1 00:00:03,480 --> 00:00:07,560 Speaker 1: Welcome to the Bloomberg Law Podcast. I'm June Grosso. Every 2 00:00:07,640 --> 00:00:10,440 Speaker 1: day we bring you insight and analysis into the most 3 00:00:10,480 --> 00:00:13,399 Speaker 1: important legal news of the day. You can find more 4 00:00:13,480 --> 00:00:18,040 Speaker 1: episodes of the Bloomberg Law Podcast on Apple Podcasts, SoundCloud, 5 00:00:18,320 --> 00:00:22,119 Speaker 1: and on Bloomberg dot com slash podcasts. For the first 6 00:00:22,160 --> 00:00:25,120 Speaker 1: time in almost ninety years, a California judge has been 7 00:00:25,120 --> 00:00:27,680 Speaker 1: removed from office by the state's voters because of a 8 00:00:27,800 --> 00:00:33,200 Speaker 1: lenient sentence in a sexual assault case. In Santa Clara County, 9 00:00:33,200 --> 00:00:37,320 Speaker 1: Superior Court judge Aaron Pursky sentence Stanford student Brock Turner 10 00:00:37,400 --> 00:00:40,320 Speaker 1: to just six months in jail for sexually assaulting a 11 00:00:40,360 --> 00:00:43,920 Speaker 1: woman who was unconscious. Prosecutors had asked for six years. 12 00:00:44,280 --> 00:00:49,080 Speaker 1: Persky spoke with CBS News before the recall vote. If 13 00:00:49,080 --> 00:00:51,000 Speaker 1: a judge is thinking, in the back of his or 14 00:00:51,040 --> 00:00:54,480 Speaker 1: her mind, how is this going to look? How will 15 00:00:54,520 --> 00:00:58,080 Speaker 1: it look on social media? Will I be vilified on 16 00:00:58,640 --> 00:01:02,240 Speaker 1: cable news? That's the wrong avenue. We can't do that. 17 00:01:02,320 --> 00:01:05,560 Speaker 1: We shouldn't do that, and we shouldn't put judges in 18 00:01:05,640 --> 00:01:09,120 Speaker 1: a position where they fear it. Joining me is Joshua 19 00:01:09,200 --> 00:01:12,120 Speaker 1: Spevac and your fellow at the Hugh Carree, Institute for 20 00:01:12,240 --> 00:01:15,520 Speaker 1: Government Reform at Wagner College and founder of the Recall 21 00:01:15,640 --> 00:01:20,119 Speaker 1: Elections blog Joshua, Is this an isolated case or are 22 00:01:20,160 --> 00:01:24,800 Speaker 1: there implications for the future. There doesn't seem to be 23 00:01:24,840 --> 00:01:28,000 Speaker 1: too many. There aren't too many possibilities of a recall 24 00:01:28,000 --> 00:01:31,759 Speaker 1: of judges. Uh. They don't happen frequently. The last one 25 00:01:31,840 --> 00:01:35,319 Speaker 1: in the US was seventy seven, where somebody was removed, 26 00:01:35,360 --> 00:01:36,880 Speaker 1: and the last time they even got one on the 27 00:01:36,920 --> 00:01:43,520 Speaker 1: ballot was both in Wisconsin. Uh So, Well, there's always 28 00:01:43,600 --> 00:01:47,880 Speaker 1: talk whenever there's a decision, whenever there's a controversial decision. 29 00:01:48,280 --> 00:01:50,960 Speaker 1: For instance Prop eight, when that came down, there was 30 00:01:51,120 --> 00:01:55,840 Speaker 1: threats of a recall. Uh famous California Supreme Court Chief 31 00:01:55,920 --> 00:01:59,960 Speaker 1: judge faced constant threats of a recall. Eventually she was 32 00:02:00,040 --> 00:02:03,800 Speaker 1: removed by retention election. But it's very hard to get 33 00:02:03,840 --> 00:02:07,360 Speaker 1: it on the ballot, so that you would need sort 34 00:02:07,400 --> 00:02:11,919 Speaker 1: of the firestorm of criticism, and as happened in this case, 