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Speaker 1: Hey, everybody, Robert Evans here, and I wanted to let

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Speaker 1: you know this is a compiletion episode. So every episode

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Speaker 1: of the week that just happened is here in one

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Speaker 1: convenient and with somewhat less ads package for you to

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Speaker 1: listen to in a long stretch if you want. If

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Speaker 1: you've been listening to the episodes every day this week,

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Speaker 1: there's gotta be nothing new here for you, but you

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Speaker 1: can make your own decisions. Welcome to it could happen

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Speaker 1: here a podcast where we talk about things falling apart,

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Speaker 1: and this week we're talking about our ability to have

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Speaker 1: things that that don't get co opted by fascists falling apart. Garrison, Hello,

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Speaker 1: take us, take us away. Yes, So today we're going

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Speaker 1: to talk about kind of why maybe it's great not

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Speaker 1: to see any aesthetic ground to fascists anytime it's uncomfortable

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Speaker 1: to do. So we've brought on someone who I found

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Speaker 1: on Twitter who wrote a very very great article about

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Speaker 1: some kind of ongoing debate and drama around like anarchists

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Speaker 1: symbols um and fascists trying to use symbols um. But

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Speaker 1: I'm we are talking to a black ram. Hello, Hey,

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Speaker 1: I was I was things I'm I'm I'm actually I'm

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Speaker 1: actually doing okay, I've been I've been looking forward to

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Speaker 1: this chat for a while. So yes, if, um, if

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Speaker 1: people are unfamiliar, it looks like the past few weeks

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Speaker 1: people have really freaked out about an eight pointed star.

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Speaker 1: People really really seem concerned about it. Um. Yeah, this

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Speaker 1: has a lot tied in with what's been happening in

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Speaker 1: Ukraine because, as always happens when there's a new story

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Speaker 1: that has anything to do with the far right, um,

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Speaker 1: people got acquainted with some symbols that they had not

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Speaker 1: been aware of before, particularly the san and rad, which

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Speaker 1: is a common symbol that you'll see on members of

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Speaker 1: the as Off Battalion kind of some other far right

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Speaker 1: organization in Ukraine as well as elsewhere. You know, the

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Speaker 1: christ Church shooter wore a son and rad, and then

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Speaker 1: they started identifying all sorts of things that they felt

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Speaker 1: looked like son and rad's everywhere on the internet, and

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Speaker 1: things kind of spiraled from there. Well, and I think

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Speaker 1: there's actually a little bit more to it than that. Well,

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Speaker 1: we're gonna get into we're gonna get into black Ram's

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Speaker 1: article here shortly. But yeah, I kind of first one

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Speaker 1: just briefly go through. I think why it's this kind

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Speaker 1: of why this debate happened now, because the debate has

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Speaker 1: happened before, but it's never gotten this like intense. A

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Speaker 1: big part of this his tied to Russia's invasion of

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Speaker 1: Ukraine and everyone wanting to play like where's Waldo with

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Speaker 1: symbols being like can you spot the son and red

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Speaker 1: on the on the pictures of the as Off Battalion

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Speaker 1: UM and I think the other so like so everyone's

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Speaker 1: already kind of looking for symbols as like a fun game.

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Speaker 1: But the other thing that's kind of happening is because

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Speaker 1: of the Russia Dugan connection. Of Dugan's like a political

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Speaker 1: fascist writer who's a very influential inside Russia. UM. But

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Speaker 1: because of the Russia Dugan connection, some people are now

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Speaker 1: seeing Dugan's symbol, the Uration Square for the first time, right,

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Speaker 1: And now that they've seen the square, they're seeing anarchists

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Speaker 1: using the Chaos Star, which looks a little similar. They're

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Speaker 1: they're not the same, but they're because they just because

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Speaker 1: they just learned about the Uration Square, now they're seeing

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Speaker 1: the Chaos Star and they've never really noticed the castAR before.

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Speaker 1: Maybe they're they just don't really care about what symbols

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Speaker 1: random people use. But now that they see the uration

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Speaker 1: symbol and they see the chaostar, they're making this connection

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Speaker 1: here and they think this is a new development, right.

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Speaker 1: They think this is like like they're they're asking themselves like,

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Speaker 1: why are anarchists suddenly using this fascist symbol um, which

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Speaker 1: they either think to themselves or they think out loud

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Speaker 1: on Twitter dot com. Uh, which is really rich because

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Speaker 1: I mean, anarchists have been using the chaost are longer

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Speaker 1: than Dugan has been using his Uration square. And if

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Speaker 1: you have been watching anarchists for any amount of time

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Speaker 1: on the internet, I know you you would have seen

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Speaker 1: them using the chaos star. Uh. It's not it's not

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Speaker 1: a new development by any means. But because everyone's trying

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Speaker 1: to like wear's Waldo and oh sent their way through

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Speaker 1: the war, they're they're kind of drawing these false connections,

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Speaker 1: which is kind of unfortunate because because there is actually

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Speaker 1: some interesting things to talk about in terms of how

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Speaker 1: Doogan did kind of base his design off of Michael

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Speaker 1: Moorecox Chaos Star and a whole bunch of stuff around,

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Speaker 1: like why anarchists use the chaos star and you know,

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Speaker 1: there's a whole there's there's a nice debate to be

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Speaker 1: had there around fascists always in asserting themselves in these

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Speaker 1: subcultures and trying to gain ground, whether it be like

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Speaker 1: the punk scene, the industrial music scene, uh, you know

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Speaker 1: online gaming, right, fascists always trying to do this. Just

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Speaker 1: often we want to we try to push back on that, right,

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Speaker 1: like Nazia punks fuck off. But it seems specifically with

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Speaker 1: the Chaos Star, a whole bunch of people just want

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Speaker 1: to cave and let them kind of take this symbol,

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Speaker 1: which is I know, I think not not a not

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Speaker 1: a great instinct um, but to to kind of kind

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Speaker 1: of talk about this and other kind of background stuff,

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Speaker 1: like I said, we brought on a black ram Hello

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Speaker 1: to help to help talk about this. So yeah, what

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Speaker 1: kind of prompted you to write your article? I guess, uh,

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Speaker 1: you know, watching this debate kind of go down, what

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Speaker 1: what kind of actually just like what was what was

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Speaker 1: the straw that broke the camel's back? And being like, Okay,

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Speaker 1: now I need to write like a decently long article

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Speaker 1: on this topic. I think I've said this on like

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Speaker 1: on the on Twitter a little while before writing the

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Speaker 1: actual article, But I think the the spark was a

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Speaker 1: friend from a guy you may or may not have

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Speaker 1: seen him around. He's like somebody who's like, well demn

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Speaker 1: Stock but but but he has like anarchists leading on

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Speaker 1: his bio, which I guess sort of which I guess

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Speaker 1: sort of communicates the idea that he would probably like

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Speaker 1: anarchism if he did not consider it to be impractical. Sure. Yeah,

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Speaker 1: but anyways, I actually I kind of wavered on the

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Speaker 1: idea of covering it at all. I thought it would

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Speaker 1: I thought it would only go for like a few days,

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Speaker 1: and it was sort of a Johnny come Lately by

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Speaker 1: maybe a day or so, admittedly, but the figured it

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Speaker 1: would be sort of ephemeral. But there's things I sort

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Speaker 1: of kept seeing. But in the midst of writing it,

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Speaker 1: there was like some tanking who went even fervor and

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Speaker 1: made the link to the Chaos Star and I think

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Speaker 1: it was the logo of the Sith Empire from certain

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Speaker 1: Star Wars media. We'll talk about that like it's it's like, well,

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Speaker 1: it's like, well, one has six lines and they're not

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Speaker 1: even arrows. They're just like blocks in like a sort

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Speaker 1: of hexagonal shape. But it's like the same guys really

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Speaker 1: like the idea that the logo of the Ukrainian Armed

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Speaker 1: Forces is actually the iron cross. Yeah. A big chunk

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Speaker 1: of this, I think kind of the prehistory of why

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Speaker 1: this became such a specific problem started with kind of

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Speaker 1: Unite the Right in the period after that, where you

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Speaker 1: had all these new fascist groups on the ground of

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Speaker 1: the United States and they all had their symbols, and

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Speaker 1: you know, I was a part of this to to

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Speaker 1: to the degree that there's some culpability here. Um, a

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Speaker 1: number of researchers, including myself, we're warning people like, hey,

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Speaker 1: there's some like symbols that people are are taking to

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Speaker 1: right wing gatherings and they're claiming to be normal conservatives,

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Speaker 1: and these are these are symbols of groups like the

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Speaker 1: Phineest Priesthood or groups like different kind of fascist organizations,

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Speaker 1: and you might not be aware of them, and so

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Speaker 1: you should know what kind of these, you know, the

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Speaker 1: Khakistan flag or whatever means, because people are trying to

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Speaker 1: kind of signpost their sympathy to these extreme groups. And

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Speaker 1: that I think that was important because those people were

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Speaker 1: legitimate problems, and um, they were trying to kind of

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Speaker 1: stealthily hide they're very radical right wing sympathies behind some

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Speaker 1: like obscure images. But the problem is that it got

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Speaker 1: a lot of people looking not just looking for fascist

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Speaker 1: symbols and everything, but also looking for the clout that

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Speaker 1: comes from like pointing something like that out. And I

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Speaker 1: think that's that's kind of the root of a lot

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Speaker 1: of these these problems. And it's not surprising that it

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Speaker 1: happened with Dugan's symbol that there's no absolutely not um

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Speaker 1: because it does, like, again, if you're just like kind

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Speaker 1: of a casual observer, it does look a lot like

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Speaker 1: the chaos star and it makes its point and star

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Speaker 1: with arrows, yeah, and it makes If you know anything

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Speaker 1: about Dugan's philosophy, Alexander Dugan is a essentially a Russian

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Speaker 1: political theorist and author. Um. There's a lot that's kind

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Speaker 1: of said about how close he is to Putin. He

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Speaker 1: certainly was at one point closer to Putin. There's a

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Speaker 1: lot of debate as to whether or not Putin kind

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Speaker 1: of saw him as more of like a useful uh

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Speaker 1: person to kind of a useful propaganda Oregan, or whether

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Speaker 1: or not he really bought into what Dugan was saying.

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Speaker 1: But Dugan is and was a really big advocate of

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Speaker 1: like what he called like multipolar um international politics, multipolarity,

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Speaker 1: which is this idea that like the United States should

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Speaker 1: not be a the hegemonic power in the world right,

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Speaker 1: which it kind of was after the fall of the

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Speaker 1: Soviet units. This idea that there should be a bunch

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Speaker 1: of equivalent powers um, which is number one. You can

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Speaker 1: see how a lot of folks on the left would

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Speaker 1: be drawn in by that, even if they weren't particularly

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Speaker 1: fans of putin just the idea that like, oh well, yeah,

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Speaker 1: it's it's been a problem that the United States, it's

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Speaker 1: this massive hegemonic power. Perhaps it would be better if

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Speaker 1: there were a bunch of equivalent powers um. And and

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Speaker 1: it's one of those things where there's a logic to that,

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Speaker 1: but it does kind of require ignoring all of the

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Speaker 1: times in the past when we had a multipolar world

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Speaker 1: and there was tremendous violence. There's a root error in

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Speaker 1: this sort of pathway which sort of like refuses to

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Speaker 1: deal with imperialism as a global system. Yeah. The reason

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Speaker 1: that's a hang up is because once you once you

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Speaker 1: think of imperialism as a global system, you you then

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Speaker 1: have to move on to the idea that it a

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Speaker 1: global system that then has to be dismantled globally. Yeah,

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Speaker 1: you can't quite do that with capita because it implicates

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Speaker 1: nations that are supposed to serve as like moments of

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Speaker 1: world historic progress against like hegemonic capitalism, and it is

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Speaker 1: one of those spooks of the mind that people kind

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Speaker 1: of have to do away with well, which the Adicist

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Speaker 1: movement sort of does pretty successfully, because that mostly comes

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Speaker 1: from the fact that it starts off from the position

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Speaker 1: of like the state as an actual sort of structural presence.

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Speaker 1: It's sort of funny that, like the Marxist argument is

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Speaker 1: usually down to like hyper focus on the state and

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Speaker 1: hierarchy is idealist, which is odd when you consider that

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Speaker 1: hierarchy and the state are very much material in the

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Speaker 1: same way that capitalism itself is. So it's like it's

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Speaker 1: it feels more like a sort of argument that's like, well,

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Speaker 1: my materialism is the materialism, Your materialism is in fact

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Speaker 1: a form of idealism. I think with with that, we're

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Speaker 1: gonna go on a quick a quick quick head break,

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Speaker 1: and then we're gonna come back. And I think we

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Speaker 1: should probably now talk about like the origins of the

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Speaker 1: Chaos Star and and Michael Moorecock and discordionism um, and

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Speaker 1: then we'll kind of get into the kind of current

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Speaker 1: current debate on it. Uh some more so anyway, here's

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Speaker 1: here's here's some here's some ads for your ears coming

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Speaker 1: in through the ear waves. Oh yeah, yeah, it's time.

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Speaker 1: It's time to talk about more time for more so. Um,

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Speaker 1: I guess, uh black Crab you you actually did a

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Speaker 1: pretty good insistinct kind of things on how the Chaos

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Speaker 1: Star came into being, initially via Michael Moorecock. Do you

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Speaker 1: want it to just like as brief briefly talk about

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Speaker 1: kind of how he came up with the symbol for

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Speaker 1: his books and stuff. Okay, so full disclosure, I haven't

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Speaker 1: really read books themselves. I've read some Michael Moorecock. A

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Speaker 1: lot of what a lot of my familiarity from him

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Speaker 1: is pretty secondhand. One of the main things of that

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Speaker 1: is Serifungal being like this, this sort of eighties band

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Speaker 1: that I sort of think back to. Their whole vibe

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Speaker 1: is more Cox works. But but but anyways, the reason

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Speaker 1: why the Chaos Star is the shape that it is

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Speaker 1: is because what it's supposed to represent is meant to

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Speaker 1: extend outward endlessly. Yeah, the counter symbol for order is

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Speaker 1: a single a single upward pointing arrow voted with Funny enough.

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Speaker 1: When I thought about that, I thought about the twas

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Speaker 1: room or like tear. It doesn't really have to say meaning,

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Speaker 1: but it's like upward pointing arrow in a symbolic context.

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Speaker 1: That's the other example I have. But but that upward

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Speaker 1: pointing arrow significies a straight and narrow expression of where

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Speaker 1: possibility goes, where potential sort of goes, which create structure.

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Speaker 1: The other the chaos Star, by contrast, has like the

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Speaker 1: eight directions are meant to represent all directions in a

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Speaker 1: circular sort of space, like a compass of sorts, and

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Speaker 1: the energy and the potential and possibility goes out and

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Speaker 1: all of them. We have no set path, no definite limit,

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Speaker 1: no boundaries. It just goes. It just sort of goes

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Speaker 1: out there. It's little wonder why the chaos magic movement

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Speaker 1: embraced it for a very similar set of reasons. Yes,

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Speaker 1: it's even because even though it is kind of a

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Speaker 1: myth that there's absolutely no rules in chaos magic, what

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Speaker 1: is true is that you can explore very a very

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Speaker 1: very broad and like almost limitless range of like practical

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Speaker 1: possibilities within that movement and that sort of within that

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Speaker 1: sort of frame. It's a it's a very like post structuralist,

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Speaker 1: post modern view of it. But this modern is how

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Speaker 1: I've heard it described. And kind of getting back to

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Speaker 1: the like what Morecock was in brief, because I do

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Speaker 1: you think we need to kind of give an overview

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Speaker 1: of who he is. Um, he's still alive. Um, last

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Speaker 1: I checked. At least he's alive. I I heard him

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Speaker 1: talking at an anarchist sci fi conference a few weeks ago.

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Speaker 1: If you didn't immediately know who he was, he is

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Speaker 1: the most influential fantasy author you have not heard of?

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Speaker 1: He he he is like a George RR. Martin level

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Speaker 1: of influence, if not significantly more so. Like he's he

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Speaker 1: some people will say he's the most influential fantasy author

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Speaker 1: since Tolkien. UM. And among his you've you've noted the

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Speaker 1: band Sirith Ungle if you've, if you've been a fan

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Speaker 1: of of any of the Warhammer games. Um, he's a

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Speaker 1: huge influence on that because the thing that he created

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Speaker 1: was kind of the the concept of chaos as a

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Speaker 1: sort of religious entity. And I'm not going to get

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Speaker 1: into like the depths of the lore in his books,

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Speaker 1: but a lot of it is about kind of the

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Speaker 1: struggle between order and chaos um and so the Chaos

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Speaker 1: Star he he created that specifically like for this kind

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Speaker 1: of theological like conflict that occurs throughout his books, and

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Speaker 1: it became the symbol of like one of the sides

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Speaker 1: in Warhammer, and this very like there's tens of thousands

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Speaker 1: of people who have the Chaos star tattooed on them,

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Speaker 1: not because of Warhammer, but or not because of any

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Speaker 1: political reason or because of chast Mensic, because they were

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Speaker 1: fans of like Warhammer forty or whatever. And it's interesting

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Speaker 1: because in the same time, when I first got into

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Speaker 1: anarchist political theory before long before I considered calling myself one,

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Speaker 1: it was because I came across a book published by

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Speaker 1: A k press Um I think I bought it in

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Speaker 1: two thousands seven called No Gods, No Masters, and it

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Speaker 1: was it's a collection. A lot of people have a

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Speaker 1: copy of this book in in their house if they're

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Speaker 1: into anarchist theory. It's like a collection of early anarchists,

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Speaker 1: like people like Prudon essays on like the kind of

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Speaker 1: the first wave of anarchist political theory and it has

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Speaker 1: a chaos star on the cover. UM because number one

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Speaker 1: Michael Moorecock identify is an anarchist. Um is a is

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Speaker 1: a uh like as a like is both an author

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Speaker 1: and someone who identifies as an anarchistic and yeah politically,

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Speaker 1: and so his books had were particularly popular among anarchists, um,

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Speaker 1: who don't always get a lot of chunks of pop

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Speaker 1: culture to themselves. UM. And so he's he's. It was

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Speaker 1: kind of from the beginning, both this nerdy fantasy symbol

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Speaker 1: that you could see, you could you could put alongside

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Speaker 1: a bunch of different ships from the Lord of the Rings.

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Speaker 1: Not that I love the Lord of the Rings, but

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Speaker 1: like you could see it as like like like somebody

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Speaker 1: having a tattoo in Elvish. But it also took on

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Speaker 1: almost immediately this dual meaning where it was actually representing

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Speaker 1: aspects of anarchist political theory, and so it was put

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Speaker 1: in printed on like books that were about political theory

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Speaker 1: and had nothing to do with fantasy. So it's I

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Speaker 1: can't actually I cannot actually think of another symbol with

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Speaker 1: a similar pedigree. It's it's a really pretty unique case.

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Speaker 1: It is. It is because it's it's less of like

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Speaker 1: an anarchist symbol, but more a symbol created and used

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Speaker 1: by anarchists. Like it was like it was, it was,

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Speaker 1: it was, it was invented by an anarchist. It was.

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Speaker 1: It was a symbol invented by an anarchist to represent

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Speaker 1: something in fiction that had such resonance that people adopted

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Speaker 1: it as an actual political symbol. Yeah. It honestly, it

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Speaker 1: honestly doesn't require that much reach to see why people

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Speaker 1: who would why people who like the idea of there

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Speaker 1: being no hierarchy and no state, even if not total freedom,

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Speaker 1: there's still like the most range that you could get

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Speaker 1: that results in that negation. It doesn't take a lot

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Speaker 1: of elaboration to see why the symbol expressly meant for

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Speaker 1: the symbol of chaos would gain traction. Absolute. Absolutely, Yeah.

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Speaker 1: I was talking with Margaret Keilnjoy about this a while ago,

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Speaker 1: and she was like, yeah, like if you were in

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Speaker 1: the two thousands and then you were like a traveling

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Speaker 1: crust punk, at least like people would have chaostar tattoos,

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Speaker 1: because that's because that's like it's a yeah, expanding out

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Speaker 1: in all directions, you know, you're those the single arrow

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Speaker 1: is law and order. Instead, we're expanding out every in

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Speaker 1: every possible way. Yeah, I mean I have a cast

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Speaker 1: tattooed on me and I it's it's it's for primarily

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Speaker 1: ideological reasons, as opposed to the fact that I spent

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Speaker 1: my entire child with playing Warhammer of so, so yeah,

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Speaker 1: it's I think now, so it is worth mentioning. So

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Speaker 1: the cas star was invented in the sixties by Michael Morcock.

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Speaker 1: Of course there is There's been other eight pointed stars

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Speaker 1: over the course of thousands of years of history. Of

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Speaker 1: course it is it is. It is like a broad

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Speaker 1: like geometrical shape. Every kind of star has meant something, yes,

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Speaker 1: but the specific design was was made by Michael Morcock um.

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Speaker 1: And then because of because of more cocks like anarchist

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Speaker 1: tendencies in fiction, his work was used or at least

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Speaker 1: appreciated by a lot of the Discordians, which is also

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Speaker 1: popular around the sixties a lot of the situationists um.

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Speaker 1: And then as the Discordian situationist movement kind of morphed

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Speaker 1: and started to kind of intermingle with parts of occultism,

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Speaker 1: we have the chaos magic movement starting in the late seventies,

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Speaker 1: which started also using the the Chaos Star, which makes

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Speaker 1: sense because like what Robert you you were talking about

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Speaker 1: how it's like it's like it's almost like personifying chaos

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Speaker 1: as like a thing to worship um, which is actually

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Speaker 1: a big part of early chaos magic text is is

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Speaker 1: like like reveling in the idea of like chaos is

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Speaker 1: like a primordial god, which there's there's a lot of

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Speaker 1: primordial gods um in like the actual world, you know,

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Speaker 1: like if you look like through through histories of various cultures,

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Speaker 1: like chaos is one of the original primordial gods. So

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Speaker 1: it is there's a big part of that in early

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Speaker 1: chaos magic books about kind of looking at chaos as

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Speaker 1: this like this very ancient force that should be kind

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Speaker 1: of respected, and I think that that is of that

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Speaker 1: is a big part of why the chaos magicians started

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Speaker 1: using uh, the the Star. I mean, obviously there's a

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Speaker 1: lot of crossover between like sci fi writers like Robert

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Speaker 1: Anton Wilson Um and Michael Moorecock who then Robert Anton

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Speaker 1: Wilson was very influential in the chaos magic movement, so

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Speaker 1: you can see how this gets carried over from like

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Speaker 1: anarchist sci fi to chaos magic, and then because it's

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Speaker 1: in chaos magic, it gets way more visibility. So then

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Speaker 1: it starts then he starts seeing it inside more more

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Speaker 1: like underground anarchist scenes um. And then so around around

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Speaker 1: this time, Dugan was starting his political career, and he

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Speaker 1: was he was u was dabbling in a lot of

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Speaker 1: various like occult circles himself. Right now, he's he's more

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Speaker 1: of like a traditionalist, like a more like a Christian traditionalist.

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Speaker 1: That is kind of his primarily. That is like, is

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Speaker 1: that is his primary kind of a cult interest as

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Speaker 1: long as it can be called a cult. Yeah, it's

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Speaker 1: it's it's not it's not worth getting too much into

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Speaker 1: the weeds on on doing at this point, I think people,

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Speaker 1: I think it's it's it's worth it. Like like he

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Speaker 1: like he because he obviously did rip the he did

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Speaker 1: take inspiration from the Chaos Star to make his own

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Speaker 1: version of it. He's certainly because he was in those

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Speaker 1: same circles, a cultic leanings and and a degree of knowledge.

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Speaker 1: I think again, with a lot of things, a lot

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Speaker 1: of things about Dugan are overstated, including his closeness to

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Speaker 1: putin because he's this really easy in part because he's

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Speaker 1: like so prolific, and and there's a lot available on

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Speaker 1: him in English. It's really easy to kind of tie

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Speaker 1: everything happening in Russia to do him to him. Um. Yeah,

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Speaker 1: and I think that's kind of a degree of what's

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Speaker 1: happening here. There's a website I've forgotten the name of,

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Speaker 1: but I think it had like a bunch of like

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Speaker 1: online reproduction of Dugan's various writings from the nineties, all

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Speaker 1: sorts of weird shit about occultism and Yeah, and yet

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Speaker 1: I do think that there's a very obvious gulf between

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Speaker 1: the Dugan of that weird eccentric, like esoteric Nazi sort

395
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Speaker 1: of phase of like his relative youth versus today where

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Speaker 1: he frames his entire rationale for multiplorality as a kind

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Speaker 1: of Christian a Christian crusade against the hegemony that he

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Speaker 1: legitimately believes to be a Satanic fire. Yes, basically said that,

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Speaker 1: and it's not the only thing he considers satanic, like

400
00:22:05,960 --> 00:22:08,480
Speaker 1: like we should point out that like one of the

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Speaker 1: one of the main forces that were that we're going

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00:22:11,680 --> 00:22:15,400
Speaker 1: like against pussy Riot, where Eurasianists at that of that time,

403
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Speaker 1: and he called them like devils and witches and taught

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Speaker 1: his followers to show up with pitchforks. People in the

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Speaker 1: West don't really understand them. So you get guys like

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Speaker 1: when you get both Alexander Reid Ross describing him as

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Speaker 1: an adherent of chaos magic and some guy from the

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00:22:33,320 --> 00:22:36,240
Speaker 1: National Review referring to him as the leader of a

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00:22:36,240 --> 00:22:41,640
Speaker 1: satanic cult somehow. Yeah, and and boy, I mean, there's

410
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Speaker 1: a long history of people liking to flat liking to

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Speaker 1: flatten um fascist movements with an occultic tradition to just Satanism.

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Speaker 1: We're not gonna talk about that at length, but it

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Speaker 1: whenever whenever you hear people talking about a problem and

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00:22:57,000 --> 00:22:59,480
Speaker 1: like they reduce it to its satanists, you should be

415
00:22:59,520 --> 00:23:02,520
Speaker 1: a little on edge because usually they're wrong or at

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00:23:02,560 --> 00:23:06,399
Speaker 1: least incomplete um and they just have have kind of

417
00:23:06,480 --> 00:23:09,399
Speaker 1: over Anyway, we don't need to get terribly into that.

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Speaker 1: The only the only person I wanted to bring that

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Speaker 1: up is because like this is around the same time

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Speaker 1: that people that are fascists, we're trying to enter in

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Speaker 1: a lot of different politicals, like some cultures, whether it

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Speaker 1: be like the punk scene and industrial music, um, including

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Speaker 1: like the the occulture, because that that is like their

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Speaker 1: primary means, right, Like they try to like they are

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Speaker 1: an aesthetic driven movement, they try to cop to any

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Speaker 1: aesthetic and use it for their own gains and to

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Speaker 1: to kind of overlook the anarchist origins of this thing

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Speaker 1: just because fascists tried to cop it at some point.

429
00:23:41,880 --> 00:23:43,679
Speaker 1: I think it's very silly, because then, like, what are

430
00:23:43,720 --> 00:23:45,880
Speaker 1: you going to throw away all punk music like come

431
00:23:45,920 --> 00:23:49,600
Speaker 1: up or even like or even like crosses like, yeah,

432
00:23:49,680 --> 00:23:54,600
Speaker 1: a fascist still used variations of Christian crosses that still

433
00:23:54,680 --> 00:23:59,520
Speaker 1: have essentially political Christian meanings. But I'd probably still assume

434
00:23:59,600 --> 00:24:03,280
Speaker 1: that the majority of religious fascists do lean on some

435
00:24:03,359 --> 00:24:07,080
Speaker 1: kind of Christianity, And to the extent that there's neopagans involved,

436
00:24:07,520 --> 00:24:10,680
Speaker 1: there's sort of a minority. There's a couple of things

437
00:24:10,760 --> 00:24:12,600
Speaker 1: that this is. Like. One of them would be kind

438
00:24:12,600 --> 00:24:15,119
Speaker 1: of in the United States, fascist co option of of

439
00:24:15,480 --> 00:24:18,480
Speaker 1: the flag of the United States, which we can talk

440
00:24:18,520 --> 00:24:20,880
Speaker 1: a lot about like the fact that the United States

441
00:24:20,960 --> 00:24:24,480
Speaker 1: is an imperialist power um and the genocide is done

442
00:24:24,480 --> 00:24:29,320
Speaker 1: on under that flag without while still acknowledging that attempts

443
00:24:29,520 --> 00:24:32,159
Speaker 1: by fascist movements to co opt it as a purely

444
00:24:32,160 --> 00:24:36,199
Speaker 1: fascist symbol are problematic. In part because that symbol, the

445
00:24:36,280 --> 00:24:38,479
Speaker 1: United States flag, has a lot of power to a

446
00:24:38,480 --> 00:24:41,199
Speaker 1: lot of people. And so if you if the fascists

447
00:24:41,320 --> 00:24:46,119
Speaker 1: kind of co opted totally, um, that's a harmful thing.

448
00:24:46,280 --> 00:24:48,160
Speaker 1: That's a thing that can like allow them to get

449
00:24:48,200 --> 00:24:51,200
Speaker 1: their brain worms into more people. Which doesn't mean like

450
00:24:51,480 --> 00:24:53,960
Speaker 1: you should take and wave the US flag, but it

451
00:24:54,000 --> 00:24:57,280
Speaker 1: does mean that, like it's just a matter of don't

452
00:24:57,359 --> 00:25:01,919
Speaker 1: you don't have to let them take the ground, you know. Um.

453
00:25:01,960 --> 00:25:04,719
Speaker 1: And I think on a kind of a different angle.

454
00:25:05,000 --> 00:25:07,520
Speaker 1: One of the things I think about a lot is, uh,

455
00:25:07,640 --> 00:25:10,639
Speaker 1: the first time I went to India, seeing especially in

456
00:25:10,680 --> 00:25:13,880
Speaker 1: a large parts of India, you'll see swastika's hanging over

457
00:25:14,080 --> 00:25:16,440
Speaker 1: the doors of many, many houses all over the place.

458
00:25:16,480 --> 00:25:20,040
Speaker 1: You'll see them hanging from cars. They're they're constant things.

459
00:25:20,440 --> 00:25:24,000
Speaker 1: And it's only unsettling if you have allowed yourself to

460
00:25:24,040 --> 00:25:27,200
Speaker 1: forget that the swastika is a symbol that the Nazis

461
00:25:27,280 --> 00:25:30,560
Speaker 1: stole from another culture, co opted and invested with a

462
00:25:30,600 --> 00:25:36,479
Speaker 1: new meaning. Jan yeah, yeah, And why should people in

463
00:25:37,600 --> 00:25:39,399
Speaker 1: other parts of the world, who have been using it

464
00:25:39,400 --> 00:25:41,840
Speaker 1: for a totally different purpose for thousands of years, why

465
00:25:41,840 --> 00:25:43,400
Speaker 1: should they be like, well, I guess we don't get

466
00:25:43,400 --> 00:25:47,800
Speaker 1: this now. It's like in India has had to deal

467
00:25:47,840 --> 00:25:51,960
Speaker 1: with their own fashion. Yes, and and and there's I

468
00:25:51,960 --> 00:25:55,040
Speaker 1: mean again, we're delving into a lot of very deep

469
00:25:55,080 --> 00:25:56,720
Speaker 1: topics because there's a lot to be said about how

470
00:25:56,800 --> 00:25:59,520
Speaker 1: the fact that the Nazis took the swastika lead to

471
00:26:00,040 --> 00:26:03,160
Speaker 1: degrees of sympathy within areas of Indian culture that allowed

472
00:26:03,200 --> 00:26:06,200
Speaker 1: some fascist ideology to creep in. And like that's also

473
00:26:06,280 --> 00:26:09,159
Speaker 1: tied to the fact that both the Nazis and a

474
00:26:09,200 --> 00:26:11,840
Speaker 1: lot of Indian nationalists were fighting against the British Empire.

475
00:26:12,000 --> 00:26:17,760
Speaker 1: It's all very complicated, right. They're guys, guys like vds

476
00:26:17,840 --> 00:26:21,840
Speaker 1: of Our Care did who were founders of the Hinduva movement, Yeah,

477
00:26:22,000 --> 00:26:25,520
Speaker 1: did openly praise Hitler. Oh yeah, Yeah. It's kind of

478
00:26:25,560 --> 00:26:27,840
Speaker 1: easy for some people to think of it as entirely

479
00:26:27,880 --> 00:26:31,679
Speaker 1: motivated by religion, but his whole concept of nationhood is

480
00:26:31,880 --> 00:26:35,359
Speaker 1: entirely racial. Yeah. It says himself that it has nothing

481
00:26:35,400 --> 00:26:40,640
Speaker 1: to do with religion. So yeah, and it's it's it's

482
00:26:40,640 --> 00:26:42,919
Speaker 1: one of those things. If you actually want to understand

483
00:26:43,000 --> 00:26:45,720
Speaker 1: things and engage with them in a useful area, you

484
00:26:45,800 --> 00:26:48,719
Speaker 1: have to understand that history and grapple with it without

485
00:26:48,800 --> 00:26:52,200
Speaker 1: like looking at a year old Hindu temple and going, well,

486
00:26:52,240 --> 00:26:58,320
Speaker 1: I guess they were Nazis hash hash hashtag problematic. Yeah, ugly.

487
00:26:59,440 --> 00:27:02,320
Speaker 1: The last thing actually want to talk about is how

488
00:27:03,280 --> 00:27:06,080
Speaker 1: how how the kind of debate around symbols US to

489
00:27:06,080 --> 00:27:09,040
Speaker 1: symbols has just kind of morphed into just fast jacketing

490
00:27:09,119 --> 00:27:13,440
Speaker 1: anarchists in general and worrying about like, oh, the fascists

491
00:27:13,440 --> 00:27:16,840
Speaker 1: are secretly infiltrating the anarchists and they're gonna turn anarchists

492
00:27:16,840 --> 00:27:19,040
Speaker 1: into fascists. Just pretty silly, because I mean, if you're

493
00:27:19,040 --> 00:27:21,160
Speaker 1: gonna I you're gonna turn anyone into fascists. Think anarchists

494
00:27:21,160 --> 00:27:23,080
Speaker 1: are one of the hardest people to do to do

495
00:27:23,119 --> 00:27:24,919
Speaker 1: that too. This is this is there's a lot of

496
00:27:24,920 --> 00:27:28,159
Speaker 1: other people it's way easier to convince to become fascists

497
00:27:28,160 --> 00:27:33,200
Speaker 1: than when anarchists go fascists they pretty hard well, yeah,

498
00:27:33,480 --> 00:27:38,400
Speaker 1: but they the type of like fear mongering around it

499
00:27:38,440 --> 00:27:42,199
Speaker 1: is still it's really frustrating because like I'm looking at

500
00:27:42,200 --> 00:27:45,320
Speaker 1: all these I'm looking at all these tanky's like fast

501
00:27:45,359 --> 00:27:48,120
Speaker 1: jacketing anarchists for using us for using a symbol created

502
00:27:48,119 --> 00:27:51,600
Speaker 1: by anarchists which has been used by anarchists for decades, right, um,

503
00:27:51,640 --> 00:27:54,600
Speaker 1: But then you also have like Tanky superstar Kalin Malplin

504
00:27:54,880 --> 00:27:58,720
Speaker 1: regularly hanging out with like like Melvin regularly hangs out

505
00:27:58,720 --> 00:28:01,359
Speaker 1: with dougod Of. And then you have someone who's like

506
00:28:01,359 --> 00:28:04,520
Speaker 1: another like pretty like popular, like like tinky influencer like

507
00:28:04,760 --> 00:28:09,600
Speaker 1: Ben Norton who openly uses Dugan's multipolar theory. Right, and

508
00:28:09,680 --> 00:28:11,720
Speaker 1: so if if if, if you're looking for the most

509
00:28:11,800 --> 00:28:16,480
Speaker 1: visible example of fascist nationalist rhetoric trying to enter into leftism,

510
00:28:16,520 --> 00:28:19,600
Speaker 1: you should look at like the growing like patriotic communists,

511
00:28:19,680 --> 00:28:25,399
Speaker 1: you know, people people like patriotic socialists, but yeah, the

512
00:28:25,480 --> 00:28:28,480
Speaker 1: idea is basically the same. But yeah, it's like people

513
00:28:28,480 --> 00:28:32,119
Speaker 1: like Peter Coffin and this like growing like patriot communist

514
00:28:32,160 --> 00:28:35,679
Speaker 1: socialist kind of live streamer grifft um, which is like

515
00:28:35,920 --> 00:28:39,280
Speaker 1: because like the easiest entry on the left for fascism

516
00:28:39,400 --> 00:28:42,800
Speaker 1: is informs of nationalist authoritarian communism. Right, It's like you

517
00:28:42,800 --> 00:28:44,520
Speaker 1: know that that's that that is how you get like

518
00:28:44,640 --> 00:28:47,960
Speaker 1: national socialism. Right. Uh. It's like they just had this

519
00:28:48,040 --> 00:28:50,720
Speaker 1: like super cringe e Nauz Bill convention just a few

520
00:28:50,720 --> 00:28:53,960
Speaker 1: weeks ago with with some of the best moments on

521
00:28:54,560 --> 00:28:57,560
Speaker 1: until Will Smith slapped that guy. Yeah, but like you know,

522
00:28:57,600 --> 00:28:59,960
Speaker 1: you have you have like Coffin and Malpin hanging out

523
00:29:00,120 --> 00:29:02,720
Speaker 1: and like Mopid regularly regularly hangs out with Doo Good.

524
00:29:02,760 --> 00:29:04,480
Speaker 1: It's like, if you're gonna lift, if you want to

525
00:29:04,520 --> 00:29:07,440
Speaker 1: be watching out for like a fascist creep, maybe you

526
00:29:07,440 --> 00:29:09,640
Speaker 1: should direct it towards the people and just like doing

527
00:29:09,640 --> 00:29:11,960
Speaker 1: it out in the open and not fast jacketing like

528
00:29:12,120 --> 00:29:14,200
Speaker 1: queer anarchists who have been doing the thing that they've

529
00:29:14,240 --> 00:29:16,360
Speaker 1: been doing for like decades. I guess one of the

530
00:29:16,400 --> 00:29:20,560
Speaker 1: last things I bele mention is, uh, the hilarious incidents

531
00:29:20,720 --> 00:29:23,960
Speaker 1: with the Sith Empire thing of people just fully of

532
00:29:24,160 --> 00:29:27,440
Speaker 1: like fully getting consumed by their own brain worms and

533
00:29:27,480 --> 00:29:30,720
Speaker 1: trying to insist that a Star Wars symbol uh is

534
00:29:30,960 --> 00:29:35,960
Speaker 1: secretly uh fascist chaos star um and then doing the

535
00:29:36,000 --> 00:29:40,080
Speaker 1: same thing to the Warhammer symbol um it is it

536
00:29:40,200 --> 00:29:44,680
Speaker 1: is in in. I mean it's funny because like in

537
00:29:45,600 --> 00:29:48,160
Speaker 1: Star Wars it is a fascist symbol, right, that is,

538
00:29:48,200 --> 00:29:50,320
Speaker 1: that's not a fascist symbol in the real world, but

539
00:29:50,360 --> 00:29:52,680
Speaker 1: it is within the world of of Star Wars that

540
00:29:52,800 --> 00:29:55,040
Speaker 1: is absolutely a fascist. It's also it's also not a

541
00:29:55,120 --> 00:29:58,080
Speaker 1: chaos star. It's not a chaos star. Uh. And in

542
00:29:58,160 --> 00:30:00,240
Speaker 1: Warhammer it is a chaos star, but it's not a

543
00:30:00,280 --> 00:30:03,719
Speaker 1: fascist symbol. It's actually an anti fascist symbol. Within the

544
00:30:03,760 --> 00:30:08,040
Speaker 1: World War you can basically argue that, yeah, because it is.

545
00:30:08,080 --> 00:30:10,080
Speaker 1: It is just frustrating looking at all these people being

546
00:30:10,120 --> 00:30:12,000
Speaker 1: like trying to play trying to play the Wears Waldo

547
00:30:12,080 --> 00:30:15,840
Speaker 1: game just to all like dunkan anarchists, and it's just

548
00:30:16,000 --> 00:30:18,480
Speaker 1: kind of shows a fundamental misunderstanding of the history of

549
00:30:18,520 --> 00:30:22,320
Speaker 1: anarchists culture um, and the history of like anti fascist anarchists.

550
00:30:22,520 --> 00:30:26,120
Speaker 1: You know, most of the anti fascists that I know

551
00:30:26,800 --> 00:30:29,240
Speaker 1: use the chaos star because it's because it's a red symbol.

552
00:30:29,280 --> 00:30:33,760
Speaker 1: It looks rad, it looks cool. Um. And Yeah, trying

553
00:30:33,760 --> 00:30:36,600
Speaker 1: to like in insisting that we must see this ground

554
00:30:37,040 --> 00:30:40,280
Speaker 1: and let fascists use anything that they think is esthetically cool.

555
00:30:40,680 --> 00:30:42,760
Speaker 1: I think is is a first of all, like a

556
00:30:42,760 --> 00:30:45,160
Speaker 1: losing battle to actually just like to just just to

557
00:30:45,320 --> 00:30:48,280
Speaker 1: to to start that now, I think is you would

558
00:30:48,320 --> 00:30:51,320
Speaker 1: have some pretty bad implications for fascism and its use

559
00:30:51,440 --> 00:30:54,120
Speaker 1: of aesthetics. You don't have to give them things just

560
00:30:54,160 --> 00:30:57,080
Speaker 1: because they want to take those things. It makes sense

561
00:30:57,120 --> 00:30:59,800
Speaker 1: that you would see like tankyas do it, because then

562
00:31:00,040 --> 00:31:03,120
Speaker 1: with your tankie you could basically get into a position

563
00:31:03,200 --> 00:31:08,080
Speaker 1: where you can basically discard all sorts of symbolisms and

564
00:31:08,240 --> 00:31:12,320
Speaker 1: just replace everything with like old like Soviet symbology or

565
00:31:12,360 --> 00:31:15,720
Speaker 1: so which is which is obviously not tied to eddie

566
00:31:15,720 --> 00:31:21,280
Speaker 1: a trocity stead of happens, right, Oh, oh it's dentally.

567
00:31:21,440 --> 00:31:25,240
Speaker 1: Don't ever tell them about Georgia. Yeah, don't don't tell

568
00:31:25,280 --> 00:31:31,960
Speaker 1: them about Georgia, Kazakhstan, Ukraine, Ukraine, that giant lake that

569
00:31:32,040 --> 00:31:34,360
Speaker 1: was like the largest lake in Europe that they turned

570
00:31:34,400 --> 00:31:36,960
Speaker 1: into a pile of poison. You know. Don't mention a

571
00:31:37,000 --> 00:31:41,160
Speaker 1: few things, and Trotsky would be proud considering he wanted

572
00:31:41,200 --> 00:31:44,880
Speaker 1: to turn mountains into like city structure. I mean that

573
00:31:44,880 --> 00:31:47,960
Speaker 1: that actually is one of the things I think Trotsky

574
00:31:48,600 --> 00:31:53,080
Speaker 1: was on the right ball about more ministrits, more minisirats.

575
00:31:53,160 --> 00:31:57,000
Speaker 1: Let's tear it up some mountains. So any any any

576
00:31:57,080 --> 00:32:01,920
Speaker 1: final thoughts on our lovely circular the chaos a chaos star.

577
00:32:02,680 --> 00:32:06,040
Speaker 1: I'm thinking I'm thinking of a quote from like, uh,

578
00:32:06,360 --> 00:32:09,440
Speaker 1: what was his name, Pablo Freer Day. I hope I've

579
00:32:09,440 --> 00:32:13,040
Speaker 1: gotten that name right. A quote I've seen going around

580
00:32:13,040 --> 00:32:14,920
Speaker 1: that I think goes around something to the effect that

581
00:32:15,240 --> 00:32:18,520
Speaker 1: when the point of education isn't liberation, the goal is

582
00:32:18,560 --> 00:32:22,840
Speaker 1: to become the oppressor. Um. You could sort of usually

583
00:32:23,040 --> 00:32:26,560
Speaker 1: that quote is like relevant to like the material processes

584
00:32:26,600 --> 00:32:31,000
Speaker 1: of like being inculcated into a capitalist system. So so

585
00:32:31,200 --> 00:32:32,640
Speaker 1: so you can kind of make the most sense of

586
00:32:32,680 --> 00:32:36,720
Speaker 1: it as basically like you are educated to become a

587
00:32:36,800 --> 00:32:41,080
Speaker 1: boss instead of wanting to abolish all bosses vot. But

588
00:32:41,080 --> 00:32:43,440
Speaker 1: but on but on a micro level, you can sort

589
00:32:43,480 --> 00:32:47,040
Speaker 1: of apply it to the to the ways in which people,

590
00:32:47,200 --> 00:32:50,880
Speaker 1: even in like radical spaces sort of to sort of

591
00:32:50,920 --> 00:32:54,320
Speaker 1: become like self styled cops as it were. That I

592
00:32:54,360 --> 00:32:57,160
Speaker 1: think is a phenomenon that a lot of the unarcho

593
00:32:57,280 --> 00:33:01,240
Speaker 1: nihilist tendency sort of responds to. Anyway, this is coming

594
00:33:01,240 --> 00:33:04,680
Speaker 1: from a perspective that is sort of flirtatious towards an

595
00:33:04,760 --> 00:33:09,040
Speaker 1: arco nihilism, but not necessarily. But it's like you could

596
00:33:09,520 --> 00:33:12,480
Speaker 1: a lot of the interactions with like they like certain

597
00:33:12,480 --> 00:33:16,320
Speaker 1: people demonstrate that. There are some instances of it where

598
00:33:16,360 --> 00:33:20,960
Speaker 1: I think I can't quite tell if it's po or not. Um.

599
00:33:21,000 --> 00:33:24,000
Speaker 1: Somebody I s s somebody posted like a photo of

600
00:33:24,040 --> 00:33:27,240
Speaker 1: themselves with like a like a jacket and they had

601
00:33:27,280 --> 00:33:30,840
Speaker 1: like the upside down cross and the inverted pedogram on board,

602
00:33:30,880 --> 00:33:35,600
Speaker 1: and somebody someone, somebody with like basically no followers who

603
00:33:35,680 --> 00:33:40,200
Speaker 1: somehow blew somehow blew up when they posted that photo

604
00:33:40,680 --> 00:33:43,360
Speaker 1: next to like a Nazi uniform to try and compare

605
00:33:43,440 --> 00:33:47,560
Speaker 1: to the inverted cross to a swastika or no not,

606
00:33:47,640 --> 00:33:50,240
Speaker 1: if not a swastika, then like maybe some other part

607
00:33:50,240 --> 00:33:53,040
Speaker 1: of the jacket and the pentagram to like the arm

608
00:33:53,120 --> 00:33:56,400
Speaker 1: band or something like yeah, yeah, And I think I'm

609
00:33:56,440 --> 00:33:59,720
Speaker 1: still not sure if that was entirely serious. See, that's

610
00:33:59,800 --> 00:34:02,680
Speaker 1: that's the thing is, like we have to be careful,

611
00:34:02,720 --> 00:34:06,440
Speaker 1: like I don't like anarchist in fighting. It's rarely useful, um,

612
00:34:06,760 --> 00:34:09,719
Speaker 1: and we have to be quick to be watchful for

613
00:34:09,760 --> 00:34:11,640
Speaker 1: like how much of it is just people trolling or

614
00:34:11,640 --> 00:34:14,879
Speaker 1: people trying to prompt in fighting just for the sake

615
00:34:14,880 --> 00:34:18,120
Speaker 1: of infighting. Right, So if if like I tried for

616
00:34:18,160 --> 00:34:20,160
Speaker 1: a long time to not engage in this debate because

617
00:34:20,239 --> 00:34:22,719
Speaker 1: I don't like talking about this, like I don't like

618
00:34:22,840 --> 00:34:24,960
Speaker 1: in fighting with anarchists. I don't like I don't like

619
00:34:25,239 --> 00:34:29,000
Speaker 1: having these types of debates. So hopefully the next time

620
00:34:29,040 --> 00:34:30,920
Speaker 1: this debate starts. We don't need to because we can

621
00:34:30,960 --> 00:34:32,600
Speaker 1: just we can just point to how this last one

622
00:34:32,600 --> 00:34:36,200
Speaker 1: went and say, no, look, we clearly demonstrated that this

623
00:34:36,239 --> 00:34:38,040
Speaker 1: has a this has a long history of use by

624
00:34:38,080 --> 00:34:41,680
Speaker 1: anarchists and invented by anarchists, and not starting, not starting,

625
00:34:42,200 --> 00:34:45,120
Speaker 1: and not start the debate again because we we don't

626
00:34:45,200 --> 00:34:46,640
Speaker 1: we we don't need to do it, and there's no

627
00:34:46,719 --> 00:34:48,839
Speaker 1: telling if people are doing it sincerely or people doing

628
00:34:48,840 --> 00:34:51,040
Speaker 1: it ironically, or people just doing it just to get

629
00:34:51,080 --> 00:34:54,279
Speaker 1: you know, people upset um. And I mean like if

630
00:34:54,280 --> 00:34:57,040
Speaker 1: you want to look at anarchists and look at I

631
00:34:57,120 --> 00:34:59,920
Speaker 1: where where is right wing people whereas fascist trying to

632
00:35:00,120 --> 00:35:03,200
Speaker 1: kind of blended with anarchists, Like look at like books right,

633
00:35:03,520 --> 00:35:06,439
Speaker 1: look at and d caps right. These people who try

634
00:35:06,440 --> 00:35:09,040
Speaker 1: to claim to be anarchists are very bad and actually

635
00:35:09,040 --> 00:35:11,600
Speaker 1: blending in because they can't help themselves when they start

636
00:35:11,640 --> 00:35:14,960
Speaker 1: talking about like the validity of anarcho capitalism or the

637
00:35:15,040 --> 00:35:18,080
Speaker 1: validity of like small nation states like it's it is,

638
00:35:18,200 --> 00:35:22,000
Speaker 1: it is. It is hard. It's hard to actually infiltrate anarchists.

639
00:35:22,040 --> 00:35:24,200
Speaker 1: This is the thing that the FBI has said multiple

640
00:35:24,360 --> 00:35:27,200
Speaker 1: multiple times. It's hard to actually do so whenever fascists

641
00:35:27,200 --> 00:35:30,000
Speaker 1: try to blend in whether they're boogloo boys, they can't

642
00:35:30,000 --> 00:35:32,960
Speaker 1: help but use their old like boogaloo symbols. They can't help,

643
00:35:33,000 --> 00:35:35,640
Speaker 1: but just like like give hints. It is it is

644
00:35:35,680 --> 00:35:39,040
Speaker 1: astonishing how how bad they are at this thing. So

645
00:35:39,239 --> 00:35:42,320
Speaker 1: also bad at like the protection that they claimed to offer,

646
00:35:42,480 --> 00:35:44,840
Speaker 1: Like there was a there was an article from like

647
00:35:44,960 --> 00:35:48,399
Speaker 1: last year going over oh we're going over well, part

648
00:35:48,400 --> 00:35:51,000
Speaker 1: of it mentioned that they were basically at this like

649
00:35:51,080 --> 00:35:54,879
Speaker 1: purported protests that they were supposed to offer protection from,

650
00:35:54,920 --> 00:35:56,719
Speaker 1: and most and most of what they did was get

651
00:35:56,800 --> 00:36:00,000
Speaker 1: drunk and like this on the sidewalks. The boogloo boys,

652
00:36:00,000 --> 00:36:02,319
Speaker 1: I've seen it, actual protests who are like with like

653
00:36:02,320 --> 00:36:04,800
Speaker 1: with like cops stacking protesters, the bogle of voice of

654
00:36:04,840 --> 00:36:10,239
Speaker 1: the first ones to run because their cowards. Yeah, all right,

655
00:36:10,360 --> 00:36:14,399
Speaker 1: well I guess where can where can people bay? Where

656
00:36:14,400 --> 00:36:16,000
Speaker 1: can people find in you on line? Where can people

657
00:36:16,400 --> 00:36:19,600
Speaker 1: read your read your article like chaos Nihilism and the

658
00:36:19,640 --> 00:36:24,279
Speaker 1: Way of No Surrender WordPress? Basically, um I could I

659
00:36:24,320 --> 00:36:27,320
Speaker 1: call it a site left the rotical domain, but the

660
00:36:27,719 --> 00:36:30,200
Speaker 1: but the link goes like my thoughts born from fire

661
00:36:30,280 --> 00:36:34,399
Speaker 1: dot WordPress dot com. I actually try I actually try

662
00:36:34,520 --> 00:36:36,680
Speaker 1: changing the U r L once I changed it to

663
00:36:36,719 --> 00:36:39,040
Speaker 1: a left the radical domain I think in two Bells

664
00:36:39,040 --> 00:36:43,080
Speaker 1: of thirteen fourteen, but I figured that doing so would

665
00:36:43,080 --> 00:36:45,520
Speaker 1: funk up all of the stats and whatever, so I

666
00:36:45,560 --> 00:36:48,520
Speaker 1: just didn't bother. Well, thank thank you so much for

667
00:36:48,880 --> 00:36:52,600
Speaker 1: kind of writing, I would say, probably the most definitive

668
00:36:52,640 --> 00:36:54,839
Speaker 1: stance on this debate at the moment, which we can

669
00:36:54,840 --> 00:36:59,680
Speaker 1: always point point back to whenever this inevitably comes up again,

670
00:36:59,680 --> 00:37:02,920
Speaker 1: and like a year or two, because I've seen it.

671
00:37:02,920 --> 00:37:05,200
Speaker 1: I've seen it come up like every every few years.

672
00:37:05,239 --> 00:37:07,640
Speaker 1: You see it. So thank you, thank you for that,

673
00:37:07,680 --> 00:37:10,960
Speaker 1: and thank you for coming on. Um yeah, if you

674
00:37:10,960 --> 00:37:13,200
Speaker 1: want to follow follow us, you can do it at

675
00:37:13,239 --> 00:37:15,200
Speaker 1: the thing, you know, the thing, you know what our

676
00:37:15,239 --> 00:37:18,279
Speaker 1: Instagram had happened here pod and cool Zone Media. You

677
00:37:18,280 --> 00:37:22,120
Speaker 1: can look at my unhinged chaos tweets at Hungry bow Tie.

678
00:37:22,560 --> 00:37:28,160
Speaker 1: Um yeah, nothing is true and everything is permitted. Also

679
00:37:28,320 --> 00:37:30,959
Speaker 1: at a skatinus is where I go to like sort

680
00:37:30,960 --> 00:37:35,560
Speaker 1: of ramble about politics and occasionally the occult and other things.

681
00:37:36,280 --> 00:37:38,120
Speaker 1: We do. We do. We do love a good we

682
00:37:38,160 --> 00:37:40,920
Speaker 1: do love a good ramble. All right, that that that

683
00:37:40,920 --> 00:37:59,399
Speaker 1: doesn't for us today, Uh, funk fascists, Nazi punks, fuck off, etcetera, etcetera, etcetera.

684
00:38:02,000 --> 00:38:05,239
Speaker 1: Welcome to it could happen here the only podcast where

685
00:38:05,239 --> 00:38:09,040
Speaker 1: the hosts asks all listeners and guests to provide their

686
00:38:09,080 --> 00:38:14,759
Speaker 1: Social Security number and bank account number, routing number, all

687
00:38:14,800 --> 00:38:18,600
Speaker 1: that good stuff. UM. This is a podcast about how

688
00:38:18,680 --> 00:38:21,279
Speaker 1: things aren't always great, uh, and maybe are kind of

689
00:38:21,280 --> 00:38:24,480
Speaker 1: falling apart a little bit. And and it has also

690
00:38:24,600 --> 00:38:29,000
Speaker 1: not been, for the most part, a podcast about the

691
00:38:29,080 --> 00:38:32,920
Speaker 1: expanded war in Ukraine. UM, for a variety of reasons.

692
00:38:33,200 --> 00:38:36,360
Speaker 1: We have done some coverage of that, but we've focused

693
00:38:36,400 --> 00:38:40,800
Speaker 1: specifically on stories of individual people and and that's generally

694
00:38:40,800 --> 00:38:43,800
Speaker 1: where I feel like our strength is as a program.

695
00:38:43,840 --> 00:38:46,359
Speaker 1: But people have been repeatedly requesting we do a little

696
00:38:46,360 --> 00:38:48,640
Speaker 1: bit of a bigger picture look at what's gone on

697
00:38:48,719 --> 00:38:51,759
Speaker 1: in that conflict, and so I have brought Aram Chambanian

698
00:38:52,280 --> 00:38:55,640
Speaker 1: into the studio. Aram, how are you doing, buddy? Oh?

699
00:38:55,719 --> 00:38:57,960
Speaker 1: Not too bad man? How you doing today? Fine and

700
00:38:58,040 --> 00:39:01,799
Speaker 1: dandy like sour candy. Now, would you describe kind of

701
00:39:01,880 --> 00:39:05,560
Speaker 1: your your who you are and what you do and

702
00:39:05,560 --> 00:39:09,120
Speaker 1: why why you're you're someone people should listen to when

703
00:39:09,160 --> 00:39:12,160
Speaker 1: we're talking about a conflict like this, because you are

704
00:39:12,239 --> 00:39:15,000
Speaker 1: one of the people who when everyone was like, there's

705
00:39:15,040 --> 00:39:18,759
Speaker 1: no way Russia will invade, was was saying, well, maybe

706
00:39:19,200 --> 00:39:23,120
Speaker 1: it might happen. Yeah, I mean, um well, I think

707
00:39:23,280 --> 00:39:25,319
Speaker 1: one of the things that that sets me aside from

708
00:39:25,320 --> 00:39:27,080
Speaker 1: a lot of other analysts out there is that I

709
00:39:27,120 --> 00:39:29,239
Speaker 1: never thought I would become an analyst, and I never

710
00:39:29,280 --> 00:39:32,040
Speaker 1: thought that I would do this. Um. I it wasn't

711
00:39:32,080 --> 00:39:34,160
Speaker 1: set in stone from me. From the beginning. I thought

712
00:39:34,160 --> 00:39:35,920
Speaker 1: I was going to be like a high school history teacher.

713
00:39:36,000 --> 00:39:38,920
Speaker 1: And so I've always studied the world in terms of

714
00:39:38,920 --> 00:39:41,520
Speaker 1: reading books on different conflicts around the world, and and

715
00:39:41,560 --> 00:39:44,920
Speaker 1: I've tried to keep appraised on where these books have

716
00:39:45,040 --> 00:39:46,960
Speaker 1: led to. Right, So if I read a book about

717
00:39:47,160 --> 00:39:50,200
Speaker 1: the Second Congo War, it makes sense to then follow

718
00:39:50,320 --> 00:39:52,920
Speaker 1: current events that are related to what happened after the

719
00:39:52,960 --> 00:39:56,239
Speaker 1: Second Congo War. As a result, I followed things going

720
00:39:56,280 --> 00:40:00,200
Speaker 1: on in Ukraine starting with year am I done? Um

721
00:40:00,200 --> 00:40:02,319
Speaker 1: and elsewhere in the world, But but Ukraine has been

722
00:40:02,360 --> 00:40:06,160
Speaker 1: one that I've focused on pretty heavily because um there's

723
00:40:06,160 --> 00:40:09,160
Speaker 1: been a lot of information about Ukraine ever since because

724
00:40:09,160 --> 00:40:12,240
Speaker 1: of how late the war happened in terms of human history,

725
00:40:12,400 --> 00:40:16,560
Speaker 1: and in terms of recent conflicts, isn't that long ago?

726
00:40:17,160 --> 00:40:20,839
Speaker 1: UM and so uh, I started following it back then.

727
00:40:20,960 --> 00:40:25,360
Speaker 1: And I think that if you combine modern open source tools,

728
00:40:25,600 --> 00:40:29,200
Speaker 1: modern technology, some of the stuff that organizations like Belling

729
00:40:29,239 --> 00:40:32,960
Speaker 1: Cat can do with traditional research and and and knowledge

730
00:40:33,040 --> 00:40:35,319
Speaker 1: some of the stuff that I've done in school, you

731
00:40:35,400 --> 00:40:39,879
Speaker 1: have a really powerful tool to combat disinformation. UM. And

732
00:40:39,920 --> 00:40:41,120
Speaker 1: I think that's one of the best tools we have

733
00:40:41,160 --> 00:40:45,320
Speaker 1: to combat disinformation is wedding oh sent with traditional research UM.

734
00:40:45,680 --> 00:40:49,440
Speaker 1: And Yeah, when it comes to open source intelligence, UM,

735
00:40:50,719 --> 00:40:52,560
Speaker 1: the Ukrainian War is actually kind of one of the

736
00:40:52,680 --> 00:40:55,319
Speaker 1: It's not the conflict where that really started to become

737
00:40:55,320 --> 00:40:57,239
Speaker 1: a thing. That would probably be the Libyan Civil War

738
00:40:57,360 --> 00:41:01,040
Speaker 1: when when that UM big and to be something people

739
00:41:01,040 --> 00:41:03,880
Speaker 1: were talking about in a big way. But the Ukrainian

740
00:41:04,520 --> 00:41:08,080
Speaker 1: the invasion of Ukraine by Russia in particular in two

741
00:41:08,080 --> 00:41:12,560
Speaker 1: thousand fourteen, UM is really where open source intelligence kind

742
00:41:12,560 --> 00:41:16,399
Speaker 1: of came into its own in a really widely known way.

743
00:41:16,400 --> 00:41:20,600
Speaker 1: That's when Belling Cats reporting on the downing of MH

744
00:41:20,640 --> 00:41:22,520
Speaker 1: on seven like went out, and that was kind of

745
00:41:22,560 --> 00:41:28,000
Speaker 1: like the first first really huge international story involving like

746
00:41:28,080 --> 00:41:32,840
Speaker 1: open source intelligent cracking a case. Um, and now since

747
00:41:32,960 --> 00:41:37,239
Speaker 1: the expanded invasion of Russia back in February, we've kind

748
00:41:37,239 --> 00:41:40,800
Speaker 1: of entered and again this isn't really where this period started,

749
00:41:40,840 --> 00:41:43,759
Speaker 1: but this has been kind of we've seen an explosion

750
00:41:43,880 --> 00:41:46,040
Speaker 1: of what I think would be fair to call open

751
00:41:46,080 --> 00:41:52,600
Speaker 1: source intelligence disinformation. Um. Yeah, you want to talk a

752
00:41:52,640 --> 00:41:54,799
Speaker 1: little bit about kind of some of the stuff that

753
00:41:54,840 --> 00:41:57,240
Speaker 1: you've seen, because there's there's a number of accounts claiming

754
00:41:57,280 --> 00:42:00,640
Speaker 1: to be doing os and on the Ukrainian war, um,

755
00:42:00,680 --> 00:42:04,279
Speaker 1: and boy howdy, they are not all giving out good information,

756
00:42:04,360 --> 00:42:07,279
Speaker 1: and it can be difficult for people to tell what

757
00:42:07,320 --> 00:42:09,719
Speaker 1: they should trust because if you're if you're kind of

758
00:42:09,760 --> 00:42:13,319
Speaker 1: just scanning over it, bad ocean or even outright fake

759
00:42:13,320 --> 00:42:16,879
Speaker 1: ocean can look very similar to good ocean, right and

760
00:42:16,880 --> 00:42:19,120
Speaker 1: and so I would put a lot of the ocean

761
00:42:19,200 --> 00:42:24,839
Speaker 1: community into four rough categories. Uh there's uh osan analysts

762
00:42:24,840 --> 00:42:27,520
Speaker 1: and those are pretty rare. Those are the kind of

763
00:42:27,520 --> 00:42:30,239
Speaker 1: people who combine what they're seeing in real time on

764
00:42:30,320 --> 00:42:33,600
Speaker 1: social media with a background of knowledge in the area.

765
00:42:33,680 --> 00:42:37,160
Speaker 1: So like a Ukraine regional expert combining that with what

766
00:42:37,200 --> 00:42:40,400
Speaker 1: they're seeing happen in Ukraine. That's an ocean analyst. There's

767
00:42:40,440 --> 00:42:43,879
Speaker 1: some Twitter accounts that are more ocean aggregators. They don't

768
00:42:43,920 --> 00:42:46,279
Speaker 1: really have much analysis that put into what they're what

769
00:42:46,280 --> 00:42:49,200
Speaker 1: they're producing, but they spit out a lot of information

770
00:42:49,360 --> 00:42:51,680
Speaker 1: in real time, and so if you follow the right

771
00:42:51,760 --> 00:42:54,640
Speaker 1: ones that use the right sources, you can get some

772
00:42:54,719 --> 00:42:57,759
Speaker 1: pretty decent information from them. Then there's more of the

773
00:42:57,840 --> 00:43:00,840
Speaker 1: misinformation aggregators, which are accounts that just kind of spread

774
00:43:00,840 --> 00:43:03,520
Speaker 1: whatever they see without regards to whether it's true or not.

