WEBVTT - Rerun: Spoofing and Caller ID

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<v Speaker 1>Welcome to tech Stuff, a production from I Heart Radio.

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<v Speaker 1>Hey there, and welcome to tech Stuff. I'm your host,

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<v Speaker 1>Jonathan Strickland. I'm an executive producer with I Heart Radio,

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<v Speaker 1>and how the tech are you? My tech is going

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<v Speaker 1>bananas today. I've been having some issues with the computer

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<v Speaker 1>I used to record episodes, and a little bit of

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<v Speaker 1>issues with my recording equipment, so I've swapped some stuff

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<v Speaker 1>out so that I can quickly do this because I

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<v Speaker 1>need to troubleshoot for the rest of the day. Fix

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<v Speaker 1>fix this so I can keep getting episodes out. But

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<v Speaker 1>I don't want to ever leave you without an episode

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<v Speaker 1>if I can help it. So what we're gonna do

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<v Speaker 1>is we're actually going to listen to an episode that

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<v Speaker 1>I originally published on July fourteenth, one called Spoofing and

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<v Speaker 1>Color I D. And the reason I picked this is

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<v Speaker 1>because we've had a lot of news recently here in

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<v Speaker 1>the United States about the Federal Communication Commission, or f CC,

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<v Speaker 1>going after telecommunications companies for allowing these sorts of activities

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<v Speaker 1>to happen, along with the related activity of robocall practices.

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<v Speaker 1>And of course there's nothing inherently illegal about robo calls,

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<v Speaker 1>but there's often use of robo calls to perpetuate scams

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<v Speaker 1>and to defraud people, and that's really a major issue,

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<v Speaker 1>so much so that recently the f c C sent

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<v Speaker 1>a cease and desist letter to a telecom as a

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<v Speaker 1>service like a communications platform as a service business called Twilio.

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<v Speaker 1>Twilio is a big deal, like it does multiple billions

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<v Speaker 1>of dollars of business every year. So this is unlike

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<v Speaker 1>those cases where the FCC went after some tiny, little

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<v Speaker 1>regional telecommunications company, which some have pointed out. You know,

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<v Speaker 1>when you squash one of those tiny companies, typically the

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<v Speaker 1>people behind it will incorporate as a different but similar company,

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<v Speaker 1>like in other words, they'll they'll have a new name

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<v Speaker 1>and maybe a new address and everything, but it's the

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<v Speaker 1>same scheme as before. This is not one of those cases.

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<v Speaker 1>This is a much larger company, not on the scale

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<v Speaker 1>of something like a T and T, but a big,

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<v Speaker 1>big company. And one of the reasons that these companies

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<v Speaker 1>get so much flak is for the allowance of these

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<v Speaker 1>kinds of practices. So to understand what spoofing is and

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<v Speaker 1>how that affects color I D I thought it would

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<v Speaker 1>be good to listen to this episode from a couple

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<v Speaker 1>of years ago, and we'll be back later this week

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<v Speaker 1>with brand new episodes as soon as I figure out

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<v Speaker 1>what gremlins are infecting all of my hardware. If it's

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<v Speaker 1>not one thing, it's another. Okay, I'll chat with you

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<v Speaker 1>at the end of this episode. So today I thought

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<v Speaker 1>I would talk a bit about Color I D, spoofing

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<v Speaker 1>and robo calls. Mostly color I D and spoofing robot calls,

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<v Speaker 1>I think I'm gonna have to say for another episode.

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<v Speaker 1>But here in the United States, the major telecommunications companies,

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<v Speaker 1>those being Verizon, T Mobile, and A T and T

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<v Speaker 1>now have to work together to fight spam calls due

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<v Speaker 1>to a mandate from the Federal Communications Commission, or f

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<v Speaker 1>c C. Now, the too Long Didn't Listen message behind this,

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<v Speaker 1>as opposed to too Long Didn't Read, is that the

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<v Speaker 1>goal is to eliminate spam robo calls going to your

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<v Speaker 1>phone so that you don't act like your phone is

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<v Speaker 1>a bomb about to go off every time it rings.

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<v Speaker 1>But to understand why this is necessary and how it

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<v Speaker 1>all works, we have to go much deeper. So if you,

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<v Speaker 1>dear listener, are of a certain age, you might remember

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<v Speaker 1>a time when we didn't all carry smartphones around with

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<v Speaker 1>us all the time. You might even remember a time

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<v Speaker 1>before we even carried simple cell phones with us. In fact,

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<v Speaker 1>some of you might remember being on a telephone handset

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<v Speaker 1>that was tethered to a phone that was mounted to

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<v Speaker 1>the wall, or sitting on top of an end table

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<v Speaker 1>or something. And back in those days, dear friends, if

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<v Speaker 1>someone called you, you really had no way of knowing

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<v Speaker 1>who that someone was. I know, it's terrifying, right the

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<v Speaker 1>phone rings, and there's no way to know who or

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<v Speaker 1>what is on the other side. Could it be Grandpa

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<v Speaker 1>Joe and he's found a golden ticket. Could it be

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<v Speaker 1>the local food bank calling to see if you'll volunteer

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<v Speaker 1>this year. Could it be a wrong number? The only

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<v Speaker 1>way to find out was to answer the phone, or

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<v Speaker 1>if you were a fancy person, you might let the

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<v Speaker 1>call go to an answering machine. Side note. The answering

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<v Speaker 1>machine traces its history all the way back to the

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<v Speaker 1>nineteen thirties. But when I was going up in the

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<v Speaker 1>seventies and eighties, they were still relatively uncommon from most

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<v Speaker 1>of the people I knew. But by the mid eighties

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<v Speaker 1>that that had totally changed, and we started seeing commercials

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<v Speaker 1>for like novelty answering machine outgoing messages, Yeah, I used

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<v Speaker 1>to be a thing. There was this incredible pressure to

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<v Speaker 1>create the perfect outgoing message to convey to those calling

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<v Speaker 1>that you had a personality. But I digress, let's get

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<v Speaker 1>back on track. Many answering machines would play incoming messages

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<v Speaker 1>out loud on a loudspeaker as someone was making the message,

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<v Speaker 1>which meant that you could use an answering machine to

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<v Speaker 1>screen your calls, and a lot of people did so.

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<v Speaker 1>If you had anxiety about answering the phone, you could

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<v Speaker 1>just wait for the answering machine to activate and then

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<v Speaker 1>see if the other person on the other end of

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<v Speaker 1>the call was going to wait around long enough to

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<v Speaker 1>actually leave a message after hearing You're hilarious and yet

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<v Speaker 1>incredibly effective outgoing message. Then upon recognizing the voice, you

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<v Speaker 1>could choose to either interrupt the machine by picking up

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<v Speaker 1>the phone and having the call initiate, or just letting

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<v Speaker 1>it go. Simpler times, really not that color I D

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<v Speaker 1>wasn't a thing back then. The foundation of color i

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<v Speaker 1>D technology has a history that dates back to the

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<v Speaker 1>late nineteen sixties, and to really understand all this, we

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<v Speaker 1>should take get another step back and just talk about

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<v Speaker 1>phone calls in general, and we'll build from there. So

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<v Speaker 1>when Alexander Graham Bell made his first call, arguably not

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<v Speaker 1>the first call, but that's a story for another time,

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<v Speaker 1>it was a direct line from his station to that

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<v Speaker 1>of his assistant, Thomas Watson. There was no need to

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<v Speaker 1>route that call anywhere. It was a straight road, if

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<v Speaker 1>you will, from one point to another. Now, let's say

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<v Speaker 1>we've got a group of four people, and we want

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<v Speaker 1>to connect these four people with phone lines so they

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<v Speaker 1>can talk to each other on the phone. We could

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<v Speaker 1>do this directly as well. Right, A simple way to

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<v Speaker 1>draw this out would be just draw four points as

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<v Speaker 1>corners of a square. Uh. Those corners represent our four

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<v Speaker 1>phone friends, and we draw straight lines from each point

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<v Speaker 1>to each other point. So what you end up with

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<v Speaker 1>is a square with a couple of diagonal lines crossing

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<v Speaker 1>through the center, and boom, you've got your four person network.

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<v Speaker 1>Each person has a direct line to each other person

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<v Speaker 1>in the network. But as we try to add more

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<v Speaker 1>people to a system like this, we quickly see the

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<v Speaker 1>limitations that we face. Each new connection means we have

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<v Speaker 1>to establish cables between that person and every other person

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<v Speaker 1>on the network. This gets expensive and complicated and messy

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<v Speaker 1>and unsustainable. A phone network in which every single person

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<v Speaker 1>with a phone has a direct line with every single

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<v Speaker 1>other person with the phone is just impossible. You wouldn't

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<v Speaker 1>even be able to move around because of all the

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<v Speaker 1>cables everywhere, and so an important development in the history

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<v Speaker 1>of the telephone system was the creation of the local exchange.

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<v Speaker 1>The local exchange is a centralized point that you dial

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<v Speaker 1>into and then the exchange could switch on a connection

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<v Speaker 1>between your line and the line of whomever it was

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<v Speaker 1>you wanted to call. So in the early days of telephones,

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<v Speaker 1>this was done with actual human beings sitting at a

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<v Speaker 1>switchboard and manually plugging cables into complete calls from one

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<v Speaker 1>person to another. So now rather than having direct connections

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<v Speaker 1>with every other phone in existence, you really just needed

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<v Speaker 1>a direct connection from your phone to an exchange. This

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<v Speaker 1>cuts way back on the amount of cables that you

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<v Speaker 1>need in order to create a network. Now, this works

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<v Speaker 1>fine for local calls, like you know, within a city,

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<v Speaker 1>everyone can connect to that one local exchange, but the

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<v Speaker 1>word local gives us a hint that there isn't one

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<v Speaker 1>single exchange for every phone line out there. Now local

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<v Speaker 1>exchanges will cover a specific region, but beyond that you

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<v Speaker 1>have other local exchanges. And to connect these exchanges together,

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<v Speaker 1>phone companies laid out what we're called trunk lines. These

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<v Speaker 1>are cables capable of carrying multiple phone signals simultaneously, which

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<v Speaker 1>is a good thing too. Otherwise a single long distance

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<v Speaker 1>call would prevent anyone else from making a similar sort

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<v Speaker 1>of call between you know, those two specific exchanges. The

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<v Speaker 1>networks grew organically, connecting to one another and forming what

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<v Speaker 1>we call the public switched Telephone network or p s

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<v Speaker 1>t N. You could look at it as a sort

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<v Speaker 1>of hierarchy as more of the world built out phone systems.

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<v Speaker 1>At the very bottom of this hierarchy, you had your

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<v Speaker 1>individual landline phones the stuff and homes and offices and

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<v Speaker 1>phone booths and stuff like that. We used to have

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<v Speaker 1>these things called phone booths, Superman, which change in them

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<v Speaker 1>doesn't matter. One level up from this level and you

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<v Speaker 1>have your local exchanges, right, These are the ones that

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<v Speaker 1>connect local calls to each other. And as I said,

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<v Speaker 1>in the old day, this was done with human operators

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<v Speaker 1>moving physical plugs into physical outlets to complete circuits and

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<v Speaker 1>switch on a phone call. But didn't take long before

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<v Speaker 1>the complexity of phone systems necessitated innovation to create automated

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<v Speaker 1>ways of handling this. One level up from local exchanges

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<v Speaker 1>are your trunk exchanges. The trunk exchange is to local exchanges,

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<v Speaker 1>as local exchanges are too individual landlines. The trunk exchanges

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<v Speaker 1>allow the various local exchanges within a country to connect

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<v Speaker 1>to one another. A level above the trunk exchanges, you

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<v Speaker 1>have international gateways, which interconnect the phone system of one

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<v Speaker 1>country with other countries. Often you end up having super

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<v Speaker 1>long cables connecting these, including cables that run under the ocean.