35 00:02:11,960 --> 00:02:15,200 Speaker 1: a lot of money um to to do. The real 36 00:02:15,320 --> 00:02:19,200 Speaker 1: hurdle is getting the signatures. Uh So, to get the 37 00:02:19,280 --> 00:02:22,760 Speaker 1: recall to the ballot is the problem. Who spearheaded this 38 00:02:23,000 --> 00:02:27,240 Speaker 1: recall effort and where did the money come from. It 39 00:02:27,360 --> 00:02:32,320 Speaker 1: was a Stanford University professor who led the effort, and 40 00:02:32,880 --> 00:02:36,440 Speaker 1: they seemed to raise the money, you know, on viral 41 00:02:36,520 --> 00:02:38,920 Speaker 1: a and on social media, and they did a very 42 00:02:38,960 --> 00:02:42,959 Speaker 1: good job fundraising and then using it effectively to get 43 00:02:42,960 --> 00:02:46,760 Speaker 1: the signatures. So it is possible to get this type 44 00:02:46,800 --> 00:02:50,679 Speaker 1: of action together, it's just quite difficult. So I want 45 00:02:50,720 --> 00:02:54,919 Speaker 1: to talk about some of Judge Persky's responses. He had 46 00:02:55,000 --> 00:02:58,520 Speaker 1: said that he had a legal and professional responsibility to 47 00:02:58,600 --> 00:03:02,760 Speaker 1: consider alternatives to imprisonment for first time offenders. Is that 48 00:03:02,800 --> 00:03:08,120 Speaker 1: a valid concern? I think that is. There's always this 49 00:03:08,360 --> 00:03:12,000 Speaker 1: concern with recalls, how what should they be allowed for, 50 00:03:13,080 --> 00:03:16,360 Speaker 1: what should they be used against judges? And from the 51 00:03:16,480 --> 00:03:19,880 Speaker 1: very beginning in California there was a real debate of 52 00:03:19,919 --> 00:03:23,240 Speaker 1: whether the recalls should be extended to judges. A number 53 00:03:23,240 --> 00:03:26,280 Speaker 1: of states do not extend it to judges for that reason, 54 00:03:26,720 --> 00:03:30,600 Speaker 1: and for instance, William Howard taft To actually vetoed the 55 00:03:30,639 --> 00:03:35,840 Speaker 1: Arizona Constitution originally until they removed a recall of judge provision. 56 00:03:36,480 --> 00:03:41,240 Speaker 1: So this is a long time debate. It hasn't played 57 00:03:41,280 --> 00:03:44,320 Speaker 1: out too much simply because there haven't been too many 58 00:03:44,640 --> 00:03:49,960 Speaker 1: uh judge recalls in US history. So Judge Persky claimed 59 00:03:49,960 --> 00:03:53,600 Speaker 1: that a recall causes judges to consider the reaction in 60 00:03:53,720 --> 00:03:57,720 Speaker 1: social media and the news when sentencing someone, and that 61 00:03:57,800 --> 00:04:01,440 Speaker 1: it's an attack on judicial independ endance. What are the 62 00:04:01,520 --> 00:04:05,960 Speaker 1: responses to that? They seem pretty good arguments. Yes, and 63 00:04:06,120 --> 00:04:09,040 Speaker 1: I think that actually the responses, that is the goal 64 00:04:09,640 --> 00:04:16,240 Speaker 1: that recalls when they were adopted, were to give a 65 00:04:16,400 --> 00:04:20,960 Speaker 1: push officials to have more of a response to popular opinion, 66 00:04:21,040 --> 00:04:26,400 Speaker 1: and including in that was judges. Uh, so he's not wrong, 67 00:04:26,600 --> 00:04:30,479 Speaker 1: it's just the the opinion, the desire to have a 68 00:04:30,520 --> 00:04:35,760 Speaker 1: recall is in many ways pushing that exact point that, yes, 69 00:04:35,839 --> 00:04:38,440 Speaker 1: we do want the judges to have more of a 70 00:04:38,520 --> 00:04:42,640 Speaker 1: feeling of what the popular will is, so let's go ahead. 