1 00:00:04,440 --> 00:00:07,800 Speaker 1: Welcome to tex Stuff, a production from I Heart Radio. 2 00:00:11,840 --> 00:00:14,640 Speaker 1: Hey there, and welcome to tech Stuff. I'm your host, 3 00:00:14,800 --> 00:00:18,320 Speaker 1: Jonathan Strickland. I'm an executive producer with I Heart Radio 4 00:00:18,400 --> 00:00:21,279 Speaker 1: and how the tech are you now? I hope all 5 00:00:21,280 --> 00:00:24,480 Speaker 1: of you out there who observed the winter holidays had 6 00:00:24,520 --> 00:00:28,320 Speaker 1: a wonderful time with loved ones. Recently, we are back 7 00:00:28,840 --> 00:00:32,519 Speaker 1: to continue our wrap up on the big tech news 8 00:00:32,560 --> 00:00:36,559 Speaker 1: stories of twenty two. So last week we had a 9 00:00:36,560 --> 00:00:41,000 Speaker 1: ton of major stories from the Elon Musk slash Twitter 10 00:00:41,120 --> 00:00:45,559 Speaker 1: drama that's still playing out right now. That included some 11 00:00:45,640 --> 00:00:48,800 Speaker 1: of the fallout of how that has affected Tesla that's 12 00:00:48,840 --> 00:00:52,320 Speaker 1: also continuing. I think the last time I covered it, 13 00:00:53,120 --> 00:00:56,560 Speaker 1: the stock price for Tesla was somewhere around maybe one fifty, 14 00:00:56,720 --> 00:01:00,720 Speaker 1: maybe one thirty. Now it's like one twelve, So yeah, 15 00:01:00,920 --> 00:01:05,920 Speaker 1: Tesla's stock is still kind of well, seriously struggling. We 16 00:01:05,959 --> 00:01:10,119 Speaker 1: also talked about Meta's very bad twenty two. We also 17 00:01:10,160 --> 00:01:12,600 Speaker 1: talked about how regulators and governments around the world are 18 00:01:12,640 --> 00:01:15,200 Speaker 1: starting to push back against big tech. But believe it 19 00:01:15,280 --> 00:01:18,080 Speaker 1: or not, we still have some more important stories from 20 00:01:18,160 --> 00:01:22,039 Speaker 1: last year to look back on, including some that include 21 00:01:22,080 --> 00:01:27,399 Speaker 1: the most dreadful of all words politics. Now, for those 22 00:01:27,400 --> 00:01:29,800 Speaker 1: of y'all who listened to Tech Stuff regularly, you know 23 00:01:30,280 --> 00:01:33,760 Speaker 1: I don't exactly shy away from expressing my own opinion 24 00:01:34,160 --> 00:01:37,080 Speaker 1: in these episodes. But in this case, I'm really just 25 00:01:37,120 --> 00:01:41,200 Speaker 1: playing on reporting how politics and tech intersected or at 26 00:01:41,240 --> 00:01:44,600 Speaker 1: times came into conflict over the last year. So this 27 00:01:44,680 --> 00:01:48,480 Speaker 1: isn't so much about Jonathan showing his left leaning perspective. 28 00:01:49,040 --> 00:01:51,560 Speaker 1: It's really about talking about how politics and tech had 29 00:01:51,560 --> 00:01:55,440 Speaker 1: a big year in two. Before I really get into it, 30 00:01:56,160 --> 00:01:59,520 Speaker 1: I do want to say that I occasionally get messages 31 00:02:00,120 --> 00:02:02,880 Speaker 1: asking that I just focus on tech and leave all 32 00:02:02,880 --> 00:02:06,360 Speaker 1: the politics stuff out. And y'all, I understand we hear 33 00:02:06,480 --> 00:02:09,560 Speaker 1: a lot about politics in our daily lives. It can 34 00:02:09,600 --> 00:02:14,600 Speaker 1: get overwhelming and exhausting or at times infuriating or depressing, 35 00:02:15,000 --> 00:02:17,440 Speaker 1: or a mixture of all of these things. But the 36 00:02:17,480 --> 00:02:22,279 Speaker 1: problem is is that tech is shaping politics, and politics 37 00:02:22,600 --> 00:02:28,360 Speaker 1: in turn shapes technology. And if you ignore contextual factors 38 00:02:28,560 --> 00:02:33,280 Speaker 1: while you talk about technology, stuff quickly stops making any 39 00:02:33,320 --> 00:02:36,119 Speaker 1: sort of sense because you end up saying something like, well, 40 00:02:36,160 --> 00:02:40,600 Speaker 1: then company X stopped doing it that way, and you 41 00:02:40,639 --> 00:02:43,799 Speaker 1: can't really explain the reasons for any sort of changes. 42 00:02:43,840 --> 00:02:47,280 Speaker 1: That were made because those changes came from political pressures 43 00:02:47,360 --> 00:02:50,560 Speaker 1: or what have you, and you're leaving politics out of it. 44 00:02:51,400 --> 00:02:55,120 Speaker 1: If tech existed in a perfect vacuum, then we could 45 00:02:55,160 --> 00:02:57,560 Speaker 1: just talk about the tech itself. We could be objective, 46 00:02:58,160 --> 00:03:00,320 Speaker 1: just look at the tech, how it works, whether it 47 00:03:00,320 --> 00:03:03,160 Speaker 1: works well, all that kind of stuff. But that's not 48 00:03:03,200 --> 00:03:06,240 Speaker 1: the way the world works. If you have a space 49 00:03:06,360 --> 00:03:09,160 Speaker 1: that has two or more people in it, congratulations, you 50 00:03:09,280 --> 00:03:12,480 Speaker 1: got yourself some politics and going on. Now, I think 51 00:03:12,480 --> 00:03:15,560 Speaker 1: it would be crass of me to label any story 52 00:03:15,760 --> 00:03:18,799 Speaker 1: as being the biggest story in this category in two 53 00:03:19,240 --> 00:03:21,920 Speaker 1: because if you do that, then you're immediately suggesting that 54 00:03:21,960 --> 00:03:26,000 Speaker 1: people who were involved in other massive political text stories 55 00:03:26,040 --> 00:03:29,360 Speaker 1: in the year weren't as important, and that that just 56 00:03:29,400 --> 00:03:34,280 Speaker 1: seems wrong to me. But one story that has had 57 00:03:34,320 --> 00:03:38,440 Speaker 1: and continues to have a massive impact on the technology 58 00:03:38,520 --> 00:03:41,480 Speaker 1: sector as well as lots of other areas is the 59 00:03:41,520 --> 00:03:46,040 Speaker 1: War in Ukraine when Russia invaded Ukraine in late February 60 00:03:46,080 --> 00:03:50,400 Speaker 1: of this year. Now, to dive into what prompted this 61 00:03:50,480 --> 00:03:54,440 Speaker 1: invasion would require a thorough series of episodes from a 62 00:03:54,560 --> 00:03:58,560 Speaker 1: history podcast, not a tech show, and you know that's 63 00:03:58,600 --> 00:04:01,600 Speaker 1: not what you tune into tech stuff war, So I'm 64 00:04:01,600 --> 00:04:05,080 Speaker 1: not going to dive into the full backstory of how 65 00:04:05,120 --> 00:04:07,640 Speaker 1: we got into this, and to be clear, if I did, 66 00:04:08,440 --> 00:04:10,720 Speaker 1: I would need to do some very substantial research on 67 00:04:10,760 --> 00:04:13,360 Speaker 1: the matter myself, because I really only have a kind 68 00:04:13,360 --> 00:04:16,359 Speaker 1: of surface level understanding of it, and I would do 69 00:04:16,640 --> 00:04:22,760 Speaker 1: a terrible job at setting that story. So I can 70 00:04:22,880 --> 00:04:28,479 Speaker 1: talk about the war's effect on technology and text effect 71 00:04:28,600 --> 00:04:31,400 Speaker 1: on the war, there's a lot of ground to cover there. 72 00:04:31,440 --> 00:04:35,520 Speaker 1: So first off, Ukraine has a hefty software development industry 73 00:04:35,560 --> 00:04:38,640 Speaker 1: inside of it, and much of that work was able 74 00:04:38,680 --> 00:04:41,080 Speaker 1: to continue through at least the early months of the 75 00:04:41,120 --> 00:04:45,279 Speaker 1: war without too much interruption. In fact, in July of 76 00:04:45,360 --> 00:04:48,719 Speaker 1: this year, in Cube reported that only two percent of 77 00:04:48,760 --> 00:04:52,800 Speaker 1: I T companies in Ukraine had to discontinue operations and 78 00:04:52,960 --> 00:04:56,200 Speaker 1: around eight of I T companies were still closing new 79 00:04:56,320 --> 00:05:00,559 Speaker 1: deals while the war was going on. So that's pretty 80 00:05:00,600 --> 00:05:06,919 Speaker 1: impressive that the whole industry could continue largely uninterrupted, at 81 00:05:07,000 --> 00:05:09,520 Speaker 1: least in the early stages of the war. As for 82 00:05:10,160 --> 00:05:12,160 Speaker 1: where they are right now, that's a great question, and 83 00:05:12,200 --> 00:05:16,400 Speaker 1: I could not find reliable data while I was researching 84 00:05:16,400 --> 00:05:20,159 Speaker 1: this episode to see where things stand now, because clearly 85 00:05:20,440 --> 00:05:23,720 Speaker 1: you know that that conflict has continued over the following months, 86 00:05:24,760 --> 00:05:27,839 Speaker 1: but yeah, it was impressive to see that the software 87 00:05:27,880 --> 00:05:33,359 Speaker 1: industry managed to continue on in the face of Russia's invasion. 88 00:05:34,320 --> 00:05:39,520 Speaker 1: That work was made possible partly by Starlink. So this 89 00:05:39,600 --> 00:05:43,640 Speaker 1: is the division of SpaceX that's known for providing satellite 90 00:05:43,680 --> 00:05:48,560 Speaker 1: based Internet service. So you have ground stations or terminals 91 00:05:48,600 --> 00:05:52,960 Speaker 1: that have an antenna, and this antenna can track satellites 92 00:05:53,000 --> 00:05:57,360 Speaker 1: that are moving overhead and establish Internet communications. There's a 93 00:05:57,360 --> 00:05:59,960 Speaker 1: little bit of latency because the signals have to try 94 00:06:00,040 --> 00:06:03,880 Speaker 1: hold back and forth between the satellites and various ground stations, 95 00:06:03,920 --> 00:06:07,800 Speaker 1: but having this meant that many areas of Ukraine have 96 00:06:07,880 --> 00:06:11,880 Speaker 1: been able to maintain Internet connectivity and thus a communications 97 00:06:11,960 --> 00:06:15,960 Speaker 1: network in a time when Russian forces are consistently targeting 98 00:06:16,080 --> 00:06:21,680 Speaker 1: Ukrainian infrastructure. So it made a huge difference. And this 99 00:06:21,839 --> 00:06:28,040 Speaker 1: wasn't some spontaneous act of charity that Starlink had on 100 00:06:28,120 --> 00:06:32,599 Speaker 1: behalf of Ukraine. SpaceX had been in negotiations for almost 101 00:06:32,640 --> 00:06:35,760 Speaker 1: two months with Ukraine before the Russian invasion even happened. 