1 00:00:04,400 --> 00:00:07,760 Speaker 1: Welcome to tech Stuff, a production from I Heart Radio. 2 00:00:12,119 --> 00:00:14,640 Speaker 1: Hey there, and welcome to tech Stuff. I'm your host, 3 00:00:14,760 --> 00:00:18,280 Speaker 1: Jonathan Strickland. I'm an executive producer with I Heart Radio, 4 00:00:18,360 --> 00:00:21,240 Speaker 1: and how the tech are you? My tech is going 5 00:00:21,320 --> 00:00:24,639 Speaker 1: bananas today. I've been having some issues with the computer 6 00:00:24,720 --> 00:00:28,080 Speaker 1: I used to record episodes, and a little bit of 7 00:00:28,080 --> 00:00:31,600 Speaker 1: issues with my recording equipment, so I've swapped some stuff 8 00:00:31,600 --> 00:00:34,040 Speaker 1: out so that I can quickly do this because I 9 00:00:34,080 --> 00:00:36,160 Speaker 1: need to troubleshoot for the rest of the day. Fix 10 00:00:36,320 --> 00:00:39,159 Speaker 1: fix this so I can keep getting episodes out. But 11 00:00:39,560 --> 00:00:41,599 Speaker 1: I don't want to ever leave you without an episode 12 00:00:41,600 --> 00:00:43,760 Speaker 1: if I can help it. So what we're gonna do 13 00:00:43,800 --> 00:00:46,919 Speaker 1: is we're actually going to listen to an episode that 14 00:00:47,000 --> 00:00:51,680 Speaker 1: I originally published on July fourteenth, one called Spoofing and 15 00:00:51,760 --> 00:00:54,680 Speaker 1: Color I D. And the reason I picked this is 16 00:00:54,720 --> 00:00:57,440 Speaker 1: because we've had a lot of news recently here in 17 00:00:57,480 --> 00:01:01,280 Speaker 1: the United States about the Federal Communication Commission, or f CC, 18 00:01:02,160 --> 00:01:07,600 Speaker 1: going after telecommunications companies for allowing these sorts of activities 19 00:01:07,600 --> 00:01:13,160 Speaker 1: to happen, along with the related activity of robocall practices. 20 00:01:13,200 --> 00:01:18,959 Speaker 1: And of course there's nothing inherently illegal about robo calls, 21 00:01:19,080 --> 00:01:25,480 Speaker 1: but there's often use of robo calls to perpetuate scams 22 00:01:25,600 --> 00:01:29,600 Speaker 1: and to defraud people, and that's really a major issue, 23 00:01:29,680 --> 00:01:32,880 Speaker 1: so much so that recently the f c C sent 24 00:01:33,040 --> 00:01:37,560 Speaker 1: a cease and desist letter to a telecom as a 25 00:01:37,640 --> 00:01:43,440 Speaker 1: service like a communications platform as a service business called Twilio. 26 00:01:43,560 --> 00:01:46,920 Speaker 1: Twilio is a big deal, like it does multiple billions 27 00:01:46,920 --> 00:01:51,240 Speaker 1: of dollars of business every year. So this is unlike 28 00:01:51,560 --> 00:01:55,640 Speaker 1: those cases where the FCC went after some tiny, little 29 00:01:55,680 --> 00:02:00,160 Speaker 1: regional telecommunications company, which some have pointed out. You know, 30 00:02:00,160 --> 00:02:03,600 Speaker 1: when you squash one of those tiny companies, typically the 31 00:02:03,640 --> 00:02:09,360 Speaker 1: people behind it will incorporate as a different but similar company, 32 00:02:09,400 --> 00:02:11,560 Speaker 1: like in other words, they'll they'll have a new name 33 00:02:11,600 --> 00:02:13,360 Speaker 1: and maybe a new address and everything, but it's the 34 00:02:13,440 --> 00:02:17,680 Speaker 1: same scheme as before. This is not one of those cases. 35 00:02:17,760 --> 00:02:20,440 Speaker 1: This is a much larger company, not on the scale 36 00:02:20,440 --> 00:02:23,800 Speaker 1: of something like a T and T, but a big, 37 00:02:23,840 --> 00:02:28,320 Speaker 1: big company. And one of the reasons that these companies 38 00:02:28,840 --> 00:02:33,959 Speaker 1: get so much flak is for the allowance of these 39 00:02:34,040 --> 00:02:38,080 Speaker 1: kinds of practices. So to understand what spoofing is and 40 00:02:38,120 --> 00:02:40,360 Speaker 1: how that affects color I D I thought it would 41 00:02:40,360 --> 00:02:43,120 Speaker 1: be good to listen to this episode from a couple 42 00:02:43,120 --> 00:02:46,440 Speaker 1: of years ago, and we'll be back later this week 43 00:02:46,480 --> 00:02:49,359 Speaker 1: with brand new episodes as soon as I figure out 44 00:02:49,440 --> 00:02:54,880 Speaker 1: what gremlins are infecting all of my hardware. If it's 45 00:02:54,919 --> 00:02:57,120 Speaker 1: not one thing, it's another. Okay, I'll chat with you 46 00:02:57,200 --> 00:03:04,040 Speaker 1: at the end of this episode. So today I thought 47 00:03:04,120 --> 00:03:07,359 Speaker 1: I would talk a bit about Color I D, spoofing 48 00:03:07,760 --> 00:03:11,760 Speaker 1: and robo calls. Mostly color I D and spoofing robot calls, 49 00:03:11,880 --> 00:03:13,959 Speaker 1: I think I'm gonna have to say for another episode. 50 00:03:14,120 --> 00:03:17,799 Speaker 1: But here in the United States, the major telecommunications companies, 51 00:03:17,960 --> 00:03:21,000 Speaker 1: those being Verizon, T Mobile, and A T and T 52 00:03:21,960 --> 00:03:24,919 Speaker 1: now have to work together to fight spam calls due 53 00:03:24,919 --> 00:03:28,120 Speaker 1: to a mandate from the Federal Communications Commission, or f 54 00:03:28,280 --> 00:03:34,960 Speaker 1: c C. Now, the too Long Didn't Listen message behind this, 55 00:03:35,360 --> 00:03:37,920 Speaker 1: as opposed to too Long Didn't Read, is that the 56 00:03:37,920 --> 00:03:40,440 Speaker 1: goal is to eliminate spam robo calls going to your 57 00:03:40,480 --> 00:03:43,320 Speaker 1: phone so that you don't act like your phone is 58 00:03:43,360 --> 00:03:45,920 Speaker 1: a bomb about to go off every time it rings. 59 00:03:46,240 --> 00:03:48,520 Speaker 1: But to understand why this is necessary and how it 60 00:03:48,560 --> 00:03:52,040 Speaker 1: all works, we have to go much deeper. So if you, 61 00:03:53,040 --> 00:03:57,480 Speaker 1: dear listener, are of a certain age, you might remember 62 00:03:57,480 --> 00:04:00,080 Speaker 1: a time when we didn't all carry smartphones around with 63 00:04:00,200 --> 00:04:02,640 Speaker 1: us all the time. You might even remember a time 64 00:04:03,040 --> 00:04:06,920 Speaker 1: before we even carried simple cell phones with us. In fact, 65 00:04:07,120 --> 00:04:10,360 Speaker 1: some of you might remember being on a telephone handset 66 00:04:10,720 --> 00:04:14,040 Speaker 1: that was tethered to a phone that was mounted to 67 00:04:14,080 --> 00:04:16,560 Speaker 1: the wall, or sitting on top of an end table 68 00:04:16,720 --> 00:04:20,120 Speaker 1: or something. And back in those days, dear friends, if 69 00:04:20,120 --> 00:04:22,800 Speaker 1: someone called you, you really had no way of knowing 70 00:04:22,800 --> 00:04:27,480 Speaker 1: who that someone was. I know, it's terrifying, right the 71 00:04:27,520 --> 00:04:32,000 Speaker 1: phone rings, and there's no way to know who or 72 00:04:32,040 --> 00:04:35,600 Speaker 1: what is on the other side. Could it be Grandpa 73 00:04:35,760 --> 00:04:38,960 Speaker 1: Joe and he's found a golden ticket. Could it be 74 00:04:39,240 --> 00:04:42,040 Speaker 1: the local food bank calling to see if you'll volunteer 75 00:04:42,120 --> 00:04:45,720 Speaker 1: this year. Could it be a wrong number? The only 76 00:04:45,720 --> 00:04:49,080 Speaker 1: way to find out was to answer the phone, or 77 00:04:49,400 --> 00:04:51,839 Speaker 1: if you were a fancy person, you might let the 78 00:04:51,880 --> 00:04:55,280 Speaker 1: call go to an answering machine. Side note. The answering 79 00:04:55,279 --> 00:04:57,640 Speaker 1: machine traces its history all the way back to the 80 00:04:57,720 --> 00:05:00,760 Speaker 1: nineteen thirties. But when I was going up in the 81 00:05:00,800 --> 00:05:05,120 Speaker 1: seventies and eighties, they were still relatively uncommon from most 82 00:05:05,120 --> 00:05:07,440 Speaker 1: of the people I knew. But by the mid eighties 83 00:05:07,440 --> 00:05:10,360 Speaker 1: that that had totally changed, and we started seeing commercials 84 00:05:10,400 --> 00:05:14,640 Speaker 1: for like novelty answering machine outgoing messages, Yeah, I used 85 00:05:14,680 --> 00:05:17,880 Speaker 1: to be a thing. There was this incredible pressure to 86 00:05:17,960 --> 00:05:21,520 Speaker 1: create the perfect outgoing message to convey to those calling 87 00:05:22,040 --> 00:05:25,880 Speaker 1: that you had a personality. But I digress, let's get 88 00:05:25,920 --> 00:05:30,719 Speaker 1: back on track. Many answering machines would play incoming messages 89 00:05:31,000 --> 00:05:34,360 Speaker 1: out loud on a loudspeaker as someone was making the message, 90 00:05:34,400 --> 00:05:37,360 Speaker 1: which meant that you could use an answering machine to 91 00:05:37,440 --> 00:05:40,200 Speaker 1: screen your calls, and a lot of people did so. 92 00:05:40,400 --> 00:05:43,120 Speaker 1: If you had anxiety about answering the phone, you could 93 00:05:43,160 --> 00:05:45,719 Speaker 1: just wait for the answering machine to activate and then 94 00:05:45,920 --> 00:05:48,039 Speaker 1: see if the other person on the other end of 95 00:05:48,040 --> 00:05:50,280 Speaker 1: the call was going to wait around long enough to 96 00:05:50,320 --> 00:05:53,880 Speaker 1: actually leave a message after hearing You're hilarious and yet 97 00:05:53,920 --> 00:05:58,320 Speaker 1: incredibly effective outgoing message. Then upon recognizing the voice, you 98 00:05:58,320 --> 00:06:00,720 Speaker 1: could choose to either interrupt the machine by picking up 99 00:06:00,760 --> 00:06:03,799 Speaker 1: the phone and having the call initiate, or just letting 100 00:06:03,800 --> 00:06:08,160 Speaker 1: it go. Simpler times, really not that color I D 101 00:06:08,560 --> 00:06:13,240 Speaker 1: wasn't a thing back then. The foundation of color i 102 00:06:13,360 --> 00:06:15,600 Speaker 1: D technology has a history that dates back to the 103 00:06:15,680 --> 00:06:19,039 Speaker 1: late nineteen sixties, and to really understand all this, we 104 00:06:19,040 --> 00:06:21,640 Speaker 1: should take get another step back and just talk about 105 00:06:21,880 --> 00:06:25,760 Speaker 1: phone calls in general, and we'll build from there. So 106 00:06:25,800 --> 00:06:29,920 Speaker 1: when Alexander Graham Bell made his first call, arguably not 107 00:06:30,240 --> 00:06:32,560 Speaker 1: the first call, but that's a story for another time, 108 00:06:33,160 --> 00:06:35,840 Speaker 1: it was a direct line from his station to that 109 00:06:35,920 --> 00:06:39,599 Speaker 1: of his assistant, Thomas Watson. There was no need to 110 00:06:39,720 --> 00:06:42,720 Speaker 1: route that call anywhere. It was a straight road, if 111 00:06:42,760 --> 00:06:47,760 Speaker 1: you will, from one point to another. Now, let's say 112 00:06:47,760 --> 00:06:50,200 Speaker 1: we've got a group of four people, and we want 113 00:06:50,240 --> 00:06:52,600 Speaker 1: to connect these four people with phone lines so they 114 00:06:52,600 --> 00:06:55,200 Speaker 1: can talk to each other on the phone. We could 115 00:06:55,240 --> 00:06:58,479 Speaker 1: do this directly as well. Right, A simple way to 116 00:06:58,640 --> 00:07:01,760 Speaker 1: draw this out would be just draw four points as 117 00:07:01,800 --> 00:07:06,360 Speaker 1: corners of a square. Uh. Those corners represent our four 118 00:07:06,400 --> 00:07:10,520 Speaker 1: phone friends, and we draw straight lines from each point 119 00:07:10,680 --> 00:07:13,120 Speaker 1: to each other point. So what you end up with 120 00:07:13,280 --> 00:07:16,640 Speaker 1: is a square with a couple of diagonal lines crossing 121 00:07:16,640 --> 00:07:20,640 Speaker 1: through the center, and boom, you've got your four person network. 