WEBVTT - The Birth of Blockbuster

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<v Speaker 1>Get in touch with technology with tech Stuff from how

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<v Speaker 1>stuff works dot com. Hey there, and welcome to tech Stuff.

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<v Speaker 1>I'm your host, Jonathan Strickland. I'm an executive producer with

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<v Speaker 1>how Stuff Works in a love all things tech, and

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<v Speaker 1>it's time to start a new short series series by

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<v Speaker 1>two episodes. That's not really a series, I guess. Tech

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<v Speaker 1>Stuff listener Paul asked that I would do if I

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<v Speaker 1>would do an episode about Blockbuster, the mega chain video

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<v Speaker 1>rental store that at one point had more than nine

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<v Speaker 1>thousand locations worldwide. I'm instead gonna do two episodes on

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<v Speaker 1>the company. This episode is called the Birth of Blockbuster,

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<v Speaker 1>and spoiler alert, the title of the next episode is

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<v Speaker 1>the Death of Blockbuster. So this is gonna be all

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<v Speaker 1>about the founding of Blockbuster and its rise to dominate

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<v Speaker 1>the video rental industry. And the next one is what

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<v Speaker 1>the heck happened? Right? How did it? How did things

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<v Speaker 1>go so wrong for Blockbuster that today only one Blockbuster

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<v Speaker 1>video store exists in the United States, though I should

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<v Speaker 1>say there are a few others that are actually an

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<v Speaker 1>overseas locations, but only one US Blockbuster remains. So we're

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<v Speaker 1>going to find out together. Let's dive right in and

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<v Speaker 1>stop delaying. Wow, what a difference. Well, to understand the

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<v Speaker 1>rise of Blockbuster, we need to look back at the

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<v Speaker 1>development of the rise of the VCR. Sony's Beta Max

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<v Speaker 1>and j VCS VHS standards debuted in the nineteen seventies,

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<v Speaker 1>and both formats used magnetic tape to store video content,

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<v Speaker 1>and they were incompatible with one another, so you could

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<v Speaker 1>not put a Beta Max tape in a VHS VCR.

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<v Speaker 1>They also were enormous disruptors. You know, we talked about

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<v Speaker 1>disruptive technology. Videotapes were huge and disruptive. Media companies hated

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<v Speaker 1>the idea of video tapes. They tried to stop the technology.

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<v Speaker 1>They were worried that people would have the ability to

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<v Speaker 1>tape content right off their televisions and then that would

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<v Speaker 1>somehow eat up into their revenue, maybe there'd be piracy issues.

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<v Speaker 1>It was just a big scare. And in fact, we

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<v Speaker 1>see this all the time. Whenever there was a new

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<v Speaker 1>media format that would allow people to put media onto

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<v Speaker 1>some sort of storage device, we've seen companies react negatively,

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<v Speaker 1>whether it's CDs, DVDs, whatever, And the same was true

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<v Speaker 1>way back in the seventies with VHS and Beta Max.

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<v Speaker 1>The first film to be released on VHS, meaning you

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<v Speaker 1>could go and purchase a copy of the movie on

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<v Speaker 1>VHS in the store would be a South Korean movie

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<v Speaker 1>called The Young Teacher that became available way back in

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<v Speaker 1>nineteen seventy six, but America wouldn't start having access to

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<v Speaker 1>VHS tapes until nine. A company called Magnetic Video had

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<v Speaker 1>a great idea. Well, the owner of Magnetic Video, Andre Blair,

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<v Speaker 1>he had a great idea. He said, I'm gonna license movies.

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<v Speaker 1>I'm gonna go to a movie studio. I'm going to

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<v Speaker 1>pay a licensing fee and UH in return, I will

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<v Speaker 1>end up producing videotapes of that studio's library of content.

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<v Speaker 1>And ZI lands a deal with twentieth Century Fox, and

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<v Speaker 1>the agreement was that Blay would pay a licensing fee

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<v Speaker 1>of seven dollars and fifty cents per video that he

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<v Speaker 1>sold and also give a three dred thousand dollar upfront

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<v Speaker 1>advance to twentie century Fox. Magnetic Video had an organization

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<v Speaker 1>called the Video Club of America that had a membership

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<v Speaker 1>fee of ten dollars, and through that club you could

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<v Speaker 1>purchase movies like Patent Mash, Hello Dolly, The Sound of Music,

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<v Speaker 1>and The French Connection, among others. But the cost of

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<v Speaker 1>every video was forty cents. Parently, some seven dollars and

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<v Speaker 1>fifty cents would go to twenty century Fox and the

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<v Speaker 1>rest would be divvied up between you know, Andrea Blay

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<v Speaker 1>and whatever the expenses were. By the December of nineteen,

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<v Speaker 1>an entrepreneur named George Atkinson got a crazy idea. He

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<v Speaker 1>had already run a home theater system business, but now

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<v Speaker 1>he thought, what if I bought copies of these movies

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<v Speaker 1>and then offered them as rentals to people who own

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<v Speaker 1>VCRs and Beta Max machines. I could get a lot

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<v Speaker 1>of money. This way, I can generate a lot of revenue.

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<v Speaker 1>It's gonna take a big upfront cost because you have

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<v Speaker 1>to build out the inventory. You have to pay for

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<v Speaker 1>all those videotapes. But then over uh sequence of rentals,

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<v Speaker 1>for a low amount per rental, you can start making

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<v Speaker 1>that money back. You you make back your investment and

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<v Speaker 1>you start making a profit. Atkinson opened up a six

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<v Speaker 1>d square foot storefront he called Video Cassette Rentals and

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<v Speaker 1>he would later rename the Video Station. It was on

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<v Speaker 1>Wilshire Boulevard in Los Angeles, California, and that's when the

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<v Speaker 1>video rental business was born. Atkinson was a pioneer in

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<v Speaker 1>this space, and he would even franchise his idea. He

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<v Speaker 1>would license that out to other small business owners. Now,

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<v Speaker 1>the media companies again hated this idea, but the license

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<v Speaker 1>agreements they had made for videotapes they were intended for

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<v Speaker 1>home sale, right, they were meant for the home theater

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<v Speaker 1>enthusiast to go out and purchase a fifty dollar videotape

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<v Speaker 1>of a movie. But copyright law was pretty clear there

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<v Speaker 1>was nothing illegal about what Atkinson was doing. He was

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<v Speaker 1>his rental business did not violate any laws. So while

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<v Speaker 1>the movie studios didn't like the idea, they couldn't legally

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<v Speaker 1>stop it. Later on, those same studios would totally come

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<v Speaker 1>around to this rental industry. It would become an lucrative

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<v Speaker 1>revenue source. But of course, at first it was brand new,

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<v Speaker 1>and as we all know, big companies hate new things.

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<v Speaker 1>They're scary. And across the United States, other entrepreneurs would

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<v Speaker 1>follow Atkinson's lead. Some of them were independent mom and

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<v Speaker 1>pop stores, so little, local neighborhood video rental facilities. And

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<v Speaker 1>then one guy would start up a business that would

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<v Speaker 1>become the giant of this burgeoning industry. Now that one

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<v Speaker 1>guy's name might surprise you, because when you talk about Blockbuster,

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<v Speaker 1>one name tends to pop up more frequently than others.

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<v Speaker 1>There was a billionaire named Wayne Huizenga, and he made

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<v Speaker 1>his fortune growing Blockbuster and then ultimately sold it to

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<v Speaker 1>Viacom in the nineties, which I will cover in our

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<v Speaker 1>next episode, and we will get to him. He is

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<v Speaker 1>a crucial part of Blockbusters history, but he was not

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<v Speaker 1>the person who started the chain. That honor goes to

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<v Speaker 1>a guy named David Cook of Dallas, Texas. David Cook

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<v Speaker 1>was a programmer and an entrepreneur, and in nineteen eighty

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<v Speaker 1>two he founded a company called Cook Data Services, and

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<v Speaker 1>this company built databases and software and some hardware tools

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<v Speaker 1>for the petroleum industry. His company, UH was doing pretty well,

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<v Speaker 1>but then the oil business as a whole, the whole

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<v Speaker 1>industry took a huge hit in the early nineteen eighties,

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<v Speaker 1>and so Cook started to look around for other opportunities.

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<v Speaker 1>It was clear that the oil industry was not going

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<v Speaker 1>to be a reliable source of revenue. His wife, Sandy,

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<v Speaker 1>loved film, and she said, maybe you should look into

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<v Speaker 1>video rental operations because we're starting to see these businesses

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<v Speaker 1>pop up, and I think you could probably do a

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<v Speaker 1>really good job with it. So Cook began to do research.