102 00:06:36,279 --> 00:06:41,600 Speaker 1: Those negotiations were still unfolding when on February two, Russia 103 00:06:41,680 --> 00:06:46,400 Speaker 1: did in fact invade Ukraine. Two days later, Mikhailo Fedorov, 104 00:06:46,960 --> 00:06:52,279 Speaker 1: Ukraine's Minister of Digital Transformation, tweeted to Elon Musk, who 105 00:06:52,360 --> 00:06:56,039 Speaker 1: at that point was not yet publicly pursuing Twitter. He 106 00:06:56,040 --> 00:06:58,400 Speaker 1: had been buying up Twitter stock, but no one really 107 00:06:58,480 --> 00:07:02,760 Speaker 1: knew about it yet, and Federov asked Elon Musk if 108 00:07:02,800 --> 00:07:05,800 Speaker 1: Starlink could provide assistance and serve as sort of a 109 00:07:05,800 --> 00:07:11,640 Speaker 1: communication lifeline for Ukraine, And immediately Elon Musk said absolutely, 110 00:07:11,720 --> 00:07:14,800 Speaker 1: and the satellite network above Ukraine went into active service, 111 00:07:15,160 --> 00:07:20,000 Speaker 1: and SpaceX shipped thousands of terminals to Ukraine just a 112 00:07:20,040 --> 00:07:22,560 Speaker 1: couple of days later, so by the end of February 113 00:07:22,920 --> 00:07:28,280 Speaker 1: there were already these these SpaceX designed terminals heading to 114 00:07:28,400 --> 00:07:33,120 Speaker 1: Ukraine to establish communications. Now this also wasn't strictly a 115 00:07:33,160 --> 00:07:37,560 Speaker 1: show of solidarity and charity. According to reports, SpaceX has 116 00:07:37,600 --> 00:07:41,640 Speaker 1: been receiving money from the governments of Poland, the UK, 117 00:07:42,000 --> 00:07:46,320 Speaker 1: and the United States to provide these kinds of pieces 118 00:07:46,320 --> 00:07:49,200 Speaker 1: of equipment. The US government has said it has paid 119 00:07:49,280 --> 00:07:52,960 Speaker 1: to send terminals to Ukraine, but that SpaceX itself was 120 00:07:53,080 --> 00:07:58,120 Speaker 1: handling the service. In October, service for around thirteen hundred 121 00:07:58,200 --> 00:08:02,320 Speaker 1: terminals in Ukraine opt and the problem was not a 122 00:08:02,360 --> 00:08:07,760 Speaker 1: technical one. Apparently, instead it was a lack of funding. Now, 123 00:08:07,840 --> 00:08:11,200 Speaker 1: SpaceX had previously sent a message to the Pentagon here 124 00:08:11,200 --> 00:08:14,440 Speaker 1: in the United States asking the Department of Defense to 125 00:08:14,920 --> 00:08:18,640 Speaker 1: foot the internet bill for Ukraine. But you know, it's 126 00:08:18,640 --> 00:08:21,680 Speaker 1: a pretty bad pr move for a company to stop 127 00:08:21,720 --> 00:08:25,280 Speaker 1: providing service to people who are actively under siege from 128 00:08:25,320 --> 00:08:29,640 Speaker 1: an oppressive military force. And I suppose even Elon Musk 129 00:08:29,760 --> 00:08:33,240 Speaker 1: recognized that. So he refers to his company's position and 130 00:08:33,280 --> 00:08:37,600 Speaker 1: said SpaceX would provide the service while withdrawing its requests 131 00:08:37,679 --> 00:08:40,920 Speaker 1: for funding, though reportedly the company is still you know, 132 00:08:41,000 --> 00:08:45,720 Speaker 1: negotiating with the US government for funding. The Starlink story 133 00:08:46,160 --> 00:08:50,040 Speaker 1: illustrates the analogy of the double edged sword. So on 134 00:08:50,040 --> 00:08:54,040 Speaker 1: one side, you've got a vital communications service that has 135 00:08:54,080 --> 00:08:57,800 Speaker 1: allowed the people of Ukraine and the Ukrainian military to 136 00:08:57,920 --> 00:09:01,319 Speaker 1: maintain a communications network while finning off attacks from Russia. 137 00:09:01,840 --> 00:09:06,520 Speaker 1: That is clearly a vital service for the people of Ukraine. 138 00:09:07,120 --> 00:09:10,679 Speaker 1: On the other side, the other edge, we see a 139 00:09:10,800 --> 00:09:16,360 Speaker 1: shift of countries depending not upon allies as much as 140 00:09:16,400 --> 00:09:21,320 Speaker 1: they are on large businesses. In fact, Starlink's involvement has 141 00:09:21,360 --> 00:09:24,000 Speaker 1: been one part of a larger picture in which we've 142 00:09:24,040 --> 00:09:27,040 Speaker 1: seen for profit companies playing a vital part in how 143 00:09:27,080 --> 00:09:33,040 Speaker 1: a conflict unfolds. These companies are effectively taking sides, where 144 00:09:33,320 --> 00:09:36,880 Speaker 1: in the past companies at least attempted to maintain a 145 00:09:36,960 --> 00:09:40,800 Speaker 1: kind of neutral stance because they figured that that was 146 00:09:41,480 --> 00:09:44,560 Speaker 1: probably the best thing for business. Now we're starting to 147 00:09:44,600 --> 00:09:48,400 Speaker 1: see that shift where companies will take a side. That's 148 00:09:48,440 --> 00:09:52,280 Speaker 1: making some folks a little nervous because these companies might 149 00:09:52,320 --> 00:09:56,320 Speaker 1: not answer to anyone while making these decisions. Now, obviously 150 00:09:56,360 --> 00:09:59,640 Speaker 1: there are notable exceptions, like if a country or group 151 00:09:59,640 --> 00:10:04,200 Speaker 1: of kind trees level sanctions against another nation, then even 152 00:10:04,280 --> 00:10:07,400 Speaker 1: large companies aren't likely to violate that, at least not yet. 153 00:10:08,440 --> 00:10:11,920 Speaker 1: So it's not in every case where these companies are 154 00:10:11,960 --> 00:10:15,480 Speaker 1: just acting totally on their own, lone wolf style, but 155 00:10:15,559 --> 00:10:19,080 Speaker 1: they are able to make these kind of decisions, you know, 156 00:10:19,480 --> 00:10:22,560 Speaker 1: on their own without the direction of governments. And that's 157 00:10:22,600 --> 00:10:27,080 Speaker 1: made a few people nervous because we've had plenty of, say, 158 00:10:27,080 --> 00:10:29,800 Speaker 1: science fiction stories that suggests that in the future of 159 00:10:29,840 --> 00:10:32,280 Speaker 1: the world is going to be run not by governments, 160 00:10:32,280 --> 00:10:36,400 Speaker 1: whether those are authoritarian or democratically elected or whatever, but 161 00:10:36,559 --> 00:10:40,480 Speaker 1: rather by corporations. In fact, it is a trope in 162 00:10:40,760 --> 00:10:43,640 Speaker 1: certain types of science fiction. At this point, you can 163 00:10:43,720 --> 00:10:49,760 Speaker 1: see stuff like Blade Runner, Snow Crash, Jennifer Government, Broken Angels, 164 00:10:49,800 --> 00:10:53,720 Speaker 1: the Space Merchants. There's a huge list of science fiction 165 00:10:53,840 --> 00:10:58,480 Speaker 1: movies and novels and stories that follow this kind of storytelling. 166 00:10:59,200 --> 00:11:04,439 Speaker 1: Generally speaking, businesses first and sometimes only concern is delivering 167 00:11:04,559 --> 00:11:08,240 Speaker 1: value to stakeholders, whether that's a private business or a 168 00:11:08,280 --> 00:11:12,679 Speaker 1: publicly traded one. And yeah, delivering value might mean putting 169 00:11:12,720 --> 00:11:17,840 Speaker 1: out a really good service or product, but that's almost secondary, right, Like, 170 00:11:17,920 --> 00:11:21,960 Speaker 1: that's the way you get value for your stakeholders. It's 171 00:11:22,000 --> 00:11:26,200 Speaker 1: not that you're really really dedicated to making the world's 172 00:11:26,240 --> 00:11:28,719 Speaker 1: best thing of a jig. It's that by making the 173 00:11:28,760 --> 00:11:31,880 Speaker 1: world's best thing of a jig, you end up providing 174 00:11:31,880 --> 00:11:36,040 Speaker 1: an incredible value to your stakeholders. That's sort of the 175 00:11:36,080 --> 00:11:39,120 Speaker 1: fear here, and and to be fair, that is like 176 00:11:39,520 --> 00:11:44,240 Speaker 1: oversimplifying matters dramatically. And there are plenty of companies out 177 00:11:44,240 --> 00:11:48,560 Speaker 1: there that really do take serious pride in providing the 178 00:11:48,640 --> 00:11:51,800 Speaker 1: best of the best that they can, right, and not 179 00:11:52,320 --> 00:11:56,240 Speaker 1: just a cynical approach of here's how we make our 180 00:11:56,280 --> 00:12:03,559 Speaker 1: stakeholders richer. Anyway, corporate value you it's not necessarily equate 181 00:12:03,600 --> 00:12:09,200 Speaker 1: to societal value, and that's where there's some unease around this. Also, 182 00:12:09,280 --> 00:12:13,240 Speaker 1: the fact that Starlink shut off service even temporarily for 183 00:12:13,280 --> 00:12:18,440 Speaker 1: those terminals in Ukraine painted a pretty scary picture for 184 00:12:18,520 --> 00:12:21,800 Speaker 1: a company just to decide to stop service for whatever 185 00:12:21,880 --> 00:12:26,160 Speaker 1: reason that could lead to life or death situations in 186 00:12:26,240 --> 00:12:28,559 Speaker 1: certain parts of the world. Now, we've seen this sort 187 00:12:28,600 --> 00:12:32,120 Speaker 1: of thing happen due to government's cracking down on services 188 00:12:32,160 --> 00:12:34,960 Speaker 1: in an effort to stop citizens from being able to organize. Like, 189 00:12:35,320 --> 00:12:40,520 Speaker 1: that's something we've seen for a while. Right If government says, oh, 190 00:12:40,679 --> 00:12:43,000 Speaker 1: we see a danger here because people are starting to 191 00:12:43,080 --> 00:12:47,640 Speaker 1: use Twitter to organize resistance, then they'll crack down on Twitter. 