775
00:43:04,080 --> 00:43:09,600
Speaker 1: Um they'll sensationalized stories. You know, if there's the uh

776
00:43:09,680 --> 00:43:12,360
Speaker 1: a rare command and control plane takes off somewhere in

777
00:43:12,360 --> 00:43:15,560
Speaker 1: America that's known as the doomsday plane during the Cold War,

778
00:43:15,840 --> 00:43:17,799
Speaker 1: they'll tweet out the doomsday plane is in the air.

779
00:43:17,920 --> 00:43:21,160
Speaker 1: Doesn't mean the clear war right, And they're not doing

780
00:43:21,200 --> 00:43:23,400
Speaker 1: it to be hurtful, they're doing it for likes. And

781
00:43:23,440 --> 00:43:27,080
Speaker 1: then there's disinformation aggregators who are deliberately out there trying

782
00:43:27,080 --> 00:43:30,439
Speaker 1: to sow discord and so problems. And those are four

783
00:43:30,480 --> 00:43:32,520
Speaker 1: categories that I've seen all of them develop in their

784
00:43:32,560 --> 00:43:36,080
Speaker 1: own ways in the last ten years. UM. I think

785
00:43:36,120 --> 00:43:40,040
Speaker 1: the best best example of that final category, there's an

786
00:43:40,040 --> 00:43:43,520
Speaker 1: account on Twitter called s MM Syria and If you

787
00:43:43,560 --> 00:43:46,360
Speaker 1: look at the account, it looks almost identical to the

788
00:43:46,400 --> 00:43:50,680
Speaker 1: os CES Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine. It takes the

789
00:43:50,719 --> 00:43:52,640
Speaker 1: same kind of graphics and it has the same kind

790
00:43:52,640 --> 00:43:57,080
Speaker 1: of terminology, but it's an assaddist disinformation outlet and so

791
00:43:57,280 --> 00:44:00,040
Speaker 1: but they've woven their way into if you just like

792
00:44:00,120 --> 00:44:02,440
Speaker 1: a casual glance at the war in Syria, you might

793
00:44:02,520 --> 00:44:05,879
Speaker 1: believe that it's a valid source. And that's the kind

794
00:44:05,920 --> 00:44:08,800
Speaker 1: of more malicious disinformation that I'm talking about, where like

795
00:44:09,120 --> 00:44:11,799
Speaker 1: they know what they're doing and they're trying to confuse people,

796
00:44:12,480 --> 00:44:15,160
Speaker 1: and it's there's you know, I think one of the

797
00:44:15,239 --> 00:44:20,080
Speaker 1: best examples of something that really struck me recently as

798
00:44:20,160 --> 00:44:22,600
Speaker 1: problematic in in the war in Ukraine, as you've got

799
00:44:22,640 --> 00:44:26,520
Speaker 1: a video going around um of that purports to show

800
00:44:26,800 --> 00:44:32,200
Speaker 1: Ukrainian soldiers shooting captured Russian soldiers um which is a

801
00:44:32,239 --> 00:44:35,480
Speaker 1: war crime. And uh, I think credible people within the

802
00:44:35,560 --> 00:44:38,839
Speaker 1: Ocean community have said this is something that desperately needs

803
00:44:38,880 --> 00:44:42,560
Speaker 1: to be investigated more seriously. This this like is very

804
00:44:42,960 --> 00:44:45,239
Speaker 1: has a very good chance of being legitimate and people

805
00:44:45,239 --> 00:44:48,280
Speaker 1: should be looking into this. Whereas you've also seen folks

806
00:44:48,320 --> 00:44:52,560
Speaker 1: who kind of reflectively jumped to defend Ukraine against these

807
00:44:52,560 --> 00:44:56,360
Speaker 1: allegations putting out what I think is fairly shoddy ocean

808
00:44:56,640 --> 00:44:59,360
Speaker 1: claiming to show like issues with the video and stuff,

809
00:44:59,400 --> 00:45:02,719
Speaker 1: and it's like circling blurry sections of the video and

810
00:45:02,880 --> 00:45:04,799
Speaker 1: saying like this is you know, looks like it could

811
00:45:04,800 --> 00:45:07,040
Speaker 1: be edited, or this doesn't look credible, and it is

812
00:45:07,120 --> 00:45:09,799
Speaker 1: the kind of thing. I think One reason people can

813
00:45:09,840 --> 00:45:12,400
Speaker 1: get tripped up by that is prior to the invasion

814
00:45:12,440 --> 00:45:15,080
Speaker 1: of Ukraine, there were some Russian false flag events that

815
00:45:15,200 --> 00:45:18,720
Speaker 1: involved like cadavers, bodies that had been autopsy and stuff,

816
00:45:18,719 --> 00:45:21,000
Speaker 1: which was broken down by people like Elliot Higgins at

817
00:45:21,040 --> 00:45:23,520
Speaker 1: Belling cat Um and one of the things that again

818
00:45:23,640 --> 00:45:25,719
Speaker 1: if you're just kind of looking at the surface level,

819
00:45:26,040 --> 00:45:28,560
Speaker 1: you can see like, oh, well that those were videos

820
00:45:28,640 --> 00:45:31,359
Speaker 1: that were faked, and so these like the o cent

821
00:45:31,480 --> 00:45:33,960
Speaker 1: around this people like pointing out different sections of the

822
00:45:34,040 --> 00:45:37,920
Speaker 1: video looks the same. Some of the differences are for example, Um,

823
00:45:38,239 --> 00:45:41,479
Speaker 1: when they were analyzing the bodies and those those false

824
00:45:41,520 --> 00:45:47,560
Speaker 1: flag footage, they brought in actual you know, corpse cutter ruppers, morticians, yes,

825
00:45:47,760 --> 00:45:50,400
Speaker 1: to analyze like the cuts in the in the skulls

826
00:45:50,480 --> 00:45:53,040
Speaker 1: and whatnot, as opposed to again just kind of a

827
00:45:53,080 --> 00:45:55,400
Speaker 1: guy circling aspects of a video and being like this

828
00:45:55,520 --> 00:45:58,239
Speaker 1: doesn't seem right, and it's like, um, but you can

829
00:45:58,320 --> 00:46:00,320
Speaker 1: I can see why people get tripped up by it,

830
00:46:00,480 --> 00:46:02,840
Speaker 1: and it it is important not to get tripped up

831
00:46:02,880 --> 00:46:06,080
Speaker 1: by that kind of stuff because um, war crimes are bad,

832
00:46:06,480 --> 00:46:08,759
Speaker 1: I think is a general attitude that we we both

833
00:46:08,840 --> 00:46:12,560
Speaker 1: share um and and should be investigated regardless of like

834
00:46:12,719 --> 00:46:15,879
Speaker 1: whether or not they're being done by the side who's

835
00:46:15,880 --> 00:46:18,600
Speaker 1: also towing Russian tanks away with tractors. That you're you're

836
00:46:18,640 --> 00:46:20,879
Speaker 1: on the side of right, like right, And I think

837
00:46:20,920 --> 00:46:24,080
Speaker 1: that that's that's exactly an important distinction to because like,

838
00:46:24,680 --> 00:46:26,920
Speaker 1: there are certain claims that have come out from the

839
00:46:27,040 --> 00:46:29,839
Speaker 1: Ukrainian side, certain statements that have come out that as

840
00:46:29,920 --> 00:46:33,360
Speaker 1: an osan analyst, I could probably look into more and

841
00:46:33,560 --> 00:46:36,160
Speaker 1: maybe poke holes and stuff like the number of kills

842
00:46:36,280 --> 00:46:40,560
Speaker 1: that the ghost of keys, right, Okay, maybe it's not

843
00:46:40,760 --> 00:46:42,600
Speaker 1: thirty kills or whatever it is that people are saying,

844
00:46:42,760 --> 00:46:47,680
Speaker 1: maybe he's not really, but that's not harmful as much

845
00:46:47,800 --> 00:46:50,960
Speaker 1: as did these guys shoot people in the legs? Right? Right?

846
00:46:51,040 --> 00:46:54,360
Speaker 1: So one of those bears examination just because of the

847
00:46:54,480 --> 00:46:56,840
Speaker 1: nature of the claim. The other one maybe we can

848
00:46:56,920 --> 00:46:59,600
Speaker 1: examine it after the war when it's not it doesn't

849
00:46:59,640 --> 00:47:03,320
Speaker 1: really matter. If there is a Ukrainian ace fighter pilot

850
00:47:03,360 --> 00:47:05,920
Speaker 1: who's dropped a bunch of a crazy number like obviously

851
00:47:05,920 --> 00:47:08,520
Speaker 1: in a military sense of Russian jets are being down to,

852
00:47:08,640 --> 00:47:11,600
Speaker 1: that doesn't matter. But like from the perspective of people

853
00:47:11,719 --> 00:47:15,640
Speaker 1: just kind of observing this war as as news consumers,

854
00:47:15,719 --> 00:47:18,480
Speaker 1: it doesn't really matter, whereas whether or not a country

855
00:47:18,560 --> 00:47:22,080
Speaker 1: gets away with a war crime absolutely matters, and people

856
00:47:22,120 --> 00:47:24,680
Speaker 1: are treating it with the same reflective handwave as they

857
00:47:24,719 --> 00:47:28,440
Speaker 1: do when they accept these ghost of Kiev yes myths. Right,

858
00:47:28,600 --> 00:47:30,440
Speaker 1: they're saying like, well, no, but I want the Ukrainian

859
00:47:30,480 --> 00:47:32,960
Speaker 1: side to win this war, so we can't even look

860
00:47:33,000 --> 00:47:35,120
Speaker 1: into any claims of war crimes. And that's just not

861
00:47:35,160 --> 00:47:38,280
Speaker 1: how it's supposed to be. Like you condemn the crimes

862
00:47:38,400 --> 00:47:41,760
Speaker 1: up front, and you investigate and you try to move forward,

863
00:47:41,880 --> 00:47:44,320
Speaker 1: and that's how we prove that we're better than the

864
00:47:44,400 --> 00:47:47,919
Speaker 1: opposing side. Like that's that's been the rule in this war,

865
00:47:48,080 --> 00:47:50,000
Speaker 1: and it's been the rule in war's past. You know,

866
00:47:50,320 --> 00:47:52,680
Speaker 1: you you prove that you're better than your opponents by

867
00:47:52,800 --> 00:47:56,839
Speaker 1: being more decent. Yeah, and it's it's I have seen

868
00:47:56,920 --> 00:47:59,960
Speaker 1: some really unsettling logic from some people along the line

869
00:48:00,160 --> 00:48:03,400
Speaker 1: of like, well, these were artillerymen who have been you know,

870
00:48:03,520 --> 00:48:06,919
Speaker 1: shelling civilian areas, so why shouldn't they be be shot

871
00:48:06,960 --> 00:48:09,239
Speaker 1: in the leg? And the answer is because, like that's

872
00:48:09,320 --> 00:48:12,480
Speaker 1: number one, it is a war crime to shoot captured prisoners.

873
00:48:12,640 --> 00:48:14,800
Speaker 1: Likely that that is a thing that we as a

874
00:48:15,040 --> 00:48:18,920
Speaker 1: as a species have attempted to make illegal um and

875
00:48:19,239 --> 00:48:20,920
Speaker 1: problems and ought to be it is a thing that

876
00:48:21,080 --> 00:48:22,759
Speaker 1: like should not be done. And there's actually of a

877
00:48:22,800 --> 00:48:25,840
Speaker 1: wide variety of like tactical reasons why it's bad for Ukraine.

878
00:48:26,120 --> 00:48:29,360
Speaker 1: If Russian soldiers believe they will be shot after being captured,

879
00:48:29,440 --> 00:48:31,839
Speaker 1: it makes, among other things, it makes soldiers less likely

880
00:48:31,920 --> 00:48:35,640
Speaker 1: to turn themselves in. UM. One of the wiser decisions

881
00:48:35,719 --> 00:48:37,799
Speaker 1: that the Ukrainian government has made in this war has

882
00:48:37,880 --> 00:48:42,920
Speaker 1: been really deliberately pushing um the idea that like, hey, Russians,

883
00:48:43,000 --> 00:48:46,719
Speaker 1: if you surrender, will pay you, you can get Ukrainian citizenship,

884
00:48:46,880 --> 00:48:49,280
Speaker 1: Like bring in your tanks, you know, land your planes

885
00:48:49,360 --> 00:48:51,600
Speaker 1: or whatever, like, well, you know, we'll make it worth

886
00:48:51,680 --> 00:48:55,920
Speaker 1: your while. Um, which is a lot which is potentially

887
00:48:56,000 --> 00:48:59,319
Speaker 1: a force multiplier, right, UM, If Russian soldiers think when

888
00:48:59,360 --> 00:49:01,600
Speaker 1: I get captured, they will shoot me. Then they will

889
00:49:01,640 --> 00:49:04,000
Speaker 1: fight to the death, and Ukraine will lose more people

890
00:49:04,520 --> 00:49:07,439
Speaker 1: in that fight, as opposed to if Russian soldiers think, well, ship,

891
00:49:07,520 --> 00:49:10,000
Speaker 1: I could actually have a pretty decent life if I

892
00:49:10,120 --> 00:49:12,319
Speaker 1: just turned myself into these guys and refused to fight.

893
00:49:12,719 --> 00:49:15,800
Speaker 1: That means less people you have to fight. Um. So

894
00:49:15,920 --> 00:49:18,920
Speaker 1: it it does. It does really matter whether or not

895
00:49:19,200 --> 00:49:23,320
Speaker 1: this is happening. Um. And it's also just like on

896
00:49:23,400 --> 00:49:25,520
Speaker 1: a moral level, you you shouldn't accept it. And I

897
00:49:25,600 --> 00:49:27,640
Speaker 1: see some really I think one of the things that

898
00:49:27,880 --> 00:49:31,520
Speaker 1: I find so unsettling about that logic like these are uh,

899
00:49:31,920 --> 00:49:35,120
Speaker 1: these are you know, artillerymen who have been targeting civilian areas.

900
00:49:35,120 --> 00:49:37,920
Speaker 1: Why shouldn't they be shot? Um, it's not that much

901
00:49:37,960 --> 00:49:40,120
Speaker 1: of a leap to like some other ship we saw

902
00:49:40,200 --> 00:49:43,520
Speaker 1: people saying in Vietnam, you know, these villages are harboring insurgents.

903
00:49:43,560 --> 00:49:45,800
Speaker 1: Why shouldn't we treat them like the enemy? You know,

904
00:49:45,960 --> 00:49:49,040
Speaker 1: Like all of this logic leads to people getting murdered

905
00:49:49,040 --> 00:49:53,000
Speaker 1: who don't deserve to get murdered, and that is bad. Right.

906
00:49:53,120 --> 00:49:55,520
Speaker 1: There's the snowball effect, the slippery slope effect with the

907
00:49:55,600 --> 00:49:57,080
Speaker 1: moral side of it, and then like you're saying the

908
00:49:57,120 --> 00:49:59,120
Speaker 1: practical side of it. I mean, if you look at

909
00:50:00,040 --> 00:50:02,560
Speaker 1: part of the reason members of ISIS fought so hard

910
00:50:02,600 --> 00:50:06,400
Speaker 1: in places like most of which because once you're in

911
00:50:06,480 --> 00:50:09,040
Speaker 1: that organization, your options are a bullet or like a

912
00:50:09,200 --> 00:50:12,279
Speaker 1: desert cell. If you're lucky, they're not going to treat

913
00:50:12,320 --> 00:50:14,920
Speaker 1: you well and reintegrate you into society. Come on, like, no,

914
00:50:15,239 --> 00:50:17,279
Speaker 1: that's not how it works, so you fight like hell,

915
00:50:18,120 --> 00:50:20,959
Speaker 1: you know that's that's a very basic rule. That's pretty

916
00:50:20,960 --> 00:50:24,400
Speaker 1: easy to understand, I would think. So that's why this

917
00:50:24,480 --> 00:50:26,800
Speaker 1: needs to be looked into. And if it's proven false,

918
00:50:28,120 --> 00:50:30,439
Speaker 1: if it's proven it to not be a correct true video,

919
00:50:30,960 --> 00:50:32,880
Speaker 1: that just strengthens the Ukrainian side. But if it is

920
00:50:32,920 --> 00:50:35,000
Speaker 1: proven to be true, it's something that needs to be investigated.

921
00:50:35,040 --> 00:50:37,160
Speaker 1: It can't be overlooked. It can't be swept under the

922
00:50:37,239 --> 00:50:39,680
Speaker 1: under the rug. Just because we we want one side

923
00:50:39,719 --> 00:50:41,880
Speaker 1: of this war to come out on top doesn't mean

924
00:50:41,920 --> 00:50:45,520
Speaker 1: that we have to ignore you're committing Like one, A

925
00:50:45,840 --> 00:50:48,879
Speaker 1: good rule of thumb to approach a war from when

926
00:50:48,920 --> 00:50:52,200
Speaker 1: you're trying to analyze it is that there there has

927
00:50:52,280 --> 00:50:54,560
Speaker 1: never been a side in a war who have not

928
00:50:54,719 --> 00:50:58,600
Speaker 1: committed war crimes. Um. So that should always be on

929
00:50:58,640 --> 00:51:00,640
Speaker 1: your mind when you're trying to evaluate the reality of

930
00:51:00,680 --> 00:51:02,040
Speaker 1: a war crame. It doesn't mean every claim of a

931
00:51:02,080 --> 00:51:04,560
Speaker 1: war crime is true. That would be a very silly

932
00:51:04,600 --> 00:51:06,440
Speaker 1: way to translate that. But it does mean that when

933
00:51:06,840 --> 00:51:09,040
Speaker 1: there is a claim that the side you support has

934
00:51:09,080 --> 00:51:11,719
Speaker 1: been responsible for a war crime, your default should be

935
00:51:12,040 --> 00:51:15,080
Speaker 1: this is not impossible, and I should I should proceed

936
00:51:15,160 --> 00:51:17,239
Speaker 1: from the area that this could have happened, and and

937
00:51:17,360 --> 00:51:21,040
Speaker 1: it should be analyzed without reflectively dismissing it, and also

938
00:51:21,120 --> 00:51:23,640
Speaker 1: without saying that like war crimes committed by a group

939
00:51:23,719 --> 00:51:26,080
Speaker 1: of soldiers in a single part of a theater necessarily

940
00:51:26,200 --> 00:51:29,800
Speaker 1: mean that the the war itself is being prosecuted in

941
00:51:29,840 --> 00:51:33,080
Speaker 1: a criminal level by that government. Um. Because for example, well,

942
00:51:33,080 --> 00:51:36,360
Speaker 1: I mean I was about to say U. S. Soldiers

943
00:51:36,360 --> 00:51:38,880
Speaker 1: committed war crimes in World War Two, but actually the

944
00:51:38,960 --> 00:51:40,920
Speaker 1: prosecution of that war was criminal in a lot of

945
00:51:40,960 --> 00:51:47,960
Speaker 1: fundamental ways. But it does. That doesn't mean that like

946
00:51:48,160 --> 00:51:51,520
Speaker 1: your granddad committed war crimes because other U. S. Soldiers

947
00:51:51,560 --> 00:51:56,799
Speaker 1: who were in the field executed captured German POW's you know, um, Yeah,

948
00:51:57,239 --> 00:51:59,000
Speaker 1: which I think is something people have an easier time

949
00:51:59,080 --> 00:52:01,879
Speaker 1: understanding and it's not a war. They feel the need

950
00:52:01,960 --> 00:52:05,719
Speaker 1: to have a series of character or less takes on

951
00:52:05,920 --> 00:52:09,880
Speaker 1: in Twitter. Yeah, it's That's the weirdest thing about about

952
00:52:10,200 --> 00:52:13,880
Speaker 1: the social media age and and kind of sent in general,

953
00:52:14,040 --> 00:52:17,279
Speaker 1: is that while it does make it very accessible and

954
00:52:17,400 --> 00:52:21,960
Speaker 1: easy for anybody to get involved in investigating these crimes

955
00:52:22,000 --> 00:52:24,920
Speaker 1: and these events, it also means that everybody thinks they

956
00:52:24,920 --> 00:52:28,080
Speaker 1: have an opinion that matters on it and uh and

957
00:52:28,280 --> 00:52:30,799
Speaker 1: and in that sense, they muddy the waters. They they

958
00:52:31,360 --> 00:52:34,520
Speaker 1: a lot of people can can imitate the ocent look

959
00:52:34,600 --> 00:52:38,000
Speaker 1: pretty well. They can circle things in pictures that look similar,

960
00:52:38,200 --> 00:52:40,600
Speaker 1: or as we saw in Syria, a lot they'd take

961
00:52:40,680 --> 00:52:44,160
Speaker 1: two pictures of two totally different dudes and say these

962
00:52:44,200 --> 00:52:46,160
Speaker 1: are the same guy, they're both members of Al Nustra

963
00:52:46,560 --> 00:52:49,760
Speaker 1: are something like that, and they would compare the eyes

964
00:52:49,800 --> 00:52:51,680
Speaker 1: and compare the chins and stuff, and it looks kind

965
00:52:51,680 --> 00:52:54,520
Speaker 1: of like a belling cat image, but it wasn't right.

966
00:52:56,560 --> 00:52:59,600
Speaker 1: That's the danger here is that like everybody can can help,

967
00:52:59,680 --> 00:53:01,919
Speaker 1: but every what he can hurt now too, Yeah, yeah,

968
00:53:01,960 --> 00:53:05,920
Speaker 1: And it's one of those things, every every aspect of

969
00:53:06,000 --> 00:53:09,320
Speaker 1: this cuts both ways, because like the thing people started saying. Rightfully,

970
00:53:09,400 --> 00:53:12,600
Speaker 1: so after the invasion or the expanded invasion I should

971
00:53:12,640 --> 00:53:15,399
Speaker 1: say of Ukraine by Russia is like, well, now all

972
00:53:15,440 --> 00:53:17,919
Speaker 1: of these people who were experts in whatever the last

973
00:53:17,960 --> 00:53:19,960
Speaker 1: big story was are going to become experts on the

974
00:53:20,080 --> 00:53:22,880
Speaker 1: Ukrainian conflict, right, which is absolutely a thing that happened.

975
00:53:22,880 --> 00:53:24,480
Speaker 1: You get all of these people who I think are

976
00:53:25,239 --> 00:53:28,680
Speaker 1: pretty bad journalists and reporters who suddenly like rushed to

977
00:53:28,880 --> 00:53:30,880
Speaker 1: to have their commentary on this thing that they have

978
00:53:30,920 --> 00:53:34,320
Speaker 1: ignored for the last eight years. Um. But at the

979
00:53:34,400 --> 00:53:37,200
Speaker 1: same time, it's to talk about Belling Cat. The founder

980
00:53:37,280 --> 00:53:39,960
Speaker 1: of Belling Cat, my old boss, Elliott Higgins, was like

981
00:53:40,200 --> 00:53:43,480
Speaker 1: literally an unemployed dude sitting on his couch when he

982
00:53:43,560 --> 00:53:47,160
Speaker 1: started analyzing war footage um and is now one of

983
00:53:47,320 --> 00:53:50,800
Speaker 1: the most respected conflict analysts in the world. UM. And

984
00:53:50,920 --> 00:53:53,480
Speaker 1: that is a thing the Internet has made possible. UM.

985
00:53:53,560 --> 00:53:56,880
Speaker 1: I think a great example would be the Caliber Obscura Twitter,

986
00:53:57,000 --> 00:53:59,480
Speaker 1: which is just like a dude in the UK who

987
00:53:59,600 --> 00:54:04,760
Speaker 1: has an almost impossible ability to recognize firearms and pieces

988
00:54:04,800 --> 00:54:08,960
Speaker 1: of firearms and so just analyzes people send him footage

989
00:54:09,000 --> 00:54:10,880
Speaker 1: from all over the planet and he'll say, like, these

990
00:54:10,880 --> 00:54:12,480
Speaker 1: are these guns? And this is where they came from.

991
00:54:12,560 --> 00:54:14,840
Speaker 1: And this is uh, this one is like looks like

992
00:54:14,920 --> 00:54:18,279
Speaker 1: this kind of gun, but it's actually, um, a fake

993
00:54:18,360 --> 00:54:20,640
Speaker 1: one that's being made locally in this country, and it

994
00:54:20,760 --> 00:54:22,120
Speaker 1: is supposed to look like this. And you can tell

995
00:54:22,160 --> 00:54:25,759
Speaker 1: because like, um, that's not a person who Caliber did

996
00:54:25,840 --> 00:54:29,000
Speaker 1: not like go to some sort of fancy gun school.

997
00:54:29,080 --> 00:54:32,200
Speaker 1: They just are Uh. I mean, it's definitely not right

998
00:54:32,200 --> 00:54:34,239
Speaker 1: to call them an amateur because quite frankly, I don't

999
00:54:34,280 --> 00:54:37,319
Speaker 1: know any people who are working at institutes and better

1000
00:54:37,400 --> 00:54:40,560
Speaker 1: at the thing that Caliber does than Caliber is right, Um,

1001
00:54:40,600 --> 00:54:42,640
Speaker 1: But they did just start as a person on Twitter.

1002
00:54:42,800 --> 00:54:45,440
Speaker 1: You know. Well, that's the thing about this, this is

1003
00:54:45,520 --> 00:54:48,919
Speaker 1: that you get people who were not kind of born

1004
00:54:49,040 --> 00:54:51,280
Speaker 1: with an idea that they were going to become analysts

1005
00:54:51,320 --> 00:54:54,120
Speaker 1: and in this field. And so you have people like

1006
00:54:54,400 --> 00:54:56,680
Speaker 1: both of both of the people you mentioned, whom I

1007
00:54:56,840 --> 00:54:59,080
Speaker 1: I know personal I don't know Elliott personally, but I

1008
00:54:59,160 --> 00:55:02,239
Speaker 1: remember him for our days are shared days on a

1009
00:55:02,360 --> 00:55:06,800
Speaker 1: comedy website together. It's the website that show remained nameless,

1010
00:55:08,560 --> 00:55:13,120
Speaker 1: right Um. And then and then you know, uh, Caliber

1011
00:55:13,160 --> 00:55:15,200
Speaker 1: and I have talked on Twitter a bunch, and you

1012
00:55:15,239 --> 00:55:17,080
Speaker 1: know we're friends there and it's just interesting to see that,

1013
00:55:17,120 --> 00:55:20,400
Speaker 1: like both of them are very real people behind like

1014
00:55:20,560 --> 00:55:24,799
Speaker 1: their professional personality and their their expertise, they're also down

1015
00:55:24,880 --> 00:55:27,680
Speaker 1: to earth, real people, which is rare in this field

1016
00:55:27,719 --> 00:55:30,480
Speaker 1: because a lot of people are kind of elitist. Um

1017
00:55:30,680 --> 00:55:34,520
Speaker 1: and and and yeah Gatekeeper and neither of them are

1018
00:55:34,640 --> 00:55:37,080
Speaker 1: about that. They're both all about like getting as many

1019
00:55:37,120 --> 00:55:40,319
Speaker 1: people doing this as possible because more eyes are better, Like, yeah,

1020
00:55:40,960 --> 00:55:43,040
Speaker 1: Elliott is is uh, I mean, the whole reason my

1021
00:55:43,160 --> 00:55:45,920
Speaker 1: career with Belling Cat existed is because, like I emailed

1022
00:55:45,960 --> 00:55:47,480
Speaker 1: him out of the blue one day and said, hey,

1023
00:55:47,520 --> 00:55:50,360
Speaker 1: I've been noticing this weird thing in videos of fascists

1024
00:55:50,960 --> 00:55:52,960
Speaker 1: talking to cops. Can I write a thing for you?

1025
00:55:53,200 --> 00:55:55,640
Speaker 1: And he was just like okay, And and that was

1026
00:55:55,880 --> 00:55:57,960
Speaker 1: I mean, like that was how that started. Um And

1027
00:55:58,080 --> 00:56:00,719
Speaker 1: he's I've met him since a couple at times, and yeah,

1028
00:56:00,760 --> 00:56:04,360
Speaker 1: it is a very I think is very informed. Because

1029
00:56:04,440 --> 00:56:06,600
Speaker 1: of the fact that he did not come from sort

1030
00:56:06,600 --> 00:56:10,240
Speaker 1: of this big institutional background. UM has has a humility

1031
00:56:10,520 --> 00:56:14,439
Speaker 1: with which he approaches his investigations that, uh, I think

1032
00:56:15,239 --> 00:56:17,480
Speaker 1: is one of the things you should look for in

1033
00:56:17,600 --> 00:56:20,880
Speaker 1: trying to decide whether or not open source intelligence that

1034
00:56:20,920 --> 00:56:23,879
Speaker 1: you're seeing on Twitter. Whatever is credible is how how

1035
00:56:24,760 --> 00:56:28,319
Speaker 1: how conclusive are they stating their claims? Are? How many

1036
00:56:28,400 --> 00:56:30,800
Speaker 1: times do they offer only a single possibility for what

1037
00:56:31,000 --> 00:56:33,960
Speaker 1: something is? Like? Um, you know, there's a number of

1038
00:56:34,000 --> 00:56:36,279
Speaker 1: things you can do. I think at this point we

1039
00:56:36,280 --> 00:56:39,600
Speaker 1: should probably move to a separate area of discussion, which

1040
00:56:39,680 --> 00:56:46,840
Speaker 1: is how's the how's this war going? Who, who's who's winning? What? Um? Well, so,

1041
00:56:47,000 --> 00:56:51,040
Speaker 1: I I made a statement on my Facebook page, my

1042
00:56:51,160 --> 00:56:53,919
Speaker 1: personal Facebook page, three weeks ago, and I still feel

1043
00:56:53,960 --> 00:56:57,040
Speaker 1: confident in that statement, and that is that well, Ukraine

1044
00:56:57,120 --> 00:57:00,839
Speaker 1: has yet to win this war. Sha has already lost.

1045
00:57:01,040 --> 00:57:04,400
Speaker 1: They've already lost their objectives, They've already lost what they

1046
00:57:04,560 --> 00:57:06,239
Speaker 1: what their goals were. And at this point it's a

1047
00:57:06,320 --> 00:57:09,400
Speaker 1: face saving venture on the Russian part. But a raum um.

1048
00:57:10,239 --> 00:57:14,279
Speaker 1: Russia carried out a cutting faint action to distract while

1049
00:57:14,320 --> 00:57:17,080
Speaker 1: they while they took the East by burning a fifth

1050
00:57:17,120 --> 00:57:20,040
Speaker 1: of their general staff and all of their armored vehicles.

1051
00:57:20,680 --> 00:57:23,400
Speaker 1: It was a cunning fat Yeah I saw someone on

1052
00:57:23,520 --> 00:57:29,200
Speaker 1: Twitter positive actually uh a move to use up all

1053
00:57:29,200 --> 00:57:35,440
Speaker 1: of Ukraine's ammunition. Brilliant, Yeah, just very very zab Brannigan logic.

1054
00:57:35,880 --> 00:57:41,440
Speaker 1: Half of Vladimir Putin. Ukrainians have a preset kill limit

1055
00:57:41,480 --> 00:57:44,479
Speaker 1: and once they hit ten generals, the army will shut down.

1056
00:57:46,760 --> 00:57:48,480
Speaker 1: But no, the war is not going well for Russia.

1057
00:57:48,960 --> 00:57:51,120
Speaker 1: Um and that's not to say that it's going great

1058
00:57:51,160 --> 00:57:54,960
Speaker 1: for Ukraine either, but no one needs to do less

1059
00:57:55,040 --> 00:58:01,200
Speaker 1: well to succeed here. Yes, it's a I mean because

1060
00:58:01,240 --> 00:58:02,920
Speaker 1: one of the things that is a black box, right.

1061
00:58:03,040 --> 00:58:05,800
Speaker 1: I do think because there was a lot of discussion

1062
00:58:05,880 --> 00:58:08,040
Speaker 1: earlier in the ward, particularly like how credible are these

1063
00:58:08,120 --> 00:58:10,920
Speaker 1: numbers that the Ukrainian government is putting out for for

1064
00:58:11,040 --> 00:58:14,520
Speaker 1: dead and for destroyed vehicles? And I think the oceans

1065
00:58:14,960 --> 00:58:18,160
Speaker 1: out there, like the verified vehicle casualties and stuff that

1066
00:58:18,160 --> 00:58:21,040
Speaker 1: we can verify, means that like obviously the Ukrainian government

1067
00:58:21,160 --> 00:58:24,080
Speaker 1: is patting their numbers, but not by as much as

1068
00:58:24,160 --> 00:58:27,280
Speaker 1: a lot of people might have, like it's not wildly off.

1069
00:58:28,360 --> 00:58:31,080
Speaker 1: Saw their first casualty account. I think first casual account.

1070
00:58:31,080 --> 00:58:35,920
Speaker 1: I think it was like day two or three, and

1071
00:58:36,000 --> 00:58:38,080
Speaker 1: then like all of the western and held me. Yeah,

1072
00:58:38,520 --> 00:58:44,360
Speaker 1: actually yeah, it's probably about two Oh my god. Wow. Yeah.

1073
00:58:44,960 --> 00:58:47,320
Speaker 1: In perspective for some people who may not that number

1074
00:58:47,400 --> 00:58:50,640
Speaker 1: may not jump out to them. We lost you know,

1075
00:58:51,160 --> 00:58:54,360
Speaker 1: just shy of three thousand soldiers killed during the Iraq Wars.

1076
00:58:54,440 --> 00:58:57,120
Speaker 1: So yeah, two thousand in a couple of days is

1077
00:58:57,280 --> 00:59:00,480
Speaker 1: an extraordinary number of losses. Yeah. And of course the

1078
00:59:00,520 --> 00:59:02,520
Speaker 1: black box here we don't have nearly as good an

1079
00:59:02,560 --> 00:59:05,320
Speaker 1: information on is what kind of casualties is the Ukrainian

1080
00:59:05,400 --> 00:59:08,320
Speaker 1: military suffered and what kind of civilian casualties have been suffered?

1081
00:59:08,480 --> 00:59:13,640
Speaker 1: And um, Obviously civilian casualties nearly always take much longer

1082
00:59:13,760 --> 00:59:16,240
Speaker 1: to get, um to the extent that it's ever. I

1083
00:59:16,320 --> 00:59:19,720
Speaker 1: think we have a better chance of getting objective civilian

1084
00:59:19,800 --> 00:59:22,280
Speaker 1: casualties for this because, unlike a lot of other conflicts,

1085
00:59:22,400 --> 00:59:27,160
Speaker 1: these civilians being killed, our civilians under the ages of

1086
00:59:27,240 --> 00:59:30,440
Speaker 1: a government that is a functional state, as opposed to Syria,

1087
00:59:30,520 --> 00:59:34,400
Speaker 1: for example, where the there's basically the only people with

1088
00:59:34,440 --> 00:59:36,760
Speaker 1: an interest in accurately reporting the death count are a

1089
00:59:36,880 --> 00:59:42,280
Speaker 1: number of different non governmental organizations. Um, because the people

1090
00:59:42,440 --> 00:59:44,440
Speaker 1: being are being killed by one government or the other,

1091
00:59:44,560 --> 00:59:46,960
Speaker 1: right including like this is this was the same thing

1092
00:59:47,080 --> 00:59:49,760
Speaker 1: like in Iraq. The civilians who died in Mosel were

1093
00:59:49,800 --> 00:59:54,600
Speaker 1: technically under the Iraqi governments. You know, whatever. Protection seems

1094
00:59:54,640 --> 00:59:56,600
Speaker 1: like the wrong word to say, but I can tell

1095
00:59:56,640 --> 00:59:59,919
Speaker 1: you from my experience there, there was no We still

1096
01:00:00,040 --> 01:00:02,560
Speaker 1: do not have anything that approaches a credible civilian death

1097
01:00:02,680 --> 01:00:05,720
Speaker 1: count for for that conflict, um and probably never will

1098
01:00:06,440 --> 01:00:09,680
Speaker 1: right and and on that note, on the civilian casualties note,

1099
01:00:10,520 --> 01:00:14,560
Speaker 1: we were talking earlier about what how you can identify

1100
01:00:14,640 --> 01:00:16,840
Speaker 1: a credible ostan account versus a one that you probably

1101
01:00:16,840 --> 01:00:18,920
Speaker 1: shouldn't give too much credence to. And one of the

1102
01:00:18,960 --> 01:00:22,240
Speaker 1: best ways to do that, honestly is is, ah, look

1103
01:00:22,280 --> 01:00:25,960
Speaker 1: at their their morals. I guess if they're ever posting

1104
01:00:26,080 --> 01:00:29,760
Speaker 1: and celebrating the death of civilians anywhere, you should probably

1105
01:00:29,880 --> 01:00:33,560
Speaker 1: disregard them. Like, yeah, I'll never see Elliott Higgins being like, yeah,

1106
01:00:33,680 --> 01:00:36,280
Speaker 1: suck at people of belowgrad like you got hit with

1107
01:00:36,320 --> 01:00:38,520
Speaker 1: a missile, Like it's not it's you know, it's not

1108
01:00:38,520 --> 01:00:41,200
Speaker 1: gonna happen. Yeah, it's not. It's the same thing as like,

1109
01:00:42,200 --> 01:00:48,320
Speaker 1: I get why people celebrate h, you know, battlefield victories. Obviously,

1110
01:00:48,400 --> 01:00:51,439
Speaker 1: I don't think, especially if you're literally a Ukrainian living,

1111
01:00:51,840 --> 01:00:53,919
Speaker 1: you know, in the area affected, I don't think there's

1112
01:00:53,920 --> 01:00:59,720
Speaker 1: anything morally wrong with celebrating opposing soldiers being defeated. But

1113
01:01:00,080 --> 01:01:03,600
Speaker 1: I am I continue to be deeply unsettled by footage

1114
01:01:03,920 --> 01:01:08,080
Speaker 1: celebrating things like the destruction of armored personnel carriers full

1115
01:01:08,120 --> 01:01:11,919
Speaker 1: of nineteen year old kids, um, even though a non

1116
01:01:12,160 --> 01:01:15,560
Speaker 1: insignificant number of those nineteen year old kids are accessories

1117
01:01:15,600 --> 01:01:18,600
Speaker 1: to war crimes. Right, Like, it doesn't mean like I'm

1118
01:01:18,840 --> 01:01:21,320
Speaker 1: broadly okay with it. I do. I do feel a

1119
01:01:21,360 --> 01:01:25,000
Speaker 1: lot better about celebrating losses of special forces units like

1120
01:01:25,040 --> 01:01:28,360
Speaker 1: the vdv UM that have been heavily involved in war

1121
01:01:28,480 --> 01:01:30,800
Speaker 1: crimes around the world, like that I have less kind

1122
01:01:30,840 --> 01:01:34,520
Speaker 1: of an issue with. But and I felt that personally.

1123
01:01:34,640 --> 01:01:37,840
Speaker 1: You know, I'm Armenian and during the Carback War, it

1124
01:01:37,960 --> 01:01:40,760
Speaker 1: was just day, every day I would wake up to

1125
01:01:41,320 --> 01:01:44,800
Speaker 1: dozens of videos of Armenian conscripts and soldiers being blown

1126
01:01:44,920 --> 01:01:47,920
Speaker 1: up and hunted from the air, and people on Twitter

1127
01:01:48,040 --> 01:01:50,360
Speaker 1: cheering for it because they were, for one reason or another,

1128
01:01:50,440 --> 01:01:52,840
Speaker 1: on the ZERI side. And like, I get it, you know,

1129
01:01:53,000 --> 01:01:55,320
Speaker 1: like you were saying, you want to cheer your battlefield victories,

1130
01:01:56,120 --> 01:01:59,120
Speaker 1: and I understand that from people who live on the

1131
01:01:59,160 --> 01:02:03,080
Speaker 1: battlefield and live near the battlefield, I get it. It's

1132
01:02:03,120 --> 01:02:06,640
Speaker 1: happening to you, to people thousands of miles away cheerleading

1133
01:02:06,680 --> 01:02:09,720
Speaker 1: on the internet. What the hell is wrong with you? Yeah,

1134
01:02:09,920 --> 01:02:12,320
Speaker 1: maybe don't do that. Maybe don't do that, like you

1135
01:02:12,680 --> 01:02:14,840
Speaker 1: what the hell? Like you know, those are real people

1136
01:02:15,120 --> 01:02:18,040
Speaker 1: in that video that never did anything to you. And

1137
01:02:18,160 --> 01:02:19,840
Speaker 1: this is not like a sporting event where like they

1138
01:02:19,880 --> 01:02:21,200
Speaker 1: go home at the end of the day and they've

1139
01:02:21,280 --> 01:02:24,080
Speaker 1: just lost, like they're dead even when they do. Like,

1140
01:02:24,240 --> 01:02:28,000
Speaker 1: I've spent a huge amount of my career talking directly

1141
01:02:28,120 --> 01:02:30,400
Speaker 1: face to face with victims of ISIS, Right, I have

1142
01:02:30,520 --> 01:02:34,640
Speaker 1: been to like eight or nine refugee camps in two

1143
01:02:34,920 --> 01:02:38,360
Speaker 1: countries at this point, specifically for that were in addition

1144
01:02:38,440 --> 01:02:41,760
Speaker 1: to days spent on the refugee trail in between Hungary

1145
01:02:41,800 --> 01:02:45,800
Speaker 1: and Serbia talking to two Syrians and talking to um

1146
01:02:46,240 --> 01:02:49,760
Speaker 1: um people who had like fled the region. Uh. But

1147
01:02:49,880 --> 01:02:53,040
Speaker 1: at the same time, I can't help but like, like

1148
01:02:53,160 --> 01:02:55,480
Speaker 1: I've literally been under fire by ISIS and then had

1149
01:02:55,520 --> 01:02:58,040
Speaker 1: those ISIS guys gotten killed, and I have celebrated and

1150
01:02:58,160 --> 01:03:01,200
Speaker 1: cheered when that's happened. Um, And I'll never forget we

1151
01:03:01,280 --> 01:03:03,400
Speaker 1: were embedded with this mortar team and we were under

1152
01:03:03,440 --> 01:03:06,920
Speaker 1: fire from this sniper and the mortar team. I forget

1153
01:03:07,000 --> 01:03:08,640
Speaker 1: you can. In the article I wrote on it, I

1154
01:03:08,760 --> 01:03:10,280
Speaker 1: list the exact number of rounds fired, but it was

1155
01:03:10,280 --> 01:03:12,840
Speaker 1: like nine or ten something like that, where they're gradually

1156
01:03:12,920 --> 01:03:16,400
Speaker 1: walking in mortars until they get this guy um. And

1157
01:03:16,800 --> 01:03:19,200
Speaker 1: obviously we like cheered when they fucking killed this dude

1158
01:03:19,240 --> 01:03:21,200
Speaker 1: because he was shooting at us. And I remember, like

1159
01:03:21,320 --> 01:03:24,080
Speaker 1: kind of on our way out away from the front,

1160
01:03:24,280 --> 01:03:28,520
Speaker 1: my fixer Sangar was like, how many rounds did they

1161
01:03:28,600 --> 01:03:30,080
Speaker 1: drop before they got him? And I was like, I

1162
01:03:30,080 --> 01:03:31,200
Speaker 1: don't know. I think it was like nine or ten.

1163
01:03:31,240 --> 01:03:32,960
Speaker 1: I've got the footage somewhere, and he was like, I

1164
01:03:33,040 --> 01:03:38,640
Speaker 1: wonder what else they hit and and sang sangarsa Uhum

1165
01:03:38,840 --> 01:03:41,200
Speaker 1: like was born and raised in mosle Um, And it

1166
01:03:41,320 --> 01:03:43,520
Speaker 1: was one of those things we spent the very next day.

1167
01:03:43,560 --> 01:03:46,480
Speaker 1: We were like talking to people fleeing their homes and stuff.

1168
01:03:46,560 --> 01:03:49,080
Speaker 1: And not only did we we like see some of

1169
01:03:49,160 --> 01:03:52,520
Speaker 1: those people who lost family members too misses both by

1170
01:03:52,720 --> 01:03:56,080
Speaker 1: Iraqi forces and by coalition aircraft and stuff, but like

1171
01:03:56,200 --> 01:03:58,880
Speaker 1: we came upon this dead ices fighter in a fighting

1172
01:03:58,920 --> 01:04:01,560
Speaker 1: position where you could he he had been in there

1173
01:04:01,640 --> 01:04:04,080
Speaker 1: with his wife for days, and he had been wounded

1174
01:04:04,120 --> 01:04:06,680
Speaker 1: two or three days before he got killed, and you

1175
01:04:06,720 --> 01:04:09,240
Speaker 1: could see the evidence of the first aide she had

1176
01:04:09,320 --> 01:04:10,720
Speaker 1: done on him, and it was one of those things.

1177
01:04:10,800 --> 01:04:12,760
Speaker 1: I guess I could try to make the case that like, well,

1178
01:04:12,800 --> 01:04:15,320
Speaker 1: maybe she was a captive and didn't want to do it,

1179
01:04:15,440 --> 01:04:18,120
Speaker 1: but quite frankly, everything I saw in there makes me

1180
01:04:18,240 --> 01:04:21,200
Speaker 1: believe like she cared deeply for him and stayed with

1181
01:04:21,320 --> 01:04:23,960
Speaker 1: him until the bitter end, trying to keep him alive

1182
01:04:24,040 --> 01:04:26,680
Speaker 1: and fighting. Um. And that doesn't mean he's not like

1183
01:04:26,800 --> 01:04:28,640
Speaker 1: a monster, and it doesn't mean he shouldn't have been

1184
01:04:28,760 --> 01:04:31,120
Speaker 1: killed because he's a fucking dashi who was in the

1185
01:04:31,200 --> 01:04:34,720
Speaker 1: middle of doing enabling a series of terrible things. But

1186
01:04:34,800 --> 01:04:38,280
Speaker 1: he's also like, you can't you can't ignore the humanity

1187
01:04:39,000 --> 01:04:42,280
Speaker 1: of of somebody when you have seen that element of

1188
01:04:42,400 --> 01:04:45,800
Speaker 1: what what happens in the conflict, and that has stayed

1189
01:04:45,880 --> 01:04:49,280
Speaker 1: with me quite a bit ever since. Yeah, and it's

1190
01:04:50,480 --> 01:04:53,920
Speaker 1: it's one of those things. And you gotta you gotta

1191
01:04:53,960 --> 01:04:57,479
Speaker 1: remember that the majority of young men of fighting age

1192
01:04:57,480 --> 01:05:01,000
Speaker 1: around the world who joined a military or armed organization

1193
01:05:01,120 --> 01:05:03,320
Speaker 1: or an insurgent group, whatever it may be, they do

1194
01:05:03,520 --> 01:05:06,160
Speaker 1: so typically because it's whomever is in charge of the

1195
01:05:06,240 --> 01:05:09,240
Speaker 1: area they're growing up in. Right, You don't join the

1196
01:05:09,320 --> 01:05:11,560
Speaker 1: Russian Army because you wait all the options, and the

1197
01:05:11,600 --> 01:05:14,040
Speaker 1: Brazilian Army offer some good aid, you know, some good

1198
01:05:14,240 --> 01:05:16,760
Speaker 1: healthcare packages. And I looked at the Italian Army, but

1199
01:05:16,800 --> 01:05:18,240
Speaker 1: really I want to go with the Russian. No, you

1200
01:05:18,320 --> 01:05:21,840
Speaker 1: go with wherever you were born, yeah, whether, And you know,

1201
01:05:21,920 --> 01:05:23,920
Speaker 1: and I was talking to my roommate about this last night.

1202
01:05:24,280 --> 01:05:26,760
Speaker 1: We were watching this footage from the flood of nineties

1203
01:05:27,040 --> 01:05:29,240
Speaker 1: here in Oregon, you know, and it's this National Guard

1204
01:05:29,280 --> 01:05:31,920
Speaker 1: a helicopter where they're pushing bales of hay out of

1205
01:05:31,920 --> 01:05:34,360
Speaker 1: the back of the helicopter down to cows stranded out

1206
01:05:34,360 --> 01:05:37,240
Speaker 1: in your tillamook. And so depending on when you join

1207
01:05:37,280 --> 01:05:39,800
Speaker 1: the National Guard, you either fed cows hey from a

1208
01:05:39,880 --> 01:05:44,640
Speaker 1: helicopter or deployed to Irock. That's the luck of the draw, right,

1209
01:05:44,920 --> 01:05:48,400
Speaker 1: That's not fair. No, they don't deserve to die any

1210
01:05:48,440 --> 01:05:49,840
Speaker 1: more than the guys dropping the hay out of the

1211
01:05:49,880 --> 01:05:55,200
Speaker 1: helicopter did, right. But people get yeah, they get carried

1212
01:05:55,240 --> 01:05:57,800
Speaker 1: away with like turning it into a sport almost, and

1213
01:05:57,880 --> 01:05:59,320
Speaker 1: they forget that there's people on the other end, and

1214
01:05:59,360 --> 01:06:02,040
Speaker 1: that like, well, some of them are threats and they

1215
01:06:02,080 --> 01:06:05,000
Speaker 1: may need to be dealt with. It's like, you know,

1216
01:06:05,880 --> 01:06:08,440
Speaker 1: a bear comes at you in the woods. You shoot it,

1217
01:06:08,560 --> 01:06:10,640
Speaker 1: you don't, you don't skin it and make fun of it,

1218
01:06:10,880 --> 01:06:15,560
Speaker 1: like yeah, you know, I go kill its kids. You know,

1219
01:06:15,720 --> 01:06:17,480
Speaker 1: that's not that's not how it works, you know. So

1220
01:06:17,760 --> 01:06:20,439
Speaker 1: like yeah, yeah, don't don't be don't be a piece

1221
01:06:20,480 --> 01:06:24,320
Speaker 1: of ship, Like don't don't don't don't lose your humanity, um,

1222
01:06:24,600 --> 01:06:26,760
Speaker 1: because I mean, one of the things that makes it

1223
01:06:26,840 --> 01:06:29,840
Speaker 1: easy to lose your humanity is that like videos of

1224
01:06:29,880 --> 01:06:32,960
Speaker 1: ship getting blown up looks dope, right like it it does.

1225
01:06:33,000 --> 01:06:35,000
Speaker 1: It looks cool to watch things get blown up. That's

1226
01:06:35,040 --> 01:06:37,440
Speaker 1: in fact, I suspect how a lot of people who

1227
01:06:37,560 --> 01:06:40,320
Speaker 1: become very good oh since investigators part of what draws

1228
01:06:40,360 --> 01:06:41,760
Speaker 1: them in. It's just like I'm sure that was a

1229
01:06:41,800 --> 01:06:44,680
Speaker 1: part of why Caliber started obsessively researching guns. Is like

1230
01:06:44,760 --> 01:06:47,760
Speaker 1: their neat guns are neat. You know, weapons are interesting.

1231
01:06:47,880 --> 01:06:52,320
Speaker 1: People are inherently interested in in weaponry. Um, which is

1232
01:06:53,320 --> 01:06:55,280
Speaker 1: not a good thing. It's just the thing, you know.

1233
01:06:55,400 --> 01:06:56,840
Speaker 1: It's not a bad thing either. It's just like a

1234
01:06:56,960 --> 01:07:00,120
Speaker 1: thing human beings will always be interested in. But as

1235
01:07:00,160 --> 01:07:04,800
Speaker 1: warfare is as natural to us as eating and fucking. Um, well,

1236
01:07:04,840 --> 01:07:07,160
Speaker 1: you're talking about the mortars, right, the mortars walking in

1237
01:07:07,240 --> 01:07:09,920
Speaker 1: And there's this video on YouTube of made by an

1238
01:07:09,920 --> 01:07:14,720
Speaker 1: American Navy attack squadron of them dropping bomb after bomb

1239
01:07:14,840 --> 01:07:18,160
Speaker 1: on targets and muzzle and and and uh rocca places

1240
01:07:18,200 --> 01:07:21,080
Speaker 1: like that, and it's set to the Devil's going to

1241
01:07:21,160 --> 01:07:23,200
Speaker 1: cut you down, And every time there's a beat in

1242
01:07:23,280 --> 01:07:25,600
Speaker 1: the music, and you see a bomb drop, and some

1243
01:07:25,680 --> 01:07:27,960
Speaker 1: of these bombs it's like four bombs dropping at a time,

1244
01:07:28,040 --> 01:07:30,560
Speaker 1: dropping an eight story building. And so I'm sure there

1245
01:07:30,640 --> 01:07:32,440
Speaker 1: was a guy inside there with a weapon, but like

1246
01:07:32,800 --> 01:07:34,680
Speaker 1: you want to tell me there wasn't anybody else in

1247
01:07:34,760 --> 01:07:37,880
Speaker 1: that eighth story building, And like, okay, yeah, you're celebrating

1248
01:07:37,880 --> 01:07:39,720
Speaker 1: the death of the combatant there, but like also all

1249
01:07:39,760 --> 01:07:42,760
Speaker 1: those other people are being celebrated indirectly, and so like

1250
01:07:43,080 --> 01:07:45,760
Speaker 1: you gotta remember that, like these bombs explode and they

1251
01:07:45,800 --> 01:07:47,800
Speaker 1: take out a large area, and these fights are happening

1252
01:07:47,840 --> 01:07:50,720
Speaker 1: in cities a lot of the time. Yeah, the weaponry

1253
01:07:50,840 --> 01:07:55,120
Speaker 1: that the United States uses is more precise than something

1254
01:07:55,200 --> 01:07:58,520
Speaker 1: like a barrel bomb, but not by as midy orders

1255
01:07:58,560 --> 01:08:02,600
Speaker 1: of magnitude as you would hope. Um. And and precision

1256
01:08:02,680 --> 01:08:07,920
Speaker 1: doesn't precision matters, Yes, it's not a non important an

1257
01:08:08,080 --> 01:08:11,160
Speaker 1: important thing, but Ultimately, it doesn't matter if your missile

1258
01:08:11,240 --> 01:08:13,600
Speaker 1: went right into that living room full of civilians and

1259
01:08:13,640 --> 01:08:15,680
Speaker 1: blew them all up, or if you leveled the block

1260
01:08:15,800 --> 01:08:18,840
Speaker 1: and maybe you know, killed them indirectly. Like you gotta

1261
01:08:18,880 --> 01:08:21,320
Speaker 1: know what you're hitting. The target is what really matters, right,

1262
01:08:21,600 --> 01:08:23,040
Speaker 1: So it doesn't matter if you can hit the target,

1263
01:08:23,040 --> 01:08:24,960
Speaker 1: you gotta make sure it's the right target. And that's

1264
01:08:25,040 --> 01:08:27,000
Speaker 1: where we're starting to have issues now, is like we

1265
01:08:27,080 --> 01:08:29,880
Speaker 1: can hit targets really well, we just aren't always sure

1266
01:08:29,920 --> 01:08:32,720
Speaker 1: that it's the right yes, as opposed I mean, and

1267
01:08:32,880 --> 01:08:35,560
Speaker 1: and you are seeing. So let's let's talk about we

1268
01:08:35,680 --> 01:08:40,320
Speaker 1: we started this chatting about Ukrainian potential Ukrainian war crime. Um,

1269
01:08:40,479 --> 01:08:44,120
Speaker 1: what we have absolute documentation of a tremendous amount of

1270
01:08:44,200 --> 01:08:48,120
Speaker 1: war crimes on behalf of the Russian UH invaders, including

1271
01:08:48,200 --> 01:08:50,680
Speaker 1: a thing that they have done repeatedly in Syria, which

1272
01:08:50,760 --> 01:08:55,040
Speaker 1: is the targeting of hospitals and medical facilities, um with

1273
01:08:55,320 --> 01:08:58,200
Speaker 1: with terrible civilian casualties as a as a result. And

1274
01:08:58,280 --> 01:09:00,719
Speaker 1: this is something that the New York Times actually published

1275
01:09:00,760 --> 01:09:03,639
Speaker 1: an incredible article based on a mix of O cent

1276
01:09:03,880 --> 01:09:06,479
Speaker 1: and like I'm not entirely sure how they got them,

1277
01:09:06,560 --> 01:09:10,040
Speaker 1: but combat flight recorders, like the audio that these these

1278
01:09:10,120 --> 01:09:13,360
Speaker 1: Russian fighter pilots were sending back and forth to command

1279
01:09:13,400 --> 01:09:16,639
Speaker 1: as they attacked hospitals in Syria. Um, so we actually

1280
01:09:16,640 --> 01:09:19,120
Speaker 1: have a tremendous amount of detail about like what it

1281
01:09:19,320 --> 01:09:22,599
Speaker 1: looks like inside the cockpit and in like the control

1282
01:09:22,680 --> 01:09:25,600
Speaker 1: room and whatnot, as air strikes are being ordered on

1283
01:09:25,760 --> 01:09:28,840
Speaker 1: medical facilities. I really recommend people check that article out.

1284
01:09:29,520 --> 01:09:33,120
Speaker 1: Um it's it's pretty harrowing. Ship. But UM, yeah, are

1285
01:09:33,160 --> 01:09:35,320
Speaker 1: you are you surprised at all by kind of what

1286
01:09:35,520 --> 01:09:37,800
Speaker 1: you are what you've seen so far in behalf of

1287
01:09:37,840 --> 01:09:40,760
Speaker 1: the Russian forces in Ukraine. No, no, not even not

1288
01:09:40,840 --> 01:09:43,760
Speaker 1: even the slightest, Because I followed the war and in

1289
01:09:44,000 --> 01:09:47,000
Speaker 1: Syria rather closely. And uh, I mean there was a

1290
01:09:47,040 --> 01:09:49,320
Speaker 1: point when they had to stop marking the hospitals with

1291
01:09:49,439 --> 01:09:52,520
Speaker 1: hospital marketings because the Russians would target them so consistently.

1292
01:09:52,880 --> 01:09:55,000
Speaker 1: The United Nations had to stop giving the Russians the

1293
01:09:55,080 --> 01:09:57,519
Speaker 1: coordinates of the hospitals and in Aleppo because they kept

1294
01:09:57,560 --> 01:10:02,040
Speaker 1: getting targeted. Um. There was an AID convoy that was struck,

1295
01:10:02,200 --> 01:10:05,200
Speaker 1: I believe by Syrian aircraft, but it was the targeting

1296
01:10:05,280 --> 01:10:07,720
Speaker 1: was given to them by Russian aircraft. Um. It was

1297
01:10:07,760 --> 01:10:10,040
Speaker 1: just an AID convoy coming into Aleppo, a United Nations

1298
01:10:10,080 --> 01:10:12,760
Speaker 1: and Aid convoy, and it was bombed and strafe repeatedly

1299
01:10:12,880 --> 01:10:16,160
Speaker 1: for you know, several hours. Um. Things like that that

1300
01:10:16,320 --> 01:10:20,240
Speaker 1: happened so regularly in Syria to the relative silence of

1301
01:10:20,320 --> 01:10:23,400
Speaker 1: the rest of the world. Um, that led me to

1302
01:10:23,439 --> 01:10:25,760
Speaker 1: believe that when they go into Ukraine, they're not going

1303
01:10:25,800 --> 01:10:29,400
Speaker 1: to be any gentler. Um. A lot of people suspected

1304
01:10:29,439 --> 01:10:33,160
Speaker 1: early on that, like, well, they it's harder to demonize

1305
01:10:33,160 --> 01:10:34,960
Speaker 1: people who look like you, so they're not going to

1306
01:10:36,040 --> 01:10:39,200
Speaker 1: have as much of an easy time demonizing Ukrainians. And

1307
01:10:39,560 --> 01:10:42,320
Speaker 1: I think there has been some degree of difficulty with that,

1308
01:10:42,760 --> 01:10:44,439
Speaker 1: at least in terms of some of the conscripts on

1309
01:10:44,439 --> 01:10:46,920
Speaker 1: the Russian side. But the other thing we're seeing is that,

1310
01:10:47,000 --> 01:10:49,360
Speaker 1: like a lot of these a lot of people seem

1311
01:10:49,439 --> 01:10:53,800
Speaker 1: to genuinely believe the mission of denazifying Ukraine. And so

1312
01:10:54,360 --> 01:10:59,439
Speaker 1: if that's what you believe you're doing, then the bombing

1313
01:10:59,760 --> 01:11:02,439
Speaker 1: does surprised, It doesn't become a surprise. Right. If you

1314
01:11:02,560 --> 01:11:04,920
Speaker 1: think that you're going into Ukraine to suppress it and

1315
01:11:05,000 --> 01:11:07,879
Speaker 1: occupy it, then bombing city city is full of Russians,

1316
01:11:07,960 --> 01:11:10,920
Speaker 1: Russians and Russian speakers seems like a bad idea, but

1317
01:11:11,040 --> 01:11:14,479
Speaker 1: if you believe that they're all Nazis, then it makes

1318
01:11:14,960 --> 01:11:17,240
Speaker 1: sense that you might just blow them up because they're

1319
01:11:17,240 --> 01:11:19,080
Speaker 1: all the enemy. I'm not saying I'm not condoning it.

1320
01:11:19,160 --> 01:11:20,920
Speaker 1: I'm saying no, But I mean that is literally what

1321
01:11:21,040 --> 01:11:23,719
Speaker 1: the US government in the British government did in World

1322
01:11:23,760 --> 01:11:29,320
Speaker 1: War you know exactly. There have been claims made that

1323
01:11:30,120 --> 01:11:33,439
Speaker 1: what Russia is doing in places like mary A Pole

1324
01:11:34,280 --> 01:11:37,759
Speaker 1: amounts to an active genocide. Um, what is your opinion

1325
01:11:37,800 --> 01:11:45,760
Speaker 1: on that? Genocide is a big word. It's yeah, but

1326
01:11:45,960 --> 01:11:47,400
Speaker 1: you know, it has a lot of meaning behind it,

1327
01:11:47,439 --> 01:11:50,160
Speaker 1: in the sense that like, just because somebody is killing

1328
01:11:50,240 --> 01:11:52,479
Speaker 1: large numbers of people and doing so in heinous ways

1329
01:11:52,560 --> 01:11:54,760
Speaker 1: does not make it a genocide. You have to an

1330
01:11:54,760 --> 01:11:57,720
Speaker 1: attempt to destroy culture and destroy heritage and things of

1331
01:11:57,800 --> 01:12:01,680
Speaker 1: that nature. Um, as it stands, I would say that

1332
01:12:01,800 --> 01:12:05,800
Speaker 1: it looks likely that there are signs of potential genocide

1333
01:12:06,360 --> 01:12:08,599
Speaker 1: in Mariable. I am not confident enough to come out

1334
01:12:08,600 --> 01:12:11,840
Speaker 1: and say that I conclusively think it's happening, but the

1335
01:12:11,920 --> 01:12:14,320
Speaker 1: way that it looks like the the city is being

1336
01:12:14,439 --> 01:12:18,719
Speaker 1: deliberately targeted to either force the entire population to flee

1337
01:12:19,240 --> 01:12:22,680
Speaker 1: or to radicalize them one way or the other. Is

1338
01:12:23,520 --> 01:12:27,760
Speaker 1: it goes beyond military target you know. I think the

1339
01:12:27,880 --> 01:12:32,120
Speaker 1: thing that were that I that is the most like

1340
01:12:32,560 --> 01:12:36,800
Speaker 1: troubling potential sign of an intention of genocide is the

1341
01:12:37,000 --> 01:12:40,960
Speaker 1: reports that the Russian government has been evacuating civilians that

1342
01:12:41,040 --> 01:12:43,400
Speaker 1: they have in parts of Mariopole. They have captured two

1343
01:12:43,640 --> 01:12:47,000
Speaker 1: places in Russia, which is this is a misconception. You

1344
01:12:47,040 --> 01:12:49,280
Speaker 1: don't have to just be killing people, as you stated,

1345
01:12:49,280 --> 01:12:51,519
Speaker 1: it's an attempt to destroy a culture, which you can

1346
01:12:51,600 --> 01:12:53,479
Speaker 1: do by killing, but you can also do by things

1347
01:12:53,600 --> 01:12:58,479
Speaker 1: like separating moving people, like forced migration and whatnot. Like

1348
01:12:58,680 --> 01:13:00,840
Speaker 1: there's aspects of that at again, look at like the

1349
01:13:00,920 --> 01:13:03,240
Speaker 1: genocide of the Native Americans in the United States. It

1350
01:13:03,320 --> 01:13:05,320
Speaker 1: was not all straight up killing. A lot of it

1351
01:13:05,479 --> 01:13:09,000
Speaker 1: was forced migration, um, which is an act of genocide

1352
01:13:09,040 --> 01:13:11,360
Speaker 1: as well. Um. And that's the kind of thing where

1353
01:13:11,400 --> 01:13:14,080
Speaker 1: I'm I'm kind of waiting for more reporting on that

1354
01:13:14,800 --> 01:13:17,320
Speaker 1: to the to see here exactly what's happening in the

1355
01:13:17,360 --> 01:13:19,439
Speaker 1: extent to what's happening, But that really troubles me in

1356
01:13:19,600 --> 01:13:22,800
Speaker 1: terms of potential signs of a genocide. Yeah, and when

1357
01:13:22,840 --> 01:13:25,439
Speaker 1: they when they coined the term genocide after World War Two.

