1 00:00:02,000 --> 00:00:03,840 Speaker 1: United States Space Force. 2 00:00:04,640 --> 00:00:04,760 Speaker 2: Uh. 3 00:00:05,320 --> 00:00:08,039 Speaker 1: Is it an arm of NASA or is it a 4 00:00:08,039 --> 00:00:09,600 Speaker 1: private corporation. 5 00:00:09,320 --> 00:00:11,840 Speaker 3: A space force? Gosh, I don't know. 6 00:00:11,880 --> 00:00:16,200 Speaker 4: Are they guardians or exploration? I don't know. 7 00:00:16,280 --> 00:00:20,279 Speaker 1: Defend US against alleged space threats? I mean, I don't 8 00:00:20,280 --> 00:00:22,360 Speaker 1: know that I think it does much. I'm assuming like 9 00:00:22,400 --> 00:00:25,760 Speaker 1: a branch of the army that fights crime and space. 10 00:00:26,040 --> 00:00:28,960 Speaker 5: Well, I think Space Force they go in space with 11 00:00:29,080 --> 00:00:33,040 Speaker 5: like weapons for some reason. And I don't know why 12 00:00:33,080 --> 00:00:36,159 Speaker 5: I even need weapons in space, explore space. 13 00:00:36,240 --> 00:00:38,960 Speaker 1: To the moon or flight to the moon or whatever. 14 00:00:39,479 --> 00:00:40,960 Speaker 1: I don't know if it's public. 15 00:00:41,000 --> 00:00:45,199 Speaker 2: I'm guessing it's some sort of military arm of NASA, 16 00:00:45,360 --> 00:00:47,960 Speaker 2: the space program that has to do with strategic defense 17 00:00:48,080 --> 00:00:49,880 Speaker 2: or maybe settling Mars. 18 00:00:50,720 --> 00:00:53,680 Speaker 1: The almost nine hundred billion dollar defense spending bill that's 19 00:00:53,720 --> 00:00:56,680 Speaker 1: working its way through the Congress includes a thirty billion 20 00:00:56,760 --> 00:01:00,360 Speaker 1: dollar request for the newest and smallest branch of the 21 00:01:00,440 --> 00:01:04,960 Speaker 1: US military, the US Space Force. You may remember when 22 00:01:04,959 --> 00:01:07,840 Speaker 1: it was created in twenty nineteen, there were plenty of 23 00:01:08,000 --> 00:01:11,240 Speaker 1: star Trek in space cadet jokes, and even at Netflix 24 00:01:11,319 --> 00:01:15,080 Speaker 1: comedy starring Steve Carrell as a bumbling Space Force commander. 25 00:01:15,840 --> 00:01:19,320 Speaker 2: Air Force is Space Force, Space Force, sir, you don't 26 00:01:19,400 --> 00:01:20,680 Speaker 2: like to use your full title. 27 00:01:21,480 --> 00:01:23,920 Speaker 3: Sorry, sir, Spaceman first class. 28 00:01:23,959 --> 00:01:27,600 Speaker 2: Nothing to be ashamed of Air Forces airmen Space Force 29 00:01:27,640 --> 00:01:30,960 Speaker 2: as spacemen. Nothing embarrassing or comical about it. 30 00:01:32,200 --> 00:01:34,960 Speaker 1: But we haven't heard much about Space Force since then, 31 00:01:35,440 --> 00:01:38,160 Speaker 1: which made us wonder, now that it's up and running, 32 00:01:38,360 --> 00:01:41,600 Speaker 1: what does it actually do and how are they spending 33 00:01:41,760 --> 00:01:45,119 Speaker 1: all those billions to find out? I paid a visit 34 00:01:45,200 --> 00:01:48,280 Speaker 1: to the Pentagon to speak with General David Thompson. 35 00:01:48,520 --> 00:01:51,000 Speaker 3: Our job is to protect US interest in space. 36 00:01:51,520 --> 00:01:54,720 Speaker 1: He's the Vice Chief of Space Operations for all of 37 00:01:54,800 --> 00:01:55,440 Speaker 1: Space Force. 38 00:01:55,680 --> 00:01:58,000 Speaker 4: It is now incumbent on us to do two things. 39 00:01:58,000 --> 00:02:01,240 Speaker 4: First is to develop get abilities that will defend our 40 00:02:01,280 --> 00:02:03,520 Speaker 4: satellites in a whole host of ways, and it will 41 00:02:03,520 --> 00:02:06,800 Speaker 4: become our responsibility also to deny advisary use of space. 42 00:02:07,440 --> 00:02:09,960 Speaker 1: And later in the show, I talked to Bloomberg cyber 43 00:02:10,120 --> 00:02:12,160 Speaker 1: security reporter Katrina Manson. 44 00:02:12,480 --> 00:02:14,519 Speaker 5: I think it's really fair to say the homes race 45 00:02:14,600 --> 00:02:18,120 Speaker 5: is already on, and certainly in terms of perception, the 46 00:02:18,200 --> 00:02:20,360 Speaker 5: amount that you're seeing from the commercial well putting up 47 00:02:20,360 --> 00:02:23,640 Speaker 5: into space also creates huge dilemmas for the US military 48 00:02:23,639 --> 00:02:24,960 Speaker 5: and what they need to defend. 49 00:02:29,360 --> 00:02:32,600 Speaker 1: I'm wes Kasova today on the big take. Space Force 50 00:02:33,000 --> 00:02:44,920 Speaker 1: is no joke. General, I would imagine that some portion 51 00:02:45,000 --> 00:02:47,799 Speaker 1: of your job is just explaining to people you meet 52 00:02:48,160 --> 00:02:49,240 Speaker 1: what the Space Force is. 53 00:02:50,200 --> 00:02:52,440 Speaker 4: You're absolutely right, it really is. There a whole host 54 00:02:52,440 --> 00:02:54,799 Speaker 4: of things that we do that many people don't really understand. 55 00:02:55,560 --> 00:02:58,079 Speaker 4: But I'll start with the things that people probably see 56 00:02:58,120 --> 00:03:01,160 Speaker 4: every day and may not realize it. Right, people with 57 00:03:01,280 --> 00:03:04,600 Speaker 4: smartphones billions all over the world follow the blue dot 58 00:03:04,639 --> 00:03:08,280 Speaker 4: on their smartphone every day. That's Global Positioning System GPS. 59 00:03:09,160 --> 00:03:11,520 Speaker 4: That constellation of thirty satellites is brought to you by 60 00:03:11,560 --> 00:03:15,120 Speaker 4: the United States Space Force. That constellation also provides a 61 00:03:15,160 --> 00:03:18,960 Speaker 4: timing signal that synchronizes the cellular network they use, and 62 00:03:19,080 --> 00:03:21,880 Speaker 4: financial networks and the Internet and things like that. 63 00:03:21,880 --> 00:03:23,960 Speaker 3: That's provided as a service for the world. 64 00:03:23,960 --> 00:03:26,799 Speaker 4: But the real reason it exists is US Air Force 65 00:03:26,880 --> 00:03:30,160 Speaker 4: aircraft flying over the Arctic ice cap, Navy ships in 66 00:03:30,200 --> 00:03:33,400 Speaker 4: the Middle Pacific Ocean, Army units in the middle of 67 00:03:33,400 --> 00:03:36,400 Speaker 4: the Arabian Desert. They follow the blue dot every day 68 00:03:36,400 --> 00:03:38,360 Speaker 4: as well, and that's really why it's there. So they 69 00:03:38,360 --> 00:03:40,200 Speaker 4: can navigate effectively all over. 70 00:03:40,080 --> 00:03:41,960 Speaker 3: The globe, all over the world. 71 00:03:42,040 --> 00:03:46,080 Speaker 4: There's a whole host of missile and rocket activity. Rockets 72 00:03:46,080 --> 00:03:48,200 Speaker 4: are launched all over the world every single day. We 73 00:03:48,320 --> 00:03:51,680 Speaker 4: operate a constellation of spacecraft that detect every single launch, 74 00:03:52,160 --> 00:03:55,360 Speaker 4: figure out where it is, where it's coming from, if 75 00:03:55,360 --> 00:03:57,600 Speaker 4: it poses a threat to the nation or our friends 76 00:03:57,680 --> 00:04:00,680 Speaker 4: or allies and forces, and provide warning. Those are the 77 00:04:00,800 --> 00:04:02,400 Speaker 4: kinds of things that we do every day. I'm done 78 00:04:02,400 --> 00:04:05,880 Speaker 4: for decades, all the way up to including keeping track 79 00:04:05,920 --> 00:04:09,680 Speaker 4: of objects in space. Forty thousand plus objects in space 80 00:04:09,720 --> 00:04:12,600 Speaker 4: that we keep track of every single day. We figure 81 00:04:12,600 --> 00:04:14,680 Speaker 4: out where they are, we figure out where they're going, 82 00:04:14,720 --> 00:04:17,240 Speaker 4: and whether or not they oppose a hazard to themselves, 83 00:04:17,240 --> 00:04:20,359 Speaker 4: to others, Do they pose a hazard just to astronauts 84 00:04:20,400 --> 00:04:23,400 Speaker 4: on the International Space Station. We have a global array 85 00:04:23,440 --> 00:04:26,279 Speaker 4: of ground and space based sensors to keep track of 86 00:04:26,320 --> 00:04:26,640 Speaker 4: all that. 87 00:04:26,839 --> 00:04:29,000 Speaker 1: So you're keeping track of this stuff. Let's say you 88 00:04:29,080 --> 00:04:32,800 Speaker 1: find an object, an old satellite, something else that does 89 00:04:32,880 --> 00:04:33,440 Speaker 1: pose a threat. 