192 00:12:47,880 --> 00:12:50,280 Speaker 1: That's something we've seen in the past. But to see 193 00:12:50,280 --> 00:12:52,439 Speaker 1: it from the corporate end, where a company could just say, 194 00:12:52,440 --> 00:12:55,520 Speaker 1: you know what, we're just gonna turn off service here, uh, 195 00:12:55,679 --> 00:13:00,000 Speaker 1: that is a little different. Anyway, Starlink continues to provide 196 00:13:00,000 --> 00:13:04,880 Speaker 1: EID services in Ukraine, and numerous Ukrainian officials have praised 197 00:13:05,080 --> 00:13:08,480 Speaker 1: Starlink and the service, pointing out that the country would 198 00:13:08,480 --> 00:13:13,160 Speaker 1: have significantly more struggles without that lifeline, and that connectivity 199 00:13:13,320 --> 00:13:18,800 Speaker 1: has contributed to important Ukrainian military operations, including drone missions. 200 00:13:18,840 --> 00:13:22,600 Speaker 1: So I don't want to dismiss Starlink's important role in 201 00:13:22,640 --> 00:13:27,120 Speaker 1: this ongoing conflict, but rather, you know, taking the big picture, look, 202 00:13:27,960 --> 00:13:31,440 Speaker 1: other stuff that happened created a sort of secondary struggle. 203 00:13:31,960 --> 00:13:33,920 Speaker 1: I almost said a war, but I don't want in 204 00:13:33,960 --> 00:13:37,240 Speaker 1: any way to diminish the horrors of the actual war 205 00:13:37,360 --> 00:13:41,080 Speaker 1: going on in Eastern Europe. But for example, social networks 206 00:13:41,120 --> 00:13:45,720 Speaker 1: began to shift a bit in favor of Ukraine. So Facebook, TikTok, 207 00:13:45,800 --> 00:13:50,480 Speaker 1: and YouTube began blocking Russia's government connected communication accounts. This 208 00:13:50,520 --> 00:13:53,040 Speaker 1: followed a move in the EU to ban those Russian 209 00:13:53,120 --> 00:13:56,400 Speaker 1: media and news organizations in an effort to shut down 210 00:13:56,480 --> 00:14:00,600 Speaker 1: propaganda and misinformation efforts. Meta also began to take down 211 00:14:00,600 --> 00:14:03,400 Speaker 1: networks of accounts that the company said we're part of 212 00:14:03,440 --> 00:14:07,840 Speaker 1: such misinformation campaigns. In addition, Meta allowed posts that were 213 00:14:07,840 --> 00:14:12,920 Speaker 1: calling for violence against Russia itself on Facebook. That was 214 00:14:13,000 --> 00:14:15,959 Speaker 1: quite unusual, right. That was one of those things where 215 00:14:16,960 --> 00:14:20,880 Speaker 1: this was a controversial call because normally the policy is 216 00:14:21,040 --> 00:14:24,400 Speaker 1: you can't call for violence, that is just that's against 217 00:14:24,440 --> 00:14:27,440 Speaker 1: the rules. But in this case where people were saying, no, 218 00:14:27,600 --> 00:14:31,800 Speaker 1: we're trying to organize resistance to an invasion, that's threatening 219 00:14:32,040 --> 00:14:35,520 Speaker 1: people's lives. Meta made the call of allowing those posts 220 00:14:35,560 --> 00:14:40,080 Speaker 1: to stay up on Facebook. Russia's response was to start 221 00:14:40,080 --> 00:14:44,360 Speaker 1: to ban various services within the country. They labeled Facebook 222 00:14:44,400 --> 00:14:49,080 Speaker 1: and then later Instagram as extremist corporations, and so this 223 00:14:49,240 --> 00:14:53,760 Speaker 1: was a back and forth issue. Okay, we've got some 224 00:14:53,800 --> 00:14:56,400 Speaker 1: more to talk about with the Ukraine War and then 225 00:14:56,480 --> 00:15:01,120 Speaker 1: some other issues around the world where tech politics came 226 00:15:01,600 --> 00:15:05,760 Speaker 1: into conflict with one another. But first let's take a 227 00:15:05,840 --> 00:15:20,160 Speaker 1: quick break. Okay, we're back. So we were talking about 228 00:15:20,200 --> 00:15:23,120 Speaker 1: Starlink and a little bit about social networks like Meta 229 00:15:23,280 --> 00:15:27,480 Speaker 1: and their role within the conflict between Ukraine and Russia. 230 00:15:27,920 --> 00:15:32,240 Speaker 1: There were other parts of tech that were active in 231 00:15:32,360 --> 00:15:36,920 Speaker 1: an effort to help Ukrainians. So, for example, Google shut 232 00:15:36,960 --> 00:15:41,480 Speaker 1: down live services and Google Maps in parts of Ukraine. Now, 233 00:15:41,520 --> 00:15:45,720 Speaker 1: at first that might sound like Google was acting against Ukraine, 234 00:15:45,760 --> 00:15:48,960 Speaker 1: but that wasn't the case. Instead, they were removing real 235 00:15:49,040 --> 00:15:52,200 Speaker 1: time traffic information so that Russian forces wouldn't be able 236 00:15:52,240 --> 00:15:56,560 Speaker 1: to use services to identify where Ukrainian resistance happened to 237 00:15:56,560 --> 00:15:59,960 Speaker 1: be at any given time. So really this was Google's 238 00:16:00,120 --> 00:16:03,920 Speaker 1: a chance to help provide a little smoke cover for 239 00:16:04,080 --> 00:16:10,760 Speaker 1: Ukrainian forces essentially in a digital way. Companies like Microsoft, Oracle, Apple, 240 00:16:11,400 --> 00:16:14,760 Speaker 1: uh and Nvidia, Samsung and lots of others in the 241 00:16:14,800 --> 00:16:19,400 Speaker 1: tech space effectively pulled out of Russia, shutting down their offices, 242 00:16:19,640 --> 00:16:22,800 Speaker 1: some of which Russian authorities ended up seizing and then 243 00:16:22,880 --> 00:16:26,080 Speaker 1: handing over to people to to create, you know, a 244 00:16:26,160 --> 00:16:29,920 Speaker 1: Russian company using whatever assets were left behind. The departure 245 00:16:30,000 --> 00:16:32,400 Speaker 1: of so many tech companies dealt a major blow to 246 00:16:32,440 --> 00:16:37,720 Speaker 1: Russia's efforts to continue to develop AI solutions their speculation 247 00:16:37,800 --> 00:16:40,360 Speaker 1: that that is going to have a lasting impact on 248 00:16:40,400 --> 00:16:43,160 Speaker 1: the country for the mid to long term. On top 249 00:16:43,200 --> 00:16:45,800 Speaker 1: of that, many countries, including the United States, have placed 250 00:16:46,480 --> 00:16:49,400 Speaker 1: tons of sanctions on Russia that really limit the types 251 00:16:49,440 --> 00:16:53,320 Speaker 1: of technologies that companies are allowed to export to Russia. 252 00:16:53,360 --> 00:16:56,720 Speaker 1: So now Russia's getting a real shortage of some of 253 00:16:56,720 --> 00:17:02,400 Speaker 1: these high tech components. Russi also experienced an outflow of 254 00:17:02,560 --> 00:17:07,680 Speaker 1: skill and expertise and knowledge. Reportedly, thousands of tech professionals 255 00:17:08,119 --> 00:17:10,960 Speaker 1: left Russia to go work in other parts of the world. 256 00:17:11,080 --> 00:17:16,640 Speaker 1: Russia has since attempted to create incentives to inspire tech 257 00:17:16,760 --> 00:17:19,960 Speaker 1: professionals to stay in the country. Also, reportedly, a few 258 00:17:20,280 --> 00:17:23,920 Speaker 1: of them have returned to Russia, possibly because they were 259 00:17:23,960 --> 00:17:27,240 Speaker 1: failing to find gainful employment elsewhere, so they really had 260 00:17:27,280 --> 00:17:31,119 Speaker 1: no other options. But yeah, that's another part of this 261 00:17:31,200 --> 00:17:36,960 Speaker 1: story where Russia is potentially doing long term damage to 262 00:17:37,080 --> 00:17:42,840 Speaker 1: its technological innovation and evolution through these actions in Ukraine. 