1358
01:13:26,080 --> 01:13:29,240
Speaker 1: It was it was with reference to the Holocaust, but

1359
01:13:29,720 --> 01:13:32,920
Speaker 1: but what they had in mind was the Armenian genocide. Yeah,

1360
01:13:33,920 --> 01:13:36,800
Speaker 1: when it when they when they drafted these words, and

1361
01:13:37,720 --> 01:13:40,160
Speaker 1: because it was beyond just sheer number of people killed,

1362
01:13:40,160 --> 01:13:42,919
Speaker 1: if we're talking sheer number of people killed, the Nazis

1363
01:13:43,000 --> 01:13:46,519
Speaker 1: also killed six million other people in addition to the

1364
01:13:46,560 --> 01:13:48,960
Speaker 1: six million Jews they killed. The reason we talked about

1365
01:13:49,000 --> 01:13:51,880
Speaker 1: the Jews is one, six million is a lot of people.

1366
01:13:52,200 --> 01:13:54,960
Speaker 1: And two it was a deliberate attempt to destroy their

1367
01:13:55,120 --> 01:13:59,720
Speaker 1: entire culture. You make them have never existed, and that's

1368
01:13:59,840 --> 01:14:03,000
Speaker 1: very different and very scary. Dying is also very bad,

1369
01:14:03,680 --> 01:14:05,599
Speaker 1: the idea of dying and then all of the people

1370
01:14:05,640 --> 01:14:07,880
Speaker 1: who were like you just don't exist anymore, and all

1371
01:14:07,920 --> 01:14:12,760
Speaker 1: your books and your literature are gone. Like that's that's monstrous. Yeah,

1372
01:14:13,080 --> 01:14:16,639
Speaker 1: And that's why there's a difference between genocide and mass killing. Yeah,

1373
01:14:16,760 --> 01:14:19,080
Speaker 1: And it's it's the difference. Like we talked about US

1374
01:14:19,120 --> 01:14:21,160
Speaker 1: war crimes in World War Two, of which there were many,

1375
01:14:21,200 --> 01:14:24,160
Speaker 1: including the fire bombing of Dresden. I would argue, but

1376
01:14:24,280 --> 01:14:26,760
Speaker 1: it's not an act of genocide because when they fire

1377
01:14:26,840 --> 01:14:31,200
Speaker 1: bombed Dresden. It was certainly um the killing of civilians

1378
01:14:31,280 --> 01:14:35,200
Speaker 1: without particular regard to the direct military efficacy of the action,

1379
01:14:35,280 --> 01:14:37,799
Speaker 1: But it was not an attempt to destroy German culture

1380
01:14:37,920 --> 01:14:41,360
Speaker 1: or obliterate the German people. And you brought up the

1381
01:14:41,479 --> 01:14:44,080
Speaker 1: Armenian genocide. Well, we'll talk about this at some point

1382
01:14:44,240 --> 01:14:47,040
Speaker 1: behind the bastards, but you mentioned that that was kind

1383
01:14:47,080 --> 01:14:50,799
Speaker 1: of what the people when the term genocide was invented,

1384
01:14:51,439 --> 01:14:53,880
Speaker 1: that was what people were looking at, even though it

1385
01:14:53,960 --> 01:14:55,720
Speaker 1: was kind of a direct response to the Holocaust. It's

1386
01:14:55,720 --> 01:14:59,520
Speaker 1: also worth noting that like when the Nazis planned the Holocaust,

1387
01:14:59,640 --> 01:15:03,160
Speaker 1: they to the Armenian genocide as a model. Um Hitler's

1388
01:15:03,240 --> 01:15:06,479
Speaker 1: literal statement was when people when he was asked during

1389
01:15:06,560 --> 01:15:08,720
Speaker 1: like one of his his dinners with a bunch of

1390
01:15:08,920 --> 01:15:13,200
Speaker 1: Nazi officials, like what what about kind of the international

1391
01:15:13,320 --> 01:15:15,880
Speaker 1: reaction to what we're planning to do? He was like, well,

1392
01:15:15,880 --> 01:15:18,560
Speaker 1: who remembers the Armenians? You know? Like that was his

1393
01:15:18,760 --> 01:15:20,240
Speaker 1: That was his attitude, is like, we'll get away with

1394
01:15:20,320 --> 01:15:23,439
Speaker 1: it because nobody did anything during this genocide, right and

1395
01:15:23,600 --> 01:15:27,160
Speaker 1: and and I think while I would hesitate to call

1396
01:15:27,320 --> 01:15:31,200
Speaker 1: the entire war in Ukraine and genocide. Yes, as of yet.

1397
01:15:31,680 --> 01:15:33,840
Speaker 1: I would say that there's a similarity between the Armenian

1398
01:15:33,920 --> 01:15:38,120
Speaker 1: genocide and and how that led to the Holocaust. There's

1399
01:15:38,120 --> 01:15:40,799
Speaker 1: a similarity between the Russian war crimes committed in Syria

1400
01:15:41,120 --> 01:15:43,559
Speaker 1: and how that led to the war crimes being committed

1401
01:15:43,600 --> 01:15:45,800
Speaker 1: in Ukraine, in the sense that if the world had

1402
01:15:45,800 --> 01:15:49,800
Speaker 1: stood up earlier, we would not be seeing this now. Yeah.

1403
01:15:50,800 --> 01:15:53,439
Speaker 1: The problem is the world looked the other way when

1404
01:15:53,479 --> 01:15:57,919
Speaker 1: the Russians bombed hospitals in Syria, when they repeatedly bombed hospitals.

1405
01:15:57,960 --> 01:16:01,320
Speaker 1: In fact, the world didn't just look away. A lot

1406
01:16:01,400 --> 01:16:04,320
Speaker 1: of people in the West mocked it. I'm sure you've

1407
01:16:04,360 --> 01:16:06,200
Speaker 1: heard it as often as I have. The last Hospital

1408
01:16:06,280 --> 01:16:09,080
Speaker 1: and Aleppo joke, right where, oh they're bombing the lost

1409
01:16:09,200 --> 01:16:11,880
Speaker 1: last hospital and Aleppo again. Well, the reason that happened

1410
01:16:11,960 --> 01:16:13,720
Speaker 1: is because when you bomb the hospital, they build a

1411
01:16:13,760 --> 01:16:16,200
Speaker 1: new one, and then it gets bombed again three days later,

1412
01:16:16,280 --> 01:16:18,479
Speaker 1: so they've bombed the last one again. So it wasn't

1413
01:16:18,479 --> 01:16:20,519
Speaker 1: a joke. It was just a tragedy that kept playing

1414
01:16:20,520 --> 01:16:23,920
Speaker 1: out that people couldn't really fathom, so they mocked, right.

1415
01:16:24,000 --> 01:16:25,960
Speaker 1: And so when that's the attitude of a lot of

1416
01:16:26,000 --> 01:16:28,400
Speaker 1: the world, it's no surprise that what's what's happened in

1417
01:16:28,520 --> 01:16:32,400
Speaker 1: Ukraine as has run out of control? M hm, Where

1418
01:16:32,400 --> 01:16:34,040
Speaker 1: do you think we go from here? What are you

1419
01:16:34,080 --> 01:16:36,840
Speaker 1: what are you expecting to kind of see next within

1420
01:16:36,960 --> 01:16:39,759
Speaker 1: this conflict? You know, the most recent kind of reporting

1421
01:16:39,840 --> 01:16:42,599
Speaker 1: is that Russia's pulling. Russia's framing it is they're pulling

1422
01:16:42,680 --> 01:16:46,080
Speaker 1: back from Kiev to to focus on other fronts. Uh.

1423
01:16:46,200 --> 01:16:48,679
Speaker 1: The Ukrainian side is saying like, well, they've been defeated

1424
01:16:48,760 --> 01:16:50,639
Speaker 1: around Kiev and they're pulling back. What do you think

1425
01:16:50,680 --> 01:16:53,040
Speaker 1: kind of we're seeing next? What is your opinion on

1426
01:16:53,160 --> 01:16:55,760
Speaker 1: kind of the next stages here? So I think it

1427
01:16:55,840 --> 01:17:00,160
Speaker 1: really depends on Vladimir Prutin's power and how long he

1428
01:17:00,280 --> 01:17:03,800
Speaker 1: remains in a position of unchecked power. I'm not saying

1429
01:17:04,040 --> 01:17:06,960
Speaker 1: necessarily he will fall from power. I'm saying that how

1430
01:17:07,040 --> 01:17:09,679
Speaker 1: long can he go as the only guy calling the shots?

1431
01:17:09,760 --> 01:17:12,920
Speaker 1: Because as it stands right now, it doesn't look like

1432
01:17:13,280 --> 01:17:15,320
Speaker 1: he's the same Vladimir Putin that we were used to

1433
01:17:15,400 --> 01:17:17,640
Speaker 1: dealing with. It seems like something may have changed with him.

1434
01:17:18,320 --> 01:17:22,599
Speaker 1: And that's a wild card because if if Vladimir Putin

1435
01:17:22,680 --> 01:17:24,760
Speaker 1: wants to continue to escalate here he can continue to

1436
01:17:24,800 --> 01:17:27,040
Speaker 1: do so because he may not be getting the same

1437
01:17:27,080 --> 01:17:29,200
Speaker 1: reporting that we are about the condition of his army.

1438
01:17:29,720 --> 01:17:31,519
Speaker 1: He may think his army is doing better than they're

1439
01:17:31,560 --> 01:17:34,160
Speaker 1: doing and that they actually are just repositioning. So if

1440
01:17:34,240 --> 01:17:36,439
Speaker 1: that's the case, there's a chance to he'll escalate against

1441
01:17:36,680 --> 01:17:40,240
Speaker 1: potentially in NATO country. I find that unlikely, but there's

1442
01:17:40,240 --> 01:17:42,360
Speaker 1: still a chance for it. I think what's more likely

1443
01:17:42,479 --> 01:17:44,880
Speaker 1: is that we're going to see the Russian military refocused

1444
01:17:45,000 --> 01:17:48,599
Speaker 1: efforts in the east, in in Donetskan Luhansk, with an

1445
01:17:48,600 --> 01:17:50,960
Speaker 1: attempts to create a land bridge to Crimea through the

1446
01:17:51,000 --> 01:17:55,120
Speaker 1: area through Mariopol Melitopa area UM and I think they're

1447
01:17:55,120 --> 01:17:56,760
Speaker 1: going to try to rucify the area as much as

1448
01:17:56,840 --> 01:17:59,920
Speaker 1: possible and remove as many of the Ukrainians as possible

1449
01:18:00,520 --> 01:18:03,120
Speaker 1: UM one way or the other. And I don't know

1450
01:18:03,160 --> 01:18:05,400
Speaker 1: if they'll be successful in that, but I think simultaneously

1451
01:18:05,400 --> 01:18:06,720
Speaker 1: while they do that, they're going to try to tie

1452
01:18:06,800 --> 01:18:09,080
Speaker 1: down and destroy as much of the Ukrainian military as

1453
01:18:09,120 --> 01:18:12,160
Speaker 1: possible UM, which will be difficult because the units in

1454
01:18:12,200 --> 01:18:16,000
Speaker 1: the east are Ukraine's best equip units. So I don't

1455
01:18:16,080 --> 01:18:18,720
Speaker 1: know how this ends. I don't see a reasonable end

1456
01:18:18,760 --> 01:18:21,840
Speaker 1: to this insight, but that's just because there's too many

1457
01:18:21,880 --> 01:18:24,960
Speaker 1: variables at the moment. I do think one thing that's

1458
01:18:25,000 --> 01:18:28,440
Speaker 1: kind of worth looking at this war in a historical context.

1459
01:18:29,479 --> 01:18:31,519
Speaker 1: A number of comparisons have been made to both of

1460
01:18:31,560 --> 01:18:34,439
Speaker 1: the world wars here, um, I think the thing that

1461
01:18:34,600 --> 01:18:37,320
Speaker 1: it most reminds me of is World War One, not

1462
01:18:37,880 --> 01:18:40,720
Speaker 1: in that it's a conflagration on that scale or in

1463
01:18:40,840 --> 01:18:43,519
Speaker 1: that um it's a similar war in terms of the combat,

1464
01:18:44,040 --> 01:18:47,160
Speaker 1: but it is an example of the first big war

1465
01:18:47,600 --> 01:18:50,360
Speaker 1: that utilizes a variety of weapons and tactics that have

1466
01:18:50,520 --> 01:18:54,960
Speaker 1: been battlefield tested in a series of smaller wars, right, um,

1467
01:18:55,280 --> 01:18:58,040
Speaker 1: And I think we are seeing in Ukraine for the

1468
01:18:58,120 --> 01:19:01,920
Speaker 1: first time the actual will. I think one thing that

1469
01:19:02,000 --> 01:19:04,280
Speaker 1: we have seen is that drones. And I'm not talking

1470
01:19:04,320 --> 01:19:06,000
Speaker 1: about the big ones here. You know, they get a

1471
01:19:06,000 --> 01:19:07,599
Speaker 1: lot of the bay rock tar and stuff like get

1472
01:19:07,680 --> 01:19:11,040
Speaker 1: that gets a lot of attention, but like small the

1473
01:19:11,200 --> 01:19:13,559
Speaker 1: kind of drones anyone listening to this could pick up

1474
01:19:13,600 --> 01:19:17,479
Speaker 1: and buy today, right, Those drones, I think are proving

1475
01:19:17,560 --> 01:19:20,600
Speaker 1: to be a game changer on a tactical level, in

1476
01:19:20,680 --> 01:19:23,479
Speaker 1: a similar manner to the machine gun in in the

1477
01:19:23,560 --> 01:19:27,000
Speaker 1: turn of the last century. Before the last century. Yeah,

1478
01:19:27,080 --> 01:19:30,960
Speaker 1: with the drones, I've often machine guns are good good comparison.

1479
01:19:31,040 --> 01:19:33,680
Speaker 1: I've often thought of it as like the airplane, and

1480
01:19:33,800 --> 01:19:36,160
Speaker 1: that we had airplanes and we haven't had combat airplanes.

1481
01:19:36,240 --> 01:19:38,120
Speaker 1: Before World War One, we didn't have very many of

1482
01:19:38,200 --> 01:19:40,519
Speaker 1: them because nobody really realized the utility of them in war.

1483
01:19:41,040 --> 01:19:43,040
Speaker 1: And then as the war got closer and then the

1484
01:19:43,080 --> 01:19:45,880
Speaker 1: war started, countries started to slowly build up these small

1485
01:19:45,920 --> 01:19:47,920
Speaker 1: fleets of aircraft, and then by the end of the war,

1486
01:19:48,800 --> 01:19:50,760
Speaker 1: everybody had an air force. I think we see the

1487
01:19:50,760 --> 01:19:52,800
Speaker 1: same thing with these small consumer drones, is that like,

1488
01:19:53,280 --> 01:19:56,360
Speaker 1: by the end of this war or whatever conflagrations are

1489
01:19:56,400 --> 01:19:59,360
Speaker 1: coming after it, every military in the world is going

1490
01:19:59,400 --> 01:20:02,800
Speaker 1: to have little little you know, phantom phantom threes or whatever,

1491
01:20:02,920 --> 01:20:06,320
Speaker 1: basically for every infantry squad. One of the things that's

1492
01:20:06,320 --> 01:20:09,840
Speaker 1: so wild is that if if you again, if you're

1493
01:20:09,840 --> 01:20:13,599
Speaker 1: sitting here right now, have not an insignificant amount of money,

1494
01:20:13,640 --> 01:20:17,360
Speaker 1: let's say three to four thousand dollars and the enough

1495
01:20:17,560 --> 01:20:23,080
Speaker 1: mechanical like competence to carry out modest repairs on your

1496
01:20:23,120 --> 01:20:28,120
Speaker 1: own car, you could, with things entirely available over the shelf,

1497
01:20:28,600 --> 01:20:32,120
Speaker 1: build a weapon system capable of disabling a variety of

1498
01:20:32,240 --> 01:20:35,360
Speaker 1: armored vehicles at night. You know, like you that that

1499
01:20:35,520 --> 01:20:38,280
Speaker 1: is a thing that individual people, You could do that

1500
01:20:38,439 --> 01:20:39,760
Speaker 1: and you can have it up and running in a

1501
01:20:39,840 --> 01:20:43,719
Speaker 1: matter of days. I just I'm imagining the next protest

1502
01:20:43,840 --> 01:20:48,720
Speaker 1: in unnamed city. Yeah, and a consumer drone flies over

1503
01:20:48,800 --> 01:20:50,640
Speaker 1: the police line and drops a little thing on him.

1504
01:20:50,640 --> 01:20:55,760
Speaker 1: This is bang. Yeah, yeah, yeah, exactly. Like there's a

1505
01:20:55,840 --> 01:20:59,799
Speaker 1: lot of people, even even as as influential and meaningful

1506
01:20:59,840 --> 01:21:01,720
Speaker 1: as they've been on the battlefield in Ukraine, I think

1507
01:21:01,720 --> 01:21:04,320
Speaker 1: people still are kind of slow to understand the extent.

1508
01:21:04,439 --> 01:21:06,439
Speaker 1: Like there's one of the wildest stories that's come out

1509
01:21:06,479 --> 01:21:09,439
Speaker 1: of it is that the Ukrainian military has a an

1510
01:21:09,520 --> 01:21:14,800
Speaker 1: outfit of civilian drone operators using hacked and home built

1511
01:21:14,920 --> 01:21:18,800
Speaker 1: drones to attack Russian forces at night. UM and they

1512
01:21:18,880 --> 01:21:22,000
Speaker 1: have been The documented of efficacy of their raids has

1513
01:21:22,040 --> 01:21:24,840
Speaker 1: been significant, And I can I can remember spending a

1514
01:21:24,880 --> 01:21:27,920
Speaker 1: brief period of time with an Iraqi military unit that

1515
01:21:28,080 --> 01:21:30,120
Speaker 1: was just using d g I phantoms that they had

1516
01:21:30,200 --> 01:21:33,840
Speaker 1: rigged to drop what were since essentially mortar shells with

1517
01:21:33,880 --> 01:21:36,599
Speaker 1: shuttlecocks on them from a height. UM, and they were

1518
01:21:36,760 --> 01:21:39,479
Speaker 1: very effective at killing people. UM. As isis, drones were

1519
01:21:39,520 --> 01:21:42,920
Speaker 1: effective at sort of spotting, you know, mortars for folks well.

1520
01:21:42,920 --> 01:21:44,400
Speaker 1: And one of the things I saw I SIS used

1521
01:21:44,400 --> 01:21:47,760
Speaker 1: their more their drones for great effect wasn't so much

1522
01:21:47,960 --> 01:21:50,680
Speaker 1: to kill large numbers of enemy soldiers. It was to

1523
01:21:50,760 --> 01:21:53,360
Speaker 1: do the same thing that American predator drones and report

1524
01:21:53,439 --> 01:21:56,160
Speaker 1: drones had done for for decades by that point the

1525
01:21:56,320 --> 01:21:58,439
Speaker 1: terror groups, which is let them know you can't gather

1526
01:21:58,560 --> 01:22:01,240
Speaker 1: in large numbers. Yeah, if you gather in large numbers

1527
01:22:01,240 --> 01:22:03,040
Speaker 1: of your target. And so you saw a Rocky soldier

1528
01:22:03,120 --> 01:22:04,800
Speaker 1: saying no more than two or three in a group, ye,

1529
01:22:05,080 --> 01:22:06,720
Speaker 1: any more than that will get targeted, you know, And

1530
01:22:06,880 --> 01:22:10,120
Speaker 1: so they flipped the equation basically yep, and don't I

1531
01:22:10,200 --> 01:22:13,560
Speaker 1: mean I one of the reasons why I I have

1532
01:22:13,720 --> 01:22:16,799
Speaker 1: a general policy heavily informed by my time in Mozle

1533
01:22:16,920 --> 01:22:20,080
Speaker 1: that the last place I want to be in a

1534
01:22:20,439 --> 01:22:24,040
Speaker 1: anywhere near a war zone is an armored vehicle. Um.

1535
01:22:24,479 --> 01:22:28,240
Speaker 1: Because that's really unless you are in something that's heavily

1536
01:22:28,320 --> 01:22:32,000
Speaker 1: up armored, like an im wrap. Little bombs dropped by

1537
01:22:32,080 --> 01:22:34,559
Speaker 1: drones can do significant damage to something like a humpy

1538
01:22:34,720 --> 01:22:36,960
Speaker 1: and that's exactly what you target. You don't target a

1539
01:22:37,040 --> 01:22:40,240
Speaker 1: Toyota Corolla with a drone like that, unless you specifically

1540
01:22:40,320 --> 01:22:42,639
Speaker 1: know an individuals in that Corolla that you want to kill.

1541
01:22:43,280 --> 01:22:46,240
Speaker 1: But you may just behind the lines see a target

1542
01:22:46,280 --> 01:22:49,240
Speaker 1: of opportunity in an armor see an armored lightly armored vehicle,

1543
01:22:49,320 --> 01:22:52,200
Speaker 1: and drop a immunition on it. And that's one of

1544
01:22:52,240 --> 01:22:54,519
Speaker 1: the things this is done. There's a lot of talk

1545
01:22:54,640 --> 01:22:57,920
Speaker 1: prior to the expanded Russian invasion about how immediately Russia

1546
01:22:58,000 --> 01:23:00,040
Speaker 1: was going to get air superiority, and that's obviously a

1547
01:23:00,120 --> 01:23:03,000
Speaker 1: bigger story than just drones. There's a lot of factors

1548
01:23:03,080 --> 01:23:06,360
Speaker 1: and why Russia. It's probably accurate to say they have

1549
01:23:06,479 --> 01:23:09,040
Speaker 1: superiority in a number of parts of the war, but

1550
01:23:09,120 --> 01:23:11,320
Speaker 1: they don't have supremacy like that. It's not like an

1551
01:23:11,320 --> 01:23:14,559
Speaker 1: absolute matter. And part of that is because, um, it's

1552
01:23:14,600 --> 01:23:18,320
Speaker 1: not really possible to at this moment. Someday, I suspect

1553
01:23:18,360 --> 01:23:21,040
Speaker 1: there will be more effective ways of stopping drones and

1554
01:23:21,840 --> 01:23:25,519
Speaker 1: at like a theater level. Um, maybe, but it certainly

1555
01:23:25,560 --> 01:23:29,040
Speaker 1: hasn't happened yet. Yeah. Yeah, And and that's the thing.

1556
01:23:29,120 --> 01:23:31,040
Speaker 1: You know, there's there's the drones, and then there's also

1557
01:23:31,479 --> 01:23:34,000
Speaker 1: on the Ukrainian side, they you know, I think they

1558
01:23:34,120 --> 01:23:37,920
Speaker 1: recognize that air force against air force, the Russians have

1559
01:23:37,960 --> 01:23:41,680
Speaker 1: a numerical superiority. So you can deny the Russians air

1560
01:23:41,760 --> 01:23:45,439
Speaker 1: supremacy by shooting down their planes with man pads. You

1561
01:23:45,520 --> 01:23:47,559
Speaker 1: don't have to have an air force to deny your opponent.

1562
01:23:48,600 --> 01:23:50,400
Speaker 1: You just have to dine them the ability to freely

1563
01:23:50,439 --> 01:23:53,320
Speaker 1: operate in your airspace. And this is one of those things.

1564
01:23:53,400 --> 01:23:55,880
Speaker 1: There's been a lot of talk about a no fly zone, um,

1565
01:23:56,080 --> 01:23:58,120
Speaker 1: which I tend to think would be a bad idea

1566
01:23:58,200 --> 01:24:00,360
Speaker 1: in the traditional sense in terms of like the US

1567
01:24:00,880 --> 01:24:03,920
Speaker 1: and NATO sending in planes to down Russian planes over Ukraine.

1568
01:24:03,920 --> 01:24:06,439
Speaker 1: There's a number of reasons why that's concerning. But you

1569
01:24:06,560 --> 01:24:09,360
Speaker 1: can effectively establish a no fly zone by shipping in

1570
01:24:09,400 --> 01:24:13,800
Speaker 1: a funckload of man pads exactly. Yeah, And I'm not

1571
01:24:13,920 --> 01:24:16,200
Speaker 1: against that. I think in terms of what kind of

1572
01:24:16,640 --> 01:24:20,719
Speaker 1: what kind of armed arms support is ethical to provide,

1573
01:24:21,360 --> 01:24:25,320
Speaker 1: giving people the ability to stop planes from bombing cities

1574
01:24:25,600 --> 01:24:28,120
Speaker 1: is broadly speaking, one of the most ethical things you

1575
01:24:28,200 --> 01:24:31,559
Speaker 1: can do in terms of shipping munitions around the world, right,

1576
01:24:31,640 --> 01:24:34,360
Speaker 1: and the other advantages that man pads. I'm sure somebody

1577
01:24:34,400 --> 01:24:37,960
Speaker 1: could turn it into a lethal ground weapon, but they're

1578
01:24:38,000 --> 01:24:42,559
Speaker 1: pretty hard to yeah, use against ground targets, against houses,

1579
01:24:42,600 --> 01:24:45,560
Speaker 1: things like that, not really what they're designed for. So

1580
01:24:46,400 --> 01:24:51,560
Speaker 1: it's not like just handing over, you know, some indiscriminate

1581
01:24:51,600 --> 01:24:54,200
Speaker 1: weapon to the Ukrainians to use against Russian cities. You're

1582
01:24:54,280 --> 01:24:57,719
Speaker 1: you're giving them a weapon that's specifically used against military aircraft.

1583
01:24:57,920 --> 01:25:00,520
Speaker 1: Like most man pads can't reach the altitude the airliners

1584
01:25:00,520 --> 01:25:04,400
Speaker 1: are out even so yep, so I think that's probably

1585
01:25:04,520 --> 01:25:07,080
Speaker 1: what we want to talk about today. Um, you wanna

1586
01:25:07,600 --> 01:25:09,639
Speaker 1: plug your plug ables, tell people where they can find

1587
01:25:09,680 --> 01:25:13,120
Speaker 1: you in your analysis out in the wild. Yeah, so

1588
01:25:13,479 --> 01:25:15,759
Speaker 1: you can. You can follow me on Twitter. My handle

1589
01:25:15,880 --> 01:25:20,240
Speaker 1: is at Shabanian Rum and uh I work I published

1590
01:25:20,240 --> 01:25:23,000
Speaker 1: occasionally with the New Lines Institute. Uh so you can

1591
01:25:23,040 --> 01:25:24,880
Speaker 1: see my work there as well. And I have a

1592
01:25:24,960 --> 01:25:27,920
Speaker 1: website that I seldom update, the Folded Gap dot com

1593
01:25:28,479 --> 01:25:31,800
Speaker 1: um hasn't been updated and probably eight months now because

1594
01:25:31,880 --> 01:25:35,360
Speaker 1: I've been tired. But um, yeah, those are the places

1595
01:25:35,400 --> 01:25:38,200
Speaker 1: to find me and uh d m s are open

1596
01:25:38,240 --> 01:25:40,000
Speaker 1: on Twitter. So if you ever have questions or anything

1597
01:25:40,040 --> 01:25:41,840
Speaker 1: like that, let me know. I'm happy to talk with

1598
01:25:41,840 --> 01:25:44,439
Speaker 1: anybody who's got questions on these kind of things. Hell yeah,

1599
01:25:44,840 --> 01:25:50,120
Speaker 1: well that's gonna be us. So you know, enjoy this

1600
01:25:50,520 --> 01:25:54,320
Speaker 1: analysis of the of the war in Ukraine. Um, before

1601
01:25:54,400 --> 01:25:57,320
Speaker 1: we return you to your regularly scheduled multi part series

1602
01:25:57,400 --> 01:26:00,439
Speaker 1: on Nazi cat girls. Uh. The primary focus of this

1603
01:26:00,560 --> 01:26:21,760
Speaker 1: podcast money money. This is welcome, Dick had happen here?

1604
01:26:22,000 --> 01:26:24,439
Speaker 1: It is me, Christopher Long. Uh, this is a This

1605
01:26:24,560 --> 01:26:27,360
Speaker 1: is a podcast about things falling apart, things putting back

1606
01:26:27,360 --> 01:26:29,760
Speaker 1: together again. And also today it's just about money. Um.

1607
01:26:30,680 --> 01:26:32,639
Speaker 1: And also well, okay, it is not just about money.

1608
01:26:32,680 --> 01:26:37,799
Speaker 1: It is about money and is about seemingly seemingly esoteric

1609
01:26:38,479 --> 01:26:41,400
Speaker 1: arguments about the nature of money that actually turned out

1610
01:26:41,439 --> 01:26:44,040
Speaker 1: to be extremely important for any post revolutionary society or

1611
01:26:44,040 --> 01:26:48,200
Speaker 1: even just this society. So yeah, and and joining joining

1612
01:26:48,240 --> 01:26:50,559
Speaker 1: me to talk about this are Kyle Flannery and Steve

1613
01:26:50,680 --> 01:26:53,280
Speaker 1: manned where the co editors of Strange Matters magazine, which

1614
01:26:53,320 --> 01:26:55,479
Speaker 1: is a new workers co op that's in the middle

1615
01:26:55,479 --> 01:26:58,479
Speaker 1: of a fundraising drive. So yeah, go Stworth the magazine.

1616
01:26:58,600 --> 01:27:01,880
Speaker 1: And uh, even Kyle, welcome to the show. It's great

1617
01:27:01,880 --> 01:27:04,719
Speaker 1: to be here, Chris, thanks for having us. The basis

1618
01:27:04,760 --> 01:27:07,320
Speaker 1: of this interview is a piece that is coming out,

1619
01:27:07,439 --> 01:27:09,720
Speaker 1: actually when is it coming out that that's a good

1620
01:27:09,800 --> 01:27:12,800
Speaker 1: question that I should probably have asked of this. Um,

1621
01:27:13,160 --> 01:27:16,559
Speaker 1: let's see, it will come out later this month. Okay, Yeah,

1622
01:27:16,720 --> 01:27:19,200
Speaker 1: there'll be out later this month. That is about the

1623
01:27:19,320 --> 01:27:22,360
Speaker 1: history of money and what money is. So I guess

1624
01:27:22,400 --> 01:27:25,840
Speaker 1: we can we can start there, which is, yeah, can

1625
01:27:25,920 --> 01:27:29,759
Speaker 1: can you walk us through a bit about the debate

1626
01:27:29,880 --> 01:27:33,360
Speaker 1: over what money is and how sort of various people

1627
01:27:33,439 --> 01:27:36,479
Speaker 1: have gotten parts of it wrong and parts of it right. Sure.

1628
01:27:36,920 --> 01:27:41,799
Speaker 1: I got into this debate as a economics graduate student

1629
01:27:41,960 --> 01:27:45,920
Speaker 1: in eleven and a book that really kind of shaped

1630
01:27:46,160 --> 01:27:49,320
Speaker 1: my initial understanding was David Graeber's Depth the First five

1631
01:27:49,400 --> 01:27:55,479
Speaker 1: Thousand Years and yeah, it's excellent. Um it's it's very long,

1632
01:27:55,560 --> 01:27:58,760
Speaker 1: and it's a bit scattered, but I love what he

1633
01:27:58,840 --> 01:28:01,920
Speaker 1: put together with it. And um, so he kind of

1634
01:28:01,960 --> 01:28:07,320
Speaker 1: introduced me to ideas of from a school of economic

1635
01:28:07,439 --> 01:28:10,640
Speaker 1: thought called chartile is UM and chartial is M is

1636
01:28:10,760 --> 01:28:14,960
Speaker 1: kind of the theoretical forbear of M M T and

1637
01:28:15,280 --> 01:28:19,160
Speaker 1: m M T is, which is modern monetary theory is

1638
01:28:19,240 --> 01:28:21,920
Speaker 1: kind of in the news now as a theory which

1639
01:28:22,000 --> 01:28:25,360
Speaker 1: is saying, like, okay, if you if you're a government

1640
01:28:25,840 --> 01:28:29,880
Speaker 1: that issues its own money, its own currency, that is

1641
01:28:29,960 --> 01:28:32,439
Speaker 1: not really backed by anything. It's not backed by any

1642
01:28:32,520 --> 01:28:37,080
Speaker 1: other currency or any other commodity. Then you don't really

1643
01:28:37,400 --> 01:28:40,240
Speaker 1: face a financial limit as far as how much you

1644
01:28:40,320 --> 01:28:42,920
Speaker 1: can produce. You you're the sole source of that money,

1645
01:28:43,520 --> 01:28:47,120
Speaker 1: and you can spend it into existence, spend by buying

1646
01:28:47,240 --> 01:28:51,680
Speaker 1: things the money into existence, and people will accept it

1647
01:28:51,760 --> 01:28:54,240
Speaker 1: to the extent that they either need it or they

1648
01:28:54,320 --> 01:28:58,640
Speaker 1: want it. And that's one theory that's kind of in

1649
01:28:58,680 --> 01:29:02,120
Speaker 1: the air now. But chartali is Um, over a hundred

1650
01:29:02,200 --> 01:29:06,559
Speaker 1: years before this, is putting out very similar ideas around

1651
01:29:06,760 --> 01:29:10,120
Speaker 1: money that is um created by states in order to

1652
01:29:10,400 --> 01:29:15,080
Speaker 1: martial physical resources. They call it biophysical resources, which is

1653
01:29:15,200 --> 01:29:22,599
Speaker 1: just a fancy word of meaning all of the material, people, techniques, um,

1654
01:29:22,840 --> 01:29:28,320
Speaker 1: physical processes that are required to create economic activity. So

1655
01:29:29,040 --> 01:29:31,120
Speaker 1: to the extent that people either need or want your

1656
01:29:31,160 --> 01:29:34,600
Speaker 1: money UM, you can use it as a social technology

1657
01:29:34,720 --> 01:29:38,560
Speaker 1: sort of to marshal those resources into action, and you

1658
01:29:38,720 --> 01:29:43,240
Speaker 1: being a state, chartali is Um says, so from Chartalism

1659
01:29:43,280 --> 01:29:45,800
Speaker 1: we got m MT. But David Graverer's book is about

1660
01:29:45,800 --> 01:29:48,680
Speaker 1: a lot more than just Churtleism and MT, So it's

1661
01:29:48,680 --> 01:29:52,320
Speaker 1: about the origins of money, and origins of money, it

1662
01:29:52,439 --> 01:29:55,640
Speaker 1: turns out, are at least five thousand years ago. As

1663
01:29:55,680 --> 01:30:00,960
Speaker 1: the title says, UM, there are examples of UM early

1664
01:30:01,040 --> 01:30:07,240
Speaker 1: accounting systems that are where people are just UM. Rather

1665
01:30:07,320 --> 01:30:10,240
Speaker 1: than there being a circulating medium of exchange type money

1666
01:30:10,400 --> 01:30:13,519
Speaker 1: like a coin or something or a daughter bill, there

1667
01:30:13,560 --> 01:30:16,280
Speaker 1: were just records of what people own and what people

1668
01:30:16,360 --> 01:30:20,600
Speaker 1: owe and their debts and credits against each other. And

1669
01:30:21,760 --> 01:30:26,840
Speaker 1: it was in early Mesopotamia there. So we have these

1670
01:30:26,880 --> 01:30:32,040
Speaker 1: early accounting systems that yield more advanced credit systems over time,

1671
01:30:32,360 --> 01:30:36,000
Speaker 1: that are ruled by temples UM, which are sort of

1672
01:30:36,040 --> 01:30:38,519
Speaker 1: proto states in a way in terms of like they

1673
01:30:38,600 --> 01:30:42,919
Speaker 1: administer the flow of goods and services through their territory

1674
01:30:43,120 --> 01:30:48,080
Speaker 1: and between their territory and another temple's territory using their

1675
01:30:48,160 --> 01:30:53,440
Speaker 1: domestic money, but also international money. International money was facilitated

1676
01:30:53,520 --> 01:30:58,320
Speaker 1: through trade networks. Trade networks use things like UM. They

1677
01:30:58,400 --> 01:31:01,639
Speaker 1: needed to convert between a domestic money and international money.

1678
01:31:02,920 --> 01:31:06,639
Speaker 1: And Gregory goes through these like wonderful examples of UM,

1679
01:31:06,840 --> 01:31:11,040
Speaker 1: silver and other medals being used as like international means

1680
01:31:11,080 --> 01:31:16,000
Speaker 1: of payment. UM. That's sort of our term in our

1681
01:31:16,080 --> 01:31:20,160
Speaker 1: piece basically, which is covering them foreign exchange. But UM.

1682
01:31:21,160 --> 01:31:23,320
Speaker 1: He says, like in order to get from the domestic

1683
01:31:23,400 --> 01:31:26,479
Speaker 1: money into the international money. UM. You need to have

1684
01:31:26,800 --> 01:31:31,760
Speaker 1: these linkages of experts in the temple and the trade

1685
01:31:31,840 --> 01:31:36,800
Speaker 1: networks to get together and make um credit instruments which

1686
01:31:36,920 --> 01:31:41,479
Speaker 1: knit them together into this trade network. And from there

1687
01:31:41,760 --> 01:31:44,599
Speaker 1: we go into UM. I don't want to spend too

1688
01:31:44,680 --> 01:31:47,000
Speaker 1: much time on the history, but we go from there

1689
01:31:47,120 --> 01:31:54,439
Speaker 1: to situations thousands of years later, we get coins. Coins

1690
01:31:54,720 --> 01:32:02,080
Speaker 1: are being minted by starting in the fulle six hundred BC.

1691
01:32:02,720 --> 01:32:08,040
Speaker 1: I want to say, Carl, yeah, that that sounds about right.

1692
01:32:08,160 --> 01:32:12,120
Speaker 1: So um the first I someone can correct me if

1693
01:32:12,160 --> 01:32:14,640
Speaker 1: I'm wrong. But I've been doing some homework on this

1694
01:32:14,800 --> 01:32:16,840
Speaker 1: because I've been on a few podcasts and there's like

1695
01:32:17,040 --> 01:32:22,200
Speaker 1: like numismatists in the comments and whatnot. But um, the

1696
01:32:22,400 --> 01:32:26,880
Speaker 1: first okay, the first mixed gold and silver coin was

1697
01:32:27,280 --> 01:32:32,639
Speaker 1: sometime in the seventh century BC, and the first gold

1698
01:32:32,720 --> 01:32:35,560
Speaker 1: coin was not long after. I think it was like

1699
01:32:35,960 --> 01:32:41,040
Speaker 1: they were both Lydian kings, like one after another. Anyway,

1700
01:32:41,040 --> 01:32:42,840
Speaker 1: I just wanted to hit that because someone said I

1701
01:32:42,880 --> 01:32:49,080
Speaker 1: got wrong earlier. But um uh, these coins were kind

1702
01:32:49,080 --> 01:32:54,200
Speaker 1: of the first widely used sort of retail means of

1703
01:32:54,320 --> 01:32:58,599
Speaker 1: settling debts, like at the point of sale between people.

1704
01:32:59,040 --> 01:33:01,280
Speaker 1: So it wasn't just an accounting system. It was an

1705
01:33:01,280 --> 01:33:04,160
Speaker 1: elaborate credit system with no circulating means of payment. It

1706
01:33:04,280 --> 01:33:08,640
Speaker 1: was a circulating money. Now and it's getting around um

1707
01:33:09,040 --> 01:33:13,960
Speaker 1: based on military conquest. Military conquest in the excellent age

1708
01:33:14,520 --> 01:33:17,920
Speaker 1: spread the use of coins much wider than the domestic

1709
01:33:18,000 --> 01:33:20,960
Speaker 1: spheres in which they were first minted. Yeah, and I

1710
01:33:21,240 --> 01:33:23,439
Speaker 1: think we should like just just to talk about it

1711
01:33:23,439 --> 01:33:26,439
Speaker 1: about like roughly when this is like you know like

1712
01:33:26,479 --> 01:33:27,960
Speaker 1: if if if you go back, I mean this this

1713
01:33:28,080 --> 01:33:30,840
Speaker 1: is slightly later, but one of the huge sort of

1714
01:33:30,960 --> 01:33:34,360
Speaker 1: like like the periods where like the entire Mediterraneans using coinage,

1715
01:33:34,439 --> 01:33:36,040
Speaker 1: right is you know you're this this is this is

1716
01:33:36,080 --> 01:33:38,160
Speaker 1: when you're dealing with you're sort of like classical Greek

1717
01:33:38,320 --> 01:33:40,120
Speaker 1: like you have you have your gree your Greeks and

1718
01:33:40,200 --> 01:33:41,960
Speaker 1: your Persians, and you have your sort of like Athens

1719
01:33:42,000 --> 01:33:45,840
Speaker 1: and sparta Um and that those guys are very much uh,

1720
01:33:46,160 --> 01:33:49,320
Speaker 1: they're engaged in this thing that Graver calls the the

1721
01:33:49,400 --> 01:33:54,599
Speaker 1: military industrial coinage slavery complex, the military industrial coinage complex. Yeah,

1722
01:33:54,800 --> 01:33:56,439
Speaker 1: and I yeah, I think he has slavery on the

1723
01:33:56,520 --> 01:33:58,599
Speaker 1: end because it's yeah, it's it's this giant sort of places,

1724
01:33:58,720 --> 01:34:02,240
Speaker 1: giant warfare system. Right, these are like like Athens is

1725
01:34:02,240 --> 01:34:04,559
Speaker 1: an empire, right, they run around, they steal, they see

1726
01:34:04,640 --> 01:34:07,160
Speaker 1: people's gold, this golden silver byance, and they like have

1727
01:34:07,320 --> 01:34:09,320
Speaker 1: slaves that work in this this whole sort of light

1728
01:34:10,720 --> 01:34:13,479
Speaker 1: like this. Yeah, you get the system of empire that

1729
01:34:13,720 --> 01:34:17,120
Speaker 1: is like what the actual ages sort of defined by. Yeah. Yeah,

1730
01:34:17,200 --> 01:34:21,439
Speaker 1: And it's like whereas previously, like so precious medals did circulate,

1731
01:34:21,520 --> 01:34:23,720
Speaker 1: but they weren't in coin form, and they were more

1732
01:34:24,040 --> 01:34:27,639
Speaker 1: as like a bulk means of payment stored from one

1733
01:34:27,680 --> 01:34:30,519
Speaker 1: temple to the next, almost as if they are central banks,

1734
01:34:30,560 --> 01:34:35,000
Speaker 1: but central banks don't exist yet, and actual actual age

1735
01:34:35,080 --> 01:34:39,360
Speaker 1: coinage system gave rise to the more much more sophisticated

1736
01:34:39,439 --> 01:34:43,559
Speaker 1: medieval coinage system. And I'm going breezily through this because um,

1737
01:34:43,680 --> 01:34:47,920
Speaker 1: there's a lot there, but several years, there's several thousands

1738
01:34:48,000 --> 01:34:50,400
Speaker 1: years they're passing in a few minutes here, so um,

1739
01:34:50,680 --> 01:34:57,160
Speaker 1: bear with me. But there are there now in the Mediva,

1740
01:34:57,400 --> 01:35:00,040
Speaker 1: Medieval and Renaissance times, not only do we have the

1741
01:35:00,080 --> 01:35:03,479
Speaker 1: coin is circulating, but we also have credit instruments um

1742
01:35:03,960 --> 01:35:11,559
Speaker 1: which uh are being submitted, transferred, transmitted rather between banks uh,

1743
01:35:12,720 --> 01:35:17,639
Speaker 1: between banks in different countries and territories that are saying, hey,

1744
01:35:17,880 --> 01:35:21,759
Speaker 1: you don't even need to based on what is written

1745
01:35:21,800 --> 01:35:24,439
Speaker 1: on this piece of paper, I already know you're good

1746
01:35:24,479 --> 01:35:28,280
Speaker 1: for it. I will dispense with the coins uh that

1747
01:35:28,600 --> 01:35:31,360
Speaker 1: I have in my bank because this paper signifies that

1748
01:35:31,479 --> 01:35:34,880
Speaker 1: they you're good for it, basically, and so that greatly

1749
01:35:35,200 --> 01:35:40,479
Speaker 1: speeds things up in terms of UM settling commerce debts

1750
01:35:41,320 --> 01:35:47,560
Speaker 1: and and uh settling bills between different UM states. So

1751
01:35:48,840 --> 01:35:50,760
Speaker 1: but going through all this history, the point of it

1752
01:35:50,960 --> 01:35:53,960
Speaker 1: is that at every at every sort of step of

1753
01:35:54,040 --> 01:35:56,479
Speaker 1: the way, you see, okay, there's a lot of different

1754
01:35:56,520 --> 01:35:59,960
Speaker 1: types of money. They're circulating and they're being exchanged against

1755
01:36:00,040 --> 01:36:02,599
Speaker 1: one another, and there also seems to be a domestic

1756
01:36:02,680 --> 01:36:08,320
Speaker 1: sphere and international sphere. The international means of payment, which

1757
01:36:08,439 --> 01:36:11,920
Speaker 1: is a analytic category that um I and my co

1758
01:36:12,080 --> 01:36:16,120
Speaker 1: author John Michael Cloone thought up, is kind of sort

1759
01:36:16,160 --> 01:36:21,960
Speaker 1: of sets the tune as far as what uh, what

1760
01:36:22,360 --> 01:36:25,840
Speaker 1: kind of hierarchy of money, if you will, develops in

1761
01:36:26,160 --> 01:36:30,080
Speaker 1: each of these ages. So like in the prior to

1762
01:36:30,120 --> 01:36:33,600
Speaker 1: the Axle Age, there were both there was bulk settlements

1763
01:36:33,720 --> 01:36:36,639
Speaker 1: from one temple to the next in terms of silver

1764
01:36:36,920 --> 01:36:40,360
Speaker 1: although it wasn't coins, it was just UM like bullion

1765
01:36:40,840 --> 01:36:44,880
Speaker 1: basically UM, and then and then later it was coins,

1766
01:36:44,920 --> 01:36:47,280
Speaker 1: and then later it was bills of exchange, and then

1767
01:36:48,800 --> 01:36:54,160
Speaker 1: after a while there emerged gold standards UM that existed

1768
01:36:54,200 --> 01:36:58,960
Speaker 1: between nations, and they had central banks eventually, which UM

1769
01:36:59,200 --> 01:37:02,360
Speaker 1: hoarded goal old not because not just because they are

1770
01:37:02,439 --> 01:37:06,000
Speaker 1: fetishizing it or something something basic like that, but rather

1771
01:37:06,200 --> 01:37:10,280
Speaker 1: because it was the established international means of payment. And

1772
01:37:11,240 --> 01:37:13,840
Speaker 1: if you either you need that or you need something

1773
01:37:13,920 --> 01:37:18,120
Speaker 1: that is easily transferable into that in order to conduct

1774
01:37:18,200 --> 01:37:23,560
Speaker 1: your trade, especially if you're developing country or um A

1775
01:37:23,880 --> 01:37:29,439
Speaker 1: otherwise like an upstart state of some type. Now today

1776
01:37:29,600 --> 01:37:34,000
Speaker 1: we're in a dollarized world. The dollar is the international

1777
01:37:34,080 --> 01:37:39,519
Speaker 1: means of payment from one onwards the M M T story, Yeah,

1778
01:37:39,560 --> 01:37:43,560
Speaker 1: I mean that's basically true. The E then the for

1779
01:37:44,240 --> 01:37:47,880
Speaker 1: the US government as the issuer the sole issue of

1780
01:37:48,000 --> 01:37:50,680
Speaker 1: the dollar, which is a fiat currency which is not

1781
01:37:50,800 --> 01:37:53,960
Speaker 1: backed by anything UM. Yeah, you can make as much

1782
01:37:54,000 --> 01:37:56,560
Speaker 1: of that as what you want. You could make, you

1783
01:37:56,640 --> 01:38:00,760
Speaker 1: can create and spend into existence as need dollars as

1784
01:38:00,840 --> 01:38:04,559
Speaker 1: the US government wants, and then delete it from existence

1785
01:38:04,640 --> 01:38:08,759
Speaker 1: by taxing it away. And that makes perfect sense totally

1786
01:38:08,760 --> 01:38:12,200
Speaker 1: acknowledged that. But there's some problems nonetheless in terms of

1787
01:38:12,280 --> 01:38:16,759
Speaker 1: how they apply that into a more general theory, because

1788
01:38:16,800 --> 01:38:19,680
Speaker 1: it's like, can you, okay, you can make as much

1789
01:38:19,720 --> 01:38:22,439
Speaker 1: of your own money, what about other types of money

1790
01:38:23,120 --> 01:38:27,680
Speaker 1: from the perspective of a US state craft interested individual,

1791
01:38:27,920 --> 01:38:32,880
Speaker 1: Like why would you care about other people's money? Basically,

1792
01:38:33,000 --> 01:38:35,720
Speaker 1: if you're just the full sole source of the of

1793
01:38:35,800 --> 01:38:38,320
Speaker 1: the US dollar, which happens to also be the international

1794
01:38:38,360 --> 01:38:42,439
Speaker 1: means of payment, of course you wouldn't are if you're like, say,

1795
01:38:42,560 --> 01:38:50,200
Speaker 1: to Tunisia. The Tunisian dollar is accepted almost nowhere as payment. Yeah,

1796
01:38:50,280 --> 01:38:51,840
Speaker 1: And and one one of the big things, I mean,

1797
01:38:52,000 --> 01:38:54,360
Speaker 1: it's not the soul driver and people start for emphasize this.

1798
01:38:54,439 --> 01:38:56,880
Speaker 1: I'm going to caveat this immediately because people will yell

1799
01:38:56,920 --> 01:38:58,080
Speaker 1: at me. But like, one of one of the very

1800
01:38:58,080 --> 01:39:00,840
Speaker 1: important things about the dollar is that the dollar is

1801
01:39:00,880 --> 01:39:04,280
Speaker 1: what you can buy oil in. And this is extremely

1802
01:39:04,320 --> 01:39:06,880
Speaker 1: important because if you are a society in the world,

1803
01:39:07,160 --> 01:39:11,560
Speaker 1: you need oil. Um, this is basically universally true. And

1804
01:39:11,800 --> 01:39:14,680
Speaker 1: and this you know, but and the fact that you

1805
01:39:14,760 --> 01:39:16,160
Speaker 1: need to buy oil, and and the fact that you

1806
01:39:16,160 --> 01:39:17,320
Speaker 1: need to buy a lot of other things that are

1807
01:39:17,360 --> 01:39:20,280
Speaker 1: manufactured in the US means you have to find some

1808
01:39:20,400 --> 01:39:23,360
Speaker 1: way to get U S dollars. Now, again, the US doesn't.

1809
01:39:23,360 --> 01:39:24,920
Speaker 1: This doesn't matter for the U S because we can

1810
01:39:24,960 --> 01:39:28,439
Speaker 1: just make them. Well okay, a, this is another thing.

1811
01:39:29,240 --> 01:39:32,840
Speaker 1: This stuff gets very weird and convoluted very quickly. Um.

1812
01:39:32,960 --> 01:39:37,680
Speaker 1: But the essentially the US can just sort of make

1813
01:39:37,840 --> 01:39:40,559
Speaker 1: this money technically speaking as a federal reserve. And there's

1814
01:39:40,600 --> 01:39:44,840
Speaker 1: all of this just incredibly convoluted finance stuff. But yeah,

1815
01:39:44,880 --> 01:39:46,760
Speaker 1: the the US like doesn't the US does not have

1816
01:39:46,920 --> 01:39:48,840
Speaker 1: to worry about obtaining U S dollars. You could just

1817
01:39:48,920 --> 01:39:51,760
Speaker 1: do it. But you know, yeah, if if you're if

1818
01:39:51,800 --> 01:39:53,720
Speaker 1: you're if you're I don't know if true Trenisia, if

1819
01:39:53,760 --> 01:39:57,519
Speaker 1: you're Denmarks an example, Yeah, den Mark. Yeah, like you

1820
01:39:57,760 --> 01:39:59,400
Speaker 1: you you need to find a way to get US

1821
01:39:59,439 --> 01:40:01,200
Speaker 1: dollars because you need to have stuff, you need to

1822
01:40:01,320 --> 01:40:04,280
Speaker 1: use US dollars to buy it. Mhm. Yeah. And so

1823
01:40:04,479 --> 01:40:07,400
Speaker 1: in our national context, this is after all of the

1824
01:40:07,479 --> 01:40:10,800
Speaker 1: history I just went through, since about or so when

1825
01:40:10,880 --> 01:40:13,439
Speaker 1: we went off the gold standard. Um, we have a

1826
01:40:13,520 --> 01:40:17,320
Speaker 1: system of central banks dominated by the dollar, and the

1827
01:40:17,439 --> 01:40:25,519
Speaker 1: dollar represents about of settlement of all trade and the

1828
01:40:25,640 --> 01:40:29,879
Speaker 1: next five or so currencies are plus the US account

1829
01:40:30,000 --> 01:40:34,080
Speaker 1: for like a d of all trade, so there's really

1830
01:40:34,240 --> 01:40:38,679
Speaker 1: just a few currencies which dominate everything, with the US

1831
01:40:38,760 --> 01:40:43,240
Speaker 1: being outsized among them. And when you look at the

1832
01:40:43,320 --> 01:40:47,200
Speaker 1: historical record, this is like very similar to other forms

1833
01:40:47,240 --> 01:40:49,800
Speaker 1: of international means of payment, where it's like, okay, I

1834
01:40:49,840 --> 01:40:51,599
Speaker 1: either need to have the one that's at the top,

1835
01:40:52,200 --> 01:40:56,920
Speaker 1: or failing that, one of the other sort of reserve currencies,

1836
01:40:57,160 --> 01:41:00,639
Speaker 1: even though that that that terminology didn't really exists prior

1837
01:41:00,680 --> 01:41:05,960
Speaker 1: to about eighty years ago. Um. But yeah, so like

1838
01:41:06,080 --> 01:41:08,120
Speaker 1: if you don't if it's not gold, then okay, it's

1839
01:41:08,120 --> 01:41:10,800
Speaker 1: the US dollar, So we need dollars or we either

1840
01:41:10,920 --> 01:41:13,120
Speaker 1: need to be printing dollars because we're the U S

1841
01:41:13,240 --> 01:41:16,000
Speaker 1: or for not them, then we need to get into

1842
01:41:16,120 --> 01:41:18,599
Speaker 1: either U S Dollar or the yen or the euro

1843
01:41:18,920 --> 01:41:23,280
Speaker 1: or one of the major trading currencies. And um, like China,

1844
01:41:25,120 --> 01:41:28,120
Speaker 1: China does a lot of trade with the US and

1845
01:41:28,800 --> 01:41:32,799
Speaker 1: they sell things to us, We give them dollars. They're rational,

1846
01:41:33,040 --> 01:41:36,160
Speaker 1: they put their dollars into treasuries to gain a little

1847
01:41:36,160 --> 01:41:38,240
Speaker 1: bit of a return instead of just holding the dollars

1848
01:41:38,320 --> 01:41:40,800
Speaker 1: themselves for no return. Do we explain I guess what

1849
01:41:40,880 --> 01:41:44,320
Speaker 1: a treasury is because yeah, sorry, Uh, the treasury bill

1850
01:41:44,680 --> 01:41:47,040
Speaker 1: is if you receive dollars, you can use them to

1851
01:41:47,120 --> 01:41:49,880
Speaker 1: purchase what's called a treasury note or a treasury bill

1852
01:41:50,400 --> 01:41:52,800
Speaker 1: and notes too. So if you ever hear something to

1853
01:41:52,840 --> 01:41:55,240
Speaker 1: talk about tea notes, that that's what this is. Yeah.

1854
01:41:55,320 --> 01:41:57,680
Speaker 1: So it's a way to learn. It's like moving from

1855
01:41:57,720 --> 01:42:00,760
Speaker 1: your checking to your savings account essentially. So if you

1856
01:42:00,840 --> 01:42:03,439
Speaker 1: have just dollars in a bank, it doesn't earn hardly anything.

1857
01:42:03,760 --> 01:42:05,560
Speaker 1: If you're in a saving if you go into the

1858
01:42:05,640 --> 01:42:08,800
Speaker 1: savings account, which is basically the treasury the treasury bills,

1859
01:42:09,000 --> 01:42:11,720
Speaker 1: you'll learn a little more and you'll learn dollars. You

1860
01:42:11,760 --> 01:42:15,320
Speaker 1: won't earn reminity from them. You'll learn more dollars and

1861
01:42:15,439 --> 01:42:18,800
Speaker 1: dollars for the international means of payments. So that's good. Yeah.

1862
01:42:18,840 --> 01:42:21,920
Speaker 1: So so like basically like there's the US government puts

1863
01:42:21,920 --> 01:42:23,800
Speaker 1: out a bond and like you buy it and then

1864
01:42:24,640 --> 01:42:26,880
Speaker 1: when when whatever it like expires or there's like a

1865
01:42:26,960 --> 01:42:29,200
Speaker 1: ten year team note that people talk about that's like

1866
01:42:29,880 --> 01:42:32,120
Speaker 1: years you buy it and yeah, it'll give it'll give

1867
01:42:32,120 --> 01:42:34,720
Speaker 1: you like a certain amount of dollars like later on

1868
01:42:34,840 --> 01:42:37,519
Speaker 1: that is more than what you paid for it HM exactly,

1869
01:42:37,720 --> 01:42:39,519
Speaker 1: So you'll learn a little bit of interest over time,

1870
01:42:39,920 --> 01:42:41,840
Speaker 1: and then you may earn like a little lump sum

1871
01:42:41,920 --> 01:42:47,360
Speaker 1: when it matures in in the future. So China has

1872
01:42:47,720 --> 01:42:50,840
Speaker 1: tons of dollars. It's part of a huge strategy that

1873
01:42:50,960 --> 01:42:55,599
Speaker 1: they have in order to manage their foreign their foreign

1874
01:42:55,640 --> 01:42:59,800
Speaker 1: currency reserves or what's called for X. So for X

1875
01:43:00,120 --> 01:43:03,280
Speaker 1: is the that's the term. We're going to use a

1876
01:43:03,320 --> 01:43:07,400
Speaker 1: lot um. That just is the foreign currency reserves you

1877
01:43:07,520 --> 01:43:10,400
Speaker 1: have on hand in order to pay for things that

1878
01:43:10,520 --> 01:43:15,080
Speaker 1: are only available for sale in currencies that you can't

1879
01:43:15,120 --> 01:43:17,639
Speaker 1: make yourself. Okay. So you know you have this question

1880
01:43:17,720 --> 01:43:19,519
Speaker 1: of like why do we care about this? Right, Like

1881
01:43:19,880 --> 01:43:21,679
Speaker 1: why do we people who want to make the world

1882
01:43:21,720 --> 01:43:25,960
Speaker 1: better care about this? And the answer is, okay, take

1883
01:43:26,040 --> 01:43:29,759
Speaker 1: take take your hypothetical scenario, your your Your hypothetical scenario

1884
01:43:30,080 --> 01:43:33,679
Speaker 1: is the scenario in which like a a a bunch

1885
01:43:33,720 --> 01:43:36,559
Speaker 1: of workers in alliance with like tribal confederations have taken

1886
01:43:36,680 --> 01:43:39,360
Speaker 1: Vancouver Island, right, and they've set up a new They've

1887
01:43:39,360 --> 01:43:40,880
Speaker 1: they've set up a new government that they have worked

1888
01:43:40,920 --> 01:43:44,120
Speaker 1: out sovereignty arrangements. Things have happened. You now have a

1889
01:43:44,200 --> 01:43:47,000
Speaker 1: new you have you have a new sort of entity

1890
01:43:47,120 --> 01:43:51,560
Speaker 1: that that is in Vancouver Island. Um. Yeah, so so

1891
01:43:51,760 --> 01:43:56,760
Speaker 1: immediately you have you have both you have both resources

1892
01:43:56,800 --> 01:43:59,240
Speaker 1: and you have problems. Right. You have a certain amount

1893
01:43:59,240 --> 01:44:02,680
Speaker 1: of resources that on Vancouver Island, right, you have you know,

1894
01:44:02,800 --> 01:44:05,560
Speaker 1: you have like you have literally like what what you

1895
01:44:05,680 --> 01:44:06,960
Speaker 1: have the things that are on the island. Right. You

1896
01:44:07,040 --> 01:44:10,280
Speaker 1: have cars, you have like probably some yaches you've managed

1897
01:44:10,320 --> 01:44:13,519
Speaker 1: to like steal you have you know, you have you

1898
01:44:13,560 --> 01:44:17,920
Speaker 1: have shops, you have production facilities, you have extremely large

1899
01:44:18,000 --> 01:44:26,880
Speaker 1: number of very good Chinese restaurants. Uh you have trees. Trees, yeah,

1900
01:44:26,920 --> 01:44:30,040
Speaker 1: you know restaurants. I mean also it's true like I yeah,

1901
01:44:30,080 --> 01:44:32,360
Speaker 1: my my my family spent a lot of time like

1902
01:44:32,479 --> 01:44:36,639
Speaker 1: specifically going going to Vancouver Island just to eat Chinese food. Uh. Yeah,

1903
01:44:36,720 --> 01:44:38,479
Speaker 1: you know, and say say like, let' let's say you've

1904
01:44:38,479 --> 01:44:40,360
Speaker 1: taken Vancouver Island and you you expand out and you

1905
01:44:40,439 --> 01:44:42,920
Speaker 1: now have like a swath of Canada, right that that

1906
01:44:43,080 --> 01:44:44,639
Speaker 1: is that is that is now sort of been liberated,

1907
01:44:44,720 --> 01:44:46,479
Speaker 1: and you know, you have you have you have a

1908
01:44:46,520 --> 01:44:48,640
Speaker 1: lot of resources. You have sort of timber, you have

1909
01:44:49,880 --> 01:44:52,400
Speaker 1: I don't know, maybe you have coal, maybe you have

1910
01:44:52,680 --> 01:44:54,360
Speaker 1: other stuff you have, you have, and you also have

1911
01:44:54,400 --> 01:44:59,400
Speaker 1: a lot of people and yeah, you have a lot

1912
01:44:59,439 --> 01:45:01,519
Speaker 1: of labor and and those people have a lot of skills,

1913
01:45:01,640 --> 01:45:04,439
Speaker 1: they have a lot of education, they have like you know,

1914
01:45:04,560 --> 01:45:06,240
Speaker 1: they have, they have, they have, they have a belief

1915
01:45:06,280 --> 01:45:08,439
Speaker 1: that you can make the world a better place. And

1916
01:45:08,640 --> 01:45:12,200
Speaker 1: I think this is where you know, this is this

1917
01:45:12,360 --> 01:45:15,799
Speaker 1: is the arena in which MMT can sort of explain

1918
01:45:15,920 --> 01:45:20,800
Speaker 1: what you're doing next. Mhm Yeah. So you have this um,

1919
01:45:21,479 --> 01:45:24,680
Speaker 1: you have a territory, this undergone revolutionary change, and you

1920
01:45:24,760 --> 01:45:29,599
Speaker 1: have biophysical resources that are in it and biophysical resources

1921
01:45:29,680 --> 01:45:34,400
Speaker 1: that could be in it. And you have and you

1922
01:45:34,479 --> 01:45:37,280
Speaker 1: also have the social technology of money. Some of the

1923
01:45:37,320 --> 01:45:40,080
Speaker 1: money you can just make yourself. Other moneys you cannot

1924
01:45:41,200 --> 01:45:44,519
Speaker 1: um M m T in the is applicable in the

1925
01:45:44,600 --> 01:45:47,760
Speaker 1: sense that it says in this scenario. I think the

1926
01:45:47,840 --> 01:45:50,840
Speaker 1: most the way MMT is most acclicable is to say

1927
01:45:51,880 --> 01:45:56,639
Speaker 1: everyone can be employed. Who wants to be employed, Yeah,

1928
01:45:56,680 --> 01:45:58,880
Speaker 1: there's they're the One of their principal ideas is a

1929
01:45:58,960 --> 01:46:01,639
Speaker 1: job you're in a federal job guarantee. And it could

1930
01:46:01,640 --> 01:46:06,040
Speaker 1: be applied just as easily conceptually in this situation. It says,

1931
01:46:07,479 --> 01:46:12,439
Speaker 1: UM there's nothing preventing a revolutionary government of some type, um,

1932
01:46:12,640 --> 01:46:15,840
Speaker 1: not necessarily a states, but any any non state type

1933
01:46:15,880 --> 01:46:20,360
Speaker 1: of administration from setting up something sort of like a

1934
01:46:20,479 --> 01:46:24,640
Speaker 1: central bank to make its own money, to martial domestic resources,

1935
01:46:24,800 --> 01:46:30,000
Speaker 1: domestic in terms of within its own territory, and to

1936
01:46:30,680 --> 01:46:34,040
Speaker 1: get everyone everyone who wants to be employed, to be

1937
01:46:34,160 --> 01:46:37,200
Speaker 1: employed and to be paid for their work. Like not

1938
01:46:37,360 --> 01:46:40,560
Speaker 1: to be too vulgar, but like why why this is

1939
01:46:40,600 --> 01:46:43,519
Speaker 1: stuff is important? This monetary theory in this history is like,

1940
01:46:43,960 --> 01:46:47,080
Speaker 1: people want to be paid for their work. They're not

1941
01:46:47,200 --> 01:46:50,120
Speaker 1: going to go inviter things. They want to get paid. Yeah,

1942
01:46:50,160 --> 01:46:52,479
Speaker 1: And I think this is something that like you know,

1943
01:46:52,520 --> 01:46:54,080
Speaker 1: if if if if you look at sort of like

1944
01:46:54,560 --> 01:46:56,679
Speaker 1: the thing that gets held up was like the classic

1945
01:46:56,720 --> 01:46:59,160
Speaker 1: example of an anarchist revolution, right is is what happens

1946
01:46:59,200 --> 01:47:02,519
Speaker 1: in Spain necinety six. And if if if you look

1947
01:47:02,560 --> 01:47:07,559
Speaker 1: at what they do right like very almost immediately after

1948
01:47:07,600 --> 01:47:10,080
Speaker 1: the revolution, what happens is you have basically like a

1949
01:47:10,240 --> 01:47:13,280
Speaker 1: union of all of the bank workers, and those guys

1950
01:47:13,360 --> 01:47:15,840
Speaker 1: take over all the banks, um, and you you have

1951
01:47:15,960 --> 01:47:18,439
Speaker 1: you have the individual work like workers in different unions

1952
01:47:18,439 --> 01:47:20,800
Speaker 1: starts seizing, they start seasing the factories that start seizing

1953
01:47:20,880 --> 01:47:23,880
Speaker 1: like the trains. And once they've done that, they start

1954
01:47:24,000 --> 01:47:27,000
Speaker 1: just pulling all of their resources into you know, like

1955
01:47:27,080 --> 01:47:29,240
Speaker 1: in into like they have they they now have this

1956
01:47:29,439 --> 01:47:31,080
Speaker 1: like they have they have the banking union. The banking

1957
01:47:31,160 --> 01:47:33,080
Speaker 1: union is is that the sort of sexual body that

1958
01:47:33,200 --> 01:47:36,160
Speaker 1: has resources that can distribute it. And you know what

1959
01:47:36,320 --> 01:47:38,680
Speaker 1: what what MMT is essentially saying is like, yeah, so

1960
01:47:40,040 --> 01:47:43,000
Speaker 1: as long as what you're moving around is the resources

1961
01:47:43,040 --> 01:47:45,560
Speaker 1: that you have in your territory, like you can just

1962
01:47:45,840 --> 01:47:48,360
Speaker 1: create money in order to do that, and you can

1963
01:47:48,439 --> 01:47:50,280
Speaker 1: sort of you know, and you can use this to

1964
01:47:50,320 --> 01:47:51,880
Speaker 1: get people to do certain things. And like you know,

1965
01:47:52,000 --> 01:47:56,479
Speaker 1: the Catalonians, like they they the equals if one's wages,

1966
01:47:56,560 --> 01:47:58,280
Speaker 1: for example, I mean, it would be better if we

1967
01:47:58,320 --> 01:48:01,000
Speaker 1: equalize everyone's wages. I do agree with that. Yeah, well,

1968
01:48:01,160 --> 01:48:02,920
Speaker 1: you know, I mean they did do with a lot

1969
01:48:02,960 --> 01:48:05,080
Speaker 1: of other stuff that's like okay, so like they get

1970
01:48:05,200 --> 01:48:07,400
Speaker 1: rid of a lot of jobs that are like sort

1971
01:48:07,439 --> 01:48:10,120
Speaker 1: of managerial stuff or like just bullshit jobs they just

1972
01:48:10,200 --> 01:48:12,439
Speaker 1: kind of eliminate and yeah, and you know, and this

1973
01:48:12,600 --> 01:48:15,360
Speaker 1: this frees up people to like do stuff that actually

1974
01:48:15,439 --> 01:48:18,160
Speaker 1: matters and is real instead of sort of dislike this

1975
01:48:18,240 --> 01:48:23,120
Speaker 1: sort of bureaucratic hierarchy that's above them. And yeah, but

1976
01:48:23,240 --> 01:48:24,519
Speaker 1: and I think the other thing they do that's that's

1977
01:48:24,600 --> 01:48:27,120
Speaker 1: very important for our sort of scenario for us talking

1978
01:48:27,120 --> 01:48:29,960
Speaker 1: about money is that like they they immediately start like

1979
01:48:30,200 --> 01:48:34,280
Speaker 1: they start seizing gold and they start seizing you know,

1980
01:48:34,360 --> 01:48:37,360
Speaker 1: like they start seasing foreign currency. And yeah, and I

1981
01:48:37,400 --> 01:48:38,880
Speaker 1: think that this this is where we can get into

1982
01:48:38,920 --> 01:48:41,840
Speaker 1: where where I guess MP doesn't work because m T

1983
01:48:42,800 --> 01:48:47,559
Speaker 1: like it's it's it's it doesn't. It doesn't really think

1984
01:48:47,720 --> 01:48:50,920
Speaker 1: much about the fact that like, Okay, you have Vancouver Island,

1985
01:48:51,000 --> 01:48:54,320
Speaker 1: you have a part of like Canada, right, there is

1986
01:48:54,400 --> 01:48:58,760
Speaker 1: a lot of resources that you don't have. Absolutely, Yeah,

1987
01:48:58,800 --> 01:49:03,759
Speaker 1: that's that's that's gonna be a lot of why foreign

1988
01:49:03,800 --> 01:49:09,160
Speaker 1: exchange matters so much as that, you know, you inevitably

1989
01:49:09,240 --> 01:49:13,719
Speaker 1: you think, what if we just made an autartic society.