90 00:04:33,440 --> 00:04:37,279 Speaker 4: What do you do, well, We provide warning to whomever 91 00:04:37,320 --> 00:04:40,520 Speaker 4: it poses a threat to, you know, obviously and most directly, 92 00:04:40,839 --> 00:04:43,000 Speaker 4: we have a very close tie with NASA so that 93 00:04:43,040 --> 00:04:45,880 Speaker 4: we protect the International Space Station and to human beings 94 00:04:45,880 --> 00:04:50,640 Speaker 4: in orbit. We do the same for satellites operated by companies, 95 00:04:51,160 --> 00:04:57,200 Speaker 4: satellites operated by other nations. When the Chinese have astronauts 96 00:04:57,240 --> 00:05:00,680 Speaker 4: on board their space station, we provide warning the We 97 00:05:00,720 --> 00:05:05,120 Speaker 4: provide warning to anybody and everybody who operates a spacecraft, 98 00:05:05,440 --> 00:05:08,800 Speaker 4: and then it becomes their responsibility to decide what they 99 00:05:08,800 --> 00:05:11,800 Speaker 4: want to do with that information. Move their satellite, assume 100 00:05:11,880 --> 00:05:13,480 Speaker 4: the risk, and hope that it doesn't hit them. 101 00:05:13,480 --> 00:05:14,320 Speaker 3: Those sources of things. 102 00:05:17,080 --> 00:05:18,840 Speaker 1: What do you find when you talk to people about 103 00:05:18,839 --> 00:05:22,200 Speaker 1: Space Force? What do Americans think it does? Well? 104 00:05:22,240 --> 00:05:24,440 Speaker 4: Yeah, great question, I mean, and you know, when we 105 00:05:24,440 --> 00:05:26,560 Speaker 4: were created three and a half years ago, there was 106 00:05:26,600 --> 00:05:30,800 Speaker 4: this line of conversation that said, now that we've created 107 00:05:30,800 --> 00:05:33,000 Speaker 4: a space Force, we have to find something for them 108 00:05:33,040 --> 00:05:35,919 Speaker 4: to do well. As I just described, there were a 109 00:05:35,960 --> 00:05:38,760 Speaker 4: whole host of things we were already doing. Most of us, 110 00:05:38,800 --> 00:05:41,680 Speaker 4: not all of us, but most of us were in 111 00:05:41,720 --> 00:05:45,200 Speaker 4: the United States Air Force doing those things. So the GPS, 112 00:05:45,240 --> 00:05:48,400 Speaker 4: the communication, satellites, the missile warning, tracking all those objects 113 00:05:48,440 --> 00:05:51,520 Speaker 4: in space, we were already doing all that, and when 114 00:05:51,560 --> 00:05:54,680 Speaker 4: we created the Space Force, we continued. The difference is 115 00:05:55,279 --> 00:05:58,720 Speaker 4: and the reason we were created is other nations, now, 116 00:05:58,800 --> 00:06:02,120 Speaker 4: especially those that wish us ill who would seek to 117 00:06:02,120 --> 00:06:05,880 Speaker 4: do us harm, are looking to deny us use of 118 00:06:05,920 --> 00:06:08,640 Speaker 4: those capabilities if in fact we're in conflict with them, 119 00:06:08,839 --> 00:06:11,280 Speaker 4: And so one of the reasons we were created was 120 00:06:11,360 --> 00:06:14,600 Speaker 4: to help protect those satellites as well and make sure 121 00:06:14,680 --> 00:06:19,320 Speaker 4: those soldiers and sailors and airmen and marines get the 122 00:06:19,360 --> 00:06:21,880 Speaker 4: things they need from GPS, have the communications they need, 123 00:06:21,960 --> 00:06:25,039 Speaker 4: get the information they need from space, because other countries 124 00:06:25,080 --> 00:06:27,560 Speaker 4: have now said we're going to try and take that 125 00:06:27,600 --> 00:06:29,200 Speaker 4: away from you if it comes to conflict. 126 00:06:29,279 --> 00:06:31,240 Speaker 1: Yea, and I want to talk a bit more about 127 00:06:31,240 --> 00:06:34,760 Speaker 1: that a little bit later. First, this new branch of 128 00:06:34,760 --> 00:06:37,200 Speaker 1: the military built up very quickly. Can you just talk 129 00:06:37,240 --> 00:06:41,600 Speaker 1: about what happened from twenty nineteen when it was first 130 00:06:41,600 --> 00:06:42,560 Speaker 1: announced till now? 131 00:06:43,600 --> 00:06:46,760 Speaker 4: Sure, Actually we had a little bit of advanced notice. 132 00:06:46,960 --> 00:06:50,880 Speaker 4: We started, as you said, when the legislation was signed 133 00:06:50,880 --> 00:06:55,520 Speaker 4: into law in December of twenty nineteen, about eight months previously. 134 00:06:55,600 --> 00:06:58,120 Speaker 4: We saw that this was very much a possibility, so 135 00:06:58,160 --> 00:07:00,799 Speaker 4: we established a planning team to decide how we would 136 00:07:00,839 --> 00:07:04,360 Speaker 4: establish the force, so that the day the law was created, 137 00:07:04,400 --> 00:07:06,560 Speaker 4: we sort of had a running start. So what we 138 00:07:06,600 --> 00:07:10,960 Speaker 4: did was we took the foundational pieces that existed already 139 00:07:10,960 --> 00:07:13,520 Speaker 4: in the Air Force, already in the Army, already in 140 00:07:13,520 --> 00:07:17,560 Speaker 4: the Navy, and we began putting them together and filling 141 00:07:17,600 --> 00:07:20,480 Speaker 4: in pieces that weren't there. As an example, you know, 142 00:07:20,520 --> 00:07:25,000 Speaker 4: we had organizations that built satellites and deployed satellites and 143 00:07:25,040 --> 00:07:30,280 Speaker 4: operated satellites. What we didn't have was an effective intelligence enterprise, 144 00:07:30,400 --> 00:07:34,040 Speaker 4: right adversaries, how do they operate in space? What are 145 00:07:34,040 --> 00:07:36,840 Speaker 4: their capabilities, what sort of hostile behaviors. We didn't have 146 00:07:36,880 --> 00:07:39,880 Speaker 4: an effective enterprise in that regard, so we had to 147 00:07:39,880 --> 00:07:41,000 Speaker 4: build that very quickly. 148 00:07:41,480 --> 00:07:43,280 Speaker 1: And how large is Space Force now? 149 00:07:43,320 --> 00:07:46,840 Speaker 4: The Space Force today consists of about eighty five hundred 150 00:07:46,880 --> 00:07:51,440 Speaker 4: guardians in uniform and about five thousand more civilians, and 151 00:07:51,520 --> 00:07:55,000 Speaker 4: so all told, we're now approaching fourteen thousand people. 152 00:07:55,560 --> 00:07:55,760 Speaker 3: Now. 153 00:07:55,840 --> 00:07:58,920 Speaker 4: One important point in that regard, though, is we also 154 00:07:59,000 --> 00:08:01,440 Speaker 4: rely heavily on the United States Air Force for a 155 00:08:01,440 --> 00:08:04,040 Speaker 4: lot of things that we need that we don't do ourselves. 156 00:08:04,040 --> 00:08:07,120 Speaker 4: And there are about five thousand airmen who are out 157 00:08:07,120 --> 00:08:10,559 Speaker 4: there helping us operator installations. They're providing our medical care, 158 00:08:11,040 --> 00:08:15,040 Speaker 4: They're giving us logistical and security and legal support, and 159 00:08:15,120 --> 00:08:16,840 Speaker 4: so a lot of the things that we need to 160 00:08:16,840 --> 00:08:20,120 Speaker 4: operate effectively we don't do for ourselves. It's a great 161 00:08:20,160 --> 00:08:22,080 Speaker 4: partnership that we have with the US Air Force that 162 00:08:22,120 --> 00:08:24,400 Speaker 4: allows us to execute all those functions as well. 163 00:08:25,960 --> 00:08:28,360 Speaker 1: So in a little over three years, really you built 164 00:08:28,400 --> 00:08:31,800 Speaker 1: space for us up pretty quickly. How large will it be? 165 00:08:31,960 --> 00:08:34,040 Speaker 1: Is there a final number that you're building towards. 166 00:08:34,320 --> 00:08:35,439 Speaker 3: There is not, but I. 167 00:08:35,400 --> 00:08:37,840 Speaker 4: Will tell you we're continuing to grow. And the reason 168 00:08:37,880 --> 00:08:40,240 Speaker 4: we're continuing to go is missions that we used to 169 00:08:40,280 --> 00:08:43,680 Speaker 4: do in other domains are moving to space. Right For example, 170 00:08:43,880 --> 00:08:47,600 Speaker 4: something we call ground moving target indication tracking ships as 171 00:08:47,640 --> 00:08:50,160 Speaker 4: they move across the ocean, tracking large vehicles on the 172 00:08:50,200 --> 00:08:52,160 Speaker 4: ground and actually some of them in. 173 00:08:52,120 --> 00:08:53,240 Speaker 3: The air as well. 174 00:08:53,400 --> 00:08:55,960 Speaker 4: So that mission is moving to space, and so we 175 00:08:56,080 --> 00:08:58,559 Speaker 4: have to grow our number of people in our systems 176 00:08:58,600 --> 00:09:01,960 Speaker 4: to be able to do that. We're creating a whole 177 00:09:02,000 --> 00:09:06,360 Speaker 4: lot more connectivity for forces at sea, on the ground, 178 00:09:06,400 --> 00:09:08,080 Speaker 4: in the air, so that they can operate in a 179 00:09:08,080 --> 00:09:12,280 Speaker 4: more integrated fashion. That requires a whole lot more connectivity 180 00:09:12,840 --> 00:09:15,160 Speaker 4: to move data and to communicate through space. So we 181 00:09:15,240 --> 00:09:18,240 Speaker 4: have to build that out. There's not a final number, 182 00:09:18,880 --> 00:09:20,679 Speaker 4: but I would say in the next five to ten 183 00:09:20,800 --> 00:09:23,840 Speaker 4: years we will probably grow by about a third just 184 00:09:23,920 --> 00:09:26,520 Speaker 4: because of those new missions, and who knows what will 185 00:09:26,520 --> 00:09:27,800 Speaker 4: happen in the future after that. 186 00:09:28,320 --> 00:09:30,240 Speaker 1: You said earlier that a lot of the functions that 187 00:09:30,320 --> 00:09:34,880 Speaker 1: the Space Force now does was previously done by the 188 00:09:34,920 --> 00:09:37,800 Speaker 1: Air Force. Why did Space Force need to become its 189 00:09:37,800 --> 00:09:41,200 Speaker 1: own branch. Why couldn't the Air Force have expanded to 190 00:09:41,240 --> 00:09:43,840 Speaker 1: meet the challenges of a changing time. 191 00:09:44,400 --> 00:09:46,920 Speaker 4: There's a couple of reasons why. The first is really 192 00:09:47,240 --> 00:09:49,400 Speaker 4: the fact that we moved from what I will call 193 00:09:49,440 --> 00:09:53,880 Speaker 4: a relatively benign and domain into one where those space 194 00:09:53,960 --> 00:09:57,800 Speaker 4: systems are under threat. Starting as far back as two 195 00:09:57,800 --> 00:10:02,560 Speaker 4: thousand and seven, starting with the Chinese, they specifically started 196 00:10:02,600 --> 00:10:06,640 Speaker 4: developing and fielding weapons to take our satellites and the 197 00:10:06,679 --> 00:10:09,480 Speaker 4: services they provide away from missing conflict. They did that 198 00:10:09,520 --> 00:10:11,840 Speaker 4: with a test with a missile launched from the ground 199 00:10:11,840 --> 00:10:15,040 Speaker 4: to destroy a satellite space The Russians have followed suit. 200 00:10:15,200 --> 00:10:19,839 Speaker 4: Both have put offensive weapons in orbit to threaten our satellites. 201 00:10:20,200 --> 00:10:22,760 Speaker 4: And so now we're not talking about just providing that 202 00:10:22,920 --> 00:10:26,360 Speaker 4: GPS signal or the communications or the warning. We're now 203 00:10:26,400 --> 00:10:29,079 Speaker 4: talking about the need to defend and protect those assets 204 00:10:29,120 --> 00:10:33,640 Speaker 4: as well. And so that requires a focused service who 205 00:10:33,720 --> 00:10:36,920 Speaker 4: thinks every day about what it takes to operate in 206 00:10:37,000 --> 00:10:41,959 Speaker 4: space and to do that effectively with soldier, sailors, airmen, 207 00:10:42,000 --> 00:10:45,480 Speaker 4: and marines. The second thing I'll say is the United 208 00:10:45,520 --> 00:10:48,520 Speaker 4: States Air Force has a really full plate, and to 209 00:10:48,520 --> 00:10:51,280 Speaker 4: ask one service and one service chief and one staff 210 00:10:51,320 --> 00:10:53,760 Speaker 4: to do all that effectively in the air and then sale, 211 00:10:53,800 --> 00:10:56,440 Speaker 4: by the way, focus effectively on space as well, was 212 00:10:56,520 --> 00:10:58,960 Speaker 4: really too large of it span of control. And so 213 00:10:59,240 --> 00:11:01,360 Speaker 4: just like in nineteen forty seven, the last time we 214 00:11:01,400 --> 00:11:05,360 Speaker 4: did this, the United States Army built the world's greatest 215 00:11:05,400 --> 00:11:08,560 Speaker 4: air forces as part of the army. But in nineteen 216 00:11:08,640 --> 00:11:11,200 Speaker 4: forty seven the nation decided we now need a separate 217 00:11:11,240 --> 00:11:14,240 Speaker 4: service that focuses every day on the air and interfaces 218 00:11:14,240 --> 00:11:16,560 Speaker 4: directly with the Army of the Davy. We reach the 219 00:11:16,559 --> 00:11:19,000 Speaker 4: same point in space to say, now, just like we 220 00:11:19,120 --> 00:11:22,120 Speaker 4: need a service to understand how to operate on the ground, 221 00:11:22,200 --> 00:11:25,720 Speaker 4: at sea in the air, we need a comparable service 222 00:11:25,760 --> 00:11:29,800 Speaker 4: to be able to do that in space as well. 223 00:11:29,840 --> 00:11:33,000 Speaker 1: I imagine since the military is very keen on drying 224 00:11:33,360 --> 00:11:37,679 Speaker 1: boundaries and lines, and what's the difference between air and space. 225 00:11:37,520 --> 00:11:39,600 Speaker 3: Well, there's a lot of difference. 226 00:11:39,640 --> 00:11:42,240 Speaker 4: In fact, it's actually pretty easy because it's a very 227 00:11:42,480 --> 00:11:45,720 Speaker 4: thick and large boundary. You know, there's really you get 228 00:11:45,800 --> 00:11:49,000 Speaker 4: up to about one hundred thousand feet maybe one hundred 229 00:11:49,000 --> 00:11:52,800 Speaker 4: and fifty thousand feet, you can't really operate effectively in 230 00:11:52,920 --> 00:11:56,280 Speaker 4: the air anymore above that, and then it's really about 231 00:11:56,320 --> 00:11:58,400 Speaker 4: down to about one hundred miles where you can operate 232 00:11:58,520 --> 00:12:02,360 Speaker 4: effectively in space. So there's a boundary there. We can 233 00:12:02,440 --> 00:12:05,080 Speaker 4: draw one specific line, but there's really a large area 234 00:12:05,120 --> 00:12:07,239 Speaker 4: in between air and space where you don't operate effectively. 235 00:12:07,720 --> 00:12:12,200 Speaker 4: And the principles under which you operate are vastly different, 236 00:12:12,440 --> 00:12:15,240 Speaker 4: and therefore you need to understand it, act and think 237 00:12:15,280 --> 00:12:17,559 Speaker 4: about them differently to operate effectively in each kind of 238 00:12:17,559 --> 00:12:19,880 Speaker 4: the same way. The difference between operating and see and 239 00:12:19,920 --> 00:12:21,520 Speaker 4: operating on the ground, same thing. 240 00:12:21,840 --> 00:12:25,240 Speaker 1: And what does training look like to become a member 241 00:12:25,280 --> 00:12:28,120 Speaker 1: of space for us, I imagine it's a lot different 242 00:12:28,120 --> 00:12:30,040 Speaker 1: than it is for other branches in out there. 243 00:12:30,080 --> 00:12:30,439 Speaker 3: It is. 244 00:12:30,760 --> 00:12:34,080 Speaker 4: The initial training is very similar. First of all, you know, 245 00:12:34,320 --> 00:12:36,920 Speaker 4: if you think about basic training, we just first of all, 246 00:12:36,920 --> 00:12:40,160 Speaker 4: I want you to teach you the fundamentals of military service. 247 00:12:40,240 --> 00:12:43,120 Speaker 4: But the second phase of training, what we call technical training, 248 00:12:43,200 --> 00:12:46,680 Speaker 4: immediately becomes different. We do that technical training out at 249 00:12:46,760 --> 00:12:49,840 Speaker 4: VanderBurg Space Force Base in California, and that's when we 250 00:12:49,880 --> 00:12:53,920 Speaker 4: start talking about how is operating in space different than 251 00:12:53,960 --> 00:12:56,560 Speaker 4: operating in the air, or land or at sea. What 252 00:12:56,600 --> 00:12:58,240 Speaker 4: do we need to train you and how do we 253 00:12:58,280 --> 00:13:02,640 Speaker 4: need to train you to either operate those satellites effectively 254 00:13:02,840 --> 00:13:05,640 Speaker 4: or provide intelligence support or build and fly them. 255 00:13:05,960 --> 00:13:09,240 Speaker 1: What sort of training is needed when you're really pushing 256 00:13:09,320 --> 00:13:11,600 Speaker 1: up against the limits of technology to try to keep 257 00:13:11,720 --> 00:13:16,560 Speaker 1: up with both civilian technology and military adversaries. 258 00:13:17,040 --> 00:13:20,000 Speaker 4: We're now moving into an era where we have to 259 00:13:20,040 --> 00:13:23,280 Speaker 4: move faster. You know, those potential adversaries out there like 260 00:13:23,400 --> 00:13:28,520 Speaker 4: China are moving very quickly. Technology lets us build satellites faster. 261 00:13:29,320 --> 00:13:32,160 Speaker 4: Technology allows us to build them a little more cheaply, 262 00:13:32,600 --> 00:13:35,240 Speaker 4: and the way people are operating. Rather than building a 263 00:13:35,320 --> 00:13:39,559 Speaker 4: handful of very large, very capable, very expensive satellites, we're 264 00:13:39,600 --> 00:13:43,840 Speaker 4: now talking about building hundreds and perhaps thousands of smaller, 265 00:13:44,360 --> 00:13:46,720 Speaker 4: cheaper satellites that can do the same thing. We saw 266 00:13:46,840 --> 00:13:49,440 Speaker 4: that in the commercial space sector. We're now moving that 267 00:13:49,480 --> 00:13:50,319 Speaker 4: direction as well. 268 00:13:50,400 --> 00:13:53,520 Speaker 1: In access to space, as you're saying, is really easy. 269 00:13:53,559 --> 00:13:55,079 Speaker 1: It used to be pretty hard. Now you can pay 270 00:13:55,120 --> 00:13:57,160 Speaker 1: you a long musk to put a satellite up there 271 00:13:57,200 --> 00:13:59,440 Speaker 1: for an amount of money that a mid sized company 272 00:13:59,520 --> 00:14:00,000 Speaker 1: can afford. 