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<v Speaker 1>You know, there's cables under the Atlantic that connect Europe

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<v Speaker 1>to North America, for example. All right, so now let's

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<v Speaker 1>get a bit more complicated by throwing cellular phones into

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<v Speaker 1>the mix. Sell phones communicate to cell towers, which you

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<v Speaker 1>can think of as being kind of similar to the

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<v Speaker 1>local exchange I was talking about earlier. So cell towers

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<v Speaker 1>are essentially antenna, and the cell phones communicate with cell

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<v Speaker 1>towers through electromagnetic radiation, specifically radiation that falls into the

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<v Speaker 1>microwave frequency range. But they're not the same microwaves that

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<v Speaker 1>we use to zap our popcorn and microwave ovens. It's

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<v Speaker 1>not that level of frequency. It's also a very low

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<v Speaker 1>wattage that we use for cell phones now. The microwave

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<v Speaker 1>acts as a carrier wave, and I've talked a bit

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<v Speaker 1>about carrier waves in the past with stuff like radio signals.

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<v Speaker 1>Each phone is using a slightly different frequency, otherwise you

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<v Speaker 1>would run into issues with phones interfering with one another.

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<v Speaker 1>All right, So cell phone towers are at the heart

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<v Speaker 1>of the cells that make up a service area. One

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<v Speaker 1>really clever thing about this approach is the handshake that

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<v Speaker 1>happens as you move across a region. So you can

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<v Speaker 1>be on a phone call, and you can be let's say,

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<v Speaker 1>in a car, and you pass out of the range

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<v Speaker 1>of one cell phone or cell tower rather and you

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<v Speaker 1>enter into the range of another, and your call continues

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<v Speaker 1>on as if you had a solid connection on a

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<v Speaker 1>single cell tower the entire time. I'm gonna leave it

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<v Speaker 1>at that, because getting into the tech of all that

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<v Speaker 1>would really get us off course. This episode would end

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<v Speaker 1>up being like three hours long. But maybe I'll do

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<v Speaker 1>a full episode about how cell towers work. It is

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<v Speaker 1>really fascinating because they have to be very careful with

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<v Speaker 1>the frequencies they use in order to both service everyone

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<v Speaker 1>who's within range of a specific cell tower and not

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<v Speaker 1>interfere with anyone who's at a neighboring cell tower anyway.

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<v Speaker 1>Connecting the towers is the Mobile Telephone Switching Office or

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<v Speaker 1>mt s O. Each service provider has its own empty

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<v Speaker 1>s O in regions, So if the person you're talking

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<v Speaker 1>with is in the same region, such as like in

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<v Speaker 1>the same city as you, and they happen to be

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<v Speaker 1>on the same carrier, one MT s O pretty much

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<v Speaker 1>handles every thing. The call signals go through the cell

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<v Speaker 1>towers to one another through the m t s O,

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<v Speaker 1>but the calls are not made directly phone to phone.

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<v Speaker 1>It's not like your phone is acting like a radio

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<v Speaker 1>directly with the other phone. Now, if you're calling someone

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<v Speaker 1>who's on the other side of the country, it's a

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<v Speaker 1>little bit different. Typically, your call would go from your

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<v Speaker 1>phone to a cell tower, and from the cell tower

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<v Speaker 1>to the local MT s O of your carrier, then

0:13:26.120 --> 0:13:30.640
<v Speaker 1>from there to the ps TN, that big public switching

0:13:30.640 --> 0:13:34.160
<v Speaker 1>telephone network, and that would then route your call to

0:13:34.320 --> 0:13:37.320
<v Speaker 1>the MT s O relevant to whomever it was your

0:13:37.360 --> 0:13:40.640
<v Speaker 1>calling on the other end. So even cell calls can

0:13:40.679 --> 0:13:44.600
<v Speaker 1>rely upon the old phone system. Getting back to call

0:13:44.640 --> 0:13:47.319
<v Speaker 1>or I D. Back in the nineteen sixties, there was

0:13:47.360 --> 0:13:51.040
<v Speaker 1>an engineer named Theodore Paris Cavacos. It still is, I mean,

0:13:51.040 --> 0:13:54.040
<v Speaker 1>he's still alive today. He developed a way to send

0:13:54.080 --> 0:13:58.840
<v Speaker 1>electronic data over telephone lines. In one he filed and

0:13:58.920 --> 0:14:02.640
<v Speaker 1>received a patent for are a quote decoding and display

0:14:02.679 --> 0:14:06.440
<v Speaker 1>apparatus for groups of pulse trains end quote. This would

0:14:06.440 --> 0:14:09.440
<v Speaker 1>become the basis of color i D, in which the

0:14:09.480 --> 0:14:13.640
<v Speaker 1>telephone of the person making the call will send data

0:14:13.720 --> 0:14:18.520
<v Speaker 1>relating to the phone number of that originating call along

0:14:18.520 --> 0:14:21.200
<v Speaker 1>with the call itself, and a device on the other

0:14:21.320 --> 0:14:26.200
<v Speaker 1>end on the receiveing end could get this information, decode it,

0:14:26.360 --> 0:14:30.680
<v Speaker 1>and display the incoming phone number and thus identify the

0:14:30.720 --> 0:14:35.560
<v Speaker 1>incoming call. Other engineers around the same time period began

0:14:35.600 --> 0:14:38.880
<v Speaker 1>to develop similar technologies and approaches, and so the early

0:14:38.920 --> 0:14:41.360
<v Speaker 1>days of color I D are a bit muddled, as

0:14:41.360 --> 0:14:44.680
<v Speaker 1>there are numerous patents assigned to different inventors, some of

0:14:44.720 --> 0:14:48.240
<v Speaker 1>which acknowledged the existence of other inventions as prior art.

0:14:49.320 --> 0:14:53.120
<v Speaker 1>One of those inventors was Katsuo Hashimoto for a quote

0:14:53.440 --> 0:14:57.880
<v Speaker 1>Telephone Information Displaying Device end quote. The abstract of that

0:14:57.920 --> 0:15:00.840
<v Speaker 1>patent essentially lays out what we think go as color

0:15:00.960 --> 0:15:03.760
<v Speaker 1>I D. So I'm going to read to you the

0:15:03.880 --> 0:15:08.880
<v Speaker 1>abstract of this patent. Here he goes a calling parties

0:15:08.920 --> 0:15:12.680
<v Speaker 1>telephone number displaying device, in which, while the telephone set

0:15:12.760 --> 0:15:16.080
<v Speaker 1>of a subscriber is ringing in response to calling signals

0:15:16.080 --> 0:15:19.120
<v Speaker 1>from a telephone exchange office, the telephone number of a

0:15:19.240 --> 0:15:23.160
<v Speaker 1>calling party and information are displayed on digital display units

0:15:23.520 --> 0:15:28.320
<v Speaker 1>at high speed before lifting the handset. Accordingly, the subscriber

0:15:28.320 --> 0:15:30.760
<v Speaker 1>can determine whether or not he should answer the call

0:15:30.840 --> 0:15:34.280
<v Speaker 1>before picking up the handset. Thus his privacy can be

0:15:34.280 --> 0:15:37.720
<v Speaker 1>protected from a variety of telephone troubles such as wrong

0:15:37.800 --> 0:15:41.280
<v Speaker 1>number and nuisance calls. The display is maintained as it

0:15:41.360 --> 0:15:44.520
<v Speaker 1>is even if the handset is put back after the talk,

0:15:44.880 --> 0:15:47.480
<v Speaker 1>but it will be cleared automatically upon reception of the

0:15:47.520 --> 0:15:50.120
<v Speaker 1>next call to display the telephone number of the next

0:15:50.200 --> 0:15:53.080
<v Speaker 1>calling party. When the subscriber picks up the handset to

0:15:53.120 --> 0:15:56.440
<v Speaker 1>make a call, the internal circuit is automatically changed to

0:15:56.520 --> 0:16:00.880
<v Speaker 1>display a telephone number dialed by him. That's it. So

0:16:01.000 --> 0:16:04.200
<v Speaker 1>that patent pretty much explains that the invention would allow

0:16:04.280 --> 0:16:09.000
<v Speaker 1>telephones to send and receive signals between successive ringing signals.

0:16:09.000 --> 0:16:12.080
<v Speaker 1>So In other words, when the phone company isn't sending

0:16:12.120 --> 0:16:15.680
<v Speaker 1>the signal to make the receiving phone ring, it could

0:16:15.680 --> 0:16:19.680
<v Speaker 1>send the signal containing information about the origin of that call.

0:16:20.120 --> 0:16:23.200
<v Speaker 1>And that's why if you're using a landline and you

0:16:23.280 --> 0:16:25.960
<v Speaker 1>get a phone call with a system that had color

0:16:26.040 --> 0:16:28.440
<v Speaker 1>I D, you would only see the I D stuff

0:16:28.480 --> 0:16:31.880
<v Speaker 1>pop up after the first ring happened. The method for

0:16:32.000 --> 0:16:36.240
<v Speaker 1>sending the information was a type of frequency modulation that's

0:16:36.320 --> 0:16:39.280
<v Speaker 1>changing the frequency of a signal in order to encode

0:16:39.280 --> 0:16:44.280
<v Speaker 1>information on it, called frequency shift keying or f s K.

0:16:44.840 --> 0:16:47.880
<v Speaker 1>Applying f s K to a carrier signal alters that

0:16:48.000 --> 0:16:50.400
<v Speaker 1>carrier signal in a way that can be interpreted on

0:16:50.440 --> 0:16:52.880
<v Speaker 1>the other side in some manner. So in the case

0:16:52.880 --> 0:16:55.680
<v Speaker 1>of color I D, that some manner is that the

0:16:55.720 --> 0:17:00.360
<v Speaker 1>transmitting side can encode the phone number in that carrier way,

0:17:00.560 --> 0:17:04.119
<v Speaker 1>and the receiving side can decode that carrier wave and

0:17:04.160 --> 0:17:07.359
<v Speaker 1>get back at that number. FSK is used in lots

0:17:07.400 --> 0:17:10.800
<v Speaker 1>of applications, not just Color I D. But for our purposes,

0:17:11.000 --> 0:17:13.040
<v Speaker 1>it's just important that we know that this is the

0:17:13.080 --> 0:17:15.960
<v Speaker 1>methodology that the phone companies used to transmit the info

0:17:16.040 --> 0:17:19.280
<v Speaker 1>of Hey, this is the phone number that just dialed you.