1990
01:49:13,920 --> 01:49:17,160
Speaker 1: That's sorry, that's a little I probably jump got a

1991
01:49:17,160 --> 01:49:19,360
Speaker 1: little bit there. What if we just made everything ourselves?

1992
01:49:19,439 --> 01:49:23,880
Speaker 1: What if we made a society that was fully economically independent. Um,

1993
01:49:24,360 --> 01:49:27,000
Speaker 1: that's what autarchy tends to be used to mean. And

1994
01:49:27,160 --> 01:49:32,080
Speaker 1: the answer to that is because that sucks. The problem

1995
01:49:32,120 --> 01:49:35,559
Speaker 1: with it is that it sucks like you, you don't

1996
01:49:35,760 --> 01:49:38,560
Speaker 1: want to be trying to manage an autartic society on

1997
01:49:38,800 --> 01:49:45,439
Speaker 1: multiple grounds, uh, not least of which is that I mean,

1998
01:49:45,479 --> 01:49:48,160
Speaker 1: we've we've we've seen societies try to do it, and uh,

1999
01:49:48,439 --> 01:49:51,479
Speaker 1: you know, we me, me and Steve could go for

2000
01:49:51,600 --> 01:49:54,479
Speaker 1: hours and hours and hours talking about historical precedents of

2001
01:49:54,560 --> 01:49:57,439
Speaker 1: previous economic systems, many of which did try to be autartic,

2002
01:49:57,520 --> 01:49:59,920
Speaker 1: because that was something that monarchy has liked a lot,

2003
01:50:00,360 --> 01:50:03,800
Speaker 1: was the idea that their their kingdom could be fully independent.

2004
01:50:04,040 --> 01:50:07,479
Speaker 1: Because the thing is that when you're economically independent, that

2005
01:50:07,560 --> 01:50:10,360
Speaker 1: means that you've got a certain amount of security, of

2006
01:50:10,439 --> 01:50:13,439
Speaker 1: international security. Uh. And there's kind of a trade off

2007
01:50:13,560 --> 01:50:16,400
Speaker 1: where the more stuff that you're reliant on importing, the

2008
01:50:16,520 --> 01:50:19,280
Speaker 1: more vulnerable you are to the people you're importing and

2009
01:50:19,560 --> 01:50:25,040
Speaker 1: screwing you. But it's just so massively difficult to be

2010
01:50:25,240 --> 01:50:28,200
Speaker 1: a good producer of every possible good. Yeah, and and

2011
01:50:28,280 --> 01:50:30,080
Speaker 1: this and this is this is true even if you

2012
01:50:30,200 --> 01:50:32,760
Speaker 1: have an annoyance amount of resources, like I think, you know,

2013
01:50:32,800 --> 01:50:34,639
Speaker 1: we can talk about one case study of this, which

2014
01:50:34,720 --> 01:50:37,639
Speaker 1: is socialist period China, and you know, social spirit China.

2015
01:50:39,200 --> 01:50:42,960
Speaker 1: They they have they they they're they're getting resources, and

2016
01:50:43,080 --> 01:50:45,160
Speaker 1: especially the early periods, you're getting some resources from like

2017
01:50:45,240 --> 01:50:47,519
Speaker 1: Hong Kong, they're getting some stuff from the Soviets. But

2018
01:50:48,120 --> 01:50:52,720
Speaker 1: you know they get into like Mao famously does not

2019
01:50:52,880 --> 01:50:55,280
Speaker 1: like markets. Um, this is a this is the thing

2020
01:50:55,320 --> 01:50:57,360
Speaker 1: that is known about Mao, and so Mao is like, Okay,

2021
01:50:57,400 --> 01:50:59,040
Speaker 1: We're like no, we're going to shut off the sort

2022
01:50:59,080 --> 01:51:01,639
Speaker 1: of like ket system that we that we've been running

2023
01:51:01,640 --> 01:51:05,160
Speaker 1: sort of through Hong Kong. And then you know, China

2024
01:51:05,200 --> 01:51:08,680
Speaker 1: have been getting technology transfers and aid from the USSR.

2025
01:51:08,880 --> 01:51:10,599
Speaker 1: But you know, the US are in China got into

2026
01:51:10,600 --> 01:51:12,680
Speaker 1: a bunch of political fights and the US are like

2027
01:51:12,720 --> 01:51:16,000
Speaker 1: pulls out all of advisors and you know China, China

2028
01:51:16,120 --> 01:51:18,360
Speaker 1: has an enormous amount of resources, right, they have a

2029
01:51:18,439 --> 01:51:22,280
Speaker 1: large population, they have they have just an enormous geographic mass,

2030
01:51:23,479 --> 01:51:27,960
Speaker 1: and so they basically try to you know, build into

2031
01:51:28,000 --> 01:51:29,720
Speaker 1: target society and they try to sort of just okay,

2032
01:51:29,760 --> 01:51:31,720
Speaker 1: well we'll just what does martial our resources and we'll

2033
01:51:31,760 --> 01:51:33,360
Speaker 1: just sort of like, well, we'll plan a way out

2034
01:51:33,400 --> 01:51:34,600
Speaker 1: of it. And they run into this problem, which is

2035
01:51:34,640 --> 01:51:36,320
Speaker 1: that there is actually things that they need from other countries,

2036
01:51:36,360 --> 01:51:39,320
Speaker 1: which is technology, and they hit this thing I've talked

2037
01:51:39,360 --> 01:51:42,400
Speaker 1: about before, which is, uh, like they basically get this bottle,

2038
01:51:42,439 --> 01:51:44,280
Speaker 1: this production bottleneck where it's like, well, okay, so in

2039
01:51:44,400 --> 01:51:46,639
Speaker 1: order to produce more industrial goods, than need more food.

2040
01:51:47,400 --> 01:51:49,120
Speaker 1: But the problem is, in order to produce more food

2041
01:51:49,160 --> 01:51:52,120
Speaker 1: to support a large urban population, uh, you need more

2042
01:51:52,120 --> 01:51:54,519
Speaker 1: industrial goods, right, You need your like fertilizers, need your

2043
01:51:54,560 --> 01:51:57,720
Speaker 1: tractors and need stuff like that, and you know, and

2044
01:51:58,240 --> 01:52:00,200
Speaker 1: once they're cut off from sort of the rest of

2045
01:52:00,240 --> 01:52:01,880
Speaker 1: the world from through Hong Kong, and for the U. S.

2046
01:52:01,960 --> 01:52:05,000
Speaker 1: S R. They don't have what they you know, they're

2047
01:52:05,000 --> 01:52:06,760
Speaker 1: they're sort of they're sort of scrambling to figure out

2048
01:52:06,800 --> 01:52:09,519
Speaker 1: how we do this. And their solution is a greatly forward,

2049
01:52:10,200 --> 01:52:13,160
Speaker 1: which is essentially we're we're we're gonna just bust through

2050
01:52:13,200 --> 01:52:14,679
Speaker 1: this whole thing, and we're gonna do it by forcing

2051
01:52:14,720 --> 01:52:18,559
Speaker 1: everyone to work for like an absolutely enormous like increase

2052
01:52:18,600 --> 01:52:20,160
Speaker 1: in hours. Right Like, We're we're gonna we're gonna have

2053
01:52:20,160 --> 01:52:22,759
Speaker 1: peasants working in the fields literally until they collasse some exhaustion,

2054
01:52:23,400 --> 01:52:25,080
Speaker 1: and it just doesn't work. It is a it is

2055
01:52:25,160 --> 01:52:28,640
Speaker 1: a epocal failure. There are millions of people die from

2056
01:52:28,680 --> 01:52:32,519
Speaker 1: famines and you know, and the sort of the response

2057
01:52:32,600 --> 01:52:36,360
Speaker 1: to this is that, like is that China eventually ends

2058
01:52:36,439 --> 01:52:39,200
Speaker 1: up like winds up opening its economy again. Yeah and

2059
01:52:39,400 --> 01:52:40,880
Speaker 1: yeah and yeah, and like you know, and this is

2060
01:52:40,920 --> 01:52:44,240
Speaker 1: the thing, like if if China, which has like just

2061
01:52:44,560 --> 01:52:47,800
Speaker 1: just an astounding breath of natural resources, can't pull this off,

2062
01:52:48,200 --> 01:52:53,000
Speaker 1: like it's probably just not a good idea because it's like, yeah, well,

2063
01:52:53,080 --> 01:52:55,160
Speaker 1: I mean we even have like a very you know,

2064
01:52:55,240 --> 01:52:59,160
Speaker 1: a very contemporary example that you know, makes they will

2065
01:52:59,280 --> 01:53:01,040
Speaker 1: make certainly makes my blood, boy, and I'm sure we

2066
01:53:01,040 --> 01:53:04,920
Speaker 1: will make some of the listeners blood boil. The vaccines, uh,

2067
01:53:05,120 --> 01:53:10,280
Speaker 1: you know, the realistically, you know, the the coronavirus is

2068
01:53:10,400 --> 01:53:13,320
Speaker 1: fund is a more or less is an incredible threat

2069
01:53:13,360 --> 01:53:15,559
Speaker 1: to basically adding every state on the planet at this point.

2070
01:53:16,080 --> 01:53:22,280
Speaker 1: And the really really chemical and biomedical research is done

2071
01:53:22,320 --> 01:53:25,080
Speaker 1: in just a handful of places on the planet. Uh.

2072
01:53:25,560 --> 01:53:29,920
Speaker 1: And there have been attempts to create vaccines outside of

2073
01:53:30,000 --> 01:53:33,800
Speaker 1: those places, and they have been somewhat successful, but it

2074
01:53:33,960 --> 01:53:37,880
Speaker 1: has been difficult, and most places are just not in

2075
01:53:37,960 --> 01:53:44,000
Speaker 1: a position to create a to develop their own competing technology. Uh.

2076
01:53:44,120 --> 01:53:48,480
Speaker 1: And even China struggled with creating their own competing vaccination technology.

2077
01:53:48,479 --> 01:53:52,120
Speaker 1: And I'm not at all a bio biology expert, understand

2078
01:53:52,200 --> 01:53:56,360
Speaker 1: it's a not quite a sufficient vaccine, the sinovac. But

2079
01:53:57,400 --> 01:53:59,559
Speaker 1: at the end of the day, this is like South

2080
01:53:59,600 --> 01:54:02,080
Speaker 1: Africa not developing their own independent vaccine. That's a quite

2081
01:54:02,120 --> 01:54:06,040
Speaker 1: sophisticatedicated economy. All of all the very South American countries

2082
01:54:06,080 --> 01:54:08,800
Speaker 1: could have pulled their resources together in theory, but it's

2083
01:54:08,880 --> 01:54:12,879
Speaker 1: so hard to turn a dime and develop from scratch

2084
01:54:12,960 --> 01:54:18,120
Speaker 1: a primary research industry. Uh, it's so difficult, and it's

2085
01:54:18,160 --> 01:54:20,880
Speaker 1: so not worth it. It's you know, if you have

2086
01:54:21,240 --> 01:54:25,479
Speaker 1: trade relations with a country that has technology developments in

2087
01:54:25,560 --> 01:54:28,040
Speaker 1: a field that you really care about, it's just not

2088
01:54:28,840 --> 01:54:32,080
Speaker 1: really worth it. Like we don't the United States doesn't

2089
01:54:32,080 --> 01:54:34,960
Speaker 1: really compete with several sort of forms of Japanese technology

2090
01:54:35,040 --> 01:54:40,080
Speaker 1: because it's just not worth the bother. Uh. Just let

2091
01:54:40,560 --> 01:54:43,600
Speaker 1: Korea and Japan handle that for US, and we buy

2092
01:54:43,640 --> 01:54:46,280
Speaker 1: it and they accept our our four x they accept

2093
01:54:46,320 --> 01:54:50,720
Speaker 1: our dollars. But you know, let's say you're the Philippines, Yeah,

2094
01:54:51,720 --> 01:54:54,480
Speaker 1: how are you going to get those? And uh, this

2095
01:54:54,680 --> 01:54:57,720
Speaker 1: is this is now international trade and international politics. And

2096
01:54:58,680 --> 01:55:02,200
Speaker 1: if we're creating our now independent Vancouver Island, we have

2097
01:55:02,280 --> 01:55:05,960
Speaker 1: now entered into this territory, we have now entered into

2098
01:55:06,360 --> 01:55:11,040
Speaker 1: international politics and international trade. Yeah, and and this this

2099
01:55:11,160 --> 01:55:13,920
Speaker 1: is an arena that's fraud in a lot of ways

2100
01:55:14,040 --> 01:55:16,240
Speaker 1: because it's it's you know, as you've sort of been

2101
01:55:16,240 --> 01:55:18,080
Speaker 1: talking about, right, it's it's not just that you need.

2102
01:55:19,520 --> 01:55:21,360
Speaker 1: It's not sing that you need for XP. It's like example,

2103
01:55:21,400 --> 01:55:23,880
Speaker 1: like you know, if you have you have your sort

2104
01:55:23,920 --> 01:55:27,240
Speaker 1: of like you know, you you you you have your

2105
01:55:27,280 --> 01:55:31,040
Speaker 1: new society and like Vancouver, right mack you violence, you

2106
01:55:31,120 --> 01:55:32,960
Speaker 1: know you need the thing you need mostly is dollars.

2107
01:55:34,280 --> 01:55:39,240
Speaker 1: And this is this is a real problem because this

2108
01:55:39,440 --> 01:55:42,760
Speaker 1: requires you to have something that you can turn into dollars.

2109
01:55:43,960 --> 01:55:45,760
Speaker 1: And you know, okay, so you're you're going to have

2110
01:55:45,920 --> 01:55:49,360
Speaker 1: some amount of dollars that are just there right from

2111
01:55:49,400 --> 01:55:51,720
Speaker 1: from when you see society. There's there's assets you can

2112
01:55:51,760 --> 01:55:53,520
Speaker 1: sort of just sell off that like okay, like do

2113
01:55:53,600 --> 01:55:56,040
Speaker 1: we really need this yacht? Like okay, we can, we

2114
01:55:56,080 --> 01:55:57,600
Speaker 1: can we can sell this for some amount of dollars.

2115
01:55:58,480 --> 01:56:03,360
Speaker 1: But this becomes a real economic problem because you need

2116
01:56:03,440 --> 01:56:07,440
Speaker 1: to produce something that you can exchange for dollars, and

2117
01:56:07,640 --> 01:56:10,120
Speaker 1: you know, there's there's a pretty good chance that like

2118
01:56:10,600 --> 01:56:12,760
Speaker 1: whatever sort of new currency whatever new sort of like

2119
01:56:12,920 --> 01:56:16,880
Speaker 1: MMT currency that's like, oh, it's it's controlled because we're producing.

2120
01:56:16,920 --> 01:56:19,360
Speaker 1: It moves our resources around. We can make a bustment

2121
01:56:19,400 --> 01:56:21,840
Speaker 1: as we want, Like yeah, you have to actually be

2122
01:56:21,840 --> 01:56:24,920
Speaker 1: able to look convert that into dollars. And you know

2123
01:56:25,360 --> 01:56:27,280
Speaker 1: why why does the U? Y is the US going

2124
01:56:27,320 --> 01:56:30,920
Speaker 1: to want your currency? Yeah, it's a bit dialectical because

2125
01:56:31,000 --> 01:56:33,839
Speaker 1: you have to. Okay, you have your m m T currency,

2126
01:56:33,960 --> 01:56:37,320
Speaker 1: which domestically is accepted because of text receive ability or

2127
01:56:37,400 --> 01:56:42,520
Speaker 1: something uh or or national fervor if you will to

2128
01:56:42,840 --> 01:56:50,440
Speaker 1: um create a new democratic confederalists society um, and that's

2129
01:56:50,440 --> 01:56:52,880
Speaker 1: accepted there. But yeah, you need US sellars. So like

2130
01:56:54,440 --> 01:56:56,400
Speaker 1: you need us sellars. But why do you need them?

2131
01:56:56,880 --> 01:57:00,480
Speaker 1: Partly because like you eventually want to not need them. Yeah,

2132
01:57:01,000 --> 01:57:03,400
Speaker 1: and so you have what you can You have assets

2133
01:57:03,520 --> 01:57:06,480
Speaker 1: right now that you can just sell, so that's one way,

2134
01:57:06,800 --> 01:57:08,920
Speaker 1: but long term you can't do that. So you need

2135
01:57:09,000 --> 01:57:12,839
Speaker 1: to have cash flow over the long haul that allows

2136
01:57:12,920 --> 01:57:17,360
Speaker 1: you to buy what are called capital goods, which are

2137
01:57:18,560 --> 01:57:21,920
Speaker 1: is a fancy term for machines that make machines or

2138
01:57:22,080 --> 01:57:25,480
Speaker 1: machines that make some sort of like in product, which

2139
01:57:25,560 --> 01:57:27,720
Speaker 1: is a physical thing. It's not like a service or something.

2140
01:57:29,040 --> 01:57:36,600
Speaker 1: And um, you want to classic like really classic economic

2141
01:57:36,680 --> 01:57:41,200
Speaker 1: development advice that is actually pretty good is you want

2142
01:57:41,280 --> 01:57:44,120
Speaker 1: to move up what's called a value chain and eventually

2143
01:57:44,360 --> 01:57:47,720
Speaker 1: be not producing, um, just like a stable crop or something,

2144
01:57:47,880 --> 01:57:52,160
Speaker 1: but doing really innovative advanced technology things later on. So

2145
01:57:52,320 --> 01:57:54,480
Speaker 1: you like, here's where I am, here's what I have,

2146
01:57:55,560 --> 01:57:59,280
Speaker 1: Here's what I could have. Though, how do I get there? Um,

2147
01:57:59,600 --> 01:58:02,200
Speaker 1: part of of part of the formula to get there

2148
01:58:02,520 --> 01:58:06,640
Speaker 1: is yes, acquiring for X, but it's other things like saying,

2149
01:58:07,240 --> 01:58:11,440
Speaker 1: how do I cultivate political alliances that will yield trade

2150
01:58:11,480 --> 01:58:14,520
Speaker 1: partners such that I have a stable flow of for

2151
01:58:14,880 --> 01:58:18,640
Speaker 1: X and uh, maybe even technology transfers you know, or

2152
01:58:18,720 --> 01:58:22,000
Speaker 1: something down the line which could be a game changer. Um,

2153
01:58:22,320 --> 01:58:25,160
Speaker 1: you need to have an education system. Like if you're

2154
01:58:25,280 --> 01:58:29,280
Speaker 1: a fan of the economist Torstin Veblen, he thought like

2155
01:58:29,440 --> 01:58:32,400
Speaker 1: in his mind he thought the economic development was ultimately

2156
01:58:32,560 --> 01:58:36,320
Speaker 1: from the human intellect and like everything was downstream of that.

2157
01:58:37,200 --> 01:58:40,320
Speaker 1: So like you need to have money to um, you

2158
01:58:40,360 --> 01:58:42,120
Speaker 1: can use your m M T money to create a

2159
01:58:42,200 --> 01:58:45,680
Speaker 1: basic education system and you can augment it with buying

2160
01:58:45,880 --> 01:58:49,800
Speaker 1: importing things that you can't yet make and using it

2161
01:58:49,920 --> 01:58:52,800
Speaker 1: to create like a university or something which can do

2162
01:58:53,440 --> 01:58:58,080
Speaker 1: R and D work. Um, you have to you have

2163
01:58:58,200 --> 01:59:02,040
Speaker 1: to find tools to get enough of the money that

2164
01:59:02,160 --> 01:59:05,160
Speaker 1: you can't just infinitely produce for X in order to

2165
01:59:05,800 --> 01:59:10,280
Speaker 1: augment what your society can produce beyond what initially could

2166
01:59:11,000 --> 01:59:14,200
Speaker 1: and show essentially that you, okay, I can make a

2167
01:59:14,280 --> 01:59:19,560
Speaker 1: better mouse trap like I. I don't need to. I

2168
01:59:19,640 --> 01:59:24,360
Speaker 1: don't need donations from well meaning imperial powers or something.

2169
01:59:24,880 --> 01:59:27,680
Speaker 1: We're building what we need in order to move up

2170
01:59:27,720 --> 01:59:30,959
Speaker 1: the value chain and then build out our productive capacity

2171
01:59:31,720 --> 01:59:34,680
Speaker 1: in such a way that, um, it doesn't leave anyone behind.

2172
01:59:34,880 --> 01:59:38,360
Speaker 1: Everyone is everyone's employed because we're doing the classic M

2173
01:59:38,440 --> 01:59:40,680
Speaker 1: M T stuff on the home front, such as a

2174
01:59:40,800 --> 01:59:45,560
Speaker 1: job guarantee, but we're also doing the international economic development

2175
01:59:45,680 --> 01:59:51,520
Speaker 1: stuff of assiduationally monitoring our foreign foreign currency reserves and

2176
01:59:51,640 --> 01:59:54,280
Speaker 1: then using them to import things that we cannot yet

2177
01:59:54,360 --> 01:59:59,400
Speaker 1: make but can make things internally and then have a

2178
02:00:00,880 --> 02:00:04,440
Speaker 1: a snowballing effect as far as being able to sell

2179
02:00:04,680 --> 02:00:09,160
Speaker 1: even higher value things which UM to our trade partners

2180
02:00:09,560 --> 02:00:12,920
Speaker 1: who are hopefully share our values of like democratic confederalism

2181
02:00:13,080 --> 02:00:17,640
Speaker 1: or whatever you whatever you're chosen guidelines are yeah, and

2182
02:00:17,920 --> 02:00:22,040
Speaker 1: this is something that like, this is something that that

2183
02:00:22,120 --> 02:00:25,480
Speaker 1: becomes very difficult in like the current market. You know,

2184
02:00:25,760 --> 02:00:27,200
Speaker 1: this is this is to some extent like why the

2185
02:00:27,280 --> 02:00:29,360
Speaker 1: Cold War went the way it did, right, which is

2186
02:00:29,480 --> 02:00:32,800
Speaker 1: that you know, once once you have the Zinosovie explant,

2187
02:00:32,800 --> 02:00:34,640
Speaker 1: and once you have like you have Chinese and Russian

2188
02:00:34,640 --> 02:00:38,160
Speaker 1: troops killing each other on the border um China, it

2189
02:00:38,880 --> 02:00:41,440
Speaker 1: like enters the situation where it's like, well, okay, so

2190
02:00:42,320 --> 02:00:44,960
Speaker 1: we still want to do economic developments, but we've lost

2191
02:00:45,160 --> 02:00:46,960
Speaker 1: the Soviet unions as a typology as a way to

2192
02:00:47,000 --> 02:00:48,720
Speaker 1: get to knowledgy transfers, and their solution to that was

2193
02:00:48,760 --> 02:00:51,440
Speaker 1: to ally with the U S. And this is like

2194
02:00:53,880 --> 02:00:55,680
Speaker 1: it works out for the Chinese economy. It is an

2195
02:00:55,680 --> 02:00:59,760
Speaker 1: apocal disaster for like literally everyone else on earth because

2196
02:01:00,200 --> 02:01:02,480
Speaker 1: it means that capitalism is the thing that wins the

2197
02:01:02,560 --> 02:01:04,400
Speaker 1: Cold War. And and this means that like you know,

2198
02:01:04,480 --> 02:01:06,040
Speaker 1: I mean like if you look if you look at

2199
02:01:06,120 --> 02:01:10,440
Speaker 1: how you know, like the things that China are doing

2200
02:01:10,600 --> 02:01:12,440
Speaker 1: in order to be able to get technology transfers for

2201
02:01:12,480 --> 02:01:16,520
Speaker 1: the US. It's like like there's so there there are

2202
02:01:16,640 --> 02:01:20,760
Speaker 1: joints like Chinese CIA like operations inside of China that

2203
02:01:20,840 --> 02:01:23,000
Speaker 1: are like monitoring Soviet missile site. So there's just like

2204
02:01:23,400 --> 02:01:26,120
Speaker 1: CIA app post just like in China that are just

2205
02:01:26,400 --> 02:01:29,560
Speaker 1: you know, doing spying. Like for for the U. S. Government.

2206
02:01:29,760 --> 02:01:34,600
Speaker 1: There's like they invade Vietnam, which is you know, and

2207
02:01:34,640 --> 02:01:36,520
Speaker 1: it's such as the invade neenomen's like they've made Vietnam

2208
02:01:36,600 --> 02:01:38,600
Speaker 1: and then they fight this like this really you know,

2209
02:01:39,240 --> 02:01:41,240
Speaker 1: the immediate war just last that long, but they fight

2210
02:01:41,320 --> 02:01:43,520
Speaker 1: this like horrible border war that goes on for like

2211
02:01:43,600 --> 02:01:47,440
Speaker 1: a decade that kills enormous numbers of people, and you know,

2212
02:01:47,560 --> 02:01:49,320
Speaker 1: and the end result of this is like yeah, like

2213
02:01:49,400 --> 02:01:51,120
Speaker 1: you know, trying to get the signalogy transfers and they

2214
02:01:51,160 --> 02:01:55,960
Speaker 1: developed economy, but everyone else on Earth, yeah, because is

2215
02:01:56,040 --> 02:01:58,720
Speaker 1: like everyone who's ever tried to be a labor organizer

2216
02:01:58,880 --> 02:02:03,040
Speaker 1: in like you know, and like how Salvador gets murdered

2217
02:02:03,120 --> 02:02:07,840
Speaker 1: by a bunch of fascists and every development econ is

2218
02:02:07,960 --> 02:02:11,160
Speaker 1: so fucking frustrating because every single step of the way,

2219
02:02:11,800 --> 02:02:14,520
Speaker 1: there's like there's like a really razor thin line between

2220
02:02:14,680 --> 02:02:18,040
Speaker 1: risk and reward at every step of the way. And

2221
02:02:18,160 --> 02:02:22,720
Speaker 1: so like imperial powers will dangle technology transfers or extended

2222
02:02:22,760 --> 02:02:28,000
Speaker 1: trade agreements on some favorable terms in exchange for allowing

2223
02:02:28,080 --> 02:02:30,640
Speaker 1: them to just like go to war with your neighbors,

2224
02:02:30,840 --> 02:02:37,120
Speaker 1: like or rope you into it, or or extract resources

2225
02:02:37,160 --> 02:02:41,600
Speaker 1: that would be value for you later in your development phases. Yeah. Actually,

2226
02:02:41,720 --> 02:02:44,000
Speaker 1: uh this leads to me, um, you know, going to

2227
02:02:44,120 --> 02:02:47,320
Speaker 1: our hypothetical here thinking about Vancouver Island, the People's Republic

2228
02:02:47,400 --> 02:02:50,400
Speaker 1: of Vancouver Island, and we can kind of talk about

2229
02:02:50,440 --> 02:02:52,320
Speaker 1: some of development traps because that's kind of what I'm

2230
02:02:52,600 --> 02:02:55,360
Speaker 1: was turning through my head right now because I'm looking

2231
02:02:55,360 --> 02:02:58,360
Speaker 1: at the Wikipedia page for Vancouver Island. Is that incredibly

2232
02:02:58,400 --> 02:03:02,600
Speaker 1: deep research, and so what they listen under the economy

2233
02:03:02,800 --> 02:03:08,000
Speaker 1: is there's a tech sector, logging, fishing, tourism, and food um.

2234
02:03:08,440 --> 02:03:10,400
Speaker 1: And so you know we're talked first about like you

2235
02:03:10,440 --> 02:03:12,760
Speaker 1: could like sell off like the yachts and the cars

2236
02:03:12,840 --> 02:03:15,600
Speaker 1: and stuff like that. Uh, and that's I don't even

2237
02:03:15,600 --> 02:03:17,160
Speaker 1: know if that counts as a sector of the economy

2238
02:03:17,200 --> 02:03:22,640
Speaker 1: at that level. That's a yeah, you can start sale.

2239
02:03:24,120 --> 02:03:26,480
Speaker 1: But you know, logging and fishing, those are those are

2240
02:03:26,480 --> 02:03:29,960
Speaker 1: pretty solid primary sector economies, you know, you know, to

2241
02:03:30,760 --> 02:03:33,240
Speaker 1: that describe the terminology, you know, they've got this. This

2242
02:03:33,400 --> 02:03:35,520
Speaker 1: is part of that hierarchy that Steve was talking about

2243
02:03:35,560 --> 02:03:38,680
Speaker 1: that you know, the chain of development, and a primary

2244
02:03:38,760 --> 02:03:43,320
Speaker 1: sector is like a basic extractive element of your economy

2245
02:03:43,800 --> 02:03:49,879
Speaker 1: a mine, uh, logging, phishing, food production, you know, basic goods.

2246
02:03:50,320 --> 02:03:52,400
Speaker 1: And then you know, you talk about a secondary development,

2247
02:03:52,480 --> 02:03:54,720
Speaker 1: which is like manufacturing in the territiary, which is you

2248
02:03:54,760 --> 02:03:58,040
Speaker 1: know services. Those are kind of your basic Those are

2249
02:03:58,120 --> 02:04:00,120
Speaker 1: usually considered like sectors of the economy, but in a

2250
02:04:00,120 --> 02:04:03,680
Speaker 1: way they kind of correspond to development um and they

2251
02:04:03,760 --> 02:04:06,800
Speaker 1: require different amounts of developments. And you know the thing

2252
02:04:06,840 --> 02:04:11,200
Speaker 1: about primaries that everybody needs those things, Like unless people

2253
02:04:11,360 --> 02:04:14,280
Speaker 1: just stop using wood for construction, which we are very

2254
02:04:14,360 --> 02:04:16,520
Speaker 1: far from doing. We still use a lot of wood

2255
02:04:16,560 --> 02:04:19,440
Speaker 1: for construction. Uh, your logging industry is going to have

2256
02:04:19,520 --> 02:04:24,000
Speaker 1: buyers um until people stop buying eating fish. Your fishing

2257
02:04:24,040 --> 02:04:27,200
Speaker 1: industry is going to have buyers. Yeah, up to a

2258
02:04:27,400 --> 02:04:31,440
Speaker 1: really ludicrously bottomless reserve. But you're gonna be stopped on

2259
02:04:31,440 --> 02:04:34,800
Speaker 1: that secondary industry until you have capital. Like I don't

2260
02:04:34,840 --> 02:04:36,360
Speaker 1: mean just like the sense of having a lot of money,

2261
02:04:36,440 --> 02:04:40,320
Speaker 1: but you know the right money, and well, you need capital.

2262
02:04:40,400 --> 02:04:43,120
Speaker 1: Production need capital, you need the machine, you need, you

2263
02:04:43,160 --> 02:04:48,000
Speaker 1: need major factories, you need your need yeah. Uh, and

2264
02:04:48,520 --> 02:04:52,240
Speaker 1: wealthy countries partly in order to maintain their powers they

2265
02:04:52,520 --> 02:04:55,800
Speaker 1: have they they want to be the only seller of

2266
02:04:55,840 --> 02:04:58,280
Speaker 1: capital kids. Yeah, and and they're gonna be very withholding

2267
02:04:58,280 --> 02:05:01,880
Speaker 1: about it. Like a really good example for right now,

2268
02:05:02,040 --> 02:05:04,000
Speaker 1: I like all of the inflation stuff going on, like

2269
02:05:04,080 --> 02:05:09,040
Speaker 1: the chip shortage. Yeah, so the machines that make the

2270
02:05:09,200 --> 02:05:12,920
Speaker 1: machines that make the chips, Holy sh it, those are

2271
02:05:13,040 --> 02:05:15,960
Speaker 1: like those are they only make like fifty of those

2272
02:05:16,000 --> 02:05:20,600
Speaker 1: a year? Yeah, and it's all two companies. Yeah, you know,

2273
02:05:21,920 --> 02:05:23,480
Speaker 1: the thing with the thing with the chip shortage. Right.

2274
02:05:23,480 --> 02:05:26,760
Speaker 1: It's also like so if you can be like the

2275
02:05:26,920 --> 02:05:28,480
Speaker 1: people who do that, that gives you a lot of

2276
02:05:28,560 --> 02:05:31,560
Speaker 1: economic power. Like this is this is one of Taiwan's things, right,

2277
02:05:31,640 --> 02:05:33,560
Speaker 1: which is that like you know, it's like, okay, so

2278
02:05:33,600 --> 02:05:35,600
Speaker 1: why hasn't Taiwan just sort of been bowled over by

2279
02:05:35,880 --> 02:05:37,920
Speaker 1: by China? And like, I mean, there's a lot of

2280
02:05:38,000 --> 02:05:40,160
Speaker 1: sort of geopolitical reasons for them. It's also partly it's

2281
02:05:40,200 --> 02:05:42,680
Speaker 1: just that like, yeah, like Taiwan has this enormous chipmaking

2282
02:05:42,760 --> 02:05:46,480
Speaker 1: industry and it's incredibly advanced, and you know, it has

2283
02:05:46,600 --> 02:05:49,000
Speaker 1: like you know this this is I think and everything

2284
02:05:49,080 --> 02:05:51,120
Speaker 1: that that that's a real problem for sort of revelation

2285
02:05:51,280 --> 02:05:54,200
Speaker 1: society doing this is that like yeah, like Taiwan's chip

2286
02:05:54,320 --> 02:06:00,240
Speaker 1: making economy, like it's not like people like fall in

2287
02:06:00,360 --> 02:06:04,000
Speaker 1: like vats of chemicals like a lot, like there's a

2288
02:06:04,080 --> 02:06:06,000
Speaker 1: lot of there's a lot like just horrible sort of

2289
02:06:06,080 --> 02:06:08,000
Speaker 1: labor application. And then this comes back to even you're

2290
02:06:08,000 --> 02:06:10,080
Speaker 1: sort of like like you know, if you're talking about

2291
02:06:10,080 --> 02:06:14,240
Speaker 1: your your sort of primary primary sector stuff in the economy,

2292
02:06:14,280 --> 02:06:16,400
Speaker 1: which is that like okay, well yeah, I mean like

2293
02:06:16,480 --> 02:06:18,160
Speaker 1: oils particularly example of this, but like you know, same

2294
02:06:18,200 --> 02:06:20,080
Speaker 1: with timber, and same same with fishes, like these are

2295
02:06:20,120 --> 02:06:24,880
Speaker 1: extractive industries, and this becomes a real problem for a

2296
02:06:25,000 --> 02:06:27,600
Speaker 1: lot of your sort of like newly revolutionary developing societies

2297
02:06:27,680 --> 02:06:30,960
Speaker 1: because you get this tension between um like and you

2298
02:06:31,080 --> 02:06:33,320
Speaker 1: see this a lot in Latin America's like this is

2299
02:06:33,360 --> 02:06:35,480
Speaker 1: there's a huge tension like this Simplivia for example, he

2300
02:06:35,480 --> 02:06:37,880
Speaker 1: se as an Ecuador two where like you have different

2301
02:06:37,920 --> 02:06:40,840
Speaker 1: factions of do you have different factors of the political

2302
02:06:40,880 --> 02:06:42,920
Speaker 1: movements where you have people who are like okay, yeah,

2303
02:06:43,000 --> 02:06:46,080
Speaker 1: I'm I'm okay with just like you know, building these

2304
02:06:46,160 --> 02:06:49,560
Speaker 1: highways through indigenous land or just like doing massy forestation

2305
02:06:49,840 --> 02:06:53,240
Speaker 1: or like doing doing open pit mining, and those people

2306
02:06:53,280 --> 02:06:55,040
Speaker 1: will be like, those people will be leftist right there.

2307
02:06:55,200 --> 02:06:56,480
Speaker 1: People are like, Okay, well we need to do this

2308
02:06:56,560 --> 02:06:58,160
Speaker 1: because we need to like you know, this is an

2309
02:06:58,200 --> 02:06:59,960
Speaker 1: antipoverty measure. We have to be at the value chain,

2310
02:07:00,080 --> 02:07:02,400
Speaker 1: we have to increase your production. But then you know

2311
02:07:02,520 --> 02:07:06,160
Speaker 1: you have the indigenous people who's like, homes these are right, Yeah, yeah,

2312
02:07:06,520 --> 02:07:10,680
Speaker 1: you can rationalize, yeah, the intellectual backing. Yeah, and like

2313
02:07:10,720 --> 02:07:12,960
Speaker 1: and this this happens like in in China too. There's

2314
02:07:13,000 --> 02:07:16,360
Speaker 1: like like a lot of the interstation has been absolutely devastating,

2315
02:07:16,520 --> 02:07:19,560
Speaker 1: like and and and this this becomes a real like

2316
02:07:19,880 --> 02:07:23,880
Speaker 1: the fact that you need for REX becomes this like

2317
02:07:24,200 --> 02:07:28,040
Speaker 1: incredible trap that that you you sink into because it's like,

2318
02:07:28,800 --> 02:07:31,480
Speaker 1: on the one hand, like, yeah, like there are resources

2319
02:07:32,520 --> 02:07:34,720
Speaker 1: that you need in order to have a function anxiety,

2320
02:07:34,800 --> 02:07:37,080
Speaker 1: but it's also that that you can't get in your territory.

2321
02:07:37,120 --> 02:07:40,320
Speaker 1: But also like the cost of getting that for REX

2322
02:07:40,440 --> 02:07:43,680
Speaker 1: is enormous and and a lot of times it's it's

2323
02:07:43,720 --> 02:07:47,120
Speaker 1: it's it's a it's something that just simply destroys the

2324
02:07:47,120 --> 02:07:49,760
Speaker 1: revolutionary project. Well it hit me when I looked at

2325
02:07:49,800 --> 02:07:55,400
Speaker 1: this list of Vancouver's economic sectors was uh, you know,

2326
02:07:55,480 --> 02:07:57,520
Speaker 1: tourism being listed among the big ones in my mind

2327
02:07:57,560 --> 02:08:01,680
Speaker 1: immediately into Cuba two pre revolution, precastro Cuba, and your

2328
02:08:01,720 --> 02:08:04,600
Speaker 1: precast Cuba has all these things going for it. Off

2329
02:08:05,080 --> 02:08:07,240
Speaker 1: when you're when you're looking at from like a developmental standpoint,

2330
02:08:07,240 --> 02:08:09,760
Speaker 1: you know, it's got this like very good productive base

2331
02:08:10,200 --> 02:08:15,200
Speaker 1: of primary resources like sugar. Uh. It has great relations

2332
02:08:15,240 --> 02:08:20,920
Speaker 1: with the United States of America, particularly through the mafia. Uh. Yeah, wonderful, right,

2333
02:08:21,640 --> 02:08:26,200
Speaker 1: it has, Uh, the tourism industry is very successful. It's

2334
02:08:26,240 --> 02:08:29,480
Speaker 1: producing manufactured cigar, so it even has a secondary industry bridge,

2335
02:08:30,040 --> 02:08:33,760
Speaker 1: but is still absolutely failing to develop in a way

2336
02:08:33,800 --> 02:08:36,760
Speaker 1: that is meaningful for the people living in Cuba. You know,

2337
02:08:36,960 --> 02:08:41,240
Speaker 1: pre pre castro Cuba was a nightmare for most people. Uh.

2338
02:08:41,680 --> 02:08:45,880
Speaker 1: And that's you know that, that's like Steve said, you know,

2339
02:08:45,960 --> 02:08:50,520
Speaker 1: there's this razor thin thing between risk and reward. And

2340
02:08:51,640 --> 02:08:53,800
Speaker 1: during that, you know, during the fourties and fifties in Cuba,

2341
02:08:54,680 --> 02:08:56,480
Speaker 1: it was just it just made so much sense to

2342
02:08:56,600 --> 02:09:03,640
Speaker 1: just stick with this impoverty, extractive tourists, heavy mafia friendly economy.

2343
02:09:03,800 --> 02:09:06,000
Speaker 1: And yeah they were friends with the US. They could

2344
02:09:06,000 --> 02:09:10,960
Speaker 1: have gone technology transfers in principle, but were they actually

2345
02:09:11,000 --> 02:09:13,920
Speaker 1: going to h And I's something we have to think

2346
02:09:13,920 --> 02:09:16,400
Speaker 1: about with our our people's republic of Vancouver Island, is

2347
02:09:16,440 --> 02:09:18,840
Speaker 1: you know, yeah, like people are going to want our logs,

2348
02:09:18,880 --> 02:09:21,280
Speaker 1: people are gonna want our fishing. American tourists are going

2349
02:09:21,320 --> 02:09:24,000
Speaker 1: to come here and go whale watching and that's gonna

2350
02:09:24,120 --> 02:09:25,680
Speaker 1: bring in forex. But are we gonna be able to

2351
02:09:25,800 --> 02:09:30,040
Speaker 1: like leverage that and how leg Yeah? Yeah, And I

2352
02:09:30,160 --> 02:09:32,200
Speaker 1: kind of want to move the conversation to like I

2353
02:09:32,280 --> 02:09:35,000
Speaker 1: think people might be listening and saying like, Okay, yeah,

2354
02:09:35,000 --> 02:09:36,880
Speaker 1: I can see why far actually be important, but like,

2355
02:09:37,120 --> 02:09:41,760
Speaker 1: what are the specific ways in which we can acquire

2356
02:09:41,840 --> 02:09:44,920
Speaker 1: it but also manage it? And it's like, okay, well

2357
02:09:46,600 --> 02:09:54,520
Speaker 1: without which we want without tell being socialists who want democracy? Um, okay,

2358
02:09:55,040 --> 02:09:59,560
Speaker 1: So I think if we're I'm I'm picturing some sort

2359
02:09:59,560 --> 02:10:03,000
Speaker 1: of a sim Belie structure taking shape because I'm a

2360
02:10:03,080 --> 02:10:09,720
Speaker 1: lipsock Libertrian socialist. Um and uh it could be something else,

2361
02:10:09,960 --> 02:10:13,960
Speaker 1: but any case, Uh, I think they should appoint fifty

2362
02:10:14,120 --> 02:10:16,160
Speaker 1: or so people, some of them experts, some of them

2363
02:10:16,240 --> 02:10:22,320
Speaker 1: not two examine. They should do a thorough economic analysis

2364
02:10:22,360 --> 02:10:25,720
Speaker 1: of the entire island, and you should do it on

2365
02:10:25,800 --> 02:10:29,360
Speaker 1: the basis of here are the assets we have, Here's

2366
02:10:29,360 --> 02:10:32,080
Speaker 1: where we want to go in terms of assets, how

2367
02:10:32,120 --> 02:10:34,840
Speaker 1: do we get from here to there? And one of

2368
02:10:34,920 --> 02:10:36,760
Speaker 1: the assets that you have is, okay, we have so

2369
02:10:36,880 --> 02:10:39,280
Speaker 1: many U S dollars, we have so many Canadian dollars,

2370
02:10:39,720 --> 02:10:43,320
Speaker 1: we have reserve balances. So we need to import things.

2371
02:10:44,320 --> 02:10:47,000
Speaker 1: We can make some of it ourselves. We need to

2372
02:10:47,080 --> 02:10:50,440
Speaker 1: buy the rest of it. We can't buy all of

2373
02:10:50,520 --> 02:10:53,240
Speaker 1: it now. We need to cash flow some of this.

2374
02:10:53,640 --> 02:10:58,440
Speaker 1: We need to We need to do export led growth.

2375
02:10:59,080 --> 02:11:02,600
Speaker 1: As the developed the classic development ECON people would say,

2376
02:11:03,000 --> 02:11:06,200
Speaker 1: where we say, we have some industries where we can

2377
02:11:07,280 --> 02:11:10,240
Speaker 1: gradually and consistently ramp up to the point that they

2378
02:11:10,320 --> 02:11:12,640
Speaker 1: give They give us the types of money which we

2379
02:11:12,760 --> 02:11:16,120
Speaker 1: need in order to input capital goods. The machines that

2380
02:11:16,160 --> 02:11:21,480
Speaker 1: build machines two, buy them, learn how to use them

2381
02:11:22,520 --> 02:11:27,520
Speaker 1: and maintain them, and then build more ourselves. Ideally and

2382
02:11:27,840 --> 02:11:31,880
Speaker 1: over the course of say, basically, I'm basically suggesting that

2383
02:11:32,080 --> 02:11:37,120
Speaker 1: Vancouver Island should have a ten year plan. They should

2384
02:11:37,120 --> 02:11:40,640
Speaker 1: have a ten year plan for further economic development, and

2385
02:11:41,120 --> 02:11:45,640
Speaker 1: it should be as democratically decided upon as possible within

2386
02:11:45,720 --> 02:11:48,160
Speaker 1: the limits of like Okay, there's some experts which will

2387
02:11:48,200 --> 02:11:52,720
Speaker 1: obviously be needed and not everyone can do that. But um,

2388
02:11:53,560 --> 02:11:57,960
Speaker 1: whatever assembly structure you have should be given oversight ultimately

2389
02:11:59,080 --> 02:12:03,120
Speaker 1: and you should say, um, just be really frank with it,

2390
02:12:03,320 --> 02:12:07,800
Speaker 1: Like we have these are biophysical resources. Now in ten

2391
02:12:07,920 --> 02:12:11,440
Speaker 1: years they should be this in order to get there,

2392
02:12:11,560 --> 02:12:14,160
Speaker 1: each year, these things need to happen. We have to

2393
02:12:14,200 --> 02:12:17,520
Speaker 1: have this much foreign currency, we have to have this

2394
02:12:17,760 --> 02:12:22,800
Speaker 1: many workers involved in this industry. Um, we can change

2395
02:12:22,840 --> 02:12:25,800
Speaker 1: things along the way, but we're constrained by these factors

2396
02:12:26,480 --> 02:12:31,680
Speaker 1: where like we need trade partners, we need uh two

2397
02:12:33,160 --> 02:12:36,960
Speaker 1: reverse engineers, some technology that we've acquired or something in

2398
02:12:37,160 --> 02:12:40,960
Speaker 1: order to to educate ourselves on how to create chips

2399
02:12:41,080 --> 02:12:46,360
Speaker 1: or something in the future. UM yeah, there's like there

2400
02:12:46,360 --> 02:12:50,080
Speaker 1: should be like an extremely vigorous discussion of what assets

2401
02:12:50,120 --> 02:12:52,560
Speaker 1: do we have, what do we need, what's our goal

2402
02:12:53,240 --> 02:12:56,920
Speaker 1: and then thread together a development plan from there and

2403
02:12:57,040 --> 02:12:59,880
Speaker 1: then use your m m T money to marshal the

2404
02:13:00,040 --> 02:13:02,880
Speaker 1: resources that you currently have and that you need for

2405
02:13:03,000 --> 02:13:08,200
Speaker 1: like the next year, say domestically, while monitoring and augmenting

2406
02:13:08,880 --> 02:13:14,240
Speaker 1: your foreign currency reserves and um, using the tools of

2407
02:13:14,440 --> 02:13:19,040
Speaker 1: monetary policy to safeguard those reserves and economize on them

2408
02:13:19,240 --> 02:13:22,160
Speaker 1: in order to import what you can't yet make so

2409
02:13:22,240 --> 02:13:25,200
Speaker 1: that you can make it in the future. I think

2410
02:13:25,240 --> 02:13:28,240
Speaker 1: the thing that we should learn from the fact that

2411
02:13:28,360 --> 02:13:31,960
Speaker 1: like a lot of these projects haven't worked is well,

2412
02:13:32,000 --> 02:13:34,480
Speaker 1: I think it's twofold. One is that you have okay,

2413
02:13:34,520 --> 02:13:40,080
Speaker 1: there there there's constant sort of like there's traps you

2414
02:13:40,160 --> 02:13:42,640
Speaker 1: have to avoid that have to do with like, for example,

2415
02:13:42,720 --> 02:13:45,680
Speaker 1: like who actually has access to the forex because this

2416
02:13:45,840 --> 02:13:47,560
Speaker 1: is what this is a way that like you know,

2417
02:13:47,680 --> 02:13:51,200
Speaker 1: and also like because it's it's very very easy to

2418
02:13:51,280 --> 02:13:54,520
Speaker 1: like access to sort of like incidentally redeveloped ruling classes

2419
02:13:54,560 --> 02:13:56,400
Speaker 1: when you're trying to do playing technology stuff and when

2420
02:13:56,400 --> 02:13:58,800
Speaker 1: you're trying when you're dealing with enormous amounts of foreign currency,

2421
02:14:00,040 --> 02:14:02,440
Speaker 1: and this is a problem and you know. And in

2422
02:14:02,560 --> 02:14:04,440
Speaker 1: the second problem has to do with sort of like

2423
02:14:06,360 --> 02:14:08,360
Speaker 1: how how how do you make sure that your economy

2424
02:14:08,480 --> 02:14:12,040
Speaker 1: essentially doesn't end up as a resource colony and this

2425
02:14:12,200 --> 02:14:13,760
Speaker 1: has this has other components and you know, and I

2426
02:14:13,840 --> 02:14:16,600
Speaker 1: think I think this is something that like like there

2427
02:14:16,760 --> 02:14:19,120
Speaker 1: is a lot that can be done if you control

2428
02:14:19,440 --> 02:14:24,480
Speaker 1: like a regid of territory but there's there's political limits

2429
02:14:24,520 --> 02:14:26,120
Speaker 1: on it. And the political limits have to do with

2430
02:14:27,240 --> 02:14:30,960
Speaker 1: you know, who actually controls the sort of like vast

2431
02:14:31,000 --> 02:14:35,560
Speaker 1: majority of resources and technology. And the only way to

2432
02:14:35,800 --> 02:14:38,400
Speaker 1: really deal with that is that like, you know, you

2433
02:14:38,520 --> 02:14:41,480
Speaker 1: can't you can't sort of have like you if if

2434
02:14:41,560 --> 02:14:43,839
Speaker 1: if you want to actually have sort of long term stability,

2435
02:14:43,880 --> 02:14:46,120
Speaker 1: you can't just have your sort of like your your

2436
02:14:46,280 --> 02:14:49,120
Speaker 1: like libertary and social counsels in one country. I guess

2437
02:14:49,160 --> 02:14:50,800
Speaker 1: it's a it's a thing that has to like keep

2438
02:14:50,880 --> 02:14:54,520
Speaker 1: moving and keep spreading because otherwise it becomes it becomes

2439
02:14:54,560 --> 02:14:58,000
Speaker 1: just increasingly difficult, and you come under increasing pressures, you know,

2440
02:14:58,280 --> 02:15:00,600
Speaker 1: for you know, in order to do things that you

2441
02:15:00,840 --> 02:15:02,040
Speaker 1: be that you need to do in order to make

2442
02:15:02,040 --> 02:15:03,800
Speaker 1: sure people don't starve, in order to make sure that

2443
02:15:03,960 --> 02:15:06,240
Speaker 1: people have educations, to make sure that people you know,

2444
02:15:06,280 --> 02:15:08,160
Speaker 1: are able to sort of live with their lives, and

2445
02:15:08,200 --> 02:15:09,600
Speaker 1: also like in order to make sure that you don't

2446
02:15:09,640 --> 02:15:12,960
Speaker 1: just annihilate the annihilate the entire environment doing this, because

2447
02:15:12,960 --> 02:15:15,160
Speaker 1: that's something that happens a lot when in these developmental

2448
02:15:15,320 --> 02:15:19,200
Speaker 1: estates is that like, you know, you get you you

2449
02:15:19,280 --> 02:15:21,240
Speaker 1: know you you you get groups who are like come

2450
02:15:21,280 --> 02:15:23,120
Speaker 1: in the power and are like, well, okay, we're like

2451
02:15:23,120 --> 02:15:25,080
Speaker 1: we're gonna be an ecological regime, and then you know,

2452
02:15:25,400 --> 02:15:27,000
Speaker 1: they wind up having to they wind up doing oil

2453
02:15:27,040 --> 02:15:31,560
Speaker 1: extraction and like well prepit mining, because that's you know,

2454
02:15:31,640 --> 02:15:34,760
Speaker 1: that that's the easiest way to to get money. And

2455
02:15:34,840 --> 02:15:41,800
Speaker 1: I think I think, like I I think it's it's

2456
02:15:41,920 --> 02:15:44,920
Speaker 1: valuable that like, these are things that if you're serious

2457
02:15:44,920 --> 02:15:48,320
Speaker 1: about taking power, you have to think about. But I

2458
02:15:48,520 --> 02:15:51,120
Speaker 1: also think it's it's important to keep in mind just

2459
02:15:52,440 --> 02:15:56,720
Speaker 1: the the inherent limits that you have if you're just

2460
02:15:56,800 --> 02:16:00,440
Speaker 1: sort of if you're if you're completely isolated, like if

2461
02:16:00,480 --> 02:16:02,680
Speaker 1: you're a completely isolated referee street movement in one place,

2462
02:16:02,720 --> 02:16:04,680
Speaker 1: it doesn't have people where that you can you know,

2463
02:16:05,400 --> 02:16:08,880
Speaker 1: give stuff to and move stuff around between. Yeah, I mean,

2464
02:16:08,960 --> 02:16:11,320
Speaker 1: it's it's it's always been kind. I mean, that's that's

2465
02:16:11,360 --> 02:16:14,080
Speaker 1: been like a kind of inevitable thing that like, you know,

2466
02:16:14,840 --> 02:16:19,240
Speaker 1: there are there are communes in my extended family. You know,

2467
02:16:19,280 --> 02:16:22,440
Speaker 1: I've got members of my family who live on you know,

2468
02:16:22,920 --> 02:16:29,640
Speaker 1: those little farm communes, and they're not fully economically independent. Um,

2469
02:16:29,760 --> 02:16:31,640
Speaker 1: and I'm sure that we could find people who would

2470
02:16:31,640 --> 02:16:33,200
Speaker 1: be willing to say, oh, you know this is like,

2471
02:16:33,920 --> 02:16:36,480
Speaker 1: this is totally fake. This is not a real commune

2472
02:16:36,520 --> 02:16:41,280
Speaker 1: because they you know sell uh, you know, sell sunflower

2473
02:16:41,360 --> 02:16:46,680
Speaker 1: seeds at the farmers market and stuff. Uh. And that's

2474
02:16:46,920 --> 02:16:49,200
Speaker 1: kind of the unfortunate. That's kind of like the tough

2475
02:16:49,280 --> 02:16:57,920
Speaker 1: reality that unless you managed to create a truly global revolution,

2476
02:16:57,959 --> 02:16:59,680
Speaker 1: as I said, unlet's until you've got like two thirds

2477
02:16:59,720 --> 02:17:04,400
Speaker 1: of the population under your umbrella. Uh, you're going to

2478
02:17:04,440 --> 02:17:07,000
Speaker 1: have foreign relations and you're going to have foreign trade,

2479
02:17:08,400 --> 02:17:12,520
Speaker 1: which is going to uh, it's going to be it's

2480
02:17:12,520 --> 02:17:14,520
Speaker 1: going to be difficult to manage. You know, you're going

2481
02:17:14,600 --> 02:17:15,840
Speaker 1: to have to be both. You're going to have to

2482
02:17:15,920 --> 02:17:18,400
Speaker 1: have like a you know, a diplomatic core. That's something

2483
02:17:18,440 --> 02:17:20,920
Speaker 1: we're barely mentioning here, but like we're gonna need to

2484
02:17:21,000 --> 02:17:23,840
Speaker 1: have diplomats coming out of this council if we're talking

2485
02:17:23,879 --> 02:17:27,480
Speaker 1: about them having relations with the US and Canada. Uh,

2486
02:17:27,640 --> 02:17:29,760
Speaker 1: and you're negotiating these trade deals. You know, these trade

2487
02:17:29,840 --> 02:17:33,560
Speaker 1: deals don't happen out of nowhere. Um. And you know,

2488
02:17:33,640 --> 02:17:35,800
Speaker 1: we kind of brushed this aside, but it's a it's

2489
02:17:35,800 --> 02:17:37,720
Speaker 1: a bit of as a bit of a misperception that

2490
02:17:37,760 --> 02:17:42,560
Speaker 1: people tend to have that the United States is pro

2491
02:17:42,840 --> 02:17:45,680
Speaker 1: free trade in like an extreme sense that like any

2492
02:17:45,720 --> 02:17:48,080
Speaker 1: trade of the United States is done without any tariffs.

2493
02:17:48,440 --> 02:17:53,160
Speaker 1: Oh dead, No, I don't think that you if you

2494
02:17:53,320 --> 02:17:56,760
Speaker 1: believe that without having done a lot of research, I

2495
02:17:56,840 --> 02:17:58,880
Speaker 1: do not think that that is an absurd thing to believe,

2496
02:17:59,040 --> 02:18:04,040
Speaker 1: because that is the propaganda that is passed along in

2497
02:18:04,240 --> 02:18:09,720
Speaker 1: common knowledge. A very quick examination of how trade works

2498
02:18:09,800 --> 02:18:13,800
Speaker 1: between international actors will reveal that there are thousands and

2499
02:18:13,879 --> 02:18:16,320
Speaker 1: thousands and thousands of tariffs active all the time in

2500
02:18:16,480 --> 02:18:19,720
Speaker 1: every trade to Yeah, and like the like the big

2501
02:18:19,800 --> 02:18:22,680
Speaker 1: one with the US agricultural subsidies, which are just it

2502
02:18:22,840 --> 02:18:25,040
Speaker 1: is it is it is illegal to have them. We

2503
02:18:25,200 --> 02:18:28,920
Speaker 1: have like just in just like billions and billions of

2504
02:18:28,920 --> 02:18:33,080
Speaker 1: billions of dollars agricultural subsidies that have producing cheap food.

2505
02:18:33,200 --> 02:18:35,280
Speaker 1: That's like we're not even good at making it. Like

2506
02:18:35,480 --> 02:18:38,960
Speaker 1: it's it's a complete disaster. It Let mean this like this,

2507
02:18:39,160 --> 02:18:42,280
Speaker 1: this is just single handedly annihilated the economies of like

2508
02:18:42,640 --> 02:18:44,960
Speaker 1: enormous swass of the globe because because no one can

2509
02:18:45,000 --> 02:18:47,080
Speaker 1: compete with withoth American agri culture subsidies. And it's you know,

2510
02:18:47,200 --> 02:18:48,840
Speaker 1: and and but like when when you join the free

2511
02:18:48,879 --> 02:18:50,960
Speaker 1: trade system, like that's one of the carve outs. That

2512
02:18:51,080 --> 02:18:52,680
Speaker 1: was that's that's that's in the w t O is

2513
02:18:52,760 --> 02:18:55,760
Speaker 1: you can't have uh subsidies for for your culture programs

2514
02:18:55,920 --> 02:18:59,520
Speaker 1: except for the US and it's it's great and I

2515
02:18:59,600 --> 02:19:01,680
Speaker 1: mean food one dies. Well, there's all sorts of like

2516
02:19:01,760 --> 02:19:05,200
Speaker 1: weird technical ways that you can create pseudo subsidies, you know. Uh.