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<v Speaker 1>He began to look into the business of video rentals,

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<v Speaker 1>and he saw that most video stores were actually pretty

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<v Speaker 1>small operations. They were limited to an inventory that represented

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<v Speaker 1>some of the biggest move be titles because the cost

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<v Speaker 1>per video was pretty high, so it was prohibitively expensive

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<v Speaker 1>to aim for a really large inventory spanning niche genres

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<v Speaker 1>and interests. Right, Like, if you sit there and say

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<v Speaker 1>to yourself, well, E T is going to be huge,

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<v Speaker 1>so I want to make sure that we have plenty

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<v Speaker 1>of copies of ET. That's a bad example because of

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<v Speaker 1>how long it took a t to get to the

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<v Speaker 1>home video Marcord. But just assume that we're talking about

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<v Speaker 1>something that was available in so you say, I want

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<v Speaker 1>to have a whole bunch of copies of that because

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<v Speaker 1>it's a big, big name. But there's this other smaller film.

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<v Speaker 1>Maybe let's say it's a racer head. You know, it's

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<v Speaker 1>a David Lynch movie and people have heard about it,

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<v Speaker 1>but most people think of it, Oh, that's that weird

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<v Speaker 1>art house kind of film, and I don't understand it.

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<v Speaker 1>It's very independent and strange and surreal and absurd, and

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<v Speaker 1>I don't. That's not for me. And so a lot

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<v Speaker 1>of these video rental stores would ignore those other titles

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<v Speaker 1>and just focus on the really big, most recent ones.

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<v Speaker 1>But Cook thought there might be a way of appealing

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<v Speaker 1>to a broader audience by including those titles. He also

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<v Speaker 1>knowed that a lot of video stores had a pretty

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<v Speaker 1>clunky way of actually renting titles. Movies typically would not

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<v Speaker 1>be kept on shelves because there was a very legitimate

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<v Speaker 1>fear that customers might come in, see a video tape

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<v Speaker 1>on the shelf, get some sticky fingers, slip that video

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<v Speaker 1>cassette into a bag, and just walk right on out.

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<v Speaker 1>And then next thing you know, they have the latest

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<v Speaker 1>copy of the most recent releases. And so that was

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<v Speaker 1>something that you typically wouldn't see in your normal video

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<v Speaker 1>rental stores. You would you might see cases, but there'd

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<v Speaker 1>be no videotapes inside. You would have to take it

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<v Speaker 1>out to the desk and then they would have to

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<v Speaker 1>go find a copy of that movie and they would

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<v Speaker 1>have to do the whole checkout process, which typically was

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<v Speaker 1>not automated. It was laborious. It was slow. It was

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<v Speaker 1>not good customer experience. So David Cook asides, He's going

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<v Speaker 1>to take a stab at this, and he opens up

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<v Speaker 1>what would become the first Blockbuster video rental store. This

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<v Speaker 1>was still under the umbrella of his company, Cook Data Systems.

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<v Speaker 1>He bought an inventory of movies and opened a store space,

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<v Speaker 1>and that inventory included eight thousand tapes, which represented six thousand,

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<v Speaker 1>five hundred different titles. And remember each of those is

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<v Speaker 1>costing quite a bit of money per go. We're talking

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<v Speaker 1>like around fifty bucks per tape, sometimes sixty depends on

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<v Speaker 1>the title in the movie studio. But you multiply that

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<v Speaker 1>by eight thousand, that's a lot of money. But he

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<v Speaker 1>gave his store a much larger selection than most other

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<v Speaker 1>stores and was significantly bigger to the competitor that was

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<v Speaker 1>geographically closest to him, So he had an incredible advantage

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<v Speaker 1>just from an inventory perspective. Cook also would outfit every

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<v Speaker 1>single tape with a special magnetic strip, and he mounted

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<v Speaker 1>sensors near the door of his shop to discourage theft.

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<v Speaker 1>So if you took the tape through the sensors, an

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<v Speaker 1>alarm would go off and Cook would know, or his

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<v Speaker 1>employees would know that someone was trying to lift one

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<v Speaker 1>of those videotapes. And I remember this set up vividly

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<v Speaker 1>because I remember you would go to rent the tapes

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<v Speaker 1>and the process would have the clerk actually put the

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<v Speaker 1>video tape on the other side of the sensors, on

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<v Speaker 1>their side of the counter, so you'd have to, you know,

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<v Speaker 1>you'd have to complete your transaction, walk through the sensors,

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<v Speaker 1>pick up your movie, and then you could leave. So

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<v Speaker 1>good times that still it was still in in uh

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<v Speaker 1>in place when I was renting movies or when my

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<v Speaker 1>family was renting movies in the late eighties. He also

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<v Speaker 1>incorporated a database that could actually keep track of all

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<v Speaker 1>the rental titles, so pulling a title up on the

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<v Speaker 1>system would tell you immediately where it was, whether it

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<v Speaker 1>was out for rent, or if it should be in

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<v Speaker 1>the store, so he could keep track of where everything

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<v Speaker 1>was at any given time. It also meant that he

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<v Speaker 1>could see which titles were getting rented more frequently, and

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<v Speaker 1>if necessary, he could order another copy of a title

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<v Speaker 1>if it was proving to be incredibly popular and consistently

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<v Speaker 1>checked out. Checking out titles was actually computerized and automated

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<v Speaker 1>as well. That was a huge advantage over other video

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<v Speaker 1>rental stores. So a customer would first have to become

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<v Speaker 1>a member of the store. You couldn't just rent anything.

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<v Speaker 1>You had to first apply for a membership card, and

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<v Speaker 1>you would get a membership card for you'd pay a

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<v Speaker 1>fee get a membership card has a unique barcode on

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<v Speaker 1>it that's tied to your account, so you have a

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<v Speaker 1>customer profile, and whenever you scan your membership card, it

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<v Speaker 1>links whatever transaction you are doing to your customer profile

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<v Speaker 1>in Cook's computer system. And every videotape would also have

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<v Speaker 1>its own barcode. So if you wanted to check out

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<v Speaker 1>a video, you bring it up to the front, the

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<v Speaker 1>clerk would scan your card, they would scan the video.

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<v Speaker 1>This links the video to your profile. It tells the system, hey,

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<v Speaker 1>Jonathan has rented Big Trouble in Little China for the

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<v Speaker 1>eightieth time. So Jonathan's got Big Trouble in Little China

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<v Speaker 1>on rent, and we know what's going to be due

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<v Speaker 1>in X number of days. So that way they could

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<v Speaker 1>actually keep track of all that information to and it

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<v Speaker 1>meant that if you kept the movie longer than what

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<v Speaker 1>the membership agreement allowed you to, you'd end up having

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<v Speaker 1>to pay late fees which would become a very important

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<v Speaker 1>part of Blockbusters revenue model. As it turns out, the

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<v Speaker 1>business was a smash success. According to Cook, the night

0:13:33.720 --> 0:13:36.560
<v Speaker 1>they opened, they had to close off and lock the

0:13:36.640 --> 0:13:39.520
<v Speaker 1>doors to limit the number of people who are coming

0:13:39.520 --> 0:13:42.360
<v Speaker 1>in and overcrowding the store. Cook found that people were

0:13:42.360 --> 0:13:44.760
<v Speaker 1>really eager to rent all sorts of movies, not just

0:13:44.840 --> 0:13:47.600
<v Speaker 1>the big titles, but other ones as well. So he

0:13:47.720 --> 0:13:51.400
<v Speaker 1>discovered that that prevailing wisdom that you should really focus

0:13:51.440 --> 0:13:54.240
<v Speaker 1>on the latest releases didn't really hold true. That a

0:13:54.240 --> 0:13:57.600
<v Speaker 1>lot of people were interested in watching older films, things

0:13:57.600 --> 0:13:59.840
<v Speaker 1>that they had heard about but never seen, or maybe

0:13:59.840 --> 0:14:02.120
<v Speaker 1>they had seen it years ago but it hadn't seen

0:14:02.160 --> 0:14:06.480
<v Speaker 1>it since, he found that those smaller titles had real value,

0:14:06.679 --> 0:14:09.920
<v Speaker 1>so it turned out that his approach was more effective.

0:14:10.360 --> 0:14:14.600
<v Speaker 1>The following summer, in x Cook would open three more stores.

0:14:15.040 --> 0:14:17.960
<v Speaker 1>Not even a year had gone by since he had

0:14:18.000 --> 0:14:20.320
<v Speaker 1>opened the first one, and already he was ready to expand.

0:14:20.720 --> 0:14:24.520
<v Speaker 1>He also changed the company over to become Blockbuster Entertainment Corporation.