273 00:14:00,080 --> 00:14:02,160 Speaker 3: Yeah, that's it. I would say it's getting easier. It's 274 00:14:02,200 --> 00:14:03,120 Speaker 3: still very. 275 00:14:02,880 --> 00:14:06,120 Speaker 4: Complicated, but you're right compared to the past when it 276 00:14:06,160 --> 00:14:09,880 Speaker 4: took superpowers to gain access to space and then countries, 277 00:14:09,920 --> 00:14:12,679 Speaker 4: but you're right. Now the ability to do it, do 278 00:14:12,679 --> 00:14:14,680 Speaker 4: it quickly, do it easily, and do it at reasonable 279 00:14:14,679 --> 00:14:15,719 Speaker 4: cost is absolutely there. 280 00:14:15,800 --> 00:14:16,200 Speaker 3: And so. 281 00:14:17,760 --> 00:14:21,280 Speaker 4: You know, a university, a small company, folks that don't 282 00:14:21,320 --> 00:14:27,560 Speaker 4: really have tremendous expertise or a huge infrastructure could build 283 00:14:27,600 --> 00:14:30,240 Speaker 4: and design and fly their own spacecraft or pay somebody 284 00:14:30,240 --> 00:14:32,640 Speaker 4: to do it for them. And you're right, it's really unleashing. 285 00:14:32,680 --> 00:14:35,200 Speaker 4: I think a new way of thinking about. 286 00:14:34,960 --> 00:14:40,200 Speaker 1: Space after the break. How Space Force defends US interests 287 00:14:40,240 --> 00:14:52,040 Speaker 1: in orbit. One of the things you talked about earlier, 288 00:14:52,040 --> 00:14:56,560 Speaker 1: which is very important, is the militarization of space and 289 00:14:56,800 --> 00:15:00,400 Speaker 1: those concerns. Who are the adversaries the US is most 290 00:15:00,480 --> 00:15:02,120 Speaker 1: concerned about in this realm. 291 00:15:02,480 --> 00:15:06,640 Speaker 4: Yeah, today the most concerning adversaries are to Russia and China. 292 00:15:07,480 --> 00:15:11,760 Speaker 4: China for two reasons. One is they have very clearly 293 00:15:12,000 --> 00:15:15,200 Speaker 4: demonstrated by their actions and by what they're developing fielding 294 00:15:15,240 --> 00:15:20,160 Speaker 4: and testing their desire to attack our spacecraft, our satellites 295 00:15:20,200 --> 00:15:22,040 Speaker 4: and deny our use of them in conflict. 296 00:15:22,160 --> 00:15:23,800 Speaker 1: I mean, when you say attack, what do you mean 297 00:15:23,840 --> 00:15:25,480 Speaker 1: by so? 298 00:15:25,600 --> 00:15:27,400 Speaker 3: Attack in any number of ways. 299 00:15:27,520 --> 00:15:30,480 Speaker 4: In two thousand and seven, as I had said earlier, 300 00:15:30,960 --> 00:15:33,280 Speaker 4: they launched a missile from the ground to destroy one 301 00:15:33,320 --> 00:15:36,240 Speaker 4: of their satellites, physically attack it and destroy it. They 302 00:15:36,280 --> 00:15:40,000 Speaker 4: also now have spacecraft in orbit that can maneuver right 303 00:15:40,080 --> 00:15:44,680 Speaker 4: up next to one of our satellites and block it, 304 00:15:45,000 --> 00:15:48,280 Speaker 4: collide with it. You know, they've actually demonstrated the ability 305 00:15:48,320 --> 00:15:50,520 Speaker 4: to throw a net over one of their satellites and 306 00:15:50,640 --> 00:15:54,600 Speaker 4: drag it to another orbit, so to physically attack in orbit. 307 00:15:54,720 --> 00:15:58,240 Speaker 4: They have the capability to interfere with the communications links 308 00:15:58,280 --> 00:16:02,320 Speaker 4: of our satellites jam those links. They've demonstrated the ability 309 00:16:02,360 --> 00:16:05,520 Speaker 4: to use lasers to either dazzle our sensors whether the 310 00:16:05,560 --> 00:16:08,960 Speaker 4: sensors don't work, or to cause physical damage on them. 311 00:16:09,120 --> 00:16:14,640 Speaker 4: So basically, whether it's direct attack, kinetic attack, reversible jamming attack. 312 00:16:14,880 --> 00:16:19,280 Speaker 4: In addition to attack through cyberspace physical attack of ground infrastructure, 313 00:16:19,320 --> 00:16:23,840 Speaker 4: they have developed means to attack our satellites directly, indirectly, 314 00:16:23,960 --> 00:16:26,800 Speaker 4: kinetically and non kinetically pretty much in any orbit we 315 00:16:26,840 --> 00:16:29,360 Speaker 4: operate in. So they have a vast array of offensive force. 316 00:16:29,520 --> 00:16:31,320 Speaker 1: Does the US have the same capabilities? 317 00:16:32,000 --> 00:16:33,120 Speaker 3: The US does not. 318 00:16:33,560 --> 00:16:34,640 Speaker 1: And what is the reason for that. 319 00:16:36,160 --> 00:16:37,960 Speaker 4: Well, for a couple of reasons. One is we have 320 00:16:38,040 --> 00:16:41,880 Speaker 4: been very loath to pursue capabilities like that in the 321 00:16:41,880 --> 00:16:44,760 Speaker 4: past because we believe in preserving the domain and using 322 00:16:44,760 --> 00:16:49,240 Speaker 4: it effectively for a broad range of purposes. I will say, however, 323 00:16:49,440 --> 00:16:53,680 Speaker 4: that we are We have been developing capabilities for electronic 324 00:16:53,760 --> 00:16:56,440 Speaker 4: interference for several years and been using those, but at 325 00:16:56,440 --> 00:16:58,680 Speaker 4: this point in time, it is now incumbent on us 326 00:16:58,720 --> 00:17:02,160 Speaker 4: to do two things. First is to develop capabilities that 327 00:17:02,200 --> 00:17:04,480 Speaker 4: will defend our satellites in a whole host of ways, 328 00:17:04,560 --> 00:17:07,720 Speaker 4: and it will become our responsibility also to deny adversary 329 00:17:07,800 --> 00:17:10,320 Speaker 4: use of space. And so what I'll say today is, 330 00:17:11,080 --> 00:17:13,800 Speaker 4: as a result of the activities of others, we are 331 00:17:14,560 --> 00:17:17,119 Speaker 4: looking at and preparing for a whole host of ways 332 00:17:17,160 --> 00:17:20,000 Speaker 4: to both defend and protect our capabilities but also potentially 333 00:17:20,040 --> 00:17:23,320 Speaker 4: deny adversary's use of space and conflict. 334 00:17:25,440 --> 00:17:27,720 Speaker 1: If you think back to the nuclear age, the concept 335 00:17:27,720 --> 00:17:29,760 Speaker 1: of deterrence is maybe you didn't want to use it, 336 00:17:29,840 --> 00:17:33,120 Speaker 1: but just the adversary knowing that you could deterred them. 337 00:17:33,280 --> 00:17:34,320 Speaker 1: Is that the idea. 338 00:17:34,880 --> 00:17:37,720 Speaker 4: So that is absolutely our approach, especially our approach to 339 00:17:37,960 --> 00:17:43,840 Speaker 4: new constellations, what we call proliferated constellations A constellation, sorry, 340 00:17:43,880 --> 00:17:46,720 Speaker 4: a whole bunch of satellites, right, constellation of satellites. Right. 341 00:17:46,920 --> 00:17:49,880 Speaker 4: Most of the satellites we've developed in the past, relatively 342 00:17:49,880 --> 00:17:53,600 Speaker 4: small in number GPS satellites about thirty provide all that 343 00:17:53,640 --> 00:17:58,040 Speaker 4: global coverage communication satellites depends on specifically what they're for, 344 00:17:58,640 --> 00:18:01,480 Speaker 4: but usually if from about six to a dozen satellites 345 00:18:01,480 --> 00:18:04,600 Speaker 4: to provide those communications, our mister, warning, constellations about the 346 00:18:04,600 --> 00:18:07,760 Speaker 4: same size. What we're moving to now is as opposed 347 00:18:07,800 --> 00:18:11,840 Speaker 4: to tens, maybe tens of satellites to conduct missions, we're 348 00:18:11,840 --> 00:18:15,119 Speaker 4: now talking about one hundreds and thousands. And so the 349 00:18:15,160 --> 00:18:17,919 Speaker 4: first thing you say is, Okay, if my goal is 350 00:18:17,960 --> 00:18:22,000 Speaker 4: to attack ten satellites, that's a manageable problem. If now 351 00:18:22,040 --> 00:18:23,800 Speaker 4: the goal is I got to take out one hundred 352 00:18:23,880 --> 00:18:26,120 Speaker 4: or a thousand satellites, that's much harder. And so there's 353 00:18:26,119 --> 00:18:29,879 Speaker 4: a detern effect there because it is very hard to 354 00:18:29,960 --> 00:18:32,160 Speaker 4: do something like that. And so that's the first part. 355 00:18:32,840 --> 00:18:35,800 Speaker 4: The second part is if an adversary looks into space 356 00:18:35,840 --> 00:18:40,600 Speaker 4: and either sees through their desire to deny US use 357 00:18:40,640 --> 00:18:42,639 Speaker 4: of space, or US knowing that we can take their 358 00:18:42,680 --> 00:18:45,000 Speaker 4: space capabilities away. If they look into space and say, 359 00:18:45,160 --> 00:18:46,879 Speaker 4: I will not be able to do what I intend 360 00:18:46,960 --> 00:18:50,320 Speaker 4: to do. I'm not going to go to conflict today. 