2517
02:19:05,640 --> 02:19:10,280
Speaker 1: You know, Italy very famously has a price floor on wine. Uh.

2518
02:19:10,520 --> 02:19:13,800
Speaker 1: And this means that you know, if you if you

2519
02:19:13,879 --> 02:19:17,120
Speaker 1: make a bottle of wine that nobody would buy for

2520
02:19:17,200 --> 02:19:19,280
Speaker 1: the minimum price, the government will buy it off of

2521
02:19:19,320 --> 02:19:21,680
Speaker 1: you for that price. And so there there are wineries

2522
02:19:21,680 --> 02:19:24,040
Speaker 1: in Italy that just produced wine at such a this

2523
02:19:24,200 --> 02:19:26,080
Speaker 1: so bad nobody would buy nobody you would have to

2524
02:19:26,120 --> 02:19:29,039
Speaker 1: pay people to drink it. But the government just buys

2525
02:19:29,080 --> 02:19:31,400
Speaker 1: it at this minimum set price and then throws it

2526
02:19:31,520 --> 02:19:35,000
Speaker 1: enough in a giant Olympic swimming pool that uh to

2527
02:19:35,120 --> 02:19:40,200
Speaker 1: go rot uh And like there are yeah, there there there.

2528
02:19:40,280 --> 02:19:43,560
Speaker 1: The trade is, you know, there's a lot more complex.

2529
02:19:44,200 --> 02:19:46,440
Speaker 1: The free trade is kind of a meth at the

2530
02:19:46,480 --> 02:19:52,520
Speaker 1: international level. Uh. It is at it's at the most cynical.

2531
02:19:52,720 --> 02:19:56,000
Speaker 1: Free trade as a doctrine is a cudgel used by

2532
02:19:56,080 --> 02:19:58,880
Speaker 1: more powerful countries that they impose that you have to

2533
02:19:58,920 --> 02:20:01,280
Speaker 1: do free trade with um and that they get to

2534
02:20:01,320 --> 02:20:05,280
Speaker 1: do protract and trade with you. Well, it's a it's well, firstly,

2535
02:20:05,360 --> 02:20:09,120
Speaker 1: like you mentioned, it's a myth. And historically speaking, we

2536
02:20:09,280 --> 02:20:13,200
Speaker 1: had like, we had infant industries in this country that

2537
02:20:13,320 --> 02:20:18,440
Speaker 1: we're highly protected from the verily earliest days through most

2538
02:20:18,520 --> 02:20:21,480
Speaker 1: of the nineteenth century and into this one century, and

2539
02:20:21,680 --> 02:20:26,199
Speaker 1: we had uh, we had expert lead growth from infant

2540
02:20:26,280 --> 02:20:30,959
Speaker 1: lead for infant industries in the US. And that's precisely

2541
02:20:31,080 --> 02:20:34,200
Speaker 1: the opposite advice we now turn around and give via

2542
02:20:34,480 --> 02:20:38,600
Speaker 1: our imperial like apparatus from the I m F and

2543
02:20:38,680 --> 02:20:42,920
Speaker 1: the World Bank to developing counts and like countries. Countries

2544
02:20:43,120 --> 02:20:45,880
Speaker 1: that that examined what the US was telling them to

2545
02:20:45,959 --> 02:20:48,920
Speaker 1: do and did the opposite. Are the ones that succeeded. Yes,

2546
02:20:49,200 --> 02:20:53,000
Speaker 1: like South Korea said no, funk that, and there they

2547
02:20:53,040 --> 02:20:55,760
Speaker 1: went up the value chain and they did all of

2548
02:20:55,800 --> 02:20:59,400
Speaker 1: the things that we said Vancouver Island should do basically, yeah,

2549
02:20:59,400 --> 02:21:01,720
Speaker 1: except except not being evil. They did not do that.

2550
02:21:02,160 --> 02:21:05,440
Speaker 1: They were evil. They were evil for a time, and

2551
02:21:05,480 --> 02:21:08,880
Speaker 1: they were dictatorial, but in terms of their economic development

2552
02:21:08,959 --> 02:21:11,840
Speaker 1: plan divorced from political reality, which is probably naive of

2553
02:21:11,920 --> 02:21:14,640
Speaker 1: me to say, um, they took the opposite advice of

2554
02:21:14,680 --> 02:21:18,080
Speaker 1: the I m F in terms of that narrow scope. Well, yeah,

2555
02:21:18,360 --> 02:21:20,360
Speaker 1: I think the other thing that's kind of important here

2556
02:21:20,400 --> 02:21:21,960
Speaker 1: that I haven't really touched on yet, is it, like

2557
02:21:22,800 --> 02:21:24,200
Speaker 1: so part part of part of what was going on

2558
02:21:24,320 --> 02:21:26,480
Speaker 1: with with South Korea's economy is that South Korea's economy

2559
02:21:26,560 --> 02:21:29,280
Speaker 1: was was a war economy, and it was a war

2560
02:21:29,320 --> 02:21:31,360
Speaker 1: economy designed to build I mean, originally just it was

2561
02:21:31,440 --> 02:21:33,800
Speaker 1: it was war economy because they were finding a war, right,

2562
02:21:33,879 --> 02:21:36,320
Speaker 1: But then it became this i mean ess central access

2563
02:21:36,320 --> 02:21:38,040
Speaker 1: of sort of the corruction of the Korean War, and

2564
02:21:38,080 --> 02:21:41,880
Speaker 1: that it became this access that like it became a

2565
02:21:42,000 --> 02:21:44,400
Speaker 1: huge part of the American sort of arms industry in

2566
02:21:44,560 --> 02:21:46,600
Speaker 1: in Vietnam. And this is the sending that Japan has

2567
02:21:46,640 --> 02:21:49,320
Speaker 1: this too, where both these economies are like a huge

2568
02:21:49,360 --> 02:21:50,920
Speaker 1: part of the reason why they're able to develop is

2569
02:21:50,959 --> 02:21:53,760
Speaker 1: because they get enormous amounts of just money and the

2570
02:21:54,080 --> 02:21:56,880
Speaker 1: guaranteed contract and stuff like that from American military development.

2571
02:21:56,920 --> 02:21:58,880
Speaker 1: And this is a this is another really big problem

2572
02:21:59,600 --> 02:22:03,160
Speaker 1: for like you're sort of free state that like you've

2573
02:22:03,200 --> 02:22:05,400
Speaker 1: created like whatever you're sort of like Council Republic, you're

2574
02:22:05,440 --> 02:22:08,720
Speaker 1: like if on the zone, you're like indigenous confederation. Is

2575
02:22:08,800 --> 02:22:14,640
Speaker 1: that like you need weapons and the people who make

2576
02:22:14,720 --> 02:22:19,640
Speaker 1: guns are like the US and Russia And this is

2577
02:22:19,680 --> 02:22:21,320
Speaker 1: a really you know and and you know, we've we've

2578
02:22:21,360 --> 02:22:25,080
Speaker 1: been talking on this show about about producing like three

2579
02:22:25,160 --> 02:22:28,600
Speaker 1: D point weapons, but I mean, you know, in terms

2580
02:22:28,640 --> 02:22:31,360
Speaker 1: of things like you know, you're like artillery, right, like

2581
02:22:31,840 --> 02:22:33,680
Speaker 1: k of your mortars and like things like that, were like,

2582
02:22:33,760 --> 02:22:35,800
Speaker 1: you know, you you can't. You can't three D prints

2583
02:22:35,959 --> 02:22:39,920
Speaker 1: the best of my knowledge, And I'm like ent sure

2584
02:22:39,920 --> 02:22:43,040
Speaker 1: about this that like unless you had extremely advanced facilities,

2585
02:22:43,040 --> 02:22:44,920
Speaker 1: and even then it's not clear. Like I I like,

2586
02:22:45,879 --> 02:22:47,640
Speaker 1: I don't think anyone on Earth has ever pred three

2587
02:22:47,680 --> 02:22:50,680
Speaker 1: D printed like an anti aircraft rocket, like you can

2588
02:22:50,720 --> 02:22:52,640
Speaker 1: you can you know, you can't make you can't make stingers,

2589
02:22:52,680 --> 02:22:54,039
Speaker 1: you can't make man pads. You can't make like anti

2590
02:22:54,080 --> 02:22:57,120
Speaker 1: tank anti aircraft weapons. Not to get too much into it,

2591
02:22:57,240 --> 02:23:00,280
Speaker 1: but like the way in which Ukraine is fighting like

2592
02:23:00,440 --> 02:23:05,080
Speaker 1: Russian tanks and it's very specifics is kind of encouraging. Actually, yeah,

2593
02:23:05,160 --> 02:23:08,280
Speaker 1: but like because you feel like the like specific yeah,

2594
02:23:08,320 --> 02:23:10,360
Speaker 1: I mean there's only a few companies for making the

2595
02:23:10,400 --> 02:23:13,920
Speaker 1: components for these things. Yeah, it's a problem. And that's

2596
02:23:13,959 --> 02:23:18,720
Speaker 1: that's like the personnel launched the in law or whatever things. Yeah,

2597
02:23:18,840 --> 02:23:21,360
Speaker 1: like the anti taking and takers like if you can

2598
02:23:21,440 --> 02:23:24,840
Speaker 1: get them, they're effective and they do they do stuffing

2599
02:23:26,400 --> 02:23:29,200
Speaker 1: from by the US or the UK. Yeah, yeah, and

2600
02:23:29,320 --> 02:23:31,760
Speaker 1: that's that's that's a huge problem if you're you know,

2601
02:23:32,040 --> 02:23:35,280
Speaker 1: not trying to like be a political colony of these

2602
02:23:35,280 --> 02:23:37,240
Speaker 1: two things. And and this this is another trap that

2603
02:23:37,360 --> 02:23:40,200
Speaker 1: you see, like you see did Cares especially falling into,

2604
02:23:40,280 --> 02:23:42,880
Speaker 1: which is that that they you know, Okay, so like

2605
02:23:42,920 --> 02:23:44,880
Speaker 1: on the one hand, yeah, you do need weapons, right,

2606
02:23:44,959 --> 02:23:47,360
Speaker 1: like you you need you need some kind of military complex,

2607
02:23:47,560 --> 02:23:49,800
Speaker 1: and you need arms order to make sure that like

2608
02:23:50,520 --> 02:23:52,560
Speaker 1: you know, you're not like the US doesn't rull tanks

2609
02:23:52,600 --> 02:23:56,240
Speaker 1: across the border. But simultaneously, like there's there's a thing

2610
02:23:56,320 --> 02:23:59,000
Speaker 1: that happens a lot with this is happticularly with Petro States,

2611
02:23:59,040 --> 02:24:02,880
Speaker 1: where you know, okay, so the the the the US

2612
02:24:03,000 --> 02:24:05,040
Speaker 1: is like, okay, so we need this oil, right, and

2613
02:24:05,280 --> 02:24:06,400
Speaker 1: how how do you how do you deal with the

2614
02:24:06,440 --> 02:24:08,120
Speaker 1: sort of balance payments ephas And the answer is we

2615
02:24:08,160 --> 02:24:10,840
Speaker 1: just sell them like a hundred billion tanks and we

2616
02:24:11,000 --> 02:24:12,920
Speaker 1: just like we just like dump f thirty fives on them,

2617
02:24:13,640 --> 02:24:15,560
Speaker 1: and you can get into these scenarios where like you

2618
02:24:15,680 --> 02:24:18,560
Speaker 1: get these like because I mean, the problem with weapons,

2619
02:24:18,640 --> 02:24:19,920
Speaker 1: right it is like okay, so you need them to survive,

2620
02:24:19,959 --> 02:24:22,200
Speaker 1: but they also they don't produce anything, right, in fact

2621
02:24:22,240 --> 02:24:24,160
Speaker 1: that they're sort of they're sort of net economic negatives

2622
02:24:24,160 --> 02:24:25,720
Speaker 1: because the only thing you could do with a gun

2623
02:24:26,040 --> 02:24:27,760
Speaker 1: is I mean, I guess you could technically hunt, but

2624
02:24:27,840 --> 02:24:29,720
Speaker 1: like you know that the thing you're doing with the

2625
02:24:29,760 --> 02:24:32,760
Speaker 1: weapon is destroying value. Yeah yeah. And I mean and

2626
02:24:32,920 --> 02:24:36,000
Speaker 1: then they were crying maintenance. Yeah yeah, Like these things

2627
02:24:36,040 --> 02:24:39,080
Speaker 1: are substantial net negatives. Yeah, and and and you know,

2628
02:24:39,120 --> 02:24:41,400
Speaker 1: and and countries get sucked into these traps. Were like

2629
02:24:42,200 --> 02:24:44,960
Speaker 1: you know, okay, we're just gonna keep buying American weapons

2630
02:24:45,080 --> 02:24:47,879
Speaker 1: because of security or like uh we we we want

2631
02:24:47,920 --> 02:24:49,920
Speaker 1: to invade some other country. You're like, well, you know,

2632
02:24:49,959 --> 02:24:51,920
Speaker 1: and you see this so hew weaponry to like back

2633
02:24:51,920 --> 02:24:53,720
Speaker 1: back when that was the thing and today modern Russian

2634
02:24:53,760 --> 02:24:56,120
Speaker 1: trap wheny where it's like you can you can get

2635
02:24:56,240 --> 02:24:58,560
Speaker 1: funneled into these traps were like the ruling class of

2636
02:24:58,640 --> 02:25:01,160
Speaker 1: your society just decides it's the thing that it wants

2637
02:25:01,200 --> 02:25:03,800
Speaker 1: to spend his four X on his weapons, and you

2638
02:25:03,920 --> 02:25:06,280
Speaker 1: have to be very very like you have to be

2639
02:25:06,520 --> 02:25:08,240
Speaker 1: you know, and this is the thing that happens like

2640
02:25:10,400 --> 02:25:12,880
Speaker 1: like Evner Hoax for example, famously like makes just a

2641
02:25:12,920 --> 02:25:16,039
Speaker 1: bunch of bunkers, right and like militarized society and it's like, well,

2642
02:25:17,000 --> 02:25:19,480
Speaker 1: you know, part of this is just Hoax being extremely weird,

2643
02:25:19,560 --> 02:25:25,520
Speaker 1: but like, yeah, you have to be very careful when

2644
02:25:25,560 --> 02:25:28,360
Speaker 1: your society that is genuinely under threat that you're not

2645
02:25:28,600 --> 02:25:32,480
Speaker 1: sort of like just throwing all of your resources into

2646
02:25:32,959 --> 02:25:35,520
Speaker 1: into stuff like that where you know, it doesn't it

2647
02:25:35,520 --> 02:25:38,440
Speaker 1: doesn't pre us anything, but you know, and yeah, also

2648
02:25:38,480 --> 02:25:41,720
Speaker 1: I mean this is it is a need like like

2649
02:25:42,280 --> 02:25:48,280
Speaker 1: whatever the Vancouver Economic Planning whatever group should like one

2650
02:25:48,400 --> 02:25:52,119
Speaker 1: of one of the objectives would frank would be military

2651
02:25:52,480 --> 02:25:56,240
Speaker 1: of course, Yeah, um you need to. I don't know

2652
02:25:56,320 --> 02:25:58,200
Speaker 1: if you could get your hands on in laws or

2653
02:25:58,280 --> 02:26:02,720
Speaker 1: man pads or anything like that, but you, um, I

2654
02:26:02,800 --> 02:26:07,240
Speaker 1: think you would be foolish frankly not too distribute and

2655
02:26:07,320 --> 02:26:11,960
Speaker 1: train on weapons and stuff like that. Yeah, and that yeah, yeah,

2656
02:26:12,000 --> 02:26:13,200
Speaker 1: like I think I think like, yeah, it's like you

2657
02:26:13,280 --> 02:26:14,280
Speaker 1: have to use some of it for that and it

2658
02:26:14,400 --> 02:26:16,520
Speaker 1: sucks because this is something that like this, this sucks

2659
02:26:16,520 --> 02:26:22,280
Speaker 1: you into the arms complex, right, Yeah, Rose is using

2660
02:26:22,520 --> 02:26:30,000
Speaker 1: its oil revenues um to fund its expenditure almost is

2661
02:26:30,760 --> 02:26:33,800
Speaker 1: at least like in the last time I checked, was

2662
02:26:34,840 --> 02:26:39,160
Speaker 1: to defense forces. Yeah, and like and a lot of that,

2663
02:26:39,360 --> 02:26:44,560
Speaker 1: a lot of that came from dollars, euros and turkishly

2664
02:26:44,680 --> 02:26:48,640
Speaker 1: right that they required to oil. Yeah, and like this

2665
02:26:48,800 --> 02:26:50,120
Speaker 1: and this is the thing that like, yeah, this, this

2666
02:26:50,200 --> 02:26:51,720
Speaker 1: is this is a problem if you're into your revolution

2667
02:26:51,800 --> 02:26:54,040
Speaker 1: society surrounding people who just literally want to murder you,

2668
02:26:54,480 --> 02:26:56,360
Speaker 1: or it's like stuff like this winds up happening and

2669
02:26:56,400 --> 02:26:59,000
Speaker 1: you wind it like I don't blame them, Yeah, it's

2670
02:26:59,000 --> 02:27:04,680
Speaker 1: like it's obviously it's like reality. Yeah, And I think

2671
02:27:04,720 --> 02:27:06,680
Speaker 1: that's a you know that that that's a good example

2672
02:27:06,760 --> 02:27:09,680
Speaker 1: of like what happens if the revolution doesn't spread and

2673
02:27:09,760 --> 02:27:11,760
Speaker 1: if you get sort of like you get isolated, contained

2674
02:27:11,800 --> 02:27:13,960
Speaker 1: by imperial powers who just want to murder to you,

2675
02:27:14,600 --> 02:27:19,720
Speaker 1: is that you wind up, like you basically you want,

2676
02:27:19,760 --> 02:27:22,600
Speaker 1: you wind up fighting an endless war against both the

2677
02:27:22,640 --> 02:27:24,800
Speaker 1: proxy forces and the real forces of RBS that are

2678
02:27:24,840 --> 02:27:28,440
Speaker 1: significantly large and more powerful than you. And yeah, and

2679
02:27:28,480 --> 02:27:30,120
Speaker 1: there's a lot of times there's not much you can

2680
02:27:30,160 --> 02:27:32,600
Speaker 1: do about it. But it's like I think, you know,

2681
02:27:32,720 --> 02:27:35,039
Speaker 1: in terms of like like in the school of high principle,

2682
02:27:35,120 --> 02:27:37,360
Speaker 1: like this is why internationalism is important. I mean yeah,

2683
02:27:37,360 --> 02:27:39,560
Speaker 1: And of course obviously the other answer is, you know,

2684
02:27:39,640 --> 02:27:42,880
Speaker 1: selling out on the revolution and you know, we we we.

2685
02:27:43,640 --> 02:27:45,640
Speaker 1: You know that there's the example that people didn't think

2686
02:27:45,640 --> 02:27:48,560
Speaker 1: about of Serritza. You know, Sursa gets elected on all

2687
02:27:48,600 --> 02:27:50,920
Speaker 1: these like radical promises for Greece and then just doesn't

2688
02:27:50,920 --> 02:27:53,200
Speaker 1: do any of them. Um. And then you can look

2689
02:27:53,240 --> 02:27:57,160
Speaker 1: at say Nepal, and you know, the communist one in Nepal,

2690
02:27:57,480 --> 02:28:01,120
Speaker 1: and then they establish a government that's functionally you know,

2691
02:28:01,680 --> 02:28:04,920
Speaker 1: it's a liberal government. My my, my, my. My favorite

2692
02:28:05,000 --> 02:28:08,880
Speaker 1: Nepal fact is that, Okay, so Nepol has like seventeen

2693
02:28:09,000 --> 02:28:11,840
Speaker 1: different like Maoist factions, but the guy ahead of of

2694
02:28:12,080 --> 02:28:15,800
Speaker 1: the of the largest Maoist faction, uh yeah, I think

2695
02:28:15,800 --> 02:28:17,920
Speaker 1: it's him. Is he's the one who now lives in

2696
02:28:18,040 --> 02:28:19,600
Speaker 1: the mansion of the guy who used to be the

2697
02:28:19,680 --> 02:28:25,160
Speaker 1: Nepalese head of security. And it's like, uh, we've well

2698
02:28:25,240 --> 02:28:27,720
Speaker 1: this is this, this has gone great. We've we've changed

2699
02:28:27,800 --> 02:28:33,360
Speaker 1: the person in the mansion kind of yeah. And I

2700
02:28:33,440 --> 02:28:37,200
Speaker 1: mean the and you know, uh, not too surprisingly. You know,

2701
02:28:37,280 --> 02:28:40,280
Speaker 1: the second leader a couple about a year ago, Karen

2702
02:28:40,520 --> 02:28:42,680
Speaker 1: was on the verge of declaring a new people's war

2703
02:28:42,720 --> 02:28:47,760
Speaker 1: against the Maoist faction. Yeah, Maoist war against the malice.

2704
02:28:47,920 --> 02:28:50,840
Speaker 1: Like yeah, I mean that's you know, you you you

2705
02:28:51,000 --> 02:28:56,960
Speaker 1: end up. It's yeah, it's it's tricky to try to

2706
02:28:57,120 --> 02:29:00,160
Speaker 1: like game it out, so to speak, because you know,

2707
02:29:00,320 --> 02:29:06,080
Speaker 1: my I maybe I'm just squeamish. I am hoping for

2708
02:29:06,200 --> 02:29:08,800
Speaker 1: things to not happen with the river of blood. Yeah,

2709
02:29:09,959 --> 02:29:12,200
Speaker 1: in life, I hope that, uh, I hope that we

2710
02:29:12,280 --> 02:29:16,200
Speaker 1: don't get rivers of blood. Um oh, plan plan for

2711
02:29:16,240 --> 02:29:19,800
Speaker 1: war so you get you get peace. Yeah. Yeah, but

2712
02:29:19,920 --> 02:29:21,280
Speaker 1: you like, like like Chris has said, you know, you

2713
02:29:21,320 --> 02:29:24,680
Speaker 1: can get trapped into like that that escalating security dilemma. Uh.

2714
02:29:24,800 --> 02:29:26,760
Speaker 1: And of course, you know, investing in security doesn't actually

2715
02:29:26,800 --> 02:29:29,400
Speaker 1: necessarily to security. We have you know, over a century

2716
02:29:29,440 --> 02:29:32,760
Speaker 1: of looking at Latin American countries that investments in the

2717
02:29:32,800 --> 02:29:35,760
Speaker 1: military is just investments in the next civil war. Yeah,

2718
02:29:36,320 --> 02:29:39,120
Speaker 1: or you get cooled, and then that's that's another problem. Like,

2719
02:29:39,520 --> 02:29:41,640
Speaker 1: like I mean, it's weird because it's like it's a

2720
02:29:41,640 --> 02:29:44,160
Speaker 1: double edged strey because like the twenty century, like there's

2721
02:29:44,160 --> 02:29:47,440
Speaker 1: all there's a lot of like socialistic governments that come

2722
02:29:47,480 --> 02:29:51,600
Speaker 1: into power just from military coups, but also like probably

2723
02:29:51,680 --> 02:29:54,920
Speaker 1: more of those governments like get overthrown by their own coups.

2724
02:29:55,000 --> 02:29:58,000
Speaker 1: And it's yeah, there's there was one lesson I learned

2725
02:29:58,120 --> 02:30:03,440
Speaker 1: from playing Tropical It's good if you've tried to invest

2726
02:30:03,600 --> 02:30:05,560
Speaker 1: more in your No matter how much you invest in

2727
02:30:05,640 --> 02:30:07,920
Speaker 1: your military, it only will ever get you up to

2728
02:30:08,879 --> 02:30:15,680
Speaker 1: surviving a coup. Yeah, don't have colonels and don't have generals. Yeah,

2729
02:30:16,320 --> 02:30:21,560
Speaker 1: then then you get captain's cups. It's always colonels. Yeah,

2730
02:30:21,560 --> 02:30:24,040
Speaker 1: there's always colonels. It's because they're like passed up for

2731
02:30:24,240 --> 02:30:28,240
Speaker 1: general ship by the next administration or something. Yeah. Again again,

2732
02:30:28,320 --> 02:30:31,119
Speaker 1: sometimes sometimes you do get like stumes as you get

2733
02:30:31,200 --> 02:30:33,120
Speaker 1: like your pinochet, and so sometimes you do get your

2734
02:30:33,160 --> 02:30:36,280
Speaker 1: captain's cups, and it's like this is a that goes

2735
02:30:36,440 --> 02:30:41,200
Speaker 1: that's ambition right there when the cap is the government. Yeah. Well,

2736
02:30:41,320 --> 02:30:45,959
Speaker 1: once your captains of hit fucket mode, it's a bad Yeah,

2737
02:30:46,520 --> 02:30:49,160
Speaker 1: that's indicative of like bigger, deeper problems. Yeah. Well, I

2738
02:30:49,240 --> 02:30:51,160
Speaker 1: think like the baths are an interesting example of this

2739
02:30:51,240 --> 02:30:53,440
Speaker 1: because like, okay, like the Baptists were never like good,

2740
02:30:54,120 --> 02:30:58,119
Speaker 1: but like, you know, the Bathists like originally like we're

2741
02:30:58,400 --> 02:31:01,520
Speaker 1: kind of a mass movement, but then and increasingly, like

2742
02:31:01,640 --> 02:31:03,480
Speaker 1: over time, as as they consult their power to the

2743
02:31:03,520 --> 02:31:07,160
Speaker 1: military sort of revolutions, like it becomes increasingly just the

2744
02:31:07,240 --> 02:31:10,119
Speaker 1: Baptists are powerful because they have control of like various

2745
02:31:10,120 --> 02:31:12,600
Speaker 1: portions of the military, and you know, and like the

2746
02:31:12,720 --> 02:31:15,080
Speaker 1: the the end result of this is like instead of

2747
02:31:15,120 --> 02:31:17,560
Speaker 1: having revolutions like you just get you just get all

2748
02:31:17,600 --> 02:31:19,680
Speaker 1: political power has nothing to do with whatever is happening

2749
02:31:19,680 --> 02:31:21,360
Speaker 1: in the street. You get these giant protests that are

2750
02:31:21,400 --> 02:31:22,640
Speaker 1: like we want to go back to being part of

2751
02:31:22,640 --> 02:31:26,160
Speaker 1: the United the the United Republic, and it just doesn't

2752
02:31:26,200 --> 02:31:28,920
Speaker 1: matter because the actual political power is just what happens

2753
02:31:28,959 --> 02:31:32,880
Speaker 1: when the army fights itself. And yeah, I think like

2754
02:31:35,120 --> 02:31:37,120
Speaker 1: there's no easy solution to that other than just like

2755
02:31:37,520 --> 02:31:40,560
Speaker 1: don't have an armed body that's separate from just the

2756
02:31:40,680 --> 02:31:44,760
Speaker 1: masses of people, which is difficult to do, but also

2757
02:31:44,920 --> 02:31:48,760
Speaker 1: like or just armed the people somewhat. Yeah, and and

2758
02:31:49,120 --> 02:31:53,360
Speaker 1: you know, it's means of violence should be more evenly distributed. Yeah,

2759
02:31:54,400 --> 02:31:56,160
Speaker 1: I will say that was I guess part of why

2760
02:31:56,200 --> 02:31:58,520
Speaker 1: the scenario we had started off with like you've declared

2761
02:31:58,560 --> 02:32:00,520
Speaker 1: that people's republic, because the question how you get that

2762
02:32:00,560 --> 02:32:06,400
Speaker 1: people's republic feels like that's of your podcast podcast episodes. Yeah, yeah,

2763
02:32:06,760 --> 02:32:09,080
Speaker 1: you know, we've done, we've done, we've done, just like

2764
02:32:09,240 --> 02:32:12,080
Speaker 1: a miracle has occurred, but like a revolution has occurred

2765
02:32:12,440 --> 02:32:15,680
Speaker 1: and then I don't know, they like or something like

2766
02:32:16,640 --> 02:32:17,880
Speaker 1: as I like to say, it's good to have a

2767
02:32:17,959 --> 02:32:20,680
Speaker 1: plan for it if you win. Yeah, well, and I

2768
02:32:21,040 --> 02:32:24,600
Speaker 1: like to win and then fumble once you've already gotten Yeah,

2769
02:32:24,640 --> 02:32:26,520
Speaker 1: and this this this is something that like that actually

2770
02:32:26,520 --> 02:32:29,520
Speaker 1: does happen a lot, which is like you get into that,

2771
02:32:29,600 --> 02:32:35,160
Speaker 1: you get into these revolutionary like moments, but then there's

2772
02:32:35,240 --> 02:32:38,560
Speaker 1: just sort of like no like no one has any

2773
02:32:38,560 --> 02:32:40,200
Speaker 1: idea what to do next, and so they sort of

2774
02:32:40,280 --> 02:32:43,160
Speaker 1: bungle it or you know, you get into scenarios, yeah,

2775
02:32:43,240 --> 02:32:46,119
Speaker 1: or you get too revolution scenarios where like nobody's thought

2776
02:32:46,200 --> 02:32:49,080
Speaker 1: about what happens next, and that that's that's another way

2777
02:32:49,120 --> 02:32:50,600
Speaker 1: that like, yeah, these things class at the time, and

2778
02:32:50,600 --> 02:32:53,120
Speaker 1: that's another way you get like you know, this this

2779
02:32:53,240 --> 02:32:56,320
Speaker 1: isn't somethings like the whole of the sort of like

2780
02:32:56,400 --> 02:32:58,440
Speaker 1: the trial and error of the point of the twentieth century,

2781
02:32:58,480 --> 02:33:00,200
Speaker 1: which most of which is sort of and in an

2782
02:33:00,320 --> 02:33:03,560
Speaker 1: error is that, you know, a bunch of people were

2783
02:33:03,560 --> 02:33:05,360
Speaker 1: experimenting and a lot of stuff they tried didn't work,

2784
02:33:05,879 --> 02:33:07,800
Speaker 1: and there are lots of reasons for that. But you like,

2785
02:33:08,120 --> 02:33:10,040
Speaker 1: you have to in order to win, you have to

2786
02:33:10,080 --> 02:33:13,480
Speaker 1: actually be serious about taking power, and you have to

2787
02:33:13,560 --> 02:33:16,640
Speaker 1: be you know, you have to be thinking strategically and

2788
02:33:17,120 --> 02:33:19,760
Speaker 1: have a like, have at least a vision of what

2789
02:33:19,879 --> 02:33:22,520
Speaker 1: you're going to do before you like you know, like

2790
02:33:23,000 --> 02:33:26,040
Speaker 1: before things happen, because otherwise there's just sort of like

2791
02:33:26,320 --> 02:33:27,760
Speaker 1: you know, because you just you just get sort of

2792
02:33:27,840 --> 02:33:30,680
Speaker 1: mass confusion and yeah, and say what say what you

2793
02:33:30,760 --> 02:33:32,440
Speaker 1: all about the fascists they know what they're gonna do

2794
02:33:32,480 --> 02:33:36,320
Speaker 1: when they see its power. They're not confused about it. There.

2795
02:33:36,480 --> 02:33:39,840
Speaker 1: Their problems are what you do after. Yeah, they're not

2796
02:33:39,920 --> 02:33:42,520
Speaker 1: confused about that those first like hours when things start

2797
02:33:42,600 --> 02:33:45,040
Speaker 1: out the way. I hope that nothing we've said. I

2798
02:33:45,040 --> 02:33:47,000
Speaker 1: hope that nothing we've said on this podcast kind of

2799
02:33:47,320 --> 02:33:49,320
Speaker 1: makes people think like, oh, they so they have like

2800
02:33:49,440 --> 02:33:52,920
Speaker 1: one weird trick basically to like secure secure your power,

2801
02:33:54,720 --> 02:33:57,200
Speaker 1: um and like and that and that we aren't like

2802
02:33:57,360 --> 02:34:02,119
Speaker 1: singularly focused on acquiring for X or something. Also, it's

2803
02:34:02,160 --> 02:34:07,120
Speaker 1: just like it's an important lever too to have at

2804
02:34:07,160 --> 02:34:09,920
Speaker 1: your disposal. Like, well, number one, you should know that

2805
02:34:09,959 --> 02:34:12,680
Speaker 1: it's important. Number two, you should have tools in place,

2806
02:34:12,720 --> 02:34:18,480
Speaker 1: such as like running a running a fixed extra fixed

2807
02:34:18,480 --> 02:34:20,480
Speaker 1: exchange rate or something to make it a bit easier

2808
02:34:20,560 --> 02:34:23,640
Speaker 1: to acquire for X on the whole, or doing capital

2809
02:34:23,720 --> 02:34:26,680
Speaker 1: controls or doing price controls or something like that. And

2810
02:34:26,800 --> 02:34:29,920
Speaker 1: you should have these tools in mind in order to

2811
02:34:30,040 --> 02:34:34,720
Speaker 1: get from year one to year ten in terms of

2812
02:34:34,800 --> 02:34:37,480
Speaker 1: your biophysical resources, like here's what we have, here's what

2813
02:34:37,560 --> 02:34:40,840
Speaker 1: we need, and you know, some of that could be military,

2814
02:34:40,959 --> 02:34:43,360
Speaker 1: some of that could be economic, and some of that

2815
02:34:43,400 --> 02:34:48,800
Speaker 1: could be political. And um, no, one like I don't

2816
02:34:48,800 --> 02:34:51,720
Speaker 1: know the answers. We don't know the answers, but um,

2817
02:34:52,560 --> 02:34:54,879
Speaker 1: at each step of the way, you need to find

2818
02:34:54,959 --> 02:34:57,800
Speaker 1: groups of people who can come together and think objectively

2819
02:34:57,800 --> 02:35:03,400
Speaker 1: about them. Yeah, I I want. Yeah, it's not that

2820
02:35:03,440 --> 02:35:06,880
Speaker 1: I think that there is an answer. I'm kind of

2821
02:35:06,959 --> 02:35:10,160
Speaker 1: thinking about almost a little bit parallel to like, we

2822
02:35:10,320 --> 02:35:13,000
Speaker 1: know that if we create our you know, if if

2823
02:35:13,520 --> 02:35:16,200
Speaker 1: socialist managed to sees any amount of power they're going

2824
02:35:16,280 --> 02:35:20,000
Speaker 1: to reform whatever health care system they're currently existing in. Uh.

2825
02:35:20,640 --> 02:35:22,920
Speaker 1: We know this is going to be better, because it

2826
02:35:22,920 --> 02:35:26,080
Speaker 1: would be hard for it to be worse. Uh. But

2827
02:35:27,959 --> 02:35:30,920
Speaker 1: you know that's making a good hospital system is not

2828
02:35:31,080 --> 02:35:34,200
Speaker 1: the entire thing that makes a revolution happen. It is

2829
02:35:34,240 --> 02:35:35,680
Speaker 1: just one of those things that you need to do

2830
02:35:35,800 --> 02:35:40,920
Speaker 1: and you need to think about it. And my objective here,

2831
02:35:41,120 --> 02:35:44,480
Speaker 1: and it's a lot of my objective with you know,

2832
02:35:44,600 --> 02:35:49,640
Speaker 1: making this whole magazine project, is that my socialism means

2833
02:35:49,680 --> 02:35:53,000
Speaker 1: that we all we have say over our lives. You know,

2834
02:35:53,160 --> 02:35:55,760
Speaker 1: that's fundamental to me, that we have say over what

2835
02:35:55,959 --> 02:35:58,039
Speaker 1: we do with our lives. And I want to make

2836
02:35:58,120 --> 02:36:01,240
Speaker 1: sure that the people who are in this with me,

2837
02:36:01,320 --> 02:36:03,800
Speaker 1: which is hopefully everybody. I am an optimist. I'm hoping

2838
02:36:03,840 --> 02:36:07,000
Speaker 1: that everybody is with me on creating a better socialist world,

2839
02:36:07,280 --> 02:36:10,440
Speaker 1: that all of us are at least somewhat informed about

2840
02:36:10,480 --> 02:36:13,920
Speaker 1: the decisions we're making. I'm not actually economically trained, you know,

2841
02:36:14,000 --> 02:36:16,720
Speaker 1: I'm I I've learned this stuff as I've gone. It's

2842
02:36:16,720 --> 02:36:22,879
Speaker 1: not insurmountable. Ah, and uh, it's you know, I would

2843
02:36:22,959 --> 02:36:25,280
Speaker 1: want the decision about how do we make a socialist

2844
02:36:25,360 --> 02:36:28,280
Speaker 1: economy you know, the core of socialism worker control of

2845
02:36:28,320 --> 02:36:31,400
Speaker 1: the means of production that the people involved. Again, hopefully

2846
02:36:31,400 --> 02:36:37,480
Speaker 1: everybody uh has you know, at least has an inkling

2847
02:36:37,520 --> 02:36:39,240
Speaker 1: of what's going on. I don't want people to be

2848
02:36:40,120 --> 02:36:43,760
Speaker 1: confused and baffled by the decisions being made on their behalf. That's,

2849
02:36:43,920 --> 02:36:47,800
Speaker 1: you know, a fundamental evil of a capitalist system. We

2850
02:36:47,879 --> 02:36:49,920
Speaker 1: don't know what the fun decisions are being made for

2851
02:36:50,160 --> 02:36:54,400
Speaker 1: us by powerful people. Well, part of the part of

2852
02:36:54,440 --> 02:36:57,160
Speaker 1: the problem comes back to education, because like people are

2853
02:36:57,560 --> 02:37:03,400
Speaker 1: um the rois of hogged. They've hearted the knowledge of

2854
02:37:03,640 --> 02:37:06,880
Speaker 1: how to plan in certain respects, and I think socialists

2855
02:37:07,640 --> 02:37:10,520
Speaker 1: socialists will sometimes look at the body of knowledge in

2856
02:37:10,680 --> 02:37:15,320
Speaker 1: terms of planning and economy and say, like, well, because

2857
02:37:15,520 --> 02:37:17,320
Speaker 1: they are the only ones who know how to do that,

2858
02:37:17,600 --> 02:37:21,160
Speaker 1: the knowledge itself is tainted, and like, I don't need

2859
02:37:21,200 --> 02:37:24,080
Speaker 1: to learn this because it's evil. Basically, I don't need

2860
02:37:24,120 --> 02:37:27,280
Speaker 1: to learn how to manage a currency board or do

2861
02:37:27,520 --> 02:37:34,160
Speaker 1: forex management because that's money and that's evil stuff. Yeah,

2862
02:37:34,240 --> 02:37:36,320
Speaker 1: I hope, I hope. What we've described so far says

2863
02:37:36,400 --> 02:37:38,440
Speaker 1: like I don't know if it's evil or not, but

2864
02:37:38,600 --> 02:37:42,800
Speaker 1: it's important and it should be. I think I honestly

2865
02:37:42,879 --> 02:37:46,280
Speaker 1: think you're going to probably probably fail if you don't

2866
02:37:47,000 --> 02:37:50,160
Speaker 1: consider these things at each step of the way. Yeah,

2867
02:37:50,360 --> 02:37:53,800
Speaker 1: and and even in your like one of the things

2868
02:37:53,879 --> 02:37:56,720
Speaker 1: that that you see a lot with socialist countries is

2869
02:37:57,000 --> 02:37:59,360
Speaker 1: they have basically have like a firewall, right where they

2870
02:37:59,480 --> 02:38:01,680
Speaker 1: try to keep a separation between the parts of their

2871
02:38:01,720 --> 02:38:05,320
Speaker 1: economy that like are planned and the parts of their

2872
02:38:05,360 --> 02:38:11,800
Speaker 1: economy that like are about moving forwards around. And I think, like, okay,

2873
02:38:11,840 --> 02:38:15,840
Speaker 1: like there are varying degrees of effectiveness of this, but

2874
02:38:15,959 --> 02:38:18,640
Speaker 1: like this is like even even if you're like, okay,

2875
02:38:18,760 --> 02:38:20,680
Speaker 1: like we want to get rid of the economy, right,

2876
02:38:20,760 --> 02:38:21,960
Speaker 1: like we want to get rid of labor, We want

2877
02:38:21,959 --> 02:38:23,280
Speaker 1: to get rid of all the stuff as a concept,

2878
02:38:23,400 --> 02:38:28,920
Speaker 1: like you're gonna have to deal like until until you

2879
02:38:29,120 --> 02:38:32,280
Speaker 1: like win, right like until until you've like until you've

2880
02:38:32,600 --> 02:38:38,600
Speaker 1: raised a flag over like New York, Berlin, Shanghai, like

2881
02:38:39,160 --> 02:38:41,640
Speaker 1: a New Delhi at the same time, right like you're

2882
02:38:41,680 --> 02:38:43,680
Speaker 1: you're gonna be you're gonna have to be dealing with

2883
02:38:43,800 --> 02:38:48,879
Speaker 1: this stuff. And how how you do that and how

2884
02:38:49,000 --> 02:38:51,440
Speaker 1: quickly you're able to figure this out, how quickly you're

2885
02:38:51,560 --> 02:38:53,480
Speaker 1: you're able to implement, and how quickly you're able to

2886
02:38:53,600 --> 02:38:58,120
Speaker 1: sort of like seize control of and use the resources

2887
02:38:58,160 --> 02:39:01,400
Speaker 1: that you have in order to advanta your political object use.

2888
02:39:02,120 --> 02:39:03,880
Speaker 1: You know that that that that's going to be one

2889
02:39:03,959 --> 02:39:05,800
Speaker 1: of the things that tourms whether or not your revolution

2890
02:39:05,840 --> 02:39:09,840
Speaker 1: survives no matter what it's fighting for. Mm hmm. Like

2891
02:39:09,959 --> 02:39:14,760
Speaker 1: in addition to all the military stuff, um, military and economic,

2892
02:39:15,040 --> 02:39:18,960
Speaker 1: I think you have to just say, like you have

2893
02:39:19,000 --> 02:39:21,320
Speaker 1: to get to a point economically and militarily and all

2894
02:39:21,360 --> 02:39:23,240
Speaker 1: their other stuff to where you can just say to

2895
02:39:23,440 --> 02:39:26,720
Speaker 1: international powers like I don't need to make some moral

2896
02:39:26,800 --> 02:39:29,160
Speaker 1: claim to you, I've built a better mouse trap. I'm

2897
02:39:29,160 --> 02:39:31,440
Speaker 1: going to let the people decide. And it's like it

2898
02:39:31,600 --> 02:39:36,560
Speaker 1: just shows people living freely together, uh and enjoying a

2899
02:39:36,680 --> 02:39:40,320
Speaker 1: good standard of living and they don't need to exploit

2900
02:39:40,360 --> 02:39:44,720
Speaker 1: each other to get it. And like for not everyone,

2901
02:39:45,480 --> 02:39:48,000
Speaker 1: but many people, that will be really appealing. And you

2902
02:39:48,080 --> 02:39:51,480
Speaker 1: have to have like, uh, well more than just a

2903
02:39:51,520 --> 02:39:54,400
Speaker 1: diplomatic corps, you have to have like an entire like

2904
02:39:54,520 --> 02:39:58,600
Speaker 1: a full court international push to say like it's just

2905
02:39:58,720 --> 02:40:03,280
Speaker 1: a better mass trap. It's like it's, um, I don't

2906
02:40:03,360 --> 02:40:07,039
Speaker 1: need to focus on moral claims about like well it's

2907
02:40:07,080 --> 02:40:10,240
Speaker 1: better because you should just care about people because of like,

2908
02:40:11,000 --> 02:40:14,240
Speaker 1: you should care about people more than capitalism permits because

2909
02:40:14,280 --> 02:40:17,800
Speaker 1: it's just morally right. Um, that may be the case.

2910
02:40:18,080 --> 02:40:19,960
Speaker 1: But also people want to get paid and they want

2911
02:40:20,000 --> 02:40:22,400
Speaker 1: to be treated well and have a decent standard of

2912
02:40:22,440 --> 02:40:24,720
Speaker 1: living at the same time, and we can do it.

2913
02:40:24,959 --> 02:40:28,879
Speaker 1: So here's so here's how like you've you've shown them

2914
02:40:28,959 --> 02:40:33,640
Speaker 1: specific steps you've taken, and you've shown them the material

2915
02:40:33,760 --> 02:40:39,320
Speaker 1: standard of living that is shared democratically, and um, it's

2916
02:40:39,360 --> 02:40:42,440
Speaker 1: not just like a state giving handing things out to people.

2917
02:40:43,320 --> 02:40:48,720
Speaker 1: It's like a a um, true industrial democracy where it's

2918
02:40:48,760 --> 02:40:52,119
Speaker 1: like you you get plugged in, you make decisions along

2919
02:40:52,160 --> 02:40:59,520
Speaker 1: the way, and um, yeah, basically that Yeah, I think

2920
02:40:59,560 --> 02:41:02,360
Speaker 1: I think I think that's a pretty good note to

2921
02:41:02,840 --> 02:41:06,040
Speaker 1: to end on as a a a thing that we

2922
02:41:06,200 --> 02:41:08,640
Speaker 1: want and things that are going to have to be

2923
02:41:09,640 --> 02:41:13,600
Speaker 1: components of it. And also I guess thinking about you know,

2924
02:41:13,959 --> 02:41:17,880
Speaker 1: like rejecting theories about money as incomplete that don't deal

2925
02:41:17,959 --> 02:41:20,200
Speaker 1: with the fact that you don't have all the resources

2926
02:41:20,280 --> 02:41:23,040
Speaker 1: in your country and you in fact indeed other things

2927
02:41:23,120 --> 02:41:27,880
Speaker 1: to acquire them that you cannot simply create into existence. Yeah,

2928
02:41:28,120 --> 02:41:30,600
Speaker 1: do you too have anything else you want to say

2929
02:41:30,879 --> 02:41:33,560
Speaker 1: before I guess you move into plugs. I mean, like

2930
02:41:33,720 --> 02:41:36,800
Speaker 1: like I said, I mean, I you know, we we

2931
02:41:36,959 --> 02:41:38,720
Speaker 1: This might have sounded like a whole bunch of you know,

2932
02:41:38,840 --> 02:41:43,039
Speaker 1: high minded, theoretical egghead crap, but again I am I'm

2933
02:41:43,080 --> 02:41:46,840
Speaker 1: not formally educated on this stuff. This is stuff that

2934
02:41:47,280 --> 02:41:50,920
Speaker 1: I have learned and participated in as a socialist first

2935
02:41:50,959 --> 02:41:54,840
Speaker 1: and foremost. And it's been driven uh from the get go,

2936
02:41:54,920 --> 02:41:58,880
Speaker 1: at least for me, from um, a really fundamental desire

2937
02:41:59,000 --> 02:42:02,640
Speaker 1: for ecal for egalitarianism, and for people having a say

2938
02:42:02,680 --> 02:42:06,160
Speaker 1: in their own lives. And I hope that the people,

2939
02:42:06,800 --> 02:42:10,240
Speaker 1: uh who have stuck with us through this, who didn't

2940
02:42:10,240 --> 02:42:14,320
Speaker 1: know these concepts before, feel a little bit more equipped

2941
02:42:14,360 --> 02:42:19,400
Speaker 1: to participate in a discussion about, um, how you would

2942
02:42:19,400 --> 02:42:21,680
Speaker 1: handle these things. And as as I kind of alluded to,

2943
02:42:21,800 --> 02:42:23,520
Speaker 1: this scale is all the way down to you know,

2944
02:42:24,720 --> 02:42:28,240
Speaker 1: twelve hippies on a farm. Uh, you know this, This

2945
02:42:29,200 --> 02:42:30,800
Speaker 1: the scales all the way up until you've got a

2946
02:42:30,920 --> 02:42:36,480
Speaker 1: total total global communism pretty much anything below that. This

2947
02:42:37,040 --> 02:42:42,080
Speaker 1: this this principal scale, and I I hope that people

2948
02:42:42,240 --> 02:42:48,080
Speaker 1: feel um more able and more willing to engage both

2949
02:42:48,160 --> 02:42:50,000
Speaker 1: first of all, you know, to to tell liberals to

2950
02:42:50,400 --> 02:42:53,920
Speaker 1: you know, shut the funk up that I should have

2951
02:42:54,000 --> 02:42:56,879
Speaker 1: a say over how I participate in the economy, even

2952
02:42:56,959 --> 02:42:59,160
Speaker 1: when that's things like for X that seemed very abstract

2953
02:42:59,240 --> 02:43:03,160
Speaker 1: and far away. I am, I'm a person who's affected

2954
02:43:03,160 --> 02:43:04,680
Speaker 1: by this. Therefore I've got a stake there for my

2955
02:43:04,800 --> 02:43:08,200
Speaker 1: opinion matters. Uh, and that you you can get there,

2956
02:43:08,440 --> 02:43:10,760
Speaker 1: you can learn, and you should be allowed to participate

2957
02:43:10,840 --> 02:43:15,360
Speaker 1: in that. And yeah, this is what I'm trying to create,

2958
02:43:15,440 --> 02:43:18,520
Speaker 1: is you know that socialists do not feel like they can.

2959
02:43:18,879 --> 02:43:20,560
Speaker 1: Those are just get brow beaten out of the room

2960
02:43:20,640 --> 02:43:23,640
Speaker 1: of a discussion because some liberal nerd pushed up their

2961
02:43:23,640 --> 02:43:25,560
Speaker 1: glasses a whole bunch and spun their bow tie and

2962
02:43:25,640 --> 02:43:30,040
Speaker 1: then sense of bullshit, like you know, you it is

2963
02:43:30,120 --> 02:43:35,120
Speaker 1: your life, and ah, you have a right to have

2964
02:43:35,200 --> 02:43:37,920
Speaker 1: an opinion on it. And this is not an insurmountable

2965
02:43:38,000 --> 02:43:40,440
Speaker 1: thing too, It's it's hard. I want to be clear here.

2966
02:43:40,520 --> 02:43:42,120
Speaker 1: This is hard, and I want but I want you

2967
02:43:42,200 --> 02:43:47,000
Speaker 1: in the discussion. Well so, yeah, so I guess speaking

2968
02:43:47,080 --> 02:43:50,360
Speaker 1: speaking of things that people are involved in, I can.

2969
02:43:50,400 --> 02:43:54,520
Speaker 1: I can do transitions like this because I'm a professional. Um, yeah,

2970
02:43:54,560 --> 02:43:55,680
Speaker 1: do you do, you too? Want to talk a bit

2971
02:43:55,680 --> 02:43:59,280
Speaker 1: about your magazine. Sure. Like we mentioned at up top,

2972
02:43:59,480 --> 02:44:02,520
Speaker 1: we're uh. Kyle and I are both co editors of

2973
02:44:02,640 --> 02:44:05,520
Speaker 1: Strange Matters magazine, and we're in the middle of a

2974
02:44:05,560 --> 02:44:08,800
Speaker 1: fundraiser right now, and you can find the fundraiser at

2975
02:44:08,840 --> 02:44:12,640
Speaker 1: the r L tiny url dot com slash Strange Matters

2976
02:44:13,240 --> 02:44:17,160
Speaker 1: no no dashes or anything um. You can also follow

2977
02:44:17,280 --> 02:44:23,080
Speaker 1: us on Twitter at Strange Underscore Matters. And the magazine

2978
02:44:23,120 --> 02:44:27,360
Speaker 1: itself is going to be a We're a literary magazine,

2979
02:44:27,680 --> 02:44:32,359
Speaker 1: and each issue we're publishing in both prints and digital.

2980
02:44:33,720 --> 02:44:38,200
Speaker 1: And the print issue one is about three pages, and

2981
02:44:38,280 --> 02:44:41,880
Speaker 1: it's split in a half between the front pages which

2982
02:44:41,959 --> 02:44:49,000
Speaker 1: is um topics like economics, philosophy, politics, um more technical fields,

2983
02:44:49,320 --> 02:44:55,280
Speaker 1: and then the back pages is art um uh like

2984
02:44:55,440 --> 02:45:03,720
Speaker 1: culture reviews, um apology, anthropology like uh more, sir. We

2985
02:45:04,440 --> 02:45:06,440
Speaker 1: we kind of attached it to the word meaning like

2986
02:45:06,640 --> 02:45:12,000
Speaker 1: meaning development, and and there's a middle resting spot which

2987
02:45:12,080 --> 02:45:14,600
Speaker 1: is actually called the phuton, which is a play on

2988
02:45:14,680 --> 02:45:18,360
Speaker 1: the word fujutan, which is like kind of a resting

2989
02:45:18,440 --> 02:45:21,240
Speaker 1: spot between those two halves where there's going to be

2990
02:45:21,400 --> 02:45:26,840
Speaker 1: short pieces of usually humorous nature, and overall it's going

2991
02:45:26,959 --> 02:45:31,360
Speaker 1: to cover a wide range of topics and you can

2992
02:45:31,400 --> 02:45:33,879
Speaker 1: find out more of us. You can find out more

2993
02:45:33,920 --> 02:45:37,360
Speaker 1: about us on our fundraiser on our website Strange Managers

2994
02:45:37,440 --> 02:45:39,440
Speaker 1: dot co op. We've got a couple of articles already

2995
02:45:39,480 --> 02:45:42,720
Speaker 1: off on Strange Matters dot co op. We have a

2996
02:45:43,280 --> 02:45:46,560
Speaker 1: Steve wrote an amazing piece explaining of some very uh

2997
02:45:46,879 --> 02:45:49,680
Speaker 1: in very layman's terms of arguments about what inflation is

2998
02:45:49,800 --> 02:45:51,440
Speaker 1: and why we should care about it. You know they're

2999
02:45:51,480 --> 02:45:55,560
Speaker 1: quite good, yeah, very relevant. Right now, we have a

3000
02:45:56,240 --> 02:46:02,600
Speaker 1: truly delightful review of very contemporary, very recently made cyberpunk

3001
02:46:02,640 --> 02:46:07,240
Speaker 1: works by Elizabeth Sanderford, author of Neo Reaction of Bassilisk,

3002
02:46:07,280 --> 02:46:09,160
Speaker 1: which anybody who listens to this podcast needs to read

3003
02:46:09,200 --> 02:46:12,720
Speaker 1: New Reaction of bass Lisk uh, and she did as

3004
02:46:12,760 --> 02:46:15,280
Speaker 1: the wonderful favor of doing a pop culture review for us.

3005
02:46:16,520 --> 02:46:20,400
Speaker 1: We've yeah, we've also got a work by the editors

3006
02:46:21,000 --> 02:46:25,959
Speaker 1: Words for Our Present Reality about what how how can

3007
02:46:26,120 --> 02:46:28,960
Speaker 1: we discuss what actually exists in the world and what

3008
02:46:29,120 --> 02:46:33,040
Speaker 1: are the shortcomings with our current just like the basic

3009
02:46:33,160 --> 02:46:35,600
Speaker 1: levels of our discourse, and how can we advance beyond

3010
02:46:36,840 --> 02:46:39,320
Speaker 1: beyond this difficulty? And it's you know, it's something that

3011
02:46:39,360 --> 02:46:41,880
Speaker 1: sounds like it's supposed to be this very high level philosophy,

3012
02:46:41,959 --> 02:46:44,600
Speaker 1: but we've been I think, uh, I don't want to

3013
02:46:44,600 --> 02:46:46,200
Speaker 1: take too much credit for this, because I was not

3014
02:46:46,360 --> 02:46:48,680
Speaker 1: the main writer on it. Uh. I think that we've

3015
02:46:48,720 --> 02:46:53,760
Speaker 1: successfully managed to bring it down to a to a

3016
02:46:53,879 --> 02:46:56,960
Speaker 1: lower brow level, uh, you know, to a to a

3017
02:46:57,120 --> 02:47:00,280
Speaker 1: level that doesn't require you to have eighteen letter after

3018
02:47:00,360 --> 02:47:04,320
Speaker 1: your name of various college degrees. We also managed to

3019
02:47:04,400 --> 02:47:08,480
Speaker 1: publish a piece by a Russian dissidents, And I'm very

3020
02:47:08,520 --> 02:47:10,720
Speaker 1: excited for the works that people are going to see

3021
02:47:10,720 --> 02:47:12,160
Speaker 1: in the future from us. We've got a history of

3022
02:47:12,240 --> 02:47:17,360
Speaker 1: black cooperative movements. We've I wrote a nice little diddy

3023
02:47:17,400 --> 02:47:21,560
Speaker 1: about colonialism in modern board games. Uh. I'm I'm very

3024
02:47:21,600 --> 02:47:23,320
Speaker 1: excited for people to get the chance to read these

3025
02:47:23,440 --> 02:47:25,240
Speaker 1: and uh you know, it's all kind of in the

3026
02:47:25,320 --> 02:47:33,920
Speaker 1: service of I was creating a more almost democratizing the

3027
02:47:34,040 --> 02:47:38,040
Speaker 1: socialist world and making it, making it meaningful, making it useful,

3028
02:47:38,160 --> 02:47:41,760
Speaker 1: and also making it pleasurable for people to be socialists

3029
02:47:42,000 --> 02:47:46,160
Speaker 1: and to fight for a freer and more equitable world. Yeah,

3030
02:47:46,280 --> 02:47:47,840
Speaker 1: do you two? Do you two want people to find

3031
02:47:47,879 --> 02:47:51,880
Speaker 1: you on social media? And if so, where, Okay you

3032
02:47:51,920 --> 02:47:55,120
Speaker 1: can say no to this. People do sometimes because first

3033
02:47:55,400 --> 02:47:58,720
Speaker 1: hell sight. Okay, well I don't have social media, so

3034
02:48:00,120 --> 02:48:03,200
Speaker 1: your is not really on social media. I am on

3035
02:48:03,480 --> 02:48:07,600
Speaker 1: some social media, so you can find You can find

3036
02:48:07,680 --> 02:48:11,320
Speaker 1: me at at kept him in Whackham and I'll spell

3037
02:48:11,400 --> 02:48:14,680
Speaker 1: that out because it's kind of confusing at C A

3038
02:48:15,000 --> 02:48:22,040
Speaker 1: p M in w A C c M spelling your

3039
02:48:22,040 --> 02:48:29,360
Speaker 1: own nat name. Um. Yeah, so strange matters is our

3040
02:48:29,480 --> 02:48:32,680
Speaker 1: our campaign will run through this month and it's going

3041
02:48:32,760 --> 02:48:36,280
Speaker 1: pretty good so far. But we can use uh, every

3042
02:48:36,320 --> 02:48:38,760
Speaker 1: little bit of support goes a long way, so yeah,

3043
02:48:39,120 --> 02:48:42,440
Speaker 1: find find us at our website and also the fundraiser. Yeah,

3044
02:48:42,480 --> 02:48:45,000
Speaker 1: we're not getting paid. Just to be clear, this is

3045
02:48:45,120 --> 02:48:47,240
Speaker 1: the we We need to pay the authors, we need

3046
02:48:47,320 --> 02:48:49,200
Speaker 1: to pay for the printers. But you know this is

3047
02:48:49,280 --> 02:48:51,600
Speaker 1: not us trying to make a quick book. This is

3048
02:48:51,760 --> 02:48:54,480
Speaker 1: us trying to make sure we we are not willing

3049
02:48:54,520 --> 02:48:59,240
Speaker 1: to accept paying our writer's substandard. We're going to pay

3050
02:48:59,280 --> 02:49:03,039
Speaker 1: our writers higher than market rate as on principle, because

3051
02:49:03,080 --> 02:49:04,920
Speaker 1: we think the market rate is just too low. It

3052
02:49:05,080 --> 02:49:09,160
Speaker 1: really is. Yeah. And um oh and by the way,

3053
02:49:09,800 --> 02:49:13,240
Speaker 1: we're I think I mentioned it, but we're our workers cooperative,

3054
02:49:13,360 --> 02:49:16,440
Speaker 1: so we're a d percent worker own in control. There's

3055
02:49:16,520 --> 02:49:20,640
Speaker 1: no there are no levels of employment or ownership. We're

3056
02:49:20,680 --> 02:49:27,560
Speaker 1: all horizontal. Yeah yeah, so yeah, go go check our

3057
02:49:27,640 --> 02:49:31,280
Speaker 1: change matters. Um. Yeah, thank thank you too, both for

3058
02:49:31,480 --> 02:49:34,400
Speaker 1: thank you both for joining us. It was a wonderful time. Chris,

3059
02:49:34,560 --> 02:49:37,400
Speaker 1: thank you, thank you for having us. Yeah, and if

3060
02:49:37,400 --> 02:49:40,200
Speaker 1: you want to find more of us, Uh, we're at

3061
02:49:40,360 --> 02:49:44,039
Speaker 1: Happens your pod on Twitter, Instagram. I keep saying Instagram.

3062
02:49:44,080 --> 02:49:47,800
Speaker 1: I've never actually I'm not on Instagram. So I've been

3063
02:49:47,840 --> 02:49:51,280
Speaker 1: told we have one. I've never interacted with it. Uh yeah,

3064
02:49:51,440 --> 02:49:55,920
Speaker 1: and uh, cools and media. It has our other shows.

3065
02:49:56,080 --> 02:50:00,200
Speaker 1: Go listen to them. Uh, they're good and we work

3066
02:50:00,240 --> 02:50:21,280
Speaker 1: a lot on them. By Oh, it could happen here,

3067
02:50:21,879 --> 02:50:27,440
Speaker 1: and it's currently happening there there being Ukraine, which is

3068
02:50:27,920 --> 02:50:32,039
Speaker 1: in the midst of an invasion by the Russian government.

3069
02:50:32,200 --> 02:50:34,640
Speaker 1: I'm Robert Evans. This is a podcast about bad things

3070
02:50:34,920 --> 02:50:37,640
Speaker 1: and how to make them better, joined as often by

3071
02:50:37,720 --> 02:50:41,760
Speaker 1: Garrison and Chris, my co hosts, and we are talking

3072
02:50:41,879 --> 02:50:46,640
Speaker 1: about some of the advice, good and bad, that's been

3073
02:50:46,680 --> 02:50:50,480
Speaker 1: going around on social media about how to disable and

3074
02:50:50,560 --> 02:50:53,000
Speaker 1: destroy armored vehicles. This is something we've kind of waited

3075
02:50:53,040 --> 02:50:55,440
Speaker 1: to do until the conflict was a little bit more

3076
02:50:55,480 --> 02:50:57,880
Speaker 1: of a mature state. But in brief, if you have

3077
02:50:58,000 --> 02:51:01,320
Speaker 1: been following what's been happening in Russia through the lens

3078
02:51:01,400 --> 02:51:03,240
Speaker 1: of social media or what's pepping at Ukraine through the

3079
02:51:03,320 --> 02:51:05,240
Speaker 1: lens of social media, one thing that has happened is

3080
02:51:05,600 --> 02:51:07,879
Speaker 1: in the early stages of the invasion, a whole bunch

3081
02:51:07,959 --> 02:51:12,280
Speaker 1: of people flocked, particularly to Twitter, but also not this

3082
02:51:12,400 --> 02:51:14,199
Speaker 1: did not just stay on Twitter. There were a large

3083
02:51:14,320 --> 02:51:17,440
Speaker 1: number of mainstreams news articles published on the subject of

3084
02:51:17,480 --> 02:51:20,199
Speaker 1: the things people were saying to talk about different ways

3085
02:51:20,240 --> 02:51:25,200
Speaker 1: civilians could disable Russian armored vehicles or otherwise stymy and

3086
02:51:25,360 --> 02:51:30,160
Speaker 1: thwart the progress of Russian military units through their cities. Um.

