WEBVTT - Tech News: The 150 Billion Dollar Facebook Lawsuits 0:00:04.400 --> 0:00:07.800 Welcome to tech Stuff, a production from I Heart Radio. 0:00:12.000 --> 0:00:14.320 Hey there, and welcome to tech Stuff. I'm your host, 0:00:14.440 --> 0:00:17.440 Jonathan Strickland. I'm an executive producer with I Heart Radio 0:00:17.480 --> 0:00:19.840 and I love all things tech. And this is the 0:00:19.880 --> 0:00:25.640 tech news for Tuesday, December seven, twenty twenty one. Rohinga refugees, 0:00:25.800 --> 0:00:30.120 survivors of a genocide campaign, and Myanmar have brought two 0:00:30.280 --> 0:00:34.600 class action lawsuits against Meta, you know, the company that 0:00:35.040 --> 0:00:38.040 used to be known as Facebook. One of those class 0:00:38.040 --> 0:00:40.440 action lawsuits is in the United States and the other 0:00:40.479 --> 0:00:43.800 one is in the United Kingdom, and together the lawsuits 0:00:43.800 --> 0:00:48.360 are seeking around a hundred fifty billion dollars in damages. 0:00:49.000 --> 0:00:50.159 I don't know why I put a d at the 0:00:50.200 --> 0:00:53.560 end of billion there. The Rohinga are a Muslim people, 0:00:53.840 --> 0:00:58.520 and extremist Buddhists in Myanmar, encouraged by the country's government, 0:00:58.840 --> 0:01:02.680 had sought to Why about those people? Uh, the atrocities 0:01:02.680 --> 0:01:07.520 are just absolutely horrifying anyway. The lawsuits claim that Facebook 0:01:08.040 --> 0:01:12.880 exacerbated an already deadly situation in Myanmar, facilitating the spread 0:01:12.920 --> 0:01:16.640 of hate speech and misinformation, and that this contributed to 0:01:16.800 --> 0:01:21.720 various users in Myanmar growing more extreme and organizing acts 0:01:21.720 --> 0:01:26.720 of unspeakable violence and cruelty and brutality. They further alleged 0:01:26.880 --> 0:01:31.080 that Facebook did nothing to remove posts from Myanmar's government 0:01:31.160 --> 0:01:36.559 offices that essentially called for the extermination of the Rohinga people. Further, 0:01:36.959 --> 0:01:40.160 the lawsuit alleges that Facebook's algorithm, which is the one 0:01:40.200 --> 0:01:42.720 I was talking about in yesterday's episode of Tech Stuff, 0:01:43.360 --> 0:01:46.880 encouraged people to join groups that aligned with user beliefs. 0:01:46.920 --> 0:01:51.040 So let's say there's someone in Myanmar who joins Facebook 0:01:51.320 --> 0:01:54.200 and that this person already harbors negative views about the 0:01:54.240 --> 0:01:58.520 Rohinga people. Facebook's algorithm starts to recommend groups for this 0:01:58.560 --> 0:02:01.640 person to join, and these are groups filled with others 0:02:01.960 --> 0:02:07.120 who harbor racist or xenophobic beliefs about the Rohinga and 0:02:07.280 --> 0:02:10.280 the user joins the group and becomes part of an 0:02:10.280 --> 0:02:14.000 echo chamber that escalates matters, and it drives people who 0:02:14.000 --> 0:02:18.079 are already prejudiced toward extremism and adding fuel to an 0:02:18.080 --> 0:02:22.320 already dangerous fire. And meanwhile, Facebook was profiting off the 0:02:22.360 --> 0:02:25.480 whole thing, because, as I mentioned in yesterday's episode, the 0:02:25.520 --> 0:02:28.240 whole business purpose of Facebook is to keep as many 0:02:28.280 --> 0:02:30.960 people on the platform for as long as possible to 0:02:31.080 --> 0:02:35.040 serve up as many ads as possible. So the lawsuit 0:02:35.080 --> 0:02:39.560 claims Facebook execs didn't care that the platform was contributing 0:02:39.560 --> 0:02:42.799 to a hostile situation, to put it lightly, because it 0:02:42.880 --> 0:02:47.040 was a profitable situation. At least in the company's ledger, 0:02:47.639 --> 0:02:51.880 the plaintiffs wrote, quote to maximize engagement, Facebook does not 0:02:52.080 --> 0:02:56.639 merely fill users news feeds with disproportionate amounts of hate 0:02:56.680 --> 0:03:01.160 speech and misinformation. It employs a system of social rewards 0:03:01.200 --> 0:03:05.680 that manipulates and trains users to create such content. End quote. 