122 00:07:20,720 --> 00:07:24,160 Speaker 1: Each person has a direct line to each other person 123 00:07:24,360 --> 00:07:27,000 Speaker 1: in the network. But as we try to add more 124 00:07:27,080 --> 00:07:29,960 Speaker 1: people to a system like this, we quickly see the 125 00:07:30,000 --> 00:07:33,520 Speaker 1: limitations that we face. Each new connection means we have 126 00:07:33,640 --> 00:07:37,640 Speaker 1: to establish cables between that person and every other person 127 00:07:37,680 --> 00:07:41,840 Speaker 1: on the network. This gets expensive and complicated and messy 128 00:07:41,960 --> 00:07:46,040 Speaker 1: and unsustainable. A phone network in which every single person 129 00:07:46,080 --> 00:07:48,600 Speaker 1: with a phone has a direct line with every single 130 00:07:48,600 --> 00:07:51,280 Speaker 1: other person with the phone is just impossible. You wouldn't 131 00:07:51,280 --> 00:07:53,520 Speaker 1: even be able to move around because of all the 132 00:07:53,600 --> 00:07:57,480 Speaker 1: cables everywhere, and so an important development in the history 133 00:07:57,520 --> 00:08:01,400 Speaker 1: of the telephone system was the creation of the local exchange. 134 00:08:01,680 --> 00:08:05,800 Speaker 1: The local exchange is a centralized point that you dial 135 00:08:05,920 --> 00:08:09,480 Speaker 1: into and then the exchange could switch on a connection 136 00:08:09,480 --> 00:08:12,200 Speaker 1: between your line and the line of whomever it was 137 00:08:12,280 --> 00:08:15,360 Speaker 1: you wanted to call. So in the early days of telephones, 138 00:08:15,800 --> 00:08:18,200 Speaker 1: this was done with actual human beings sitting at a 139 00:08:18,240 --> 00:08:22,640 Speaker 1: switchboard and manually plugging cables into complete calls from one 140 00:08:22,680 --> 00:08:27,080 Speaker 1: person to another. So now rather than having direct connections 141 00:08:27,120 --> 00:08:30,440 Speaker 1: with every other phone in existence, you really just needed 142 00:08:30,480 --> 00:08:35,360 Speaker 1: a direct connection from your phone to an exchange. This 143 00:08:35,400 --> 00:08:37,520 Speaker 1: cuts way back on the amount of cables that you 144 00:08:37,559 --> 00:08:40,480 Speaker 1: need in order to create a network. Now, this works 145 00:08:40,640 --> 00:08:43,600 Speaker 1: fine for local calls, like you know, within a city, 146 00:08:43,720 --> 00:08:47,360 Speaker 1: everyone can connect to that one local exchange, but the 147 00:08:47,360 --> 00:08:50,760 Speaker 1: word local gives us a hint that there isn't one 148 00:08:51,040 --> 00:08:55,360 Speaker 1: single exchange for every phone line out there. Now local 149 00:08:55,360 --> 00:08:59,240 Speaker 1: exchanges will cover a specific region, but beyond that you 150 00:08:59,320 --> 00:09:04,440 Speaker 1: have other local exchanges. And to connect these exchanges together, 151 00:09:04,640 --> 00:09:08,120 Speaker 1: phone companies laid out what we're called trunk lines. These 152 00:09:08,160 --> 00:09:12,560 Speaker 1: are cables capable of carrying multiple phone signals simultaneously, which 153 00:09:12,600 --> 00:09:15,240 Speaker 1: is a good thing too. Otherwise a single long distance 154 00:09:15,240 --> 00:09:17,960 Speaker 1: call would prevent anyone else from making a similar sort 155 00:09:18,000 --> 00:09:22,360 Speaker 1: of call between you know, those two specific exchanges. The 156 00:09:22,440 --> 00:09:25,840 Speaker 1: networks grew organically, connecting to one another and forming what 157 00:09:25,920 --> 00:09:29,319 Speaker 1: we call the public switched Telephone network or p s 158 00:09:29,440 --> 00:09:32,280 Speaker 1: t N. You could look at it as a sort 159 00:09:32,280 --> 00:09:36,520 Speaker 1: of hierarchy as more of the world built out phone systems. 160 00:09:37,040 --> 00:09:39,480 Speaker 1: At the very bottom of this hierarchy, you had your 161 00:09:39,559 --> 00:09:43,800 Speaker 1: individual landline phones the stuff and homes and offices and 162 00:09:43,960 --> 00:09:46,840 Speaker 1: phone booths and stuff like that. We used to have 163 00:09:47,000 --> 00:09:50,319 Speaker 1: these things called phone booths, Superman, which change in them 164 00:09:50,400 --> 00:09:53,920 Speaker 1: doesn't matter. One level up from this level and you 165 00:09:53,960 --> 00:09:56,240 Speaker 1: have your local exchanges, right, These are the ones that 166 00:09:56,240 --> 00:09:59,400 Speaker 1: connect local calls to each other. And as I said, 167 00:09:59,400 --> 00:10:01,760 Speaker 1: in the old day, this was done with human operators 168 00:10:01,760 --> 00:10:05,920 Speaker 1: moving physical plugs into physical outlets to complete circuits and 169 00:10:05,960 --> 00:10:08,600 Speaker 1: switch on a phone call. But didn't take long before 170 00:10:08,640 --> 00:10:12,880 Speaker 1: the complexity of phone systems necessitated innovation to create automated 171 00:10:12,920 --> 00:10:17,040 Speaker 1: ways of handling this. One level up from local exchanges 172 00:10:17,360 --> 00:10:22,079 Speaker 1: are your trunk exchanges. The trunk exchange is to local exchanges, 173 00:10:22,320 --> 00:10:26,880 Speaker 1: as local exchanges are too individual landlines. The trunk exchanges 174 00:10:26,920 --> 00:10:30,200 Speaker 1: allow the various local exchanges within a country to connect 175 00:10:30,240 --> 00:10:33,800 Speaker 1: to one another. A level above the trunk exchanges, you 176 00:10:33,840 --> 00:10:37,600 Speaker 1: have international gateways, which interconnect the phone system of one 177 00:10:37,640 --> 00:10:41,600 Speaker 1: country with other countries. Often you end up having super 178 00:10:41,679 --> 00:10:46,280 Speaker 1: long cables connecting these, including cables that run under the ocean. 179 00:10:46,559 --> 00:10:50,360 Speaker 1: You know, there's cables under the Atlantic that connect Europe 180 00:10:50,480 --> 00:10:54,680 Speaker 1: to North America, for example. All right, so now let's 181 00:10:54,679 --> 00:10:57,640 Speaker 1: get a bit more complicated by throwing cellular phones into 182 00:10:57,640 --> 00:11:01,800 Speaker 1: the mix. Sell phones communicate to cell towers, which you 183 00:11:01,800 --> 00:11:03,800 Speaker 1: can think of as being kind of similar to the 184 00:11:03,880 --> 00:11:07,720 Speaker 1: local exchange I was talking about earlier. So cell towers 185 00:11:07,720 --> 00:11:11,640 Speaker 1: are essentially antenna, and the cell phones communicate with cell 186 00:11:11,679 --> 00:11:16,719 Speaker 1: towers through electromagnetic radiation, specifically radiation that falls into the 187 00:11:16,800 --> 00:11:20,240 Speaker 1: microwave frequency range. But they're not the same microwaves that 188 00:11:20,280 --> 00:11:23,280 Speaker 1: we use to zap our popcorn and microwave ovens. It's 189 00:11:23,320 --> 00:11:26,720 Speaker 1: not that level of frequency. It's also a very low 190 00:11:26,760 --> 00:11:30,760 Speaker 1: wattage that we use for cell phones now. The microwave 191 00:11:31,120 --> 00:11:33,560 Speaker 1: acts as a carrier wave, and I've talked a bit 192 00:11:33,600 --> 00:11:36,760 Speaker 1: about carrier waves in the past with stuff like radio signals. 193 00:11:37,160 --> 00:11:40,559 Speaker 1: Each phone is using a slightly different frequency, otherwise you 194 00:11:40,559 --> 00:11:43,800 Speaker 1: would run into issues with phones interfering with one another. 195 00:11:44,160 --> 00:11:47,880 Speaker 1: All right, So cell phone towers are at the heart 196 00:11:48,000 --> 00:11:51,840 Speaker 1: of the cells that make up a service area. One 197 00:11:51,880 --> 00:11:54,520 Speaker 1: really clever thing about this approach is the handshake that 198 00:11:54,640 --> 00:11:57,600 Speaker 1: happens as you move across a region. So you can 199 00:11:57,640 --> 00:12:00,400 Speaker 1: be on a phone call, and you can be let's say, 200 00:12:00,400 --> 00:12:03,000 Speaker 1: in a car, and you pass out of the range 201 00:12:03,160 --> 00:12:06,600 Speaker 1: of one cell phone or cell tower rather and you 202 00:12:06,760 --> 00:12:09,720 Speaker 1: enter into the range of another, and your call continues 203 00:12:09,760 --> 00:12:11,880 Speaker 1: on as if you had a solid connection on a 204 00:12:11,920 --> 00:12:15,440 Speaker 1: single cell tower the entire time. I'm gonna leave it 205 00:12:15,440 --> 00:12:17,480 Speaker 1: at that, because getting into the tech of all that 206 00:12:17,559 --> 00:12:19,800 Speaker 1: would really get us off course. This episode would end 207 00:12:19,880 --> 00:12:22,720 Speaker 1: up being like three hours long. But maybe I'll do 208 00:12:22,760 --> 00:12:25,280 Speaker 1: a full episode about how cell towers work. It is 209 00:12:25,320 --> 00:12:28,080 Speaker 1: really fascinating because they have to be very careful with 210 00:12:28,120 --> 00:12:31,560 Speaker 1: the frequencies they use in order to both service everyone 211 00:12:31,600 --> 00:12:34,480 Speaker 1: who's within range of a specific cell tower and not 212 00:12:34,640 --> 00:12:39,079 Speaker 1: interfere with anyone who's at a neighboring cell tower anyway. 213 00:12:39,120 --> 00:12:43,280 Speaker 1: Connecting the towers is the Mobile Telephone Switching Office or 214 00:12:43,480 --> 00:12:47,440 Speaker 1: mt s O. Each service provider has its own empty 215 00:12:47,679 --> 00:12:51,000 Speaker 1: s O in regions, So if the person you're talking 216 00:12:51,040 --> 00:12:53,640 Speaker 1: with is in the same region, such as like in 217 00:12:53,679 --> 00:12:56,040 Speaker 1: the same city as you, and they happen to be 218 00:12:56,120 --> 00:12:59,240 Speaker 1: on the same carrier, one MT s O pretty much 219 00:12:59,280 --> 00:13:02,040 Speaker 1: handles every thing. The call signals go through the cell 220 00:13:02,080 --> 00:13:04,640 Speaker 1: towers to one another through the m t s O, 221 00:13:05,360 --> 00:13:08,400 Speaker 1: but the calls are not made directly phone to phone. 