3087
02:51:30,280 --> 02:51:32,439
Speaker 1: And this has been accompanied by things like the Ukrainian

3088
02:51:32,480 --> 02:51:35,800
Speaker 1: government giving out information on how to make molotov cocktails

3089
02:51:35,840 --> 02:51:37,880
Speaker 1: we talked about this in our Molotov Cocktail episode, and

3090
02:51:37,920 --> 02:51:41,480
Speaker 1: putting out really neat infographics on where to throw molotov

3091
02:51:41,560 --> 02:51:44,280
Speaker 1: cocktails to disable armored vehicles. Um. But it's also come

3092
02:51:44,320 --> 02:51:46,720
Speaker 1: with a lot of bad advice that I don't want

3093
02:51:46,800 --> 02:51:50,280
Speaker 1: people who are maybe looking at the potential of urban

3094
02:51:50,360 --> 02:51:53,879
Speaker 1: combat happening in their future to take away from this conflict,

3095
02:51:53,920 --> 02:51:55,560
Speaker 1: because there's also a lot of disinfos, So that's what

3096
02:51:55,560 --> 02:51:59,080
Speaker 1: we're talking about today. Yes, and I guess one of

3097
02:51:59,120 --> 02:52:03,360
Speaker 1: the first places to probably discuss this urban combat idea

3098
02:52:03,920 --> 02:52:06,680
Speaker 1: is they probably the guy who's tried to make kind

3099
02:52:06,720 --> 02:52:08,720
Speaker 1: of a career and of talking about urban combat, which

3100
02:52:08,720 --> 02:52:12,640
Speaker 1: would be who wrote a relatively viral Twitter thread on

3101
02:52:12,720 --> 02:52:15,280
Speaker 1: this topic, and it's been writing about this thing for

3102
02:52:15,400 --> 02:52:20,040
Speaker 1: the past few years. Um, he's a he's the the

3103
02:52:20,200 --> 02:52:23,640
Speaker 1: chair of Urban Warfare Studies at West Points Modern War

3104
02:52:23,760 --> 02:52:26,720
Speaker 1: Institute and served for like a quarter of a century

3105
02:52:26,760 --> 02:52:31,640
Speaker 1: as an infantry soldier, including two deployments into Iraq. And yeah,

3106
02:52:31,680 --> 02:52:33,440
Speaker 1: the past few years, he's tried to kind of make

3107
02:52:33,480 --> 02:52:35,360
Speaker 1: a name for himself as the guy who writes about

3108
02:52:35,480 --> 02:52:40,560
Speaker 1: urban combat. And obviously since this was happening largely when

3109
02:52:40,640 --> 02:52:44,440
Speaker 1: Russian started invading Kiev, John Spetzer put put together some

3110
02:52:44,520 --> 02:52:47,040
Speaker 1: of his thoughts that went pretty viral on this on

3111
02:52:47,120 --> 02:52:50,080
Speaker 1: this said topic. Yeah, and it's it's frustrating. You've got

3112
02:52:50,160 --> 02:52:52,000
Speaker 1: a quote in here from one of the articles about

3113
02:52:52,040 --> 02:52:53,640
Speaker 1: he was giving out that says some of his advice,

3114
02:52:53,680 --> 02:52:56,720
Speaker 1: which is preparing simple Molotov cocktails. It's already being seen

3115
02:52:56,760 --> 02:52:58,960
Speaker 1: on the streets of Kiev, which is kind of framing

3116
02:52:59,040 --> 02:53:04,640
Speaker 1: it as if Spin Sir advised the Ukrainians. Absolutely not true.

3117
02:53:04,720 --> 02:53:07,320
Speaker 1: Before he made that thread, the government was urging people

3118
02:53:07,800 --> 02:53:11,760
Speaker 1: to rest. And also, like Molotov cocktails got their name

3119
02:53:11,840 --> 02:53:15,000
Speaker 1: from people in Finland not super far from Ukraine resisting

3120
02:53:15,040 --> 02:53:17,640
Speaker 1: the Russian military in a very similar way to add

3121
02:53:17,640 --> 02:53:20,880
Speaker 1: they're being used by Ukrainian civilians. Now, um what I

3122
02:53:21,080 --> 02:53:23,200
Speaker 1: I believe what John Spencer did. He's a guy with

3123
02:53:23,280 --> 02:53:27,760
Speaker 1: some qualifications. Um, certainly like not a random person. We'll

3124
02:53:27,800 --> 02:53:30,720
Speaker 1: talk about random people giving advice to on Twitter. But

3125
02:53:31,080 --> 02:53:34,400
Speaker 1: he's also all None of his advice is new, none

3126
02:53:34,400 --> 02:53:37,959
Speaker 1: of it is from him, none of it is counter intuitive.

3127
02:53:38,080 --> 02:53:40,280
Speaker 1: A good deal of it is bad, And most of

3128
02:53:40,360 --> 02:53:42,440
Speaker 1: what he said that is good is just him pulling

3129
02:53:42,520 --> 02:53:46,199
Speaker 1: things from US military combat manuals and from Ukrainian military

3130
02:53:46,280 --> 02:53:49,760
Speaker 1: combat manuals and then putting it up in social media

3131
02:53:49,800 --> 02:53:51,920
Speaker 1: in order to go viral and try to get another

3132
02:53:52,000 --> 02:53:55,760
Speaker 1: book deal by making it look as if he is

3133
02:53:55,920 --> 02:53:58,400
Speaker 1: giving advice that is being adopted in real time, which

3134
02:53:58,480 --> 02:54:00,680
Speaker 1: is not what is happening. I mean, Like a good,

3135
02:54:00,760 --> 02:54:03,840
Speaker 1: good instance of this is yeah claiming that they're making

3136
02:54:03,920 --> 02:54:06,520
Speaker 1: Mulotov cocktails due to his advice. I mean, there's a

3137
02:54:06,600 --> 02:54:09,280
Speaker 1: picture in that very article that was taken before he

3138
02:54:09,320 --> 02:54:12,280
Speaker 1: even posted that thread. So it's like, no, they're they're

3139
02:54:13,000 --> 02:54:15,080
Speaker 1: people know how to make Multov cocktails. That's not hard

3140
02:54:15,120 --> 02:54:17,160
Speaker 1: to find out. In a lot of cases, the Ukrainian

3141
02:54:17,640 --> 02:54:20,040
Speaker 1: Ukrainian government was giving out instructions on how to do it.

3142
02:54:20,360 --> 02:54:21,680
Speaker 1: And I mean, and if you if you look at

3143
02:54:21,680 --> 02:54:24,600
Speaker 1: this picture, um, it looks very similar to a lot

3144
02:54:24,680 --> 02:54:28,840
Speaker 1: of a lot of like the the almost like small

3145
02:54:29,120 --> 02:54:33,200
Speaker 1: defensive weapons factories that we saw across the States. We

3146
02:54:33,240 --> 02:54:36,880
Speaker 1: would often see just collections of bottles, uh, just ready

3147
02:54:36,920 --> 02:54:39,000
Speaker 1: to be thrown, all kind of laid out in in

3148
02:54:39,200 --> 02:54:42,080
Speaker 1: in in milk crates, very similar to this photo. Now

3149
02:54:42,160 --> 02:54:45,560
Speaker 1: there was there was less actual Mulotov cocktails, but the

3150
02:54:45,680 --> 02:54:47,520
Speaker 1: way that this is whole, the way this all set

3151
02:54:47,560 --> 02:54:51,560
Speaker 1: up looks looks very similar to any kind of insurgency

3152
02:54:51,640 --> 02:54:54,960
Speaker 1: tactics of being like, yeah, there's gonna be spontaneous on

3153
02:54:55,000 --> 02:54:57,200
Speaker 1: the ground organizing because people are just kind of naturally

3154
02:54:57,720 --> 02:55:00,480
Speaker 1: gifted at that. And on a on an object ti level,

3155
02:55:00,560 --> 02:55:03,800
Speaker 1: Molotov cocktails have a place on an urban battlefield. They

3156
02:55:03,840 --> 02:55:08,320
Speaker 1: can be useful weapons for disabling armored vehicles, for causing distractions,

3157
02:55:08,440 --> 02:55:12,960
Speaker 1: for injuring and even sometimes killing soldiers. They are they

3158
02:55:13,000 --> 02:55:15,560
Speaker 1: are capable of doing that, and they that's part of

3159
02:55:15,600 --> 02:55:18,840
Speaker 1: why the Ukrainian government put out these guides showing like

3160
02:55:18,959 --> 02:55:20,760
Speaker 1: where to huck the sons of bitches in order to

3161
02:55:20,800 --> 02:55:24,440
Speaker 1: disable you know, transports and armored vehicles and whatnot. Now

3162
02:55:25,000 --> 02:55:29,160
Speaker 1: that said, attempting to attack a military column with a

3163
02:55:29,240 --> 02:55:34,560
Speaker 1: molotov cocktail in most circumstances is very close to suicidal,

3164
02:55:34,640 --> 02:55:36,600
Speaker 1: and I've watched a number of videos of Ukrainians do it.

3165
02:55:36,600 --> 02:55:38,840
Speaker 1: In the times that seemed to be most successful is

3166
02:55:38,920 --> 02:55:41,680
Speaker 1: when you have areas where the Russians are attempting to

3167
02:55:41,800 --> 02:55:46,600
Speaker 1: establish control, You have small groups of vehicles that are

3168
02:55:46,680 --> 02:55:51,240
Speaker 1: moving down residential streets, you have a significant amount of traffic,

3169
02:55:51,360 --> 02:55:56,040
Speaker 1: of civilian traffic occurring alongside those military convoys, and as

3170
02:55:56,160 --> 02:55:59,280
Speaker 1: they passed the convoy, a civilian hucks a molotov, or

3171
02:55:59,360 --> 02:56:02,120
Speaker 1: as they pass of building, a civilian hucks a molotov

3172
02:56:02,800 --> 02:56:06,240
Speaker 1: um And those seem to be, broadly speaking, the situations

3173
02:56:06,280 --> 02:56:08,000
Speaker 1: in which people have kind of gotten away with it.

3174
02:56:08,520 --> 02:56:10,680
Speaker 1: We don't have any kind of I'm not aware of

3175
02:56:10,720 --> 02:56:14,200
Speaker 1: any kind of solid UH overarching analysis of all of

3176
02:56:14,240 --> 02:56:17,960
Speaker 1: the use of molotovs in this but that is broadly speaking,

3177
02:56:18,120 --> 02:56:21,880
Speaker 1: a potentially effective way to use a molotov cocktail UH

3178
02:56:22,000 --> 02:56:25,760
Speaker 1: in order to degrade military capacity of an occupier. What

3179
02:56:26,000 --> 02:56:28,480
Speaker 1: doesn't work and what Spencer and a number of other

3180
02:56:28,520 --> 02:56:31,840
Speaker 1: people suggested is HU can paint at tanks or other

3181
02:56:31,959 --> 02:56:35,720
Speaker 1: armored vehicles. And that may be surprising to a lot

3182
02:56:35,800 --> 02:56:38,160
Speaker 1: of people. I think there's a lot of folks who

3183
02:56:38,959 --> 02:56:42,400
Speaker 1: want to believe this UH, want to believe that that

3184
02:56:42,560 --> 02:56:46,560
Speaker 1: that could really work, because it's like you walk ship right,

3185
02:56:46,680 --> 02:56:48,560
Speaker 1: it feels like the kind of thing in surgeon should

3186
02:56:48,600 --> 02:56:53,080
Speaker 1: be doing. Yes, But here is the thing. When you

3187
02:56:53,440 --> 02:56:56,000
Speaker 1: have police officers who are tear gassing an area and

3188
02:56:56,080 --> 02:56:57,560
Speaker 1: you huck a bunch of paint and you get it

3189
02:56:57,600 --> 02:57:00,600
Speaker 1: over their face masks and they cannot see, it reduces

3190
02:57:00,640 --> 02:57:03,320
Speaker 1: their ability to tear gas you for a while. It

3191
02:57:03,400 --> 02:57:06,520
Speaker 1: makes them uncomfortable, it makes them have less fun, and

3192
02:57:06,600 --> 02:57:09,240
Speaker 1: it damages gear. When you huck a bunch of paint

3193
02:57:09,280 --> 02:57:12,600
Speaker 1: at an armored vehicle, the armored vehicle will return fire

3194
02:57:12,720 --> 02:57:16,000
Speaker 1: with a fifty caliber mounted Dashka or some other similar

3195
02:57:16,080 --> 02:57:18,840
Speaker 1: gun which fires bullets. That are large enough to take

3196
02:57:18,959 --> 02:57:21,160
Speaker 1: chunks the size of your head out of concrete, and

3197
02:57:21,240 --> 02:57:23,800
Speaker 1: you will be torn apart in your organs, liquefied in

3198
02:57:23,840 --> 02:57:27,080
Speaker 1: a hail of metal. Um. Meanwhile, the paint that you

3199
02:57:27,160 --> 02:57:30,800
Speaker 1: are attempting to throw at that vehicle is almost certain

3200
02:57:30,879 --> 02:57:33,680
Speaker 1: to have no impact on it. Um. Not only are

3201
02:57:33,720 --> 02:57:36,120
Speaker 1: you unlikely to get close enough to use the paint,

3202
02:57:36,160 --> 02:57:38,760
Speaker 1: because you have to be considerably closer to do that

3203
02:57:38,920 --> 02:57:41,400
Speaker 1: than you have to with a molotov in most situations,

3204
02:57:41,800 --> 02:57:45,680
Speaker 1: but also tanks are built with the understanding that it

3205
02:57:45,800 --> 02:57:47,960
Speaker 1: is possible that one or more of the ways in

3206
02:57:48,040 --> 02:57:52,200
Speaker 1: which they see will be obstructed. Tank drivers are trained

3207
02:57:52,320 --> 02:57:55,920
Speaker 1: to drive blind. There are ways of utilizing tanks when

3208
02:57:56,000 --> 02:57:58,240
Speaker 1: vision is obstructed, because in the kinds of fights that

3209
02:57:58,360 --> 02:58:00,720
Speaker 1: tanks are built to get into, they are often in

3210
02:58:00,840 --> 02:58:05,000
Speaker 1: situations where there was so much smoke around the exactly

3211
02:58:05,360 --> 02:58:08,360
Speaker 1: that there is effectively zero visibility, which is why when

3212
02:58:08,400 --> 02:58:11,560
Speaker 1: Spencer started talking about people throwing paint at tanks, a

3213
02:58:11,640 --> 02:58:14,640
Speaker 1: number of tank drivers came out and said, that's actually

3214
02:58:14,720 --> 02:58:17,960
Speaker 1: horrible advice, like, they don't work that way, And I

3215
02:58:18,080 --> 02:58:20,720
Speaker 1: was I was chatting with a couple of people. Um,

3216
02:58:20,840 --> 02:58:23,480
Speaker 1: there was one fellow former Green brand name Mike Nelson,

3217
02:58:23,520 --> 02:58:26,320
Speaker 1: who was posting about Spencer and very angry that he

3218
02:58:26,440 --> 02:58:29,840
Speaker 1: was basically copying material directly from stuff published by the

3219
02:58:29,920 --> 02:58:33,600
Speaker 1: Ukrainian government, and then like getting up anytime journalists or

3220
02:58:33,680 --> 02:58:37,400
Speaker 1: media figures would comment about Ukraine, would like there's a

3221
02:58:37,480 --> 02:58:40,560
Speaker 1: nasty post here where Anne Cabrera, who I think is

3222
02:58:40,640 --> 02:58:43,240
Speaker 1: some sort of reporter, was like, I feel heartsick upon

3223
02:58:43,280 --> 02:58:45,360
Speaker 1: the latest news out of Mariopol. My god, just like

3224
02:58:45,480 --> 02:58:49,359
Speaker 1: expressing hard and human terry and tragedy. And Spencer posts

3225
02:58:49,480 --> 02:58:52,040
Speaker 1: a link to his personal website and says me too,

3226
02:58:52,440 --> 02:58:54,240
Speaker 1: not sure if you saw my MANI manual for the

3227
02:58:54,320 --> 02:58:57,800
Speaker 1: Urban Defender, but it is available in English and Ukrainian. Yeah,

3228
02:58:58,040 --> 02:59:01,600
Speaker 1: it's it's so like anyway grifty ship like that. But

3229
02:59:02,120 --> 02:59:04,520
Speaker 1: because that it is all that's very different than also

3230
02:59:04,640 --> 02:59:07,880
Speaker 1: like throwing paint at like a squad car or like

3231
02:59:08,080 --> 02:59:10,840
Speaker 1: a riot like a riot truck that's coming through because

3232
02:59:10,840 --> 02:59:12,760
Speaker 1: if obscure their vision, the worst that they can do

3233
02:59:12,879 --> 02:59:14,880
Speaker 1: is crash into a wall. They're not going to start

3234
02:59:14,959 --> 02:59:20,520
Speaker 1: firing uh massive explosion rounds from a central Uh. Yeah,

3235
02:59:20,879 --> 02:59:23,680
Speaker 1: so they they do not like for one thing, the

3236
02:59:24,080 --> 02:59:27,000
Speaker 1: like the police as bad as they can be. Their

3237
02:59:27,120 --> 02:59:30,960
Speaker 1: default when they come under any kind of like attack

3238
02:59:31,320 --> 02:59:35,119
Speaker 1: is not to start firing machine guns wildly in all directions,

3239
02:59:36,080 --> 02:59:41,160
Speaker 1: which Russian not yet at least um. But you know,

3240
02:59:41,240 --> 02:59:43,840
Speaker 1: the other thing, I was chatting with Matthew Mora, who's

3241
02:59:43,879 --> 02:59:46,560
Speaker 1: a is has been one of the guys who's biling

3242
02:59:46,600 --> 02:59:49,080
Speaker 1: ailing get Spencer on Twitter. Matthew was a Marine Corps

3243
02:59:49,080 --> 02:59:52,200
Speaker 1: tank commander and was blown up in Afghanistan. So he

3244
02:59:52,400 --> 02:59:54,480
Speaker 1: was in a tank that was attacked several times and

3245
02:59:54,520 --> 02:59:58,480
Speaker 1: eventually destroyed. UM, So he's he has some firsthand knowledge

3246
02:59:58,480 --> 03:00:00,600
Speaker 1: about what works and does not work a against tanks.

3247
03:00:01,040 --> 03:00:02,800
Speaker 1: And one of the things he pointed out is that

3248
03:00:03,200 --> 03:00:05,960
Speaker 1: the people who destroyed his tank put together I don't know,

3249
03:00:06,640 --> 03:00:10,920
Speaker 1: hundred two hundred dollars worth of various accelerants and random

3250
03:00:11,000 --> 03:00:13,520
Speaker 1: scrap metal and made a bomb that destroyed an Abrams

3251
03:00:13,560 --> 03:00:17,640
Speaker 1: tank that works a lot better than paint. And it's

3252
03:00:17,720 --> 03:00:20,280
Speaker 1: it's the kind of thing where I think one of

3253
03:00:20,320 --> 03:00:22,680
Speaker 1: the things that's frustrating here is you've got a lot

3254
03:00:22,720 --> 03:00:25,600
Speaker 1: of these like American kind of military academic guys and

3255
03:00:25,640 --> 03:00:28,400
Speaker 1: I know Spencer served, but that doesn't necessarily mean much

3256
03:00:28,440 --> 03:00:30,880
Speaker 1: that doesn't mean just being deployed to Iraq doesn't mean

3257
03:00:30,920 --> 03:00:33,879
Speaker 1: you did anything. But they were deployed and maybe they

3258
03:00:33,920 --> 03:00:36,920
Speaker 1: did see urban combat. But I have watched United States

3259
03:00:36,959 --> 03:00:40,800
Speaker 1: soldiers in an intense urban combat environment UH, and most

3260
03:00:40,879 --> 03:00:43,320
Speaker 1: of what they did was be inside of m wraps

3261
03:00:43,680 --> 03:00:46,440
Speaker 1: because it's very hard to blow those up. While the

3262
03:00:46,520 --> 03:00:48,600
Speaker 1: Iraqi military did a great deal of the fighting, and

3263
03:00:48,640 --> 03:00:51,440
Speaker 1: when US soldiers did engage in fighting, they did so

3264
03:00:51,640 --> 03:00:55,840
Speaker 1: with absolute air supremacy and with artillery supremacy UM. Which

3265
03:00:55,879 --> 03:00:57,680
Speaker 1: isn't to say that it wasn't dangerous, but it is

3266
03:00:57,680 --> 03:01:01,160
Speaker 1: a profoundly different situation than engaging in urban combat when

3267
03:01:01,200 --> 03:01:03,480
Speaker 1: the airspace is contested and when you do not have

3268
03:01:03,680 --> 03:01:08,520
Speaker 1: artillery supremacy. So what does that mean in terms of

3269
03:01:08,600 --> 03:01:12,480
Speaker 1: like what can people actually take away that's useful from

3270
03:01:12,520 --> 03:01:16,240
Speaker 1: this um? Well, on an individual level, something have been

3271
03:01:16,560 --> 03:01:22,160
Speaker 1: extremely effective. Ukrainian territorial defense militias have been very effective

3272
03:01:22,200 --> 03:01:25,840
Speaker 1: at doing things like picking up small arms, going out

3273
03:01:25,920 --> 03:01:30,440
Speaker 1: in small patrols into UH rural environments around the area

3274
03:01:30,480 --> 03:01:34,199
Speaker 1: where Russian troops are moving in small convoys, and oftentimes,

3275
03:01:34,720 --> 03:01:36,480
Speaker 1: because of the way the advance went, you would have

3276
03:01:36,560 --> 03:01:39,879
Speaker 1: a single or a couple of Russian munition trucks essentially

3277
03:01:39,920 --> 03:01:43,400
Speaker 1: alone and unsupported, trying to find their way around. Um.

3278
03:01:43,600 --> 03:01:46,400
Speaker 1: You had civilians doing stuff like turning signs around, like

3279
03:01:46,560 --> 03:01:49,840
Speaker 1: removing signs, which they were instructed to by the areas

3280
03:01:50,000 --> 03:01:52,480
Speaker 1: creating officials as well. Yes, yes, and which I'm sure

3281
03:01:52,520 --> 03:01:54,400
Speaker 1: some people just started doing because it seemed like a

3282
03:01:54,440 --> 03:01:57,480
Speaker 1: good idea. UM. But that sort of ship causes them

3283
03:01:57,520 --> 03:02:00,080
Speaker 1: to burn fuel, causes them to abandon vehicles. You had

3284
03:02:00,200 --> 03:02:03,800
Speaker 1: these kind of independent groups of farmers towing away abandoned vehicles.

3285
03:02:04,280 --> 03:02:10,160
Speaker 1: You had small raiding parties attacking convoys and attacking isolated units.

3286
03:02:10,840 --> 03:02:14,240
Speaker 1: You had cases where you know, Russian military units early

3287
03:02:14,320 --> 03:02:17,160
Speaker 1: in the fight would get into Kiev uh kind of

3288
03:02:17,240 --> 03:02:20,680
Speaker 1: on accident and be ambushed by territorial defense units and

3289
03:02:20,760 --> 03:02:23,680
Speaker 1: wiped out. And those are all very effective examples of

3290
03:02:24,080 --> 03:02:29,280
Speaker 1: of decentralized kind of ground up resistance against a major

3291
03:02:29,400 --> 03:02:31,560
Speaker 1: military force. Now, one thing we don't know that is

3292
03:02:31,600 --> 03:02:34,520
Speaker 1: important if you think about the potential that you might

3293
03:02:34,600 --> 03:02:36,240
Speaker 1: have to endure something like this, is we have no

3294
03:02:36,400 --> 03:02:38,560
Speaker 1: idea what the casualties were like among those kids. It

3295
03:02:38,680 --> 03:02:42,360
Speaker 1: is a total black box, and it's it's probable that

3296
03:02:42,520 --> 03:02:45,840
Speaker 1: part of why Russian forces did the war crime they

3297
03:02:45,879 --> 03:02:48,760
Speaker 1: did in Bucca Um was because they had an attitude

3298
03:02:48,760 --> 03:02:52,080
Speaker 1: that all civilians were insurgents, which is, you know what

3299
03:02:52,240 --> 03:02:54,400
Speaker 1: happens when you have kind of a people's war, which

3300
03:02:54,400 --> 03:02:58,440
Speaker 1: doesn't justify an active genocide, um, but it is something

3301
03:02:58,520 --> 03:03:00,680
Speaker 1: people should keep aware of. When you start fucking with

3302
03:03:00,800 --> 03:03:04,200
Speaker 1: the signs and ambushing the convoys and throwing molotovs, one

3303
03:03:04,280 --> 03:03:06,360
Speaker 1: of the things that will happen is it will accelerate

3304
03:03:06,480 --> 03:03:09,040
Speaker 1: the violence that is being done. Yeah, and it makes

3305
03:03:09,080 --> 03:03:14,000
Speaker 1: to the civilian justified target in some you know propaganda lens, Yeah, exactly.

3306
03:03:14,080 --> 03:03:17,040
Speaker 1: And that doesn't mean like it's you should resist if

3307
03:03:17,120 --> 03:03:20,000
Speaker 1: you are invaded, um. But these are things that also

3308
03:03:20,040 --> 03:03:22,760
Speaker 1: should be noted is this is what happens when you resist,

3309
03:03:22,959 --> 03:03:25,280
Speaker 1: right that This is what a modern war of this

3310
03:03:25,400 --> 03:03:28,320
Speaker 1: type looks like. Other things that I'm not sure if

3311
03:03:28,320 --> 03:03:31,120
Speaker 1: they've been effective, but they're certainly not bad strategies is

3312
03:03:31,200 --> 03:03:33,960
Speaker 1: the construction of a lot of vehicle barriers tank traps.

3313
03:03:35,160 --> 03:03:39,440
Speaker 1: Next is the barricade thing, both than what we've been

3314
03:03:39,600 --> 03:03:42,920
Speaker 1: kind of seeing or speculated about in the East and

3315
03:03:43,000 --> 03:03:46,000
Speaker 1: then how we've seen you know, barricade set ups a

3316
03:03:46,080 --> 03:03:48,600
Speaker 1: lot in the past few years in various resistance movements

3317
03:03:49,000 --> 03:03:52,320
Speaker 1: to you know, a variety of success levels and non

3318
03:03:52,400 --> 03:03:57,280
Speaker 1: success levels. Yeah, and and and these are like you know, barriers,

3319
03:03:57,320 --> 03:03:59,960
Speaker 1: tank traps of a very long history and in warfare.

3320
03:04:00,040 --> 03:04:02,440
Speaker 1: So they absolutely can be and have been effective many

3321
03:04:02,480 --> 03:04:04,280
Speaker 1: many times on the battlefield. So this is not an

3322
03:04:04,320 --> 03:04:07,080
Speaker 1: area of does this thing work? But it is a

3323
03:04:07,160 --> 03:04:09,480
Speaker 1: question of like and and this is something we just

3324
03:04:09,560 --> 03:04:12,440
Speaker 1: don't seem to have perfect data on did it Did

3325
03:04:12,520 --> 03:04:15,520
Speaker 1: it particularly play a role in what's happening here? And Um,

3326
03:04:16,040 --> 03:04:18,400
Speaker 1: that's harder to tell. Um. And it's probably going to

3327
03:04:18,480 --> 03:04:21,160
Speaker 1: be different, you know, depending on the tactical in an

3328
03:04:21,280 --> 03:04:23,600
Speaker 1: area you're talking about, which kind of like theater you're

3329
03:04:23,600 --> 03:04:27,600
Speaker 1: talking about. But um, you know one thing that's like

3330
03:04:27,760 --> 03:04:30,720
Speaker 1: the way in which these kind of barriers, hedgehawgs and

3331
03:04:30,920 --> 03:04:34,400
Speaker 1: like whatnot work, is there there an area denial tool.

3332
03:04:34,520 --> 03:04:37,960
Speaker 1: It's like an area denial tool four vehicles, um. And

3333
03:04:38,040 --> 03:04:41,480
Speaker 1: it makes military units slow down, it makes them take

3334
03:04:41,520 --> 03:04:44,400
Speaker 1: more time in clearing area. Um they have to tow

3335
03:04:44,560 --> 03:04:47,640
Speaker 1: things away or blow them up. Um. And they also

3336
03:04:47,720 --> 03:04:49,800
Speaker 1: can provide, depending on the type of thing, cover for

3337
03:04:49,879 --> 03:04:53,200
Speaker 1: infantry and in urban combat situations, which obviously can cut

3338
03:04:53,360 --> 03:04:55,879
Speaker 1: both ways a little bit. But there's a reason why

3339
03:04:55,959 --> 03:04:58,240
Speaker 1: you see these kinds of things in every conflict and

3340
03:04:58,280 --> 03:05:01,320
Speaker 1: also a reason why p will put them up in protests.

3341
03:05:01,520 --> 03:05:03,960
Speaker 1: It can be very useful to deny the vehicles of

3342
03:05:04,040 --> 03:05:07,440
Speaker 1: the enemy access to an area temporarily, and a big

3343
03:05:07,560 --> 03:05:11,200
Speaker 1: pile of metal always does that of the time. It

3344
03:05:11,320 --> 03:05:14,280
Speaker 1: requires something to deal with it. Yeah, that was something

3345
03:05:14,360 --> 03:05:17,280
Speaker 1: that was very kind of considered when there was an

3346
03:05:17,320 --> 03:05:20,920
Speaker 1: increase in like vehicular attacks, uh during like a lot

3347
03:05:20,920 --> 03:05:24,280
Speaker 1: of vehicles running into a massive, massive marches, there was

3348
03:05:24,400 --> 03:05:27,879
Speaker 1: definitely a concerted effort to try to block off streets

3349
03:05:28,520 --> 03:05:30,720
Speaker 1: where stuff is happening, whether that be like you know,

3350
03:05:31,080 --> 03:05:34,240
Speaker 1: corkers for marches of people who specifically block off the

3351
03:05:34,400 --> 03:05:36,800
Speaker 1: sides of streets with their own cars to follow the

3352
03:05:36,840 --> 03:05:39,960
Speaker 1: march around, or you know, less less effective arricades like

3353
03:05:40,040 --> 03:05:41,760
Speaker 1: throwing a chain like fence in the middle of the street,

3354
03:05:42,080 --> 03:05:45,119
Speaker 1: which is I guess better than nothing sometimes but also

3355
03:05:45,200 --> 03:05:47,800
Speaker 1: maybe not the most effective thing. Yeah, in terms of

3356
03:05:47,920 --> 03:05:50,960
Speaker 1: trying to like build layered barricades, that's not just you know,

3357
03:05:51,120 --> 03:05:54,800
Speaker 1: one flimsy wall, but it's a series of things that

3358
03:05:54,920 --> 03:05:58,800
Speaker 1: can compress down. And when you're talking about barricades in

3359
03:05:59,040 --> 03:06:01,920
Speaker 1: a kind of militant situation, there's there's broadly speaking, going

3360
03:06:02,000 --> 03:06:05,280
Speaker 1: to be two purposes. One of those purposes is to

3361
03:06:06,440 --> 03:06:09,800
Speaker 1: create a to add to the friction that you are

3362
03:06:09,800 --> 03:06:12,560
Speaker 1: attempting to create for the enemy. And that's that's all

3363
03:06:12,680 --> 03:06:16,440
Speaker 1: insurg All insurgent warfare is about creating friction, right, because

3364
03:06:16,520 --> 03:06:21,600
Speaker 1: friction degrades assets. It's over time. It it called basically like, okay,

3365
03:06:21,640 --> 03:06:23,040
Speaker 1: so say you've blocked off a bunch of roads and

3366
03:06:23,080 --> 03:06:26,960
Speaker 1: you've added fifteen twenty miles to the transport distance that

3367
03:06:27,040 --> 03:06:30,160
Speaker 1: this convoy has to go. Well, generally speaking, in the

3368
03:06:30,240 --> 03:06:33,119
Speaker 1: case of war, when you're talking about war, it's assumed

3369
03:06:33,160 --> 03:06:35,640
Speaker 1: that about one mile is in terms of wear and

3370
03:06:35,720 --> 03:06:39,480
Speaker 1: tear like tins plus miles um. Because of how much

3371
03:06:39,520 --> 03:06:42,600
Speaker 1: more difficult the strain on vehicles is in those situations.

3372
03:06:42,800 --> 03:06:45,240
Speaker 1: So you've added a great deal more strain on the vehicles.

3373
03:06:45,280 --> 03:06:47,080
Speaker 1: That increases the chance that one of them is gonna

3374
03:06:47,120 --> 03:06:48,920
Speaker 1: blow a tire, one of them gonna crack an axle,

3375
03:06:49,120 --> 03:06:50,640
Speaker 1: one of them is going to have an engine block

3376
03:06:51,040 --> 03:06:54,640
Speaker 1: go like blow or whatever, um, Which means over time,

3377
03:06:54,720 --> 03:06:56,400
Speaker 1: if you're doing this a bunch. If you're setting up

3378
03:06:56,440 --> 03:07:00,160
Speaker 1: barricades and you're effectively increasing or all the amount of

3379
03:07:00,240 --> 03:07:02,560
Speaker 1: travel time or at least the amount of idoling time

3380
03:07:02,600 --> 03:07:05,080
Speaker 1: that forces have to go in by a significant amount.

3381
03:07:05,560 --> 03:07:09,160
Speaker 1: Your guaranteeing a certain number of those vehicles are going

3382
03:07:09,240 --> 03:07:11,320
Speaker 1: to break or be rendered inoperable in that time. And

3383
03:07:11,400 --> 03:07:14,000
Speaker 1: you're also the other thing that they do is they

3384
03:07:14,120 --> 03:07:18,640
Speaker 1: allow you to deny area and funnel the enemy into

3385
03:07:18,840 --> 03:07:22,520
Speaker 1: a specific into a place more advantageous for you, right,

3386
03:07:22,600 --> 03:07:24,200
Speaker 1: And this can be advantageous if you're trying to set

3387
03:07:24,280 --> 03:07:26,280
Speaker 1: up an ambush, if you're just trying to buy time

3388
03:07:26,360 --> 03:07:29,000
Speaker 1: for forces to move back to a better position. Um,

3389
03:07:29,520 --> 03:07:31,960
Speaker 1: it can you know, there's a number of uses for it.

3390
03:07:32,040 --> 03:07:34,880
Speaker 1: But if you set up a series of obstacles like

3391
03:07:35,000 --> 03:07:36,720
Speaker 1: this and guarantee that they're going to have to find

3392
03:07:36,760 --> 03:07:39,520
Speaker 1: an alternate route, and you know, broadly speaking, because it's

3393
03:07:39,560 --> 03:07:42,280
Speaker 1: your terrain, what kind of route they're going to take, um,

3394
03:07:42,480 --> 03:07:44,680
Speaker 1: then you could do stuff like drop throw a drone

3395
03:07:44,720 --> 03:07:47,119
Speaker 1: at them, or if because of the damage you've done

3396
03:07:47,160 --> 03:07:49,200
Speaker 1: to the roads and the difficulty of how difficult you

3397
03:07:49,280 --> 03:07:50,840
Speaker 1: made it to advance, they wind up just parked for

3398
03:07:50,920 --> 03:07:53,480
Speaker 1: a long time. That's also a great situation to bomb

3399
03:07:53,520 --> 03:07:56,040
Speaker 1: people with a drone, which is by far the most

3400
03:07:56,080 --> 03:08:00,680
Speaker 1: effective weapons unit that we have seen built civilians in

3401
03:08:00,720 --> 03:08:03,400
Speaker 1: this war. By the way, UH, it's not molotovs, it's

3402
03:08:03,400 --> 03:08:07,959
Speaker 1: certainly not paint. It is UH civilian volunteers who put

3403
03:08:08,080 --> 03:08:12,920
Speaker 1: together combat drones using generally d j I drones that

3404
03:08:13,040 --> 03:08:18,200
Speaker 1: they have upgraded with thermal imaging cameras in order to

3405
03:08:18,280 --> 03:08:20,800
Speaker 1: see at night. And they have used three D printed

3406
03:08:20,879 --> 03:08:23,440
Speaker 1: parts in order to drop bombs from UM and they

3407
03:08:23,520 --> 03:08:27,520
Speaker 1: have done carried out for weeks now hundreds of extremely

3408
03:08:27,640 --> 03:08:30,720
Speaker 1: successful night time raids on Russian positions. This has been

3409
03:08:30,720 --> 03:08:32,400
Speaker 1: effective for a couple of reasons. One of them is

3410
03:08:32,440 --> 03:08:37,360
Speaker 1: that the Russian military does not widespread half effective night vision. UM.

3411
03:08:37,720 --> 03:08:40,320
Speaker 1: We don't need to get The reasons for this are complicated,

3412
03:08:40,400 --> 03:08:43,000
Speaker 1: based in a mix of like appropriations, corruption, issues with

3413
03:08:43,080 --> 03:08:46,120
Speaker 1: the technologies they do have, YadA, YadA, YadA, but they

3414
03:08:46,200 --> 03:08:49,080
Speaker 1: do not have the capacity in large scale to carry

3415
03:08:49,080 --> 03:08:52,600
Speaker 1: out operations at night to the extent that the Ukrainians do. UM.

3416
03:08:52,760 --> 03:08:56,080
Speaker 1: And so you get when nighttime comes these forces that

3417
03:08:56,160 --> 03:08:59,480
Speaker 1: were advancing in places like Kiev clustering up and huddling

3418
03:08:59,560 --> 03:09:02,160
Speaker 1: for the night, and then these hunter killer drones would

3419
03:09:02,200 --> 03:09:04,720
Speaker 1: sneak in at night and they are impossible to fucking

3420
03:09:04,760 --> 03:09:07,200
Speaker 1: see in daytime. I can tell you from experience. At night,

3421
03:09:07,520 --> 03:09:11,760
Speaker 1: their ghosts just dropping bombs on on armored vehicles and

3422
03:09:12,000 --> 03:09:15,280
Speaker 1: on groups of soldiers. Um and these you know what

3423
03:09:15,480 --> 03:09:17,640
Speaker 1: you have seen with these units which have been integrated.

3424
03:09:17,680 --> 03:09:20,200
Speaker 1: They are like started out as civilian volunteer groups. They

3425
03:09:20,240 --> 03:09:23,400
Speaker 1: have been integrated into the military to a significant extent.

3426
03:09:23,800 --> 03:09:26,560
Speaker 1: And I think what you do have Some of this

3427
03:09:26,760 --> 03:09:28,640
Speaker 1: is conjecture on my part, but you've had a lot

3428
03:09:28,640 --> 03:09:31,880
Speaker 1: of Russian officers in generals killed generally because they have

3429
03:09:31,959 --> 03:09:35,320
Speaker 1: been communicating over open phone lines. And I suspect some

3430
03:09:35,480 --> 03:09:37,520
Speaker 1: of what's been going on is when they figure out

3431
03:09:37,520 --> 03:09:39,120
Speaker 1: where one of these guys is, they send some of

3432
03:09:39,160 --> 03:09:41,240
Speaker 1: these fucking drone units and to blow them up, because

3433
03:09:41,240 --> 03:09:43,600
Speaker 1: it's not hard if you know where someone is to

3434
03:09:43,720 --> 03:09:46,160
Speaker 1: kill them with the drone. In this way, I think

3435
03:09:46,200 --> 03:09:48,000
Speaker 1: the other thing to talk about in terms of you know,

3436
03:09:48,120 --> 03:09:52,320
Speaker 1: building obstacles, building barricades is the whole cover versus concealment

3437
03:09:52,360 --> 03:09:54,240
Speaker 1: thing where a lot of people think that if they

3438
03:09:54,320 --> 03:09:57,960
Speaker 1: hide behind a barricade, there now impervious, which obviously isn't

3439
03:09:57,959 --> 03:10:00,520
Speaker 1: true if a drone is gonna get you, and obviously

3440
03:10:00,680 --> 03:10:03,640
Speaker 1: isn't true for a large a large number of the

3441
03:10:03,640 --> 03:10:08,600
Speaker 1: ammunitions that get fired, whether they be bullets or tank grounds. Yeah, yeah,

3442
03:10:08,680 --> 03:10:11,400
Speaker 1: I mean it's and I think that's something In videos

3443
03:10:11,440 --> 03:10:15,280
Speaker 1: I have watched of Russian soldiers responding to contact, you

3444
03:10:15,360 --> 03:10:18,680
Speaker 1: have seen a lot of people in ambushes that they

3445
03:10:18,760 --> 03:10:22,720
Speaker 1: lost hiding behind vehicles, UM, which if it's an armored vehicle,

3446
03:10:22,959 --> 03:10:25,560
Speaker 1: definitely can protect you from small arm fire. But if

3447
03:10:25,600 --> 03:10:29,000
Speaker 1: somebody shoots that vehicle with a with a javelin, you

3448
03:10:29,080 --> 03:10:31,959
Speaker 1: may find yourself next to a cooking off tank. UM.

3449
03:10:32,400 --> 03:10:36,560
Speaker 1: And I have seen it like people hiding behind fucking fences,

3450
03:10:36,680 --> 03:10:40,280
Speaker 1: which is terrible to hide behind, UM, failing to go

3451
03:10:40,400 --> 03:10:43,760
Speaker 1: to ground, which is always your best bet is to

3452
03:10:43,840 --> 03:10:45,879
Speaker 1: kind of get behind a burm or something, get loaded

3453
03:10:45,879 --> 03:10:48,480
Speaker 1: the fucking ground. And it's It's interesting to me a

3454
03:10:48,560 --> 03:10:51,120
Speaker 1: lot of the worst videos of responding to contact that

3455
03:10:51,160 --> 03:10:53,600
Speaker 1: I've seen on the Russian side have been there. The

3456
03:10:53,879 --> 03:10:57,000
Speaker 1: Ross Guardia units. I'm not great at pronouncing Russian, but

3457
03:10:57,080 --> 03:11:01,480
Speaker 1: they are essentially police special forces units that actually makes sense.

3458
03:11:02,400 --> 03:11:05,600
Speaker 1: They have every video I've seen of these guys handle

3459
03:11:05,720 --> 03:11:08,760
Speaker 1: being ambushed very poorly because they're not trained for that.

3460
03:11:08,840 --> 03:11:11,560
Speaker 1: They're trained to go bust into a house and arrest somebody,

3461
03:11:11,680 --> 03:11:14,720
Speaker 1: you know, like this is not where they're what they're

3462
03:11:14,760 --> 03:11:18,480
Speaker 1: supposed to be doing. The other thing that Spencer really

3463
03:11:18,520 --> 03:11:22,720
Speaker 1: focuses on is this whole like um sniper idea of

3464
03:11:23,120 --> 03:11:26,640
Speaker 1: of being afraid of someone, of someone just cutting you

3465
03:11:26,720 --> 03:11:29,800
Speaker 1: down from above, which obviously kind of is you know,

3466
03:11:30,040 --> 03:11:32,160
Speaker 1: more of a thing with the drone stuff as well,

3467
03:11:32,560 --> 03:11:35,440
Speaker 1: but this idea of not even being good at firearms,

3468
03:11:35,520 --> 03:11:37,879
Speaker 1: but just having the threat of taking fire from somewhere

3469
03:11:37,879 --> 03:11:40,920
Speaker 1: as you can't see in terms of like knowing your

3470
03:11:41,040 --> 03:11:44,600
Speaker 1: terrain better than whatever invading force does and knowing how

3471
03:11:44,680 --> 03:11:47,879
Speaker 1: to set up spots where it's it's less you're less

3472
03:11:47,920 --> 03:11:52,920
Speaker 1: likely to get shelled. Um, I mean yeah, and that's

3473
03:11:53,040 --> 03:11:55,440
Speaker 1: that's very I mean, this is very basic and old

3474
03:11:56,080 --> 03:12:01,000
Speaker 1: military doctrine. But this is like, you know, the ways

3475
03:12:01,360 --> 03:12:03,840
Speaker 1: a sniper can work in a deservein environment is you

3476
03:12:03,920 --> 03:12:06,000
Speaker 1: have a large number of guys and they are trying

3477
03:12:06,080 --> 03:12:09,720
Speaker 1: to move to a specific area and if they take fire, um,

3478
03:12:10,760 --> 03:12:14,199
Speaker 1: that limits their options from forward movement unless they're willing

3479
03:12:14,280 --> 03:12:16,720
Speaker 1: to just risk getting hit, and generally they're not, and

3480
03:12:16,800 --> 03:12:19,680
Speaker 1: then you find yourself kind of holding up for time

3481
03:12:19,760 --> 03:12:22,600
Speaker 1: to take out the sniper, which can be uninvolved in

3482
03:12:22,680 --> 03:12:25,879
Speaker 1: difficult process for just a single sniper. And yeah, that's

3483
03:12:25,920 --> 03:12:27,640
Speaker 1: definitely a thing like that. You don't have to be

3484
03:12:28,120 --> 03:12:32,560
Speaker 1: the fucking of Chris Kyle in order to effectively work

3485
03:12:32,640 --> 03:12:35,200
Speaker 1: in that kind of situation. Now, what makes that effective

3486
03:12:35,200 --> 03:12:38,800
Speaker 1: Because if you just have a sniper attacking police officers

3487
03:12:38,920 --> 03:12:43,080
Speaker 1: or soldiers in an urban environment, generally speaking, there exists

3488
03:12:43,200 --> 03:12:45,880
Speaker 1: the ability to deal with that pretty fucking quickly. But

3489
03:12:46,000 --> 03:12:49,839
Speaker 1: if you have small units of snipers kind of oftentimes

3490
03:12:49,920 --> 03:12:52,840
Speaker 1: just like civilians with hunting rifles who are doing that

3491
03:12:53,000 --> 03:12:56,760
Speaker 1: within the context of soldiers also being resisted by other

3492
03:12:56,920 --> 03:13:00,680
Speaker 1: soldiers and dealing with like an active combat environment, then yeah,

3493
03:13:00,720 --> 03:13:03,519
Speaker 1: a handful of people with rifles can be a significant

3494
03:13:03,560 --> 03:13:06,280
Speaker 1: force multiplier. It's a lot extra to deal with, and

3495
03:13:06,360 --> 03:13:09,000
Speaker 1: I suspect ship like that has been part of why

3496
03:13:09,640 --> 03:13:13,320
Speaker 1: you have seen cities like Mariopold resists so long under

3497
03:13:13,400 --> 03:13:18,600
Speaker 1: overwhelming forces that there's a pretty wide, comprehensive amount of

3498
03:13:19,400 --> 03:13:23,320
Speaker 1: resistance going on in those areas um And yeah, a

3499
03:13:23,400 --> 03:13:27,119
Speaker 1: single person if they're not like the only person engaging

3500
03:13:27,400 --> 03:13:30,320
Speaker 1: with the enemy in that in that area, UM, can

3501
03:13:30,400 --> 03:13:32,520
Speaker 1: make it a lot harder for them to effectively respond

3502
03:13:32,520 --> 03:13:35,840
Speaker 1: to contact. I think the last thing I wanted to

3503
03:13:35,879 --> 03:13:39,240
Speaker 1: kind of get into today is the whole I mean,

3504
03:13:39,720 --> 03:13:42,080
Speaker 1: this kind of ties into the weaponized on reality aspect

3505
03:13:42,600 --> 03:13:45,600
Speaker 1: of being like all of these people who are giving

3506
03:13:46,320 --> 03:13:48,320
Speaker 1: you know, I just listened advice on Twitter dot com,

3507
03:13:48,440 --> 03:13:51,120
Speaker 1: whether they be John Spencer, whether they be you know,

3508
03:13:51,600 --> 03:13:54,880
Speaker 1: the wife of a former marine, whether they be tank

3509
03:13:55,000 --> 03:13:58,119
Speaker 1: mechanics whatever, like everyone's everyone's doing this now, and it's

3510
03:13:58,120 --> 03:14:00,640
Speaker 1: all seen as like completely valid. Right, We're giving instructions

3511
03:14:00,680 --> 03:14:03,440
Speaker 1: on how to do urban insurgency online, um, and this

3512
03:14:03,640 --> 03:14:07,680
Speaker 1: is totally fine. Yet when you know, when information from

3513
03:14:07,840 --> 03:14:11,800
Speaker 1: Hong Kong gets used in protest kind of uh propaganda

3514
03:14:12,000 --> 03:14:17,080
Speaker 1: for urban insurgency instructions, then it's like international like organized

3515
03:14:17,360 --> 03:14:20,320
Speaker 1: like terrorism. Yeah. Yeah, if you're telling people had to

3516
03:14:20,480 --> 03:14:24,040
Speaker 1: use fucking laser pointers, yeah, it's like the selective thing.

3517
03:14:24,160 --> 03:14:26,280
Speaker 1: How but you're like, Okay, we're allowed to tell people

3518
03:14:26,320 --> 03:14:29,680
Speaker 1: how to do urban insurgency right now, but when this

3519
03:14:29,840 --> 03:14:32,280
Speaker 1: is over or in the past, it's it's it's not allowed. Right,

3520
03:14:32,320 --> 03:14:34,800
Speaker 1: you have John Spencer, who I doubt would be giving

3521
03:14:34,879 --> 03:14:37,560
Speaker 1: I doubt was a big fan of any Black Lives

3522
03:14:37,600 --> 03:14:43,119
Speaker 1: Matter demonstration just but but I mean, I certainly doubt

3523
03:14:43,200 --> 03:14:46,560
Speaker 1: was giving people instructions and how to disable bearcats. Yeah,

3524
03:14:46,720 --> 03:14:48,360
Speaker 1: I don't think he was giving instructions and how to

3525
03:14:48,400 --> 03:14:52,240
Speaker 1: ambush police officers or anything like that. So you have

3526
03:14:52,320 --> 03:14:55,680
Speaker 1: this whole coalition of people on Twitter dot com giving

3527
03:14:55,760 --> 03:14:59,200
Speaker 1: all this advice out how to do urban insurgency and whatever. Well, also,

3528
03:14:59,360 --> 03:15:02,840
Speaker 1: you know, when ever something is happening like that where

3529
03:15:02,879 --> 03:15:05,480
Speaker 1: they live, it is that that is obviously bad and

3530
03:15:05,520 --> 03:15:08,520
Speaker 1: obviously not a good thing, whether you know, for you know,

3531
03:15:08,600 --> 03:15:11,600
Speaker 1: you could talk about whatever like ideological drive people have,

3532
03:15:12,080 --> 03:15:13,680
Speaker 1: but I think this is just an interesting thing worth

3533
03:15:13,720 --> 03:15:16,160
Speaker 1: talking about in terms of how we will offer we

3534
03:15:16,200 --> 03:15:18,240
Speaker 1: will view. You know, this type of discussion of urban

3535
03:15:18,240 --> 03:15:20,520
Speaker 1: insurgency is always like a bad thing, all right. It's

3536
03:15:20,520 --> 03:15:22,640
Speaker 1: always this thing that like terrorists do you're helping, you know,

3537
03:15:22,760 --> 03:15:25,800
Speaker 1: you're you're always you're mooting for the destruction of civilization

3538
03:15:25,879 --> 03:15:28,119
Speaker 1: or whatever, um. And then it just takes a few

3539
03:15:28,200 --> 03:15:30,480
Speaker 1: things for you get you know, an instructor at West

3540
03:15:30,520 --> 03:15:33,760
Speaker 1: Point to start, you know, posting threads to help sell

3541
03:15:33,800 --> 03:15:37,080
Speaker 1: his new book on these very same topics. Yeah, I

3542
03:15:37,120 --> 03:15:39,200
Speaker 1: mean there's I think a little degree to which I

3543
03:15:39,280 --> 03:15:41,720
Speaker 1: might push back on some of that, not necessarily, Spencer,

3544
03:15:41,800 --> 03:15:44,119
Speaker 1: But I can't remember during like the Fed War in Portland,

3545
03:15:44,200 --> 03:15:46,280
Speaker 1: which was the probably the part of Portland that like

3546
03:15:46,400 --> 03:15:48,120
Speaker 1: most people are aware of, when you had a bunch

3547
03:15:48,120 --> 03:15:51,119
Speaker 1: of federal agents snatching people, it was the most warlike

3548
03:15:51,240 --> 03:15:54,879
Speaker 1: part of the you you had for this brief period

3549
03:15:54,920 --> 03:15:57,720
Speaker 1: of time a lot of folks because I took part

3550
03:15:58,240 --> 03:16:01,720
Speaker 1: giving out advice on Twitter to respond to and handle

3551
03:16:01,800 --> 03:16:05,600
Speaker 1: police munitions. Um that when I think that certainly went

3552
03:16:06,120 --> 03:16:09,879
Speaker 1: more viral than it would have gone in a different

3553
03:16:09,920 --> 03:16:12,840
Speaker 1: sort of situation. Um And I think you do have.

3554
03:16:13,280 --> 03:16:14,800
Speaker 1: I think part of what you're seeing in Ukraine, and

3555
03:16:14,840 --> 03:16:16,360
Speaker 1: this is just sort of a general thing that happens

3556
03:16:16,400 --> 03:16:21,600
Speaker 1: online is when something a news moment, blows up in

3557
03:16:21,680 --> 03:16:24,120
Speaker 1: a way that is like big enough it disrupts the

3558
03:16:24,240 --> 03:16:26,720
Speaker 1: norms and suddenly for a while you can talk about

3559
03:16:26,800 --> 03:16:29,680
Speaker 1: things like how to disable government armored vehicles and fight

3560
03:16:29,920 --> 03:16:33,000
Speaker 1: like you know, the reality suddenly becomes so much bigger,

3561
03:16:33,360 --> 03:16:37,360
Speaker 1: and what is what is acceptable discourse suddenly expands out

3562
03:16:37,879 --> 03:16:40,040
Speaker 1: much bigger than what it usually tells. It becomes a

3563
03:16:40,080 --> 03:16:42,480
Speaker 1: lot more permeable. And I do think broadly, Like we're

3564
03:16:42,480 --> 03:16:46,000
Speaker 1: shooting on Spencer here because he's frustrating to me. Um,

3565
03:16:46,120 --> 03:16:48,880
Speaker 1: but I do think that, like, really really broadly. Um,

3566
03:16:49,440 --> 03:16:51,280
Speaker 1: it's good when stuff like it's good for people to

3567
03:16:51,400 --> 03:16:54,520
Speaker 1: think about. Even if I don't, I certainly don't. I

3568
03:16:54,600 --> 03:16:57,039
Speaker 1: certainly do not want there to be I don't want

3569
03:16:57,120 --> 03:17:00,000
Speaker 1: anyone listening to this who has not experienced urban warfare

3570
03:17:00,160 --> 03:17:03,040
Speaker 1: to experienced urban warfare. I will absolutely I will. I

3571
03:17:03,120 --> 03:17:06,320
Speaker 1: will say that right now. But it is not bad

3572
03:17:06,720 --> 03:17:09,160
Speaker 1: for people to be thinking about and talking about the

3573
03:17:09,200 --> 03:17:12,320
Speaker 1: ways in which a civilian population can do damage to

3574
03:17:12,440 --> 03:17:16,880
Speaker 1: an invading organized military force. That's not a bad discourse

3575
03:17:16,959 --> 03:17:20,240
Speaker 1: to exist, and it's not bad for people to be

3576
03:17:20,440 --> 03:17:23,720
Speaker 1: thinking in this way. And it's not bad for the

3577
03:17:24,760 --> 03:17:28,920
Speaker 1: people who are potentially in power to have that in

3578
03:17:29,040 --> 03:17:31,960
Speaker 1: the back of their heads, you know. Yeah, I mean, like,

3579
03:17:32,160 --> 03:17:34,560
Speaker 1: the one of the first things you sent me when

3580
03:17:34,560 --> 03:17:36,520
Speaker 1: I started working for it could happen here was the

3581
03:17:37,360 --> 03:17:40,360
Speaker 1: was the city is not neutral peace? Um on Urban

3582
03:17:40,680 --> 03:17:47,440
Speaker 1: combat is hard. Um. Yeah, it's definitely. It's the thing that, Yeah,

3583
03:17:47,560 --> 03:17:49,400
Speaker 1: it's it's always it's it's worth thinking about, but you

3584
03:17:49,400 --> 03:17:51,920
Speaker 1: don't want to. We're not trying to wish on anybody.

3585
03:17:51,959 --> 03:17:53,800
Speaker 1: And I think you can. You can look at all

3586
03:17:53,840 --> 03:17:57,040
Speaker 1: of like the weirdos on the internet who have like

3587
03:17:57,600 --> 03:17:59,680
Speaker 1: you know this, you know this is some degree of

3588
03:17:59,760 --> 03:18:01,120
Speaker 1: like not sees who have done this, but also just

3589
03:18:01,200 --> 03:18:04,240
Speaker 1: like random other people who have flown to Ukraine to

3590
03:18:04,440 --> 03:18:07,400
Speaker 1: help join fight off the Russians because they think it's

3591
03:18:07,400 --> 03:18:08,720
Speaker 1: going to be cool and they'll be able to work

3592
03:18:08,760 --> 03:18:11,240
Speaker 1: with the Azov Batalion or something, who then get stationed

3593
03:18:11,280 --> 03:18:14,320
Speaker 1: to basically be cannon fodder because they're this like twenty

3594
03:18:14,400 --> 03:18:17,160
Speaker 1: year old from America who's never actually held a gun before.

3595
03:18:17,400 --> 03:18:20,240
Speaker 1: I hope that one's true. It is just like a

3596
03:18:20,360 --> 03:18:22,560
Speaker 1: post because if it's true, then it means that someone

3597
03:18:22,640 --> 03:18:25,400
Speaker 1: in the Ukrainian government is consciously making the choice to

3598
03:18:25,520 --> 03:18:28,000
Speaker 1: use one of the Azov veterans as cannon fodder, which

3599
03:18:28,040 --> 03:18:31,600
Speaker 1: is funny, funny, extremely funny. If it's happening, right, we don't,

3600
03:18:31,760 --> 03:18:35,920
Speaker 1: that's not that's not confirmed. Certainly, a percentage, probably not

3601
03:18:36,000 --> 03:18:38,680
Speaker 1: an insignificant percentage of dudes who have done shown up

3602
03:18:38,720 --> 03:18:40,400
Speaker 1: to do this have like been like, oh my God,

3603
03:18:40,480 --> 03:18:43,000
Speaker 1: what the fuck? Um, some of them I'm sure just

3604
03:18:43,040 --> 03:18:44,840
Speaker 1: didn't have much experience. I'm sure some of them were

3605
03:18:44,920 --> 03:18:48,080
Speaker 1: dudes who had experience being on the side with overwhelming

3606
03:18:48,120 --> 03:18:51,440
Speaker 1: air power. Um, and we're like, oh fuck, but you

3607
03:18:51,560 --> 03:18:54,280
Speaker 1: also do It's fair to note like the stories of

3608
03:18:54,360 --> 03:18:57,960
Speaker 1: people like having like freaking out go viral. Um. There's

3609
03:18:58,000 --> 03:19:00,840
Speaker 1: plenty of videos of like mixed foreign or units in

3610
03:19:01,000 --> 03:19:04,120
Speaker 1: heavy combat, including a bunch where you can hear US

3611
03:19:04,200 --> 03:19:07,360
Speaker 1: and British dudes. Finally, like, because a lot there's a

3612
03:19:07,400 --> 03:19:10,720
Speaker 1: lot of people who have legitimate, like hard combat experience

3613
03:19:10,760 --> 03:19:13,000
Speaker 1: who have have volunteered to go do this. Yeah. The

3614
03:19:13,200 --> 03:19:15,600
Speaker 1: one thing I also do find kind of uncomfortable is,

3615
03:19:16,400 --> 03:19:18,800
Speaker 1: I mean, no, it's not super unlike what what what

3616
03:19:18,879 --> 03:19:20,320
Speaker 1: we're doing now that we're trying to come at it

3617
03:19:20,360 --> 03:19:25,120
Speaker 1: from a more uh like critical standpoint, but like Americans

3618
03:19:25,200 --> 03:19:27,600
Speaker 1: who maybe have gone to a protest or two but

3619
03:19:28,040 --> 03:19:31,480
Speaker 1: no real experience, just going on Twitter dot com and

3620
03:19:31,640 --> 03:19:35,240
Speaker 1: talking about how they think beating an army is best done,

3621
03:19:35,440 --> 03:19:37,760
Speaker 1: how that works. Yeah. Well, and like you know, if

3622
03:19:37,800 --> 03:19:41,680
Speaker 1: if you look at like the okay, like the times

3623
03:19:41,800 --> 03:19:44,400
Speaker 1: that like the US has actually attempted to fight its

3624
03:19:44,440 --> 03:19:47,880
Speaker 1: own Army, right, Like the last time this happened was

3625
03:19:48,040 --> 03:19:51,080
Speaker 1: the L L A. Riot and ninety two and they

3626
03:19:51,200 --> 03:19:56,119
Speaker 1: got their ship pushed in like it it went really

3627
03:19:56,280 --> 03:19:58,520
Speaker 1: really badly for the people on This was really ugly.

3628
03:19:58,600 --> 03:20:00,640
Speaker 1: There was a lot of bodies. Yeah, and like and

3629
03:20:00,720 --> 03:20:02,280
Speaker 1: you know, and part part of what you know, and

3630
03:20:02,360 --> 03:20:04,800
Speaker 1: I will say, like part of what's I guess you

3631
03:20:04,879 --> 03:20:06,320
Speaker 1: still about this is like yeah, this is I mean,

3632
03:20:06,400 --> 03:20:07,760
Speaker 1: this is the thing that is I mean I wasn't

3633
03:20:07,800 --> 03:20:10,880
Speaker 1: alive for it, but like at like Robert, you were

3634
03:20:10,879 --> 03:20:14,120
Speaker 1: alive for that, like like that that that is a

3635
03:20:14,240 --> 03:20:16,920
Speaker 1: thing like in living memory. The Army has been deployed

3636
03:20:17,400 --> 03:20:19,600
Speaker 1: on American soil and one of the things that went

3637
03:20:19,680 --> 03:20:23,920
Speaker 1: wrong is that the people on the ground had basically

3638
03:20:23,959 --> 03:20:25,760
Speaker 1: no time. And this is something you can read from

3639
03:20:25,879 --> 03:20:28,640
Speaker 1: from like the Army's accounts of this, is that like

3640
03:20:28,800 --> 03:20:30,879
Speaker 1: the people that they were dealing with had no tactical

3641
03:20:30,920 --> 03:20:32,760
Speaker 1: experience what wherever they did it, they had no conception

3642
03:20:32,800 --> 03:20:35,560
Speaker 1: of tactics, and the Army was able to very quickly

3643
03:20:35,600 --> 03:20:38,520
Speaker 1: crush them. And you know, if if you don't want

3644
03:20:38,560 --> 03:20:40,600
Speaker 1: that to happen to you, yeah, like that there there

3645
03:20:40,680 --> 03:20:43,720
Speaker 1: there is a way which is stuff is important to

3646
03:20:43,800 --> 03:20:46,480
Speaker 1: be thinking about. But also like dear God, that is

3647
03:20:46,640 --> 03:20:52,240
Speaker 1: the worst ship, Like yeah you that here. Here's what's

3648
03:20:53,040 --> 03:20:57,560
Speaker 1: what's important to understand about that anytime you are dealing

3649
03:20:58,320 --> 03:21:03,960
Speaker 1: with any kind of conflict, like physical conflict that involves

3650
03:21:04,080 --> 03:21:06,760
Speaker 1: violence and and that can be as narrow as like

3651
03:21:06,840 --> 03:21:09,760
Speaker 1: a protest, you know, where people are squaring off with

3652
03:21:09,840 --> 03:21:14,320
Speaker 1: the cops, or an actual like full on military conflict,

3653
03:21:15,480 --> 03:21:18,960
Speaker 1: the winner is the person who is most disruptive to

3654
03:21:19,160 --> 03:21:24,840
Speaker 1: the enemies. Ode loop, right, um, observe, orient, decide act.

3655
03:21:25,080 --> 03:21:26,959
Speaker 1: That's the loop that you go through when you are

3656
03:21:27,000 --> 03:21:28,760
Speaker 1: trying to decide how to act in any kind of

3657
03:21:28,800 --> 03:21:32,400
Speaker 1: a kinetic situation UM on the streets and a protest.

3658
03:21:32,520 --> 03:21:34,280
Speaker 1: One of the things where I where we have all

3659
03:21:34,360 --> 03:21:38,600
Speaker 1: seen people be the most successful against cops is when

3660
03:21:38,640 --> 03:21:40,879
Speaker 1: you change the rules on them. Is when they are

3661
03:21:40,920 --> 03:21:43,680
Speaker 1: in a situation they did not anticipate being in, because

3662
03:21:43,720 --> 03:21:45,640
Speaker 1: they tend to freak out and they tend to respond

3663
03:21:45,720 --> 03:21:48,480
Speaker 1: and effectively, right, you do not want to if you

3664
03:21:48,560 --> 03:21:50,840
Speaker 1: see them preparing to act in a certain way because

3665
03:21:50,840 --> 03:21:54,000
Speaker 1: they believe you were doing a specific thing, you ideally

3666
03:21:54,120 --> 03:21:56,200
Speaker 1: do not then do the thing they are preparing for

3667
03:21:56,400 --> 03:21:58,400
Speaker 1: because that is a situation which you're gonna wind a

3668
03:21:58,440 --> 03:22:01,480
Speaker 1: battering yourself against a riot line. Right. Um, that's what

3669
03:22:01,640 --> 03:22:04,119
Speaker 1: the that's the core of the move be like water

3670
03:22:04,280 --> 03:22:06,600
Speaker 1: thing from Hong Kong, is the idea that do not

3671
03:22:06,840 --> 03:22:09,240
Speaker 1: engage them in a way they are prepared for, and

3672
03:22:09,320 --> 03:22:11,240
Speaker 1: that that that is a that is a piece of advice.

3673
03:22:11,320 --> 03:22:14,200
Speaker 1: Broadly speaking, that's just as true in a war as

3674
03:22:14,240 --> 03:22:17,200
Speaker 1: it is in a protest situation. On their own terms.