361 00:18:50,359 --> 00:18:52,760 Speaker 4: That's exactly what the intent is. We do not want 362 00:18:52,760 --> 00:18:55,159 Speaker 4: to see, especially members of the US Space Force, but 363 00:18:55,200 --> 00:18:57,159 Speaker 4: the United States of America and our leaders don't want 364 00:18:57,200 --> 00:18:59,880 Speaker 4: to see conflict in space. And so our first goal 365 00:19:00,400 --> 00:19:04,560 Speaker 4: is to deter any adversary action in space, but make 366 00:19:04,600 --> 00:19:07,240 Speaker 4: it clear to everybody and anybody if it comes to that, 367 00:19:07,320 --> 00:19:10,639 Speaker 4: we are preparing to win in space. So the second 368 00:19:10,640 --> 00:19:13,480 Speaker 4: piece of China is not just offensive capabilities. The second 369 00:19:13,520 --> 00:19:16,479 Speaker 4: piece of China is they've watched how effective we are 370 00:19:16,520 --> 00:19:20,000 Speaker 4: in space with GPS, with communication satellites, with monitoring and 371 00:19:20,080 --> 00:19:23,520 Speaker 4: detecting activities. They're building out a similar constellation to do 372 00:19:23,560 --> 00:19:25,879 Speaker 4: the same thing that we've been doing for decades. On 373 00:19:25,920 --> 00:19:29,480 Speaker 4: the rush aside, they are not as focused on that 374 00:19:29,720 --> 00:19:33,760 Speaker 4: second piece, but they are very much focused on offensive. 375 00:19:33,359 --> 00:19:35,000 Speaker 3: Capabilities, just like the Chinese. 376 00:19:35,000 --> 00:19:39,159 Speaker 4: And while they're not moving as aggressively and as broadly 377 00:19:39,720 --> 00:19:42,600 Speaker 4: to develop offensive weapons for space. They're doing the same things. 378 00:19:43,000 --> 00:19:46,600 Speaker 4: Just recently they conducted a kinetic attack, launched a missile 379 00:19:46,600 --> 00:19:48,719 Speaker 4: from the ground, destroyed one of their satellites in space. 380 00:19:49,320 --> 00:19:52,719 Speaker 4: The fall of twenty twenty, they launched objects into space 381 00:19:53,000 --> 00:19:56,440 Speaker 4: maneuverd them very close to some of our most capable satellites, 382 00:19:56,480 --> 00:20:00,320 Speaker 4: demonstrating that they're prepared to attack them in space. Same 383 00:20:00,359 --> 00:20:04,639 Speaker 4: thing with attacks through cyberspace, interference, jamming on the ground, 384 00:20:04,720 --> 00:20:05,560 Speaker 4: laser dazzling. 385 00:20:06,200 --> 00:20:08,880 Speaker 3: They are as aggressively. 386 00:20:08,280 --> 00:20:14,120 Speaker 4: Pursuing offensive capabilities, deny or use of space as the Chinese. 387 00:20:13,480 --> 00:20:17,080 Speaker 1: And satellites have played a really important role in the 388 00:20:17,119 --> 00:20:21,800 Speaker 1: war in Ukraine, especially on the side of Ukraine the 389 00:20:21,920 --> 00:20:25,200 Speaker 1: USSEU in helping support the war. 390 00:20:25,440 --> 00:20:27,680 Speaker 3: They absolutely have, and in fact, in many. 391 00:20:27,480 --> 00:20:30,720 Speaker 4: Cases those are commercial companies doing that, which has opened 392 00:20:30,800 --> 00:20:33,480 Speaker 4: up a whole new area of interest and exploration and 393 00:20:34,200 --> 00:20:37,439 Speaker 4: work required from a policy standpoint is what's the relationship 394 00:20:37,480 --> 00:20:41,639 Speaker 4: between commercial companies and commercial services from space as it 395 00:20:41,680 --> 00:20:46,959 Speaker 4: applies to conflict. A lot of companies monitor see sense 396 00:20:47,680 --> 00:20:50,520 Speaker 4: collect information from space, and they've been able to provide 397 00:20:50,520 --> 00:20:54,280 Speaker 4: that to Ukrainians. Companies have provided the ability to communicate 398 00:20:54,680 --> 00:20:58,840 Speaker 4: where both through the physical attacks on the ground and 399 00:20:58,880 --> 00:21:02,000 Speaker 4: some of the Russian cyber space attacks, and the Russians 400 00:21:02,040 --> 00:21:05,360 Speaker 4: have been working hard to deny them those that use 401 00:21:05,400 --> 00:21:07,840 Speaker 4: and it has proven to be quite a challenge. 402 00:21:08,520 --> 00:21:12,239 Speaker 1: Do you worry that an arms race in space is 403 00:21:12,320 --> 00:21:13,560 Speaker 1: ultimately inevitable? 404 00:21:14,359 --> 00:21:16,560 Speaker 4: I guess I am concerned. I'm concerned about that just 405 00:21:16,640 --> 00:21:19,280 Speaker 4: like any other domain. And I would say a couple 406 00:21:19,320 --> 00:21:22,679 Speaker 4: of things. One is, from my perspective, our job is 407 00:21:22,720 --> 00:21:27,000 Speaker 4: to ensure that both our forces and our national leaders 408 00:21:27,920 --> 00:21:30,879 Speaker 4: have the capabilities that they need and the options that 409 00:21:30,920 --> 00:21:34,639 Speaker 4: they need to operate effectively in the diplomatic space, in 410 00:21:34,720 --> 00:21:38,200 Speaker 4: the military space, and count on those folks to help 411 00:21:38,280 --> 00:21:39,919 Speaker 4: us work through the issues of how do we do 412 00:21:39,960 --> 00:21:42,320 Speaker 4: that responsibly, how do we do that as a community 413 00:21:42,320 --> 00:21:45,920 Speaker 4: of nations. And so while I'm concerned about how we're 414 00:21:45,960 --> 00:21:48,399 Speaker 4: growing in space, I would say, to some extent, it 415 00:21:48,480 --> 00:21:52,000 Speaker 4: is sort of inevitable. Unfortunately, that's a nature of the 416 00:21:52,040 --> 00:21:57,199 Speaker 4: human race. Our job is provide those capabilities, help to 417 00:21:57,320 --> 00:22:00,760 Speaker 4: ensure that we use them effectively, but also respond and 418 00:22:00,800 --> 00:22:03,800 Speaker 4: then work hard on the deterrens piece so that hopefully 419 00:22:03,840 --> 00:22:05,400 Speaker 4: it never comes to actual conflict. 420 00:22:05,480 --> 00:22:07,560 Speaker 1: And again, if you think back to the Cold War, 421 00:22:07,640 --> 00:22:10,920 Speaker 1: there were all of these deconfliction lines that if something 422 00:22:11,320 --> 00:22:14,320 Speaker 1: looked bad, you could quickly call and say, hey, it's okay. 423 00:22:14,600 --> 00:22:17,639 Speaker 1: Are there those kinds of lines of communication with China, 424 00:22:17,880 --> 00:22:20,919 Speaker 1: with Russia specifically with regards to space. 425 00:22:21,119 --> 00:22:25,439 Speaker 4: No, not really today, and that's not different than a 426 00:22:25,440 --> 00:22:29,199 Speaker 4: lot of our communications these days. However, there is a 427 00:22:29,240 --> 00:22:34,040 Speaker 4: body in the UN that's focused on developing responsible behaviors 428 00:22:34,119 --> 00:22:36,720 Speaker 4: in space and trying to get the Community of Nations 429 00:22:36,760 --> 00:22:40,679 Speaker 4: to agree to them. That effort is led for the 430 00:22:40,800 --> 00:22:43,680 Speaker 4: US by the State Department. But just a couple of 431 00:22:43,720 --> 00:22:46,320 Speaker 4: years ago, the Secretary of Defense Secretary of Austin put 432 00:22:46,359 --> 00:22:51,199 Speaker 4: out what we believe are tenants for responsible behavior in 433 00:22:51,240 --> 00:22:55,080 Speaker 4: space that we the Department of Defense will follow. Things 434 00:22:55,240 --> 00:22:58,359 Speaker 4: like communicating our tension with respect to what we're doing 435 00:22:58,400 --> 00:23:03,600 Speaker 4: in space, conducting activities that create large amounts of debris 436 00:23:03,680 --> 00:23:07,080 Speaker 4: like Connecticut SAT tests. Those are the sorts of things 437 00:23:07,119 --> 00:23:11,119 Speaker 4: that we believe are foundational to responsible behavior in space 438 00:23:11,400 --> 00:23:16,520 Speaker 4: and hope that that spurs additional negotiations and agreements in 439 00:23:16,560 --> 00:23:20,800 Speaker 4: the United Nations and with others to really operate responsibly 440 00:23:20,840 --> 00:23:21,320 Speaker 4: in space. 441 00:23:23,160 --> 00:23:25,720 Speaker 1: So you said, in the next five ten years, maybe 442 00:23:25,760 --> 00:23:28,640 Speaker 1: Space for US grows about thirty percent. That means you're recruiting. 443 00:23:28,680 --> 00:23:30,720 Speaker 1: What's the recruitment pitch for Space for US, Like we 444 00:23:30,760 --> 00:23:32,600 Speaker 1: know what it is for Army and Navy. You know 445 00:23:32,600 --> 00:23:33,880 Speaker 1: what's your pitch today? 