222 00:13:08,480 --> 00:13:11,360 Speaker 1: It's not like your phone is acting like a radio 223 00:13:11,600 --> 00:13:14,959 Speaker 1: directly with the other phone. Now, if you're calling someone 224 00:13:15,000 --> 00:13:17,280 Speaker 1: who's on the other side of the country, it's a 225 00:13:17,320 --> 00:13:19,959 Speaker 1: little bit different. Typically, your call would go from your 226 00:13:19,960 --> 00:13:22,559 Speaker 1: phone to a cell tower, and from the cell tower 227 00:13:22,640 --> 00:13:26,080 Speaker 1: to the local MT s O of your carrier, then 228 00:13:26,120 --> 00:13:30,640 Speaker 1: from there to the ps TN, that big public switching 229 00:13:30,640 --> 00:13:34,160 Speaker 1: telephone network, and that would then route your call to 230 00:13:34,320 --> 00:13:37,320 Speaker 1: the MT s O relevant to whomever it was your 231 00:13:37,360 --> 00:13:40,640 Speaker 1: calling on the other end. So even cell calls can 232 00:13:40,679 --> 00:13:44,600 Speaker 1: rely upon the old phone system. Getting back to call 233 00:13:44,640 --> 00:13:47,319 Speaker 1: or I D. Back in the nineteen sixties, there was 234 00:13:47,360 --> 00:13:51,040 Speaker 1: an engineer named Theodore Paris Cavacos. It still is, I mean, 235 00:13:51,040 --> 00:13:54,040 Speaker 1: he's still alive today. He developed a way to send 236 00:13:54,080 --> 00:13:58,840 Speaker 1: electronic data over telephone lines. In one he filed and 237 00:13:58,920 --> 00:14:02,640 Speaker 1: received a patent for are a quote decoding and display 238 00:14:02,679 --> 00:14:06,440 Speaker 1: apparatus for groups of pulse trains end quote. This would 239 00:14:06,440 --> 00:14:09,440 Speaker 1: become the basis of color i D, in which the 240 00:14:09,480 --> 00:14:13,640 Speaker 1: telephone of the person making the call will send data 241 00:14:13,720 --> 00:14:18,520 Speaker 1: relating to the phone number of that originating call along 242 00:14:18,520 --> 00:14:21,200 Speaker 1: with the call itself, and a device on the other 243 00:14:21,320 --> 00:14:26,200 Speaker 1: end on the receiveing end could get this information, decode it, 244 00:14:26,360 --> 00:14:30,680 Speaker 1: and display the incoming phone number and thus identify the 245 00:14:30,720 --> 00:14:35,560 Speaker 1: incoming call. Other engineers around the same time period began 246 00:14:35,600 --> 00:14:38,880 Speaker 1: to develop similar technologies and approaches, and so the early 247 00:14:38,920 --> 00:14:41,360 Speaker 1: days of color I D are a bit muddled, as 248 00:14:41,360 --> 00:14:44,680 Speaker 1: there are numerous patents assigned to different inventors, some of 249 00:14:44,720 --> 00:14:48,240 Speaker 1: which acknowledged the existence of other inventions as prior art. 250 00:14:49,320 --> 00:14:53,120 Speaker 1: One of those inventors was Katsuo Hashimoto for a quote 251 00:14:53,440 --> 00:14:57,880 Speaker 1: Telephone Information Displaying Device end quote. The abstract of that 252 00:14:57,920 --> 00:15:00,840 Speaker 1: patent essentially lays out what we think go as color 253 00:15:00,960 --> 00:15:03,760 Speaker 1: I D. So I'm going to read to you the 254 00:15:03,880 --> 00:15:08,880 Speaker 1: abstract of this patent. Here he goes a calling parties 255 00:15:08,920 --> 00:15:12,680 Speaker 1: telephone number displaying device, in which, while the telephone set 256 00:15:12,760 --> 00:15:16,080 Speaker 1: of a subscriber is ringing in response to calling signals 257 00:15:16,080 --> 00:15:19,120 Speaker 1: from a telephone exchange office, the telephone number of a 258 00:15:19,240 --> 00:15:23,160 Speaker 1: calling party and information are displayed on digital display units 259 00:15:23,520 --> 00:15:28,320 Speaker 1: at high speed before lifting the handset. Accordingly, the subscriber 260 00:15:28,320 --> 00:15:30,760 Speaker 1: can determine whether or not he should answer the call 261 00:15:30,840 --> 00:15:34,280 Speaker 1: before picking up the handset. Thus his privacy can be 262 00:15:34,280 --> 00:15:37,720 Speaker 1: protected from a variety of telephone troubles such as wrong 263 00:15:37,800 --> 00:15:41,280 Speaker 1: number and nuisance calls. The display is maintained as it 264 00:15:41,360 --> 00:15:44,520 Speaker 1: is even if the handset is put back after the talk, 265 00:15:44,880 --> 00:15:47,480 Speaker 1: but it will be cleared automatically upon reception of the 266 00:15:47,520 --> 00:15:50,120 Speaker 1: next call to display the telephone number of the next 267 00:15:50,200 --> 00:15:53,080 Speaker 1: calling party. When the subscriber picks up the handset to 268 00:15:53,120 --> 00:15:56,440 Speaker 1: make a call, the internal circuit is automatically changed to 269 00:15:56,520 --> 00:16:00,880 Speaker 1: display a telephone number dialed by him. That's it. So 270 00:16:01,000 --> 00:16:04,200 Speaker 1: that patent pretty much explains that the invention would allow 271 00:16:04,280 --> 00:16:09,000 Speaker 1: telephones to send and receive signals between successive ringing signals. 272 00:16:09,000 --> 00:16:12,080 Speaker 1: So In other words, when the phone company isn't sending 273 00:16:12,120 --> 00:16:15,680 Speaker 1: the signal to make the receiving phone ring, it could 274 00:16:15,680 --> 00:16:19,680 Speaker 1: send the signal containing information about the origin of that call. 275 00:16:20,120 --> 00:16:23,200 Speaker 1: And that's why if you're using a landline and you 276 00:16:23,280 --> 00:16:25,960 Speaker 1: get a phone call with a system that had color 277 00:16:26,040 --> 00:16:28,440 Speaker 1: I D, you would only see the I D stuff 278 00:16:28,480 --> 00:16:31,880 Speaker 1: pop up after the first ring happened. The method for 279 00:16:32,000 --> 00:16:36,240 Speaker 1: sending the information was a type of frequency modulation that's 280 00:16:36,320 --> 00:16:39,280 Speaker 1: changing the frequency of a signal in order to encode 281 00:16:39,280 --> 00:16:44,280 Speaker 1: information on it, called frequency shift keying or f s K. 282 00:16:44,840 --> 00:16:47,880 Speaker 1: Applying f s K to a carrier signal alters that 283 00:16:48,000 --> 00:16:50,400 Speaker 1: carrier signal in a way that can be interpreted on 284 00:16:50,440 --> 00:16:52,880 Speaker 1: the other side in some manner. So in the case 285 00:16:52,880 --> 00:16:55,680 Speaker 1: of color I D, that some manner is that the 286 00:16:55,720 --> 00:17:00,360 Speaker 1: transmitting side can encode the phone number in that carrier way, 287 00:17:00,560 --> 00:17:04,119 Speaker 1: and the receiving side can decode that carrier wave and 288 00:17:04,160 --> 00:17:07,359 Speaker 1: get back at that number. FSK is used in lots 289 00:17:07,400 --> 00:17:10,800 Speaker 1: of applications, not just Color I D. But for our purposes, 290 00:17:11,000 --> 00:17:13,040 Speaker 1: it's just important that we know that this is the 291 00:17:13,080 --> 00:17:15,960 Speaker 1: methodology that the phone companies used to transmit the info 292 00:17:16,040 --> 00:17:19,280 Speaker 1: of Hey, this is the phone number that just dialed you. 293 00:17:19,520 --> 00:17:22,080 Speaker 1: But this wasn't going to be a service that phone 294 00:17:22,080 --> 00:17:25,719 Speaker 1: companies were going to throw in for free. No, this 295 00:17:25,760 --> 00:17:28,399 Speaker 1: would be something that companies would charge for on top 296 00:17:28,480 --> 00:17:31,360 Speaker 1: of the normal phone bill. Now, the story goes that 297 00:17:31,440 --> 00:17:34,840 Speaker 1: the phone companies at first planned to offer this service 298 00:17:34,920 --> 00:17:37,720 Speaker 1: as an audio one. So in other words, you could 299 00:17:37,800 --> 00:17:40,479 Speaker 1: opt into this service and you would get a verbal 300 00:17:40,560 --> 00:17:42,919 Speaker 1: alert when you picked up the phone telling you the 301 00:17:42,960 --> 00:17:47,520 Speaker 1: phone number that the call originated from. UH and the 302 00:17:47,520 --> 00:17:50,680 Speaker 1: phone companies were hoping to charge on a per use basis, 303 00:17:50,720 --> 00:17:53,679 Speaker 1: so every time you did this you get charged a 304 00:17:53,680 --> 00:17:57,600 Speaker 1: little amount. That's not how things eventually turned out. We'll 305 00:17:57,600 --> 00:17:59,960 Speaker 1: get into color I D a little bit more after 306 00:18:00,040 --> 00:18:02,159 Speaker 1: the break, and then we'll talk about the systems that 307 00:18:02,320 --> 00:18:13,480 Speaker 1: enable spoofing. But first let's take that quick break. So, 308 00:18:13,560 --> 00:18:16,760 Speaker 1: phone companies were licensing technologies to enable color I D 309 00:18:16,880 --> 00:18:19,359 Speaker 1: in the nineteen seventies, but it wasn't until the mid 310 00:18:19,520 --> 00:18:22,919 Speaker 1: nineteen eighties that we saw the first pilot program of 311 00:18:22,960 --> 00:18:25,960 Speaker 1: color I D here in the United States. That took 312 00:18:26,000 --> 00:18:31,200 Speaker 1: place in Orlando, Florida, where you know, the characters from 313 00:18:31,200 --> 00:18:34,080 Speaker 1: Book of Mormon really wanted to go. And that happened 314 00:18:34,080 --> 00:18:37,920 Speaker 1: back In nine four, Bell South offered a service called 315 00:18:38,040 --> 00:18:40,920 Speaker 1: Touch Star, and Color i D was one of the 316 00:18:40,960 --> 00:18:44,440 Speaker 1: features that you could opt into with Touch Star. It 317 00:18:44,520 --> 00:18:48,359 Speaker 1: was called Custom Local Area Signaling Service, but it would 318 00:18:48,359 --> 00:18:51,399 Speaker 1: become known as Color i D. Now, if you weren't 319 00:18:51,400 --> 00:18:53,919 Speaker 1: around in the nineteen eighties, you might be surprised to 320 00:18:53,960 --> 00:18:56,359 Speaker 1: hear that the emergence of color i D was viewed 321 00:18:56,359 --> 00:19:00,440 Speaker 1: with suspicion from multiple fronts in the US. Paul piticians 322 00:19:00,440 --> 00:19:03,800 Speaker 1: were asking if perhaps Color i D would violate wire 323 00:19:03,840 --> 00:19:07,600 Speaker 1: tapping laws, and others were likening it to tracing a 324 00:19:07,640 --> 00:19:10,000 Speaker 1: phone call, kind of like what you see in movies, 325 00:19:10,040 --> 00:19:12,520 Speaker 1: where you know, the police are trying to track a 326 00:19:12,600 --> 00:19:16,840 Speaker 1: specific criminal as they talk on the phone. But in fact, 327 00:19:17,240 --> 00:19:20,200 Speaker 1: it was such a controversial subject that it took more 328 00:19:20,280 --> 00:19:23,520 Speaker 1: than a decade for all fifty states in the US 329 00:19:23,600 --> 00:19:27,480 Speaker 1: to actually adopt the technology. California held out the longest. 