0:14:24.640 --> 0:14:29.040
<v Speaker 1>In June. Things were looking up and Cook was seeking

0:14:29.080 --> 0:14:31.080
<v Speaker 1>investment in the form of an I p O to

0:14:31.360 --> 0:14:35.120
<v Speaker 1>fund this expansion because it was expensive but Just a

0:14:35.160 --> 0:14:38.120
<v Speaker 1>few days before the offering was to take place, a

0:14:38.120 --> 0:14:41.720
<v Speaker 1>financial reporter did a piece on Cook. That piece was

0:14:41.800 --> 0:14:45.080
<v Speaker 1>kind of a hatchet job. It highlighted how the oil

0:14:45.240 --> 0:14:49.800
<v Speaker 1>industry failure nearly tanked his company just a few years earlier,

0:14:50.440 --> 0:14:53.880
<v Speaker 1>and it questioned whether Cook had the expertise in the

0:14:53.960 --> 0:14:57.560
<v Speaker 1>video field to make his business a real success. And

0:14:57.600 --> 0:15:01.120
<v Speaker 1>it was such a damaging piece that it tanked that

0:15:01.200 --> 0:15:05.320
<v Speaker 1>equity offering that was planned, and due to that expansion

0:15:05.440 --> 0:15:09.480
<v Speaker 1>and the high upfront costs, the company ended six with

0:15:09.520 --> 0:15:14.320
<v Speaker 1>a three point two million dollar shortfall. But the story

0:15:14.360 --> 0:15:17.320
<v Speaker 1>obviously doesn't end there. It could have this could have

0:15:17.320 --> 0:15:19.440
<v Speaker 1>been the end of Blockbuster, and we never would have

0:15:19.480 --> 0:15:24.120
<v Speaker 1>talked about it. The name never would have risen beyond Dallas, Texas,

0:15:24.200 --> 0:15:26.400
<v Speaker 1>and we would just be ignorant of it. But of

0:15:26.440 --> 0:15:28.680
<v Speaker 1>course things did not go that way. I'll talk more

0:15:28.680 --> 0:15:31.560
<v Speaker 1>about what happened in just a second, but first let's

0:15:31.600 --> 0:15:42.160
<v Speaker 1>take a quick break to thank our sponsor. So here's

0:15:42.200 --> 0:15:45.920
<v Speaker 1>Cook with a business he knows can be successful, but

0:15:45.960 --> 0:15:49.040
<v Speaker 1>he's got a huge cash flow crisis on his hands.

0:15:49.480 --> 0:15:54.040
<v Speaker 1>In February, Cook sells off one third of the company

0:15:54.120 --> 0:15:57.600
<v Speaker 1>to a group of three investors, and all three were

0:15:57.640 --> 0:16:01.080
<v Speaker 1>from another big company that Cook had some experience with

0:16:01.120 --> 0:16:04.960
<v Speaker 1>in the past. It was a garbage disposal business of

0:16:05.000 --> 0:16:08.840
<v Speaker 1>all things, and it was called Waste Management. Side note,

0:16:08.880 --> 0:16:11.640
<v Speaker 1>I once tried to launch a fitness company called waste

0:16:11.720 --> 0:16:16.040
<v Speaker 1>Management spelled slightly differently, but it never did very well.

0:16:16.160 --> 0:16:18.680
<v Speaker 1>But the other Waste Management was a different story, had

0:16:18.680 --> 0:16:22.720
<v Speaker 1>done really well, and one of their co founders was

0:16:22.720 --> 0:16:27.240
<v Speaker 1>was the guy named Wayne Wizinga, and Waizinga had retired

0:16:27.440 --> 0:16:31.560
<v Speaker 1>from Waste Management in four He and John Milk, who

0:16:31.640 --> 0:16:36.280
<v Speaker 1>was the president of Waste Management's international division, and Donald Flynn,

0:16:36.400 --> 0:16:39.680
<v Speaker 1>who was the CFO of Waste Management, all went in

0:16:39.720 --> 0:16:43.320
<v Speaker 1>to invest in Blockbuster, pouring more than eighteen million dollars

0:16:43.400 --> 0:16:46.960
<v Speaker 1>into the company. Cook ended up handing over control to

0:16:47.000 --> 0:16:51.000
<v Speaker 1>the company to Whaizinga later on that year that it

0:16:51.200 --> 0:16:54.240
<v Speaker 1>just was clear that he was not going to be

0:16:54.240 --> 0:16:58.200
<v Speaker 1>able to hold onto the company and Cook's business strategy

0:16:58.920 --> 0:17:02.400
<v Speaker 1>was not the way that Oizinga and his his partners

0:17:02.400 --> 0:17:05.679
<v Speaker 1>wanted to go. Cook wanted to create a franchise system.

0:17:05.840 --> 0:17:08.440
<v Speaker 1>He wanted to license his computer system he had created

0:17:08.480 --> 0:17:13.600
<v Speaker 1>the database system and Blockbuster's name to independent entrepreneurs and

0:17:13.640 --> 0:17:16.400
<v Speaker 1>that way, he wouldn't have to oversee all the operations.

0:17:16.480 --> 0:17:20.399
<v Speaker 1>He could benefit from the licensing fees, and these small

0:17:20.840 --> 0:17:25.600
<v Speaker 1>independent video store owners could benefit from the work he

0:17:25.640 --> 0:17:28.320
<v Speaker 1>had done building out the database. But wa Zinga had

0:17:28.320 --> 0:17:31.119
<v Speaker 1>a different idea. He wanted the company to maintain ownership

0:17:31.320 --> 0:17:35.520
<v Speaker 1>of as many stores as possible with direct control. Cook

0:17:35.600 --> 0:17:38.960
<v Speaker 1>reportedly had issues with the new leaders of Blockbuster, and

0:17:39.040 --> 0:17:41.560
<v Speaker 1>by one report I saw, he had a hearty disagreement

0:17:41.600 --> 0:17:46.520
<v Speaker 1>with one of Zinga's direct reports. I believe the piece

0:17:46.560 --> 0:17:51.480
<v Speaker 1>I read called it one of Whizinga's lieutenants. So Cook

0:17:51.560 --> 0:17:53.439
<v Speaker 1>decides he's going to get out of the game, the

0:17:53.440 --> 0:17:57.520
<v Speaker 1>guy who founded the company. So in April, Cook sells

0:17:57.560 --> 0:18:00.800
<v Speaker 1>off his shares of the company he founded and he

0:18:00.880 --> 0:18:04.679
<v Speaker 1>goes to work on other businesses. Has pailed amounted to

0:18:05.040 --> 0:18:08.080
<v Speaker 1>something in the area of around twenty million dollars, somewhere

0:18:08.119 --> 0:18:11.560
<v Speaker 1>between eighteen and twenty million, which isn't bad. Obviously, that's

0:18:11.560 --> 0:18:13.800
<v Speaker 1>a lot of money. I mean, it makes you a millionaire,

0:18:13.960 --> 0:18:18.040
<v Speaker 1>a multimillionaire, But that was a fraction of what he

0:18:18.160 --> 0:18:21.280
<v Speaker 1>could have made had he stuck around. However, based on

0:18:21.320 --> 0:18:23.359
<v Speaker 1>a little bit of information I can find about Cook,

0:18:23.640 --> 0:18:27.200
<v Speaker 1>who is a pretty private person overall. He did not

0:18:27.320 --> 0:18:30.280
<v Speaker 1>regret his decision to leave when he did. For one thing,

0:18:30.560 --> 0:18:34.320
<v Speaker 1>it didn't sound like money was of a super high

0:18:34.640 --> 0:18:37.520
<v Speaker 1>priority in his life. Like sure, money is nice, it's

0:18:37.520 --> 0:18:40.600
<v Speaker 1>good to have it, but he's not consumed with the

0:18:40.640 --> 0:18:43.960
<v Speaker 1>idea of constantly making more money. He's appears to have

0:18:44.000 --> 0:18:48.119
<v Speaker 1>more of an engineering bent, where he likes to recognize

0:18:48.160 --> 0:18:52.040
<v Speaker 1>problems and find ways to solve them. So he leaves

0:18:52.040 --> 0:18:56.879
<v Speaker 1>the company behind, and the founder has gone. By April seven,

0:18:56.920 --> 0:19:00.200
<v Speaker 1>not quite two years after the company started in the

0:19:00.240 --> 0:19:03.560
<v Speaker 1>first place, the new leadership decides to pick up stakes

0:19:03.600 --> 0:19:07.200
<v Speaker 1>from Dallas and relocate to a new headquarters. The new

0:19:07.200 --> 0:19:12.000
<v Speaker 1>home base of operations for Blockbuster would then be Fort Lauderdale, Florida,

0:19:12.320 --> 0:19:15.479
<v Speaker 1>so they move out from Dallas to Fort Lauderdale. By

0:19:15.520 --> 0:19:18.280
<v Speaker 1>the summer of nine seven, Blockbuster had grown into a

0:19:18.320 --> 0:19:23.160
<v Speaker 1>company with fifteen of its own stores and twenty franchised stores.

0:19:23.560 --> 0:19:26.760
<v Speaker 1>Some things would remain the same as when Cook ran things.