0:03:06.320 --> 0:03:09.440 The complaint goes on to say that Facebook was made 0:03:09.480 --> 0:03:12.400 aware of the anti Rohinga material on the site as 0:03:12.400 --> 0:03:15.239 far as back as two thousand thirteen, but failed to 0:03:15.280 --> 0:03:18.440 do anything about it. Here in the US, the plaintiffs 0:03:18.440 --> 0:03:21.639 hope to have the matter tried under Burmese law. Now. 0:03:21.720 --> 0:03:24.960 The reason for that, you know, under Burmese lawns of 0:03:25.080 --> 0:03:28.919 US laws, because the United States famously has the Communications 0:03:28.960 --> 0:03:33.160 Decency Act, which contains section to thirty. Uh that's the 0:03:33.240 --> 0:03:36.680 infamous section that grants platforms immunity from liability for the 0:03:36.720 --> 0:03:40.520 stuff that their users post, at least under certain situations. 0:03:40.600 --> 0:03:44.920 The case law on the matter is a little bit muddled. Meanwhile, 0:03:45.400 --> 0:03:48.680 some scientists and academics have sent an open letter to 0:03:48.840 --> 0:03:52.520 Meta Slash Facebook and to Mark Zuckerberg, calling on the 0:03:52.560 --> 0:03:55.760 company to share research that staff have done to determine 0:03:56.040 --> 0:04:00.160 the mental health impact that products like Instagram, Facebook, and 0:04:00.200 --> 0:04:03.400 WhatsApp can have on the young, and by young, I 0:04:03.400 --> 0:04:07.160 mean like kids to teenagers. The group also asks that 0:04:07.240 --> 0:04:10.120 met us seek out an independent third party to review 0:04:10.200 --> 0:04:14.160 that research to help protect against bias, because obviously any 0:04:14.160 --> 0:04:17.680 company that conducts research on itself has a potential conflict 0:04:17.680 --> 0:04:20.839 of interest going on there. This follows the news reports 0:04:20.839 --> 0:04:24.800 about leaked internal documents from the company that indicated Instagram 0:04:25.080 --> 0:04:29.679 use might be mentally harmful, particularly for young women, that 0:04:29.839 --> 0:04:33.520 it could potentially lead to problems like body image issues, 0:04:33.600 --> 0:04:38.320 eating disorders, and anxiety. The documents obviously caused a lot 0:04:38.360 --> 0:04:40.839 of concern, but at the same time, the group of 0:04:40.839 --> 0:04:44.200 scientists say that without independent scrutiny, the methodology might not 0:04:44.240 --> 0:04:47.240 be rigorous enough to give insight into the scope of 0:04:47.279 --> 0:04:50.359 the problem or even you know, if there is a problem, 0:04:50.440 --> 0:04:53.039 because it's possible that those who were surveyed for the 0:04:53.120 --> 0:04:57.640 internal research were already dealing with mental health issues independent 0:04:57.720 --> 0:05:02.840 of their usage of Facebook's products. Maybe those products exacerbated 0:05:02.839 --> 0:05:06.560 existing issues, maybe they created them. It's impossible to say 0:05:06.640 --> 0:05:10.240 based upon the limited research. So the point that scientists 0:05:10.279 --> 0:05:12.520 are making is that it is a matter of concern 0:05:12.640 --> 0:05:16.360 and should be investigated more thoroughly and with transparency, and 0:05:16.400 --> 0:05:20.760 to behave otherwise is unethical, irresponsible, and potentially cruel. The 0:05:20.839 --> 0:05:24.000 letter points out that platforms like Facebook have a global 0:05:24.040 --> 0:05:26.920 reach and thus any effects it might have upon mental 0:05:26.960 --> 0:05:31.320 health are a worldwide concern. But because big tech companies 0:05:31.360 --> 0:05:35.960 like Meta Slash Facebook, because they rarely share research with 0:05:36.040 --> 0:05:40.440 the scientific community, it is impossible to ascertain if an 0:05:40.440 --> 0:05:44.039 effect is present and if so, to what extent. No 0:05:44.160 --> 0:05:49.120 word on if Zuckerberg has written back yet. Now let's 0:05:49.120 --> 0:05:51.960 give Facebook a little bit of credit in our next 0:05:52.080 --> 0:05:54.960 news story. And this news story is actually from last week, 0:05:55.000 --> 0:05:59.080 but it broke after we had published our news episode, 0:05:59.200 --> 0:06:02.760 and it's about how Facebook identified and removed a disinformation 0:06:02.800 --> 0:06:08.200 campaign that was originating out of China. Now, Facebook reps 0:06:08.240 --> 0:06:10.479 didn't go so far as to say that this was 0:06:10.560 --> 0:06:14.560 a state backed disinformation campaign, but it was a campaign 0:06:14.640 --> 0:06:18.720 conducted by state backed companies and it was amplified by 0:06:18.880 --> 0:06:22.760 state back media. But you know, Facebook left a little 0:06:22.760 --> 0:06:25.479 bit of wiggle room there before saying, like the Chinese 0:06:25.520 --> 0:06:28.840 government itself ordered the campaign. It's kind of like when 0:06:28.920 --> 0:06:32.480 you say the word allegedly before you say something about someone. 0:06:32.760 --> 0:06:36.159 I do that a lot on this show anyway. The 0:06:36.240 --> 0:06:41.000 campaign was centered on a Swiss biologist named Wilson Edwards, 0:06:41.360 --> 0:06:45.480 who had posted a claim that the United States government 0:06:45.520 --> 0:06:49.640 had resorted to quote enormous pressure and even intimidation end 0:06:49.720 --> 0:06:54.719 quote to force scientists around the world to blame China 0:06:54.800 --> 0:06:59.360 for the origin of the coronavirus, essentially to implicate China 0:06:59.480 --> 0:07:04.200 as being the place where the coronavirus first emerged. Essentially, 0:07:04.279 --> 0:07:06.920 the campaign was saying that the scientific community had only 0:07:07.000 --> 0:07:10.480 directed any attention towards China at all because the US 0:07:10.520 --> 0:07:13.760 government was forcing it to. A bunch of accounts on 0:07:13.760 --> 0:07:17.640 Facebook emerged and engaged with this content, liking it and 0:07:17.680 --> 0:07:20.960 reposting it, and then the Chinese media picked up the 0:07:20.960 --> 0:07:23.440 story and ran with it. Only it turns out there 0:07:23.560 --> 0:07:27.600 is no Swiss biologists named Wilson Edwards, and that hundreds 0:07:27.680 --> 0:07:31.120 of those Facebook accounts were created all around the same time. 0:07:31.480 --> 0:07:34.160 They were all like posting at close to the same time, 0:07:34.240 --> 0:07:38.960 sometimes with identical messages. In one case, a an account 0:07:39.000 --> 0:07:43.760 accidentally posted the directions for how to spread this disinformation 0:07:44.240 --> 0:07:46.720 and that the whole thing was in fact a manufactured story. 