330 00:19:27,760 --> 00:19:32,520 Speaker 1: California only incorporated color i D in nineteen twelve years 331 00:19:32,600 --> 00:19:35,359 Speaker 1: after Orlando, Florida got in on it. And by the 332 00:19:35,400 --> 00:19:38,600 Speaker 1: mid nineties, there was another big concern to think about, 333 00:19:38,680 --> 00:19:41,920 Speaker 1: and that was privacy. We weren't quite at the same 334 00:19:42,000 --> 00:19:44,399 Speaker 1: level that we are now, not by a long shot, 335 00:19:44,760 --> 00:19:49,200 Speaker 1: where the average medicine has generated tons of information about 336 00:19:49,240 --> 00:19:53,040 Speaker 1: themselves that can link back to them. But we were 337 00:19:53,160 --> 00:19:56,080 Speaker 1: entering into an era in which certain companies were building 338 00:19:56,119 --> 00:20:00,720 Speaker 1: out comprehensive databases about consumers, and so you started to 339 00:20:00,800 --> 00:20:06,040 Speaker 1: see companies building out profiles or even dossiers on people. Now, 340 00:20:06,160 --> 00:20:08,879 Speaker 1: if you want to be charitable, you could argue this 341 00:20:08,960 --> 00:20:13,320 Speaker 1: helped those companies serve their customers more effectively. But if 342 00:20:13,359 --> 00:20:15,760 Speaker 1: you want to be cynical, you could say that this 343 00:20:15,800 --> 00:20:19,160 Speaker 1: gave companies more information to leverage while trying to sell 344 00:20:19,240 --> 00:20:22,879 Speaker 1: goods or services to a potential customer. The truth is 345 00:20:22,960 --> 00:20:27,960 Speaker 1: probably somewhere in the middle. But what concerned privacy advocates 346 00:20:28,040 --> 00:20:31,680 Speaker 1: is that a business could theoretically rely on caller I D. 347 00:20:32,280 --> 00:20:34,479 Speaker 1: So if someone were to call in, let's say that 348 00:20:34,520 --> 00:20:38,240 Speaker 1: someone needs to talk to a customer service rep, then 349 00:20:38,520 --> 00:20:41,160 Speaker 1: that rep could do a reverse phone number, look up 350 00:20:41,359 --> 00:20:45,120 Speaker 1: on that call, and pull up a full profile of 351 00:20:45,160 --> 00:20:48,280 Speaker 1: the person calling. And there were a lot of privacy 352 00:20:48,320 --> 00:20:51,879 Speaker 1: implications that we're concerning. Actually kind of seems quaint in 353 00:20:51,920 --> 00:20:54,359 Speaker 1: comparison to what we deal with today, at least if 354 00:20:54,359 --> 00:20:57,879 Speaker 1: you look into how private information gets handled. These days. 355 00:20:58,640 --> 00:21:01,600 Speaker 1: For that reason, tell A phone companies introduced an option 356 00:21:01,640 --> 00:21:05,960 Speaker 1: to allow customers to opt into color I D blocking. Now, 357 00:21:05,960 --> 00:21:08,120 Speaker 1: if you did this, it meant that your number would 358 00:21:08,160 --> 00:21:11,760 Speaker 1: not be displayed when you called someone else. You were 359 00:21:11,880 --> 00:21:15,800 Speaker 1: effectively blacklisted for color I D. And so you know, 360 00:21:15,840 --> 00:21:18,240 Speaker 1: if I opted into this and I called you, you 361 00:21:18,240 --> 00:21:21,440 Speaker 1: would probably see some sort of message like color unknown 362 00:21:21,680 --> 00:21:25,960 Speaker 1: or something similar to that, which probably means you wouldn't 363 00:21:26,000 --> 00:21:29,000 Speaker 1: likely pick up my call. To be fair, you probably 364 00:21:29,040 --> 00:21:31,720 Speaker 1: wouldn't anyway, I'm kind of a drag to speak to 365 00:21:31,800 --> 00:21:35,240 Speaker 1: on the phone. It took time for attitudes around color 366 00:21:35,280 --> 00:21:38,479 Speaker 1: I D to change, but we did obviously see that 367 00:21:38,560 --> 00:21:43,720 Speaker 1: happen today. For many people, including myself, we don't pick 368 00:21:43,800 --> 00:21:46,480 Speaker 1: up the phone if we don't recognize the number that's 369 00:21:46,520 --> 00:21:50,160 Speaker 1: displayed on our phone screen, and that means that if 370 00:21:50,160 --> 00:21:53,359 Speaker 1: the call comes up as unknown or something along those lines, 371 00:21:54,160 --> 00:21:56,439 Speaker 1: we're not likely to answer it. We'll probably let it 372 00:21:56,600 --> 00:21:59,080 Speaker 1: go to voicemail. In fact, these days, I feel a 373 00:21:59,119 --> 00:22:02,400 Speaker 1: sense of anxiety even if I do recognize the number, 374 00:22:02,440 --> 00:22:05,159 Speaker 1: which is weird because I was one of those folks 375 00:22:05,160 --> 00:22:07,399 Speaker 1: who back in the eighties and nineties I love to 376 00:22:07,440 --> 00:22:10,240 Speaker 1: talk on the phone now it seems kind of odd. 377 00:22:10,640 --> 00:22:12,840 Speaker 1: I have a small group of friends and family with 378 00:22:12,880 --> 00:22:15,520 Speaker 1: whom I'll chat with on the phone, but they are 379 00:22:15,560 --> 00:22:20,080 Speaker 1: truly the exception and not the rule. Anyway, Color I 380 00:22:20,200 --> 00:22:23,440 Speaker 1: D made the transition from being viewed as being invasive 381 00:22:23,640 --> 00:22:27,640 Speaker 1: or creepy as to being necessary in order to function 382 00:22:27,800 --> 00:22:31,280 Speaker 1: as a human being in the modern technical age. And 383 00:22:31,320 --> 00:22:34,040 Speaker 1: there's a related thing I should talk about quickly for 384 00:22:34,040 --> 00:22:38,200 Speaker 1: folks in the United States, and that's the Calling Name presentation. 385 00:22:38,640 --> 00:22:43,440 Speaker 1: That's c NAP or Color Name Delivery, that's c NAM systems. 386 00:22:44,200 --> 00:22:47,080 Speaker 1: These are systems that can provide a name to go 387 00:22:47,240 --> 00:22:50,120 Speaker 1: with a phone number. So with these systems, you don't 388 00:22:50,200 --> 00:22:53,240 Speaker 1: just get a telephone number, you get a person or 389 00:22:53,359 --> 00:22:58,480 Speaker 1: business name that is associated with that phone number. So 390 00:22:58,600 --> 00:23:01,120 Speaker 1: here's how it works. In the United States. I'd say 391 00:23:01,119 --> 00:23:04,639 Speaker 1: we've got two people. We've got Max and Chris. And 392 00:23:04,800 --> 00:23:08,160 Speaker 1: Max is in New York and Chris is in California. 393 00:23:08,520 --> 00:23:12,400 Speaker 1: What's more, Max is a T mobile customer and Chriss 394 00:23:12,480 --> 00:23:15,439 Speaker 1: carrier is a T and T. And both Max and 395 00:23:15,520 --> 00:23:19,160 Speaker 1: Chris are using smartphones, so they're on cellular networks. So 396 00:23:19,280 --> 00:23:24,320 Speaker 1: Max calls Chris. Max's smartphone is connected to a nearby 397 00:23:24,400 --> 00:23:28,320 Speaker 1: cell tower, nearby T Mobile cell tower, and that routes 398 00:23:28,359 --> 00:23:31,199 Speaker 1: the call through T Mobiles M T s O in 399 00:23:31,240 --> 00:23:35,000 Speaker 1: that particular region, and the empty s O then routes 400 00:23:35,080 --> 00:23:38,080 Speaker 1: the call through the ps t N, the Public Switching 401 00:23:38,160 --> 00:23:42,399 Speaker 1: Telephone network, and that then routes the call to the 402 00:23:42,520 --> 00:23:45,159 Speaker 1: A T and T M T s O all the 403 00:23:45,160 --> 00:23:48,760 Speaker 1: way out in California. That connects to a cell tower 404 00:23:48,840 --> 00:23:52,840 Speaker 1: that's in Chris's area, and it sends the call to 405 00:23:52,920 --> 00:23:56,480 Speaker 1: Chris's smartphone. Now it's at this stage, the A T 406 00:23:56,640 --> 00:23:59,560 Speaker 1: and T stage, where we see the system call up 407 00:23:59,640 --> 00:24:03,360 Speaker 1: the name. So, in other words, the name look up 408 00:24:03,600 --> 00:24:06,960 Speaker 1: is on the receiver's end. It doesn't originate from the 409 00:24:06,960 --> 00:24:10,399 Speaker 1: the phone that's making the call. It's all down to 410 00:24:11,000 --> 00:24:15,360 Speaker 1: whichever carrier is an operation on the receiving end, and 411 00:24:15,960 --> 00:24:19,119 Speaker 1: A T and T sees that Max's phone number is 412 00:24:19,119 --> 00:24:22,080 Speaker 1: coming in, so it recognizes the number. But to associate 413 00:24:22,119 --> 00:24:26,000 Speaker 1: that number with Max as a person that requires a 414 00:24:26,080 --> 00:24:28,959 Speaker 1: database look up. And because Max is a T mobile 415 00:24:28,960 --> 00:24:31,960 Speaker 1: customer not an A T and T customer, A T 416 00:24:32,080 --> 00:24:34,800 Speaker 1: and T technically has to pay a very small fee 417 00:24:35,160 --> 00:24:38,520 Speaker 1: called a DIP fee to look up the information and 418 00:24:38,560 --> 00:24:42,000 Speaker 1: then to send that on to Chris. Then Chris sees 419 00:24:42,040 --> 00:24:46,320 Speaker 1: that Max is calling and picks up, or Chris ghosts Max. 420 00:24:46,359 --> 00:24:48,919 Speaker 1: I don't know what their friendship looks like, to be honest, 421 00:24:49,640 --> 00:24:52,280 Speaker 1: my point being that the name associated with a phone 422 00:24:52,359 --> 00:24:56,400 Speaker 1: number isn't magically connected to that number. Rather, there are 423 00:24:56,400 --> 00:25:00,199 Speaker 1: these massive databases of phone customers out there, typically at 424 00:25:00,280 --> 00:25:03,959 Speaker 1: the local level, and these databases match numbers two names. 425 00:25:04,520 --> 00:25:07,800 Speaker 1: There's no universal database out there that has every name 426 00:25:07,840 --> 00:25:11,440 Speaker 1: and every number, So phone companies have these ongoing agreements 427 00:25:11,480 --> 00:25:14,359 Speaker 1: to charge these small dip fees to dip into the 428 00:25:14,440 --> 00:25:18,960 Speaker 1: databases and retrieve relevant information. All right, So that's color 429 00:25:19,000 --> 00:25:21,680 Speaker 1: I D and I think it's pretty easy to understand 430 00:25:21,720 --> 00:25:24,399 Speaker 1: from a high level how it works. But then what 431 00:25:24,520 --> 00:25:27,760 Speaker 1: about spoofing. Well, spoofing is a practice in which the 432 00:25:27,840 --> 00:25:31,359 Speaker 1: number that pops up on a color I D system 433 00:25:31,640 --> 00:25:34,920 Speaker 1: is not the same as the actual number making the call, 434 00:25:35,480 --> 00:25:38,280 Speaker 1: And there are legitimate reasons to do this that have 435 00:25:38,440 --> 00:25:41,920 Speaker 1: nothing to do with scams or crimes. So spoofing as 436 00:25:41,960 --> 00:25:45,800 Speaker 1: it stands is not illegal on its own. It's only 437 00:25:45,840 --> 00:25:50,080 Speaker 1: illegal if you're using spoofing to purposefully mislead or scam people. 438 00:25:51,240 --> 00:25:53,280 Speaker 1: Then you can face a pretty big fine in the 439 00:25:53,320 --> 00:25:58,080 Speaker 1: United States. But spoofing is just a thing, not illegal. 440 00:25:58,240 --> 00:26:01,000 Speaker 1: So let me give you a scenario where it's it's allowed. 