0:19:26.800 --> 0:19:29.879
<v Speaker 1>The standard rental period was three days, which is what

0:19:30.080 --> 0:19:33.040
<v Speaker 1>Cook had established. Stores would open at ten am, they

0:19:33.040 --> 0:19:35.520
<v Speaker 1>would close at midnight. There was another thing that Cook

0:19:35.560 --> 0:19:38.399
<v Speaker 1>had established, and people could rent more than one film

0:19:38.440 --> 0:19:41.119
<v Speaker 1>at a time. Other interesting things that Cook had learned

0:19:41.640 --> 0:19:43.920
<v Speaker 1>and that the new owners were able to leverage to

0:19:44.000 --> 0:19:48.280
<v Speaker 1>greater effect held some surprising data. For one thing, seventy

0:19:48.359 --> 0:19:53.280
<v Speaker 1>percent of rentals were of non hit films. There were

0:19:53.280 --> 0:19:56.439
<v Speaker 1>movies that didn't receive a wide release, or some that

0:19:56.560 --> 0:19:59.679
<v Speaker 1>received no theatrical release at all, and that encouraged the

0:19:59.680 --> 0:20:02.400
<v Speaker 1>company to follow Cook's example and make sure that new

0:20:02.520 --> 0:20:05.359
<v Speaker 1>video stores, whenever they would open one up, would have

0:20:05.400 --> 0:20:09.600
<v Speaker 1>a broad spectrum of titles across all genres. To capitalize

0:20:09.640 --> 0:20:12.360
<v Speaker 1>on that trend, the company also made it a practice

0:20:12.400 --> 0:20:16.080
<v Speaker 1>to choose its locations very carefully. They would scout out

0:20:16.080 --> 0:20:19.560
<v Speaker 1>potential neighborhoods, not just to find a good storefront space,

0:20:19.600 --> 0:20:21.280
<v Speaker 1>you know, not just to say, oh, well, this this

0:20:21.400 --> 0:20:24.720
<v Speaker 1>land real estate here is ideal for us. But also

0:20:25.160 --> 0:20:26.960
<v Speaker 1>they wanted to get a really good understanding of the

0:20:26.960 --> 0:20:30.760
<v Speaker 1>demographics of the neighborhood because that would influence the choices

0:20:30.840 --> 0:20:33.679
<v Speaker 1>the company would make for the inventory held by that store.

0:20:34.000 --> 0:20:35.679
<v Speaker 1>So if you go to a location and has a

0:20:35.760 --> 0:20:41.159
<v Speaker 1>really large immigrant population, then you might include more foreign

0:20:41.200 --> 0:20:45.720
<v Speaker 1>films that represent the demographics of that area better, so

0:20:45.800 --> 0:20:49.480
<v Speaker 1>that if there's let's say there's a large Russian population

0:20:49.720 --> 0:20:51.800
<v Speaker 1>in a town, you might want to try and get

0:20:51.840 --> 0:20:54.439
<v Speaker 1>as much Russian cinema as possible because you're going to

0:20:54.520 --> 0:20:58.000
<v Speaker 1>appeal to the folks who live in that area. And

0:20:58.119 --> 0:21:00.720
<v Speaker 1>one of their big decision the company directors made was

0:21:00.800 --> 0:21:04.800
<v Speaker 1>that the video store would not carry X rated films. Uh.

0:21:04.840 --> 0:21:08.560
<v Speaker 1>They decided they definitely wanted a family friendly company, a

0:21:08.600 --> 0:21:12.639
<v Speaker 1>family oriented business, so that was right out. And in

0:21:12.680 --> 0:21:16.399
<v Speaker 1>the video rental days, there frequently were video rental stores

0:21:16.440 --> 0:21:19.919
<v Speaker 1>that would have a a surreptitious curtain hung up in

0:21:19.960 --> 0:21:22.720
<v Speaker 1>the store and behind that was where all the the

0:21:22.880 --> 0:21:26.480
<v Speaker 1>X rated material was. Blockbuster said, we're not doing that

0:21:26.520 --> 0:21:29.760
<v Speaker 1>at all. That's totally against what we're gonna stand for,

0:21:30.160 --> 0:21:34.560
<v Speaker 1>so we won't even entertain that thought. And then Wazinga

0:21:34.720 --> 0:21:38.399
<v Speaker 1>directed his new company to expand in that old, tried

0:21:38.600 --> 0:21:43.560
<v Speaker 1>and true way by buying up competition. Why open new

0:21:43.640 --> 0:21:46.760
<v Speaker 1>stores if you can buy existing ones. Although to be fair,

0:21:46.800 --> 0:21:50.480
<v Speaker 1>Blockbuster did both. They didn't just go out and acquire

0:21:50.520 --> 0:21:53.320
<v Speaker 1>other companies. They also opened up new stores of their own,

0:21:53.400 --> 0:21:57.920
<v Speaker 1>but they did do quite a bit of acquisitions. So

0:21:58.119 --> 0:22:01.040
<v Speaker 1>one thing that they started to do under Wazinga was

0:22:01.080 --> 0:22:04.400
<v Speaker 1>to try and buy back franchised stores. So the goal

0:22:04.480 --> 0:22:07.680
<v Speaker 1>was to reduce the number of franchises to of all

0:22:07.760 --> 0:22:11.600
<v Speaker 1>Blockbuster stores, so the company would operate the other six directly.

0:22:12.200 --> 0:22:16.399
<v Speaker 1>Wasazinga started acquiring regional chains of video rental stores, so

0:22:16.440 --> 0:22:18.840
<v Speaker 1>he would look for chains that held a strong position

0:22:19.040 --> 0:22:21.440
<v Speaker 1>in their local markets and then he would go out

0:22:21.480 --> 0:22:23.720
<v Speaker 1>and buy those So that way, instead of having to

0:22:23.880 --> 0:22:28.880
<v Speaker 1>go into a market and compete against an established uh rival,

0:22:29.400 --> 0:22:32.280
<v Speaker 1>they buy out the potential rival from the beginning and

0:22:32.320 --> 0:22:36.600
<v Speaker 1>then just take their place. So in March seven, Blockbuster

0:22:36.640 --> 0:22:40.000
<v Speaker 1>bought out a chain called Southern Video Partnership. In May

0:22:40.000 --> 0:22:44.000
<v Speaker 1>of that same year, they acquired Movies to Go Incorporated.

0:22:44.040 --> 0:22:47.240
<v Speaker 1>And that was just the beginning. By the end of

0:22:47.359 --> 0:22:51.240
<v Speaker 1>nineteen eight seven, Blockbuster had risen to become the fifth

0:22:51.480 --> 0:22:55.240
<v Speaker 1>largest video chain by revenue and they operated one hundred

0:22:55.440 --> 0:22:59.920
<v Speaker 1>thirty three stores. Wasazinga also planned for the future. Blow

0:23:00.119 --> 0:23:04.600
<v Speaker 1>Buster built an enormous distribution center in Dallas. This huge

0:23:04.680 --> 0:23:08.240
<v Speaker 1>warehouse building, and it was essentially a videotape warehouse. It

0:23:08.320 --> 0:23:10.760
<v Speaker 1>held industry so that a store would be able to

0:23:10.880 --> 0:23:15.600
<v Speaker 1>ramp up almost instantaneously. Essentially, Blockbuster would be able to

0:23:15.640 --> 0:23:19.359
<v Speaker 1>choose a location for a new store, secure that location

0:23:19.760 --> 0:23:21.840
<v Speaker 1>to a build out for the store, and as soon

0:23:21.880 --> 0:23:24.280
<v Speaker 1>as it was ready they could stock it. They could

0:23:24.359 --> 0:23:27.399
<v Speaker 1>fill the shelves because they had this big distribution center

0:23:27.880 --> 0:23:31.879
<v Speaker 1>that held massive numbers of tapes that were representative of

0:23:31.960 --> 0:23:36.720
<v Speaker 1>multiple stores worth of inventory. In March was Zinga led

0:23:36.760 --> 0:23:40.159
<v Speaker 1>the charge to acquire another video rental company called Video

0:23:40.359 --> 0:23:44.640
<v Speaker 1>Library Incorporated, which was based out of San Diego, California,

0:23:44.760 --> 0:23:48.440
<v Speaker 1>and had forty three locations at the time of the acquisition.