0:17:19.520 --> 0:17:22.080
<v Speaker 1>But this wasn't going to be a service that phone

0:17:22.080 --> 0:17:25.719
<v Speaker 1>companies were going to throw in for free. No, this

0:17:25.760 --> 0:17:28.399
<v Speaker 1>would be something that companies would charge for on top

0:17:28.480 --> 0:17:31.360
<v Speaker 1>of the normal phone bill. Now, the story goes that

0:17:31.440 --> 0:17:34.840
<v Speaker 1>the phone companies at first planned to offer this service

0:17:34.920 --> 0:17:37.720
<v Speaker 1>as an audio one. So in other words, you could

0:17:37.800 --> 0:17:40.479
<v Speaker 1>opt into this service and you would get a verbal

0:17:40.560 --> 0:17:42.919
<v Speaker 1>alert when you picked up the phone telling you the

0:17:42.960 --> 0:17:47.520
<v Speaker 1>phone number that the call originated from. UH and the

0:17:47.520 --> 0:17:50.680
<v Speaker 1>phone companies were hoping to charge on a per use basis,

0:17:50.720 --> 0:17:53.679
<v Speaker 1>so every time you did this you get charged a

0:17:53.680 --> 0:17:57.600
<v Speaker 1>little amount. That's not how things eventually turned out. We'll

0:17:57.600 --> 0:17:59.960
<v Speaker 1>get into color I D a little bit more after

0:18:00.040 --> 0:18:02.159
<v Speaker 1>the break, and then we'll talk about the systems that

0:18:02.320 --> 0:18:13.480
<v Speaker 1>enable spoofing. But first let's take that quick break. So,

0:18:13.560 --> 0:18:16.760
<v Speaker 1>phone companies were licensing technologies to enable color I D

0:18:16.880 --> 0:18:19.359
<v Speaker 1>in the nineteen seventies, but it wasn't until the mid

0:18:19.520 --> 0:18:22.919
<v Speaker 1>nineteen eighties that we saw the first pilot program of

0:18:22.960 --> 0:18:25.960
<v Speaker 1>color I D here in the United States. That took

0:18:26.000 --> 0:18:31.200
<v Speaker 1>place in Orlando, Florida, where you know, the characters from

0:18:31.200 --> 0:18:34.080
<v Speaker 1>Book of Mormon really wanted to go. And that happened

0:18:34.080 --> 0:18:37.920
<v Speaker 1>back In nine four, Bell South offered a service called

0:18:38.040 --> 0:18:40.920
<v Speaker 1>Touch Star, and Color i D was one of the

0:18:40.960 --> 0:18:44.440
<v Speaker 1>features that you could opt into with Touch Star. It

0:18:44.520 --> 0:18:48.359
<v Speaker 1>was called Custom Local Area Signaling Service, but it would

0:18:48.359 --> 0:18:51.399
<v Speaker 1>become known as Color i D. Now, if you weren't

0:18:51.400 --> 0:18:53.919
<v Speaker 1>around in the nineteen eighties, you might be surprised to

0:18:53.960 --> 0:18:56.359
<v Speaker 1>hear that the emergence of color i D was viewed

0:18:56.359 --> 0:19:00.440
<v Speaker 1>with suspicion from multiple fronts in the US. Paul piticians

0:19:00.440 --> 0:19:03.800
<v Speaker 1>were asking if perhaps Color i D would violate wire

0:19:03.840 --> 0:19:07.600
<v Speaker 1>tapping laws, and others were likening it to tracing a

0:19:07.640 --> 0:19:10.000
<v Speaker 1>phone call, kind of like what you see in movies,

0:19:10.040 --> 0:19:12.520
<v Speaker 1>where you know, the police are trying to track a

0:19:12.600 --> 0:19:16.840
<v Speaker 1>specific criminal as they talk on the phone. But in fact,

0:19:17.240 --> 0:19:20.200
<v Speaker 1>it was such a controversial subject that it took more

0:19:20.280 --> 0:19:23.520
<v Speaker 1>than a decade for all fifty states in the US

0:19:23.600 --> 0:19:27.480
<v Speaker 1>to actually adopt the technology. California held out the longest.

0:19:27.760 --> 0:19:32.520
<v Speaker 1>California only incorporated color i D in nineteen twelve years

0:19:32.600 --> 0:19:35.359
<v Speaker 1>after Orlando, Florida got in on it. And by the

0:19:35.400 --> 0:19:38.600
<v Speaker 1>mid nineties, there was another big concern to think about,

0:19:38.680 --> 0:19:41.920
<v Speaker 1>and that was privacy. We weren't quite at the same

0:19:42.000 --> 0:19:44.399
<v Speaker 1>level that we are now, not by a long shot,

0:19:44.760 --> 0:19:49.200
<v Speaker 1>where the average medicine has generated tons of information about

0:19:49.240 --> 0:19:53.040
<v Speaker 1>themselves that can link back to them. But we were

0:19:53.160 --> 0:19:56.080
<v Speaker 1>entering into an era in which certain companies were building

0:19:56.119 --> 0:20:00.720
<v Speaker 1>out comprehensive databases about consumers, and so you started to

0:20:00.800 --> 0:20:06.040
<v Speaker 1>see companies building out profiles or even dossiers on people. Now,

0:20:06.160 --> 0:20:08.879
<v Speaker 1>if you want to be charitable, you could argue this

0:20:08.960 --> 0:20:13.320
<v Speaker 1>helped those companies serve their customers more effectively. But if

0:20:13.359 --> 0:20:15.760
<v Speaker 1>you want to be cynical, you could say that this

0:20:15.800 --> 0:20:19.160
<v Speaker 1>gave companies more information to leverage while trying to sell

0:20:19.240 --> 0:20:22.879
<v Speaker 1>goods or services to a potential customer. The truth is

0:20:22.960 --> 0:20:27.960
<v Speaker 1>probably somewhere in the middle. But what concerned privacy advocates

0:20:28.040 --> 0:20:31.680
<v Speaker 1>is that a business could theoretically rely on caller I D.

0:20:32.280 --> 0:20:34.479
<v Speaker 1>So if someone were to call in, let's say that

0:20:34.520 --> 0:20:38.240
<v Speaker 1>someone needs to talk to a customer service rep, then

0:20:38.520 --> 0:20:41.160
<v Speaker 1>that rep could do a reverse phone number, look up

0:20:41.359 --> 0:20:45.120
<v Speaker 1>on that call, and pull up a full profile of

0:20:45.160 --> 0:20:48.280
<v Speaker 1>the person calling. And there were a lot of privacy

0:20:48.320 --> 0:20:51.879
<v Speaker 1>implications that we're concerning. Actually kind of seems quaint in

0:20:51.920 --> 0:20:54.359
<v Speaker 1>comparison to what we deal with today, at least if

0:20:54.359 --> 0:20:57.879
<v Speaker 1>you look into how private information gets handled. These days.

0:20:58.640 --> 0:21:01.600
<v Speaker 1>For that reason, tell A phone companies introduced an option

0:21:01.640 --> 0:21:05.960
<v Speaker 1>to allow customers to opt into color I D blocking. Now,

0:21:05.960 --> 0:21:08.120
<v Speaker 1>if you did this, it meant that your number would

0:21:08.160 --> 0:21:11.760
<v Speaker 1>not be displayed when you called someone else. You were

0:21:11.880 --> 0:21:15.800
<v Speaker 1>effectively blacklisted for color I D. And so you know,

0:21:15.840 --> 0:21:18.240
<v Speaker 1>if I opted into this and I called you, you

0:21:18.240 --> 0:21:21.440
<v Speaker 1>would probably see some sort of message like color unknown

0:21:21.680 --> 0:21:25.960
<v Speaker 1>or something similar to that, which probably means you wouldn't

0:21:26.000 --> 0:21:29.000
<v Speaker 1>likely pick up my call. To be fair, you probably

0:21:29.040 --> 0:21:31.720
<v Speaker 1>wouldn't anyway, I'm kind of a drag to speak to

0:21:31.800 --> 0:21:35.240
<v Speaker 1>on the phone. It took time for attitudes around color

0:21:35.280 --> 0:21:38.479
<v Speaker 1>I D to change, but we did obviously see that

0:21:38.560 --> 0:21:43.720
<v Speaker 1>happen today. For many people, including myself, we don't pick

0:21:43.800 --> 0:21:46.480
<v Speaker 1>up the phone if we don't recognize the number that's

0:21:46.520 --> 0:21:50.160
<v Speaker 1>displayed on our phone screen, and that means that if

0:21:50.160 --> 0:21:53.359
<v Speaker 1>the call comes up as unknown or something along those lines,

0:21:54.160 --> 0:21:56.439
<v Speaker 1>we're not likely to answer it. We'll probably let it

0:21:56.600 --> 0:21:59.080
<v Speaker 1>go to voicemail. In fact, these days, I feel a

0:21:59.119 --> 0:22:02.400
<v Speaker 1>sense of anxiety even if I do recognize the number,

0:22:02.440 --> 0:22:05.159
<v Speaker 1>which is weird because I was one of those folks

0:22:05.160 --> 0:22:07.399
<v Speaker 1>who back in the eighties and nineties I love to

0:22:07.440 --> 0:22:10.240
<v Speaker 1>talk on the phone now it seems kind of odd.

0:22:10.640 --> 0:22:12.840
<v Speaker 1>I have a small group of friends and family with

0:22:12.880 --> 0:22:15.520
<v Speaker 1>whom I'll chat with on the phone, but they are

0:22:15.560 --> 0:22:20.080
<v Speaker 1>truly the exception and not the rule. Anyway, Color I

0:22:20.200 --> 0:22:23.440
<v Speaker 1>D made the transition from being viewed as being invasive

0:22:23.640 --> 0:22:27.640
<v Speaker 1>or creepy as to being necessary in order to function

0:22:27.800 --> 0:22:31.280
<v Speaker 1>as a human being in the modern technical age. And

0:22:31.320 --> 0:22:34.040
<v Speaker 1>there's a related thing I should talk about quickly for

0:22:34.040 --> 0:22:38.200
<v Speaker 1>folks in the United States, and that's the Calling Name presentation.

0:22:38.640 --> 0:22:43.440
<v Speaker 1>That's c NAP or Color Name Delivery, that's c NAM systems.

0:22:44.200 --> 0:22:47.080
<v Speaker 1>These are systems that can provide a name to go

0:22:47.240 --> 0:22:50.120
<v Speaker 1>with a phone number. So with these systems, you don't

0:22:50.200 --> 0:22:53.240
<v Speaker 1>just get a telephone number, you get a person or

0:22:53.359 --> 0:22:58.480
<v Speaker 1>business name that is associated with that phone number. So

0:22:58.600 --> 0:23:01.120
<v Speaker 1>here's how it works. In the United States. I'd say

0:23:01.119 --> 0:23:04.639
<v Speaker 1>we've got two people. We've got Max and Chris. And

0:23:04.800 --> 0:23:08.160
<v Speaker 1>Max is in New York and Chris is in California.