71 00:04:43,760 --> 00:04:47,640 Speaker 1: So it's really how how valuable is that? How is 72 00:04:47,680 --> 00:04:51,360 Speaker 1: that dangerous? Or is that a positive? As the adopters 73 00:04:51,360 --> 00:04:53,680 Speaker 1: of the recall what they did in this case, the 74 00:04:53,720 --> 00:04:58,120 Speaker 1: sentence and the backlash prompted California lawmakers to change the law, 75 00:04:58,279 --> 00:05:03,360 Speaker 1: that seems a good response to this. Yeah, So that again, 76 00:05:03,400 --> 00:05:07,839 Speaker 1: that's very much in keeping with the ideology of the recall, 77 00:05:08,040 --> 00:05:10,719 Speaker 1: that you would be able to do this, you would 78 00:05:10,760 --> 00:05:12,680 Speaker 1: be able to get a recall on the valid you'd 79 00:05:12,720 --> 00:05:16,400 Speaker 1: be able to exhibit voter anger and show it and 80 00:05:17,080 --> 00:05:20,400 Speaker 1: uh there would be a reaction from elected officials. So 81 00:05:20,480 --> 00:05:23,640 Speaker 1: this is in many ways part and parcel of the 82 00:05:23,680 --> 00:05:28,080 Speaker 1: whole direct democracy movement. Does it make judges more political 83 00:05:28,200 --> 00:05:33,000 Speaker 1: than they already are? It's hard to say that one 84 00:05:33,080 --> 00:05:36,680 Speaker 1: or two recalls would do that, but judges have been 85 00:05:37,160 --> 00:05:40,880 Speaker 1: overall throughout the country. Uh, there does seem to be 86 00:05:40,920 --> 00:05:44,159 Speaker 1: more of a focus on the political politicalization of judges, 87 00:05:44,240 --> 00:05:47,520 Speaker 1: though since they're elected officials in many states, that's not 88 00:05:47,600 --> 00:05:51,719 Speaker 1: a surprise. UM. But we saw the Iowa judges removed 89 00:05:51,800 --> 00:05:56,839 Speaker 1: for their votes on gay marriage. The Wisconsin judge elections 90 00:05:56,880 --> 00:06:01,080 Speaker 1: were very highly contested, uh, and West Virginia had the 91 00:06:01,120 --> 00:06:05,839 Speaker 1: same thing. Where these just the appointment of judges becomes 92 00:06:05,839 --> 00:06:09,240 Speaker 1: a major issue in many ways. That was one of 93 00:06:09,279 --> 00:06:13,120 Speaker 1: the primary motivations in the two thousand and sixteen election 94 00:06:13,160 --> 00:06:15,479 Speaker 1: on the Supreme Court, and it does seem to be 95 00:06:15,520 --> 00:06:18,760 Speaker 1: a push for the Republicans in Congress, maybe their single 96 00:06:18,800 --> 00:06:21,480 Speaker 1: biggest issues. So the recall sort of fits in with 97 00:06:21,520 --> 00:06:26,800 Speaker 1: that whole politicalization of the judiciary. Right, we should mention 98 00:06:26,880 --> 00:06:31,920 Speaker 1: that Supreme Court justices and federal court judges cannot be recalled. 