0:23:48.600 --> 0:23:52.600
<v Speaker 1>Blockbuster paid six point for million dollars in cash plus

0:23:52.640 --> 0:23:57.159
<v Speaker 1>some stock, and then in April night Blockbuster partnered with

0:23:57.200 --> 0:24:01.159
<v Speaker 1>a company called the United Cable Television Corporation or U

0:24:01.320 --> 0:24:04.800
<v Speaker 1>See t C, and you See TC would help Blockbuster

0:24:04.920 --> 0:24:08.320
<v Speaker 1>open one hundred franchised stores over the course of nearly

0:24:08.359 --> 0:24:11.720
<v Speaker 1>three years. You See t C also purchased twenty percent

0:24:11.880 --> 0:24:16.120
<v Speaker 1>of ownership and Blockbuster, although they would not retain all

0:24:16.160 --> 0:24:19.439
<v Speaker 1>of that percentage that stake over the years. By the

0:24:19.560 --> 0:24:23.359
<v Speaker 1>end of Night, Blockbuster Video had more than four hundred

0:24:23.400 --> 0:24:26.920
<v Speaker 1>stores and was already the largest video chain rental company

0:24:26.960 --> 0:24:30.359
<v Speaker 1>in the United States. So it hit number one status

0:24:31.080 --> 0:24:35.280
<v Speaker 1>just three years after it launched, and just really just

0:24:35.440 --> 0:24:39.280
<v Speaker 1>one year after Whazinga took over, and it was still

0:24:39.320 --> 0:24:42.680
<v Speaker 1>getting bigger. To celebrate the new year, in nine nine,

0:24:42.720 --> 0:24:45.440
<v Speaker 1>Blockbuster made another big move. They made a bid for

0:24:45.480 --> 0:24:48.159
<v Speaker 1>a company called Major Video, which was based out of

0:24:48.240 --> 0:24:51.520
<v Speaker 1>Las Vegas, Nevada. Major Video was the fourth largest video

0:24:51.560 --> 0:24:53.960
<v Speaker 1>rental company in the United States, and the deal was

0:24:54.000 --> 0:24:57.160
<v Speaker 1>made official for ninety two and a half million dollars.

0:24:57.640 --> 0:25:00.359
<v Speaker 1>Blockbuster kept buying up competitors and company is that we're

0:25:00.520 --> 0:25:05.080
<v Speaker 1>running Blockbuster franchises and brought those stores back under the

0:25:05.080 --> 0:25:08.840
<v Speaker 1>direct control of Blockbuster Corporate. By the end of nine

0:25:10.040 --> 0:25:13.719
<v Speaker 1>just two years after Wazinga and his crew took over operations,

0:25:14.080 --> 0:25:18.520
<v Speaker 1>Blockbuster had grown to more than seven stores, sales had tripled,

0:25:18.720 --> 0:25:22.280
<v Speaker 1>and profits were almost four times larger than they had

0:25:22.320 --> 0:25:25.959
<v Speaker 1>been before Wazinga came on board. The company's market value

0:25:26.119 --> 0:25:30.080
<v Speaker 1>was seven times more than it had been before he

0:25:30.119 --> 0:25:34.200
<v Speaker 1>came on board. And then the company hit a little roadblock.

0:25:35.080 --> 0:25:38.199
<v Speaker 1>This is what we call a cliffhanger. I'll tell you

0:25:38.240 --> 0:25:40.439
<v Speaker 1>what that roadblock was in just a second, but first

0:25:40.640 --> 0:25:52.439
<v Speaker 1>let's take another quick break to thank our sponsors. So

0:25:52.520 --> 0:25:56.080
<v Speaker 1>that roadblock came in the form of a financial analysis

0:25:56.119 --> 0:26:00.679
<v Speaker 1>report which accused Blockbuster management of engaging in some misleading

0:26:00.960 --> 0:26:05.879
<v Speaker 1>or maybe even shady accounting. According to the report, Blockbuster

0:26:06.040 --> 0:26:09.679
<v Speaker 1>was hiding its expenses by spreading them out over long

0:26:09.800 --> 0:26:12.720
<v Speaker 1>time frames. The company would end up spreading out the

0:26:12.760 --> 0:26:17.560
<v Speaker 1>cost of acquiring and building stores over a forty year period.

0:26:17.880 --> 0:26:20.480
<v Speaker 1>The implication there was that the company was planning on

0:26:20.600 --> 0:26:24.680
<v Speaker 1>operating those businesses for at least forty years to generate

0:26:24.720 --> 0:26:28.040
<v Speaker 1>revenue to cover those costs. And Blockbuster was also spreading

0:26:28.040 --> 0:26:31.240
<v Speaker 1>out the cost of actual video tapes. They said, well,

0:26:31.600 --> 0:26:35.080
<v Speaker 1>we're paying for video tapes over a three year period,

0:26:35.160 --> 0:26:38.360
<v Speaker 1>so when we make a big purchase, we are giving

0:26:38.400 --> 0:26:42.200
<v Speaker 1>ourselves three years to recover that. Now, according to the

0:26:42.320 --> 0:26:45.840
<v Speaker 1>analyst who wrote this report, that was not realistic because

0:26:45.880 --> 0:26:48.160
<v Speaker 1>a three year old tape would not hold the same

0:26:48.280 --> 0:26:51.399
<v Speaker 1>value as a new tape and not generate as much revenue,

0:26:51.480 --> 0:26:57.240
<v Speaker 1>So you would see a decreased or diminished returns on rentals. Right,

0:26:57.720 --> 0:27:01.080
<v Speaker 1>you make a video of allable, and if it's a

0:27:01.119 --> 0:27:04.879
<v Speaker 1>new film, it might be very much sought after over

0:27:05.520 --> 0:27:07.600
<v Speaker 1>the course of the first couple of months of it

0:27:07.640 --> 0:27:10.560
<v Speaker 1>being out, but that would start to taper off. And

0:27:10.600 --> 0:27:14.080
<v Speaker 1>it was true that a large percentage of rentals were

0:27:14.119 --> 0:27:17.640
<v Speaker 1>coming from smaller films, but it didn't mean that the

0:27:17.680 --> 0:27:21.920
<v Speaker 1>same smaller film was constantly being rented, right. A single

0:27:21.960 --> 0:27:25.040
<v Speaker 1>title might only get rented once or twice a month.

0:27:25.480 --> 0:27:29.400
<v Speaker 1>It's just collectively across all of those small films, there

0:27:29.520 --> 0:27:32.600
<v Speaker 1>was a lot of rentals going on. So the analyst

0:27:32.720 --> 0:27:35.679
<v Speaker 1>was saying, you can't just spread the cost of a

0:27:35.800 --> 0:27:39.800
<v Speaker 1>video over the course of three years, because it's making

0:27:39.800 --> 0:27:43.840
<v Speaker 1>too many assumptions. And you would say, you know, this

0:27:44.400 --> 0:27:46.280
<v Speaker 1>three year old tape is not going to have the

0:27:46.320 --> 0:27:49.359
<v Speaker 1>same value as a brand new tape, unless, of course,

0:27:49.400 --> 0:27:53.000
<v Speaker 1>the old tape was some sort of classic like I

0:27:53.080 --> 0:27:55.960
<v Speaker 1>don't know, Barry Gordy's The Last Dragon, and the brand

0:27:56.000 --> 0:27:59.679
<v Speaker 1>new tape was something not so classic, like Ernest goes

0:27:59.720 --> 0:28:03.119
<v Speaker 1>to Amp because that's an easy call. Right. But on

0:28:03.160 --> 0:28:07.560
<v Speaker 1>top of those charges that the analyst made against Blockbuster,

0:28:07.600 --> 0:28:11.040
<v Speaker 1>the report also stated that Blockbuster was relying heavily upon

0:28:11.080 --> 0:28:15.280
<v Speaker 1>the initial franchise fee for way too much of its revenue.

0:28:15.840 --> 0:28:19.760
<v Speaker 1>The report found that twenty eight percent of blockbusters revenues

0:28:20.160 --> 0:28:24.680
<v Speaker 1>came from these one time fees, so nearly a third

0:28:25.040 --> 0:28:28.080
<v Speaker 1>of all revenue that Blockbuster was making came from this

0:28:28.160 --> 0:28:31.679
<v Speaker 1>franchise fee that would be paid one time by each franchise.

0:28:32.040 --> 0:28:34.320
<v Speaker 1>In other words, in order to keep that amount of

0:28:34.320 --> 0:28:37.600
<v Speaker 1>revenue steady, you would have to open at least as

0:28:37.600 --> 0:28:42.640
<v Speaker 1>many franchises the next year. Right if you make of

0:28:42.680 --> 0:28:46.400
<v Speaker 1>your revenue from these one time fees. If you don't make,

0:28:46.480 --> 0:28:49.480
<v Speaker 1>if you don't open as many franchises or more the

0:28:49.520 --> 0:28:52.280
<v Speaker 1>following year, you're going to have a decrease in that

0:28:52.320 --> 0:28:54.680
<v Speaker 1>percentage of revenue and you need to make it up

0:28:54.760 --> 0:28:58.280
<v Speaker 1>somewhere else. So this would create a business plan that

0:28:58.320 --> 0:29:02.680
<v Speaker 1>was incredibly aggressive and probably unsustainable because at some point

0:29:02.720 --> 0:29:06.120
<v Speaker 1>you're gonna hit maximum market penetration. You're not going to

0:29:06.160 --> 0:29:10.920
<v Speaker 1>be able to open up more franchises because the market

0:29:10.960 --> 0:29:14.280
<v Speaker 1>would be saturated. There would already be enough franchises in

0:29:14.640 --> 0:29:18.040
<v Speaker 1>various regions, and there wouldn't be enough demand to open