441 00:26:01,560 --> 00:26:04,879 Speaker 1: Let's say that you work at an accounting firm and 442 00:26:04,920 --> 00:26:07,680 Speaker 1: you're in charge of making some follow up calls relating 443 00:26:07,680 --> 00:26:10,879 Speaker 1: to a specific account. Now, you have your own phone 444 00:26:11,000 --> 00:26:14,560 Speaker 1: at your desk, but and your own phone actually has 445 00:26:14,600 --> 00:26:18,439 Speaker 1: its own extension, you can make calls within your department, 446 00:26:18,800 --> 00:26:22,399 Speaker 1: you know two, directly to your coworkers, no problem. But 447 00:26:22,520 --> 00:26:25,639 Speaker 1: chances are you would rather have your outgoing calls, the 448 00:26:25,640 --> 00:26:29,600 Speaker 1: ones you make outside of your company, map not to 449 00:26:29,680 --> 00:26:32,199 Speaker 1: your desk's phone number, but to the number for the 450 00:26:32,240 --> 00:26:35,720 Speaker 1: accounting firm as a whole. That way, anyone on the 451 00:26:35,760 --> 00:26:39,119 Speaker 1: receiving end would see that it's a call coming from 452 00:26:39,160 --> 00:26:43,240 Speaker 1: this big accounting company, not some unknown desk phone. You 453 00:26:43,240 --> 00:26:46,280 Speaker 1: would need a way to replace your desk phone's number 454 00:26:46,720 --> 00:26:50,159 Speaker 1: with the overall company's phone number. This happens all the 455 00:26:50,200 --> 00:26:54,000 Speaker 1: time with big companies and doctor's offices and stuff like that, 456 00:26:54,160 --> 00:26:56,560 Speaker 1: So you can probably think of lots of legitimate uses 457 00:26:56,560 --> 00:27:00,959 Speaker 1: where the call going out seems to be coming from 458 00:27:01,000 --> 00:27:05,320 Speaker 1: a very large, known entity rather than an individual phone 459 00:27:05,640 --> 00:27:10,040 Speaker 1: located within that entity. But to make this happen, you 460 00:27:10,119 --> 00:27:12,639 Speaker 1: have to have some sort of technology that does the 461 00:27:12,640 --> 00:27:16,200 Speaker 1: old switcherou with the phone numbers. Now, as I mentioned earlier, 462 00:27:16,480 --> 00:27:19,680 Speaker 1: color I D in the old phone system involves using 463 00:27:19,840 --> 00:27:23,960 Speaker 1: f s K or frequency shift keying, to alter a 464 00:27:24,000 --> 00:27:27,280 Speaker 1: carrier signal in a specific way to transmit information about 465 00:27:27,280 --> 00:27:30,000 Speaker 1: a phone number in between the signals that cause the 466 00:27:30,040 --> 00:27:33,959 Speaker 1: receiving phone to ring. And it turned out that if 467 00:27:34,000 --> 00:27:36,280 Speaker 1: you could figure out the f s K process and 468 00:27:36,320 --> 00:27:38,960 Speaker 1: build the right technology, you could build out a system 469 00:27:39,040 --> 00:27:42,919 Speaker 1: that would use FSK to transmit false information, allowing you 470 00:27:42,960 --> 00:27:46,080 Speaker 1: to mask the true originating number of a call and 471 00:27:46,160 --> 00:27:50,520 Speaker 1: substitute in something else will let you spoof a phone number. 472 00:27:50,680 --> 00:27:53,639 Speaker 1: In other words, And this again was was made on 473 00:27:53,720 --> 00:27:56,280 Speaker 1: purpose eventually, like when once we got to the point 474 00:27:56,359 --> 00:27:59,840 Speaker 1: where we had big companies with these kind of phone systems, 475 00:28:00,320 --> 00:28:03,080 Speaker 1: it was sort of a necessity. So it's not like 476 00:28:03,280 --> 00:28:08,080 Speaker 1: this was an oversight or or rather it wasn't a vulnerability. 477 00:28:08,240 --> 00:28:12,879 Speaker 1: It ended up being an opportunity. But if you wanted 478 00:28:12,880 --> 00:28:16,080 Speaker 1: to take advantage of it, it wasn't really easy to do. 479 00:28:16,560 --> 00:28:18,959 Speaker 1: Back in the early two thousands, for example, it was 480 00:28:19,080 --> 00:28:22,919 Speaker 1: actually pretty challenging. With the right hardware and software, and 481 00:28:23,000 --> 00:28:25,879 Speaker 1: with a digital phone line, you could manage it, but 482 00:28:25,960 --> 00:28:29,199 Speaker 1: it was beyond most people. Some big businesses used it 483 00:28:29,240 --> 00:28:31,840 Speaker 1: for the purposes I mentioned earlier, but that was kind 484 00:28:31,840 --> 00:28:34,440 Speaker 1: of the extent of it. Now, part of what makes 485 00:28:34,480 --> 00:28:38,640 Speaker 1: this possible is a system called a private branch exchange 486 00:28:38,800 --> 00:28:42,760 Speaker 1: or p b X, So this doesn't fit neatly into 487 00:28:42,800 --> 00:28:46,360 Speaker 1: that hierarchy I mentioned earlier. A p b X is 488 00:28:46,400 --> 00:28:49,680 Speaker 1: a telephone system that's typically within a really big organization, 489 00:28:49,800 --> 00:28:53,080 Speaker 1: like a big business, And essentially what it does is 490 00:28:53,120 --> 00:28:56,840 Speaker 1: it allows for an internal telephone system, that is, one 491 00:28:56,880 --> 00:29:00,120 Speaker 1: that connects all the internal phones with each other or 492 00:29:00,680 --> 00:29:03,560 Speaker 1: but it keeps a limited number of external phone lines 493 00:29:03,880 --> 00:29:07,440 Speaker 1: that connect outward to the general you know, public switching 494 00:29:07,520 --> 00:29:11,840 Speaker 1: telephone network or PSTN. So let's say we're looking at 495 00:29:11,840 --> 00:29:15,840 Speaker 1: a corporation with like five thousand employees. Rather than making 496 00:29:15,840 --> 00:29:18,960 Speaker 1: sure every single employee has a direct phone line to 497 00:29:18,960 --> 00:29:22,280 Speaker 1: the outside world, the business chooses to set up a 498 00:29:22,400 --> 00:29:26,240 Speaker 1: PBX while there's a phone at every employee's desk, and 499 00:29:26,320 --> 00:29:29,360 Speaker 1: these phones can make direct calls to one another within 500 00:29:29,520 --> 00:29:32,880 Speaker 1: the businesses local network. To make a call to the 501 00:29:32,960 --> 00:29:35,560 Speaker 1: outside world. First, you might have to do something like 502 00:29:35,680 --> 00:29:38,840 Speaker 1: dial A nine and that actually opens up one of 503 00:29:38,880 --> 00:29:42,200 Speaker 1: the business is limited external phone lines. So let's say 504 00:29:42,240 --> 00:29:46,400 Speaker 1: that this particular business has one hundred dedicated external phone lines, 505 00:29:46,480 --> 00:29:48,960 Speaker 1: which sounds like a lot, but it's way fewer than 506 00:29:49,080 --> 00:29:52,080 Speaker 1: the five thousand you would need for every single employee 507 00:29:52,080 --> 00:29:55,640 Speaker 1: to have their own personal external line. As long as 508 00:29:55,920 --> 00:29:58,440 Speaker 1: fewer than one hundred employees are making calls to the 509 00:29:58,440 --> 00:30:01,280 Speaker 1: outside world at any given to, i'm there's not really 510 00:30:01,360 --> 00:30:05,560 Speaker 1: a problem here. There are different flavors of p b X, 511 00:30:05,960 --> 00:30:08,120 Speaker 1: and they date back even to when the phone system 512 00:30:08,200 --> 00:30:11,760 Speaker 1: was purely running on analog signals and there were no 513 00:30:11,920 --> 00:30:15,720 Speaker 1: digital signal phone lines. Today, p b X has include 514 00:30:15,760 --> 00:30:20,320 Speaker 1: technologies like voice over Internet Protocol or void an I 515 00:30:20,560 --> 00:30:24,760 Speaker 1: p p b X or Internet Protocol. Private branch exchange 516 00:30:25,040 --> 00:30:28,160 Speaker 1: can sometimes include the ability to spoof a phone number. 517 00:30:28,200 --> 00:30:31,520 Speaker 1: It can be built into the system. Sometimes it's got 518 00:30:31,520 --> 00:30:34,800 Speaker 1: a very easy way to access and make these changes. 519 00:30:34,840 --> 00:30:37,880 Speaker 1: You'll just have like a little online form and you 520 00:30:37,920 --> 00:30:41,320 Speaker 1: can go in and you can select what you want 521 00:30:41,440 --> 00:30:47,000 Speaker 1: the outgoing call number to look like. But you know, 522 00:30:47,200 --> 00:30:49,960 Speaker 1: it's really handy if you want everything to look like 523 00:30:49,960 --> 00:30:52,719 Speaker 1: it's coming from a major office phone number. But it's 524 00:30:52,760 --> 00:30:55,320 Speaker 1: also opened up the opportunity to start a new kind 525 00:30:55,360 --> 00:31:00,560 Speaker 1: of fraudulent business. One early company that try to create 526 00:31:00,560 --> 00:31:03,560 Speaker 1: a business out of spoofing was founded by a dude 527 00:31:03,640 --> 00:31:07,680 Speaker 1: named Jason Jepson, who launched a service called Star thirty 528 00:31:07,720 --> 00:31:13,760 Speaker 1: eight dot com with start customers who from the beginning, 529 00:31:13,800 --> 00:31:18,080 Speaker 1: we're supposed to be limited to people like licensed private investigators, 530 00:31:18,440 --> 00:31:22,880 Speaker 1: law enforcement and debt collectors would be allowed to pay 531 00:31:23,000 --> 00:31:26,000 Speaker 1: a fee and that would let them make phone calls 532 00:31:26,000 --> 00:31:29,040 Speaker 1: while disguising the phone number that they were using as 533 00:31:29,160 --> 00:31:34,800 Speaker 1: you know, something else. Now that the thinking was that 534 00:31:34,840 --> 00:31:38,040 Speaker 1: the average person isn't keen to pick up the phone 535 00:31:38,160 --> 00:31:40,880 Speaker 1: if they happen to know that there's a private investigator 536 00:31:40,920 --> 00:31:44,080 Speaker 1: on the line or a debt collection agency, you know, 537 00:31:44,120 --> 00:31:48,520 Speaker 1: they would rather ghost that call. So the thinking was 538 00:31:48,560 --> 00:31:50,800 Speaker 1: it sure would be useful to be able to hide 539 00:31:50,880 --> 00:31:54,719 Speaker 1: that information and convince the person on the other end 540 00:31:54,720 --> 00:31:58,200 Speaker 1: of that that line to actually pick up the phone. 541 00:31:58,600 --> 00:32:00,480 Speaker 1: So the best way to do that is to hide 542 00:32:00,480 --> 00:32:03,880 Speaker 1: who you are. Start three eight dot com didn't have 543 00:32:04,080 --> 00:32:07,560 Speaker 1: a long and illustrious history in its original form. Three 544 00:32:08,040 --> 00:32:12,320 Speaker 1: days after he launched the service, Jepson announced he was 545 00:32:12,360 --> 00:32:15,480 Speaker 1: looking to sell the business. He had received numerous threats 546 00:32:15,480 --> 00:32:18,440 Speaker 1: and harassing calls and felt it was just, you know, 547 00:32:18,840 --> 00:32:22,440 Speaker 1: not the right line of work for him. Other services 548 00:32:22,480 --> 00:32:25,760 Speaker 1: like one called Camo Phone, you know, like camouflage, but 549 00:32:25,880 --> 00:32:29,920 Speaker 1: Camo Phone, those kind of surfaced, and Star thirty eight 550 00:32:29,920 --> 00:32:33,240 Speaker 1: actually did come back as a service marketed as being 551 00:32:33,280 --> 00:32:37,880 Speaker 1: exclusive to law enforcement agencies, and that was really the 552 00:32:37,920 --> 00:32:41,840 Speaker 1: beginning of spoofing. But when we come back, we'll talk 553 00:32:41,880 --> 00:32:46,080 Speaker 1: about how spoofing really proliferated as VOIPE systems grew in popularity, 554 00:32:46,400 --> 00:32:49,840 Speaker 1: and how the FCC is responding to the issue today. 555 00:32:49,880 --> 00:33:01,640 Speaker 1: But first let's take another quick break. The emergence of 556 00:33:01,760 --> 00:33:06,160 Speaker 1: voice over Internet protocol was one of those truly disruptive technologies. 557 00:33:06,600 --> 00:33:09,720 Speaker 1: In this case, it was disrupting the telecommunications business that 558 00:33:10,280 --> 00:33:14,120 Speaker 1: got you know, totally turned on its head. Because of 559 00:33:14,160 --> 00:33:17,240 Speaker 1: this Voice would allow people to make phone calls using 560 00:33:17,280 --> 00:33:22,040 Speaker 1: the Internet as the transmission system, essentially bypassing the phone 561 00:33:22,040 --> 00:33:25,440 Speaker 1: companies in the process, at least on one end of 562 00:33:25,440 --> 00:33:29,239 Speaker 1: the call. Possibly both void phones can connect to one 563 00:33:29,240 --> 00:33:32,200 Speaker 1: another over the Internet and not even touch the phone system, 564 00:33:32,320 --> 00:33:35,120 Speaker 1: at least not the way that normal telephone calls do. 565 00:33:35,600 --> 00:33:38,040 Speaker 1: But what if someone were to use a voice system 566 00:33:38,120 --> 00:33:40,360 Speaker 1: to call someone in a with a phone that's connected 567 00:33:40,400 --> 00:33:44,480 Speaker 1: to the old public Switching Telephone network or ps t N. Well, 568 00:33:45,160 --> 00:33:48,240 Speaker 1: any voice call connecting to the ps t N has 569 00:33:48,280 --> 00:33:51,960 Speaker 1: to go through what's called a void gateway, which serves 570 00:33:52,000 --> 00:33:56,280 Speaker 1: as a bridge between the two systems. See voice traffic 571 00:33:56,400 --> 00:34:03,360 Speaker 1: over the Internet protocol. UH. That that's using packet switching protocols. 