263 00:17:44,240 --> 00:17:48,000 Speaker 1: It has become clear that the future of conflict, the 264 00:17:48,040 --> 00:17:52,040 Speaker 1: future of war will likely involve tech companies making decisions 265 00:17:52,080 --> 00:17:56,800 Speaker 1: that impact outcomes. As we continue to see with the 266 00:17:56,920 --> 00:18:01,520 Speaker 1: Ukraine war, tech companies can have and a real influence 267 00:18:01,600 --> 00:18:04,600 Speaker 1: on how day to day operations progress. Now we're not 268 00:18:04,800 --> 00:18:10,159 Speaker 1: at the point where some company somewhere, like some boardroom 269 00:18:10,240 --> 00:18:13,280 Speaker 1: executive decides who wins or who loses an a war. 270 00:18:13,520 --> 00:18:16,920 Speaker 1: It's not like that. But we're certainly seeing how companies 271 00:18:16,960 --> 00:18:20,960 Speaker 1: can provide or deny aid in meaningful ways and make 272 00:18:21,040 --> 00:18:24,920 Speaker 1: decisions to side with one side over another. And again 273 00:18:24,960 --> 00:18:27,840 Speaker 1: it shows how tech companies are playing a role that 274 00:18:27,960 --> 00:18:31,240 Speaker 1: traditionally we would just think of as kind of the 275 00:18:31,240 --> 00:18:34,480 Speaker 1: the purview of governments. Right that we would think of 276 00:18:34,520 --> 00:18:39,399 Speaker 1: governments either leveling sanctions or having some other form of 277 00:18:40,040 --> 00:18:44,720 Speaker 1: um punishment for a country that appears to have violated 278 00:18:44,760 --> 00:18:47,800 Speaker 1: international law. That kind of stuff. Now we're seeing tech 279 00:18:47,840 --> 00:18:50,240 Speaker 1: companies take it upon themselves to make some of these 280 00:18:50,280 --> 00:18:54,720 Speaker 1: moves without necessarily being directed by any kind of government authority, 281 00:18:55,000 --> 00:18:58,840 Speaker 1: and that I think is the overall theme that we 282 00:18:58,880 --> 00:19:02,160 Speaker 1: saw in two. That's starting to make some people nervous 283 00:19:02,520 --> 00:19:04,960 Speaker 1: because while that is good, while we can see or 284 00:19:05,000 --> 00:19:07,600 Speaker 1: it potentially is good. It's potentially good that a company 285 00:19:07,640 --> 00:19:12,920 Speaker 1: can step in and perhaps provide help when a government 286 00:19:13,200 --> 00:19:16,600 Speaker 1: either is too slow or unable to do so. That 287 00:19:16,640 --> 00:19:20,919 Speaker 1: could be inspiring. But then you flip that situation and 288 00:19:20,960 --> 00:19:24,600 Speaker 1: you could quickly get to a scenario where a company 289 00:19:24,680 --> 00:19:28,880 Speaker 1: is effectively holding a country hostage, right kind of like 290 00:19:28,960 --> 00:19:32,480 Speaker 1: with the starlink example when those uh, those terminals went 291 00:19:32,600 --> 00:19:37,359 Speaker 1: dead for a little while. That is another possibility, and 292 00:19:37,359 --> 00:19:40,840 Speaker 1: it's made some people really start to question things again, 293 00:19:40,920 --> 00:19:45,200 Speaker 1: mostly questioning how big is big text grasp and should 294 00:19:45,280 --> 00:19:50,360 Speaker 1: it be restricted. We've seen some governments respond to this. 295 00:19:50,480 --> 00:19:53,240 Speaker 1: I mentioned in an earlier episode that Russia has really 296 00:19:53,280 --> 00:19:58,000 Speaker 1: cracked down on VPN services for its citizens in a 297 00:19:58,040 --> 00:20:00,440 Speaker 1: way to kind of strike back or at least to 298 00:20:00,680 --> 00:20:03,320 Speaker 1: keep a lid on things. So a VPN, in case 299 00:20:03,320 --> 00:20:06,399 Speaker 1: you're not familiar, is a virtual private network and for 300 00:20:06,440 --> 00:20:08,280 Speaker 1: those of you all who haven't really used one or 301 00:20:08,320 --> 00:20:10,879 Speaker 1: no much about them, I'll give you a very simple 302 00:20:11,160 --> 00:20:14,359 Speaker 1: explanation of what they are. So when you use your 303 00:20:14,400 --> 00:20:18,240 Speaker 1: computer and you log into a VPN, the VPN essentially 304 00:20:18,280 --> 00:20:22,240 Speaker 1: becomes a data channel for you. Anything that you access online. 305 00:20:22,280 --> 00:20:24,200 Speaker 1: Let's say you're on a browser and you want to 306 00:20:24,200 --> 00:20:27,600 Speaker 1: go to a website, Well ends up being masked because 307 00:20:27,640 --> 00:20:30,480 Speaker 1: it's actually the VPN that does all the visiting of 308 00:20:30,480 --> 00:20:33,320 Speaker 1: the site and then funnels the information to you. So 309 00:20:33,600 --> 00:20:37,919 Speaker 1: let's say you're logged into vpn X and vpn X 310 00:20:38,000 --> 00:20:40,600 Speaker 1: is based in some other country, it's not where you are, 311 00:20:41,240 --> 00:20:43,600 Speaker 1: and you choose to visit a news website. Well, the 312 00:20:43,600 --> 00:20:45,920 Speaker 1: news website will see that the request is coming from 313 00:20:46,080 --> 00:20:50,720 Speaker 1: vpn X. They won't see that ultimately that request comes 314 00:20:50,760 --> 00:20:53,040 Speaker 1: from you. They just see that, oh, vpn X is 315 00:20:53,119 --> 00:20:55,720 Speaker 1: asking for this web page, let's send it to them. 316 00:20:56,119 --> 00:20:58,439 Speaker 1: So it sends the data to vpn X, and vpn 317 00:20:58,560 --> 00:21:01,880 Speaker 1: X then sends that data to you. So VPNs can 318 00:21:01,920 --> 00:21:04,520 Speaker 1: have a lot of valuable benefits. At one is that 319 00:21:04,600 --> 00:21:08,120 Speaker 1: they can help you maintain privacy. So if someone snooping 320 00:21:08,200 --> 00:21:12,399 Speaker 1: on your connection, they would see that you were communicating 321 00:21:12,560 --> 00:21:15,520 Speaker 1: with a VPN, but they wouldn't see where you were going. 322 00:21:15,560 --> 00:21:18,639 Speaker 1: Beyond that, assuming that everything is encrypted, they would not 323 00:21:18,840 --> 00:21:21,920 Speaker 1: see that you were trying to use VPN to visit 324 00:21:22,000 --> 00:21:24,399 Speaker 1: that news site, for example. They would just see that 325 00:21:24,440 --> 00:21:28,200 Speaker 1: you were connected to the VPN. Conversely, if they were 326 00:21:28,200 --> 00:21:31,040 Speaker 1: looking at the VPN and the traffic that the VPN 327 00:21:31,160 --> 00:21:33,720 Speaker 1: or the sites of the VPN was visiting, they would 328 00:21:33,760 --> 00:21:36,040 Speaker 1: see that all the different sites of VPN was visiting, 329 00:21:36,080 --> 00:21:37,760 Speaker 1: but they wouldn't be able to say who went to 330 00:21:37,800 --> 00:21:42,159 Speaker 1: what site. So it helps mask your pri or it 331 00:21:42,200 --> 00:21:44,280 Speaker 1: helps keep things private for you. That's one of the 332 00:21:44,280 --> 00:21:48,080 Speaker 1: big benefits right now. Using a VPN can slow stuff 333 00:21:48,080 --> 00:21:50,840 Speaker 1: down a little bit, but that's a trade off if 334 00:21:50,880 --> 00:21:53,520 Speaker 1: you want to have your communications better protected. By the way, 335 00:21:53,560 --> 00:21:56,240 Speaker 1: if you ever do use any kind of public WiFi, 336 00:21:56,760 --> 00:22:00,080 Speaker 1: I highly recommend that you subscribe to a vp in 337 00:22:00,320 --> 00:22:03,880 Speaker 1: and you use a vp N. It's not a perfect, 338 00:22:03,920 --> 00:22:08,000 Speaker 1: bulletproof type of protection for you, but it goes a 339 00:22:08,040 --> 00:22:12,840 Speaker 1: long way to helping keep your data safe. Um again, 340 00:22:13,440 --> 00:22:18,640 Speaker 1: not a perfect solution, but every little layer of protection 341 00:22:18,720 --> 00:22:22,359 Speaker 1: is is a good one. So another benefit for the 342 00:22:22,680 --> 00:22:25,240 Speaker 1: VPNs is that if you log into a VPN that's 343 00:22:25,280 --> 00:22:29,400 Speaker 1: in another country, you can sometimes access stuff that otherwise 344 00:22:29,400 --> 00:22:33,320 Speaker 1: would be off limits to you. So, for example, let's 345 00:22:33,320 --> 00:22:37,359 Speaker 1: say that you were a UK citizen and you moved 346 00:22:37,520 --> 00:22:40,080 Speaker 1: to the United States, but you would still like to 347 00:22:40,080 --> 00:22:42,560 Speaker 1: be able to watch some UK programming that's just not 348 00:22:42,640 --> 00:22:47,080 Speaker 1: available here in the States. Uh, maybe the platform carrying 349 00:22:47,119 --> 00:22:49,720 Speaker 1: that programming has region locks on it. So let's say 350 00:22:49,720 --> 00:22:51,919 Speaker 1: that you know, you go to a website, let's say 351 00:22:51,960 --> 00:22:54,000 Speaker 1: it's one of the BBC websites. You go to a 352 00:22:54,040 --> 00:22:56,600 Speaker 1: BBC website, and you want to watch this one program 353 00:22:56,640 --> 00:22:59,880 Speaker 1: that runs on BBC. But when you try and play 354 00:22:59,880 --> 00:23:01,879 Speaker 1: it here in the States, you get a message that 355 00:23:01,920 --> 00:23:03,960 Speaker 1: says something along the lines of we're sorry, but the 356 00:23:03,960 --> 00:23:07,119 Speaker 1: programming you're trying to access isn't available in your area 357 00:23:07,400 --> 00:23:12,760 Speaker 1: or your region. Well, logging into a VPN that is 358 00:23:12,840 --> 00:23:17,080 Speaker 1: located within the UK can potentially help you sidestep this 359 00:23:17,480 --> 00:23:24,040 Speaker 1: region lock. Now, generally speaking, I'm against doing this personally 360 00:23:24,359 --> 00:23:26,920 Speaker 1: here in the United States. I am not in favor 361 00:23:27,280 --> 00:23:31,119 Speaker 1: of doing it for myself. For one thing, we have 362 00:23:31,200 --> 00:23:34,720 Speaker 1: access to so much stuff that it starts to feel 363 00:23:34,760 --> 00:23:38,719 Speaker 1: a bit selfish to ask for even more. But there 364 00:23:38,760 --> 00:23:41,160 Speaker 1: are parts of the world where governments restrict a lot 365 00:23:41,160 --> 00:23:44,639 Speaker 1: of what citizens can see, and there I think VPNs 366 00:23:44,680 --> 00:23:48,040 Speaker 1: provide a critical service. It gives people a chance to 367 00:23:48,600 --> 00:23:52,479 Speaker 1: get past those government restrictions and see what's going on 368 00:23:52,520 --> 00:23:56,320 Speaker 1: in the world. Well, that's exactly why the Russian government 369 00:23:56,320 --> 00:23:58,640 Speaker 1: really started to crack down on VPNs and has been 370 00:23:58,680 --> 00:24:01,840 Speaker 1: for a couple of years now. So Russian citizens could 371 00:24:01,880 --> 00:24:04,520 Speaker 1: subscribe to VPN services for a while and they could 372 00:24:04,520 --> 00:24:07,639 Speaker 1: get access to information that the Russian government objected to. 373 00:24:08,160 --> 00:24:12,879 Speaker 1: It did not go in line with the official Russian communications. 