0:29:18.160 --> 0:29:21.640
<v Speaker 1>up another one. So you can't count on one time

0:29:21.720 --> 0:29:25.200
<v Speaker 1>franchise fees to be a third of your revenue. It

0:29:25.320 --> 0:29:29.240
<v Speaker 1>was a short term strategy, according to this analyst, and

0:29:30.160 --> 0:29:33.160
<v Speaker 1>because it was making up such a significant percentage of revenue,

0:29:33.480 --> 0:29:37.520
<v Speaker 1>it was a big warning flag. Blockbuster had a prompt

0:29:37.640 --> 0:29:41.200
<v Speaker 1>response to this. Well. First of all, their stocks took

0:29:41.200 --> 0:29:45.360
<v Speaker 1>a hit their stock price debt because this report was

0:29:45.440 --> 0:29:50.200
<v Speaker 1>pretty damaging, but their swift response was this, I don't

0:29:50.240 --> 0:29:54.920
<v Speaker 1>care up. Management remained defiant. They refused to change the

0:29:54.960 --> 0:29:57.719
<v Speaker 1>way they operated. They said, this is how we do business,

0:29:57.800 --> 0:30:01.480
<v Speaker 1>and we're seeing a lot of success, So go for

0:30:01.560 --> 0:30:05.120
<v Speaker 1>a long walk off a short pier. Gradually, the stock

0:30:05.160 --> 0:30:11.000
<v Speaker 1>price recovered because sustainable or not, Blockbuster strategy was inflating

0:30:11.000 --> 0:30:15.600
<v Speaker 1>the company's value. So the company's value was increasing, even

0:30:15.640 --> 0:30:19.720
<v Speaker 1>if on the long term this strategy could not sustain itself.

0:30:20.120 --> 0:30:22.680
<v Speaker 1>Maybe someday that would all come crashing down, but in

0:30:22.680 --> 0:30:25.480
<v Speaker 1>the short term, Blockbuster stock look like a surefire ticket

0:30:25.480 --> 0:30:28.840
<v Speaker 1>to profits. The company was dominating the home video space,

0:30:29.080 --> 0:30:32.080
<v Speaker 1>and home video itself was performing like gangbusters. Not only

0:30:32.080 --> 0:30:34.800
<v Speaker 1>were people eager to get their hands on movies that

0:30:34.840 --> 0:30:37.560
<v Speaker 1>they might have missed during initial release, it also opened

0:30:37.640 --> 0:30:40.719
<v Speaker 1>up a new industry where studios could either choose to

0:30:40.800 --> 0:30:44.080
<v Speaker 1>offload titles to home video instead of going the theatrical

0:30:44.080 --> 0:30:48.880
<v Speaker 1>release route, or even purposefully make movies with the intent

0:30:49.000 --> 0:30:52.880
<v Speaker 1>of making them direct to video titles. Blockbuster had another

0:30:53.000 --> 0:30:57.960
<v Speaker 1>hiccup in November. That's so I got a backtrack a

0:30:58.000 --> 0:31:00.280
<v Speaker 1>little bit I mentioned earlier that they or at a

0:31:00.280 --> 0:31:06.280
<v Speaker 1>partnership with United Cable Television Corporation. Well in, United Cable

0:31:06.320 --> 0:31:12.000
<v Speaker 1>Television Corporation merged with United Artists Communications, Incorporated, and they

0:31:12.040 --> 0:31:17.040
<v Speaker 1>formed a new company called United Artists Entertainment, Incorporated, and

0:31:17.080 --> 0:31:22.320
<v Speaker 1>now United Artists was the largest shareholder of Blockbuster. Following

0:31:22.400 --> 0:31:26.640
<v Speaker 1>the merger between those two companies, United Cable Television Corporation

0:31:26.720 --> 0:31:32.040
<v Speaker 1>and United Artists Communications, United Artists wanted to restructure, right

0:31:32.080 --> 0:31:34.640
<v Speaker 1>they had just merged two companies together, and I said,

0:31:34.800 --> 0:31:37.240
<v Speaker 1>we need the streamline. We need to get rid of

0:31:37.280 --> 0:31:41.280
<v Speaker 1>any redundant departments or systems and find out what works

0:31:41.320 --> 0:31:45.120
<v Speaker 1>best for us as an entertainment company and streamline stuff.

0:31:45.480 --> 0:31:48.080
<v Speaker 1>Part of that meant selling off the twenty eight Blockbuster

0:31:48.160 --> 0:31:52.120
<v Speaker 1>franchises that the company owned and operated, and also divesting

0:31:52.160 --> 0:31:55.840
<v Speaker 1>itself of the shares it had of Blockbuster, which by

0:31:55.840 --> 0:31:58.760
<v Speaker 1>that time made up about twelve percent of all shares

0:31:58.960 --> 0:32:03.120
<v Speaker 1>in the company. That again raised questions about Blockbusters business plans.

0:32:03.120 --> 0:32:05.120
<v Speaker 1>Would the company be able to operate the way it

0:32:05.200 --> 0:32:09.960
<v Speaker 1>had been indefinitely or was this the tipping point? Managements

0:32:09.960 --> 0:32:14.320
<v Speaker 1>all one surefire solution to the challenges they were facing

0:32:15.360 --> 0:32:18.880
<v Speaker 1>because expansion in the United States was slowing quite a bit,

0:32:19.200 --> 0:32:21.840
<v Speaker 1>in part due to saturation. Right, there are a lot

0:32:21.880 --> 0:32:24.400
<v Speaker 1>of markets that already had enough video rental stores to

0:32:24.440 --> 0:32:27.720
<v Speaker 1>support that population. So growth in the United States was

0:32:27.760 --> 0:32:33.720
<v Speaker 1>getting increasingly challenging. But overseas markets presented huge opportunities. And

0:32:33.760 --> 0:32:36.640
<v Speaker 1>I've seen this happen with other companies, including companies I've

0:32:36.640 --> 0:32:39.920
<v Speaker 1>worked for, where a company reaches a really big size

0:32:39.960 --> 0:32:43.360
<v Speaker 1>within one country and then growth is just really hard

0:32:43.400 --> 0:32:46.160
<v Speaker 1>to do because you've already grown so much in your

0:32:46.160 --> 0:32:48.640
<v Speaker 1>home country you get you don't really have room to

0:32:48.680 --> 0:32:53.640
<v Speaker 1>get bigger. So investors still want to return on their investment, right,

0:32:53.640 --> 0:32:55.800
<v Speaker 1>they still want to make a profit from investing in

0:32:55.800 --> 0:32:58.959
<v Speaker 1>the company. That means that the company has to not

0:32:59.040 --> 0:33:02.160
<v Speaker 1>just do well in needs to grow year over year

0:33:02.320 --> 0:33:04.840
<v Speaker 1>in order for investors to get a return on that investment.

0:33:04.920 --> 0:33:07.880
<v Speaker 1>This is why we see so much emphasis on growth,

0:33:08.000 --> 0:33:11.040
<v Speaker 1>not just performance, but how much did you grow this

0:33:11.120 --> 0:33:15.040
<v Speaker 1>year compared to last year. So you are left with

0:33:15.120 --> 0:33:18.560
<v Speaker 1>some hard choices. You can try to create more customers

0:33:18.640 --> 0:33:21.800
<v Speaker 1>in your home country, but that gets more challenging the

0:33:21.880 --> 0:33:24.600
<v Speaker 1>longer you go, because the larger you get, the fewer

0:33:24.800 --> 0:33:27.760
<v Speaker 1>the smaller the pool is right, the fewer number of

0:33:27.840 --> 0:33:30.560
<v Speaker 1>non customers you have, and it gets harder and harder

0:33:30.600 --> 0:33:33.840
<v Speaker 1>to convince those to become customers. Sometimes it's impossible. Your

0:33:33.840 --> 0:33:37.040
<v Speaker 1>other choice is to try and expand into other countries,

0:33:37.240 --> 0:33:41.080
<v Speaker 1>and Blockbuster chose the foreign market strategy. John Melk, one

0:33:41.080 --> 0:33:44.240
<v Speaker 1>of the three investors who came over from Waste Management

0:33:44.240 --> 0:33:47.520
<v Speaker 1>back in n seven, traveled to the United Kingdom and

0:33:47.560 --> 0:33:52.600
<v Speaker 1>he opened up a British subsidiary of Blockbuster. The store

0:33:52.680 --> 0:33:55.800
<v Speaker 1>that he opened up in South London was called the Ritz,

0:33:56.400 --> 0:33:59.280
<v Speaker 1>and once again Blockbuster went on a really aggressive path

0:33:59.400 --> 0:34:03.680
<v Speaker 1>to open his many stores as possible. Before nine had ended,

0:34:04.200 --> 0:34:08.560
<v Speaker 1>Blockbuster had more than one thousand stores, and by June

0:34:08.560 --> 0:34:10.920
<v Speaker 1>they would have more than one thousand, two hundred stores

0:34:10.920 --> 0:34:14.080
<v Speaker 1>in the United States alone. So they were still opening

0:34:14.160 --> 0:34:18.200
<v Speaker 1>up locations very very quickly, and even though the United

0:34:18.200 --> 0:34:20.960
<v Speaker 1>States was a tougher market, they were still opening up

0:34:21.080 --> 0:34:25.200
<v Speaker 1>more stores there. The company also created ad campaign partnerships

0:34:25.400 --> 0:34:28.120
<v Speaker 1>with fast food restaurants, you know, make a night of it,

0:34:28.440 --> 0:34:30.520
<v Speaker 1>dinner in a movie, that kind of thing, And they

0:34:30.560 --> 0:34:33.719
<v Speaker 1>continued reaching out to new markets like Japan, while continuing

0:34:33.760 --> 0:34:36.399
<v Speaker 1>the old practice of gobbling up other video store chains,

0:34:36.400 --> 0:34:39.520
<v Speaker 1>particularly big ones that were struggling to compete with Blockbuster.