0:23:08.520 --> 0:23:12.400
<v Speaker 1>What's more, Max is a T mobile customer and Chriss

0:23:12.480 --> 0:23:15.439
<v Speaker 1>carrier is a T and T. And both Max and

0:23:15.520 --> 0:23:19.160
<v Speaker 1>Chris are using smartphones, so they're on cellular networks. So

0:23:19.280 --> 0:23:24.320
<v Speaker 1>Max calls Chris. Max's smartphone is connected to a nearby

0:23:24.400 --> 0:23:28.320
<v Speaker 1>cell tower, nearby T Mobile cell tower, and that routes

0:23:28.359 --> 0:23:31.199
<v Speaker 1>the call through T Mobiles M T s O in

0:23:31.240 --> 0:23:35.000
<v Speaker 1>that particular region, and the empty s O then routes

0:23:35.080 --> 0:23:38.080
<v Speaker 1>the call through the ps t N, the Public Switching

0:23:38.160 --> 0:23:42.399
<v Speaker 1>Telephone network, and that then routes the call to the

0:23:42.520 --> 0:23:45.159
<v Speaker 1>A T and T M T s O all the

0:23:45.160 --> 0:23:48.760
<v Speaker 1>way out in California. That connects to a cell tower

0:23:48.840 --> 0:23:52.840
<v Speaker 1>that's in Chris's area, and it sends the call to

0:23:52.920 --> 0:23:56.480
<v Speaker 1>Chris's smartphone. Now it's at this stage, the A T

0:23:56.640 --> 0:23:59.560
<v Speaker 1>and T stage, where we see the system call up

0:23:59.640 --> 0:24:03.360
<v Speaker 1>the name. So, in other words, the name look up

0:24:03.600 --> 0:24:06.960
<v Speaker 1>is on the receiver's end. It doesn't originate from the

0:24:06.960 --> 0:24:10.399
<v Speaker 1>the phone that's making the call. It's all down to

0:24:11.000 --> 0:24:15.360
<v Speaker 1>whichever carrier is an operation on the receiving end, and

0:24:15.960 --> 0:24:19.119
<v Speaker 1>A T and T sees that Max's phone number is

0:24:19.119 --> 0:24:22.080
<v Speaker 1>coming in, so it recognizes the number. But to associate

0:24:22.119 --> 0:24:26.000
<v Speaker 1>that number with Max as a person that requires a

0:24:26.080 --> 0:24:28.959
<v Speaker 1>database look up. And because Max is a T mobile

0:24:28.960 --> 0:24:31.960
<v Speaker 1>customer not an A T and T customer, A T

0:24:32.080 --> 0:24:34.800
<v Speaker 1>and T technically has to pay a very small fee

0:24:35.160 --> 0:24:38.520
<v Speaker 1>called a DIP fee to look up the information and

0:24:38.560 --> 0:24:42.000
<v Speaker 1>then to send that on to Chris. Then Chris sees

0:24:42.040 --> 0:24:46.320
<v Speaker 1>that Max is calling and picks up, or Chris ghosts Max.

0:24:46.359 --> 0:24:48.919
<v Speaker 1>I don't know what their friendship looks like, to be honest,

0:24:49.640 --> 0:24:52.280
<v Speaker 1>my point being that the name associated with a phone

0:24:52.359 --> 0:24:56.400
<v Speaker 1>number isn't magically connected to that number. Rather, there are

0:24:56.400 --> 0:25:00.199
<v Speaker 1>these massive databases of phone customers out there, typically at

0:25:00.280 --> 0:25:03.959
<v Speaker 1>the local level, and these databases match numbers two names.

0:25:04.520 --> 0:25:07.800
<v Speaker 1>There's no universal database out there that has every name

0:25:07.840 --> 0:25:11.440
<v Speaker 1>and every number, So phone companies have these ongoing agreements

0:25:11.480 --> 0:25:14.359
<v Speaker 1>to charge these small dip fees to dip into the

0:25:14.440 --> 0:25:18.960
<v Speaker 1>databases and retrieve relevant information. All right, So that's color

0:25:19.000 --> 0:25:21.680
<v Speaker 1>I D and I think it's pretty easy to understand

0:25:21.720 --> 0:25:24.399
<v Speaker 1>from a high level how it works. But then what

0:25:24.520 --> 0:25:27.760
<v Speaker 1>about spoofing. Well, spoofing is a practice in which the

0:25:27.840 --> 0:25:31.359
<v Speaker 1>number that pops up on a color I D system

0:25:31.640 --> 0:25:34.920
<v Speaker 1>is not the same as the actual number making the call,

0:25:35.480 --> 0:25:38.280
<v Speaker 1>And there are legitimate reasons to do this that have

0:25:38.440 --> 0:25:41.920
<v Speaker 1>nothing to do with scams or crimes. So spoofing as

0:25:41.960 --> 0:25:45.800
<v Speaker 1>it stands is not illegal on its own. It's only

0:25:45.840 --> 0:25:50.080
<v Speaker 1>illegal if you're using spoofing to purposefully mislead or scam people.

0:25:51.240 --> 0:25:53.280
<v Speaker 1>Then you can face a pretty big fine in the

0:25:53.320 --> 0:25:58.080
<v Speaker 1>United States. But spoofing is just a thing, not illegal.

0:25:58.240 --> 0:26:01.000
<v Speaker 1>So let me give you a scenario where it's it's allowed.

0:26:01.560 --> 0:26:04.879
<v Speaker 1>Let's say that you work at an accounting firm and

0:26:04.920 --> 0:26:07.680
<v Speaker 1>you're in charge of making some follow up calls relating

0:26:07.680 --> 0:26:10.879
<v Speaker 1>to a specific account. Now, you have your own phone

0:26:11.000 --> 0:26:14.560
<v Speaker 1>at your desk, but and your own phone actually has

0:26:14.600 --> 0:26:18.439
<v Speaker 1>its own extension, you can make calls within your department,

0:26:18.800 --> 0:26:22.399
<v Speaker 1>you know two, directly to your coworkers, no problem. But

0:26:22.520 --> 0:26:25.639
<v Speaker 1>chances are you would rather have your outgoing calls, the

0:26:25.640 --> 0:26:29.600
<v Speaker 1>ones you make outside of your company, map not to

0:26:29.680 --> 0:26:32.199
<v Speaker 1>your desk's phone number, but to the number for the

0:26:32.240 --> 0:26:35.720
<v Speaker 1>accounting firm as a whole. That way, anyone on the

0:26:35.760 --> 0:26:39.119
<v Speaker 1>receiving end would see that it's a call coming from

0:26:39.160 --> 0:26:43.240
<v Speaker 1>this big accounting company, not some unknown desk phone. You

0:26:43.240 --> 0:26:46.280
<v Speaker 1>would need a way to replace your desk phone's number

0:26:46.720 --> 0:26:50.159
<v Speaker 1>with the overall company's phone number. This happens all the

0:26:50.200 --> 0:26:54.000
<v Speaker 1>time with big companies and doctor's offices and stuff like that,

0:26:54.160 --> 0:26:56.560
<v Speaker 1>So you can probably think of lots of legitimate uses

0:26:56.560 --> 0:27:00.959
<v Speaker 1>where the call going out seems to be coming from

0:27:01.000 --> 0:27:05.320
<v Speaker 1>a very large, known entity rather than an individual phone

0:27:05.640 --> 0:27:10.040
<v Speaker 1>located within that entity. But to make this happen, you

0:27:10.119 --> 0:27:12.639
<v Speaker 1>have to have some sort of technology that does the

0:27:12.640 --> 0:27:16.200
<v Speaker 1>old switcherou with the phone numbers. Now, as I mentioned earlier,

0:27:16.480 --> 0:27:19.680
<v Speaker 1>color I D in the old phone system involves using

0:27:19.840 --> 0:27:23.960
<v Speaker 1>f s K or frequency shift keying, to alter a

0:27:24.000 --> 0:27:27.280
<v Speaker 1>carrier signal in a specific way to transmit information about

0:27:27.280 --> 0:27:30.000
<v Speaker 1>a phone number in between the signals that cause the

0:27:30.040 --> 0:27:33.959
<v Speaker 1>receiving phone to ring. And it turned out that if

0:27:34.000 --> 0:27:36.280
<v Speaker 1>you could figure out the f s K process and

0:27:36.320 --> 0:27:38.960
<v Speaker 1>build the right technology, you could build out a system

0:27:39.040 --> 0:27:42.919
<v Speaker 1>that would use FSK to transmit false information, allowing you

0:27:42.960 --> 0:27:46.080
<v Speaker 1>to mask the true originating number of a call and

0:27:46.160 --> 0:27:50.520
<v Speaker 1>substitute in something else will let you spoof a phone number.

0:27:50.680 --> 0:27:53.639
<v Speaker 1>In other words, And this again was was made on

0:27:53.720 --> 0:27:56.280
<v Speaker 1>purpose eventually, like when once we got to the point

0:27:56.359 --> 0:27:59.840
<v Speaker 1>where we had big companies with these kind of phone systems,

0:28:00.320 --> 0:28:03.080
<v Speaker 1>it was sort of a necessity. So it's not like

0:28:03.280 --> 0:28:08.080
<v Speaker 1>this was an oversight or or rather it wasn't a vulnerability.

0:28:08.240 --> 0:28:12.879
<v Speaker 1>It ended up being an opportunity. But if you wanted

0:28:12.880 --> 0:28:16.080
<v Speaker 1>to take advantage of it, it wasn't really easy to do.

0:28:16.560 --> 0:28:18.959
<v Speaker 1>Back in the early two thousands, for example, it was

0:28:19.080 --> 0:28:22.919
<v Speaker 1>actually pretty challenging. With the right hardware and software, and

0:28:23.000 --> 0:28:25.879
<v Speaker 1>with a digital phone line, you could manage it, but

0:28:25.960 --> 0:28:29.199
<v Speaker 1>it was beyond most people. Some big businesses used it

0:28:29.240 --> 0:28:31.840
<v Speaker 1>for the purposes I mentioned earlier, but that was kind

0:28:31.840 --> 0:28:34.440
<v Speaker 1>of the extent of it. Now, part of what makes

0:28:34.480 --> 0:28:38.640
<v Speaker 1>this possible is a system called a private branch exchange

0:28:38.800 --> 0:28:42.760
<v Speaker 1>or p b X, So this doesn't fit neatly into

0:28:42.800 --> 0:28:46.360
<v Speaker 1>that hierarchy I mentioned earlier. A p b X is

0:28:46.400 --> 0:28:49.680
<v Speaker 1>a telephone system that's typically within a really big organization,

0:28:49.800 --> 0:28:53.080
<v Speaker 1>like a big business, And essentially what it does is

0:28:53.120 --> 0:28:56.840
<v Speaker 1>it allows for an internal telephone system, that is, one

0:28:56.880 --> 0:29:00.120
<v Speaker 1>that connects all the internal phones with each other or

0:29:00.680 --> 0:29:03.560
<v Speaker 1>but it keeps a limited number of external phone lines

0:29:03.880 --> 0:29:07.440
<v Speaker 1>that connect outward to the general you know, public switching

0:29:07.520 --> 0:29:11.840
<v Speaker 1>telephone network or PSTN. So let's say we're looking at

0:29:11.840 --> 0:29:15.840
<v Speaker 1>a corporation with like five thousand employees. Rather than making

0:29:15.840 --> 0:29:18.960
<v Speaker 1>sure every single employee has a direct phone line to

0:29:18.960 --> 0:29:22.280
<v Speaker 1>the outside world, the business chooses to set up a

0:29:22.400 --> 0:29:26.240
<v Speaker 1>PBX while there's a phone at every employee's desk, and