572 00:34:03,360 --> 00:34:05,600 Speaker 1: That's what the Internet at large uses in order to 573 00:34:05,640 --> 00:34:10,160 Speaker 1: send data. It divides up files into packets of information 574 00:34:10,239 --> 00:34:12,400 Speaker 1: and then sends them across the network to be essentially 575 00:34:12,480 --> 00:34:16,440 Speaker 1: reassembled on the other side. But this is incompatible with 576 00:34:16,480 --> 00:34:20,080 Speaker 1: how phone calls are transmitted across the ps t N. 577 00:34:20,520 --> 00:34:24,040 Speaker 1: It's two totally different systems. So the gateway has to 578 00:34:24,280 --> 00:34:28,399 Speaker 1: decompress the digital packets from the voice call and turn 579 00:34:28,480 --> 00:34:32,440 Speaker 1: it into a digital signal that then can be converted 580 00:34:32,480 --> 00:34:35,320 Speaker 1: into an analog signal to cross the ps t N, 581 00:34:35,680 --> 00:34:39,680 Speaker 1: which is pretty wild right. Gateways also come in different flavors. 582 00:34:39,719 --> 00:34:43,680 Speaker 1: There are standalone gateways UH, then there are gateway functions 583 00:34:43,680 --> 00:34:46,680 Speaker 1: that can be built into specific types of routers. H. 584 00:34:46,760 --> 00:34:48,920 Speaker 1: There's also the I P P B X that I 585 00:34:49,000 --> 00:34:52,919 Speaker 1: mentioned earlier. Those can act as gateways. The important part 586 00:34:53,000 --> 00:34:56,040 Speaker 1: for our discussion is that many of these voice services 587 00:34:56,080 --> 00:34:59,360 Speaker 1: allow users to take advantage of p b X features. 588 00:35:00,120 --> 00:35:05,400 Speaker 1: Traditionally only big companies could use, including spoofing the phone number. 589 00:35:06,360 --> 00:35:12,360 Speaker 1: So as void technology proliferated and as more providers began 590 00:35:12,400 --> 00:35:16,239 Speaker 1: to offer up spoofing services, including ones that just they 591 00:35:16,280 --> 00:35:18,799 Speaker 1: allow you to start up an account and you pay 592 00:35:18,840 --> 00:35:22,279 Speaker 1: a certain amount and then from that point forward you 593 00:35:22,320 --> 00:35:25,440 Speaker 1: get just have your account deducted whenever you're making calls 594 00:35:25,640 --> 00:35:31,279 Speaker 1: using spoofing. This kind of of technology really allowed bad 595 00:35:31,320 --> 00:35:35,799 Speaker 1: actors to see potential for spoofing numbers for malicious purposes. 596 00:35:36,160 --> 00:35:39,000 Speaker 1: The goal is always to convince someone to pick up 597 00:35:39,040 --> 00:35:42,560 Speaker 1: the ding dang phone, and while the popular approaches centered 598 00:35:42,600 --> 00:35:47,640 Speaker 1: around spoofing is to create a number that is similar 599 00:35:47,680 --> 00:35:50,360 Speaker 1: to the target number you're calling, so in other words, 600 00:35:50,719 --> 00:35:53,320 Speaker 1: trying to get something within the same area code, maybe 601 00:35:53,360 --> 00:35:56,319 Speaker 1: even the same phone prefix. I get this all the 602 00:35:56,400 --> 00:36:01,040 Speaker 1: time with with spoofed numbers. So the idea is that 603 00:36:01,120 --> 00:36:03,200 Speaker 1: if you see a number pop up on caller I 604 00:36:03,320 --> 00:36:06,719 Speaker 1: D and it appears to be a local number, you're 605 00:36:06,760 --> 00:36:09,080 Speaker 1: more likely to pick up the phone because you're more 606 00:36:09,120 --> 00:36:11,520 Speaker 1: likely to feel that the person on the other end 607 00:36:11,520 --> 00:36:14,399 Speaker 1: of that call is someone you know, or at least 608 00:36:14,400 --> 00:36:19,239 Speaker 1: it's something relevant to you as how they get you. Well, 609 00:36:19,239 --> 00:36:22,080 Speaker 1: it's one way. Another way is to use databases of 610 00:36:22,120 --> 00:36:25,800 Speaker 1: personal information to create spear fishing attempts, though not every 611 00:36:25,800 --> 00:36:28,880 Speaker 1: scammer goes to that kind of trouble, but they could 612 00:36:28,920 --> 00:36:33,000 Speaker 1: attempt to spoof specific numbers that you might know, so 613 00:36:33,080 --> 00:36:36,480 Speaker 1: you might think, oh, it's my auntie calling. I wonder 614 00:36:36,520 --> 00:36:38,480 Speaker 1: what's up, and you answer and you find out it's 615 00:36:38,480 --> 00:36:41,520 Speaker 1: not your auntie, it's a scammer. Uh. A lot of 616 00:36:41,560 --> 00:36:44,759 Speaker 1: these hackers and scammers just sort of cast a very 617 00:36:44,840 --> 00:36:47,960 Speaker 1: wide net to see if they catch anything. If you 618 00:36:48,000 --> 00:36:51,800 Speaker 1: pick up a phone that is a catch. At that point, 619 00:36:51,920 --> 00:36:54,680 Speaker 1: you might be prompted to say press a number in 620 00:36:54,719 --> 00:36:57,839 Speaker 1: response to a specific direction, you know, like press two 621 00:36:58,000 --> 00:37:01,640 Speaker 1: to speak with a representative. Don't do it, it's a 622 00:37:01,680 --> 00:37:05,120 Speaker 1: bad idea. A lot of these are actually worked into 623 00:37:05,160 --> 00:37:08,160 Speaker 1: systems where if you do a button press, it gets 624 00:37:08,200 --> 00:37:13,520 Speaker 1: interpreted as an authorization for a charge, and the scammers 625 00:37:13,560 --> 00:37:16,040 Speaker 1: are making money off of this, and you're getting charged 626 00:37:16,160 --> 00:37:18,680 Speaker 1: through your phone company and you get these you know, 627 00:37:18,719 --> 00:37:22,759 Speaker 1: fraudulent charges on your account, so don't fall for that. 628 00:37:23,280 --> 00:37:28,719 Speaker 1: Um Uh, this is essentially illegal. I mean, it is illegal, 629 00:37:29,040 --> 00:37:31,640 Speaker 1: but doesn't stop people from doing it because it's kind 630 00:37:31,680 --> 00:37:34,520 Speaker 1: of hard to catch them. Uh. You might also get 631 00:37:34,600 --> 00:37:36,520 Speaker 1: someone who's on the other end of the call and 632 00:37:36,560 --> 00:37:39,080 Speaker 1: they're looking to get valuable information from you, like a 633 00:37:39,080 --> 00:37:42,880 Speaker 1: bank account number or something. Obviously, is a bad idea 634 00:37:42,920 --> 00:37:45,239 Speaker 1: to engage in this sort of stuff. In fact, it's 635 00:37:45,280 --> 00:37:48,759 Speaker 1: bad enough that some phone companies and the FCC have 636 00:37:49,000 --> 00:37:52,600 Speaker 1: argued that if you don't recognize a number, don't answer it. 637 00:37:53,239 --> 00:37:57,040 Speaker 1: Think about that for a moment. This you have companies 638 00:37:57,040 --> 00:38:02,000 Speaker 1: like phone companies, their business is charging customers for this 639 00:38:02,120 --> 00:38:06,200 Speaker 1: inner connectivity, this ability to have communication channels open. And 640 00:38:06,239 --> 00:38:08,280 Speaker 1: then they're saying, by the way, if you don't recognize 641 00:38:08,320 --> 00:38:10,920 Speaker 1: the number, don't use our services, which we are charging 642 00:38:10,920 --> 00:38:15,640 Speaker 1: you for. It's kind of wild, right, because you would think, 643 00:38:15,960 --> 00:38:18,600 Speaker 1: if this is that big of a problem, surely there 644 00:38:18,640 --> 00:38:21,600 Speaker 1: has to be some measure you can take to kind 645 00:38:21,640 --> 00:38:25,400 Speaker 1: of curtail this problem. Because what you're telling me right 646 00:38:25,400 --> 00:38:27,680 Speaker 1: now is that your service isn't good enough for me 647 00:38:27,719 --> 00:38:30,160 Speaker 1: to rely upon all the time. Because there are people 648 00:38:30,200 --> 00:38:33,560 Speaker 1: who are leveraging it to try and take advantage of me. 649 00:38:34,000 --> 00:38:38,200 Speaker 1: That's not a great marketing message right now. The use 650 00:38:38,239 --> 00:38:41,880 Speaker 1: of numbers that are similar to your own typically gets 651 00:38:41,880 --> 00:38:46,320 Speaker 1: called neighbor spoofing or neighborhood spoofing, and it's a pretty 652 00:38:46,360 --> 00:38:50,680 Speaker 1: irritating tactic. Uh. It's also possible that someone could spoof 653 00:38:50,840 --> 00:38:54,440 Speaker 1: your phone number while they are calling someone else, So 654 00:38:54,560 --> 00:38:56,840 Speaker 1: for them, it's going to come up on color I 655 00:38:56,920 --> 00:38:59,239 Speaker 1: D that you're the person making the call, right, it's 656 00:38:59,280 --> 00:39:01,960 Speaker 1: gonna be your own number, even though you're not the 657 00:39:01,960 --> 00:39:04,880 Speaker 1: one doing it. It's because it's been spoofed. So the 658 00:39:04,960 --> 00:39:09,760 Speaker 1: question is what do you do if that happens to you. 659 00:39:09,760 --> 00:39:12,880 Speaker 1: You are not going to like the answer, because there's 660 00:39:12,920 --> 00:39:16,600 Speaker 1: not much you can do other than try to explain 661 00:39:16,600 --> 00:39:19,440 Speaker 1: to anyone who's calling you up angry that you're making 662 00:39:19,440 --> 00:39:22,320 Speaker 1: these calls that you're not the one making the calls 663 00:39:22,360 --> 00:39:25,839 Speaker 1: that are upsetting them. That's kind of difficult to get 664 00:39:25,880 --> 00:39:28,400 Speaker 1: across because people are looking at their color I D 665 00:39:28,520 --> 00:39:30,839 Speaker 1: and say no, I see on my idea that you 666 00:39:30,880 --> 00:39:32,920 Speaker 1: are the one calling me. I'm telling you to stop, 667 00:39:33,520 --> 00:39:36,000 Speaker 1: and you're might. Meanwhile, you're trying to say no, no, 668 00:39:36,080 --> 00:39:40,320 Speaker 1: I promise it's not me. Someone is spoofing my phone number. 669 00:39:40,680 --> 00:39:42,760 Speaker 1: Depending upon the person on the other end of the line, 670 00:39:43,560 --> 00:39:45,720 Speaker 1: they might not have any idea of what that means 671 00:39:45,880 --> 00:39:48,600 Speaker 1: or even know that that's possible. Now, I've had this 672 00:39:48,680 --> 00:39:52,080 Speaker 1: happened to me in the past, however not on my 673 00:39:52,200 --> 00:39:56,520 Speaker 1: personal phone. So many years ago, I was working at 674 00:39:56,520 --> 00:40:00,799 Speaker 1: a consulting firm and I was getting calls from UH 675 00:40:00,800 --> 00:40:03,880 Speaker 1: a woman who was angry that I was calling her, 676 00:40:04,040 --> 00:40:07,560 Speaker 1: and I was making these crazy machine noises into her phone. 