3675
03:22:17,480 --> 03:22:20,680
Speaker 1: What this also means is that you don't want to

3676
03:22:20,720 --> 03:22:24,680
Speaker 1: be playing by a set of rules that are ineffective

3677
03:22:24,720 --> 03:22:26,840
Speaker 1: in the situation you're getting into. So like when you

3678
03:22:26,959 --> 03:22:30,280
Speaker 1: had protesters in in l A engaging with the military,

3679
03:22:30,680 --> 03:22:32,480
Speaker 1: they were playing by the rules of how do you

3680
03:22:32,640 --> 03:22:36,439
Speaker 1: deal with cops and suddenly they were dealing with soldiers

3681
03:22:36,920 --> 03:22:41,039
Speaker 1: and boy, howdy are the rules different? You know? Um?

3682
03:22:41,879 --> 03:22:46,800
Speaker 1: And likewise, the Russian military was trained and blooded to

3683
03:22:46,920 --> 03:22:50,600
Speaker 1: a large extent in conflicts in places like Syria, where

3684
03:22:50,840 --> 03:22:55,320
Speaker 1: again they had air supremacy, Um, they had artillery supremacy.

3685
03:22:55,600 --> 03:22:58,920
Speaker 1: They were backing the state that was fighting against these insurgents,

3686
03:22:59,360 --> 03:23:02,959
Speaker 1: and so they're soldiers gained the combat experience they had

3687
03:23:03,360 --> 03:23:07,879
Speaker 1: with every advantage in their pocket. Um. Meanwhile, the Ukrainian military,

3688
03:23:08,040 --> 03:23:10,720
Speaker 1: if you're talking really about like because we've talked about

3689
03:23:10,760 --> 03:23:12,680
Speaker 1: a lot of little things that have maybe had an

3690
03:23:12,680 --> 03:23:14,320
Speaker 1: impact on the conflict here, and they're one of the

3691
03:23:14,360 --> 03:23:16,920
Speaker 1: things that's had the biggest impact on how the Ukrainian

3692
03:23:17,000 --> 03:23:21,080
Speaker 1: military has responded and and comported itself in this war

3693
03:23:21,200 --> 03:23:24,800
Speaker 1: so far versus the Russian is for years eight years

3694
03:23:24,840 --> 03:23:28,560
Speaker 1: since this conflict started, the Ukrainian military has developed a

3695
03:23:28,920 --> 03:23:32,680
Speaker 1: posture of having soldiers sign up for these brief contracts,

3696
03:23:32,920 --> 03:23:36,160
Speaker 1: sending and rotating them through the battleground and the dawn

3697
03:23:36,240 --> 03:23:39,000
Speaker 1: boss so that when this war started, they had a

3698
03:23:39,200 --> 03:23:41,879
Speaker 1: huge number, more than anyone else in Europe, of combat

3699
03:23:42,000 --> 03:23:45,560
Speaker 1: veterans who got their experience fighting against a peer adversary

3700
03:23:45,720 --> 03:23:48,520
Speaker 1: when they did not have supremacy and artillery or air

3701
03:23:48,600 --> 03:23:52,160
Speaker 1: support when they engaged them um. And then the Ukrainian

3702
03:23:52,240 --> 03:23:56,560
Speaker 1: military very intelligently spread these guys out amongst their their

3703
03:23:56,760 --> 03:23:58,760
Speaker 1: their units, which is what you want to do. Any

3704
03:23:58,840 --> 03:24:01,039
Speaker 1: military is going to want to spread out your veterans

3705
03:24:01,040 --> 03:24:02,840
Speaker 1: among units, because you're not everyone's not going to be

3706
03:24:02,879 --> 03:24:04,640
Speaker 1: a combat veteran, but you want some guys who know

3707
03:24:04,800 --> 03:24:07,160
Speaker 1: what it's like to be shot at and every kind

3708
03:24:07,200 --> 03:24:09,039
Speaker 1: of unit that might get shot at because they stiff

3709
03:24:09,080 --> 03:24:11,400
Speaker 1: in the back of everybody else. And this is what

3710
03:24:11,600 --> 03:24:14,039
Speaker 1: So again, when when the war started, to get back

3711
03:24:14,040 --> 03:24:17,320
Speaker 1: to what I'm saying, the Russian military entered preparing for

3712
03:24:17,560 --> 03:24:20,560
Speaker 1: a police action like the ones they carried out in Czechnia,

3713
03:24:21,040 --> 03:24:23,920
Speaker 1: um like what they did have done for Assad in Syria,

3714
03:24:24,280 --> 03:24:26,760
Speaker 1: and they got a war, and the Ukrainians came into

3715
03:24:26,800 --> 03:24:30,880
Speaker 1: that fight prepared for a war. So you you, I

3716
03:24:31,000 --> 03:24:32,640
Speaker 1: think one of the things that is important when you

3717
03:24:32,720 --> 03:24:35,800
Speaker 1: look at consider any kind of possibility of being involved

3718
03:24:35,959 --> 03:24:38,880
Speaker 1: in a conflict is you want to know what are

3719
03:24:38,959 --> 03:24:43,560
Speaker 1: the rules your opponent is going in ready to abide by, right,

3720
03:24:43,600 --> 03:24:45,600
Speaker 1: what are the things they are expecting to happen, What

3721
03:24:45,800 --> 03:24:48,160
Speaker 1: is kind of the rubric with which they are looking at,

3722
03:24:48,240 --> 03:24:52,280
Speaker 1: what they expect to occur in this conflict? And by god,

3723
03:24:52,400 --> 03:24:55,119
Speaker 1: you want to be going in there with a different one,

3724
03:24:55,400 --> 03:24:58,480
Speaker 1: you know, um And that again, depending on how you

3725
03:24:58,560 --> 03:25:00,240
Speaker 1: do it, that can go badly or that can go

3726
03:25:00,360 --> 03:25:02,320
Speaker 1: really well, because like I said, if you're if you're

3727
03:25:02,360 --> 03:25:04,320
Speaker 1: going and prepared to fight cops and you wind up

3728
03:25:04,320 --> 03:25:08,480
Speaker 1: dealing with soldiers, that's not great. Um. But if you

3729
03:25:08,920 --> 03:25:12,280
Speaker 1: have prepared, if you are able to kind of lock

3730
03:25:12,360 --> 03:25:14,880
Speaker 1: your enemy into the kind of conflict that they're not

3731
03:25:15,240 --> 03:25:19,480
Speaker 1: ready to face, um, then generally speaking you'll win. We

3732
03:25:19,560 --> 03:25:22,040
Speaker 1: have twenty years of experience in the War on Terror

3733
03:25:22,120 --> 03:25:25,040
Speaker 1: of more or less that going down. Yeah, there's a

3734
03:25:25,120 --> 03:25:26,880
Speaker 1: there's a there's a good example of this also with

3735
03:25:27,920 --> 03:25:30,160
Speaker 1: the like with the i d F s a war

3736
03:25:30,160 --> 03:25:31,879
Speaker 1: against hes Blo in two thousand and six, where it's

3737
03:25:31,920 --> 03:25:34,560
Speaker 1: like the IDEF is a really good army, but they'd

3738
03:25:34,600 --> 03:25:36,920
Speaker 1: spent like I don't know, like they spent like forty

3739
03:25:37,080 --> 03:25:40,360
Speaker 1: years basically just sort of like, yeah, they've been about

3740
03:25:40,400 --> 03:25:43,080
Speaker 1: forty years doing police actions. Yeah, and then they run

3741
03:25:43,120 --> 03:25:45,520
Speaker 1: into Hesbla and they expect Hesbah is going to just

3742
03:25:45,720 --> 03:25:47,360
Speaker 1: you know, they've made Lebanon jails and six and their

3743
03:25:47,360 --> 03:25:49,520
Speaker 1: expectations that Hesblah is going to go to ground, They're

3744
03:25:49,520 --> 03:25:51,880
Speaker 1: gonna do a guerrilla war and instead has blood like

3745
03:25:52,360 --> 03:25:54,000
Speaker 1: when they go into bunkers. But they stand in fight

3746
03:25:54,080 --> 03:25:56,800
Speaker 1: and the id F gets smashed and like you know,

3747
03:25:56,920 --> 03:25:58,840
Speaker 1: they pull out and they spend a bunch of time

3748
03:25:58,879 --> 03:26:00,760
Speaker 1: just like murdering people from the air. But like they

3749
03:26:00,760 --> 03:26:03,760
Speaker 1: don't win the war. And like like that that happens

3750
03:26:03,800 --> 03:26:06,720
Speaker 1: a lot, especially with these armies that are used to dealing,

3751
03:26:06,879 --> 03:26:08,520
Speaker 1: used to doing these sort of police action things, and

3752
03:26:08,560 --> 03:26:11,960
Speaker 1: they losed enemies that like the fact that the I

3753
03:26:12,040 --> 03:26:14,960
Speaker 1: d F Lost Award has blood is like by like

3754
03:26:15,120 --> 03:26:17,960
Speaker 1: balance of forces. It's like this is inconceivable, Like how

3755
03:26:18,040 --> 03:26:19,920
Speaker 1: on earth did they possibly lose this? But it's like, yeah,

3756
03:26:20,040 --> 03:26:23,720
Speaker 1: this stuff happens because they weren't like, yeah, they they

3757
03:26:23,959 --> 03:26:25,600
Speaker 1: were they were doing they were doing this police action thing,

3758
03:26:25,640 --> 03:26:28,199
Speaker 1: and they weren't used to They hadn't fought an enemy

3759
03:26:28,240 --> 03:26:29,680
Speaker 1: that was actually going to stick in and fight them

3760
03:26:29,720 --> 03:26:32,520
Speaker 1: since like the seventies. Yeah, I mean a lot of

3761
03:26:32,640 --> 03:26:38,200
Speaker 1: the great defeats in military history because a force came

3762
03:26:38,280 --> 03:26:40,920
Speaker 1: into a situation expecting a different kind of fight than

3763
03:26:41,000 --> 03:26:43,000
Speaker 1: what they got. That was a part of what happened

3764
03:26:43,040 --> 03:26:45,600
Speaker 1: to Napoleon when he invaded Russia, right, and the Russians

3765
03:26:45,840 --> 03:26:48,120
Speaker 1: did not respond the way that he expected a state

3766
03:26:48,200 --> 03:26:51,840
Speaker 1: to respond to having their capital occupied, um, and effectively

3767
03:26:51,959 --> 03:26:53,520
Speaker 1: kind of starved him out. There was other ship going

3768
03:26:53,560 --> 03:26:57,640
Speaker 1: on there. Attrician had really depleted the French military before

3769
03:26:57,720 --> 03:27:00,640
Speaker 1: it got there. But but yeah, um, yeah, how how

3770
03:27:00,680 --> 03:27:02,160
Speaker 1: I went on how I would want to wrap up

3771
03:27:02,200 --> 03:27:05,040
Speaker 1: this is basically saying like and all of that stuff

3772
03:27:05,080 --> 03:27:08,160
Speaker 1: regarding how this war has really prompted a lot of

3773
03:27:08,680 --> 03:27:12,760
Speaker 1: things that were seemingly more unexpected and seemingly thought to

3774
03:27:12,840 --> 03:27:16,600
Speaker 1: be previously more impossible. UM in terms of how fast

3775
03:27:17,160 --> 03:27:20,240
Speaker 1: both rhetoric around these these types of conflicts can spread

3776
03:27:20,360 --> 03:27:23,160
Speaker 1: and more and the role in which like disinformation and

3777
03:27:23,240 --> 03:27:26,640
Speaker 1: misformation is used for you know, both both sides to

3778
03:27:26,840 --> 03:27:29,480
Speaker 1: to to gain digging ground on the other and how

3779
03:27:30,520 --> 03:27:32,120
Speaker 1: you know, relating back to it could happen here is

3780
03:27:32,320 --> 03:27:34,960
Speaker 1: MS in terms of like the urban crumbles or like

3781
03:27:35,080 --> 03:27:38,720
Speaker 1: you know, the small small like urban collapses, um, and

3782
03:27:38,920 --> 03:27:43,160
Speaker 1: you know, escalating escalating like inter inter country conflict in

3783
03:27:43,280 --> 03:27:47,240
Speaker 1: various places around the world. How fast certain things can

3784
03:27:47,320 --> 03:27:49,560
Speaker 1: happen that we once thought are kind of more impossible

3785
03:27:49,680 --> 03:27:52,960
Speaker 1: or improbable at the very least. You know, how how

3786
03:27:53,040 --> 03:27:56,000
Speaker 1: fast you can get people giving advice on how to

3787
03:27:56,120 --> 03:27:58,800
Speaker 1: take out armored vehicles on Twitter dot com. How fast

3788
03:27:58,840 --> 03:28:01,000
Speaker 1: you can get you know, people like people who are

3789
03:28:01,080 --> 03:28:04,400
Speaker 1: you know, seemingly are part you know, seemingly not not

3790
03:28:04,520 --> 03:28:08,120
Speaker 1: tied to certain just certain like ideas or theologies giving

3791
03:28:08,160 --> 03:28:11,320
Speaker 1: out you know, information on types of types of ways

3792
03:28:11,400 --> 03:28:16,000
Speaker 1: to resist invading or oppressing forces. It is it is

3793
03:28:16,000 --> 03:28:19,879
Speaker 1: an interesting kind of It's like case studies the wrong

3794
03:28:19,920 --> 03:28:22,959
Speaker 1: word because it is it's it's obviously having horrible effects

3795
03:28:23,040 --> 03:28:26,280
Speaker 1: with you know, thousands and thousands of people being slaughtered um,

3796
03:28:26,879 --> 03:28:29,880
Speaker 1: but it is it is intriguing to watch, how, you know,

3797
03:28:30,120 --> 03:28:32,920
Speaker 1: in terms of like the microcos of macrocosm idea of

3798
03:28:34,080 --> 03:28:37,840
Speaker 1: of eventually you know, conflict, if conflict breaks out in

3799
03:28:37,920 --> 03:28:39,640
Speaker 1: other places around the world, and next in the next

3800
03:28:39,680 --> 03:28:42,560
Speaker 1: few years, how are current like social media landscape, How

3801
03:28:43,280 --> 03:28:47,800
Speaker 1: are kind of rules around like urban conflict, like urban

3802
03:28:47,879 --> 03:28:50,120
Speaker 1: conflict and all of these things kind of interact with

3803
03:28:50,160 --> 03:28:53,720
Speaker 1: each other and how we view Yeah, what is what

3804
03:28:53,959 --> 03:28:56,080
Speaker 1: is likely and what we you know, who who you're

3805
03:28:56,080 --> 03:28:58,400
Speaker 1: going to predict is gonna do X thing based on

3806
03:28:58,800 --> 03:29:03,119
Speaker 1: people invading a city that it's not theirs? Yeah, um,

3807
03:29:03,520 --> 03:29:05,440
Speaker 1: I mean I think in terms of stuff that that

3808
03:29:05,560 --> 03:29:09,880
Speaker 1: people can take out of this, you know, without necessarily

3809
03:29:09,959 --> 03:29:12,680
Speaker 1: needing to prepare to fight in an urban insurgency. One

3810
03:29:12,720 --> 03:29:17,000
Speaker 1: of them is that anytime big ship happens and and

3811
03:29:17,120 --> 03:29:18,920
Speaker 1: more big ship is going to keep happening for us,

3812
03:29:18,959 --> 03:29:21,720
Speaker 1: you have a window of opportunity through which you can

3813
03:29:21,800 --> 03:29:24,320
Speaker 1: get things across to people that they would not normally

3814
03:29:24,400 --> 03:29:28,440
Speaker 1: listen to. UM. And that is a really important time,

3815
03:29:29,040 --> 03:29:31,920
Speaker 1: and it helps to think about the kind of situations

3816
03:29:32,000 --> 03:29:34,320
Speaker 1: that might occur in the kind of things that you

3817
03:29:34,400 --> 03:29:36,600
Speaker 1: want to push out into the world. UM. Because this

3818
03:29:36,760 --> 03:29:38,680
Speaker 1: is this is is true with climate change as it

3819
03:29:38,800 --> 03:29:41,080
Speaker 1: is with war. Right, We're going to have more disasters,

3820
03:29:41,400 --> 03:29:45,120
Speaker 1: and when those disasters hit, it will be easier to

3821
03:29:45,320 --> 03:29:48,600
Speaker 1: get people to talk about radical solutions to things like

3822
03:29:48,720 --> 03:29:51,520
Speaker 1: climate change, and it will be easier to do things

3823
03:29:51,600 --> 03:29:54,160
Speaker 1: like get out in the fucking streets and get large

3824
03:29:54,200 --> 03:29:57,640
Speaker 1: groups of people agitated. You know, we're we're at some point,

3825
03:29:58,200 --> 03:30:01,640
Speaker 1: fucking God willing, we will have of the climate change

3826
03:30:01,680 --> 03:30:05,560
Speaker 1: equivalent to what happened in where something so terrible and

3827
03:30:05,640 --> 03:30:07,440
Speaker 1: fucked up happens that a lot of people take to

3828
03:30:07,440 --> 03:30:11,840
Speaker 1: the streets, and hopefully we will succeed to a greater

3829
03:30:11,959 --> 03:30:15,520
Speaker 1: extent in forcing actual change than maybe we did in

3830
03:30:17,720 --> 03:30:20,680
Speaker 1: But but that's that's something like that could very well happen.

3831
03:30:20,800 --> 03:30:22,280
Speaker 1: And so that's one of the lessons I think you

3832
03:30:22,320 --> 03:30:24,640
Speaker 1: can take out of this again without sort of obsessing

3833
03:30:24,720 --> 03:30:29,040
Speaker 1: over military technology or getting into gunfights with fucking soldiers

3834
03:30:29,240 --> 03:30:34,240
Speaker 1: is Ukraine is hard evidence that that is the way

3835
03:30:34,280 --> 03:30:37,280
Speaker 1: the media environment works. You get these moments where you

3836
03:30:37,360 --> 03:30:40,920
Speaker 1: can really push some wild ship to people. That's that's

3837
03:30:40,959 --> 03:30:44,400
Speaker 1: why I like the whole uprising or insurrection model more

3838
03:30:44,480 --> 03:30:48,800
Speaker 1: than the revolution model, because the uprising model posits that basically,

3839
03:30:49,000 --> 03:30:51,800
Speaker 1: you have you know, base base society based reality, you know,

3840
03:30:51,920 --> 03:30:54,920
Speaker 1: always at like the base side level, then uprising happens.

3841
03:30:54,959 --> 03:30:57,199
Speaker 1: It's like it's like shooting up onto a graph. Suddenly,

3842
03:30:57,320 --> 03:31:00,440
Speaker 1: so many things that are outside the normal way that

3843
03:31:00,560 --> 03:31:03,640
Speaker 1: we view you know, systems, the governance systems of you know,

3844
03:31:03,760 --> 03:31:06,160
Speaker 1: social control. So many things become so much more possible

3845
03:31:06,200 --> 03:31:08,680
Speaker 1: in this like heightened place. Um. And that's what the

3846
03:31:08,800 --> 03:31:11,879
Speaker 1: uprising does. It gets things that were suddenly that were

3847
03:31:11,959 --> 03:31:14,600
Speaker 1: once so far away and once just only in the imagination.

3848
03:31:15,000 --> 03:31:18,199
Speaker 1: It almost it makes them so much closer. Right. There's

3849
03:31:18,240 --> 03:31:20,600
Speaker 1: this feeling in like July during the height of the

3850
03:31:20,640 --> 03:31:23,360
Speaker 1: fed war, being like so many things feel possible in

3851
03:31:23,440 --> 03:31:26,680
Speaker 1: this one moment, nothing is true and all is permitted,

3852
03:31:26,920 --> 03:31:30,200
Speaker 1: Like you can you can get away with some ship. Yeah,

3853
03:31:30,440 --> 03:31:33,400
Speaker 1: And so using the uprising model, yeah, it can really

3854
03:31:34,120 --> 03:31:36,360
Speaker 1: and or or the or the instruction model like it

3855
03:31:36,400 --> 03:31:39,640
Speaker 1: can really it can really make things feel so much

3856
03:31:39,760 --> 03:31:42,760
Speaker 1: more possible than what they usually feel like. And that

3857
03:31:42,920 --> 03:31:45,560
Speaker 1: there's you know, brief moments in time where massive social

3858
03:31:45,680 --> 03:31:48,039
Speaker 1: change can happen, and you know you have to learn

3859
03:31:48,080 --> 03:31:50,400
Speaker 1: how to recognize when this moment are happening and then

3860
03:31:50,560 --> 03:31:56,880
Speaker 1: organize effectively when they do happen. Yeah, yep, well I

3861
03:31:57,000 --> 03:32:00,520
Speaker 1: believe that does it for us today. Um yeah, we

3862
03:32:00,600 --> 03:32:02,720
Speaker 1: when we've been wanting to talk about this topic for

3863
03:32:02,720 --> 03:32:04,480
Speaker 1: a while in terms of you know, one of the

3864
03:32:04,760 --> 03:32:08,800
Speaker 1: very first things that's not happening was various governments giving

3865
03:32:08,879 --> 03:32:11,800
Speaker 1: guides out on where to attack armored vehicles with ball tops.

3866
03:32:11,840 --> 03:32:13,920
Speaker 1: We're like, oh wow, this is this is intriguing to

3867
03:32:14,000 --> 03:32:17,240
Speaker 1: have a government giving out instructions. Um, this is probably

3868
03:32:17,280 --> 03:32:19,920
Speaker 1: has some implications on how we view you know, uh,

3869
03:32:20,560 --> 03:32:23,600
Speaker 1: collapse in the in a in a general concept. So yeah, Ever,

3870
03:32:23,680 --> 03:32:25,440
Speaker 1: since that's not happening, we wanted to talk about it.

3871
03:32:25,640 --> 03:32:28,360
Speaker 1: So yeah, it certainly leaves us with a lot to

3872
03:32:28,360 --> 03:32:30,480
Speaker 1: think about. And I didn't get to go on my

3873
03:32:30,640 --> 03:32:33,800
Speaker 1: rant about the structure of the Russian military visa VI

3874
03:32:33,879 --> 03:32:35,640
Speaker 1: their lack of an n c O COREP. But maybe

3875
03:32:35,640 --> 03:32:37,520
Speaker 1: we'll talk about that in the future. I'm sure we'll

3876
03:32:37,560 --> 03:32:42,320
Speaker 1: have enough time to talk about this in the future. Uh. Well, everyone,

3877
03:32:42,680 --> 03:32:46,080
Speaker 1: h I don't know, do do something productive? Yeah, do

3878
03:32:46,200 --> 03:32:49,959
Speaker 1: do something productive. I don't charge armored vehicles. Don't charge

3879
03:32:50,080 --> 03:32:54,640
Speaker 1: armored vehicles with paint. Maybe think about the different things

3880
03:32:54,920 --> 03:32:58,000
Speaker 1: you would like to get a bunch of people suddenly

3881
03:32:58,160 --> 03:33:02,080
Speaker 1: radicalized on Twitter to do in the immediate wake of

3882
03:33:02,160 --> 03:33:05,000
Speaker 1: a horrible climate disaster in which large numbers of folks

3883
03:33:05,040 --> 03:33:07,640
Speaker 1: are suddenly willing to take to the streets seemingly overnight.

3884
03:33:07,720 --> 03:33:11,760
Speaker 1: Maybe thinking about that and and trying to talking with

3885
03:33:11,840 --> 03:33:14,400
Speaker 1: your buddies about it, and being like, hey, if everybody

3886
03:33:14,440 --> 03:33:17,000
Speaker 1: gets out in the streets again, what kind of information

3887
03:33:17,080 --> 03:33:18,920
Speaker 1: do I want to spread? What would be good to

3888
03:33:19,000 --> 03:33:21,560
Speaker 1: get people talking about in that instance when they're suddenly

3889
03:33:21,640 --> 03:33:24,120
Speaker 1: listening for I don't know about two weeks. It feels

3890
03:33:24,120 --> 03:33:29,200
Speaker 1: like you get about two weeks to honestly, Yeah, Well,

3891
03:33:29,879 --> 03:33:32,440
Speaker 1: in the wake of the new I PCC report, we

3892
03:33:32,520 --> 03:33:34,119
Speaker 1: have what we should certainly have a lot to think about.

3893
03:33:35,080 --> 03:33:55,959
Speaker 1: All right, Bye bye, it's goblin mode. Welcome to Happen

3894
03:33:56,080 --> 03:33:59,320
Speaker 1: here a podcast that is today in goblin mode. Uh,

3895
03:34:00,000 --> 03:34:01,520
Speaker 1: you know what it's about you've her to say it

3896
03:34:01,640 --> 03:34:06,240
Speaker 1: like about twenty million times. But yeah, I'm your host,

3897
03:34:06,320 --> 03:34:10,320
Speaker 1: Christopher Wong and uh with me today we have Juniper,

3898
03:34:10,440 --> 03:34:16,120
Speaker 1: who is a really twitter ship post extraordinary extraordinaire, on

3899
03:34:16,320 --> 03:34:18,960
Speaker 1: to discuss language, media, culture, of the nature of reality,

3900
03:34:19,000 --> 03:34:23,199
Speaker 1: and Goblin Mode. Junifer, Welcome to the show. Hiy, how's

3901
03:34:23,240 --> 03:34:26,039
Speaker 1: it gone. It's going good. It's going much better. Since

3902
03:34:26,080 --> 03:34:31,200
Speaker 1: Goblin rode ceased control of the world, we are now

3903
03:34:31,320 --> 03:34:36,600
Speaker 1: living in the age of Mode. And Drew mar Show

3904
03:34:36,680 --> 03:34:42,959
Speaker 1: said this morning, apparently it's quite a time. I didn't

3905
03:34:43,000 --> 03:34:47,280
Speaker 1: realize just posting would like just posting would influence so

3906
03:34:47,400 --> 03:34:50,080
Speaker 1: much around me. I guess it's been an interesting time

3907
03:34:50,200 --> 03:34:52,480
Speaker 1: for sure. Yeah. So, so I wanted to talk to

3908
03:34:52,560 --> 03:34:56,840
Speaker 1: you about sort of the absurdity that is Goblin Mode. Um,

3909
03:34:57,080 --> 03:34:58,840
Speaker 1: and I want to hold off on talking about what

3910
03:34:58,879 --> 03:35:01,360
Speaker 1: Goblin Mode like is isn't for a bit because I

3911
03:35:01,400 --> 03:35:03,920
Speaker 1: think that's actually, weirdly the less interesting part. And I

3912
03:35:04,000 --> 03:35:07,280
Speaker 1: want to start with instead the story of how Goblin

3913
03:35:07,320 --> 03:35:11,440
Speaker 1: Mode became like a thing and why I am reading. Uh.

3914
03:35:13,280 --> 03:35:15,320
Speaker 1: I keep I keep like, every every time I look

3915
03:35:15,320 --> 03:35:18,160
Speaker 1: for more Goblin Mode headlines, there's more goblin mode headlines

3916
03:35:18,720 --> 03:35:23,560
Speaker 1: like the I think my favorite so far is from Bloomberg.

3917
03:35:23,680 --> 03:35:26,960
Speaker 1: It's a dieselent. Diesel prices have gone goblin mode. Forget

3918
03:35:27,080 --> 03:35:30,280
Speaker 1: crude oil. This could be the real energy emergency. Yeah,

3919
03:35:30,360 --> 03:35:32,080
Speaker 1: that that is by far one of my favorites to

3920
03:35:32,520 --> 03:35:35,600
Speaker 1: uh the full headline too, if you search for that

3921
03:35:35,760 --> 03:35:39,000
Speaker 1: one is it's what you said, but then it adds

3922
03:35:39,040 --> 03:35:44,360
Speaker 1: on thanks to the Ukraine War. An official Bloilberg headline

3923
03:35:44,440 --> 03:35:48,640
Speaker 1: with goblin mode and the Ukraine word. I gotta that's

3924
03:35:48,640 --> 03:35:53,040
Speaker 1: just by part of my favorite one amazing. The other

3925
03:35:53,080 --> 03:35:55,840
Speaker 1: part of three that's extremely funny is that so the

3926
03:35:56,080 --> 03:35:59,119
Speaker 1: people who are doing these articles, I keep getting asked,

3927
03:35:59,160 --> 03:36:01,320
Speaker 1: so someone someone's asking like an intern to find a

3928
03:36:01,400 --> 03:36:03,680
Speaker 1: picture of a goblin, and they keep posting pictures of orcs,

3929
03:36:04,280 --> 03:36:10,840
Speaker 1: which is like enormously funny to me. Okay, so I'm

3930
03:36:10,840 --> 03:36:12,920
Speaker 1: not sure what they're searching to get those. I don't know.

3931
03:36:13,280 --> 03:36:18,680
Speaker 1: It's really incredible, Okay, So yeah, I guess I should.

3932
03:36:18,680 --> 03:36:20,840
Speaker 1: So we should start from the beginning of this story,

3933
03:36:21,000 --> 03:36:23,800
Speaker 1: which is, yeah, can you talk about your ship post

3934
03:36:23,959 --> 03:36:26,440
Speaker 1: and uh, what you were thinking at the time when

3935
03:36:26,480 --> 03:36:29,879
Speaker 1: you made a ship post that randomly like has has

3936
03:36:29,920 --> 03:36:36,960
Speaker 1: had months long ripple effects on the world. Sure, I

3937
03:36:37,879 --> 03:36:41,200
Speaker 1: think you were right though, like the post itself, and

3938
03:36:41,360 --> 03:36:44,160
Speaker 1: that's like the least interesting part of all of goblin

3939
03:36:44,240 --> 03:36:47,600
Speaker 1: mode in my opinion as well, Like just seeing the

3940
03:36:47,680 --> 03:36:50,160
Speaker 1: ripple effect is what's been super interesting and really funny

3941
03:36:50,200 --> 03:36:55,080
Speaker 1: to me. But um sure yeah the post. Um basically,

3942
03:36:55,200 --> 03:36:58,760
Speaker 1: I think it was like the day that um what

3943
03:36:59,200 --> 03:37:02,640
Speaker 1: Kanye West and Julia Fox, which there's a quick note,

3944
03:37:02,680 --> 03:37:05,280
Speaker 1: I've never heard of Julia Fox before any of this.

3945
03:37:05,920 --> 03:37:08,840
Speaker 1: So I like sometimes if like you know, Twitter is

3946
03:37:08,879 --> 03:37:11,520
Speaker 1: all talking about one thing, the most recent thing being

3947
03:37:11,640 --> 03:37:14,040
Speaker 1: like the Will Smith slap, like everyone's talking about that.

3948
03:37:14,560 --> 03:37:16,760
Speaker 1: So whenever like some like big event like that is

3949
03:37:16,840 --> 03:37:19,120
Speaker 1: happening and everyone's posting about it, I try to like

3950
03:37:19,320 --> 03:37:22,240
Speaker 1: think of some creative different posts I can do, you know,

3951
03:37:22,400 --> 03:37:24,760
Speaker 1: just to get in on the the discourse or whatever

3952
03:37:24,800 --> 03:37:28,040
Speaker 1: you wanna call it. So I just I really don't

3953
03:37:28,080 --> 03:37:30,640
Speaker 1: know what compelled me to make a fake headline, But basically,

3954
03:37:30,720 --> 03:37:33,120
Speaker 1: I just I just decided to search. I think I

3955
03:37:33,160 --> 03:37:34,840
Speaker 1: was driving home from work and I just decided to

3956
03:37:34,879 --> 03:37:38,720
Speaker 1: search like Kanye West, Julia Fox, and I just found

3957
03:37:38,800 --> 03:37:41,800
Speaker 1: the first headline and I just edited it to say, um,

3958
03:37:42,160 --> 03:37:46,200
Speaker 1: Kanye West doesn't like it when Julia Fox goes goneling basically,

3959
03:37:46,240 --> 03:37:47,720
Speaker 1: and that's why they broke up. That was that was

3960
03:37:47,760 --> 03:37:51,119
Speaker 1: the whole lessons of the of the post itself. Um,

3961
03:37:51,320 --> 03:37:54,640
Speaker 1: and I really didn't think too deeply about it beyond

3962
03:37:54,840 --> 03:37:58,320
Speaker 1: just making the post, and it just it caught fire

3963
03:37:58,440 --> 03:38:00,520
Speaker 1: with like I guess what we would probably all normally

3964
03:38:00,760 --> 03:38:04,400
Speaker 1: normally Twitter like people that aren't even like necessarily leftists

3965
03:38:04,520 --> 03:38:07,480
Speaker 1: or anything like us. Um, it just really caught a

3966
03:38:07,520 --> 03:38:11,280
Speaker 1: hold with the whole of Twitter and pretty much like

3967
03:38:11,600 --> 03:38:13,200
Speaker 1: most of the people that saw it. You can you

3968
03:38:13,240 --> 03:38:15,400
Speaker 1: can go back and check the replies. Most people think

3969
03:38:15,440 --> 03:38:20,560
Speaker 1: it's real at the time and replying about all things

3970
03:38:20,560 --> 03:38:23,160
Speaker 1: it's real, and no one, like hardly anyone verified it.

3971
03:38:23,520 --> 03:38:26,440
Speaker 1: It was like kind of insane to see yeah and

3972
03:38:27,000 --> 03:38:30,000
Speaker 1: just just cost yeah, I think it's funny because again,

3973
03:38:30,080 --> 03:38:31,600
Speaker 1: like you could very you could you could just google

3974
03:38:31,720 --> 03:38:34,320
Speaker 1: this right, Like you can just google it and it'd

3975
03:38:34,320 --> 03:38:35,560
Speaker 1: be like, oh, wait, hol on, this isn't real. But

3976
03:38:35,640 --> 03:38:41,160
Speaker 1: like no one did that, and it was like, yeah,

3977
03:38:41,280 --> 03:38:43,760
Speaker 1: like you could have just easily searched the main part

3978
03:38:43,760 --> 03:38:45,840
Speaker 1: of the headline, like Kanye West to Julia Fox. It

3979
03:38:45,959 --> 03:38:49,600
Speaker 1: was literally the second or third headlines you can have

3980
03:38:49,720 --> 03:38:52,440
Speaker 1: found the same website, same author, but seeing that it

3981
03:38:52,560 --> 03:38:56,680
Speaker 1: wasn't the correct headline. Although that does remind me when

3982
03:38:57,120 --> 03:39:00,480
Speaker 1: there was the initial article about my post um, I

3983
03:39:00,600 --> 03:39:04,840
Speaker 1: forget who wrote it at this point, I think I was, Yes,

3984
03:39:04,959 --> 03:39:08,400
Speaker 1: that's right, it was the focus they they they for

3985
03:39:08,520 --> 03:39:11,080
Speaker 1: some reason, it made the assumption when they decided when

3986
03:39:11,120 --> 03:39:15,000
Speaker 1: they decided to talk about my tweet that the website,

3987
03:39:15,800 --> 03:39:19,720
Speaker 1: like the headline that I made made up the original

3988
03:39:19,840 --> 03:39:23,080
Speaker 1: website like edited that part out. So they thought that

3989
03:39:23,200 --> 03:39:26,800
Speaker 1: my headline was real, but it was just and taken away.

3990
03:39:27,120 --> 03:39:31,200
Speaker 1: And so that also affected what some people thought about

3991
03:39:31,240 --> 03:39:33,080
Speaker 1: it too, Like they thought a lot of people thought

3992
03:39:33,120 --> 03:39:35,600
Speaker 1: it was really real. That's that's what's insane to me

3993
03:39:35,640 --> 03:39:39,240
Speaker 1: about this. Yeah, and like you and like like Vogue

3994
03:39:39,360 --> 03:39:41,400
Speaker 1: like picked this up. This was just like a thing

3995
03:39:41,959 --> 03:39:44,920
Speaker 1: that that like everyone believes us real. Everyone was just

3996
03:39:45,000 --> 03:39:48,920
Speaker 1: reporting on it as news and there's so much like

3997
03:39:49,879 --> 03:39:53,120
Speaker 1: there's so much like incredible stuff about this, like part

3998
03:39:53,160 --> 03:39:58,400
Speaker 1: of it, you know, so what if the articles that

3999
03:39:58,600 --> 03:40:00,960
Speaker 1: that gets published about this after so like there's this

4000
03:40:01,000 --> 03:40:03,400
Speaker 1: initial period where everyone is running around going like oh

4001
03:40:03,480 --> 03:40:06,280
Speaker 1: my god, it was goblin Mode, and then Julia Fox

4002
03:40:06,560 --> 03:40:09,640
Speaker 1: has to make a statement that's like, no, there was

4003
03:40:09,720 --> 03:40:13,080
Speaker 1: no goblin Mode. No one said this. Yeah, yeah, that's

4004
03:40:13,160 --> 03:40:16,320
Speaker 1: That's the interesting about the evolution of goblin Mode, like

4005
03:40:16,600 --> 03:40:20,400
Speaker 1: stemming from my post specifically, is at first the coverage

4006
03:40:20,440 --> 03:40:23,120
Speaker 1: was talking about whether my post was real or fake

4007
03:40:23,240 --> 03:40:26,959
Speaker 1: and talking about that aspect of it. But as time

4008
03:40:27,000 --> 03:40:29,200
Speaker 1: has gone on, it's kind of evolved away from that.

4009
03:40:29,320 --> 03:40:31,920
Speaker 1: Like you you won't see any goblin Mode article talk

4010
03:40:32,000 --> 03:40:35,400
Speaker 1: about the original like Julia Fox tweet that jump started

4011
03:40:35,440 --> 03:40:38,279
Speaker 1: this whole thing anymore. It's kind of like shifted away

4012
03:40:39,160 --> 03:40:42,640
Speaker 1: from that initial that initial post, which I found really

4013
03:40:42,680 --> 03:40:46,640
Speaker 1: interesting that that's what sustaining this. I feel like, yeah,

4014
03:40:46,879 --> 03:40:51,800
Speaker 1: I wanted to read a uh, I wanted to read

4015
03:40:52,200 --> 03:40:54,680
Speaker 1: a passage from one of the art I don't know

4016
03:40:54,680 --> 03:40:57,920
Speaker 1: why I'm calling it a passage. It's just like a sentence,

4017
03:40:58,240 --> 03:41:00,440
Speaker 1: but read part of one of the art goals that

4018
03:41:00,520 --> 03:41:02,520
Speaker 1: that came from up from the the initial search, which

4019
03:41:02,600 --> 03:41:06,360
Speaker 1: is from the streetwear company called high Snobby. Don't tell

4020
03:41:06,400 --> 03:41:10,080
Speaker 1: me if I'm like pronouncing that wrong. Uh well, okay,

4021
03:41:10,120 --> 03:41:12,040
Speaker 1: that's not not to Twitter. If I'm pronouncing that wrong.

4022
03:41:12,280 --> 03:41:18,760
Speaker 1: My Twitter is at I right, okay, yell there, Um yeah,

4023
03:41:18,879 --> 03:41:21,160
Speaker 1: but I want I want to read this quote because

4024
03:41:21,160 --> 03:41:23,400
Speaker 1: I think it's interesting. So the article, they have this

4025
03:41:23,480 --> 03:41:25,640
Speaker 1: whole thing that's like, Okay, they get to the denial,

4026
03:41:25,760 --> 03:41:27,560
Speaker 1: they post your tweet about like, oh my god, I

4027
03:41:27,560 --> 03:41:29,320
Speaker 1: can't believe Julia Fox had to respond to this, and

4028
03:41:29,360 --> 03:41:32,320
Speaker 1: then they say, I'm not saying Fox was lying, but

4029
03:41:32,440 --> 03:41:35,959
Speaker 1: wearing a borderline not suited for work dress, a purse

4030
03:41:36,040 --> 03:41:39,160
Speaker 1: trimmed and human DNA and d I y I make

4031
03:41:39,240 --> 03:41:41,880
Speaker 1: up to an Oscar's after party? Is goblin mode to

4032
03:41:41,959 --> 03:41:45,800
Speaker 1: a t? And I think this brings up an interesting question,

4033
03:41:46,200 --> 03:41:49,080
Speaker 1: which is to what extent was goblin mode real in

4034
03:41:49,160 --> 03:41:51,920
Speaker 1: the first place before You're sort of mean to went

4035
03:41:52,040 --> 03:41:58,360
Speaker 1: went viral? So like the phrase itself, you mean yeah, yeah,

4036
03:41:58,440 --> 03:42:02,000
Speaker 1: like I want part of the phrase existed before my post. Yeah,

4037
03:42:02,080 --> 03:42:05,000
Speaker 1: And I think it was also like what were you thinking, Like,

4038
03:42:05,120 --> 03:42:07,400
Speaker 1: did you have like a conception of what goblin mode

4039
03:42:07,720 --> 03:42:13,440
Speaker 1: like was before he made the post? So so the

4040
03:42:13,600 --> 03:42:16,320
Speaker 1: only thing I had in my mind at that point. Um,

4041
03:42:16,640 --> 03:42:19,920
Speaker 1: it's it stems from specifically, Um, do you do you

4042
03:42:20,000 --> 03:42:24,360
Speaker 1: know the user on Twitter hottie pants? Do you happen

4043
03:42:24,360 --> 03:42:29,080
Speaker 1: to know that guy, I don't think so now he

4044
03:42:29,200 --> 03:42:31,600
Speaker 1: goes by I think his ad is like punished Pants

4045
03:42:31,680 --> 03:42:35,040
Speaker 1: or something like that. But anyways, he around that time,

4046
03:42:35,080 --> 03:42:37,360
Speaker 1: he was posting a lot about like goblins. He was

4047
03:42:37,480 --> 03:42:39,760
Speaker 1: He would post a lot about like goblin time and

4048
03:42:39,840 --> 03:42:41,480
Speaker 1: like it's oh, it's goblin time, and he would just

4049
03:42:41,520 --> 03:42:43,560
Speaker 1: make like a bunch of just like posts like that.

4050
03:42:44,040 --> 03:42:46,000
Speaker 1: So goblins were on my mind at that point. And

4051
03:42:46,080 --> 03:42:49,560
Speaker 1: then I forget his user name, but his um I

4052
03:42:49,640 --> 03:42:54,120
Speaker 1: think his user name is um uncontrolled. I for I

4053
03:42:54,160 --> 03:42:56,560
Speaker 1: forget his user I'll have to tell you afterwards or something.

4054
03:42:57,120 --> 03:42:58,800
Speaker 1: I I don't remember off the top of my head,

4055
03:42:59,200 --> 03:43:01,720
Speaker 1: but he he may a post that went viral, uh,

4056
03:43:02,000 --> 03:43:05,560
Speaker 1: something to the effect of like um, your honor UM.

4057
03:43:06,040 --> 03:43:07,720
Speaker 1: I was going goblin mode at that time, you know

4058
03:43:07,800 --> 03:43:11,280
Speaker 1: that format that's like you're in the court, but excuses like, oh,

4059
03:43:11,360 --> 03:43:13,840
Speaker 1: I'm going goblin mode. It really in my head. That's

4060
03:43:13,879 --> 03:43:17,360
Speaker 1: really the only reference I had, So I didn't make

4061
03:43:17,440 --> 03:43:19,240
Speaker 1: up the phrase. A lot of people think I made

4062
03:43:19,280 --> 03:43:22,640
Speaker 1: up the phrase goblin mode, which I definitely did not. Um,

4063
03:43:23,840 --> 03:43:26,039
Speaker 1: but I think just there was a lot of people

4064
03:43:26,080 --> 03:43:28,400
Speaker 1: posting about about goblins around that time, like early in

4065
03:43:28,440 --> 03:43:31,720
Speaker 1: mid March, and I just in my mind, I was like, oh,

4066
03:43:31,760 --> 03:43:34,520
Speaker 1: you know, I'm just gonna say Goblin Mode on this

4067
03:43:34,879 --> 03:43:37,360
Speaker 1: this ship post Aboulia Fox. I don't. I really don't

4068
03:43:37,400 --> 03:43:39,600
Speaker 1: know why. It's just the first thing that popped in

4069
03:43:39,680 --> 03:43:41,920
Speaker 1: my head. And whenever something pops in my head, like

4070
03:43:42,160 --> 03:43:44,119
Speaker 1: a tweet idea, and I laughed myself. I'm like, okay,

4071
03:43:44,160 --> 03:43:46,320
Speaker 1: I should post it. I don't know, and it seemed

4072
03:43:46,360 --> 03:43:50,440
Speaker 1: to work. Did you end up so one of these things?

4073
03:43:50,480 --> 03:43:52,040
Speaker 1: What are these things? I think is really interesting? Is

4074
03:43:52,120 --> 03:43:55,080
Speaker 1: that right? So okay, so you have you have your

4075
03:43:55,120 --> 03:43:57,960
Speaker 1: first wave of like it's the goblin Mode thing, and

4076
03:43:58,000 --> 03:43:59,720
Speaker 1: then you have your second wave articles that are trying

4077
03:43:59,720 --> 03:44:03,200
Speaker 1: to blaine what goblin Mode is. And I was I

4078
03:44:03,280 --> 03:44:05,440
Speaker 1: was wondering if if you'd see if you'd actually even

4079
03:44:05,600 --> 03:44:07,880
Speaker 1: seen the post. I just like I linked to the

4080
03:44:08,000 --> 03:44:11,320
Speaker 1: chat um. There was like like the thing I'd seen

4081
03:44:11,360 --> 03:44:15,240
Speaker 1: from goblin Mode before thislike all started, was just like Reddit.

4082
03:44:15,320 --> 03:44:17,840
Speaker 1: It was someone on Twitter had a tweet that went

4083
03:44:17,920 --> 03:44:20,600
Speaker 1: viral about goblin Mode and it was about just like

4084
03:44:20,760 --> 03:44:22,560
Speaker 1: someone It was about this Reddit post of like someone

4085
03:44:22,640 --> 03:44:28,080
Speaker 1: creeping around their house and pretending acting like a goblin. Yes, yes,

4086
03:44:28,560 --> 03:44:31,040
Speaker 1: So I didn't see that until I made my post,

4087
03:44:31,520 --> 03:44:34,800
Speaker 1: like in my initial because I think someone linked it

4088
03:44:34,920 --> 03:44:37,120
Speaker 1: under my post and I was like, oh, Ship, this

4089
03:44:37,160 --> 03:44:38,920
Speaker 1: is just like a thing, Like this is actually like

4090
03:44:39,000 --> 03:44:41,080
Speaker 1: a thing. And then I started popping off more because

4091
03:44:41,120 --> 03:44:43,560
Speaker 1: people saw that reply. I'm real like, oh, Ship, this

4092
03:44:43,720 --> 03:44:46,600
Speaker 1: is like actually a thing. And to my surprise, that

4093
03:44:46,680 --> 03:44:49,320
Speaker 1: like totally worked out for me, like everything kind of

4094
03:44:49,400 --> 03:44:53,360
Speaker 1: just came together and it really insane fashion. Oh that's

4095
03:44:53,360 --> 03:44:55,640
Speaker 1: another tweet to the one that you linked the That's

4096
03:44:55,680 --> 03:44:57,600
Speaker 1: when I was going, that's when I was in goblin mode.

4097
03:44:57,879 --> 03:45:00,880
Speaker 1: That came before my tweet too. Had you had you

4098
03:45:01,000 --> 03:45:05,160
Speaker 1: seen that one before you made it? I followed her,

4099
03:45:06,240 --> 03:45:08,480
Speaker 1: I followed Telgore. I might have seen it. I don't remember.

4100
03:45:08,560 --> 03:45:12,039
Speaker 1: I remember the other one I was referencing before. Um,

4101
03:45:12,320 --> 03:45:14,440
Speaker 1: I might have seen that one now, yeah, like I

4102
03:45:15,000 --> 03:45:16,960
Speaker 1: I think like that. That was what was interesting to

4103
03:45:17,000 --> 03:45:20,640
Speaker 1: me about this was that, like the moment it went viral,

4104
03:45:21,120 --> 03:45:24,920
Speaker 1: there was this whole sort of like attempt because there

4105
03:45:24,959 --> 03:45:26,880
Speaker 1: was an attempt to figure out what it is, and

4106
03:45:26,920 --> 03:45:29,360
Speaker 1: then there was an attempt to like back project a

4107
03:45:29,440 --> 03:45:31,280
Speaker 1: history on it, and so you get a lot of

4108
03:45:31,320 --> 03:45:32,600
Speaker 1: these articles and you get a lot of people like

4109
03:45:32,760 --> 03:45:34,160
Speaker 1: I don't know, like I would talk to people about

4110
03:45:34,200 --> 03:45:36,520
Speaker 1: this and they would like, you know, okay, so they

4111
03:45:36,520 --> 03:45:38,200
Speaker 1: do this thing or it's like okay, so they go

4112
03:45:38,320 --> 03:45:40,960
Speaker 1: to know your meme, they look at the Google trends,

4113
03:45:41,200 --> 03:45:44,840
Speaker 1: and then like the people sort of like, you know, okay,

4114
03:45:44,879 --> 03:45:47,200
Speaker 1: Like there was an urban Dictionary thing from like two

4115
03:45:47,280 --> 03:45:49,320
Speaker 1: thousand nine that was like a completely like a weird

4116
03:45:49,320 --> 03:45:52,120
Speaker 1: sex thing. It was like completely unrelated to this, but

4117
03:45:52,200 --> 03:45:56,480
Speaker 1: it was interesting to me the way that people like, Okay,

4118
03:45:56,520 --> 03:45:59,840
Speaker 1: so you have this thing that goes viral, right, and

4119
03:46:00,160 --> 03:46:03,480
Speaker 1: like you're just sucking around like there's no act, Like

4120
03:46:03,560 --> 03:46:08,680
Speaker 1: it's just sounds cool. But then like yeah, there's an

4121
03:46:08,680 --> 03:46:11,160
Speaker 1: extent which it becomes this like you know, it gets

4122
03:46:11,200 --> 03:46:13,640
Speaker 1: into the sort of like viralty machine, and so you

4123
03:46:13,720 --> 03:46:16,080
Speaker 1: have all these journalists who like have to cover it

4124
03:46:16,280 --> 03:46:18,120
Speaker 1: right because like, you know, the the way the journalism

4125
03:46:18,160 --> 03:46:21,520
Speaker 1: bottle works is okay, so you have this trend, right,

4126
03:46:22,000 --> 03:46:24,160
Speaker 1: people can see it trending. You see something on Twitter,

4127
03:46:25,040 --> 03:46:27,520
Speaker 1: you do like four sets of Googles, and you write

4128
03:46:27,520 --> 03:46:30,560
Speaker 1: an article about it, and it's like, well, okay, because

4129
03:46:30,560 --> 03:46:32,680
Speaker 1: they're trying to you're trying to capitalize on on the

4130
03:46:32,720 --> 03:46:34,720
Speaker 1: clicks as fast as possible. So when someone googles what

4131
03:46:34,840 --> 03:46:36,560
Speaker 1: is goblin mode, it's like, okay, your thing comes up.

4132
03:46:37,160 --> 03:46:39,080
Speaker 1: But it's interesting because it's like it's like they have

4133
03:46:39,160 --> 03:46:42,800
Speaker 1: to fill the content in because there isn't any Yeah. Yeah,

4134
03:46:42,840 --> 03:46:45,440
Speaker 1: that's what what was interesting about the specific that first one,

4135
03:46:45,520 --> 03:46:47,680
Speaker 1: the focus article, it was just a lot of like

4136
03:46:47,840 --> 03:46:51,800
Speaker 1: filling in where there was really nothing. Yeah, and that's

4137
03:46:51,840 --> 03:46:54,360
Speaker 1: what's interesting about that. Yeah. And then and then like

4138
03:46:54,480 --> 03:46:57,280
Speaker 1: after that, like all the other articles are like you

4139
03:46:57,360 --> 03:46:59,120
Speaker 1: get to see this proliferation sort of of how the

4140
03:46:59,160 --> 03:47:01,760
Speaker 1: media works where it's okay, so you have the initial article,

4141
03:47:01,800 --> 03:47:04,400
Speaker 1: the initial article google some stuff and it's basically just

4142
03:47:04,480 --> 03:47:07,280
Speaker 1: making it up because they're they're trying to like give

4143
03:47:07,360 --> 03:47:09,960
Speaker 1: coherence or like give am meeting to an empty signifier.

4144
03:47:10,040 --> 03:47:12,800
Speaker 1: And then after that, it's like all of the other

4145
03:47:12,920 --> 03:47:16,040
Speaker 1: articles are just copying off of the first article, and

4146
03:47:16,160 --> 03:47:19,440
Speaker 1: you get this like Ora boris of like everyone just

4147
03:47:19,600 --> 03:47:21,520
Speaker 1: is repeating the same thing over and over again, and

4148
03:47:21,560 --> 03:47:24,160
Speaker 1: none of them seem to understand that, like it was

4149
03:47:24,879 --> 03:47:27,120
Speaker 1: not that the thing that they originally talking about was

4150
03:47:27,200 --> 03:47:34,560
Speaker 1: just kind of like that's really all it was, and

4151
03:47:35,760 --> 03:47:38,160
Speaker 1: it's it is interesting to see how it is just

4152
03:47:38,280 --> 03:47:41,480
Speaker 1: able to proliferate off of as you as you were saying,

4153
03:47:41,520 --> 03:47:44,560
Speaker 1: they just google search urban, they find an urban dictionary,

4154
03:47:44,600 --> 03:47:47,600
Speaker 1: and it's like my article urban dictionary is is a

4155
03:47:47,640 --> 03:47:52,120
Speaker 1: good source. Yeah, and like I think this this is

4156
03:47:52,240 --> 03:47:53,640
Speaker 1: I mean, I think there's there's like a few interesting

4157
03:47:53,680 --> 03:47:57,040
Speaker 1: things here, one of which is about how yeah, like

4158
03:47:57,080 --> 03:47:59,000
Speaker 1: I had this before, Like I'm not sure if I

4159
03:47:59,000 --> 03:48:00,840
Speaker 1: actually talked about this on the show. So the day

4160
03:48:00,879 --> 03:48:04,760
Speaker 1: of the Atlantis shooting, Garrison and I spent a lot

4161
03:48:04,840 --> 03:48:07,720
Speaker 1: of time trying to like track down the shooter, and

4162
03:48:08,320 --> 03:48:10,200
Speaker 1: there was there was this like fake Facebook post that

4163
03:48:10,280 --> 03:48:13,360
Speaker 1: was going around and you know, Garrison I has spent

4164
03:48:13,400 --> 03:48:14,600
Speaker 1: like a lot of time looking for this guy and

4165
03:48:14,640 --> 03:48:16,600
Speaker 1: we okay, well we realized that this guy just doesn't

4166
03:48:16,600 --> 03:48:19,040
Speaker 1: have a Facebook, right, and so we were like so

4167
03:48:19,160 --> 03:48:20,560
Speaker 1: like I was like look at this, Like I saw

4168
03:48:20,640 --> 03:48:21,920
Speaker 1: his fake Facebook post and I was like, oh, this

4169
03:48:22,040 --> 03:48:26,680
Speaker 1: is fake. And then like a bunch of a bunch

4170
03:48:26,760 --> 03:48:28,840
Speaker 1: of like a bunch of like actual journalists like found

4171
03:48:28,959 --> 03:48:31,160
Speaker 1: you know people because journalists have been passing around the

4172
03:48:31,200 --> 03:48:34,120
Speaker 1: fake Facebook post as like this is a suppost alleged

4173
03:48:34,160 --> 03:48:35,400
Speaker 1: to be a thing, and then and then suddenly they

4174
03:48:35,440 --> 03:48:37,080
Speaker 1: were like, oh, hey this is fake. Hey you can

4175
03:48:37,120 --> 03:48:40,160
Speaker 1: see all these things like oh look, it's like uh,

4176
03:48:41,640 --> 03:48:46,440
Speaker 1: you know, like there was like the it was pretty

4177
03:48:46,480 --> 03:48:48,400
Speaker 1: clear of it, like his face had been copied and

4178
03:48:48,440 --> 03:48:51,080
Speaker 1: pasted into like a thing that's it was supposed to

4179
03:48:51,120 --> 03:48:52,680
Speaker 1: look like a Facebook post because there was all these

4180
03:48:52,720 --> 03:48:54,240
Speaker 1: like minor details about that, which is wrong, and it

4181
03:48:54,320 --> 03:48:57,440
Speaker 1: was like, okay, so this isn't real. But the media

4182
03:48:57,520 --> 03:49:00,440
Speaker 1: cycle of it was like all of these people saw

4183
03:49:00,600 --> 03:49:02,960
Speaker 1: my Twitter post that was like this is fake, and

4184
03:49:03,000 --> 03:49:04,600
Speaker 1: then they just wrote a story off of it and

4185
03:49:04,680 --> 03:49:06,640
Speaker 1: like never mentioned that that that they literally got it

4186
03:49:06,760 --> 03:49:11,200
Speaker 1: from like me fucking around on Twitter. Like it's like

4187
03:49:13,000 --> 03:49:14,760
Speaker 1: and it's like and it's like you look at this

4188
03:49:14,800 --> 03:49:20,400
Speaker 1: stuff and the extent to which these people are just

4189
03:49:21,200 --> 03:49:22,680
Speaker 1: like these people who are journalist, who are you know,

4190
03:49:22,680 --> 03:49:25,520
Speaker 1: supposed to people journalists are just like woefully unprepared. Even

4191
03:49:25,560 --> 03:49:28,680
Speaker 1: people even who people who are extremely online like wind

4192
03:49:28,800 --> 03:49:35,200
Speaker 1: up being woefully unprepared to deal with like anything, like

4193
03:49:35,520 --> 03:49:38,040
Speaker 1: they're woefully unprepared to deal with anything of any complexity

4194
03:49:38,200 --> 03:49:44,280
Speaker 1: or deal or like figure out that they're being like hoaxed. Yeah, yeah, no,

4195
03:49:44,400 --> 03:49:46,600
Speaker 1: you're you're you're really right about that. I mean, I

4196
03:49:46,640 --> 03:49:48,640
Speaker 1: mean I think this it's I don't know what I

4197
03:49:48,680 --> 03:49:52,240
Speaker 1: would call this phenomena, but there's definitely something there where

4198
03:49:52,280 --> 03:49:55,840
Speaker 1: it's like they we'll see something like I don't know,

4199
03:49:55,960 --> 03:49:58,960
Speaker 1: and I don't know what it is about specifically Twitter

4200
03:49:59,120 --> 03:50:01,040
Speaker 1: that like I feel like it's where a lot of

4201
03:50:01,200 --> 03:50:04,240
Speaker 1: people get news just in general, but I feel like

4202
03:50:04,240 --> 03:50:06,760
Speaker 1: a lot of journalists just assume anything that they see.

4203
03:50:07,280 --> 03:50:10,840
Speaker 1: Maybe I'm over generalizing, but if they see something on Twitter,

4204
03:50:11,480 --> 03:50:14,200
Speaker 1: even if it's like a joke, like they'll just assume

4205
03:50:14,280 --> 03:50:16,600
Speaker 1: it's real or something I'm not. I'm not entirely sure.

4206
03:50:16,800 --> 03:50:19,360
Speaker 1: Like it's super easy to make a fake post. I

4207
03:50:19,440 --> 03:50:21,520
Speaker 1: do it all the time. I make all sorts of

4208
03:50:21,760 --> 03:50:23,960
Speaker 1: like fake fake things. Most of them are more obvious

4209
03:50:23,960 --> 03:50:27,280
Speaker 1: than Goblin But I guess, but I don't know that

4210
03:50:27,400 --> 03:50:31,240
Speaker 1: they're I don't want to say journalists are too trusting. Yeah, well,

4211
03:50:31,280 --> 03:50:34,960
Speaker 1: and but I will say, like there are times where

4212
03:50:34,960 --> 03:50:37,480
Speaker 1: there's genuine Like when when you first started posting the

4213
03:50:37,600 --> 03:50:40,440
Speaker 1: headlines of like the actual Twitter articles that were about

4214
03:50:40,440 --> 03:50:42,240
Speaker 1: Goblin mode, I like I didn't do about it looking

4215
03:50:42,400 --> 03:50:45,040
Speaker 1: up because I just assumed they were fake. Yeah, it

4216
03:50:45,200 --> 03:50:48,960
Speaker 1: was like a lot of people told me, Like I

4217
03:50:49,040 --> 03:50:52,560
Speaker 1: think specifically, the the one that like most of my

4218
03:50:52,680 --> 03:50:55,320
Speaker 1: followers realized that they weren't fake anymore was the one

4219
03:50:55,400 --> 03:51:00,240
Speaker 1: that was like, um as a disabled uh them in

4220
03:51:00,640 --> 03:51:05,760
Speaker 1: goblin mode. This goblin mode trend is really problematic, and

4221
03:51:05,920 --> 03:51:08,240
Speaker 1: people people decided to look that one up and we're like, oh,

4222
03:51:08,320 --> 03:51:10,120
Speaker 1: it's real. And then everyone was like, wait, we're all

4223
03:51:10,160 --> 03:51:11,920
Speaker 1: these other ones that you were posting real And I'm

4224
03:51:11,920 --> 03:51:19,440
Speaker 1: like they were all real, Julia Foxlan real. It was

4225
03:51:20,800 --> 03:51:23,440
Speaker 1: agencies have been all these news organizations. I've been writing

4226
03:51:23,440 --> 03:51:28,040
Speaker 1: all this insane shit about nothing. Yeah, and there's there's

4227
03:51:28,160 --> 03:51:30,000
Speaker 1: you know, I mean, I think that this one is

4228
03:51:30,040 --> 03:51:31,920
Speaker 1: funny just because like yeah, I mean like it's goblin

4229
03:51:31,960 --> 03:51:34,280
Speaker 1: mode right, like it's it's it's it's just funny, like

4230
03:51:34,360 --> 03:51:36,160
Speaker 1: there's no like you know. But but I mean, I

4231
03:51:36,200 --> 03:51:38,280
Speaker 1: think that there's an interesting thing that happens with with

4232
03:51:38,440 --> 03:51:41,200
Speaker 1: the specifically the disabilities one, because the disabilities one isn't

4233
03:51:41,600 --> 03:51:45,160
Speaker 1: like it's basically about something completely different that the Goblin

4234
03:51:45,240 --> 03:51:47,480
Speaker 1: mode things spawned, which is that like, like the the

4235
03:51:47,600 --> 03:51:50,760
Speaker 1: other thing that happened with Goblin Mode. Was that Okay,

4236
03:51:50,800 --> 03:51:53,280
Speaker 1: So people saw Goblin Mode and then physicularly on like

4237
03:51:53,360 --> 03:51:55,920
Speaker 1: TikTok Um. I don't I don't know if they knew

4238
03:51:55,960 --> 03:51:59,880
Speaker 1: where it came from, but like people like people turn

4239
03:52:00,120 --> 03:52:02,920
Speaker 1: just gobblin mode into an actual thing where like it

4240
03:52:03,040 --> 03:52:06,640
Speaker 1: became this thing about like I like, I I think

4241
03:52:06,640 --> 03:52:09,400
Speaker 1: I think this is also influenced by like some of

4242
03:52:09,480 --> 03:52:11,800
Speaker 1: the like ship post answers that you gave the media

4243
03:52:11,880 --> 03:52:14,200
Speaker 1: people that were like gobblin Boe could be whatever you want.

4244
03:52:15,080 --> 03:52:17,880
Speaker 1: It's when you aren't awake of the padel or like

4245
03:52:17,960 --> 03:52:20,240
Speaker 1: you're not doing your makeup in the pandemic or whatever.

4246
03:52:20,880 --> 03:52:27,200
Speaker 1: Like yeah, but but but it's interesting that field like that.

4247
03:52:27,760 --> 03:52:30,160
Speaker 1: I really don't know if the TikTok's thing came before

4248
03:52:30,240 --> 03:52:35,400
Speaker 1: or after. I think it's after. Yeah, from what I've seen,

4249
03:52:35,840 --> 03:52:38,080
Speaker 1: it's it seems like it actually became a thing after.

4250
03:52:38,200 --> 03:52:40,000
Speaker 1: And that was really interesting to me too, because it

4251
03:52:40,120 --> 03:52:44,840
Speaker 1: was like it's this way in which, like you know, okay,

4252
03:52:44,920 --> 03:52:48,920
Speaker 1: so you start running into these sort of like fundamental

4253
03:52:49,000 --> 03:52:51,800
Speaker 1: problems about the nature of reality where it's like, okay,

4254
03:52:51,840 --> 03:52:54,960
Speaker 1: so we made this thing that is fake, right, but

4255
03:52:55,120 --> 03:52:58,680
Speaker 1: then it became real because enough enough people believed it

4256
03:52:58,800 --> 03:53:01,960
Speaker 1: was real that it turned into a thing that people

4257
03:53:02,000 --> 03:53:03,640
Speaker 1: actually use to describe stuff. And then you know that

4258
03:53:03,720 --> 03:53:05,880
Speaker 1: that's how you get to like you get a bunch

4259
03:53:05,920 --> 03:53:08,960
Speaker 1: of people complaining about how like there was an article

4260
03:53:09,040 --> 03:53:12,320
Speaker 1: that was like the Great resignation and going Goblin mode

4261
03:53:12,400 --> 03:53:14,280
Speaker 1: or like the two great threats to employers as they

4262
03:53:14,320 --> 03:53:19,520
Speaker 1: try to force people back to work. Like yeah, it's

4263
03:53:19,600 --> 03:53:24,560
Speaker 1: it's like the goblin mode, like self manifested into reality.