0:29:26.320 --> 0:29:29.360
<v Speaker 1>these phones can make direct calls to one another within

0:29:29.520 --> 0:29:32.880
<v Speaker 1>the businesses local network. To make a call to the

0:29:32.960 --> 0:29:35.560
<v Speaker 1>outside world. First, you might have to do something like

0:29:35.680 --> 0:29:38.840
<v Speaker 1>dial A nine and that actually opens up one of

0:29:38.880 --> 0:29:42.200
<v Speaker 1>the business is limited external phone lines. So let's say

0:29:42.240 --> 0:29:46.400
<v Speaker 1>that this particular business has one hundred dedicated external phone lines,

0:29:46.480 --> 0:29:48.960
<v Speaker 1>which sounds like a lot, but it's way fewer than

0:29:49.080 --> 0:29:52.080
<v Speaker 1>the five thousand you would need for every single employee

0:29:52.080 --> 0:29:55.640
<v Speaker 1>to have their own personal external line. As long as

0:29:55.920 --> 0:29:58.440
<v Speaker 1>fewer than one hundred employees are making calls to the

0:29:58.440 --> 0:30:01.280
<v Speaker 1>outside world at any given to, i'm there's not really

0:30:01.360 --> 0:30:05.560
<v Speaker 1>a problem here. There are different flavors of p b X,

0:30:05.960 --> 0:30:08.120
<v Speaker 1>and they date back even to when the phone system

0:30:08.200 --> 0:30:11.760
<v Speaker 1>was purely running on analog signals and there were no

0:30:11.920 --> 0:30:15.720
<v Speaker 1>digital signal phone lines. Today, p b X has include

0:30:15.760 --> 0:30:20.320
<v Speaker 1>technologies like voice over Internet Protocol or void an I

0:30:20.560 --> 0:30:24.760
<v Speaker 1>p p b X or Internet Protocol. Private branch exchange

0:30:25.040 --> 0:30:28.160
<v Speaker 1>can sometimes include the ability to spoof a phone number.

0:30:28.200 --> 0:30:31.520
<v Speaker 1>It can be built into the system. Sometimes it's got

0:30:31.520 --> 0:30:34.800
<v Speaker 1>a very easy way to access and make these changes.

0:30:34.840 --> 0:30:37.880
<v Speaker 1>You'll just have like a little online form and you

0:30:37.920 --> 0:30:41.320
<v Speaker 1>can go in and you can select what you want

0:30:41.440 --> 0:30:47.000
<v Speaker 1>the outgoing call number to look like. But you know,

0:30:47.200 --> 0:30:49.960
<v Speaker 1>it's really handy if you want everything to look like

0:30:49.960 --> 0:30:52.719
<v Speaker 1>it's coming from a major office phone number. But it's

0:30:52.760 --> 0:30:55.320
<v Speaker 1>also opened up the opportunity to start a new kind

0:30:55.360 --> 0:31:00.560
<v Speaker 1>of fraudulent business. One early company that try to create

0:31:00.560 --> 0:31:03.560
<v Speaker 1>a business out of spoofing was founded by a dude

0:31:03.640 --> 0:31:07.680
<v Speaker 1>named Jason Jepson, who launched a service called Star thirty

0:31:07.720 --> 0:31:13.760
<v Speaker 1>eight dot com with start customers who from the beginning,

0:31:13.800 --> 0:31:18.080
<v Speaker 1>we're supposed to be limited to people like licensed private investigators,

0:31:18.440 --> 0:31:22.880
<v Speaker 1>law enforcement and debt collectors would be allowed to pay

0:31:23.000 --> 0:31:26.000
<v Speaker 1>a fee and that would let them make phone calls

0:31:26.000 --> 0:31:29.040
<v Speaker 1>while disguising the phone number that they were using as

0:31:29.160 --> 0:31:34.800
<v Speaker 1>you know, something else. Now that the thinking was that

0:31:34.840 --> 0:31:38.040
<v Speaker 1>the average person isn't keen to pick up the phone

0:31:38.160 --> 0:31:40.880
<v Speaker 1>if they happen to know that there's a private investigator

0:31:40.920 --> 0:31:44.080
<v Speaker 1>on the line or a debt collection agency, you know,

0:31:44.120 --> 0:31:48.520
<v Speaker 1>they would rather ghost that call. So the thinking was

0:31:48.560 --> 0:31:50.800
<v Speaker 1>it sure would be useful to be able to hide

0:31:50.880 --> 0:31:54.719
<v Speaker 1>that information and convince the person on the other end

0:31:54.720 --> 0:31:58.200
<v Speaker 1>of that that line to actually pick up the phone.

0:31:58.600 --> 0:32:00.480
<v Speaker 1>So the best way to do that is to hide

0:32:00.480 --> 0:32:03.880
<v Speaker 1>who you are. Start three eight dot com didn't have

0:32:04.080 --> 0:32:07.560
<v Speaker 1>a long and illustrious history in its original form. Three

0:32:08.040 --> 0:32:12.320
<v Speaker 1>days after he launched the service, Jepson announced he was

0:32:12.360 --> 0:32:15.480
<v Speaker 1>looking to sell the business. He had received numerous threats

0:32:15.480 --> 0:32:18.440
<v Speaker 1>and harassing calls and felt it was just, you know,

0:32:18.840 --> 0:32:22.440
<v Speaker 1>not the right line of work for him. Other services

0:32:22.480 --> 0:32:25.760
<v Speaker 1>like one called Camo Phone, you know, like camouflage, but

0:32:25.880 --> 0:32:29.920
<v Speaker 1>Camo Phone, those kind of surfaced, and Star thirty eight

0:32:29.920 --> 0:32:33.240
<v Speaker 1>actually did come back as a service marketed as being

0:32:33.280 --> 0:32:37.880
<v Speaker 1>exclusive to law enforcement agencies, and that was really the

0:32:37.920 --> 0:32:41.840
<v Speaker 1>beginning of spoofing. But when we come back, we'll talk

0:32:41.880 --> 0:32:46.080
<v Speaker 1>about how spoofing really proliferated as VOIPE systems grew in popularity,

0:32:46.400 --> 0:32:49.840
<v Speaker 1>and how the FCC is responding to the issue today.

0:32:49.880 --> 0:33:01.640
<v Speaker 1>But first let's take another quick break. The emergence of

0:33:01.760 --> 0:33:06.160
<v Speaker 1>voice over Internet protocol was one of those truly disruptive technologies.

0:33:06.600 --> 0:33:09.720
<v Speaker 1>In this case, it was disrupting the telecommunications business that

0:33:10.280 --> 0:33:14.120
<v Speaker 1>got you know, totally turned on its head. Because of

0:33:14.160 --> 0:33:17.240
<v Speaker 1>this Voice would allow people to make phone calls using

0:33:17.280 --> 0:33:22.040
<v Speaker 1>the Internet as the transmission system, essentially bypassing the phone

0:33:22.040 --> 0:33:25.440
<v Speaker 1>companies in the process, at least on one end of

0:33:25.440 --> 0:33:29.239
<v Speaker 1>the call. Possibly both void phones can connect to one

0:33:29.240 --> 0:33:32.200
<v Speaker 1>another over the Internet and not even touch the phone system,

0:33:32.320 --> 0:33:35.120
<v Speaker 1>at least not the way that normal telephone calls do.

0:33:35.600 --> 0:33:38.040
<v Speaker 1>But what if someone were to use a voice system

0:33:38.120 --> 0:33:40.360
<v Speaker 1>to call someone in a with a phone that's connected

0:33:40.400 --> 0:33:44.480
<v Speaker 1>to the old public Switching Telephone network or ps t N. Well,

0:33:45.160 --> 0:33:48.240
<v Speaker 1>any voice call connecting to the ps t N has

0:33:48.280 --> 0:33:51.960
<v Speaker 1>to go through what's called a void gateway, which serves

0:33:52.000 --> 0:33:56.280
<v Speaker 1>as a bridge between the two systems. See voice traffic

0:33:56.400 --> 0:34:03.360
<v Speaker 1>over the Internet protocol. UH. That that's using packet switching protocols.

0:34:03.360 --> 0:34:05.600
<v Speaker 1>That's what the Internet at large uses in order to

0:34:05.640 --> 0:34:10.160
<v Speaker 1>send data. It divides up files into packets of information

0:34:10.239 --> 0:34:12.400
<v Speaker 1>and then sends them across the network to be essentially

0:34:12.480 --> 0:34:16.440
<v Speaker 1>reassembled on the other side. But this is incompatible with

0:34:16.480 --> 0:34:20.080
<v Speaker 1>how phone calls are transmitted across the ps t N.

0:34:20.520 --> 0:34:24.040
<v Speaker 1>It's two totally different systems. So the gateway has to

0:34:24.280 --> 0:34:28.399
<v Speaker 1>decompress the digital packets from the voice call and turn

0:34:28.480 --> 0:34:32.440
<v Speaker 1>it into a digital signal that then can be converted

0:34:32.480 --> 0:34:35.320
<v Speaker 1>into an analog signal to cross the ps t N,

0:34:35.680 --> 0:34:39.680
<v Speaker 1>which is pretty wild right. Gateways also come in different flavors.

0:34:39.719 --> 0:34:43.680
<v Speaker 1>There are standalone gateways UH, then there are gateway functions

0:34:43.680 --> 0:34:46.680
<v Speaker 1>that can be built into specific types of routers. H.

0:34:46.760 --> 0:34:48.920
<v Speaker 1>There's also the I P P B X that I

0:34:49.000 --> 0:34:52.919
<v Speaker 1>mentioned earlier. Those can act as gateways. The important part

0:34:53.000 --> 0:34:56.040
<v Speaker 1>for our discussion is that many of these voice services

0:34:56.080 --> 0:34:59.360
<v Speaker 1>allow users to take advantage of p b X features.

0:35:00.120 --> 0:35:05.400
<v Speaker 1>Traditionally only big companies could use, including spoofing the phone number.

0:35:06.360 --> 0:35:12.360
<v Speaker 1>So as void technology proliferated and as more providers began

0:35:12.400 --> 0:35:16.239
<v Speaker 1>to offer up spoofing services, including ones that just they

0:35:16.280 --> 0:35:18.799
<v Speaker 1>allow you to start up an account and you pay

0:35:18.840 --> 0:35:22.279
<v Speaker 1>a certain amount and then from that point forward you

0:35:22.320 --> 0:35:25.440
<v Speaker 1>get just have your account deducted whenever you're making calls

0:35:25.640 --> 0:35:31.279
<v Speaker 1>using spoofing. This kind of of technology really allowed bad

0:35:31.320 --> 0:35:35.799
<v Speaker 1>actors to see potential for spoofing numbers for malicious purposes.