99 00:06:31,920 --> 00:06:37,239 Speaker 1: They're there for life. UM study of elected state judges 100 00:06:37,320 --> 00:06:40,480 Speaker 1: by n y U Law School concluded that judges are 101 00:06:40,560 --> 00:06:44,760 Speaker 1: influenced by their election cycles. The studied showed judges issuing 102 00:06:44,839 --> 00:06:48,479 Speaker 1: longer sentences for serious felony conviction when they're close to 103 00:06:48,520 --> 00:06:53,080 Speaker 1: re election. Now, that sort of that seems like it's 104 00:06:53,520 --> 00:06:59,159 Speaker 1: a bad result of having elected judges. Do you favor 105 00:06:59,200 --> 00:07:03,200 Speaker 1: appointed judge as are elected judges? Uh, you know, I 106 00:07:03,560 --> 00:07:06,239 Speaker 1: don't know which is better. I've seen in New York 107 00:07:07,320 --> 00:07:11,160 Speaker 1: there there's some a lot of negatives to having elected judges. 108 00:07:11,200 --> 00:07:15,320 Speaker 1: There were some corruption scandals surrounding that, as opposed to 109 00:07:15,360 --> 00:07:19,600 Speaker 1: the appointed judges. Where there it seems to be better 110 00:07:19,640 --> 00:07:22,440 Speaker 1: than New York State's UH Court of Appeals, the highest 111 00:07:22,440 --> 00:07:26,000 Speaker 1: court doesn't have elections. They have appointments, and they seem 112 00:07:26,080 --> 00:07:31,360 Speaker 1: to be well respected generally. Um, but it is it's 113 00:07:31,360 --> 00:07:36,800 Speaker 1: a matter of debate whether judicial officers should be elected. 114 00:07:37,320 --> 00:07:39,200 Speaker 1: Uh Is this a good thing? Is it good that 115 00:07:39,280 --> 00:07:43,480 Speaker 1: they are uh influenced by voter opinion? Well, some people 116 00:07:43,520 --> 00:07:46,120 Speaker 1: would say yes, you know, they should be They should 117 00:07:46,240 --> 00:07:49,360 Speaker 1: be aware of what the will of the voters and 118 00:07:49,400 --> 00:07:52,320 Speaker 1: the will of the popula says, on the other hand, 119 00:07:52,640 --> 00:07:55,160 Speaker 1: you know, if they're changing their opinions, maybe that's not 120 00:07:55,200 --> 00:07:58,680 Speaker 1: a good thing. We've been debating this for quite some time, 121 00:07:58,760 --> 00:08:00,920 Speaker 1: and I suspect that we will continue to do so. 122 00:08:01,040 --> 00:08:04,680 Speaker 1: Thanks so much for your input. Joshua. That's Joshua Spivack. 123 00:08:04,760 --> 00:08:07,680 Speaker 1: He's a senior fellow at the Hugh L. Carey Institute 124 00:08:07,680 --> 00:08:15,760 Speaker 1: for Government Reform at Wagner College. The stakes are very 125 00:08:15,840 --> 00:08:18,240 Speaker 1: high in a Missouri trial where J and J is 126 00:08:18,280 --> 00:08:21,840 Speaker 1: defending itself against claims that it's sold its iconic baby 127 00:08:21,880 --> 00:08:25,640 Speaker 1: powder knowing it caused ovarian cancer. It's the biggest trial 128 00:08:25,720 --> 00:08:28,400 Speaker 1: yet in the recent wave of cases against J and J. 129 00:08:28,840 --> 00:08:31,360 Speaker 1: Twenty two women are trying to link their illnesses to 130 00:08:31,440 --> 00:08:34,920 Speaker 1: exposure to asbestos in the company's talk. Joining me is 131 00:08:34,960 --> 00:08:38,400 Speaker 1: Howard Ericson, a professor at Fordham Law School. Howard, will 132 00:08:38,480 --> 00:08:42,319 Speaker 1: you explain how the allegations here are slightly different than 133 00:08:42,320 --> 00:08:48,120 Speaker 1: in other trials. Yes. In this case, the plaintiff, player 134 00:08:48,200 --> 00:08:52,480 Speaker 1: Mark Lanier is UM is pushing a theory that the 135 00:08:52,600 --> 00:08:58,040 Speaker 1: traces of asbestos in Malcolm powder caused ovarian cancer in 136 00:08:58,080 --> 00:09:02,240 Speaker 1: these twenty two women and UM and that's a theory 137 00:09:02,280 --> 00:09:05,000 Speaker 1: that hasn't been used in the in the prior ovarian 138 00:09:05,080 --> 00:09:09,880 Speaker 1: cancer cases. So is that a risky theory? Well, I 139 00:09:09,920 --> 00:09:14,520 Speaker 1: suppose that. I think it's a smart theory because there 140 00:09:14,520 --> 00:09:19,960 Speaker 1: have been recent plaintiffs verdicts in cases involving mesa seloma 141 00:09:20,080 --> 00:09:25,319 Speaker 1: that is an asbestos linked type of cancer, and I 142 00:09:25,360 --> 00:09:28,320 Speaker 1: think I think the plaintiff lawyer in this case is 143 00:09:28,360 --> 00:09:32,400 Speaker 1: hoping that those prior verdicts that have found that there 144 00:09:32,400 --> 00:09:37,240 Speaker 1: were traces of asbestos in uh in talcum powdern hoping 145 00:09:37,240 --> 00:09:41,160 Speaker 1: that will play out um similarly in the ovarian cancer cases. 146 00:09:41,200 --> 00:09:43,760 Speaker 1: But it does require new science and it remains to 147 00:09:43,800 --> 00:09:47,720 Speaker 1: be seen whether the jury will believe it. Mark, you 148 00:09:47,800 --> 00:09:50,959 Speaker 1: mentioned him. Lanier is representing the women and he's one 149 00:09:51,000 --> 00:09:55,079 Speaker 1: of the pre eminent plaintiff's lawyers in the countries. Billions 150 00:09:55,080 --> 00:09:57,240 Speaker 1: of dollar verdicts are par for the course with him. 151 00:09:57,360 --> 00:10:01,200 Speaker 1: Is his presence changing the scenario or changing it up 152 00:10:01,240 --> 00:10:04,559 Speaker 1: a little? Well, he's he's a big time trial lawyer. 153 00:10:04,559 --> 00:10:07,280 Speaker 1: I mean, this is uh, this is a big trial. 154 00:10:07,640 --> 00:10:11,800 Speaker 1: You know, as you mentioned, it is the biggest case 155 00:10:11,840 --> 00:10:13,640 Speaker 1: to go to trial in the in the talk and 156 00:10:13,679 --> 00:10:18,400 Speaker 1: powder litigation with twenty two plaintiffs and all that. So 157 00:10:18,480 --> 00:10:20,680 Speaker 1: this is really this is the big at bat and 158 00:10:20,720 --> 00:10:23,480 Speaker 1: they are bringing up you know, the home run hitter 159 00:10:24,040 --> 00:10:27,600 Speaker 1: on and and as you say, he is accustomed to 160 00:10:27,600 --> 00:10:30,760 Speaker 1: winning big verdicts in mass torque cases. It is his 161 00:10:30,840 --> 00:10:34,960 Speaker 1: first talk trial. However, now is this case going to 162 00:10:35,000 --> 00:10:38,360 Speaker 1: be about the science and what the jury believes about 163 00:10:38,400 --> 00:10:42,000 Speaker 1: the science or will it be about documentation of whether 164 00:10:42,120 --> 00:10:45,600 Speaker 1: or not Jay and Jay knew it's product contained asbestos. 165 00:10:47,440 --> 00:10:51,400 Speaker 1: I have to assume the plaintiffs will want to emphasize 166 00:10:51,480 --> 00:10:56,280 Speaker 1: what Ja and Jay knew, because you can always find 167 00:10:56,440 --> 00:10:59,719 Speaker 1: a memo somewhere showing that someone at a company was 168 00:10:59,760 --> 00:11:03,640 Speaker 1: more read about something. I assume the descendant J and 169 00:11:03,720 --> 00:11:08,240 Speaker 1: J will want to emphasize the science and the you 170 00:11:08,280 --> 00:11:11,440 Speaker 1: know what is very much an open question of and 171 00:11:11,440 --> 00:11:14,000 Speaker 1: and something that it's not clear the plaintiffs can prove 172 00:11:14,160 --> 00:11:18,560 Speaker 1: that is the causal link between Telcom POWERN and ovarian cancer? 