446 00:23:33,880 --> 00:23:35,760 Speaker 4: Well, and I will say I know that the other 447 00:23:35,800 --> 00:23:39,800 Speaker 4: services are facing some recruiting challenges right now. We are not, 448 00:23:40,480 --> 00:23:42,840 Speaker 4: But ours is. I mean it feels like back to 449 00:23:42,880 --> 00:23:45,359 Speaker 4: the future. Right when I was young, space was cool. 450 00:23:45,920 --> 00:23:48,640 Speaker 4: There was this grand vision and idea of moving out 451 00:23:48,680 --> 00:23:51,160 Speaker 4: into the galaxy and things are going on. Well, that's 452 00:23:51,200 --> 00:23:54,439 Speaker 4: not exactly our pitch, but we are certainly leveraging that 453 00:23:54,520 --> 00:23:57,600 Speaker 4: desire and that interest. If you want to do something 454 00:23:57,880 --> 00:23:59,679 Speaker 4: that matters, if you want to serve the nation, if 455 00:23:59,720 --> 00:24:03,560 Speaker 4: you want to work with advanced technology and really operate 456 00:24:03,640 --> 00:24:07,200 Speaker 4: in and deal with activities and what is still my opinion, 457 00:24:07,359 --> 00:24:11,679 Speaker 4: the final frontier, not just today focused on what we 458 00:24:11,720 --> 00:24:13,760 Speaker 4: do on Earth, but in the future as we move 459 00:24:13,800 --> 00:24:15,679 Speaker 4: out towards the Moon in Mars. You can go to 460 00:24:15,680 --> 00:24:18,440 Speaker 4: commercial industry, you can go to NASA, but absolutely there's 461 00:24:18,480 --> 00:24:20,120 Speaker 4: a role for you in the Space Force as well. 462 00:24:20,560 --> 00:24:23,440 Speaker 1: And what are the top three positions say that you 463 00:24:23,480 --> 00:24:25,080 Speaker 1: would be recruiting for it of your psyche. This is 464 00:24:25,119 --> 00:24:25,600 Speaker 1: what we need. 465 00:24:25,720 --> 00:24:28,600 Speaker 4: Yeah, well, we only really do four things, so they're 466 00:24:28,600 --> 00:24:32,399 Speaker 4: all important. The first is we build and then launch 467 00:24:32,440 --> 00:24:34,360 Speaker 4: those space systems in dow Or. But that's one thing 468 00:24:34,400 --> 00:24:36,880 Speaker 4: you can do. You could be an engineer, a program manager. 469 00:24:37,320 --> 00:24:39,199 Speaker 4: The second thing we do is we operate them, so 470 00:24:39,280 --> 00:24:42,080 Speaker 4: you're no kidding sitting there in the operation center managing 471 00:24:42,119 --> 00:24:44,919 Speaker 4: the activities and fly and the things you need to 472 00:24:44,920 --> 00:24:46,800 Speaker 4: do every single day. If you want to be an 473 00:24:46,840 --> 00:24:49,679 Speaker 4: intelligence specialist like you might be in the air, on 474 00:24:49,720 --> 00:24:52,960 Speaker 4: the ground, at sea. We need folks who deeply understand 475 00:24:53,040 --> 00:24:56,240 Speaker 4: what's going on in the domain, what other capabilities exist 476 00:24:56,240 --> 00:24:58,760 Speaker 4: out there, how people operate, So we need those. And 477 00:24:58,800 --> 00:25:06,440 Speaker 4: then lastly, space capabilities today don't really produce except through cyberspace. 478 00:25:06,600 --> 00:25:09,040 Speaker 4: That information it's collectors from those satellites has to get 479 00:25:09,080 --> 00:25:11,720 Speaker 4: to the ground. It has to be disseminated. We have 480 00:25:11,800 --> 00:25:15,320 Speaker 4: to operate networks and IT systems to operate them to 481 00:25:15,320 --> 00:25:17,200 Speaker 4: connect them and get that data that people need them. 482 00:25:17,200 --> 00:25:21,400 Speaker 4: So we need cyberspace operators and cyberspace defenders. And because 483 00:25:21,400 --> 00:25:25,280 Speaker 4: we're small our numbers, we only need several hundred people 484 00:25:25,280 --> 00:25:27,240 Speaker 4: a year and so right now we don't really have 485 00:25:27,280 --> 00:25:31,240 Speaker 4: a recruiting challenge. We have the opportunity to accept applicants 486 00:25:31,240 --> 00:25:34,160 Speaker 4: and from those applicants choose the absolute best to come 487 00:25:34,200 --> 00:25:36,120 Speaker 4: into the space for So it's a pretty easy sell. 488 00:25:36,600 --> 00:25:38,400 Speaker 1: Do you ever get to premise and they're going to get 489 00:25:38,400 --> 00:25:39,040 Speaker 1: to go to space? 490 00:25:41,240 --> 00:25:44,720 Speaker 4: So I would say, I hope someday that can guardians 491 00:25:44,720 --> 00:25:47,320 Speaker 4: go to space? Yes, today we have two guardians who 492 00:25:47,359 --> 00:25:52,200 Speaker 4: go to space. They are astronauts in NASA's Astronaut Core. 493 00:25:53,280 --> 00:25:56,680 Speaker 4: Most of our works on the ground. As the human race, 494 00:25:56,720 --> 00:25:59,240 Speaker 4: as the nation and the human race goes back to 495 00:25:59,280 --> 00:26:02,119 Speaker 4: the Moon, to Mars, goes beyond that, will there be 496 00:26:02,160 --> 00:26:05,719 Speaker 4: a place for guardians in space? Absolutely in the future, 497 00:26:05,720 --> 00:26:08,359 Speaker 4: and we are you know, Ana as NASA returns to 498 00:26:08,440 --> 00:26:11,000 Speaker 4: the Moon, we talk about how do you navigate near 499 00:26:11,000 --> 00:26:12,840 Speaker 4: the moon, how do you communicate near the moon? How 500 00:26:12,840 --> 00:26:16,280 Speaker 4: do you understand what's happening in the lunar space and 501 00:26:16,320 --> 00:26:19,399 Speaker 4: whether it's a hazard or a threat. Guardians are doing 502 00:26:19,440 --> 00:26:21,920 Speaker 4: all of that today side by side with NASA. We're 503 00:26:21,960 --> 00:26:24,000 Speaker 4: just doing it from the ground. We're not doing it 504 00:26:24,080 --> 00:26:26,919 Speaker 4: in space yet, but one day somewhere out there in 505 00:26:26,920 --> 00:26:27,320 Speaker 4: the future. 506 00:26:27,359 --> 00:26:29,199 Speaker 1: Absolutely do you have to suffer through a lot of 507 00:26:29,240 --> 00:26:30,680 Speaker 1: Guardians of the Galaxy jokes. 508 00:26:30,760 --> 00:26:31,560 Speaker 3: Ah, we do. 509 00:26:32,760 --> 00:26:35,560 Speaker 4: But you know what, humor is part of the American 510 00:26:35,600 --> 00:26:37,720 Speaker 4: psyche and culture. And if you can't take a joke, 511 00:26:37,920 --> 00:26:39,520 Speaker 4: you know what you really have to do is just 512 00:26:39,560 --> 00:26:42,600 Speaker 4: embrace it. Like I said, you know, my people are nerds, 513 00:26:43,680 --> 00:26:45,000 Speaker 4: and today nerd is cool. 514 00:26:45,600 --> 00:26:47,720 Speaker 1: General Thompson, thanks so much for speaking with me. 515 00:26:47,920 --> 00:26:49,640 Speaker 3: Absolutely, it's been a real pleasure. 516 00:26:51,200 --> 00:26:53,399 Speaker 1: When we come back. What the US is doing to 517 00:26:53,480 --> 00:27:06,480 Speaker 1: prepare for an escalation of tensions in space. If the 518 00:27:06,560 --> 00:27:09,399 Speaker 1: kind of conflict in space that General Thompson talked about 519 00:27:09,440 --> 00:27:13,280 Speaker 1: did happen, that's when the US Space Command would take charge, 520 00:27:13,400 --> 00:27:16,720 Speaker 1: with Space Force and other branches of the US military 521 00:27:16,880 --> 00:27:22,560 Speaker 1: pitching in personnel and resources. Bloomberg's Katrina Manson covers cyber 522 00:27:22,720 --> 00:27:26,520 Speaker 1: and emerging tech. I asked her about Space Command and 523 00:27:26,640 --> 00:27:29,840 Speaker 1: what exactly the US is doing to prepare for a 524 00:27:29,880 --> 00:27:35,720 Speaker 1: potential military confrontation high above the Earth. Katrina, you've been 525 00:27:35,720 --> 00:27:40,120 Speaker 1: out to Space Command in Colorado, I think twice now, right, Yeah. 526 00:27:39,880 --> 00:27:43,600 Speaker 5: That's right. I went in twenty eighteen and then again 527 00:27:43,640 --> 00:27:48,400 Speaker 5: in twenty twenty, so a while ago. What really struck 528 00:27:48,480 --> 00:27:53,439 Speaker 5: me is. It's kind of a low slung building, and 529 00:27:53,480 --> 00:27:57,560 Speaker 5: obviously one's looking for one's fill of Star Trek analogies 530 00:27:57,640 --> 00:28:01,240 Speaker 5: and a bit of Battlestar Galactica. I think you get 531 00:28:01,280 --> 00:28:04,000 Speaker 5: it more and more now from the Space Force, but 532 00:28:04,200 --> 00:28:06,919 Speaker 5: Space Command looked to me a little bit like a 533 00:28:07,119 --> 00:28:10,520 Speaker 5: sort of rudimentary rocket combined with a crossed with the 534 00:28:10,520 --> 00:28:14,600 Speaker 5: sardine can. And inside it's a little bit like visiting 535 00:28:14,680 --> 00:28:17,800 Speaker 5: a smaller version of the National Air and Space Museum. 536 00:28:18,040 --> 00:28:22,439 Speaker 5: There are lots of wrapped boxes in the sky hanging 537 00:28:22,480 --> 00:28:26,600 Speaker 5: down from the ceilings, and their satellites, their models of satellites. 538 00:28:26,640 --> 00:28:29,720 Speaker 5: And the thing that really struck me is the early 539 00:28:29,800 --> 00:28:33,240 Speaker 5: satellites are big and the newer satellites are small, and 540 00:28:33,280 --> 00:28:36,359 Speaker 5: it's just a really clear demonstration of the way the 541 00:28:36,400 --> 00:28:39,400 Speaker 5: whole entire approach to space is changing. 