0:35:36.160 --> 0:35:39.000
<v Speaker 1>The goal is always to convince someone to pick up

0:35:39.040 --> 0:35:42.560
<v Speaker 1>the ding dang phone, and while the popular approaches centered

0:35:42.600 --> 0:35:47.640
<v Speaker 1>around spoofing is to create a number that is similar

0:35:47.680 --> 0:35:50.360
<v Speaker 1>to the target number you're calling, so in other words,

0:35:50.719 --> 0:35:53.320
<v Speaker 1>trying to get something within the same area code, maybe

0:35:53.360 --> 0:35:56.319
<v Speaker 1>even the same phone prefix. I get this all the

0:35:56.400 --> 0:36:01.040
<v Speaker 1>time with with spoofed numbers. So the idea is that

0:36:01.120 --> 0:36:03.200
<v Speaker 1>if you see a number pop up on caller I

0:36:03.320 --> 0:36:06.719
<v Speaker 1>D and it appears to be a local number, you're

0:36:06.760 --> 0:36:09.080
<v Speaker 1>more likely to pick up the phone because you're more

0:36:09.120 --> 0:36:11.520
<v Speaker 1>likely to feel that the person on the other end

0:36:11.520 --> 0:36:14.399
<v Speaker 1>of that call is someone you know, or at least

0:36:14.400 --> 0:36:19.239
<v Speaker 1>it's something relevant to you as how they get you. Well,

0:36:19.239 --> 0:36:22.080
<v Speaker 1>it's one way. Another way is to use databases of

0:36:22.120 --> 0:36:25.800
<v Speaker 1>personal information to create spear fishing attempts, though not every

0:36:25.800 --> 0:36:28.880
<v Speaker 1>scammer goes to that kind of trouble, but they could

0:36:28.920 --> 0:36:33.000
<v Speaker 1>attempt to spoof specific numbers that you might know, so

0:36:33.080 --> 0:36:36.480
<v Speaker 1>you might think, oh, it's my auntie calling. I wonder

0:36:36.520 --> 0:36:38.480
<v Speaker 1>what's up, and you answer and you find out it's

0:36:38.480 --> 0:36:41.520
<v Speaker 1>not your auntie, it's a scammer. Uh. A lot of

0:36:41.560 --> 0:36:44.759
<v Speaker 1>these hackers and scammers just sort of cast a very

0:36:44.840 --> 0:36:47.960
<v Speaker 1>wide net to see if they catch anything. If you

0:36:48.000 --> 0:36:51.800
<v Speaker 1>pick up a phone that is a catch. At that point,

0:36:51.920 --> 0:36:54.680
<v Speaker 1>you might be prompted to say press a number in

0:36:54.719 --> 0:36:57.839
<v Speaker 1>response to a specific direction, you know, like press two

0:36:58.000 --> 0:37:01.640
<v Speaker 1>to speak with a representative. Don't do it, it's a

0:37:01.680 --> 0:37:05.120
<v Speaker 1>bad idea. A lot of these are actually worked into

0:37:05.160 --> 0:37:08.160
<v Speaker 1>systems where if you do a button press, it gets

0:37:08.200 --> 0:37:13.520
<v Speaker 1>interpreted as an authorization for a charge, and the scammers

0:37:13.560 --> 0:37:16.040
<v Speaker 1>are making money off of this, and you're getting charged

0:37:16.160 --> 0:37:18.680
<v Speaker 1>through your phone company and you get these you know,

0:37:18.719 --> 0:37:22.759
<v Speaker 1>fraudulent charges on your account, so don't fall for that.

0:37:23.280 --> 0:37:28.719
<v Speaker 1>Um Uh, this is essentially illegal. I mean, it is illegal,

0:37:29.040 --> 0:37:31.640
<v Speaker 1>but doesn't stop people from doing it because it's kind

0:37:31.680 --> 0:37:34.520
<v Speaker 1>of hard to catch them. Uh. You might also get

0:37:34.600 --> 0:37:36.520
<v Speaker 1>someone who's on the other end of the call and

0:37:36.560 --> 0:37:39.080
<v Speaker 1>they're looking to get valuable information from you, like a

0:37:39.080 --> 0:37:42.880
<v Speaker 1>bank account number or something. Obviously, is a bad idea

0:37:42.920 --> 0:37:45.239
<v Speaker 1>to engage in this sort of stuff. In fact, it's

0:37:45.280 --> 0:37:48.759
<v Speaker 1>bad enough that some phone companies and the FCC have

0:37:49.000 --> 0:37:52.600
<v Speaker 1>argued that if you don't recognize a number, don't answer it.

0:37:53.239 --> 0:37:57.040
<v Speaker 1>Think about that for a moment. This you have companies

0:37:57.040 --> 0:38:02.000
<v Speaker 1>like phone companies, their business is charging customers for this

0:38:02.120 --> 0:38:06.200
<v Speaker 1>inner connectivity, this ability to have communication channels open. And

0:38:06.239 --> 0:38:08.280
<v Speaker 1>then they're saying, by the way, if you don't recognize

0:38:08.320 --> 0:38:10.920
<v Speaker 1>the number, don't use our services, which we are charging

0:38:10.920 --> 0:38:15.640
<v Speaker 1>you for. It's kind of wild, right, because you would think,

0:38:15.960 --> 0:38:18.600
<v Speaker 1>if this is that big of a problem, surely there

0:38:18.640 --> 0:38:21.600
<v Speaker 1>has to be some measure you can take to kind

0:38:21.640 --> 0:38:25.400
<v Speaker 1>of curtail this problem. Because what you're telling me right

0:38:25.400 --> 0:38:27.680
<v Speaker 1>now is that your service isn't good enough for me

0:38:27.719 --> 0:38:30.160
<v Speaker 1>to rely upon all the time. Because there are people

0:38:30.200 --> 0:38:33.560
<v Speaker 1>who are leveraging it to try and take advantage of me.

0:38:34.000 --> 0:38:38.200
<v Speaker 1>That's not a great marketing message right now. The use

0:38:38.239 --> 0:38:41.880
<v Speaker 1>of numbers that are similar to your own typically gets

0:38:41.880 --> 0:38:46.320
<v Speaker 1>called neighbor spoofing or neighborhood spoofing, and it's a pretty

0:38:46.360 --> 0:38:50.680
<v Speaker 1>irritating tactic. Uh. It's also possible that someone could spoof

0:38:50.840 --> 0:38:54.440
<v Speaker 1>your phone number while they are calling someone else, So

0:38:54.560 --> 0:38:56.840
<v Speaker 1>for them, it's going to come up on color I

0:38:56.920 --> 0:38:59.239
<v Speaker 1>D that you're the person making the call, right, it's

0:38:59.280 --> 0:39:01.960
<v Speaker 1>gonna be your own number, even though you're not the

0:39:01.960 --> 0:39:04.880
<v Speaker 1>one doing it. It's because it's been spoofed. So the

0:39:04.960 --> 0:39:09.760
<v Speaker 1>question is what do you do if that happens to you.

0:39:09.760 --> 0:39:12.880
<v Speaker 1>You are not going to like the answer, because there's

0:39:12.920 --> 0:39:16.600
<v Speaker 1>not much you can do other than try to explain

0:39:16.600 --> 0:39:19.440
<v Speaker 1>to anyone who's calling you up angry that you're making

0:39:19.440 --> 0:39:22.320
<v Speaker 1>these calls that you're not the one making the calls

0:39:22.360 --> 0:39:25.839
<v Speaker 1>that are upsetting them. That's kind of difficult to get

0:39:25.880 --> 0:39:28.400
<v Speaker 1>across because people are looking at their color I D

0:39:28.520 --> 0:39:30.839
<v Speaker 1>and say no, I see on my idea that you

0:39:30.880 --> 0:39:32.920
<v Speaker 1>are the one calling me. I'm telling you to stop,

0:39:33.520 --> 0:39:36.000
<v Speaker 1>and you're might. Meanwhile, you're trying to say no, no,

0:39:36.080 --> 0:39:40.320
<v Speaker 1>I promise it's not me. Someone is spoofing my phone number.

0:39:40.680 --> 0:39:42.760
<v Speaker 1>Depending upon the person on the other end of the line,

0:39:43.560 --> 0:39:45.720
<v Speaker 1>they might not have any idea of what that means

0:39:45.880 --> 0:39:48.600
<v Speaker 1>or even know that that's possible. Now, I've had this

0:39:48.680 --> 0:39:52.080
<v Speaker 1>happened to me in the past, however not on my

0:39:52.200 --> 0:39:56.520
<v Speaker 1>personal phone. So many years ago, I was working at

0:39:56.520 --> 0:40:00.799
<v Speaker 1>a consulting firm and I was getting calls from UH

0:40:00.800 --> 0:40:03.880
<v Speaker 1>a woman who was angry that I was calling her,

0:40:04.040 --> 0:40:07.560
<v Speaker 1>and I was making these crazy machine noises into her phone.

0:40:07.960 --> 0:40:10.640
<v Speaker 1>Now I figured out that what was happening was that

0:40:10.760 --> 0:40:14.960
<v Speaker 1>some fax machine was calling her landline as if it

0:40:14.960 --> 0:40:18.560
<v Speaker 1>were another fax machine, and since her phone is not

0:40:19.000 --> 0:40:22.960
<v Speaker 1>a fax machine, she was just getting that garbled electronic

0:40:23.400 --> 0:40:26.640
<v Speaker 1>mass of sounds whenever she picked up the receiver. And

0:40:26.719 --> 0:40:29.759
<v Speaker 1>she said that the number that was associated on color

0:40:29.880 --> 0:40:32.799
<v Speaker 1>I D belonged to the company I worked for. So

0:40:32.880 --> 0:40:35.719
<v Speaker 1>I had her read me the number, and sure enough,

0:40:36.360 --> 0:40:40.280
<v Speaker 1>it was our office's main phone number, but it wasn't

0:40:40.280 --> 0:40:42.480
<v Speaker 1>our facts number, it wasn't the number for the fax

0:40:42.640 --> 0:40:45.600
<v Speaker 1>machine we had. And I even went over to our

0:40:45.680 --> 0:40:49.799
<v Speaker 1>fax machine and I used a report to generate a

0:40:49.840 --> 0:40:52.560
<v Speaker 1>report to that told me about all the outgoing calls

0:40:52.600 --> 0:40:56.000
<v Speaker 1>that had been made, every single facts that had been sent.

0:40:56.400 --> 0:40:59.600
<v Speaker 1>And this was in a day where we still facts

0:41:00.080 --> 0:41:03.680
<v Speaker 1>occasionally anyway, And I checked it against this woman's number,

0:41:03.719 --> 0:41:07.800
<v Speaker 1>and I saw there was no call from our facts

0:41:07.800 --> 0:41:10.760
<v Speaker 1>machine going out to her number. There was nothing coming

0:41:10.760 --> 0:41:13.880
<v Speaker 1>out from our office that was going to her. But

0:41:13.960 --> 0:41:17.960
<v Speaker 1>it appeared as though someone had been spoofing our office's

0:41:18.040 --> 0:41:21.319
<v Speaker 1>phone number for facts no less and was sending out

0:41:21.320 --> 0:41:24.960
<v Speaker 1>stuff to people like this woman. And there wasn't anything

0:41:24.960 --> 0:41:27.360
<v Speaker 1>I could do about it because we had nothing to

0:41:27.400 --> 0:41:29.640
<v Speaker 1>do with the situation in the first place. We were

0:41:29.719 --> 0:41:33.320
<v Speaker 1>victims just as she was. Someone else had picked our

0:41:33.480 --> 0:41:36.520
<v Speaker 1>number to use a mask for some reason, and because

0:41:36.560 --> 0:41:39.480
<v Speaker 1>the voice system they were using allowed for this kind

0:41:39.520 --> 0:41:42.000
<v Speaker 1>of thing, there was really no way for us to

0:41:42.040 --> 0:41:45.200
<v Speaker 1>even know who was doing it, much less stop them.