374 00:24:12,920 --> 00:24:16,000 Speaker 1: So over the last couple of years, many VPN services 375 00:24:16,040 --> 00:24:20,480 Speaker 1: have been banned within Russia. Even Russia's own Kaspersky Labs 376 00:24:20,560 --> 00:24:22,760 Speaker 1: has announced that it is no longer going to offer 377 00:24:22,840 --> 00:24:27,439 Speaker 1: VPN services within Russia, presumably because government pressure is so 378 00:24:27,520 --> 00:24:29,919 Speaker 1: great that it just doesn't make sense to try and 379 00:24:30,000 --> 00:24:34,520 Speaker 1: operate VPN as a business there. Russia is not the 380 00:24:34,600 --> 00:24:39,840 Speaker 1: only country to have cracked down on VPNs. In two Iran, India, 381 00:24:39,920 --> 00:24:44,400 Speaker 1: and Myanmar similarly have tried to restrict access to these 382 00:24:44,480 --> 00:24:47,320 Speaker 1: kinds of services in an effort to control the information 383 00:24:47,400 --> 00:24:51,119 Speaker 1: that citizens can access. In some of these countries, it 384 00:24:51,240 --> 00:24:55,360 Speaker 1: is illegal to post or share any messaging that criticizes 385 00:24:55,400 --> 00:24:59,240 Speaker 1: the government or contradicts the government's official stance on any 386 00:24:59,280 --> 00:25:05,200 Speaker 1: given top. So again we see this ongoing battle between governments, 387 00:25:05,240 --> 00:25:10,880 Speaker 1: particularly more authoritarian governments, and tech companies. Now, often these 388 00:25:10,920 --> 00:25:15,760 Speaker 1: crackdowns on tech coincide with authoritarian governments doing authoritarian things 389 00:25:15,800 --> 00:25:20,760 Speaker 1: go figure, you know, like ignoring or manipulating elections, or 390 00:25:20,800 --> 00:25:24,560 Speaker 1: removing or restricting citizen rights, that kind of thing. One 391 00:25:24,560 --> 00:25:27,440 Speaker 1: of the truly powerful things tech has ever done over 392 00:25:27,480 --> 00:25:31,320 Speaker 1: the years is given people more accessibility to information and 393 00:25:31,359 --> 00:25:35,359 Speaker 1: for the chance to communicate, and thus potentially leading to 394 00:25:35,480 --> 00:25:41,000 Speaker 1: things like organization, like citizens banding together to oppose an 395 00:25:41,000 --> 00:25:43,760 Speaker 1: oppressive government. That's the kind of thing that is very 396 00:25:43,840 --> 00:25:47,520 Speaker 1: dangerous for authoritarian regimes, which depend heavily on controlling people, 397 00:25:48,240 --> 00:25:51,359 Speaker 1: and that comes hand in hand with controlling information and 398 00:25:51,440 --> 00:25:56,640 Speaker 1: access to various services. Now, sometimes tech companies will still 399 00:25:56,640 --> 00:26:00,600 Speaker 1: try to operate in these regions. They might say that 400 00:26:00,840 --> 00:26:03,359 Speaker 1: they do so in an effort to provide resources to 401 00:26:03,440 --> 00:26:06,280 Speaker 1: people who desperately need them, And I'm sure that's at 402 00:26:06,359 --> 00:26:09,000 Speaker 1: least part of the reason, and it's a valuable one 403 00:26:09,080 --> 00:26:12,760 Speaker 1: Like that is a valuable goal is to to let 404 00:26:12,840 --> 00:26:16,960 Speaker 1: people have access to these tools that could potentially help 405 00:26:17,000 --> 00:26:22,399 Speaker 1: them have a better existence. It also could be true 406 00:26:22,440 --> 00:26:26,200 Speaker 1: that these companies depend upon expanding to more customers every year, 407 00:26:26,520 --> 00:26:31,520 Speaker 1: so you know, expanding into countries where things are dicey 408 00:26:31,760 --> 00:26:34,919 Speaker 1: can still align with company goals from a business standpoint, 409 00:26:34,960 --> 00:26:37,000 Speaker 1: and I guess there's an argument for that as well, 410 00:26:37,040 --> 00:26:39,239 Speaker 1: Like we don't live in a world where we can 411 00:26:39,240 --> 00:26:42,680 Speaker 1: all just be altruistic. But one thing we have seen 412 00:26:42,680 --> 00:26:45,960 Speaker 1: over the year the past year is that more and 413 00:26:46,000 --> 00:26:49,800 Speaker 1: more companies are are either reluctant to do business in 414 00:26:50,080 --> 00:26:52,960 Speaker 1: or they're actively pulling out of one of the largest 415 00:26:53,000 --> 00:26:58,160 Speaker 1: markets in the world, and that being China. As for why, well, 416 00:26:58,240 --> 00:27:01,560 Speaker 1: there are a lot of potential reasons. One might be 417 00:27:01,760 --> 00:27:05,560 Speaker 1: a fundamental disagreement with the Chinese Communist Party the c 418 00:27:05,720 --> 00:27:09,640 Speaker 1: c P, that's the ruling party in China. In fact, 419 00:27:09,640 --> 00:27:13,199 Speaker 1: a lot of people just equated with Chinese government. Then 420 00:27:13,240 --> 00:27:17,120 Speaker 1: you could understand why. And the CCP has a very 421 00:27:17,119 --> 00:27:20,760 Speaker 1: long history of human rights violations, um terrible ones. You 422 00:27:20,760 --> 00:27:22,520 Speaker 1: can read all about it if you like to, but 423 00:27:22,680 --> 00:27:27,359 Speaker 1: trust me, there's an incredibly long history of truly dreadful 424 00:27:27,400 --> 00:27:30,320 Speaker 1: things going on on an official basis, but not a 425 00:27:30,320 --> 00:27:34,800 Speaker 1: public one official, but denied is the way it works. 426 00:27:35,680 --> 00:27:39,000 Speaker 1: Another reason that companies might be reluctant to work in 427 00:27:39,119 --> 00:27:41,360 Speaker 1: China is how the Chinese government has taken a more 428 00:27:41,400 --> 00:27:45,120 Speaker 1: active and restrictive role in how companies, particularly tech companies, 429 00:27:45,520 --> 00:27:48,880 Speaker 1: are allowed to do business within the country. This past year, 430 00:27:48,920 --> 00:27:51,760 Speaker 1: we saw the Chinese government past restrictive laws that affected 431 00:27:51,760 --> 00:27:54,679 Speaker 1: the video games industry. For example, this has actually been 432 00:27:54,720 --> 00:27:56,960 Speaker 1: an ongoing story for more than a year. It began 433 00:27:57,040 --> 00:28:01,080 Speaker 1: before two but this year we saw the Chinese government 434 00:28:01,080 --> 00:28:05,040 Speaker 1: take a more firm stance on certain types of video 435 00:28:05,080 --> 00:28:10,119 Speaker 1: game businesses. For example, China's government issued a ban on 436 00:28:10,320 --> 00:28:14,320 Speaker 1: licensing games for the first several months of two so 437 00:28:14,480 --> 00:28:18,080 Speaker 1: in China, video game companies have to apply for a 438 00:28:18,119 --> 00:28:22,040 Speaker 1: license before they are allowed to sell a specific game 439 00:28:22,200 --> 00:28:27,600 Speaker 1: to Chinese citizens. Even Chinese companies video game companies have 440 00:28:27,680 --> 00:28:30,880 Speaker 1: to do this. It's not just foreign companies that are 441 00:28:30,920 --> 00:28:35,680 Speaker 1: wanting to sell their titles within China, and in fact, 442 00:28:35,720 --> 00:28:38,800 Speaker 1: back in two thousand eighteen, ten Cent famously had to 443 00:28:38,800 --> 00:28:42,560 Speaker 1: pull Monster Hunter World from Chinese markets after failing to 444 00:28:42,600 --> 00:28:46,640 Speaker 1: secure a license first. Intencent is a huge Chinese company, 445 00:28:47,080 --> 00:28:51,040 Speaker 1: so the government has been issuing fewer licenses in recent years, 446 00:28:51,120 --> 00:28:54,320 Speaker 1: and by the summer of one they essentially just stopped 447 00:28:54,680 --> 00:28:58,920 Speaker 1: issuing game licenses. That pretty much was the case until 448 00:28:59,320 --> 00:29:03,240 Speaker 1: the spring of this year. Somewhere around April of two, 449 00:29:03,640 --> 00:29:07,720 Speaker 1: we started to finally see the government licensed new titles 450 00:29:07,760 --> 00:29:10,640 Speaker 1: for sale in China. As for a while that was 451 00:29:10,680 --> 00:29:12,520 Speaker 1: going on. It was part of a larger effort to 452 00:29:12,560 --> 00:29:16,280 Speaker 1: combat what the government was referring to as video game addiction, 453 00:29:16,760 --> 00:29:20,760 Speaker 1: particularly for younger citizens, as well as just the standard 454 00:29:21,120 --> 00:29:23,880 Speaker 1: They don't want any content in any video games that 455 00:29:23,920 --> 00:29:29,520 Speaker 1: could potentially contradict the official Chinese government line on any 456 00:29:29,640 --> 00:29:34,920 Speaker 1: given topic. The restrictions this year also included a ban 457 00:29:35,640 --> 00:29:40,400 Speaker 1: on live streaming certain games, so China warned platforms against 458 00:29:40,480 --> 00:29:44,560 Speaker 1: the live streaming of titles that are unapproved and unlicensed. Further, 459 00:29:44,920 --> 00:29:47,960 Speaker 1: if you wanted to live stream overseas games within China, 460 00:29:48,560 --> 00:29:51,560 Speaker 1: you first had to secure approval in order to do so, 461 00:29:51,800 --> 00:29:54,680 Speaker 1: and live streamers were also told to avoid quote unquote 462 00:29:55,160 --> 