677 00:40:07,960 --> 00:40:10,640 Speaker 1: Now I figured out that what was happening was that 678 00:40:10,760 --> 00:40:14,960 Speaker 1: some fax machine was calling her landline as if it 679 00:40:14,960 --> 00:40:18,560 Speaker 1: were another fax machine, and since her phone is not 680 00:40:19,000 --> 00:40:22,960 Speaker 1: a fax machine, she was just getting that garbled electronic 681 00:40:23,400 --> 00:40:26,640 Speaker 1: mass of sounds whenever she picked up the receiver. And 682 00:40:26,719 --> 00:40:29,759 Speaker 1: she said that the number that was associated on color 683 00:40:29,880 --> 00:40:32,799 Speaker 1: I D belonged to the company I worked for. So 684 00:40:32,880 --> 00:40:35,719 Speaker 1: I had her read me the number, and sure enough, 685 00:40:36,360 --> 00:40:40,280 Speaker 1: it was our office's main phone number, but it wasn't 686 00:40:40,280 --> 00:40:42,480 Speaker 1: our facts number, it wasn't the number for the fax 687 00:40:42,640 --> 00:40:45,600 Speaker 1: machine we had. And I even went over to our 688 00:40:45,680 --> 00:40:49,799 Speaker 1: fax machine and I used a report to generate a 689 00:40:49,840 --> 00:40:52,560 Speaker 1: report to that told me about all the outgoing calls 690 00:40:52,600 --> 00:40:56,000 Speaker 1: that had been made, every single facts that had been sent. 691 00:40:56,400 --> 00:40:59,600 Speaker 1: And this was in a day where we still facts 692 00:41:00,080 --> 00:41:03,680 Speaker 1: occasionally anyway, And I checked it against this woman's number, 693 00:41:03,719 --> 00:41:07,800 Speaker 1: and I saw there was no call from our facts 694 00:41:07,800 --> 00:41:10,760 Speaker 1: machine going out to her number. There was nothing coming 695 00:41:10,760 --> 00:41:13,880 Speaker 1: out from our office that was going to her. But 696 00:41:13,960 --> 00:41:17,960 Speaker 1: it appeared as though someone had been spoofing our office's 697 00:41:18,040 --> 00:41:21,319 Speaker 1: phone number for facts no less and was sending out 698 00:41:21,320 --> 00:41:24,960 Speaker 1: stuff to people like this woman. And there wasn't anything 699 00:41:24,960 --> 00:41:27,360 Speaker 1: I could do about it because we had nothing to 700 00:41:27,400 --> 00:41:29,640 Speaker 1: do with the situation in the first place. We were 701 00:41:29,719 --> 00:41:33,320 Speaker 1: victims just as she was. Someone else had picked our 702 00:41:33,480 --> 00:41:36,520 Speaker 1: number to use a mask for some reason, and because 703 00:41:36,560 --> 00:41:39,480 Speaker 1: the voice system they were using allowed for this kind 704 00:41:39,520 --> 00:41:42,000 Speaker 1: of thing, there was really no way for us to 705 00:41:42,040 --> 00:41:45,200 Speaker 1: even know who was doing it, much less stop them. 706 00:41:45,239 --> 00:41:47,239 Speaker 1: It was frustrating for the woman, and it was not 707 00:41:47,360 --> 00:41:50,840 Speaker 1: super great for me either, because I genuinely wanted to 708 00:41:50,880 --> 00:41:54,040 Speaker 1: help her. I don't want anyone to be, you know, 709 00:41:54,160 --> 00:41:57,719 Speaker 1: aggravated and harassed in this way, and that really stinks, right, 710 00:41:57,760 --> 00:42:00,200 Speaker 1: I mean, if someone makes use of your number and 711 00:42:00,239 --> 00:42:03,840 Speaker 1: then harasses another person, you could be left holding the 712 00:42:03,840 --> 00:42:07,640 Speaker 1: bag and your defenses it wasn't me. Someone spoofed my 713 00:42:07,680 --> 00:42:10,720 Speaker 1: phone number. That is pretty hard to prove to someone 714 00:42:10,840 --> 00:42:13,600 Speaker 1: unless you can actually show them that your phone did 715 00:42:13,640 --> 00:42:16,680 Speaker 1: not make those outgoing calls by just showing them a 716 00:42:16,760 --> 00:42:19,800 Speaker 1: record of every call you've made over you know, whatever 717 00:42:19,880 --> 00:42:23,440 Speaker 1: length of time. But more frequently we find ourselves on 718 00:42:23,480 --> 00:42:26,120 Speaker 1: the receiving end of these calls, which I guess we 719 00:42:26,160 --> 00:42:29,640 Speaker 1: should be thankful for because it's irritating, but nause irritating 720 00:42:29,640 --> 00:42:33,439 Speaker 1: as being blamed for them. And the frequency of these 721 00:42:33,440 --> 00:42:35,480 Speaker 1: calls have picked up the pace over the years. Now 722 00:42:35,520 --> 00:42:37,960 Speaker 1: twenty twenty was actually a bit of an outlier. We 723 00:42:38,040 --> 00:42:42,640 Speaker 1: saw a dip and spoofed robo calls in but in 724 00:42:42,719 --> 00:42:46,560 Speaker 1: June one there were more than four billion robot calls. 725 00:42:46,840 --> 00:42:48,759 Speaker 1: So it's not like that's a problem that's gonna go away. 726 00:42:48,800 --> 00:42:51,640 Speaker 1: I mean, that's nearly a hundred fifty million robo calls 727 00:42:51,840 --> 00:42:56,800 Speaker 1: per day. That being said, the FCC and major phone 728 00:42:56,840 --> 00:42:59,840 Speaker 1: carriers are trying to fight back a bit. The f 729 00:43:00,040 --> 00:43:03,520 Speaker 1: c C past a mandate actually Congress past the law 730 00:43:03,880 --> 00:43:07,319 Speaker 1: that requires all the major carriers in the US, those 731 00:43:07,400 --> 00:43:10,520 Speaker 1: being A T and T, Verizon Anti Mobile to comply 732 00:43:10,640 --> 00:43:13,400 Speaker 1: with the rule that requires them to incorporate a technology 733 00:43:13,480 --> 00:43:19,759 Speaker 1: called stir slash shaken, which is very James Bondish, you know. Now. 734 00:43:19,800 --> 00:43:23,080 Speaker 1: The idea behind this is that stir slash shaken is 735 00:43:23,080 --> 00:43:26,000 Speaker 1: supposed to verify that a number that pops up on 736 00:43:26,080 --> 00:43:29,759 Speaker 1: color I D is in fact the number that belongs 737 00:43:29,840 --> 00:43:31,880 Speaker 1: to the line that's making that phone call in the 738 00:43:31,920 --> 00:43:36,160 Speaker 1: first place. In other words, it's supposed to help detect spoofing. 739 00:43:36,600 --> 00:43:39,040 Speaker 1: It would mean that phone companies could filter calls and 740 00:43:39,080 --> 00:43:42,319 Speaker 1: potentially block some of them, or at least label them 741 00:43:42,360 --> 00:43:45,600 Speaker 1: as spam before they get to your your phone. Now, 742 00:43:45,640 --> 00:43:48,440 Speaker 1: those three carriers have said that they have all enabled 743 00:43:48,520 --> 00:43:52,000 Speaker 1: this technology on their own networks, which is good because 744 00:43:52,040 --> 00:43:56,719 Speaker 1: the deadline for doing so was this past June je 745 00:43:56,800 --> 00:44:00,400 Speaker 1: to be precise. Smaller regional carriers in the Unit States 746 00:44:00,400 --> 00:44:05,160 Speaker 1: currently have a deadline of June three to implement this technology, 747 00:44:05,200 --> 00:44:09,120 Speaker 1: though that could change. The FCC might step up that deadline. 748 00:44:10,040 --> 00:44:13,600 Speaker 1: So what's going on with this technology? Well, first let's 749 00:44:13,640 --> 00:44:17,200 Speaker 1: talk about what these names stand for. Though I suspect 750 00:44:17,800 --> 00:44:21,160 Speaker 1: there's some backronym shenanigans going on here. That is that, 751 00:44:22,000 --> 00:44:23,719 Speaker 1: you know, they came up with the names and then 752 00:44:23,760 --> 00:44:25,720 Speaker 1: tried to figure out what they stood for as opposed 753 00:44:25,719 --> 00:44:29,400 Speaker 1: to the other way around. Anyway, STIR stands for Secure 754 00:44:29,600 --> 00:44:37,560 Speaker 1: Telephony Identity revisited and SHAKEN stands for secure handling of 755 00:44:37,600 --> 00:44:42,800 Speaker 1: asserted information using tokens. So the Ken part of SHAKEN 756 00:44:42,840 --> 00:44:47,040 Speaker 1: comes from tokens, And you cannot convince me that this 757 00:44:47,160 --> 00:44:53,200 Speaker 1: wasn't some crazy backronym thing. Anyway, these two technologies work 758 00:44:53,239 --> 00:44:57,879 Speaker 1: in tandem. SHAKEN is honestly just sort of a broader thing. 759 00:44:57,920 --> 00:44:59,880 Speaker 1: We'll get to it. So STIR comes out of a 760 00:45:00,000 --> 00:45:03,000 Speaker 1: working group of the organization i e. T F that 761 00:45:03,080 --> 00:45:07,120 Speaker 1: stands for Internet Engineering Task Force. The group figured out 762 00:45:07,120 --> 00:45:11,000 Speaker 1: a way to append digital signatures on a call as 763 00:45:11,080 --> 00:45:13,560 Speaker 1: a means of authenticating that a call comes from a 764 00:45:13,600 --> 00:45:17,440 Speaker 1: specific phone number for real zes. SHAKEN refers to the 765 00:45:17,560 --> 00:45:21,080 Speaker 1: standards that service providers are supposed to follow while they're 766 00:45:21,080 --> 00:45:25,880 Speaker 1: deploying STIR in their networks. So SHAKEN really is here's 767 00:45:25,960 --> 00:45:31,279 Speaker 1: how you use this technology that is STIR. The protocols 768 00:45:31,320 --> 00:45:36,680 Speaker 1: give three levels of attestation that carriers can assign to 769 00:45:36,800 --> 00:45:39,239 Speaker 1: a call or service providers, I think is how they 770 00:45:39,239 --> 00:45:41,759 Speaker 1: were that service providers can assign to a call, So 771 00:45:41,960 --> 00:45:46,560 Speaker 1: full attestation means that the service provider has a call 772 00:45:46,680 --> 00:45:50,520 Speaker 1: originating out of their service and they say that that 773 00:45:50,600 --> 00:45:53,080 Speaker 1: call is in fact coming from a number that this 774 00:45:53,200 --> 00:45:56,759 Speaker 1: particular customer is authorized to use, so, in other words, 775 00:45:57,360 --> 00:46:01,560 Speaker 1: it's legit. Then you have partial a testation, and that 776 00:46:01,600 --> 00:46:05,399 Speaker 1: means that the carrier has authenticated the customer making the call. 777 00:46:05,440 --> 00:46:08,080 Speaker 1: They're saying, we know who is making the call. However, 778 00:46:08,120 --> 00:46:11,560 Speaker 1: we cannot verify that this customer is actually authorized to 779 00:46:11,719 --> 00:46:15,600 Speaker 1: use the number in question. Then there's gateway at a station, 780 00:46:16,080 --> 00:46:19,680 Speaker 1: means that the service provider can authenticate where it received 781 00:46:19,680 --> 00:46:23,399 Speaker 1: a call, but can't authenticate the source, can't say who 782 00:46:23,480 --> 00:46:27,200 Speaker 1: for certain sent it. The information is meant to be 783 00:46:27,239 --> 00:46:30,719 Speaker 1: shared between carriers so that one carrier can essentially say 784 00:46:30,719 --> 00:46:33,600 Speaker 1: to another, hey, here's this call that needs to go 785 00:46:33,719 --> 00:46:36,600 Speaker 1: over your network to get to your customer, but I 786 00:46:36,680 --> 00:46:39,319 Speaker 1: totes can't verify that the call is legit, so it 787 00:46:39,360 --> 00:46:42,960 Speaker 1: maybe suss just a heads up, and then your carrier 788 00:46:43,440 --> 00:46:46,440 Speaker 1: might block the call or append to label, alerting you 789 00:46:46,520 --> 00:46:49,719 Speaker 1: the end customer that the call could be spam. The 790 00:46:49,760 --> 00:46:52,120 Speaker 1: way this works in practice is you've got someone making 791 00:46:52,160 --> 00:46:55,960 Speaker 1: a call. Let's say it's scuzzy scumbag who's posing as 792 00:46:55,960 --> 00:46:59,040 Speaker 1: a member of the Internal Revenue