we need to be. Yeah, awesome, Well Jake,

847
00:40:34,400 --> 00:40:36,440
Speaker 1: I appreciate you taking the time to explain that to us.

848
00:40:36,880 --> 00:40:41,200
Speaker 1: Um really interesting stuff and and thank you thanks marking

849
00:40:41,320 --> 00:40:43,600
Speaker 1: for them. Hey, if you like this episode of the

850
00:40:43,600 --> 00:40:46,960
Speaker 1: Market Disruptors podcast, please help us take this to the

851
00:40:47,000 --> 00:40:49,480
Speaker 1: top of the podcast charts. Just please do me a

852
00:40:49,480 --> 00:40:53,440
Speaker 1: favor and rate, review and subscribe. Taking fifteen seconds to

853
00:40:53,480 --> 00:40:55,680
Speaker 1: just leave a quick review goes a long way and

854
00:40:55,719 --> 00:40:58,799
Speaker 1: helping us reach more people and disrupt born markets. I

855
00:40:58,880 --> 00:41:01,279
Speaker 1: really appreciate you listening and I'll see you next time

856
00:41:01,400 --> 00:41:02,880
Speaker 1: on the Market Instructor's podcast.