00:29:59,560 Speaker 1: abnormal esthetics. Now you might wonder what was an abnormal 463 00:30:00,280 --> 00:30:03,160 Speaker 1: I think mostly they were trying to tell streamers that 464 00:30:03,200 --> 00:30:06,600 Speaker 1: they need to dress modestly and not play up their 465 00:30:06,640 --> 00:30:09,840 Speaker 1: sex appeal the way you see a lot of Western 466 00:30:09,880 --> 00:30:17,200 Speaker 1: streamers do so kind of a crackdown on people being 467 00:30:17,240 --> 00:30:19,680 Speaker 1: able to express themselves in a way that they wanted 468 00:30:19,880 --> 00:30:23,480 Speaker 1: and that would be popular. So yeah, the Chinese government says, 469 00:30:23,520 --> 00:30:26,360 Speaker 1: don't do that. They also said, don't foster the kind 470 00:30:26,360 --> 00:30:28,680 Speaker 1: of para social relationships you see in other parts of 471 00:30:28,680 --> 00:30:31,880 Speaker 1: the world with online gaming culture, to avoid you know, 472 00:30:32,040 --> 00:30:36,880 Speaker 1: so called harmful celebrity uh interactions, that kind of thing, which, honestly, 473 00:30:37,280 --> 00:30:40,280 Speaker 1: I mean, if we can do stuff to help discourage 474 00:30:40,680 --> 00:30:43,520 Speaker 1: the development of para social relationships, that might be a 475 00:30:43,600 --> 00:30:47,760 Speaker 1: really good thing, because I've seen a lot of heartache 476 00:30:48,280 --> 00:30:52,160 Speaker 1: pop up because of people developing these sorts of relationships, 477 00:30:52,200 --> 00:30:58,800 Speaker 1: and that's that's unfortunate. Sometimes doing business in China maybe 478 00:30:59,040 --> 00:31:02,320 Speaker 1: more work than what it's worth, or the revenue will 479 00:31:02,360 --> 00:31:05,880 Speaker 1: be reduced due to government interference, and that's one of 480 00:31:05,880 --> 00:31:10,840 Speaker 1: the reasons why some companies have been dialing back or 481 00:31:10,880 --> 00:31:13,840 Speaker 1: even pulling out of China. So when we come back, 482 00:31:14,000 --> 00:31:15,920 Speaker 1: we'll talk a little bit more about that. We'll also 483 00:31:15,960 --> 00:31:20,520 Speaker 1: talk about a company that has Chinese heritage and how 484 00:31:20,600 --> 00:31:24,640 Speaker 1: that has run into some issues with the US government. 485 00:31:25,240 --> 00:31:27,160 Speaker 1: And I'm sure most of you have already guessed what 486 00:31:27,280 --> 00:31:31,440 Speaker 1: it is. If you haven't, Hey, that clock it's ticking 487 00:31:32,520 --> 00:31:45,800 Speaker 1: and also talking, We'll be back. Okay. We were talking 488 00:31:45,840 --> 00:31:49,440 Speaker 1: about reasons why companies were looking to potentially pull out 489 00:31:49,440 --> 00:31:52,640 Speaker 1: of China. There's another big one, and that is there 490 00:31:52,640 --> 00:31:57,000 Speaker 1: are a lot of state run or state owned Chinese firms, 491 00:31:57,440 --> 00:32:01,040 Speaker 1: more than a hundred fifty companies in China ultimately owned 492 00:32:01,200 --> 00:32:04,400 Speaker 1: by the state by the Chinese government, and as you 493 00:32:04,440 --> 00:32:09,120 Speaker 1: might imagine, these companies typically enjoy competitive advantages over outsiders 494 00:32:09,120 --> 00:32:12,600 Speaker 1: that are providing goods and services within the same space. 495 00:32:13,200 --> 00:32:17,160 Speaker 1: So while China does have a huge population and theoretically 496 00:32:17,240 --> 00:32:20,800 Speaker 1: represents a healthy source of revenue for a company, the 497 00:32:20,880 --> 00:32:24,400 Speaker 1: reality is that some tech companies from other parts of 498 00:32:24,400 --> 00:32:27,640 Speaker 1: the world might find themselves at a disadvantage rail the 499 00:32:27,640 --> 00:32:33,680 Speaker 1: gate because they're jumping into uh an industry where state 500 00:32:33,760 --> 00:32:39,080 Speaker 1: run companies already have an existing presence, and so they're 501 00:32:39,120 --> 00:32:41,440 Speaker 1: just going to run into more and more adversity as 502 00:32:41,480 --> 00:32:45,040 Speaker 1: they try to establish their own base of operations within China. 503 00:32:45,120 --> 00:32:48,280 Speaker 1: So that's another reason why some companies have decided to 504 00:32:48,320 --> 00:32:51,520 Speaker 1: pull out. They just can't compete in a country where 505 00:32:51,520 --> 00:32:57,000 Speaker 1: state owned businesses get the edge over everybody else. Then, 506 00:32:57,080 --> 00:33:01,280 Speaker 1: of course there are sanctions. There are various sanctions within 507 00:33:01,440 --> 00:33:04,440 Speaker 1: say the semiconductor industry in particular, So the US government 508 00:33:04,520 --> 00:33:08,160 Speaker 1: essentially has put a strict limit on the types of 509 00:33:08,200 --> 00:33:12,480 Speaker 1: semiconductor chips that are allowed to be exported to China. Essentially, 510 00:33:12,720 --> 00:33:17,120 Speaker 1: only the older, less powerful chips are fair game. Anything 511 00:33:17,160 --> 00:33:21,959 Speaker 1: else that's more modern, more powerful, those are not allowed 512 00:33:22,000 --> 00:33:25,280 Speaker 1: to be exported to China. Then there was China's former 513 00:33:25,360 --> 00:33:30,200 Speaker 1: policy with regard to COVID nineteen. Until recently, it was 514 00:33:30,520 --> 00:33:33,960 Speaker 1: the official policy that if health officials detected a COVID 515 00:33:34,040 --> 00:33:37,800 Speaker 1: nineteen case within a given region, that whole region would 516 00:33:37,800 --> 00:33:40,920 Speaker 1: go on lockdown and a lot of businesses, particularly in 517 00:33:40,960 --> 00:33:44,320 Speaker 1: the manufacturing field, would either have to shut down or 518 00:33:44,360 --> 00:33:47,880 Speaker 1: they would have to arrange to have employees essentially live 519 00:33:48,360 --> 00:33:51,280 Speaker 1: at the manufacturing facility in order to stay in operation. 520 00:33:51,400 --> 00:33:54,080 Speaker 1: Tesla did that and got a lot of pushback on it. 521 00:33:54,680 --> 00:33:57,880 Speaker 1: Several companies have been exploring the option of migrating at 522 00:33:57,960 --> 00:34:02,240 Speaker 1: least some of their manufacturing to India instead of China. 523 00:34:02,560 --> 00:34:05,360 Speaker 1: This is also in response two issues we had with 524 00:34:05,400 --> 00:34:08,479 Speaker 1: supply chain problems, where you know, we started to see 525 00:34:08,520 --> 00:34:13,600 Speaker 1: a real shortage and semiconductors due to lots of different reasons. 526 00:34:13,840 --> 00:34:17,440 Speaker 1: It's actually very complicated, but one of the fears was 527 00:34:17,520 --> 00:34:21,520 Speaker 1: that will if it's in China and China shuts down operations, 528 00:34:22,080 --> 00:34:25,359 Speaker 1: then that stops everything for like two weeks, and that 529 00:34:25,400 --> 00:34:29,680 Speaker 1: can really start to put massive bottlenecks in the supply chain. 530 00:34:30,280 --> 00:34:33,719 Speaker 1: So companies have actively been looking at migrating some of 531 00:34:33,760 --> 00:34:39,280 Speaker 1: those operations to other countries to relieve that dependence upon China. 532 00:34:40,880 --> 00:34:44,520 Speaker 1: Companies that had already left China before two even got 533 00:34:44,560 --> 00:34:47,640 Speaker 1: started would include Yahoo and LinkedIn. Both of them pulled 534 00:34:47,640 --> 00:34:50,680 Speaker 1: out of China. They had encountered challenges relating to operating 535 00:34:50,680 --> 00:34:54,440 Speaker 1: within a country that has such a hands on government. 536 00:34:55,080 --> 00:34:58,600 Speaker 1: Amazon stopped selling Kindle devices in China this year. They 537 00:34:58,640 --> 00:35:02,399 Speaker 1: closed there did all Kindle bookstore in China. This year. 538 00:35:03,120 --> 00:35:07,600 Speaker 1: Airbnb started to shut down operations in China, sighting challenges 539 00:35:07,640 --> 00:35:10,400 Speaker 1: associated with the pandemic as well as the presence of 540 00:35:10,440 --> 00:35:15,280 Speaker 1: heavily established Chinese competitors within that space and um and yeah. 541 00:35:15,400 --> 00:35:18,480 Speaker 1: So that's why we're starting to see the tech sector 542 00:35:18,960 --> 00:35:24,840 Speaker 1: reconsider China as a market, at least the Western tech sector, 543 00:35:24,880 --> 00:35:28,799 Speaker 1: I should say. Now, speaking of China and tech it 544 00:35:28,960 --> 00:35:31,359 Speaker 1: is time for us to tackle another big story from 545 00:35:31,400 --> 00:35:35,120 Speaker 1: this past year, and that would be TikTok. So for 546 00:35:35,120 --> 00:35:38,759 Speaker 1: those who don't know, TikTok got its start as an 547 00:35:38,760 --> 00:35:43,399 Speaker 1: app called Musical dot Lee so Musically and it let 548 00:35:43,440 --> 00:35:46,239 Speaker 1: folks record short videos, typically of them lips sinking to 549 00:35:46,480 --> 00:35:50,400 Speaker 1: popular songs, and it got its start in China, but 550 00:35:50,520 --> 00:35:55,040 Speaker 1: it didn't really get much traction there. However, US users 551 00:35:55,080 --> 00:35:59,480 Speaker 1: were responding well to it, so Musically then established a 552 00:35:59,560 --> 00:36:04,759 Speaker 1: headquarters in California and really just focused almost exclusively on 553 00:36:04,880 --> 00:36:08,680 Speaker 1: developing its business in the United States. Then you had 554 00:36:08,680 --> 00:36:12,440 Speaker 1: this big company in China called Byte Dance, and it 555 00:36:12,520 --> 00:36:15,960 Speaker 1: had a different short form video app that it owned, 556 00:36:16,160 --> 00:36:18,960 Speaker 1: and it wanted to get access to the American market. 