Service, but Scuzzy really 793 00:46:59,080 --> 00:47:02,240 Speaker 1: just wants to fish personal information out of you. Scuzzy 794 00:47:02,320 --> 00:47:05,440 Speaker 1: picks up the phone or more likely uses an automated 795 00:47:05,520 --> 00:47:09,919 Speaker 1: robo dialer and calls your number and spoofs their own 796 00:47:10,000 --> 00:47:12,080 Speaker 1: number in the process to make it seem as if 797 00:47:12,120 --> 00:47:15,279 Speaker 1: it's the I r S calling you. The call goes 798 00:47:15,320 --> 00:47:19,319 Speaker 1: out over Scuzzies service provider, whomever that may be. The 799 00:47:19,360 --> 00:47:22,040 Speaker 1: service provider takes a look at the originating number and 800 00:47:22,080 --> 00:47:24,360 Speaker 1: the source of the call to determine what level of 801 00:47:24,440 --> 00:47:29,239 Speaker 1: attestation to assign to that call. Then it makes use 802 00:47:29,239 --> 00:47:32,880 Speaker 1: of an authentication service to create a digital certificate that 803 00:47:33,000 --> 00:47:37,799 Speaker 1: holds onto this information, then passes both the call and 804 00:47:37,920 --> 00:47:41,719 Speaker 1: the certificate on so that it ultimately ends at the 805 00:47:41,880 --> 00:47:46,839 Speaker 1: terminating service provider. This would be whatever service provider you use. 806 00:47:47,000 --> 00:47:48,640 Speaker 1: So let's say it's like a T and T. So 807 00:47:48,719 --> 00:47:51,480 Speaker 1: now it gets sent to a T and T. So 808 00:47:51,800 --> 00:47:54,880 Speaker 1: a T and T. Your service provider, upon receiving this 809 00:47:55,040 --> 00:47:59,480 Speaker 1: signal and digital certificate, sends the certificate to a verification service, 810 00:47:59,680 --> 00:48:02,400 Speaker 1: which attempts to verify if the originating source of the 811 00:48:02,480 --> 00:48:06,880 Speaker 1: call is authorized to make calls from that number it 812 00:48:06,960 --> 00:48:10,560 Speaker 1: claims to be calling from. Then it returns this information 813 00:48:10,880 --> 00:48:13,040 Speaker 1: to a T and T and then a T and 814 00:48:13,080 --> 00:48:15,960 Speaker 1: T can either block the call or label it or 815 00:48:16,040 --> 00:48:19,360 Speaker 1: pass it on to you. So this approach is not 816 00:48:19,560 --> 00:48:22,480 Speaker 1: like a catch all for all robo calls and spam 817 00:48:22,640 --> 00:48:24,880 Speaker 1: or even for spoofing. It's not going to put an 818 00:48:24,960 --> 00:48:27,440 Speaker 1: end to it, but it is meant to help cut 819 00:48:27,480 --> 00:48:31,640 Speaker 1: back on those practices. There are other companies trying to 820 00:48:31,680 --> 00:48:35,040 Speaker 1: address this issue in other ways. There are companies that 821 00:48:35,160 --> 00:48:39,080 Speaker 1: have blocking services that you can use. There's the Do 822 00:48:39,120 --> 00:48:42,560 Speaker 1: Not Call Registry that you can be part of, and 823 00:48:42,600 --> 00:48:45,800 Speaker 1: then companies like Verizon or trying something different like Verizon 824 00:48:45,840 --> 00:48:49,120 Speaker 1: has introduced an updated call filter app that will send 825 00:48:49,120 --> 00:48:52,560 Speaker 1: suspected spam calls that appear to have phone numbers from 826 00:48:52,600 --> 00:48:56,760 Speaker 1: your area straight to voicemail. So, in other words, those 827 00:48:56,800 --> 00:49:00,680 Speaker 1: neighborhoods spoofing calls would never even make your phone ring, 828 00:49:00,680 --> 00:49:03,279 Speaker 1: it would go straight to your voicemail. Of course, this 829 00:49:03,360 --> 00:49:05,920 Speaker 1: means that if there is someone from your region who 830 00:49:06,000 --> 00:49:09,560 Speaker 1: is actually trying to call you for real, zes they 831 00:49:09,640 --> 00:49:12,640 Speaker 1: might end up going straight to voicemail too. Now you 832 00:49:12,680 --> 00:49:17,000 Speaker 1: can go into the apps filter settings and turn those 833 00:49:17,040 --> 00:49:20,160 Speaker 1: off for specific numbers. So it's not like, you know, 834 00:49:20,640 --> 00:49:22,799 Speaker 1: it's an all or nothing, but it does mean that 835 00:49:23,000 --> 00:49:25,360 Speaker 1: at least in some cases, there might be more hands 836 00:49:25,400 --> 00:49:28,920 Speaker 1: on work for the consumer to get everything to work 837 00:49:28,960 --> 00:49:33,640 Speaker 1: out properly. Now, I think we will continue to see 838 00:49:34,520 --> 00:49:38,319 Speaker 1: companies and governments really try to crack down on this 839 00:49:38,400 --> 00:49:42,000 Speaker 1: practice because it's so irritating. Like the people in charge 840 00:49:42,400 --> 00:49:46,680 Speaker 1: don't like it either, right, Politicians do not like robo 841 00:49:46,800 --> 00:49:50,359 Speaker 1: calls and spam because it affects them too, and so 842 00:49:50,560 --> 00:49:54,399 Speaker 1: we're likely to see more strides taken to try and 843 00:49:54,680 --> 00:49:57,640 Speaker 1: combat it. At the same time, we'll see the people 844 00:49:57,640 --> 00:49:59,960 Speaker 1: who are making use of it try and find way 845 00:50:00,120 --> 00:50:02,600 Speaker 1: is around the system. So it's going to be a 846 00:50:02,640 --> 00:50:06,640 Speaker 1: c saw kind of approach, and it's certainly an irritating one. 847 00:50:06,760 --> 00:50:10,759 Speaker 1: So if, like me, you treat your phone like it's 848 00:50:10,800 --> 00:50:13,359 Speaker 1: a way to send email and text and that's it, 849 00:50:13,560 --> 00:50:15,800 Speaker 1: or maybe occasionally, you know, look at pictures of cats, 850 00:50:16,840 --> 00:50:21,640 Speaker 1: then you're in good company because this approach of robocalls 851 00:50:21,920 --> 00:50:26,359 Speaker 1: and spoofing has really created a an environment of distrust 852 00:50:27,120 --> 00:50:30,480 Speaker 1: with our communication devices, so much so that the companies 853 00:50:30,560 --> 00:50:34,919 Speaker 1: in charge of providing those services are saying yeah, kind 854 00:50:34,920 --> 00:50:37,160 Speaker 1: of stinks done in it, and and say like, yeah, 855 00:50:37,200 --> 00:50:40,840 Speaker 1: you should probably not pick up the phone. And again 856 00:50:40,880 --> 00:50:43,680 Speaker 1: they're the ones providing the service to allow you to 857 00:50:43,800 --> 00:50:47,239 Speaker 1: get calls in the first place. It's not great, but 858 00:50:47,960 --> 00:50:50,839 Speaker 1: that's kind of you know how technology can be, right, 859 00:50:50,920 --> 00:50:54,000 Speaker 1: It's we can create these amazing tools that open up 860 00:50:54,280 --> 00:50:58,439 Speaker 1: incredible potential possibilities. But it also means that people who 861 00:50:58,440 --> 00:51:00,839 Speaker 1: are looking at the system from a differ and perspective 862 00:51:01,480 --> 00:51:05,719 Speaker 1: may find ways to twist it to benefit themselves at 863 00:51:05,760 --> 00:51:09,000 Speaker 1: the expense of the rest of us, which again kind 864 00:51:09,000 --> 00:51:12,080 Speaker 1: of stinks. So yeah, this is one of those topics 865 00:51:12,080 --> 00:51:14,640 Speaker 1: where while I say I love all things tech, I 866 00:51:14,719 --> 00:51:20,480 Speaker 1: don't love spoofing. I think it's uh. At best, it's misleading, 867 00:51:20,800 --> 00:51:27,959 Speaker 1: and at worst it is it is predating upon vulnerable populations, 868 00:51:28,000 --> 00:51:30,960 Speaker 1: which I don't think is cool at all. I hope 869 00:51:31,000 --> 00:51:34,480 Speaker 1: you enjoyed that episode about spoofing and color I D 870 00:51:35,400 --> 00:51:38,719 Speaker 1: I apologize once again for not having a brand new episode. 871 00:51:38,840 --> 00:51:40,600 Speaker 1: I was actually working on one that was going to 872 00:51:40,680 --> 00:51:42,959 Speaker 1: be a short episode. In fact, it wasn't gonna be 873 00:51:43,320 --> 00:51:46,120 Speaker 1: one of those fifty minute epics. It was gonna be 874 00:51:46,239 --> 00:51:49,359 Speaker 1: maybe a half hour, maybe not even that, but uh 875 00:51:49,480 --> 00:51:52,360 Speaker 1: it's it's about a an invention created by one of 876 00:51:52,400 --> 00:51:57,000 Speaker 1: the United States founding fathers, and because of the technical 877 00:51:57,080 --> 00:51:59,040 Speaker 1: issues I've had, I haven't been able to finish it. 878 00:51:59,080 --> 00:52:01,440 Speaker 1: Hopefully I'll be able to do that for Wednesday's episode 879 00:52:01,440 --> 00:52:04,400 Speaker 1: because it's just a fun topic. It's a little different 880 00:52:04,440 --> 00:52:06,600 Speaker 1: from what I typically cover on tech Stuff, but I 881 00:52:06,600 --> 00:52:09,279 Speaker 1: thought it would be nice to get away from all 882 00:52:09,360 --> 00:52:14,480 Speaker 1: the social networking platforms and all the wireless communications companies 883 00:52:14,520 --> 00:52:16,399 Speaker 1: and all that kind of stuff and to to look 884 00:52:16,440 --> 00:52:20,120 Speaker 1: back at something a little a little less high tech 885 00:52:20,239 --> 00:52:23,120 Speaker 1: but still really intriguing. So hopefully I'll be able to 886 00:52:23,160 --> 00:52:25,359 Speaker 1: get back on that once I figure out these little 887 00:52:25,360 --> 00:52:28,800 Speaker 1: technical glitches, and we'll have a brand new episode on Wednesday. 888 00:52:29,000 --> 00:52:31,360 Speaker 1: If you have suggestions for topics I should tackle in 889 00:52:31,440 --> 00:52:34,360 Speaker 1: future episodes of tech Stuff, please reach out to me. 890 00:52:34,520 --> 00:52:36,520 Speaker 1: You can do so on Twitter. The handle for the 891 00:52:36,520 --> 00:52:39,720 Speaker 1: show is tech Stuff hs W, or you can download 892 00:52:39,719 --> 00:52:42,200 Speaker 1: the I Heart radio app. It's free to download, free 893 00:52:42,200 --> 00:52:43,880 Speaker 1: to use. You can navigate over to tech Stuff by 894 00:52:43,920 --> 00:52:46,560 Speaker 1: putting it into the little search bar and you'll see 895 00:52:46,560 --> 00:52:49,879 Speaker 1: a little microphone icon pop up on that page. If 896 00:52:49,880 --> 00:52:52,440 Speaker 1: you use that microphone icon. You can record a voice 897 00:52:52,440 --> 00:52:54,799 Speaker 1: message up to thirty seconds in length and let me 898 00:52:54,800 --> 00:52:56,280 Speaker 1: know what you would like to hear in the future. 899 00:52:56,760 --> 00:53:00,720 Speaker 1: And again, we'll have new episodes as soon as I 900 00:53:00,800 --> 00:53:05,439 Speaker 1: get this darn computer fixed. I think my dog got 901 00:53:05,440 --> 00:53:08,440 Speaker 1: on it and decided to start, you know, surfing for 902 00:53:09,040 --> 00:53:11,839 Speaker 1: cat videos or something. I don't know. I'll figure it out, 903 00:53:12,160 --> 00:53:16,000 Speaker 1: but until then, I'll talk to you again, really soon. 904 00:53:17,800 --> 00:53:24,880 Speaker 1: Y Text Stuff is an I Heart Radio production. For 905 00:53:24,960 --> 00:53:27,919 Speaker 1: more podcasts from my Heart Radio, visit the I Heart 906 00:53:28,000 --> 00:53:31,200 Speaker 1: Radio app, Apple Podcasts, or wherever you listen to your 907 00:53:31,239 --> 00:53:31,920 Speaker 1: favorite shows.