4264
03:53:24,720 --> 03:53:26,880
Speaker 1: Like I feel like a lot of journalists are saying,

4265
03:53:27,000 --> 03:53:29,560
Speaker 1: like people being lazy and like, you know how the

4266
03:53:30,000 --> 03:53:32,280
Speaker 1: whole meme of like, oh, no one wants to work anymore.

4267
03:53:32,680 --> 03:53:34,080
Speaker 1: I feel like a lot of people are trying to

4268
03:53:34,160 --> 03:53:36,800
Speaker 1: like attributing like oh, not wanting to work and being

4269
03:53:36,880 --> 03:53:40,480
Speaker 1: lazy to goblin mode, and it's it's self manifested through

4270
03:53:40,520 --> 03:53:42,920
Speaker 1: the media or TikTok or whatever whatever it might be.

4271
03:53:43,480 --> 03:53:46,520
Speaker 1: I actually don't know, but it's it's become a thing

4272
03:53:46,640 --> 03:53:49,760
Speaker 1: now and in a really strange way. Yeah, yeah, And

4273
03:53:49,880 --> 03:53:51,280
Speaker 1: I think I think this is like this is an

4274
03:53:51,320 --> 03:53:53,160
Speaker 1: interesting way of looking like, you know, like this was

4275
03:53:53,280 --> 03:53:57,080
Speaker 1: the whole sort of like like in in terms of

4276
03:53:57,200 --> 03:54:02,200
Speaker 1: like okay, in so far as posting can actually affect reality,

4277
03:54:02,360 --> 03:54:04,760
Speaker 1: which it can, but not as much as people seem

4278
03:54:04,800 --> 03:54:07,360
Speaker 1: to think, like there are there are there are people

4279
03:54:07,400 --> 03:54:10,560
Speaker 1: who like seem to think that like the three letter

4280
03:54:10,600 --> 03:54:12,880
Speaker 1: agencies care what they post on Twitter, which is like

4281
03:54:13,720 --> 03:54:15,280
Speaker 1: it's like no, no, no, hold on, hold on if

4282
03:54:15,320 --> 03:54:18,280
Speaker 1: if we post correctly interventions, it won't happen. It's like

4283
03:54:19,400 --> 03:54:22,360
Speaker 1: if you've seen the c I A like like like

4284
03:54:22,480 --> 03:54:25,960
Speaker 1: there's there's this whole thing where it's like you know,

4285
03:54:25,960 --> 03:54:28,800
Speaker 1: I mean this, it's okay, this this is gonna be

4286
03:54:28,920 --> 03:54:30,760
Speaker 1: the like someone's gonna pull this out of context and

4287
03:54:30,880 --> 03:54:32,560
Speaker 1: be like, hey, look at Don Chris is but like

4288
03:54:32,600 --> 03:54:33,760
Speaker 1: you know, like this is this is kind of what

4289
03:54:33,800 --> 03:54:35,640
Speaker 1: happened with Trump, which like this is this isn't like

4290
03:54:35,720 --> 03:54:37,360
Speaker 1: what the meme magic was like if if you just

4291
03:54:37,520 --> 03:54:40,080
Speaker 1: meme something long enough, you can kind of turn it

4292
03:54:40,120 --> 03:54:43,160
Speaker 1: into reality by just sort of convincing enough people that

4293
03:54:43,320 --> 03:54:45,880
Speaker 1: it's real, that it and and you know and once

4294
03:54:45,880 --> 03:54:48,080
Speaker 1: you've done that, like you you have effectively made the

4295
03:54:48,160 --> 03:54:52,640
Speaker 1: thing real. Right. It was interesting about this one is

4296
03:54:52,840 --> 03:54:54,120
Speaker 1: it's just like it's like a lot of people like

4297
03:54:54,160 --> 03:54:55,840
Speaker 1: do that on purpose, right, Like this is how this

4298
03:54:55,920 --> 03:54:57,560
Speaker 1: is like there's a lot of propaganda stuff that works

4299
03:54:57,600 --> 03:54:58,840
Speaker 1: like this or like, you know, this is like what

4300
03:54:58,960 --> 03:55:02,440
Speaker 1: the meme before jan Trump bullshit was, Like you just

4301
03:55:02,560 --> 03:55:06,680
Speaker 1: this like completely like as a joke on accidents. Yeah,

4302
03:55:06,720 --> 03:55:08,360
Speaker 1: I didn't. I didn't intend this. I just mean I

4303
03:55:08,720 --> 03:55:10,800
Speaker 1: just wanted to make a one off joke. Yeah, I

4304
03:55:10,840 --> 03:55:12,880
Speaker 1: didn't think that would happen. But if you're you're you're

4305
03:55:12,920 --> 03:55:15,200
Speaker 1: totally right about the whole, Like I don't. I don't

4306
03:55:15,200 --> 03:55:17,360
Speaker 1: know how much like the Trump magic was really a

4307
03:55:17,480 --> 03:55:21,160
Speaker 1: self manifestation of him kind of just winning the election

4308
03:55:21,240 --> 03:55:24,120
Speaker 1: and keep becoming popular with a certain people. But it

4309
03:55:24,200 --> 03:55:28,040
Speaker 1: definitely feels like like that self manifestation of like posting

4310
03:55:28,360 --> 03:55:31,640
Speaker 1: to a certain extent really can become real if it

4311
03:55:31,760 --> 03:55:33,880
Speaker 1: just like hits a certain ziteguist of some sort and

4312
03:55:34,080 --> 03:55:36,200
Speaker 1: like they just didn't. I think a crucial part of

4313
03:55:36,280 --> 03:55:37,680
Speaker 1: it is it needs to get picked up by the

4314
03:55:37,760 --> 03:55:42,240
Speaker 1: media and taken seriously by journalists specifically, because the thing

4315
03:55:42,320 --> 03:55:44,880
Speaker 1: that really, uh, I feel like broke the camel's back

4316
03:55:45,040 --> 03:55:48,960
Speaker 1: for Goblin about specifically was the first journalist that reached

4317
03:55:48,960 --> 03:55:51,640
Speaker 1: out to me because she she wanted to interview me

4318
03:55:51,800 --> 03:55:54,680
Speaker 1: about the whole. The whole experience, like and and her

4319
03:55:54,720 --> 03:55:56,840
Speaker 1: coverage of it was about the whole fake mame thing

4320
03:55:56,880 --> 03:55:59,360
Speaker 1: and then how it became sort of a thing in

4321
03:55:59,760 --> 03:56:05,440
Speaker 1: that aspect um, and then um from there, they all

4322
03:56:05,960 --> 03:56:08,680
Speaker 1: a lot of different journalists and websites referred back to

4323
03:56:08,800 --> 03:56:11,120
Speaker 1: that article, and now it seems to be the one

4324
03:56:11,240 --> 03:56:14,720
Speaker 1: that everyone's referring to now is the Guardian article about

4325
03:56:14,760 --> 03:56:17,000
Speaker 1: it that seems to be like the media's favorite piece

4326
03:56:17,040 --> 03:56:19,280
Speaker 1: about it, which is the one that talks more about

4327
03:56:19,320 --> 03:56:22,680
Speaker 1: it being like a lifestyle trend. And I think that's

4328
03:56:22,720 --> 03:56:25,600
Speaker 1: where it really went off, is when like some people

4329
03:56:27,120 --> 03:56:29,920
Speaker 1: took in the TikTok aspect of it and kind of

4330
03:56:29,960 --> 03:56:32,480
Speaker 1: manifested it that way. I think it's a couple of

4331
03:56:32,520 --> 03:56:35,320
Speaker 1: interesting political consequences of this, one of which is that like,

4332
03:56:36,760 --> 03:56:39,880
Speaker 1: like Twitter as a platform isn't really I mean, since

4333
03:56:39,920 --> 03:56:42,360
Speaker 1: Trump got banned, it's kind of like it hasn't really

4334
03:56:42,520 --> 03:56:47,800
Speaker 1: been where most like stuff is happening, like TikTok is exploding.

4335
03:56:48,080 --> 03:56:49,920
Speaker 1: I mean, you still have like the boomers on Facebook,

4336
03:56:50,080 --> 03:56:52,440
Speaker 1: Like it hasn't like it hasn't been the sort of

4337
03:56:52,480 --> 03:56:55,240
Speaker 1: like driving force of politics that normally is. But the

4338
03:56:55,360 --> 03:56:56,840
Speaker 1: one thing that it has is that all of the

4339
03:56:56,920 --> 03:57:00,400
Speaker 1: journalists are still on there, and that means that yeah,

4340
03:57:00,400 --> 03:57:02,280
Speaker 1: like there's all these weird political consequences. Were like, yeah,

4341
03:57:02,280 --> 03:57:04,840
Speaker 1: you can sort of like like you can just sort

4342
03:57:04,880 --> 03:57:09,080
Speaker 1: of will things into existence by convincing journalists that it's real.

4343
03:57:10,120 --> 03:57:13,960
Speaker 1: And that's I think really scary in a lot of ways,

4344
03:57:14,720 --> 03:57:16,720
Speaker 1: because you know, like the people who are really really

4345
03:57:16,720 --> 03:57:18,560
Speaker 1: good at the sort of manipulation are right wingers, and

4346
03:57:18,640 --> 03:57:21,440
Speaker 1: right wingers could have sort of like like I don't know,

4347
03:57:21,520 --> 03:57:23,560
Speaker 1: like I people are probably mad about me for this,

4348
03:57:23,640 --> 03:57:25,160
Speaker 1: but like one of the things that I remember from

4349
03:57:25,240 --> 03:57:29,840
Speaker 1: like God was just two dozen sixteen. It was like

4350
03:57:29,920 --> 03:57:34,600
Speaker 1: there was this whole discourse about like, uh, like there's

4351
03:57:34,600 --> 03:57:36,560
Speaker 1: a bunch of like all a bunch of people are

4352
03:57:36,600 --> 03:57:38,720
Speaker 1: really mad about like there being a black stonone trooper

4353
03:57:38,800 --> 03:57:45,480
Speaker 1: and Star Wars, yeah, the whole Yeah, it's interesting about it.

4354
03:57:45,560 --> 03:57:48,840
Speaker 1: Was like yeah, I think I think that was just yeah, yeah,

4355
03:57:49,080 --> 03:57:50,680
Speaker 1: there there. There's the thing that was interesting about it

4356
03:57:50,760 --> 03:57:53,240
Speaker 1: was like so I know people who like who like

4357
03:57:53,760 --> 03:57:55,800
Speaker 1: looked into it beforehand, and it was like the only

4358
03:57:55,840 --> 03:57:58,240
Speaker 1: people who were talking about this it was like people

4359
03:57:58,280 --> 03:58:00,520
Speaker 1: who were confused because they thought that Star Troopers were

4360
03:58:00,520 --> 03:58:03,920
Speaker 1: all clones and we're like wait, why wait? And then

4361
03:58:04,040 --> 03:58:05,680
Speaker 1: and the other thing there are other group of people

4362
03:58:05,680 --> 03:58:09,360
Speaker 1: who were mad about this was storm Front, and store

4363
03:58:09,440 --> 03:58:12,680
Speaker 1: Front was able to like turn this into like like

4364
03:58:13,040 --> 03:58:15,080
Speaker 1: a discourse, like they able to they were able to

4365
03:58:15,080 --> 03:58:16,840
Speaker 1: convince journalists like this was a real thing that like

4366
03:58:16,880 --> 03:58:18,560
Speaker 1: a significant number people are mad about, and then it

4367
03:58:18,640 --> 03:58:20,480
Speaker 1: like actually turned into a thing that a stnificant number

4368
03:58:20,480 --> 03:58:22,080
Speaker 1: of people are were mad about. Because you can sort

4369
03:58:22,080 --> 03:58:24,760
Speaker 1: of just like like you you can start these like

4370
03:58:25,200 --> 03:58:26,840
Speaker 1: panics and like this is one of the things we're

4371
03:58:26,840 --> 03:58:29,560
Speaker 1: talking about in our trans episodes where like, you know,

4372
03:58:30,920 --> 03:58:34,640
Speaker 1: a fairly small network of well funded people can cause

4373
03:58:35,480 --> 03:58:39,880
Speaker 1: like enormous swass of the US to just lose their

4374
03:58:40,000 --> 03:58:44,320
Speaker 1: ship and get extremely violence and get like you know,

4375
03:58:44,400 --> 03:58:47,280
Speaker 1: and and the specific thing they're mad about changes like

4376
03:58:48,080 --> 03:58:52,480
Speaker 1: pretty frequently. But you can just sort of like if

4377
03:58:52,480 --> 03:58:54,360
Speaker 1: if you're able to manipulate the media well enough and

4378
03:58:54,440 --> 03:58:55,960
Speaker 1: you you know that there's other ways to do this,

4379
03:58:56,120 --> 03:58:57,960
Speaker 1: Like you know, you could do it by like weird memes.

4380
03:58:58,040 --> 03:59:00,800
Speaker 1: You can do it by you know, being the cops

4381
03:59:00,880 --> 03:59:03,120
Speaker 1: are just like having press releases that you send out,

4382
03:59:03,280 --> 03:59:04,440
Speaker 1: you can have you can do it through like these

4383
03:59:04,480 --> 03:59:07,560
Speaker 1: sort of like astro turf, Like I don't know you

4384
03:59:07,640 --> 03:59:09,920
Speaker 1: have like an astro turf intellectual, like what's his name,

4385
03:59:10,000 --> 03:59:13,760
Speaker 1: Margaret Upo, But it's it's it's interesting to me that

4386
03:59:13,880 --> 03:59:17,760
Speaker 1: like they all seem to work, like the pathway through

4387
03:59:17,800 --> 03:59:19,720
Speaker 1: it all seems to be very similar. Which is what

4388
03:59:19,880 --> 03:59:21,520
Speaker 1: you do is you convince aboutch of media people or

4389
03:59:21,520 --> 03:59:24,880
Speaker 1: something is real, and then once once they start taking

4390
03:59:24,920 --> 03:59:29,760
Speaker 1: it seriously, it sort of manifests itself into reality. Yeah,

4391
03:59:29,800 --> 03:59:32,840
Speaker 1: I know that, that is what I realized what was happening,

4392
03:59:33,080 --> 03:59:35,240
Speaker 1: Like I one of my initial points that I was

4393
03:59:35,280 --> 03:59:38,680
Speaker 1: trying to make after um, the whole goblin thing, after

4394
03:59:38,760 --> 03:59:41,200
Speaker 1: the first article came out, I was like, it really

4395
03:59:41,280 --> 03:59:44,880
Speaker 1: made me realized, like how potent fake I hate saying

4396
03:59:44,920 --> 03:59:48,360
Speaker 1: this phrase just because it's become such like a nothing

4397
03:59:48,440 --> 03:59:50,840
Speaker 1: sort of phrase, but like fake news is how how

4398
03:59:50,960 --> 03:59:54,400
Speaker 1: easy it is to just like instead of goblin mode.

4399
03:59:54,480 --> 03:59:56,680
Speaker 1: I decided like maybe let's say I'm like a crazy

4400
03:59:56,800 --> 04:00:00,520
Speaker 1: right winger and I had this weird digeist moment causing

4401
04:00:00,560 --> 04:00:02,800
Speaker 1: a panic about like trans people, and I made like

4402
04:00:02,880 --> 04:00:06,000
Speaker 1: a fake tweet like that you would we see that

4403
04:00:06,120 --> 04:00:08,920
Speaker 1: happened all the time, like trans people people, A lot

4404
04:00:08,960 --> 04:00:11,560
Speaker 1: of people hate us, um, and it would be super

4405
04:00:11,640 --> 04:00:15,120
Speaker 1: easy put it in the right community. UM, make this

4406
04:00:15,240 --> 04:00:18,760
Speaker 1: fake tweet or a fake headline, and people right wing

4407
04:00:18,840 --> 04:00:22,040
Speaker 1: or specifically will go wild and it'll really influence the discourse.

4408
04:00:22,080 --> 04:00:24,000
Speaker 1: I mean, look at the current I mean it's it's

4409
04:00:24,040 --> 04:00:26,720
Speaker 1: kind of over now. But the last it it was

4410
04:00:26,800 --> 04:00:30,720
Speaker 1: last week, the swimmer, the trans swimmer, that one, the

4411
04:00:30,760 --> 04:00:34,800
Speaker 1: women's competition. I mean, the amount of vitriol that was

4412
04:00:35,120 --> 04:00:37,800
Speaker 1: able to be created over that. Just imagine what, like,

4413
04:00:37,880 --> 04:00:40,640
Speaker 1: as you said, like a well funded height network of

4414
04:00:41,840 --> 04:00:44,200
Speaker 1: um but I don't know, but for lack of a

4415
04:00:44,240 --> 04:00:47,600
Speaker 1: better phrase, like fake news creators, just all they would

4416
04:00:47,640 --> 04:00:49,480
Speaker 1: need to do is put something out on Facebook, the

4417
04:00:49,520 --> 04:00:53,520
Speaker 1: boomers see it, and then it's over. Yea, what what? What?

4418
04:00:53,680 --> 04:00:55,600
Speaker 1: What are the things I learned about? Like, well, I

4419
04:00:55,720 --> 04:00:59,520
Speaker 1: was doing research for Weirdly an episode about Reverend Moon.

4420
04:00:59,720 --> 04:01:02,240
Speaker 1: Was that like people figured so this is sort of

4421
04:01:02,280 --> 04:01:03,960
Speaker 1: like this is like how Republicans came to power, Like

4422
04:01:04,000 --> 04:01:05,280
Speaker 1: that they figured out you could do shoot like this,

4423
04:01:05,400 --> 04:01:09,080
Speaker 1: and like Rubber Fiugieri like in like in like the

4424
04:01:09,360 --> 04:01:12,240
Speaker 1: sixties figured out that like if you just if you

4425
04:01:12,440 --> 04:01:17,080
Speaker 1: sent like you could just send letters to like they work.

4426
04:01:17,080 --> 04:01:18,480
Speaker 1: I guess they weren't even boomers that if you just

4427
04:01:18,520 --> 04:01:21,200
Speaker 1: send letters to old people that would say stuff like

4428
04:01:21,760 --> 04:01:24,720
Speaker 1: planned parenthood is harvesting baby fetuses, you could just get

4429
04:01:24,760 --> 04:01:27,800
Speaker 1: the really mad and it's like and it's funny because

4430
04:01:27,800 --> 04:01:29,440
Speaker 1: you know in the citties like he's he's doing this

4431
04:01:29,520 --> 04:01:32,840
Speaker 1: like by mail, right, like he is mailing you a

4432
04:01:33,000 --> 04:01:40,760
Speaker 1: chain letter. It's just stuff. Yeah, it became just like yeah, yeah,

4433
04:01:40,880 --> 04:01:42,800
Speaker 1: it's like he's just like it's it's weird because you

4434
04:01:42,800 --> 04:01:45,120
Speaker 1: can watch them invent this and then it's like, oh, yeah,

4435
04:01:45,160 --> 04:01:49,680
Speaker 1: this guy was funded by like a weird cult guy

4436
04:01:49,760 --> 04:01:51,760
Speaker 1: who was trying to take over the world, who was

4437
04:01:52,120 --> 04:01:55,320
Speaker 1: being backed by the Korean CIA, and it's like, I

4438
04:01:55,360 --> 04:01:58,640
Speaker 1: don't know, it gets into this, Yeah, it all sort

4439
04:01:58,680 --> 04:02:01,960
Speaker 1: of comes back into this weird thing where yeah, I

4440
04:02:02,000 --> 04:02:03,960
Speaker 1: mean I like one of one of the what the

4441
04:02:04,120 --> 04:02:06,240
Speaker 1: political transformations I've had since I started working here was

4442
04:02:06,320 --> 04:02:08,440
Speaker 1: like I didn't take like it's sort of a similar

4443
04:02:08,440 --> 04:02:09,520
Speaker 1: to what you were saying, Like I didn't take the

4444
04:02:09,600 --> 04:02:12,400
Speaker 1: like weaponized unreality like fake new stuff like that seriously.

4445
04:02:12,480 --> 04:02:16,200
Speaker 1: And then it was like you cover it every day

4446
04:02:16,280 --> 04:02:19,680
Speaker 1: and it's like, oh my god like the like the weird,

4447
04:02:19,800 --> 04:02:22,800
Speaker 1: like like watching like four Chan like invents the I

4448
04:02:22,800 --> 04:02:28,840
Speaker 1: actoually don't know if it's portunately was one of watching

4449
04:02:28,920 --> 04:02:31,600
Speaker 1: like just weird right wing like message boards invent like

4450
04:02:31,760 --> 04:02:35,920
Speaker 1: the Ukrainian biolab thing, which like grand Mean Wall now

4451
04:02:35,960 --> 04:02:38,960
Speaker 1: tweets about and like like like the like the official

4452
04:02:39,000 --> 04:02:41,720
Speaker 1: state media of Russia and China are like talking about

4453
04:02:41,760 --> 04:02:45,800
Speaker 1: these bio labs and it's like it's turned into this

4454
04:02:45,960 --> 04:02:49,080
Speaker 1: weird like like thing where like yeah, like like actual

4455
04:02:49,200 --> 04:02:55,880
Speaker 1: countries with like nuclear weapons are like basically using ship

4456
04:02:56,000 --> 04:02:59,000
Speaker 1: posters as like as like a way to do propaganda,

4457
04:02:59,000 --> 04:03:03,400
Speaker 1: and it's it's just like really the weird. I don't know,

4458
04:03:03,800 --> 04:03:07,200
Speaker 1: it's this really weird and incredibly disturbing media space to

4459
04:03:07,240 --> 04:03:10,520
Speaker 1: live in. Yeah, it's it's like a it's a weird

4460
04:03:10,600 --> 04:03:14,760
Speaker 1: synthesis of ship posters just posting online to like whatever audience,

4461
04:03:15,080 --> 04:03:17,520
Speaker 1: and I guess like media of some sort and not

4462
04:03:17,960 --> 04:03:20,320
Speaker 1: maybe not like um in the in the case with

4463
04:03:20,400 --> 04:03:23,520
Speaker 1: the biolot I don't know too much about that, especially

4464
04:03:23,560 --> 04:03:25,680
Speaker 1: cause I'm black by gun Greenwald, so I don't see

4465
04:03:25,680 --> 04:03:30,560
Speaker 1: a lot of stuff. But you know, it's it's interesting

4466
04:03:30,640 --> 04:03:33,760
Speaker 1: how how kind of interlocked there. And and to your

4467
04:03:33,800 --> 04:03:36,720
Speaker 1: point about the earlier about the whole Trump me magic thing,

4468
04:03:37,240 --> 04:03:39,440
Speaker 1: like I didn't take that too seriously at the time,

4469
04:03:40,080 --> 04:03:43,200
Speaker 1: Like in I was like, Oh, all these silly right

4470
04:03:43,240 --> 04:03:47,040
Speaker 1: wingers making these means like this isn't gonna do anything,

4471
04:03:47,240 --> 04:03:48,680
Speaker 1: Like I I don't. I really don't know if it

4472
04:03:48,720 --> 04:03:52,120
Speaker 1: really had an effect, but I mean it's we can't

4473
04:03:52,160 --> 04:03:55,200
Speaker 1: really ignore the power of that. Just simply manifesting something,

4474
04:03:55,320 --> 04:03:58,600
Speaker 1: even if it's artificial, can actually have a hole about

4475
04:03:58,640 --> 04:04:02,560
Speaker 1: certain people. Um as we were saying with the mailing letters.

4476
04:04:03,200 --> 04:04:06,640
Speaker 1: I mean, if you just say enough, if you say

4477
04:04:06,760 --> 04:04:09,400
Speaker 1: something enough to the right type of person, they'll just

4478
04:04:09,520 --> 04:04:12,040
Speaker 1: believe it. I mean, it's it's not hard to lie

4479
04:04:12,080 --> 04:04:14,320
Speaker 1: to people as horrible as those to say. It's really

4480
04:04:14,360 --> 04:04:16,920
Speaker 1: not that hard to lie to people. Yeah, Like I

4481
04:04:17,000 --> 04:04:19,560
Speaker 1: mean that's the whole sort of like everyone yelling groomer

4482
04:04:19,800 --> 04:04:22,280
Speaker 1: like constantly about trans people. It's like, yeah, they just

4483
04:04:22,800 --> 04:04:24,720
Speaker 1: lied over and over again. And like half the people

4484
04:04:24,760 --> 04:04:27,360
Speaker 1: who were like saying this stuff are actually pedophiles. And

4485
04:04:27,400 --> 04:04:30,760
Speaker 1: it doesn't matter because you know, if you just like

4486
04:04:30,960 --> 04:04:33,080
Speaker 1: do this ship over and over again, you get these

4487
04:04:33,200 --> 04:04:37,200
Speaker 1: you get just get these like hate bobs and it's yeah, no,

4488
04:04:37,360 --> 04:04:40,600
Speaker 1: the right wing, right wing or specifically are phenomenal at

4489
04:04:40,720 --> 04:04:45,320
Speaker 1: creating hate mobs. Yeah, it's kind of incredible to witness.

4490
04:04:45,360 --> 04:04:47,960
Speaker 1: It's it's really scary, but it's it's an incredible thing

4491
04:04:48,040 --> 04:04:50,040
Speaker 1: to see. There's not really an equivalent, i would say,

4492
04:04:50,040 --> 04:04:53,880
Speaker 1: on the left in the way that um even maybe

4493
04:04:54,040 --> 04:04:56,680
Speaker 1: in liberals there's an equivalent, but like on the on

4494
04:04:56,760 --> 04:04:58,520
Speaker 1: the left, there's not really like an equivalent to like

4495
04:04:59,200 --> 04:05:05,240
Speaker 1: some like mob in that way. Yeah, yeah, I mean

4496
04:05:05,320 --> 04:05:08,080
Speaker 1: I think that's you know, like, Okay, there's always an

4497
04:05:08,120 --> 04:05:10,480
Speaker 1: extent to which like these stuff the stuff has like

4498
04:05:10,680 --> 04:05:14,040
Speaker 1: material constraints, Like you know, I thought to talk about

4499
04:05:14,080 --> 04:05:16,880
Speaker 1: like constantly on this show, the fact that like this

4500
04:05:17,120 --> 04:05:18,840
Speaker 1: is like this is the stuff that the DEO cons

4501
04:05:18,880 --> 04:05:20,960
Speaker 1: believed and then they ran into the material constraints of

4502
04:05:20,960 --> 04:05:23,680
Speaker 1: the Iraq War and their entire project imploded. And like,

4503
04:05:24,200 --> 04:05:25,680
Speaker 1: I mean, I think one of the reasons why this

4504
04:05:25,800 --> 04:05:29,840
Speaker 1: is easier for the right is that like there's the

4505
04:05:30,080 --> 04:05:32,120
Speaker 1: there there's a there's a there's there's a there's always

4506
04:05:32,320 --> 04:05:35,600
Speaker 1: a political base for them that is there that they

4507
04:05:35,640 --> 04:05:38,000
Speaker 1: can access fairly easily, which is okay, they they they

4508
04:05:38,240 --> 04:05:42,000
Speaker 1: have access to like you know that they have access

4509
04:05:42,000 --> 04:05:45,920
Speaker 1: to like a vast swath the petit boars. Well, they

4510
04:05:45,920 --> 04:05:47,760
Speaker 1: have access to a bunch of of white business owners.

4511
04:05:47,840 --> 04:05:51,960
Speaker 1: They have access to like this sort of like this

4512
04:05:52,120 --> 04:05:54,160
Speaker 1: like white professional class. They have access to this sort

4513
04:05:54,160 --> 04:05:56,960
Speaker 1: of like white gentry e class, and like those people

4514
04:05:57,960 --> 04:06:02,320
Speaker 1: can very easily be of like whipped into a frothing rage.

4515
04:06:02,360 --> 04:06:04,440
Speaker 1: And like part of it is because like that that's

4516
04:06:04,560 --> 04:06:06,640
Speaker 1: essentially that's just what they're That's what their class interest is,

4517
04:06:06,880 --> 04:06:09,280
Speaker 1: that's what they're sort of like like their status, the

4518
04:06:09,800 --> 04:06:13,640
Speaker 1: racial hierarchy like brings them to do already. And you

4519
04:06:13,680 --> 04:06:16,480
Speaker 1: could sort of like you know, if you just shovel

4520
04:06:16,560 --> 04:06:18,120
Speaker 1: a bit of coal on it, you can you can

4521
04:06:18,160 --> 04:06:21,400
Speaker 1: you can make the fire go absolutely. And I mean

4522
04:06:22,160 --> 04:06:24,080
Speaker 1: it's talked about a lot, I'm sure, but like the

4523
04:06:24,640 --> 04:06:28,760
Speaker 1: one thing that is really powerful is Fox News. Fox

4524
04:06:28,840 --> 04:06:31,040
Speaker 1: News will pick up literally anything like I saw I

4525
04:06:31,120 --> 04:06:34,120
Speaker 1: saw a post on Twitter just the other day, screenshot

4526
04:06:34,440 --> 04:06:37,960
Speaker 1: or just just a picture of Fox News and they

4527
04:06:38,080 --> 04:06:42,320
Speaker 1: they cited the lives of TikTok Twitter account talking about

4528
04:06:42,520 --> 04:06:45,440
Speaker 1: school classrooms. It's like, what is that like not like

4529
04:06:45,560 --> 04:06:47,600
Speaker 1: the right wingers will just take the source of a

4530
04:06:47,720 --> 04:06:51,560
Speaker 1: random Twitter user that has a take that takes messages

4531
04:06:51,680 --> 04:06:54,520
Speaker 1: from random people that message them and then that's their news.

4532
04:06:54,920 --> 04:06:57,080
Speaker 1: Like that is just insane to to to to to

4533
04:06:57,480 --> 04:06:59,040
Speaker 1: be fair to Fox News, which is not a thing

4534
04:06:59,120 --> 04:07:01,960
Speaker 1: I will ever say a and uh, it wouldn't It

4535
04:07:01,960 --> 04:07:04,680
Speaker 1: wouldn't surprise me if that whole thing like because so

4536
04:07:04,840 --> 04:07:06,560
Speaker 1: the I don't know if you saw this the lives

4537
04:07:06,560 --> 04:07:08,840
Speaker 1: of TikTok person is like, is that that thing is

4538
04:07:08,920 --> 04:07:12,120
Speaker 1: run by an old Bush administration person? I did not

4539
04:07:12,240 --> 04:07:14,840
Speaker 1: know that. Yeah, so it wouldn't. I mean, Okay, like

4540
04:07:15,080 --> 04:07:17,200
Speaker 1: the there there there's probably a three and four chance

4541
04:07:17,240 --> 04:07:19,400
Speaker 1: that they just saw someone who's like trying to own

4542
04:07:19,440 --> 04:07:20,920
Speaker 1: the libs on TikTok. But there's like a one in

4543
04:07:21,000 --> 04:07:23,880
Speaker 1: four chance that like all the old like Bush network

4544
04:07:23,960 --> 04:07:26,800
Speaker 1: people like know each other and that's why they're promoting it.

4545
04:07:27,960 --> 04:07:29,920
Speaker 1: That's that's a good point. That's a good point. I

4546
04:07:30,000 --> 04:07:35,160
Speaker 1: mean that, well maybe I don't know, like it's it's

4547
04:07:35,240 --> 04:07:37,120
Speaker 1: it's one of those things where it's like it becomes

4548
04:07:38,200 --> 04:07:42,400
Speaker 1: I don't know, it becomes really difficult to to know

4549
04:07:42,640 --> 04:07:47,360
Speaker 1: the extent to which the beliefs. Yeah, well how organized

4550
04:07:47,360 --> 04:07:48,880
Speaker 1: they are into the extent to which they believe what

4551
04:07:48,920 --> 04:07:51,880
Speaker 1: they're saying, because part of that, like that becomes like

4552
04:07:51,920 --> 04:07:53,880
Speaker 1: you know, if if, if you know who's behind that,

4553
04:07:54,000 --> 04:07:55,920
Speaker 1: it becomes easier to sort of be like, oh yeah,

4554
04:07:55,920 --> 04:07:57,280
Speaker 1: we're just sort of playing a game. But it could

4555
04:07:57,280 --> 04:07:59,760
Speaker 1: also just be like, no, this is this is content

4556
04:07:59,800 --> 04:08:02,240
Speaker 1: that we like, uh, we were all too lazy to

4557
04:08:02,280 --> 04:08:04,880
Speaker 1: go or just message the person to see who they are,

4558
04:08:05,360 --> 04:08:09,480
Speaker 1: Like I mean, they had the specifically in this case,

4559
04:08:09,560 --> 04:08:12,680
Speaker 1: the lives of TikTok Lady. They had her like on

4560
04:08:13,440 --> 04:08:17,400
Speaker 1: TALX news once talking oh yeah yeah, referenced her multiple times,

4561
04:08:17,440 --> 04:08:22,360
Speaker 1: so they have to know her. Yeah yeah, yeah, that's that.

4562
04:08:22,480 --> 04:08:24,200
Speaker 1: That's another technique that they do a lot, which that

4563
04:08:24,640 --> 04:08:26,480
Speaker 1: they take someone who is like you know, like a

4564
04:08:26,600 --> 04:08:29,800
Speaker 1: like an old part like who's literally a Republican operative, right,

4565
04:08:30,680 --> 04:08:33,040
Speaker 1: and just laundered them as an actress. Actually, the funny

4566
04:08:33,080 --> 04:08:35,880
Speaker 1: part is you see like like the New York Times

4567
04:08:35,960 --> 04:08:37,680
Speaker 1: and Ship like all the main street outlets do the

4568
04:08:37,760 --> 04:08:41,040
Speaker 1: same thing too, where it's like yeah, well, well, like

4569
04:08:41,840 --> 04:08:44,160
Speaker 1: any time you see an article that is like I

4570
04:08:44,320 --> 04:08:46,080
Speaker 1: was a Democratic voter, but I'm going to vote for

4571
04:08:46,080 --> 04:08:49,280
Speaker 1: the Republicans nine times out of ten that person is

4572
04:08:49,280 --> 04:08:51,280
Speaker 1: a Republican operative and if you google their name and

4573
04:08:51,440 --> 04:08:54,320
Speaker 1: look hard enough, you can just find it. And it's like,

4574
04:08:57,200 --> 04:09:00,720
Speaker 1: and that's the only thing that other thing was like

4575
04:09:00,720 --> 04:09:03,440
Speaker 1: I don't know whether they whether they're just lazy and

4576
04:09:03,520 --> 04:09:06,760
Speaker 1: don't check, or whether they're just sort of like doing

4577
04:09:06,920 --> 04:09:11,320
Speaker 1: this kind of like I don't know that what what

4578
04:09:11,480 --> 04:09:15,280
Speaker 1: what whe whether they're doing this on purpose? Because I

4579
04:09:15,320 --> 04:09:17,040
Speaker 1: mean that you know, That's that's the thing with journalism,

4580
04:09:17,120 --> 04:09:20,440
Speaker 1: Like it's it's difficult to like, when someone screws something up,

4581
04:09:20,440 --> 04:09:22,440
Speaker 1: it's it's difficult to determine a lot of times whether

4582
04:09:22,480 --> 04:09:25,960
Speaker 1: it's malice or whether it's they're just the only research

4583
04:09:26,000 --> 04:09:31,640
Speaker 1: they did was they googled something. Yeah, I feel like

4584
04:09:32,000 --> 04:09:34,400
Speaker 1: in the realblem that we're talking about right now, it's

4585
04:09:34,440 --> 04:09:37,120
Speaker 1: like right wingers, I think a lot of it. Obviously

4586
04:09:37,160 --> 04:09:40,960
Speaker 1: it's pretty malicious a lot of the times. But in

4587
04:09:41,120 --> 04:09:43,880
Speaker 1: terms of like the whole goblin mode situation where that

4588
04:09:44,000 --> 04:09:47,680
Speaker 1: that stemmed off just from like random like Guardian whatever articles,

4589
04:09:47,680 --> 04:09:50,880
Speaker 1: I think I think that was just more of like, oh,

4590
04:09:51,000 --> 04:09:53,560
Speaker 1: let's kind of trying to explain this thing that is

4591
04:09:53,600 --> 04:09:57,520
Speaker 1: apparently now a trend and we're manifesting it in real time. Yeah,

4592
04:09:57,640 --> 04:10:00,720
Speaker 1: I do think there's like this distinct in between. Next,

4593
04:10:01,040 --> 04:10:04,240
Speaker 1: I feel there's no like like with God, there's there's

4594
04:10:04,240 --> 04:10:08,080
Speaker 1: no nefarious aspect of it, but that like technique can

4595
04:10:08,200 --> 04:10:10,960
Speaker 1: be used in a very nefarious way, and I think

4596
04:10:11,000 --> 04:10:15,120
Speaker 1: that manifests in the most easy to waste, the easiest

4597
04:10:15,360 --> 04:10:18,840
Speaker 1: to see ways in right wing media. Yeah, I do

4598
04:10:18,960 --> 04:10:21,880
Speaker 1: want to also mention that, like the Yeah, I I

4599
04:10:22,400 --> 04:10:24,680
Speaker 1: think I said briefly, like the people who do this

4600
04:10:24,840 --> 04:10:29,520
Speaker 1: the most often are cops, Like the cops. And if

4601
04:10:29,640 --> 04:10:31,560
Speaker 1: if you see a story about the police in a

4602
04:10:31,640 --> 04:10:34,560
Speaker 1: manship newspaper and you see the same story in another paper,

4603
04:10:34,680 --> 04:10:37,840
Speaker 1: it's because they're basically printing a press release. And you know,

4604
04:10:37,920 --> 04:10:40,160
Speaker 1: I mean this this gets used to like launder just

4605
04:10:40,560 --> 04:10:45,240
Speaker 1: straight up police lies about shootings they manufactured, like the

4606
04:10:45,480 --> 04:10:49,160
Speaker 1: entire crime wave thing, like the whole thing about people

4607
04:10:49,240 --> 04:10:52,560
Speaker 1: taking boxes off of trains. It's like, yeah, you look

4608
04:10:52,640 --> 04:10:54,080
Speaker 1: into it and it's like, yeah, there's these like the

4609
04:10:54,440 --> 04:10:58,120
Speaker 1: there's the sort of like shadowy police networks of people

4610
04:10:58,160 --> 04:11:00,840
Speaker 1: who are basically running I mean they have enormous budgets

4611
04:11:00,840 --> 04:11:02,840
Speaker 1: to do this too, Like they have these enormous um

4612
04:11:04,320 --> 04:11:08,680
Speaker 1: like departmental like public outreach budgets, and those public outreach

4613
04:11:08,720 --> 04:11:13,240
Speaker 1: budgets are basically them running information ops on us, which

4614
04:11:13,320 --> 04:11:18,000
Speaker 1: is incredibly fun. You know that that is absolutely like

4615
04:11:18,080 --> 04:11:20,840
Speaker 1: a real phenomena. I I don't know too much about

4616
04:11:20,880 --> 04:11:22,720
Speaker 1: it specifically in cops, but I know, I know the

4617
04:11:22,720 --> 04:11:25,640
Speaker 1: White House does that all the time, where it's like, oh,

4618
04:11:25,720 --> 04:11:28,120
Speaker 1: there's a White House leap and it's like, oh, no,

4619
04:11:28,320 --> 04:11:32,280
Speaker 1: they wanted people to see this. This is entirely intentional. Yeah,

4620
04:11:32,320 --> 04:11:34,240
Speaker 1: they try a balloon stuff a lot, and that's I

4621
04:11:34,280 --> 04:11:40,160
Speaker 1: don't know, and like that this is this is goblin mode.

4622
04:11:40,240 --> 04:11:42,680
Speaker 1: Is like the fun version of looking at how all

4623
04:11:42,800 --> 04:11:46,400
Speaker 1: this stuff works. But this stuff happens with stuff that

4624
04:11:46,600 --> 04:11:51,880
Speaker 1: is extremely deadly and has real world consequences. And yeah,

4625
04:11:52,080 --> 04:11:54,080
Speaker 1: it's it's some It's something we need to be thinking

4626
04:11:54,160 --> 04:11:58,320
Speaker 1: about and trying to I don't know if used for

4627
04:11:58,440 --> 04:12:00,800
Speaker 1: good is the right thing, but like it's something that

4628
04:12:00,920 --> 04:12:05,200
Speaker 1: we need to be really conscious of as we're dealing with,

4629
04:12:06,240 --> 04:12:10,240
Speaker 1: you know, a bunch of fascists trying to murder everyone. Absolutely,

4630
04:12:10,320 --> 04:12:12,720
Speaker 1: I mean that that's been the most interesting thing about

4631
04:12:12,800 --> 04:12:16,360
Speaker 1: this to me is watching Like I hate calling it this,

4632
04:12:16,520 --> 04:12:18,000
Speaker 1: but just for lack of a better word, kind of

4633
04:12:18,080 --> 04:12:22,480
Speaker 1: like goblin mode is like being manufactured, like manufacturing consent

4634
04:12:22,560 --> 04:12:25,000
Speaker 1: in real time, like from the genesis of my post,

4635
04:12:25,320 --> 04:12:27,800
Speaker 1: watching it in real time, seeing all these articles come

4636
04:12:27,840 --> 04:12:29,960
Speaker 1: out and kind of all tie into each other and

4637
04:12:30,080 --> 04:12:31,840
Speaker 1: refer back to each other. It's been it's been kind

4638
04:12:31,840 --> 04:12:36,520
Speaker 1: of eye opening about this topic that I think a

4639
04:12:36,600 --> 04:12:38,360
Speaker 1: lot of leftists kind of know a lot about, like

4640
04:12:38,440 --> 04:12:42,760
Speaker 1: in terms of like medium manipulation and you're it's you're

4641
04:12:42,840 --> 04:12:45,760
Speaker 1: right when you said it's like the fun version of that. Yeah,

4642
04:12:45,880 --> 04:12:47,920
Speaker 1: and it has been the fun version of it. But

4643
04:12:48,080 --> 04:12:49,880
Speaker 1: deep down it's like, oh, this is kind of like

4644
04:12:50,840 --> 04:12:53,880
Speaker 1: watching like how they did like they this might be dramatic,

4645
04:12:53,960 --> 04:12:56,520
Speaker 1: but like how they did the Iraq War in real time,

4646
04:12:56,840 --> 04:13:01,440
Speaker 1: Like this is on some level that's very similar media strategy.

4647
04:13:02,040 --> 04:13:03,800
Speaker 1: And I think, I mean, I think I think there's

4648
04:13:04,760 --> 04:13:07,320
Speaker 1: specifically gobler mode. I think there's because because like the

4649
04:13:07,360 --> 04:13:10,640
Speaker 1: Iraq War, there's a lot of malice there and but

4650
04:13:10,800 --> 04:13:12,400
Speaker 1: but in this one, it's like, yeah, like that, you know,

4651
04:13:12,960 --> 04:13:16,880
Speaker 1: not all of the media, like all of them, like okay,

4652
04:13:17,720 --> 04:13:20,720
Speaker 1: in order for something that's completely fake to get traction,

4653
04:13:21,200 --> 04:13:24,800
Speaker 1: it doesn't require everyone involved being malicious. What it requires

4654
04:13:24,960 --> 04:13:27,000
Speaker 1: is one person saying a thing and then a bunch

4655
04:13:27,000 --> 04:13:29,200
Speaker 1: of journalists being too lazy to actually look into something,

4656
04:13:29,280 --> 04:13:31,840
Speaker 1: and that just you know, basically reprinting the article, but

4657
04:13:31,960 --> 04:13:36,040
Speaker 1: like rewriting a few things, which happens constantly, and yeah,

4658
04:13:36,080 --> 04:13:39,120
Speaker 1: and and that, like you know, the thing I think

4659
04:13:39,120 --> 04:13:41,480
Speaker 1: that's scary about that is it reduces the number of

4660
04:13:41,560 --> 04:13:44,240
Speaker 1: actors who actually have to be involved in a thing

4661
04:13:44,840 --> 04:13:47,840
Speaker 1: for it to just sort of like take off like this,

4662
04:13:48,800 --> 04:13:52,760
Speaker 1: which yeah, because like I think like there's there's an

4663
04:13:52,800 --> 04:13:57,040
Speaker 1: extent to which okay, like it rocks, Like something on

4664
04:13:57,160 --> 04:14:01,840
Speaker 1: that scale is pretty rare because it requires, like in

4665
04:14:01,920 --> 04:14:05,720
Speaker 1: an enormous amount of buying from a lot of people.

4666
04:14:06,400 --> 04:14:09,760
Speaker 1: But there's lots of small examples of this stuff that

4667
04:14:09,880 --> 04:14:13,720
Speaker 1: just happened sort of constantly and that stuff like yeah,

4668
04:14:13,720 --> 04:14:15,520
Speaker 1: I mean, you know, as we've been talking about like that,

4669
04:14:15,640 --> 04:14:17,920
Speaker 1: that that kind of thing with small numbers actors and

4670
04:14:18,000 --> 04:14:22,120
Speaker 1: then people just sort of lazily reprinting articles like that stuff. Right.

4671
04:14:22,200 --> 04:14:24,120
Speaker 1: I mean, I think the best example of this is currently,

4672
04:14:24,160 --> 04:14:26,040
Speaker 1: at least just in my mind, because I am trans,

4673
04:14:26,240 --> 04:14:29,480
Speaker 1: the the whole trans panic that's happening right now. I

4674
04:14:29,600 --> 04:14:31,720
Speaker 1: think that's a really good example of it is just

4675
04:14:31,800 --> 04:14:35,120
Speaker 1: where like some website will print this certain thing and

4676
04:14:35,240 --> 04:14:41,600
Speaker 1: then it becomes a hysterical panic talking about it. Yeah,

4677
04:14:41,600 --> 04:14:43,280
Speaker 1: Like I think that the best. The most recent example

4678
04:14:43,360 --> 04:14:45,520
Speaker 1: that was that spa where it was like some person

4679
04:14:45,840 --> 04:14:49,800
Speaker 1: claimed like made it made a bunch of claims where

4680
04:14:49,800 --> 04:14:53,440
Speaker 1: they were like they might have seen a trans person maybe,

4681
04:14:54,080 --> 04:14:57,720
Speaker 1: and it turned into just like literally mobs showing up

4682
04:14:57,800 --> 04:15:00,880
Speaker 1: at this spa, like anti trans bobs, like a bunch

4683
04:15:00,960 --> 04:15:04,400
Speaker 1: of fascists showing up, a bunch of like like yeah,

4684
04:15:04,480 --> 04:15:10,200
Speaker 1: and that kind of stuff. Yeah, that's that affects reality. Yeah,

4685
04:15:11,400 --> 04:15:13,840
Speaker 1: that really affects people. Yeah. And and like the the

4686
04:15:13,960 --> 04:15:15,440
Speaker 1: the other one, the other one that that we've talked

4687
04:15:15,480 --> 04:15:18,160
Speaker 1: about in the trans episodes is people to people are

4688
04:15:18,200 --> 04:15:21,080
Speaker 1: starting to do this kind of stuff with ginger clinics,

4689
04:15:21,160 --> 04:15:24,760
Speaker 1: and it's you know, yeah, it's like yeah, like that

4690
04:15:24,880 --> 04:15:27,520
Speaker 1: that's only a matter of time before they start killing people,

4691
04:15:28,160 --> 04:15:33,760
Speaker 1: Like yeah, yeah. The media can easily whip someone into

4692
04:15:33,920 --> 04:15:36,200
Speaker 1: frenzy to do that. I mean we've seen that in

4693
04:15:36,280 --> 04:15:38,640
Speaker 1: the past with I think, as you referenced before, like

4694
04:15:38,720 --> 04:15:42,000
Speaker 1: the whole like abortion whole, like in the nineties and

4695
04:15:42,080 --> 04:15:45,120
Speaker 1: early two thousands, the whole abortion panic. Yeah, I mean

4696
04:15:45,200 --> 04:15:47,320
Speaker 1: we saw we saw people die over stuff like that.

4697
04:15:47,800 --> 04:15:52,720
Speaker 1: It's yeah, bombings like and you know. And the other

4698
04:15:52,800 --> 04:15:55,320
Speaker 1: thing is that like they're winning, like they are on

4699
04:15:55,480 --> 04:15:59,440
Speaker 1: the verge of after this like half a century long battle,

4700
04:15:59,520 --> 04:16:01,480
Speaker 1: like they are on the verge of over turning ro

4701
04:16:01,600 --> 04:16:05,040
Speaker 1: he weighed. Yeah, yeah, like you know that. And that's

4702
04:16:07,120 --> 04:16:10,280
Speaker 1: I think a really grim thing for the left where

4703
04:16:10,320 --> 04:16:14,280
Speaker 1: it's like, like, what one of the asymmetries here is

4704
04:16:14,440 --> 04:16:17,960
Speaker 1: that like if a leftist like assassinated the head of

4705
04:16:18,040 --> 04:16:22,040
Speaker 1: Ice right like they were, like I would be in

4706
04:16:22,160 --> 04:16:24,960
Speaker 1: prison in like a day and a half. There'd be

4707
04:16:25,040 --> 04:16:29,040
Speaker 1: like fifteen people who be shot in police raids. Like yeah,

4708
04:16:29,120 --> 04:16:30,400
Speaker 1: but you know, but like when when the right wing

4709
04:16:30,480 --> 04:16:33,240
Speaker 1: just like it does terrorism, like just murders abortion right

4710
04:16:33,280 --> 04:16:38,240
Speaker 1: as it works, And that's a really grim asymmetry. But

4711
04:16:38,640 --> 04:16:43,280
Speaker 1: it's sort of the reality of the situation that Brian right,

4712
04:16:43,880 --> 04:16:46,440
Speaker 1: And yeah, that reminds me of the This is a

4713
04:16:46,520 --> 04:16:48,880
Speaker 1: while ago. This was during the Black Lives Matter protests.

4714
04:16:48,880 --> 04:16:52,120
Speaker 1: I don't even remember why he was on the fed's radar,

4715
04:16:52,440 --> 04:16:54,600
Speaker 1: but there was the dude I think in Portland, and

4716
04:16:54,720 --> 04:16:56,960
Speaker 1: there was like a there was like a raid and

4717
04:16:57,040 --> 04:17:00,240
Speaker 1: they just shot the dude in the remember that. Yeah, yeah,

4718
04:17:00,240 --> 04:17:02,240
Speaker 1: I mean it happened again in Uh. Yeah, they just

4719
04:17:02,320 --> 04:17:04,600
Speaker 1: murdered him. And then like it happened again with Winston

4720
04:17:04,640 --> 04:17:09,280
Speaker 1: Smith in uh in Minneapolis where like the like the

4721
04:17:09,360 --> 04:17:11,480
Speaker 1: cops were mad at him because he was like he

4722
04:17:11,600 --> 04:17:13,760
Speaker 1: was one of the leaders of what's happening in Minneapolis

4723
04:17:13,880 --> 04:17:18,160
Speaker 1: and they just walked up and shot him. Yeah and yeah,

4724
04:17:18,640 --> 04:17:23,800
Speaker 1: and it's it's it is a really bleak look at

4725
04:17:25,640 --> 04:17:28,000
Speaker 1: you know, how this country actually works, which is not

4726
04:17:28,320 --> 04:17:30,640
Speaker 1: really what I expected this episode to be. Ending up.

4727
04:17:31,520 --> 04:17:33,200
Speaker 1: I just like, we'll do a fun episode about Goblin

4728
04:17:33,280 --> 04:17:34,720
Speaker 1: Bode and now it's like, yeah, he was the state

4729
04:17:34,880 --> 04:17:38,040
Speaker 1: just assassinating people and they're gonna keep doing it. And

4730
04:17:38,120 --> 04:17:40,440
Speaker 1: also they're gonna like to start bombing abortion not well,

4731
04:17:40,480 --> 04:17:42,400
Speaker 1: I mean to keep bombing abortion clinics and start bombing

4732
04:17:42,440 --> 04:17:45,600
Speaker 1: gender clinics, and it's like that doesn't actually happen, but

4733
04:17:45,800 --> 04:17:49,040
Speaker 1: but yeah, I think it was our point was that

4734
04:17:49,120 --> 04:17:51,560
Speaker 1: it was like we've seen that happen in the past. Yeah,

4735
04:17:52,960 --> 04:17:58,120
Speaker 1: of the reactionary media feeling the hysteria through it doesn't

4736
04:17:58,120 --> 04:18:00,800
Speaker 1: even matter if it's real or fake stories that's that's

4737
04:18:00,840 --> 04:18:02,520
Speaker 1: the main issue is it can be totally fake and

4738
04:18:02,760 --> 04:18:08,440
Speaker 1: it'll it'll just fuel hysterics against anyone, any any target. Yeah,

4739
04:18:08,520 --> 04:18:12,480
Speaker 1: that's just like yeah, like what the we should probably

4740
04:18:12,560 --> 04:18:14,800
Speaker 1: close out. But like the one that's been fun for me,

4741
04:18:14,960 --> 04:18:17,720
Speaker 1: and by fun, I mean dear God, has been the

4742
04:18:18,560 --> 04:18:22,200
Speaker 1: fucking the Wuhuan biolab ship, which was like literally like

4743
04:18:22,440 --> 04:18:24,800
Speaker 1: like literally this this was this like literally this whole

4744
04:18:24,880 --> 04:18:27,320
Speaker 1: thing was a psi oup by Steve Bannett who was like,

4745
04:18:27,400 --> 04:18:28,920
Speaker 1: this is how we can have Trump win the election

4746
04:18:29,120 --> 04:18:33,360
Speaker 1: by by by uniting everyone in like anti Asian hate,

4747
04:18:33,960 --> 04:18:36,360
Speaker 1: and like it worked. Like well, I mean, okay, he

4748
04:18:36,480 --> 04:18:39,200
Speaker 1: he lost the election, but like you know, all like

4749
04:18:39,280 --> 04:18:45,720
Speaker 1: eventually this is this just like completely crank, like absolutely batship.

4750
04:18:45,840 --> 04:18:48,000
Speaker 1: All the people who are advocating for it are like

4751
04:18:48,760 --> 04:18:51,560
Speaker 1: like they like they're like mushroom scientists or they're like

4752
04:18:51,760 --> 04:18:55,480
Speaker 1: people who like you know, like like they're they're like weird.

4753
04:18:55,520 --> 04:18:58,520
Speaker 1: I ever met In Truthers, Like all these people, you know,

4754
04:18:58,640 --> 04:19:00,920
Speaker 1: like were were legitim mice by the media and like

4755
04:19:01,080 --> 04:19:05,240
Speaker 1: that had that had an enormous impact on the last

4756
04:19:05,400 --> 04:19:07,960
Speaker 1: sort of two years of anti ation violence. Like that's

4757
04:19:08,680 --> 04:19:10,560
Speaker 1: like that that's the thing that way to get as

4758
04:19:10,600 --> 04:19:12,920
Speaker 1: bad as it did. And again, it is just completely fake.

4759
04:19:13,000 --> 04:19:15,800
Speaker 1: There's nothing, it's it's there. They're just they're just you know,

4760
04:19:16,520 --> 04:19:19,000
Speaker 1: like a bunch of fascists made up a lie about

4761
04:19:19,760 --> 04:19:21,840
Speaker 1: a plague so that they could try to win an

4762
04:19:21,880 --> 04:19:25,040
Speaker 1: election by like burdering Asian people. And yeah, yeah, and

4763
04:19:25,160 --> 04:19:27,520
Speaker 1: it's it's that. That's the interesting thing is that if

4764
04:19:27,600 --> 04:19:30,520
Speaker 1: you look at um, like poles about like, oh, how

4765
04:19:30,560 --> 04:19:32,880
Speaker 1: do you feel about China, Like you go back even

4766
04:19:32,920 --> 04:19:35,880
Speaker 1: just four years ago, most people were like, I don't

4767
04:19:35,920 --> 04:19:38,880
Speaker 1: have exact numbers on my head, um, but most people

4768
04:19:39,000 --> 04:19:41,720
Speaker 1: it was like maybe split like oh, like China is

4769
04:19:41,760 --> 04:19:44,040
Speaker 1: kind of scary, or like China, China is okay. But

4770
04:19:44,120 --> 04:19:46,040
Speaker 1: like most Americans at this point, even like a lot

4771
04:19:46,120 --> 04:19:49,120
Speaker 1: of liberals do not like China. Like it's like even

4772
04:19:49,200 --> 04:19:52,040
Speaker 1: the rest like China. It's like it was just manifested

4773
04:19:52,120 --> 04:19:55,759
Speaker 1: through the whole maybe not all through the whole Buhanu

4774
04:19:56,200 --> 04:19:58,520
Speaker 1: lab but just the last few years and years of

4775
04:19:59,200 --> 04:20:05,280
Speaker 1: both by the government and Trump's government ratcheting hard against China,

4776
04:20:05,440 --> 04:20:09,240
Speaker 1: and just like anti China or even anti Chinese like

4777
04:20:09,360 --> 04:20:12,520
Speaker 1: people sentiments. Yeah, and there's an interesting thing there too,

4778
04:20:12,560 --> 04:20:14,960
Speaker 1: where it's like, okay, so for the first about so

4779
04:20:15,080 --> 04:20:17,840
Speaker 1: that this pivot starts when which when Trump starts a

4780
04:20:17,880 --> 04:20:21,240
Speaker 1: trade war, right, and there's this interesting thing where it's

4781
04:20:21,320 --> 04:20:24,360
Speaker 1: like for the first about two years of it, it

4782
04:20:24,520 --> 04:20:26,400
Speaker 1: was like the views about China were changing, but the

4783
04:20:26,400 --> 04:20:29,880
Speaker 1: actual level of anti Asian violence wasn't doing much. But

4784
04:20:29,960 --> 04:20:31,640
Speaker 1: then when COVID hit, it was like you know it

4785
04:20:31,880 --> 04:20:33,800
Speaker 1: was it was it was kind of like an abstract thing, right,

4786
04:20:33,880 --> 04:20:35,240
Speaker 1: it was like, okay, well we don't like China, but

4787
04:20:35,360 --> 04:20:39,760
Speaker 1: like there was nothing that there wasn't like a super

4788
04:20:40,520 --> 04:20:45,040
Speaker 1: strong like the thing you could point to to directly

4789
04:20:45,120 --> 04:20:47,280
Speaker 1: tie it to Asian people. And then the moment the

4790
04:20:47,360 --> 04:20:49,280
Speaker 1: moment the pandemic started and then the moment that like

4791
04:20:49,320 --> 04:20:52,120
Speaker 1: Wuhan shit started, it was like suddenly there was like

4792
04:20:52,160 --> 04:20:54,200
Speaker 1: a concrete thing that you could point to, and it

4793
04:20:54,280 --> 04:20:56,880
Speaker 1: was that was like, hey, look it's the Chinese people.

4794
04:20:57,040 --> 04:20:59,880
Speaker 1: The they're they're they're they're spreading the plague, they benefactured

4795
04:20:59,920 --> 04:21:02,520
Speaker 1: the played a lab is because they're dirty. Like the

4796
04:21:02,680 --> 04:21:06,200
Speaker 1: moments became that was when everything just like all the

4797
04:21:06,320 --> 04:21:08,800
Speaker 1: tax skyrockety like that. That's that's that's when like everything

4798
04:21:08,920 --> 04:21:15,160
Speaker 1: just sort of like really like kicked off, and that

4799
04:21:15,440 --> 04:21:18,320
Speaker 1: was like hysterics. That was like the targeted hysteria of

4800
04:21:21,560 --> 04:21:23,720
Speaker 1: I would say, yeah, yeah, and it's well, you know,

4801
04:21:23,880 --> 04:21:26,600
Speaker 1: the fun thing I'm bracing for is like, yeah, this

4802
04:21:26,600 --> 04:21:28,960
Speaker 1: looks like it's gonna be the Democrat strategy two as

4803
04:21:28,960 --> 04:21:32,280
Speaker 1: well as Republican strategy, and it's like, oh, hey, more

4804
04:21:32,360 --> 04:21:34,040
Speaker 1: of us are gonna die. This is gonna be fun.

4805
04:21:34,760 --> 04:21:41,040
Speaker 1: So yeah, yeah, yeah, it's kind of scary. Yeah, this

4806
04:21:41,160 --> 04:21:43,680
Speaker 1: just started out as a fun episode. But yeah, it's

4807
04:21:43,760 --> 04:21:47,400
Speaker 1: how kind that was fun, So I guess it was

4808
04:21:47,440 --> 04:21:49,720
Speaker 1: still a lot of fun. Yeah, yeah. Do you have

4809
04:21:49,760 --> 04:21:51,280
Speaker 1: anything else that you want to say or do you

4810
04:21:51,360 --> 04:21:53,840
Speaker 1: want to tell people where to find you? Um? I

4811
04:21:53,880 --> 04:21:56,480
Speaker 1: don't really have anything to say necessarily. All I really

4812
04:21:56,560 --> 04:21:59,080
Speaker 1: do on the internet, at least like my my whole

4813
04:21:59,120 --> 04:22:02,240
Speaker 1: internet in that prevate presence right now is just on Twitter. UM.

4814
04:22:02,520 --> 04:22:06,600
Speaker 1: If you want to follow me, it's um at meAll meu. UM.

4815
04:22:07,200 --> 04:22:09,280
Speaker 1: I don't know if you'll have like that link or anything.

4816
04:22:09,640 --> 04:22:12,160
Speaker 1: It's kind of hard to spell with the last the

4817
04:22:12,360 --> 04:22:15,680
Speaker 1: whole MEU it's i'm eu w. But that's really all

4818
04:22:15,720 --> 04:22:18,280
Speaker 1: I have is just my Twitter. Yeah, that's all. That's

4819
04:22:18,320 --> 04:22:22,000
Speaker 1: all I really do online. I mean, it is extremely funny,

4820
04:22:22,000 --> 04:22:25,320
Speaker 1: and every once in a while you create Goblin Mode

4821
04:22:27,240 --> 04:22:32,960
Speaker 1: as an actual thing, which is Yeah, it's fun. Yeah,

4822
04:22:32,960 --> 04:22:35,320
Speaker 1: I have a good time on Twitter people. People complain

4823
04:22:35,320 --> 04:22:38,280
Speaker 1: about that website a lot. But yeah, since I joined

4824
04:22:38,320 --> 04:22:40,560
Speaker 1: the like twenty nineteen or whatever, I haven't looked back.

4825
04:22:40,600 --> 04:22:42,440
Speaker 1: It's it's a lot of fun about a lot of

4826
04:22:42,480 --> 04:22:45,760
Speaker 1: cool people. Yeah, I've known of you for a while,

4827
04:22:45,920 --> 04:22:51,160
Speaker 1: but it's nice to actually talk to you. You too, Yeah, yeah,

4828
04:22:51,240 --> 04:22:54,680
Speaker 1: it was. It was a good time. Yeah, So go

4829
04:22:54,920 --> 04:23:01,200
Speaker 1: Goblin Mode. Don't let the fascist murder trans people. H Yeah. Yeah,

4830
04:23:01,880 --> 04:23:05,240
Speaker 1: this is manning. It happen here. You can find us

4831
04:23:05,280 --> 04:23:12,840
Speaker 1: on Twitter, Instagram at happen here pod. Uh. Yeah, have fun,

4832
04:23:13,400 --> 04:23:19,160
Speaker 1: find cool trinkets suppressed the turfs gotta you gotta have

4833
04:23:19,240 --> 04:23:22,000
Speaker 1: the trinkets. You gotta find the that's what Goblin knows

4834
04:23:22,040 --> 04:23:34,440
Speaker 1: all about getting trinkets. That's right, all right, by folks. Hey,

4835
04:23:34,600 --> 04:23:37,680
Speaker 1: we'll be back Monday with more episodes every week from

4836
04:23:37,720 --> 04:23:40,320
Speaker 1: now until the heat death of the universe. It could

4837
04:23:40,320 --> 04:23:42,640
Speaker 1: happen Here is a production of cool Zone Media. For

4838
04:23:42,800 --> 04:23:45,520
Speaker 1: more podcasts from cool Zone Media, visit our website, cool

4839
04:23:45,560 --> 04:23:47,520
Speaker 1: zone media dot com, or check us out on the

4840
04:23:47,600 --> 04:23:50,280
Speaker 1: I Heart Radio app, Apple Podcasts, or wherever you listen

4841
04:23:50,280 --> 04:23:53,240
Speaker 1: to podcasts. You can find sources for It could happen here,

4842
04:23:53,320 --> 04:23:56,720
Speaker 1: updated monthly at cool zone media dot com slash sources.

4843
04:23:57,000 --> 04:23:57,760
Speaker 1: Thanks for listening.