557 00:36:19,840 --> 00:36:22,719 Speaker 1: But just as it can be difficult for an American 558 00:36:22,760 --> 00:36:26,240 Speaker 1: company to gain traction in China, it can be really 559 00:36:26,280 --> 00:36:29,520 Speaker 1: hard for a Chinese company to gain traction in America. 560 00:36:29,719 --> 00:36:33,760 Speaker 1: So Byte Dance saw that Musically was already doing pretty 561 00:36:33,800 --> 00:36:38,040 Speaker 1: well and decided to essentially by their way in. They 562 00:36:38,080 --> 00:36:42,759 Speaker 1: bought Musically and then rebranded that into TikTok, and that 563 00:36:42,840 --> 00:36:47,359 Speaker 1: became a subsidiary company underneath Byte Dance, the Chinese company. 564 00:36:47,400 --> 00:36:51,840 Speaker 1: So TikTok is headquartered in America, but their parent company 565 00:36:51,920 --> 00:36:54,880 Speaker 1: is byte Dance, and that's in China. During the Trump 566 00:36:54,880 --> 00:36:58,439 Speaker 1: administration here in the United States, concerns were first brought 567 00:36:58,520 --> 00:37:01,800 Speaker 1: up about TikTok and it's really reationship with its parent company. 568 00:37:02,040 --> 00:37:05,880 Speaker 1: There were worries about where TikTok was storing user information, 569 00:37:06,360 --> 00:37:11,719 Speaker 1: like we're users data being stored on servers in China. 570 00:37:12,200 --> 00:37:15,719 Speaker 1: This concern led TikTok to make some changes. They migrated 571 00:37:15,760 --> 00:37:19,400 Speaker 1: their services and data onto US based servers that were 572 00:37:19,400 --> 00:37:23,080 Speaker 1: administered by the company Oracle, so essentially saying, look, see 573 00:37:23,120 --> 00:37:26,080 Speaker 1: are our data is not on Chinese servers, It's on 574 00:37:26,120 --> 00:37:30,000 Speaker 1: American servers. This is not totally satisfied at least some 575 00:37:30,040 --> 00:37:33,560 Speaker 1: folks in the US government. There continued to be those 576 00:37:33,600 --> 00:37:36,680 Speaker 1: concerned that TikTok could be serving as a way to 577 00:37:36,719 --> 00:37:40,680 Speaker 1: collect US citizen information as well as just accessing other 578 00:37:40,760 --> 00:37:42,759 Speaker 1: kinds of info. I mean, if you've got someone who's 579 00:37:43,320 --> 00:37:46,200 Speaker 1: shooting a funny TikTok they happened to be and say, 580 00:37:46,680 --> 00:37:52,560 Speaker 1: you know, a fairly secretive company or government agency, then 581 00:37:52,719 --> 00:37:56,040 Speaker 1: that video might end up giving people some really valuable information, 582 00:37:56,120 --> 00:38:00,680 Speaker 1: even if it's not exclusively about that subject. Meanwhile, the 583 00:38:00,760 --> 00:38:04,080 Speaker 1: Chinese Communist Party has a history of establishing a presence 584 00:38:04,280 --> 00:38:08,719 Speaker 1: in private companies in China. Last year, China's government acquired 585 00:38:08,760 --> 00:38:12,719 Speaker 1: a one percent stake in part of byte Dance, specifically 586 00:38:12,760 --> 00:38:15,600 Speaker 1: in the part of the company that holds licenses that 587 00:38:15,680 --> 00:38:20,640 Speaker 1: are crucial to their video sharing platforms. So along with 588 00:38:20,719 --> 00:38:25,080 Speaker 1: that steak, the CCP also secured a seat on byte 589 00:38:25,160 --> 00:38:28,000 Speaker 1: dances board for this part of byte Dance. That's a 590 00:38:28,040 --> 00:38:31,520 Speaker 1: board that only has three seats on it, so one 591 00:38:31,640 --> 00:38:33,880 Speaker 1: third of the board of directors for this part of 592 00:38:33,880 --> 00:38:38,080 Speaker 1: byte Dance is occupied by a representative from the Chinese 593 00:38:38,120 --> 00:38:42,000 Speaker 1: Communist Party. Then you have to consider that China has 594 00:38:42,040 --> 00:38:45,799 Speaker 1: the National Intelligence Law of the People's Republic of China. 595 00:38:46,000 --> 00:38:48,200 Speaker 1: This is a law that China actually passed back in 596 00:38:48,200 --> 00:38:51,480 Speaker 1: two thousand seventeen. That law states it is the responsibility 597 00:38:51,520 --> 00:38:55,960 Speaker 1: of all Chinese companies and citizens to work to maintain 598 00:38:56,040 --> 00:38:59,000 Speaker 1: national security of China, and that as part of that, 599 00:38:59,280 --> 00:39:02,080 Speaker 1: all businesses as registered in China are required to hand 600 00:39:02,120 --> 00:39:07,200 Speaker 1: over information to Chinese intelligence agencies. That includes Chinese companies 601 00:39:07,200 --> 00:39:11,000 Speaker 1: that are operating in other countries like the United States. 602 00:39:11,440 --> 00:39:15,280 Speaker 1: So there's literally a law in China, that assuming TikTok 603 00:39:15,560 --> 00:39:20,080 Speaker 1: is obeying this law, means that TikTok is obligated to 604 00:39:20,239 --> 00:39:24,240 Speaker 1: share data back to the Chinese government because TikTok itself 605 00:39:24,360 --> 00:39:28,239 Speaker 1: is a subsidiary of byte Dance, a Chinese company. By 606 00:39:28,239 --> 00:39:30,120 Speaker 1: the way, the same policy as part of the reason 607 00:39:30,120 --> 00:39:34,520 Speaker 1: why the United States banned Huawei components in telecommunications networks 608 00:39:34,560 --> 00:39:39,040 Speaker 1: here in the States. Now. Back in former President Trump 609 00:39:39,120 --> 00:39:43,080 Speaker 1: issued an executive order aiming to ban TikTok, but this 610 00:39:43,120 --> 00:39:45,960 Speaker 1: band never actually went into effect, partly because there were 611 00:39:46,000 --> 00:39:48,600 Speaker 1: real questions over whether the US government actually had the 612 00:39:48,680 --> 00:39:52,759 Speaker 1: authority to ban TikTok just based on an executive order 613 00:39:52,800 --> 00:39:55,640 Speaker 1: in the first place. Then there were other factors at well, 614 00:39:55,640 --> 00:39:57,400 Speaker 1: but I'm not gonna get into it because that was 615 00:39:57,440 --> 00:40:01,120 Speaker 1: twenty two now, you don't need to rehash all that. 616 00:40:02,080 --> 00:40:08,200 Speaker 1: Biden revoked Trump's executive order. Instead, Biden proposed a process 617 00:40:08,239 --> 00:40:12,120 Speaker 1: by which the US government will evaluate apps and social 618 00:40:12,160 --> 00:40:15,719 Speaker 1: networks that are owned and operated by foreign companies, particularly 619 00:40:16,440 --> 00:40:20,040 Speaker 1: foreign uh foreign companies that are in countries that are 620 00:40:20,120 --> 00:40:24,200 Speaker 1: antagonistic toward the United States or that we are antagonistic 621 00:40:24,280 --> 00:40:28,800 Speaker 1: toward if you prefer. The process is meant to determine 622 00:40:28,840 --> 00:40:31,719 Speaker 1: if these apps or platforms represent a security risk to 623 00:40:31,920 --> 00:40:36,000 Speaker 1: the US or just two American citizens. So TikTok has 624 00:40:36,160 --> 00:40:41,160 Speaker 1: kind of been going through this process, but that's not 625 00:40:41,280 --> 00:40:45,040 Speaker 1: where this story ends, because various people in Congress have 626 00:40:45,160 --> 00:40:48,200 Speaker 1: brought up concerns about TikTok, ranging from fears that the 627 00:40:48,200 --> 00:40:52,919 Speaker 1: company is actively spying on behalf of China to other 628 00:40:52,960 --> 00:40:57,400 Speaker 1: worries that TikTok is promoting and perpetuating harmful material to 629 00:40:57,640 --> 00:41:02,239 Speaker 1: impressionable people, particularly to young people, because TikTok has a 630 00:41:02,239 --> 00:41:06,680 Speaker 1: strong appeal for younger users, so there are some pretty 631 00:41:06,680 --> 00:41:09,840 Speaker 1: well founded worries that messages that relate to say self 632 00:41:09,920 --> 00:41:14,280 Speaker 1: harm get amplified on TikTok. So there have been renewed 633 00:41:14,320 --> 00:41:18,239 Speaker 1: calls to ban the service outright, not necessarily because it 634 00:41:18,360 --> 00:41:22,880 Speaker 1: might be a spy, but because it could be doing 635 00:41:22,960 --> 00:41:28,920 Speaker 1: some serious harm to younger users. And ultimately, TikTok's recommendation 636 00:41:28,960 --> 00:41:32,960 Speaker 1: algorithm responds to whatever it is you're watching, So if 637 00:41:33,040 --> 00:41:36,160 Speaker 1: you watch a video in full and that video happens 638 00:41:36,200 --> 00:41:39,880 Speaker 1: to have harmful material in it, TikTok is more likely 639 00:41:39,960 --> 00:41:45,040 Speaker 1: to recommend similar videos, which does amplify that message. If 640 00:41:45,120 --> 00:41:49,400 Speaker 1: you happen to watch videos in full that are about 641 00:41:49,440 --> 00:41:51,920 Speaker 1: puppies playing, then you're probably going to see more videos 642 00:41:51,920 --> 00:41:56,399 Speaker 1: about puppies playing. So the platform, you could argue, is agnostic. 