542 00:28:39,880 --> 00:28:42,239 Speaker 1: And of course that's what we're talking about today. And 543 00:28:42,760 --> 00:28:47,400 Speaker 1: you visited Space Command and there's that distinction between Space 544 00:28:47,440 --> 00:28:49,160 Speaker 1: Command and Space Force. 545 00:28:50,160 --> 00:28:52,280 Speaker 5: The simplest way to think about it is Space Force 546 00:28:52,440 --> 00:28:55,920 Speaker 5: provides the people and Space Command does the fighting, and 547 00:28:55,960 --> 00:28:59,360 Speaker 5: in this case in peace, does the operations. Space Command 548 00:29:00,520 --> 00:29:04,280 Speaker 5: existed a long time ago. It got disestablished and then 549 00:29:04,520 --> 00:29:08,280 Speaker 5: got set up again in full in twenty nineteen, and 550 00:29:08,320 --> 00:29:11,040 Speaker 5: the whole point of that really is about saying spaces 551 00:29:11,440 --> 00:29:14,719 Speaker 5: in the US jargon of the thing, a war fighting domain, 552 00:29:15,240 --> 00:29:20,200 Speaker 5: and the whole effort of creating, re establishing Space Command, 553 00:29:20,280 --> 00:29:22,920 Speaker 5: and then establishing Space Force for the first time. As 554 00:29:23,000 --> 00:29:25,360 Speaker 5: much as it was sort of accompanied by mirth, and 555 00:29:25,400 --> 00:29:27,600 Speaker 5: there are lots of detractors, I think the fact that 556 00:29:27,640 --> 00:29:30,520 Speaker 5: it has stuck it out is so much about this 557 00:29:30,720 --> 00:29:34,920 Speaker 5: US focus on what it sees as the threat from 558 00:29:35,560 --> 00:29:40,080 Speaker 5: China and the fact that they've noticed China really developed 559 00:29:40,080 --> 00:29:43,800 Speaker 5: its own space architecture really propel what it's trying to do. 560 00:29:44,320 --> 00:29:46,640 Speaker 5: I think China itself has said it wants to overtake 561 00:29:46,840 --> 00:29:51,080 Speaker 5: globally in space by twenty forty five, and the US 562 00:29:51,080 --> 00:29:53,040 Speaker 5: has said they think China really will be a world 563 00:29:53,040 --> 00:29:56,280 Speaker 5: class player by twenty thirty. But of course, China already, 564 00:29:56,280 --> 00:29:59,440 Speaker 5: in the US estimation, has many different types of weapons 565 00:30:00,320 --> 00:30:04,520 Speaker 5: in space and focused on space. That has concerned the US, 566 00:30:05,280 --> 00:30:08,560 Speaker 5: and I think when you speak to senior US military officials, 567 00:30:08,560 --> 00:30:11,320 Speaker 5: they talk a lot about developing to terrance in space. 568 00:30:11,720 --> 00:30:14,360 Speaker 5: That's already an admission that the US is not quite 569 00:30:14,400 --> 00:30:18,200 Speaker 5: clear what level of space superiority it has, and of course, 570 00:30:18,240 --> 00:30:22,200 Speaker 5: to Terrance means being able to win and then letting. 571 00:30:22,400 --> 00:30:23,840 Speaker 5: In this case, the Chinese know. 572 00:30:23,880 --> 00:30:29,280 Speaker 1: That what is the current capability of the US in 573 00:30:29,680 --> 00:30:31,800 Speaker 1: defending those satellites. 574 00:30:32,320 --> 00:30:35,080 Speaker 5: I think they're really clear not enough. When I visited 575 00:30:35,080 --> 00:30:38,080 Speaker 5: in twenty twenty, I spoke to a general Space Command 576 00:30:38,120 --> 00:30:40,840 Speaker 5: who said the US really needed to start thinking about 577 00:30:41,120 --> 00:30:43,520 Speaker 5: offensive weapons in space. And of course that triggers all 578 00:30:43,520 --> 00:30:47,560 Speaker 5: sorts of questions in Congress, in the American public, and 579 00:30:47,600 --> 00:30:51,320 Speaker 5: indeed the Biden administration, which has not set out this aim. 580 00:30:51,640 --> 00:30:54,440 Speaker 5: But I think Space Command, Space Force, and its supporters 581 00:30:54,480 --> 00:30:56,880 Speaker 5: are really leaning into this idea that the US needs 582 00:30:56,920 --> 00:31:00,920 Speaker 5: much more capability. The US says that it has communications 583 00:31:01,000 --> 00:31:03,720 Speaker 5: jamming equipment that could jam a satellite, but that it 584 00:31:03,720 --> 00:31:07,440 Speaker 5: doesn't have any space based weaponry, and several other of 585 00:31:07,480 --> 00:31:09,920 Speaker 5: the different types of weapons that you could use from 586 00:31:09,960 --> 00:31:13,080 Speaker 5: ground to space, from space to space, and from space 587 00:31:13,160 --> 00:31:15,520 Speaker 5: back down to the ground. There's a whole array. I 588 00:31:15,520 --> 00:31:18,160 Speaker 5: think the thing that really triggered US concerns was back 589 00:31:18,200 --> 00:31:20,560 Speaker 5: in two thousand and seven when the Chinese launched an 590 00:31:20,560 --> 00:31:24,960 Speaker 5: anti satellite test that did explode a decaying Chinese satellite, 591 00:31:25,240 --> 00:31:27,480 Speaker 5: and that's really when the US started saying, oh, China 592 00:31:27,520 --> 00:31:32,040 Speaker 5: is serious about this. That test was criticized as irresponsible. 593 00:31:32,080 --> 00:31:35,040 Speaker 5: It put I think more than twenty thousand pieces of 594 00:31:35,080 --> 00:31:37,680 Speaker 5: debris into circulation, and a couple of thousands of those 595 00:31:37,680 --> 00:31:40,600 Speaker 5: pieces are still circulating today. But of course the US 596 00:31:40,600 --> 00:31:43,320 Speaker 5: has done the same. It did it before China, and 597 00:31:43,360 --> 00:31:45,880 Speaker 5: it's done it since China in two thousand and eight. 598 00:31:46,120 --> 00:31:49,800 Speaker 5: India's also done it. Russia did it in twenty twenty one, 599 00:31:49,880 --> 00:31:53,320 Speaker 5: just on the eve of the invasion of Ukraine. And 600 00:31:53,880 --> 00:31:57,400 Speaker 5: this kind of mounting concern has seen the US really 601 00:31:57,400 --> 00:32:00,200 Speaker 5: want to develop things. And what the US is worried 602 00:32:00,200 --> 00:32:03,320 Speaker 5: about is when they do these war games that involve 603 00:32:03,640 --> 00:32:06,800 Speaker 5: global scenarios over Taiwan, it tends to very quickly escalate 604 00:32:06,840 --> 00:32:09,440 Speaker 5: to space. The US is worried that China will fire 605 00:32:09,520 --> 00:32:11,920 Speaker 5: the first shots of any war in Taiwan in space, 606 00:32:12,000 --> 00:32:15,880 Speaker 5: degrading US space capabilities that enable the US to communicate 607 00:32:15,920 --> 00:32:19,640 Speaker 5: with its own military forces and to move its own 608 00:32:19,680 --> 00:32:21,160 Speaker 5: weapons around the world. 609 00:32:21,560 --> 00:32:25,720 Speaker 1: You talked about these shootdowns of satellites that China did 610 00:32:25,880 --> 00:32:29,840 Speaker 1: and Russia did, is some of the thinking that those 611 00:32:29,960 --> 00:32:34,000 Speaker 1: were in part just to show the US the capability 612 00:32:34,040 --> 00:32:37,040 Speaker 1: that they had that the shooting down of the satellite 613 00:32:37,120 --> 00:32:39,560 Speaker 1: wasn't really the main point in China's case. 614 00:32:39,560 --> 00:32:41,280 Speaker 5: They said they just needed to get an old weather 615 00:32:41,360 --> 00:32:43,720 Speaker 5: satellite out of the way, and that's not really how 616 00:32:43,760 --> 00:32:45,520 Speaker 5: you need to remove an old weather satellite. So I 617 00:32:45,520 --> 00:32:48,400 Speaker 5: think the US certainly really saw that as their wake 618 00:32:48,480 --> 00:32:50,560 Speaker 5: up call and used it as their wake up call. 619 00:32:50,680 --> 00:32:53,640 Speaker 5: They did their own anti satellite test the next year. 620 00:32:53,920 --> 00:32:56,640 Speaker 5: India did theirs in twenty nineteen. I think there is 621 00:32:56,680 --> 00:32:59,400 Speaker 5: so much signaling going on in space and no one's 622 00:32:59,400 --> 00:33:02,320 Speaker 5: really figured out their doctrine yet. So in the same 623 00:33:02,360 --> 00:33:04,960 Speaker 5: way that you hear about a cyber pearl harbor, the 624 00:33:05,000 --> 00:33:09,200 Speaker 5: original pearl harbor, there is a scenario that some US 625 00:33:09,280 --> 00:33:11,800 Speaker 5: thinkers on this talk about as a space pearl harbor, 626 00:33:12,360 --> 00:33:16,720 Speaker 5: where China might destroy US capabilities in space to say 627 00:33:16,760 --> 00:33:19,280 Speaker 5: that's it, we really mean business, leave us alone, where 628 00:33:19,320 --> 00:33:21,840 Speaker 5: the US would see that as the first shot of 629 00:33:22,120 --> 00:33:25,320 Speaker 5: all out war. And so that kind of messaging, that 630 00:33:25,400 --> 00:33:30,240 Speaker 5: kind of escalatory tension is so carefully done. It's meant 631 00:33:30,280 --> 00:33:32,280 Speaker 5: to be modulated very carefully, but no one quite knows 632 00:33:32,320 --> 00:33:34,520 Speaker 5: the rules of the discussion and what you see from 633 00:33:34,560 --> 00:33:37,120 Speaker 5: Space Command in Space Force is saying no, no, no. 634 00:33:37,200 --> 00:33:41,320 Speaker 5: China is putting so much military hardware now into space. 