173 00:11:19,000 --> 00:11:24,000 Speaker 1: Have there have been many trials in different states, plaintiffs, verdicts, seems, 174 00:11:24,040 --> 00:11:28,720 Speaker 1: defense verdicts, appeals. Can you summarize where the litigation stands? 175 00:11:29,160 --> 00:11:32,360 Speaker 1: Is one side clearly winning most of the cases or 176 00:11:32,400 --> 00:11:37,760 Speaker 1: is it harder to read than that it's You cannot 177 00:11:37,800 --> 00:11:41,000 Speaker 1: say that one side is clearly winning. What you can 178 00:11:41,120 --> 00:11:48,040 Speaker 1: say is that in other states, particularly New Jersey and California, UM, 179 00:11:48,200 --> 00:11:52,319 Speaker 1: the defendants have had more success, and in Missouri plaintiffs 180 00:11:52,360 --> 00:11:55,240 Speaker 1: have had a lot of success. This case, of course, 181 00:11:55,360 --> 00:11:57,760 Speaker 1: is happening in St. Louis, Missouri, which is exactly where 182 00:11:57,760 --> 00:12:01,080 Speaker 1: the plaintiffs want to be. So how ared why are 183 00:12:01,120 --> 00:12:04,359 Speaker 1: our plaintiffs having more success in Missouri than in California 184 00:12:04,400 --> 00:12:10,680 Speaker 1: and New Jersey. Jurisdictions vary. They They vary in some 185 00:12:10,760 --> 00:12:13,520 Speaker 1: of their procedural rules. For instance, in SURI is pretty 186 00:12:13,559 --> 00:12:16,960 Speaker 1: liberal about allowing joinder, and that's one reason this case 187 00:12:17,040 --> 00:12:20,040 Speaker 1: is going forward with twenty two plaintiffs. They vary in 188 00:12:20,480 --> 00:12:25,040 Speaker 1: the judges. And Judge Burlison, who is overseeing this case, 189 00:12:25,200 --> 00:12:29,040 Speaker 1: has overseen other cases that have ended up with plaintiff verdicts, 190 00:12:29,080 --> 00:12:33,200 Speaker 1: and they differ in jury demographics, and I think the 191 00:12:33,720 --> 00:12:37,320 Speaker 1: I think the plaintiffs were happy to to try as 192 00:12:37,320 --> 00:12:40,199 Speaker 1: many of these cases in St. Louis as possible. Now, 193 00:12:40,400 --> 00:12:44,839 Speaker 1: let's talk about how these cases might affect a settlement 194 00:12:45,240 --> 00:12:47,840 Speaker 1: of some kind down the road. Or have we seen 195 00:12:47,960 --> 00:12:50,040 Speaker 1: have they seen enough of these cases to know where 196 00:12:50,080 --> 00:12:52,200 Speaker 1: they're going or are they going to have to try 197 00:12:52,240 --> 00:12:56,960 Speaker 1: a lot more in different states. Mass towards vary. There 198 00:12:57,040 --> 00:13:00,840 Speaker 1: is there are mass towards litigations in which the parties 199 00:13:00,880 --> 00:13:03,040 Speaker 1: are able to reach a global settlement before there is 200 00:13:03,080 --> 00:13:06,640 Speaker 1: a single trial verdict on this one has now seen 201 00:13:06,679 --> 00:13:11,640 Speaker 1: a number of trial verdicts. But um, but there's there's 202 00:13:11,679 --> 00:13:15,960 Speaker 1: no sign yet of any sort of global settlement. Um. 203 00:13:16,000 --> 00:13:19,120 Speaker 1: You know, obviously the outcome of a case like this 204 00:13:19,160 --> 00:13:23,040 Speaker 1: will have an enormous bearing on the settlement negotiation dynamics. 