0:41:45.239 --> 0:41:47.239
<v Speaker 1>It was frustrating for the woman, and it was not

0:41:47.360 --> 0:41:50.840
<v Speaker 1>super great for me either, because I genuinely wanted to

0:41:50.880 --> 0:41:54.040
<v Speaker 1>help her. I don't want anyone to be, you know,

0:41:54.160 --> 0:41:57.719
<v Speaker 1>aggravated and harassed in this way, and that really stinks, right,

0:41:57.760 --> 0:42:00.200
<v Speaker 1>I mean, if someone makes use of your number and

0:42:00.239 --> 0:42:03.840
<v Speaker 1>then harasses another person, you could be left holding the

0:42:03.840 --> 0:42:07.640
<v Speaker 1>bag and your defenses it wasn't me. Someone spoofed my

0:42:07.680 --> 0:42:10.720
<v Speaker 1>phone number. That is pretty hard to prove to someone

0:42:10.840 --> 0:42:13.600
<v Speaker 1>unless you can actually show them that your phone did

0:42:13.640 --> 0:42:16.680
<v Speaker 1>not make those outgoing calls by just showing them a

0:42:16.760 --> 0:42:19.800
<v Speaker 1>record of every call you've made over you know, whatever

0:42:19.880 --> 0:42:23.440
<v Speaker 1>length of time. But more frequently we find ourselves on

0:42:23.480 --> 0:42:26.120
<v Speaker 1>the receiving end of these calls, which I guess we

0:42:26.160 --> 0:42:29.640
<v Speaker 1>should be thankful for because it's irritating, but nause irritating

0:42:29.640 --> 0:42:33.439
<v Speaker 1>as being blamed for them. And the frequency of these

0:42:33.440 --> 0:42:35.480
<v Speaker 1>calls have picked up the pace over the years. Now

0:42:35.520 --> 0:42:37.960
<v Speaker 1>twenty twenty was actually a bit of an outlier. We

0:42:38.040 --> 0:42:42.640
<v Speaker 1>saw a dip and spoofed robo calls in but in

0:42:42.719 --> 0:42:46.560
<v Speaker 1>June one there were more than four billion robot calls.

0:42:46.840 --> 0:42:48.759
<v Speaker 1>So it's not like that's a problem that's gonna go away.

0:42:48.800 --> 0:42:51.640
<v Speaker 1>I mean, that's nearly a hundred fifty million robo calls

0:42:51.840 --> 0:42:56.800
<v Speaker 1>per day. That being said, the FCC and major phone

0:42:56.840 --> 0:42:59.840
<v Speaker 1>carriers are trying to fight back a bit. The f

0:43:00.040 --> 0:43:03.520
<v Speaker 1>c C past a mandate actually Congress past the law

0:43:03.880 --> 0:43:07.319
<v Speaker 1>that requires all the major carriers in the US, those

0:43:07.400 --> 0:43:10.520
<v Speaker 1>being A T and T, Verizon Anti Mobile to comply

0:43:10.640 --> 0:43:13.400
<v Speaker 1>with the rule that requires them to incorporate a technology

0:43:13.480 --> 0:43:19.759
<v Speaker 1>called stir slash shaken, which is very James Bondish, you know. Now.

0:43:19.800 --> 0:43:23.080
<v Speaker 1>The idea behind this is that stir slash shaken is

0:43:23.080 --> 0:43:26.000
<v Speaker 1>supposed to verify that a number that pops up on

0:43:26.080 --> 0:43:29.759
<v Speaker 1>color I D is in fact the number that belongs

0:43:29.840 --> 0:43:31.880
<v Speaker 1>to the line that's making that phone call in the

0:43:31.920 --> 0:43:36.160
<v Speaker 1>first place. In other words, it's supposed to help detect spoofing.

0:43:36.600 --> 0:43:39.040
<v Speaker 1>It would mean that phone companies could filter calls and

0:43:39.080 --> 0:43:42.319
<v Speaker 1>potentially block some of them, or at least label them

0:43:42.360 --> 0:43:45.600
<v Speaker 1>as spam before they get to your your phone. Now,

0:43:45.640 --> 0:43:48.440
<v Speaker 1>those three carriers have said that they have all enabled

0:43:48.520 --> 0:43:52.000
<v Speaker 1>this technology on their own networks, which is good because

0:43:52.040 --> 0:43:56.719
<v Speaker 1>the deadline for doing so was this past June je

0:43:56.800 --> 0:44:00.400
<v Speaker 1>to be precise. Smaller regional carriers in the Unit States

0:44:00.400 --> 0:44:05.160
<v Speaker 1>currently have a deadline of June three to implement this technology,

0:44:05.200 --> 0:44:09.120
<v Speaker 1>though that could change. The FCC might step up that deadline.

0:44:10.040 --> 0:44:13.600
<v Speaker 1>So what's going on with this technology? Well, first let's

0:44:13.640 --> 0:44:17.200
<v Speaker 1>talk about what these names stand for. Though I suspect

0:44:17.800 --> 0:44:21.160
<v Speaker 1>there's some backronym shenanigans going on here. That is that,

0:44:22.000 --> 0:44:23.719
<v Speaker 1>you know, they came up with the names and then

0:44:23.760 --> 0:44:25.720
<v Speaker 1>tried to figure out what they stood for as opposed

0:44:25.719 --> 0:44:29.400
<v Speaker 1>to the other way around. Anyway, STIR stands for Secure

0:44:29.600 --> 0:44:37.560
<v Speaker 1>Telephony Identity revisited and SHAKEN stands for secure handling of

0:44:37.600 --> 0:44:42.800
<v Speaker 1>asserted information using tokens. So the Ken part of SHAKEN

0:44:42.840 --> 0:44:47.040
<v Speaker 1>comes from tokens, And you cannot convince me that this

0:44:47.160 --> 0:44:53.200
<v Speaker 1>wasn't some crazy backronym thing. Anyway, these two technologies work

0:44:53.239 --> 0:44:57.879
<v Speaker 1>in tandem. SHAKEN is honestly just sort of a broader thing.

0:44:57.920 --> 0:44:59.880
<v Speaker 1>We'll get to it. So STIR comes out of a

0:45:00.000 --> 0:45:03.000
<v Speaker 1>working group of the organization i e. T F that

0:45:03.080 --> 0:45:07.120
<v Speaker 1>stands for Internet Engineering Task Force. The group figured out

0:45:07.120 --> 0:45:11.000
<v Speaker 1>a way to append digital signatures on a call as

0:45:11.080 --> 0:45:13.560
<v Speaker 1>a means of authenticating that a call comes from a

0:45:13.600 --> 0:45:17.440
<v Speaker 1>specific phone number for real zes. SHAKEN refers to the

0:45:17.560 --> 0:45:21.080
<v Speaker 1>standards that service providers are supposed to follow while they're

0:45:21.080 --> 0:45:25.880
<v Speaker 1>deploying STIR in their networks. So SHAKEN really is here's

0:45:25.960 --> 0:45:31.279
<v Speaker 1>how you use this technology that is STIR. The protocols

0:45:31.320 --> 0:45:36.680
<v Speaker 1>give three levels of attestation that carriers can assign to

0:45:36.800 --> 0:45:39.239
<v Speaker 1>a call or service providers, I think is how they

0:45:39.239 --> 0:45:41.759
<v Speaker 1>were that service providers can assign to a call, So

0:45:41.960 --> 0:45:46.560
<v Speaker 1>full attestation means that the service provider has a call

0:45:46.680 --> 0:45:50.520
<v Speaker 1>originating out of their service and they say that that

0:45:50.600 --> 0:45:53.080
<v Speaker 1>call is in fact coming from a number that this

0:45:53.200 --> 0:45:56.759
<v Speaker 1>particular customer is authorized to use, so, in other words,

0:45:57.360 --> 0:46:01.560
<v Speaker 1>it's legit. Then you have partial a testation, and that

0:46:01.600 --> 0:46:05.399
<v Speaker 1>means that the carrier has authenticated the customer making the call.

0:46:05.440 --> 0:46:08.080
<v Speaker 1>They're saying, we know who is making the call. However,

0:46:08.120 --> 0:46:11.560
<v Speaker 1>we cannot verify that this customer is actually authorized to

0:46:11.719 --> 0:46:15.600
<v Speaker 1>use the number in question. Then there's gateway at a station,

0:46:16.080 --> 0:46:19.680
<v Speaker 1>means that the service provider can authenticate where it received

0:46:19.680 --> 0:46:23.399
<v Speaker 1>a call, but can't authenticate the source, can't say who

0:46:23.480 --> 0:46:27.200
<v Speaker 1>for certain sent it. The information is meant to be

0:46:27.239 --> 0:46:30.719
<v Speaker 1>shared between carriers so that one carrier can essentially say

0:46:30.719 --> 0:46:33.600
<v Speaker 1>to another, hey, here's this call that needs to go

0:46:33.719 --> 0:46:36.600
<v Speaker 1>over your network to get to your customer, but I

0:46:36.680 --> 0:46:39.319
<v Speaker 1>totes can't verify that the call is legit, so it

0:46:39.360 --> 0:46:42.960
<v Speaker 1>maybe suss just a heads up, and then your carrier

0:46:43.440 --> 0:46:46.440
<v Speaker 1>might block the call or append to label, alerting you

0:46:46.520 --> 0:46:49.719
<v Speaker 1>the end customer that the call could be spam. The

0:46:49.760 --> 0:46:52.120
<v Speaker 1>way this works in practice is you've got someone making

0:46:52.160 --> 0:46:55.960
<v Speaker 1>a call. Let's say it's scuzzy scumbag who's posing as

0:46:55.960 --> 0:46:59.040
<v Speaker 1>a member of the Internal Revenue Service, but Scuzzy really

0:46:59.080 --> 0:47:02.240
<v Speaker 1>just wants to fish personal information out of you. Scuzzy

0:47:02.320 --> 0:47:05.440
<v Speaker 1>picks up the phone or more likely uses an automated

0:47:05.520 --> 0:47:09.919
<v Speaker 1>robo dialer and calls your number and spoofs their own

0:47:10.000 --> 0:47:12.080
<v Speaker 1>number in the process to make it seem as if

0:47:12.120 --> 0:47:15.279
<v Speaker 1>it's the I r S calling you. The call goes

0:47:15.320 --> 0:47:19.319
<v Speaker 1>out over Scuzzies service provider, whomever that may be. The

0:47:19.360 --> 0:47:22.040
<v Speaker 1>service provider takes a look at the originating number and

0:47:22.080 --> 0:47:24.360
<v Speaker 1>the source of the call to determine what level of

0:47:24.440 --> 0:47:29.239
<v Speaker 1>attestation to assign to that call. Then it makes use

0:47:29.239 --> 0:47:32.880
<v Speaker 1>of an authentication service to create a digital certificate that

0:47:33.000 --> 0:47:37.799
<v Speaker 1>holds onto this information, then passes both the call and

0:47:37.920 --> 0:47:41.719
<v Speaker 1>the certificate on so that it ultimately ends at the

0:47:41.880 --> 0:47:46.839
<v Speaker 1>terminating service provider. This would be whatever service provider you use.