635 00:33:41,400 --> 00:33:45,239 Speaker 5: It did more military launches in space last year than 636 00:33:45,240 --> 00:33:48,600 Speaker 5: the US, and that trajectory really scares the US. And 637 00:33:48,600 --> 00:33:51,000 Speaker 5: whether you sort of look away and say we won't compete, 638 00:33:51,160 --> 00:33:54,000 Speaker 5: or you say we will match you. That's the very 639 00:33:54,000 --> 00:33:56,960 Speaker 5: difficult balancing it that the US is facing, because it's 640 00:33:57,000 --> 00:33:59,760 Speaker 5: clear that the US isn't prepared to let China have 641 00:33:59,800 --> 00:34:02,640 Speaker 5: that capability. The US wants to be able to have 642 00:34:02,920 --> 00:34:07,200 Speaker 5: superiority because that's what it sees as the deterrent effect. 643 00:34:07,880 --> 00:34:11,799 Speaker 1: When you're talking to your sources, how concerned are they 644 00:34:11,880 --> 00:34:14,160 Speaker 1: that we could have an arms race in space? 645 00:34:14,880 --> 00:34:16,919 Speaker 5: I think it's really fair to say the arms race 646 00:34:17,040 --> 00:34:20,520 Speaker 5: is already on, and certainly in terms of perception, the 647 00:34:20,600 --> 00:34:22,759 Speaker 5: amount that you're seeing from the commercial world putting up 648 00:34:22,760 --> 00:34:26,040 Speaker 5: into space also creates huge dilemmas for the US military 649 00:34:26,040 --> 00:34:28,200 Speaker 5: and what they need to defend, and a lot of 650 00:34:28,200 --> 00:34:31,080 Speaker 5: that hasn't been ironed out yet. The US at the 651 00:34:31,120 --> 00:34:33,279 Speaker 5: moment is trying to work out if they should make 652 00:34:33,320 --> 00:34:38,280 Speaker 5: space critical infrastructure, should they specifically designate things in space's 653 00:34:38,320 --> 00:34:41,799 Speaker 5: critical infrastructure. There are a number of different elements that 654 00:34:41,880 --> 00:34:45,319 Speaker 5: are labeled critical infrastructure, which means that any attack on 655 00:34:45,400 --> 00:34:48,960 Speaker 5: them is seen as an attack on national security and 656 00:34:49,200 --> 00:34:51,320 Speaker 5: the US needs to defend. And in fact, when President 657 00:34:51,360 --> 00:34:55,239 Speaker 5: Biden went to meet Vladimir Putin some time ago, he said, hey, 658 00:34:55,280 --> 00:34:57,600 Speaker 5: don't touch our critical infrastructure. This is what it is. 659 00:34:57,880 --> 00:34:58,040 Speaker 1: Now. 660 00:34:58,080 --> 00:35:01,319 Speaker 5: A lot of that critical infrastructure depends on space, and 661 00:35:01,320 --> 00:35:03,680 Speaker 5: there's a discussion right now in the US about whether 662 00:35:04,080 --> 00:35:06,920 Speaker 5: that is sufficient. Does the fact that these things depend 663 00:35:06,920 --> 00:35:11,920 Speaker 5: on space mean that space is indirectly preserved and clearly 664 00:35:11,920 --> 00:35:13,920 Speaker 5: off limits, or does the US need to take a 665 00:35:13,960 --> 00:35:17,480 Speaker 5: step extra and say, actually, anything in space counts as 666 00:35:17,480 --> 00:35:20,680 Speaker 5: critical infrastructure, which would then require all sorts of different 667 00:35:20,719 --> 00:35:22,959 Speaker 5: defensive means. And of course a lot of US food 668 00:35:22,960 --> 00:35:26,439 Speaker 5: supply now depends on space. Our mobile phones depend more 669 00:35:26,480 --> 00:35:30,640 Speaker 5: and more on space. Every single element of US national economy, 670 00:35:30,680 --> 00:35:34,480 Speaker 5: which is increasingly tied to national security, relies on space 671 00:35:34,520 --> 00:35:37,840 Speaker 5: in part and will only rely more on space in future. 672 00:35:38,239 --> 00:35:41,160 Speaker 5: And so looking at exactly how you defend that, and 673 00:35:41,160 --> 00:35:43,520 Speaker 5: putting more things up in space to defend that, of 674 00:35:43,600 --> 00:35:47,480 Speaker 5: course begins to create huge anxiety on both sides. I 675 00:35:47,560 --> 00:35:49,640 Speaker 5: think you could speak to a number of people today 676 00:35:49,680 --> 00:35:53,240 Speaker 5: who would say the space race is already. 677 00:35:52,840 --> 00:35:56,480 Speaker 1: On, Katrina. One of the reasons we're doing this episode 678 00:35:56,840 --> 00:35:58,960 Speaker 1: is because all the things we're talking about here, I 679 00:35:58,960 --> 00:36:02,120 Speaker 1: think most people just don't even know is something that 680 00:36:02,239 --> 00:36:06,080 Speaker 1: Space Force does. What do you think people get wrong 681 00:36:06,160 --> 00:36:07,160 Speaker 1: about Space Force? 682 00:36:08,480 --> 00:36:11,560 Speaker 5: Well, of course there's this TV show all about Space 683 00:36:11,600 --> 00:36:14,400 Speaker 5: Force with Steve Carell, and that became a kind of 684 00:36:14,480 --> 00:36:18,279 Speaker 5: very clear parody of Space Force, and they've been a 685 00:36:18,280 --> 00:36:21,239 Speaker 5: little health hostage to some of that themselves. They've spent 686 00:36:21,280 --> 00:36:23,200 Speaker 5: a lot of time on uniforms. All of this always 687 00:36:23,200 --> 00:36:25,440 Speaker 5: happens in the military services, and they're only getting going. 688 00:36:25,520 --> 00:36:29,520 Speaker 5: So I think they defend that quite clearly. But obviously 689 00:36:29,600 --> 00:36:34,400 Speaker 5: the entire corpus of sci fi and our popular understanding 690 00:36:34,400 --> 00:36:37,799 Speaker 5: of space is sort of fun and quirky, and so 691 00:36:38,040 --> 00:36:40,400 Speaker 5: they have to deal with that fun and quirky feeling 692 00:36:40,440 --> 00:36:42,680 Speaker 5: at the same time as thinking, hold on, can we 693 00:36:42,719 --> 00:36:45,560 Speaker 5: just put our hands up? Everything we have depends on space. 694 00:36:45,600 --> 00:36:48,840 Speaker 5: This is far more vulnerable than people realize, and I 695 00:36:48,880 --> 00:36:51,799 Speaker 5: think the popular conception is that it's a bit of 696 00:36:52,120 --> 00:36:54,040 Speaker 5: a joke. And when I did speak to a general 697 00:36:54,080 --> 00:36:56,080 Speaker 5: at Space Command, I asked him if he'd watched the 698 00:36:56,080 --> 00:36:57,799 Speaker 5: TV show, and he Binge watched it in a night, 699 00:36:57,840 --> 00:37:00,080 Speaker 5: and they're very good natured about it. They say anything 700 00:37:00,120 --> 00:37:03,319 Speaker 5: that brings attention to space force and anything to do 701 00:37:03,360 --> 00:37:05,120 Speaker 5: with space is good by us. I think they took 702 00:37:05,160 --> 00:37:08,200 Speaker 5: a sort of sanguine view that they couldn't start fighting 703 00:37:08,200 --> 00:37:10,920 Speaker 5: it before they'd even established their own reputation. But this 704 00:37:10,960 --> 00:37:14,359 Speaker 5: is a reputation that is developing in the public consciousness now, 705 00:37:14,600 --> 00:37:16,840 Speaker 5: so it really depends, and I think the language around 706 00:37:16,840 --> 00:37:20,040 Speaker 5: it matters so much for trying to get public support on. 707 00:37:20,040 --> 00:37:23,480 Speaker 1: Board, Katrina, thanks so much for speaking with me today, 708 00:37:23,680 --> 00:37:26,600 Speaker 1: Thanks for having me, Thanks for listening to us here 709 00:37:26,640 --> 00:37:29,240 Speaker 1: at The Big Take. It's a daily podcast from Bloomberg 710 00:37:29,280 --> 00:37:33,760 Speaker 1: and iHeartRadio. For more shows from iHeartRadio, visit the iHeartRadio app, 711 00:37:34,000 --> 00:37:37,319 Speaker 1: Apple Podcasts, or wherever you listen, and we'd love to 712 00:37:37,360 --> 00:37:40,439 Speaker 1: hear from you. Email us questions or comments to Big 713 00:37:40,480 --> 00:37:44,759 Speaker 1: Take at Bloomberg dot net. The supervising producer of The 714 00:37:44,760 --> 00:37:48,520 Speaker 1: Big Take and the producer of this episode is Vicky Ergolina. 715 00:37:48,920 --> 00:37:53,440 Speaker 1: Our senior producer is Katherine Fink. Raphae almcaly is our 716 00:37:53,480 --> 00:37:58,360 Speaker 1: engineer with additional production support. From Nielli Haramo Plata and 717 00:37:58,440 --> 00:38:02,880 Speaker 1: a Brayer Ruffin. Original music was composed by Leo Sidron. 718 00:38:03,239 --> 00:38:06,919 Speaker 1: I'm West Kasova. We'll be back tomorrow with another big take.