0:34:40.080 --> 0:34:42.759
<v Speaker 1>But while the company was growing in size, it was

0:34:42.800 --> 0:34:46.840
<v Speaker 1>seeing earnings growth decrease year over year, So it was growing,

0:34:47.000 --> 0:34:51.440
<v Speaker 1>but it was growing at a less accelerated rate. It's

0:34:51.480 --> 0:34:54.280
<v Speaker 1>hard to say, you know, you're you're not getting smaller,

0:34:54.480 --> 0:34:57.080
<v Speaker 1>You're just not getting as big as quickly. So the

0:34:57.160 --> 0:35:00.319
<v Speaker 1>video rental business look like it was losing some team.

0:35:00.640 --> 0:35:06.319
<v Speaker 1>In ninety eight, Blockbusters earnings were up one percent from

0:35:06.480 --> 0:35:11.719
<v Speaker 1>the nineteen eight seven numbers, so seven earnings increased by

0:35:11.800 --> 0:35:17.840
<v Speaker 1>one From eight to eighty nine earnings increased ninety three percent,

0:35:18.080 --> 0:35:21.720
<v Speaker 1>so a drop in the growth rate. They're still growing,

0:35:22.280 --> 0:35:26.880
<v Speaker 1>just not as fast. The numbers were even more dramatic,

0:35:27.440 --> 0:35:30.920
<v Speaker 1>so from eighty nine to ninety it was a forty

0:35:31.000 --> 0:35:33.840
<v Speaker 1>eight percent growth rate, So I went from one fourteen

0:35:34.040 --> 0:35:37.440
<v Speaker 1>to ninety three to forty eight. So each year that

0:35:37.520 --> 0:35:40.320
<v Speaker 1>was going by, the company was getting bigger by the

0:35:40.400 --> 0:35:42.440
<v Speaker 1>number of stores and the amount of money it was making,

0:35:42.960 --> 0:35:47.520
<v Speaker 1>but the earnings growth wasn't really keeping pace with the

0:35:47.560 --> 0:35:50.680
<v Speaker 1>expansion of the company, like they were opening up more

0:35:50.719 --> 0:35:55.280
<v Speaker 1>stores and more franchises, but it was a diminishing returns

0:35:55.320 --> 0:35:58.640
<v Speaker 1>on the amount of earnings. Wazinga had an interesting explanation

0:35:58.719 --> 0:36:01.400
<v Speaker 1>for the decline and growth. He said the Gulf War

0:36:01.640 --> 0:36:04.759
<v Speaker 1>was to blame. Specifically, he said people were watching the

0:36:04.800 --> 0:36:09.080
<v Speaker 1>news more frequently rather than watching movies, and so television

0:36:09.320 --> 0:36:11.960
<v Speaker 1>was sapping his customer base, at least that was his

0:36:12.040 --> 0:36:14.319
<v Speaker 1>take on it. So he's saying, no one's coming out

0:36:14.360 --> 0:36:16.560
<v Speaker 1>to rent a movie because they are glued to the

0:36:16.560 --> 0:36:18.560
<v Speaker 1>television to see what's going on with the Gulf. For

0:36:19.120 --> 0:36:23.080
<v Speaker 1>Blockbuster was starting to see some new competition. To pay

0:36:23.080 --> 0:36:25.120
<v Speaker 1>per view had been around for a bit, and on

0:36:25.239 --> 0:36:28.400
<v Speaker 1>demand content was just kind of getting started around this time,

0:36:28.800 --> 0:36:31.279
<v Speaker 1>but they were starting to gain traction. And these were

0:36:31.400 --> 0:36:33.879
<v Speaker 1>very convenient offerings because there was no need to leave

0:36:33.920 --> 0:36:36.040
<v Speaker 1>the house to go get a tape or to return one,

0:36:36.280 --> 0:36:37.719
<v Speaker 1>and you didn't have to worry about late fee and

0:36:37.760 --> 0:36:39.960
<v Speaker 1>you didn't even have to rewind a videotape at the end.

0:36:40.640 --> 0:36:43.279
<v Speaker 1>Uh In the early days pay per view, you had

0:36:43.320 --> 0:36:46.160
<v Speaker 1>to tune in at a specific time. It wasn't on

0:36:46.320 --> 0:36:49.719
<v Speaker 1>demand early early on, but on demand was starting to

0:36:49.760 --> 0:36:54.120
<v Speaker 1>come out with things like satellite television. Management noticed this

0:36:54.800 --> 0:36:58.240
<v Speaker 1>and so some Blockbuster stores began offering new services beyond

0:36:58.360 --> 0:37:00.520
<v Speaker 1>video rental. You know, it wanted to so fi a

0:37:00.560 --> 0:37:03.959
<v Speaker 1>bit appeal to a broader audience, a broader customer base.

0:37:04.360 --> 0:37:07.080
<v Speaker 1>So they started renting out video games and even video

0:37:07.120 --> 0:37:10.240
<v Speaker 1>game consoles like the Sega Genesis, and if You began

0:37:10.320 --> 0:37:13.480
<v Speaker 1>to sell music, mostly in the form of audio cassettes

0:37:13.520 --> 0:37:17.600
<v Speaker 1>and then CDs. The company also changed its rental policies

0:37:17.680 --> 0:37:20.720
<v Speaker 1>for new movies, and this was an effort to increase

0:37:20.840 --> 0:37:26.080
<v Speaker 1>volume or increase the rate of rentals. So for brand

0:37:26.120 --> 0:37:29.920
<v Speaker 1>new movies, the idea was, we're gonna reduce the rental fee.

0:37:30.040 --> 0:37:32.080
<v Speaker 1>It's going to be cheaper to rent a brand new

0:37:32.120 --> 0:37:36.120
<v Speaker 1>movie than it is other films. However, the do date

0:37:36.400 --> 0:37:38.960
<v Speaker 1>is earlier, so you can rent a movie, a brand

0:37:38.960 --> 0:37:41.480
<v Speaker 1>new film that's just come out, and it's going to

0:37:41.600 --> 0:37:43.720
<v Speaker 1>be less money than it would be for something else,

0:37:43.920 --> 0:37:46.239
<v Speaker 1>but you have to return it to the store earlier.

0:37:46.800 --> 0:37:48.799
<v Speaker 1>And the idea here was that they would be able

0:37:48.840 --> 0:37:52.600
<v Speaker 1>to rent the same films out more frequently and keep

0:37:52.640 --> 0:37:55.680
<v Speaker 1>that revenue stream coming in. Blockbuster also began to look

0:37:55.680 --> 0:37:58.600
<v Speaker 1>around in the retail world for senior level executives with

0:37:58.640 --> 0:38:01.160
<v Speaker 1>a lot of experience in retail to bring them on board.

0:38:01.200 --> 0:38:04.200
<v Speaker 1>And enhance company leadership because you know, the guys who

0:38:04.200 --> 0:38:07.080
<v Speaker 1>were in charge, they all came from waste management. They

0:38:07.120 --> 0:38:10.000
<v Speaker 1>wanted to find other people who had this bigger, big

0:38:10.080 --> 0:38:14.680
<v Speaker 1>experience with bigger retail companies to help advise UH the

0:38:14.800 --> 0:38:19.360
<v Speaker 1>senior level of management. By Blockbuster head stores, numerous countries

0:38:19.760 --> 0:38:25.919
<v Speaker 1>including Spain, Venezuela, Japan, New Zealand, and more. Phillips Electronics

0:38:26.080 --> 0:38:29.400
<v Speaker 1>would invest more than sixty million dollars in Blockbuster in

0:38:30.360 --> 0:38:34.520
<v Speaker 1>and across the company. Blockbuster made one point five billion

0:38:34.600 --> 0:38:37.760
<v Speaker 1>dollars in sales. Now, that is a phenomenal amount of money.