205 00:13:23,720 --> 00:13:26,720 Speaker 1: Which is, the stakes are high, not simply because it 206 00:13:26,840 --> 00:13:30,160 Speaker 1: is a twenty two plaintiff case with um with a 207 00:13:30,160 --> 00:13:33,720 Speaker 1: lot of money at states in this judgment. Um, the 208 00:13:33,760 --> 00:13:35,840 Speaker 1: stakes are also high because this is going to change 209 00:13:35,840 --> 00:13:40,000 Speaker 1: the momentum one way or another in terms of settlement negotiations. Howard, 210 00:13:40,679 --> 00:13:44,119 Speaker 1: is this similar in any way to the tobacco litigation 211 00:13:44,320 --> 00:13:47,800 Speaker 1: in and by that I mean that the cases are tried, 212 00:13:47,840 --> 00:13:50,320 Speaker 1: You hear about verdicts, and then there's an appeal after 213 00:13:50,320 --> 00:13:53,040 Speaker 1: an appeal, after an appeal, and you you know, down 214 00:13:53,040 --> 00:14:00,199 Speaker 1: the road, no one is getting paid any settlements. The 215 00:14:00,880 --> 00:14:04,160 Speaker 1: guest to get too much there, right, the tobacco litigation 216 00:14:04,200 --> 00:14:08,280 Speaker 1: went decades without a penny being paid, and then all 217 00:14:08,320 --> 00:14:10,520 Speaker 1: of a sudden in the nine nineties things kind of 218 00:14:10,559 --> 00:14:13,960 Speaker 1: turned around with this with the Attorney General cases, I 219 00:14:14,000 --> 00:14:16,360 Speaker 1: think this is a bit different. I think this is 220 00:14:16,400 --> 00:14:19,760 Speaker 1: following a path more like the biox litigation or other 221 00:14:19,800 --> 00:14:23,520 Speaker 1: pharmaceutical mass towards where there are a number of cases, 222 00:14:23,560 --> 00:14:26,080 Speaker 1: but it's all moving very quickly. This is really just 223 00:14:26,160 --> 00:14:30,800 Speaker 1: the past couple of years, the number of cases has exploded, um, 224 00:14:30,920 --> 00:14:33,840 Speaker 1: and the trials are moving quickly. So it seems to 225 00:14:33,880 --> 00:14:35,920 Speaker 1: me the pace of this is all really quite quick 226 00:14:36,640 --> 00:14:40,520 Speaker 1: and um, so look down the road with about thirty 227 00:14:40,560 --> 00:14:43,600 Speaker 1: five seconds here, how how long before we see some 228 00:14:43,680 --> 00:14:48,920 Speaker 1: kind of definitive move or a payment or something like that. 229 00:14:50,520 --> 00:14:53,680 Speaker 1: You can't predict when Jay and j is going to 230 00:14:53,800 --> 00:14:58,520 Speaker 1: decide um that there is an appealing settlement to be had. 231 00:14:58,600 --> 00:15:00,640 Speaker 1: It seems to me all eyes right an hour on 232 00:15:00,800 --> 00:15:04,480 Speaker 1: this trial which could last a month, and how this 233 00:15:04,600 --> 00:15:07,760 Speaker 1: jury reacts to the scientific evidence. Well, we always appreciate 234 00:15:07,800 --> 00:15:10,360 Speaker 1: your coming on with these mass toward cases, which is 235 00:15:10,400 --> 00:15:14,040 Speaker 1: your expertise. That's Howard Ericson, a professor at Fordham Law School. 236 00:15:14,160 --> 00:15:17,120 Speaker 1: Thanks for listening to the Bloomberg Law Podcast. You can 237 00:15:17,160 --> 00:15:20,840 Speaker 1: subscribe and listen to the show on Apple podcast, SoundCloud, 238 00:15:20,960 --> 00:15:24,880 Speaker 1: and on bloomberg dot com slash podcast. I'm June Brosso. 239 00:15:25,320 --> 00:15:26,640 Speaker 1: This is Bloomberg