643 00:41:56,440 --> 00:41:59,959 Speaker 1: It doesn't care what the content is. It just wants 644 00:42:00,040 --> 00:42:02,920 Speaker 1: to serve more content that's going to keep you on TikTok. 645 00:42:03,280 --> 00:42:06,520 Speaker 1: The problem is if that content is negative, stuff that 646 00:42:06,640 --> 00:42:10,040 Speaker 1: is impacting your mental health, that's going to get amplified 647 00:42:10,200 --> 00:42:15,239 Speaker 1: and replicated and reiterated, and eventually that could have a 648 00:42:15,320 --> 00:42:19,480 Speaker 1: really negative impact on at least some people. So that's 649 00:42:19,480 --> 00:42:24,240 Speaker 1: one of the reasons why certain politicians want to ban TikTok. 650 00:42:24,320 --> 00:42:27,520 Speaker 1: So there are multiple points of view that have a 651 00:42:27,600 --> 00:42:31,880 Speaker 1: similar goal, but for different reasons. We have seen the 652 00:42:31,920 --> 00:42:34,719 Speaker 1: federal government here in the US proposed policies that make 653 00:42:34,760 --> 00:42:37,680 Speaker 1: it against the rules for federal employees to install TikTok 654 00:42:37,800 --> 00:42:40,920 Speaker 1: on their work devices. Uh, they even work that language 655 00:42:40,920 --> 00:42:44,640 Speaker 1: into spending bills, And to me, that just kind of 656 00:42:45,000 --> 00:42:48,919 Speaker 1: makes sense, the banning them on work devices, not the 657 00:42:49,280 --> 00:42:52,839 Speaker 1: burying something in a larger spending bill. I hate that 658 00:42:52,920 --> 00:42:56,759 Speaker 1: kind of stuff, like the idea that politicians sneak their 659 00:42:56,800 --> 00:43:02,000 Speaker 1: pet projects in on really necessary pieces of legislation has 660 00:43:02,040 --> 00:43:06,000 Speaker 1: always bothered me. I hate that, like, oh, well, no 661 00:43:06,040 --> 00:43:08,120 Speaker 1: one's going to vote against this because everyone needs to 662 00:43:08,160 --> 00:43:10,640 Speaker 1: get paid. So I'm gonna put my pet project that 663 00:43:10,719 --> 00:43:13,880 Speaker 1: gets my buddy back home in Mississippi a huge amount 664 00:43:13,880 --> 00:43:16,279 Speaker 1: of business, and no one's gonna object because we need 665 00:43:16,320 --> 00:43:18,239 Speaker 1: to get paid. I'm just gonna put that in here. 666 00:43:18,440 --> 00:43:23,279 Speaker 1: I hate that stuff anyway. I think banning TikTok from 667 00:43:23,320 --> 00:43:26,600 Speaker 1: federal devices makes total sense if I were issued a 668 00:43:26,600 --> 00:43:30,040 Speaker 1: phone by my office, which is not a government office, 669 00:43:30,080 --> 00:43:33,240 Speaker 1: but if if my bosses gave me a work phone 670 00:43:33,280 --> 00:43:36,400 Speaker 1: to use with work, they would be fully justified in 671 00:43:36,440 --> 00:43:39,960 Speaker 1: my opinion, of pulling me aside. If I've had installed 672 00:43:40,000 --> 00:43:43,640 Speaker 1: TikTok on my work phone, you know, they could say, hey, Jonathan, 673 00:43:43,719 --> 00:43:46,200 Speaker 1: you know this is for work, right, that kind of thing. 674 00:43:46,320 --> 00:43:50,160 Speaker 1: I think that would be totally justifiable. I personally don't 675 00:43:50,239 --> 00:43:53,200 Speaker 1: have any real issue with a ban on TikTok for 676 00:43:53,520 --> 00:43:57,720 Speaker 1: government owned property. We've seen similar bands and several states 677 00:43:57,719 --> 00:44:00,359 Speaker 1: here in the United States for state owned property as well, 678 00:44:00,400 --> 00:44:03,080 Speaker 1: so both on the federal level and in some state 679 00:44:03,120 --> 00:44:06,160 Speaker 1: government levels. And again I don't think there's anything really 680 00:44:06,200 --> 00:44:10,000 Speaker 1: scandalous about that, and I think it's totally you know, 681 00:44:10,120 --> 00:44:14,560 Speaker 1: fair for a government or even a company to say, 682 00:44:14,840 --> 00:44:19,040 Speaker 1: don't put this stuff on the devices we assigned to you, 683 00:44:19,160 --> 00:44:25,279 Speaker 1: because ultimately those devices don't belong to the employee. They 684 00:44:25,320 --> 00:44:30,200 Speaker 1: belong to, you know, either the government or a company. Now, 685 00:44:30,880 --> 00:44:34,120 Speaker 1: when you start moving toward a more general ban that 686 00:44:34,160 --> 00:44:38,080 Speaker 1: would affect private citizens, then things get way more complicated. 687 00:44:38,120 --> 00:44:41,160 Speaker 1: And honestly, most of the analysts I've followed feel that 688 00:44:41,680 --> 00:44:46,400 Speaker 1: a nationwide ban for personal devices seems unlikely, but we 689 00:44:46,520 --> 00:44:49,760 Speaker 1: might see more state governments and perhaps even companies issue 690 00:44:49,800 --> 00:44:52,760 Speaker 1: bans on work devices out of concern that TikTok could 691 00:44:52,840 --> 00:44:56,239 Speaker 1: actually be sharing info back to China. Like, if you 692 00:44:56,360 --> 00:45:01,839 Speaker 1: have a work device and you do critical work on 693 00:45:01,880 --> 00:45:06,840 Speaker 1: that device, Like if there's like stuff that is proprietary 694 00:45:06,960 --> 00:45:10,080 Speaker 1: in nature that you access on that device, or anything 695 00:45:10,080 --> 00:45:13,400 Speaker 1: else that is kind of a secret stuff of your company, 696 00:45:14,000 --> 00:45:17,840 Speaker 1: it makes sense that you don't want someone putting TikTok 697 00:45:18,040 --> 00:45:21,400 Speaker 1: on that machine. Really don't want any kind of social 698 00:45:21,440 --> 00:45:24,680 Speaker 1: network based app on that device if that is not 699 00:45:24,800 --> 00:45:28,279 Speaker 1: necessary for your work. If you're a social influencer, then yeah, 700 00:45:28,360 --> 00:45:32,960 Speaker 1: that's one thing. But if you're doing you know, important 701 00:45:33,000 --> 00:45:36,359 Speaker 1: work for say the CIA. You don't want to have 702 00:45:36,680 --> 00:45:40,640 Speaker 1: all these different apps that are basically designed to gather 703 00:45:40,719 --> 00:45:43,160 Speaker 1: as much information about the user as possible in order 704 00:45:43,200 --> 00:45:47,279 Speaker 1: to exploit it. I mean, I know we've all seen 705 00:45:47,280 --> 00:45:51,239 Speaker 1: the James Bond movies and that idiot goes around introducing 706 00:45:51,320 --> 00:45:54,400 Speaker 1: himself by name all the time, proving that he is 707 00:45:54,440 --> 00:45:57,319 Speaker 1: the worst spy in the world. But don't be like 708 00:45:57,440 --> 00:46:01,240 Speaker 1: James Bond. Okay, be like, I don't know Jason Bourne. 709 00:46:01,280 --> 00:46:04,600 Speaker 1: He he he knows how to keep a low profile. It's 710 00:46:04,640 --> 00:46:09,560 Speaker 1: just that people are really looking for him. Okay, that's 711 00:46:09,600 --> 00:46:13,640 Speaker 1: it for this goofy episode. As I look back on 712 00:46:13,719 --> 00:46:18,319 Speaker 1: the tech News of two, I've got at least one 713 00:46:18,360 --> 00:46:21,040 Speaker 1: more of these, but it should be really focused on 714 00:46:21,080 --> 00:46:25,440 Speaker 1: things like cool scientific discoveries and developments and that kind 715 00:46:25,480 --> 00:46:28,520 Speaker 1: of stuff. That's my plan for that, and that will 716 00:46:28,600 --> 00:46:32,439 Speaker 1: probably be the last one of these, unless who knows, 717 00:46:32,480 --> 00:46:36,200 Speaker 1: something major happens between now and Wednesday. We'll see um 718 00:46:36,320 --> 00:46:38,319 Speaker 1: or now on Thursday, I should say, we'll see I 719 00:46:38,360 --> 00:46:42,560 Speaker 1: forgot Today's not Monday, is it. So? I hope you've 720 00:46:42,760 --> 00:46:46,600 Speaker 1: enjoyed this look back on two. We're gonna do at 721 00:46:46,640 --> 00:46:49,640 Speaker 1: least one more of them, and already starting to look 722 00:46:49,640 --> 00:46:52,480 Speaker 1: ahead at three. If you've got suggestions for topics I 723 00:46:52,520 --> 00:46:55,720 Speaker 1: should cover in future episodes of tech Stuff, please reach 724 00:46:55,719 --> 00:46:57,560 Speaker 1: out and let me know. You can do that either 725 00:46:57,640 --> 00:47:00,400 Speaker 1: by downloading the I Heart Radio app. It's free to download, 726 00:47:00,400 --> 00:47:02,560 Speaker 1: free to use. You can put tech Stuff in the 727 00:47:02,560 --> 00:47:05,200 Speaker 1: little search field that'll take you to the tech Stuff 728 00:47:05,200 --> 00:47:07,839 Speaker 1: podcast page on the I Heart Radio app. You'll see 729 00:47:07,840 --> 00:47:09,960 Speaker 1: a little microphone icon there. If you click on that, 730 00:47:10,000 --> 00:47:11,880 Speaker 1: you can leave me a voice message up to thirty 731 00:47:11,920 --> 00:47:14,640 Speaker 1: seconds in length and uh, I would love to hear 732 00:47:14,680 --> 00:47:17,120 Speaker 1: from you, or if you would prefer, you can send 733 00:47:17,160 --> 00:47:19,479 Speaker 1: me a message on Twitter. The handle for the show 734 00:47:19,560 --> 00:47:22,799 Speaker 1: is tech Stuff H s W and I'll talk to 735 00:47:22,840 --> 00:47:32,040 Speaker 1: you again really soon. Tech Stuff is an I Heart 736 00:47:32,120 --> 00:47:36,040 Speaker 1: Radio production. For more podcasts from I Heart Radio, visit 737 00:47:36,040 --> 00:47:39,160 Speaker 1: the i Heart Radio app, Apple Podcasts, or wherever you 738 00:47:39,200 --> 00:47:40,560 Speaker 1: listen to your favorite shows.