0:47:47.000 --> 0:47:48.640
<v Speaker 1>So let's say it's like a T and T. So

0:47:48.719 --> 0:47:51.480
<v Speaker 1>now it gets sent to a T and T. So

0:47:51.800 --> 0:47:54.880
<v Speaker 1>a T and T. Your service provider, upon receiving this

0:47:55.040 --> 0:47:59.480
<v Speaker 1>signal and digital certificate, sends the certificate to a verification service,

0:47:59.680 --> 0:48:02.400
<v Speaker 1>which attempts to verify if the originating source of the

0:48:02.480 --> 0:48:06.880
<v Speaker 1>call is authorized to make calls from that number it

0:48:06.960 --> 0:48:10.560
<v Speaker 1>claims to be calling from. Then it returns this information

0:48:10.880 --> 0:48:13.040
<v Speaker 1>to a T and T and then a T and

0:48:13.080 --> 0:48:15.960
<v Speaker 1>T can either block the call or label it or

0:48:16.040 --> 0:48:19.360
<v Speaker 1>pass it on to you. So this approach is not

0:48:19.560 --> 0:48:22.480
<v Speaker 1>like a catch all for all robo calls and spam

0:48:22.640 --> 0:48:24.880
<v Speaker 1>or even for spoofing. It's not going to put an

0:48:24.960 --> 0:48:27.440
<v Speaker 1>end to it, but it is meant to help cut

0:48:27.480 --> 0:48:31.640
<v Speaker 1>back on those practices. There are other companies trying to

0:48:31.680 --> 0:48:35.040
<v Speaker 1>address this issue in other ways. There are companies that

0:48:35.160 --> 0:48:39.080
<v Speaker 1>have blocking services that you can use. There's the Do

0:48:39.120 --> 0:48:42.560
<v Speaker 1>Not Call Registry that you can be part of, and

0:48:42.600 --> 0:48:45.800
<v Speaker 1>then companies like Verizon or trying something different like Verizon

0:48:45.840 --> 0:48:49.120
<v Speaker 1>has introduced an updated call filter app that will send

0:48:49.120 --> 0:48:52.560
<v Speaker 1>suspected spam calls that appear to have phone numbers from

0:48:52.600 --> 0:48:56.760
<v Speaker 1>your area straight to voicemail. So, in other words, those

0:48:56.800 --> 0:49:00.680
<v Speaker 1>neighborhoods spoofing calls would never even make your phone ring,

0:49:00.680 --> 0:49:03.279
<v Speaker 1>it would go straight to your voicemail. Of course, this

0:49:03.360 --> 0:49:05.920
<v Speaker 1>means that if there is someone from your region who

0:49:06.000 --> 0:49:09.560
<v Speaker 1>is actually trying to call you for real, zes they

0:49:09.640 --> 0:49:12.640
<v Speaker 1>might end up going straight to voicemail too. Now you

0:49:12.680 --> 0:49:17.000
<v Speaker 1>can go into the apps filter settings and turn those

0:49:17.040 --> 0:49:20.160
<v Speaker 1>off for specific numbers. So it's not like, you know,

0:49:20.640 --> 0:49:22.799
<v Speaker 1>it's an all or nothing, but it does mean that

0:49:23.000 --> 0:49:25.360
<v Speaker 1>at least in some cases, there might be more hands

0:49:25.400 --> 0:49:28.920
<v Speaker 1>on work for the consumer to get everything to work

0:49:28.960 --> 0:49:33.640
<v Speaker 1>out properly. Now, I think we will continue to see

0:49:34.520 --> 0:49:38.319
<v Speaker 1>companies and governments really try to crack down on this

0:49:38.400 --> 0:49:42.000
<v Speaker 1>practice because it's so irritating. Like the people in charge

0:49:42.400 --> 0:49:46.680
<v Speaker 1>don't like it either, right, Politicians do not like robo

0:49:46.800 --> 0:49:50.359
<v Speaker 1>calls and spam because it affects them too, and so

0:49:50.560 --> 0:49:54.399
<v Speaker 1>we're likely to see more strides taken to try and

0:49:54.680 --> 0:49:57.640
<v Speaker 1>combat it. At the same time, we'll see the people

0:49:57.640 --> 0:49:59.960
<v Speaker 1>who are making use of it try and find way

0:50:00.120 --> 0:50:02.600
<v Speaker 1>is around the system. So it's going to be a

0:50:02.640 --> 0:50:06.640
<v Speaker 1>c saw kind of approach, and it's certainly an irritating one.

0:50:06.760 --> 0:50:10.759
<v Speaker 1>So if, like me, you treat your phone like it's

0:50:10.800 --> 0:50:13.359
<v Speaker 1>a way to send email and text and that's it,

0:50:13.560 --> 0:50:15.800
<v Speaker 1>or maybe occasionally, you know, look at pictures of cats,

0:50:16.840 --> 0:50:21.640
<v Speaker 1>then you're in good company because this approach of robocalls

0:50:21.920 --> 0:50:26.359
<v Speaker 1>and spoofing has really created a an environment of distrust

0:50:27.120 --> 0:50:30.480
<v Speaker 1>with our communication devices, so much so that the companies

0:50:30.560 --> 0:50:34.919
<v Speaker 1>in charge of providing those services are saying yeah, kind

0:50:34.920 --> 0:50:37.160
<v Speaker 1>of stinks done in it, and and say like, yeah,

0:50:37.200 --> 0:50:40.840
<v Speaker 1>you should probably not pick up the phone. And again

0:50:40.880 --> 0:50:43.680
<v Speaker 1>they're the ones providing the service to allow you to

0:50:43.800 --> 0:50:47.239
<v Speaker 1>get calls in the first place. It's not great, but

0:50:47.960 --> 0:50:50.839
<v Speaker 1>that's kind of you know how technology can be, right,

0:50:50.920 --> 0:50:54.000
<v Speaker 1>It's we can create these amazing tools that open up

0:50:54.280 --> 0:50:58.439
<v Speaker 1>incredible potential possibilities. But it also means that people who

0:50:58.440 --> 0:51:00.839
<v Speaker 1>are looking at the system from a differ and perspective

0:51:01.480 --> 0:51:05.719
<v Speaker 1>may find ways to twist it to benefit themselves at

0:51:05.760 --> 0:51:09.000
<v Speaker 1>the expense of the rest of us, which again kind

0:51:09.000 --> 0:51:12.080
<v Speaker 1>of stinks. So yeah, this is one of those topics

0:51:12.080 --> 0:51:14.640
<v Speaker 1>where while I say I love all things tech, I

0:51:14.719 --> 0:51:20.480
<v Speaker 1>don't love spoofing. I think it's uh. At best, it's misleading,

0:51:20.800 --> 0:51:27.959
<v Speaker 1>and at worst it is it is predating upon vulnerable populations,

0:51:28.000 --> 0:51:30.960
<v Speaker 1>which I don't think is cool at all. I hope

0:51:31.000 --> 0:51:34.480
<v Speaker 1>you enjoyed that episode about spoofing and color I D

0:51:35.400 --> 0:51:38.719
<v Speaker 1>I apologize once again for not having a brand new episode.

0:51:38.840 --> 0:51:40.600
<v Speaker 1>I was actually working on one that was going to

0:51:40.680 --> 0:51:42.959
<v Speaker 1>be a short episode. In fact, it wasn't gonna be

0:51:43.320 --> 0:51:46.120
<v Speaker 1>one of those fifty minute epics. It was gonna be

0:51:46.239 --> 0:51:49.359
<v Speaker 1>maybe a half hour, maybe not even that, but uh

0:51:49.480 --> 0:51:52.360
<v Speaker 1>it's it's about a an invention created by one of

0:51:52.400 --> 0:51:57.000
<v Speaker 1>the United States founding fathers, and because of the technical

0:51:57.080 --> 0:51:59.040
<v Speaker 1>issues I've had, I haven't been able to finish it.

0:51:59.080 --> 0:52:01.440
<v Speaker 1>Hopefully I'll be able to do that for Wednesday's episode

0:52:01.440 --> 0:52:04.400
<v Speaker 1>because it's just a fun topic. It's a little different

0:52:04.440 --> 0:52:06.600
<v Speaker 1>from what I typically cover on tech Stuff, but I

0:52:06.600 --> 0:52:09.279
<v Speaker 1>thought it would be nice to get away from all

0:52:09.360 --> 0:52:14.480
<v Speaker 1>the social networking platforms and all the wireless communications companies

0:52:14.520 --> 0:52:16.399
<v Speaker 1>and all that kind of stuff and to to look

0:52:16.440 --> 0:52:20.120
<v Speaker 1>back at something a little a little less high tech

0:52:20.239 --> 0:52:23.120
<v Speaker 1>but still really intriguing. So hopefully I'll be able to

0:52:23.160 --> 0:52:25.359
<v Speaker 1>get back on that once I figure out these little

0:52:25.360 --> 0:52:28.800
<v Speaker 1>technical glitches, and we'll have a brand new episode on Wednesday.

0:52:29.000 --> 0:52:31.360
<v Speaker 1>If you have suggestions for topics I should tackle in

0:52:31.440 --> 0:52:34.360
<v Speaker 1>future episodes of tech Stuff, please reach out to me.

0:52:34.520 --> 0:52:36.520
<v Speaker 1>You can do so on Twitter. The handle for the

0:52:36.520 --> 0:52:39.720
<v Speaker 1>show is tech Stuff hs W, or you can download

0:52:39.719 --> 0:52:42.200
<v Speaker 1>the I Heart radio app. It's free to download, free

0:52:42.200 --> 0:52:43.880
<v Speaker 1>to use. You can navigate over to tech Stuff by

0:52:43.920 --> 0:52:46.560
<v Speaker 1>putting it into the little search bar and you'll see

0:52:46.560 --> 0:52:49.879
<v Speaker 1>a little microphone icon pop up on that page. If

0:52:49.880 --> 0:52:52.440
<v Speaker 1>you use that microphone icon. You can record a voice

0:52:52.440 --> 0:52:54.799
<v Speaker 1>message up to thirty seconds in length and let me

0:52:54.800 --> 0:52:56.280
<v Speaker 1>know what you would like to hear in the future.

0:52:56.760 --> 0:53:00.720
<v Speaker 1>And again, we'll have new episodes as soon as I

0:53:00.800 --> 0:53:05.439
<v Speaker 1>get this darn computer fixed. I think my dog got

0:53:05.440 --> 0:53:08.440
<v Speaker 1>on it and decided to start, you know, surfing for

0:53:09.040 --> 0:53:11.839
<v Speaker 1>cat videos or something. I don't know. I'll figure it out,

0:53:12.160 --> 0:53:16.000
<v Speaker 1>but until then, I'll talk to you again, really soon.

0:53:17.800 --> 0:53:24.880
<v Speaker 1>Y Text Stuff is an I Heart Radio production. For

0:53:24.960 --> 0:53:27.919
<v Speaker 1>more podcasts from my Heart Radio, visit the I Heart

0:53:28.000 --> 0:53:31.200
<v Speaker 1>Radio app, Apple Podcasts, or wherever you listen to your

0:53:31.239 --> 0:53:31.920
<v Speaker 1>favorite shows.