0:38:37.800 --> 0:38:41.000
<v Speaker 1>One and a half billion dollars in sales. However, when

0:38:41.000 --> 0:38:44.400
<v Speaker 1>you look at earnings, while they sold one and a

0:38:44.440 --> 0:38:48.720
<v Speaker 1>half billion dollars worth of product, they earned only eighty

0:38:48.800 --> 0:38:53.280
<v Speaker 1>nine million dollars out of one point five billion in sales.

0:38:54.440 --> 0:38:57.680
<v Speaker 1>That's amazing. You know, to to have a one point

0:38:57.680 --> 0:39:01.239
<v Speaker 1>five billion in sales, but you're earnings are eighty nine

0:39:01.280 --> 0:39:05.120
<v Speaker 1>million dollars. That shows that this was a very expensive

0:39:05.280 --> 0:39:08.280
<v Speaker 1>business to be in. The those upfront costs of opening

0:39:08.360 --> 0:39:12.760
<v Speaker 1>up those stores. The acquisition cost was incredibly high, so

0:39:13.040 --> 0:39:17.240
<v Speaker 1>was Zinga and Company. They were really growing very quickly

0:39:18.160 --> 0:39:23.160
<v Speaker 1>but they weren't making that much money once you factored

0:39:23.160 --> 0:39:26.239
<v Speaker 1>in all the costs. Compared comparatively speaking, I mean a

0:39:26.360 --> 0:39:28.759
<v Speaker 1>nine million dollars is still a huge amount of money,

0:39:28.960 --> 0:39:32.240
<v Speaker 1>it's just dwarfed by one point five billion dollars in sales.

0:39:34.000 --> 0:39:37.640
<v Speaker 1>Blockbuster would make more acquisitions and video rental stores. No surprise,

0:39:37.680 --> 0:39:40.760
<v Speaker 1>they're same as it ever was. But the company also

0:39:41.000 --> 0:39:45.120
<v Speaker 1>entered a new phase. It acquired companies called Music Plus

0:39:45.200 --> 0:39:49.400
<v Speaker 1>and Sound Warehouse. This warehouse is spelled w H E

0:39:49.600 --> 0:39:52.920
<v Speaker 1>R E. And this was an effort to expand Blockbuster

0:39:53.000 --> 0:39:56.920
<v Speaker 1>into a multimedia company that not only rented videos but

0:39:57.040 --> 0:40:00.799
<v Speaker 1>also would act as a music store, so expanding that

0:40:01.400 --> 0:40:04.960
<v Speaker 1>cassette tape and CD business they had started earlier. Blockbuster

0:40:05.000 --> 0:40:08.480
<v Speaker 1>also foreigned a partnership with Virgin Group. That's the UK

0:40:08.680 --> 0:40:13.880
<v Speaker 1>company that uh, it's a big media company over in England.

0:40:14.160 --> 0:40:17.520
<v Speaker 1>And the goal was to create mega stores. Was Zinga

0:40:17.560 --> 0:40:20.680
<v Speaker 1>had a vision of these huge box stores that you

0:40:20.680 --> 0:40:24.080
<v Speaker 1>would go into, kind of like the big electronics or

0:40:24.160 --> 0:40:28.000
<v Speaker 1>big media stores things like think about Best Buy or

0:40:28.080 --> 0:40:30.920
<v Speaker 1>Circuit City something like that, but really big store and

0:40:30.960 --> 0:40:33.399
<v Speaker 1>it would offer not just video rentals, but it would

0:40:33.400 --> 0:40:37.040
<v Speaker 1>also sell stuff like that might sell movies, computer software,

0:40:37.160 --> 0:40:41.400
<v Speaker 1>video games, music, and even have like an an Arcade

0:40:41.560 --> 0:40:47.760
<v Speaker 1>type experience with virtual reality attractions. That was his idea,

0:40:48.440 --> 0:40:52.719
<v Speaker 1>and he had sort of a prototype open up in Florida,

0:40:52.800 --> 0:40:55.080
<v Speaker 1>but it never really took off the way he had

0:40:55.080 --> 0:40:58.640
<v Speaker 1>planned the way. Zinga also had a interesting idea that

0:40:58.680 --> 0:41:04.080
<v Speaker 1>foreshadowed the digital media age. He ended up starting a

0:41:04.120 --> 0:41:07.000
<v Speaker 1>project with IBM. He worked with folks over at IBM.

0:41:07.040 --> 0:41:10.919
<v Speaker 1>He wanted them to develop a system that would burn

0:41:11.080 --> 0:41:14.400
<v Speaker 1>music tracks to a CD very very fast. And the

0:41:14.440 --> 0:41:17.760
<v Speaker 1>idea he had was that customers would come into his store,

0:41:18.120 --> 0:41:19.440
<v Speaker 1>they would be able to go to up to this

0:41:19.520 --> 0:41:22.520
<v Speaker 1>machine and they would be able to browse through a

0:41:22.640 --> 0:41:26.359
<v Speaker 1>huge digital database of songs, and then they'd be able

0:41:26.400 --> 0:41:29.360
<v Speaker 1>to select songs from that digital database, which would then

0:41:29.400 --> 0:41:31.560
<v Speaker 1>get burned to this c D. You would get a

0:41:31.640 --> 0:41:35.440
<v Speaker 1>custom mixed c D made up of the tracks that

0:41:35.520 --> 0:41:38.440
<v Speaker 1>you had chosen from all these different albums. As it

0:41:38.480 --> 0:41:41.480
<v Speaker 1>turned out, music studios were not too keen on that idea,

0:41:41.760 --> 0:41:46.080
<v Speaker 1>just as they would heartily resist the digital revolution in

0:41:46.160 --> 0:41:49.120
<v Speaker 1>music a couple of years later. Uh So, there was

0:41:49.160 --> 0:41:54.200
<v Speaker 1>a lot of of disagreement on that particular approach in

0:41:55.400 --> 0:41:59.040
<v Speaker 1>Blockbuster had more than three thousand, four hundred stores around

0:41:59.040 --> 0:42:01.399
<v Speaker 1>the world, and about the thousand of those were in

0:42:01.400 --> 0:42:05.680
<v Speaker 1>international markets. Wazinga purchased controlling shares in a movie and

0:42:05.719 --> 0:42:09.239
<v Speaker 1>television production studio called Republic Pictures. That one owned a

0:42:09.360 --> 0:42:12.480
<v Speaker 1>large library of films and TV series, and they also

0:42:12.640 --> 0:42:16.560
<v Speaker 1>bought nearly fifty of the shares in Spelling Entertainment. That's

0:42:16.560 --> 0:42:20.040
<v Speaker 1>a television production company. And that's set the ground for

0:42:20.080 --> 0:42:24.360
<v Speaker 1>what would happen in which we could call the beginning

0:42:24.520 --> 0:42:27.719
<v Speaker 1>of the end. In the next episode we will cover that.

0:42:28.080 --> 0:42:31.400
<v Speaker 1>We will talk about the death of Blockbuster, how it

0:42:31.520 --> 0:42:35.239
<v Speaker 1>went from this enormous peak, and we haven't hit peak

0:42:35.320 --> 0:42:40.280
<v Speaker 1>Blockbuster yet. It continues to grow unsteadily, but it continues

0:42:40.320 --> 0:42:43.800
<v Speaker 1>to grow until things kind of come to a crashing halt.

0:42:44.239 --> 0:42:46.040
<v Speaker 1>That will be in our next episode. If you have

0:42:46.160 --> 0:42:49.960
<v Speaker 1>any suggestions for future episodes of tech Stuff, whether it's

0:42:49.960 --> 0:42:53.399
<v Speaker 1>a company, a technology, a person in tech, maybe it's

0:42:53.400 --> 0:42:56.560
<v Speaker 1>just a specific product that you think needs to have

0:42:56.640 --> 0:42:59.440
<v Speaker 1>a good profile, let me know. Send me a message

0:42:59.480 --> 0:43:02.600
<v Speaker 1>the email I addresses tech Stuff at how stuff works

0:43:02.800 --> 0:43:06.120
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0:43:06.200 --> 0:43:08.360
<v Speaker 1>They handle at both of those is tech Stuff H.

0:43:08.560 --> 0:43:11.520
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0:43:11.600 --> 0:43:14.799
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0:43:14.840 --> 0:43:18.319
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0:43:19.280 --> 0:43:22.120
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0:43:22.160 --> 0:43:24.200
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0:43:24.200 --> 0:43:26.360
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0:43:26.560 --> 0:43:30.719
<v Speaker 1>which is awesome. And don't forget to follow our Instagram account.

0:43:31.120 --> 0:43:33.279
<v Speaker 1>And that's all for me today. I'll talk to you

0:43:33.320 --> 0:43:42.719
<v Speaker 1>again really soon for more on this and thousands of

0:43:42.719 --> 0:43:54.880
<v Speaker 1>other topics. Is that how stuff works dot com