0:07:47.200 --> 0:07:51.520 Facebook subsequently removed more than six hundred accounts connected with 0:07:51.560 --> 0:07:56.200 this attempt, and security officials say that this was pretty 0:07:56.240 --> 0:07:59.800 par for the course as far as Chinese disinformation campaigns go, 0:08:00.440 --> 0:08:03.880 Uh saying that it was pretty clumsy, it was shoddy work, 0:08:03.960 --> 0:08:07.960 and that these campaigns lack the sophistication and effectiveness that 0:08:08.120 --> 0:08:12.360 we typically see with Russian disinformation campaigns, which are far 0:08:12.440 --> 0:08:15.480 more effective. So, in other words, the Chinese have room 0:08:15.520 --> 0:08:18.840 for improvement when it comes to spreading misinformation, and I 0:08:18.920 --> 0:08:22.640 have no doubt they will work hard to get up 0:08:22.680 --> 0:08:26.840 to speed with, you know, like Russia. On a related note, 0:08:27.200 --> 0:08:30.720 Twitter and Meta slash Facebook have revealed that both of 0:08:30.760 --> 0:08:34.720 these companies have removed thousands of accounts connected to various 0:08:34.800 --> 0:08:40.880 state backed disinformation campaigns and coronavirus misinformation campaigns. Twitter has 0:08:40.920 --> 0:08:44.079 removed around two thousand accounts that were spreading misinformation about 0:08:44.120 --> 0:08:47.679 human rights issues in China. That is, these were Twitter 0:08:47.720 --> 0:08:50.960 accounts that we're pushing the state backed messaging that there 0:08:51.000 --> 0:08:54.800 are no human rights issues going on in China, and 0:08:54.920 --> 0:08:59.800 Meta has removed three other coordinated inauthentic behavior or see 0:08:59.840 --> 0:09:03.320 i B operations in addition to the one I just 0:09:03.400 --> 0:09:07.840 covered a second ago. So that whole misinformation campaign about 0:09:08.120 --> 0:09:11.160 the United States pressuring the scientific community that would be 0:09:11.400 --> 0:09:14.640 one of the coordinated in authentic behavior or c i 0:09:14.760 --> 0:09:19.720 B operations. Meta also said that some campaigns involved creating 0:09:19.840 --> 0:09:23.400 a ton of accounts and then mass reporting a target 0:09:23.400 --> 0:09:26.360 account in an effort to get Meta to remove it. So, 0:09:26.440 --> 0:09:30.920 for example, let's say that there's an activist in Vietnam, 0:09:30.960 --> 0:09:33.760 they might find that their account has been targeted by 0:09:33.760 --> 0:09:36.800 one of these mass reporting campaigns in an effort to 0:09:37.000 --> 0:09:40.640 silence them. So, in other words, some groups starts creating 0:09:40.640 --> 0:09:44.560 a bunch of accounts and uses all the accounts to 0:09:44.600 --> 0:09:47.720 report the activist with the goal of getting them banned 0:09:47.840 --> 0:09:51.800 or removed. Meta also identified another form of harassment it 0:09:51.840 --> 0:09:55.280 calls brigading. This is when a bunch of folks some 0:09:55.360 --> 0:09:58.520 are brigading. I guess uh. This is when a bunch 0:09:58.520 --> 0:10:02.360 of folks, sometimes hundreds or thousands of people coordinate to 0:10:02.480 --> 0:10:05.959 harass targets in an effort to silence them. It's kind 0:10:06.000 --> 0:10:10.800 of like we've seen this before where it wasn't necessarily 0:10:10.840 --> 0:10:15.240 an organized campaign. Things that have grown organically where a 0:10:15.280 --> 0:10:18.600 bunch of people pile on start harassing a specific person. 0:10:18.679 --> 0:10:21.960 I remember, like during the Me Too movement that was 0:10:22.400 --> 0:10:24.960 really ugly, like there were a lot of women getting 0:10:24.960 --> 0:10:29.400 targeted by groups of people who kind of organically, we're 0:10:29.480 --> 0:10:31.680 doing this, Well, this is a more coordinated effort to 0:10:31.679 --> 0:10:35.240 do that, one that potentially state backed, so it's a 0:10:35.240 --> 0:10:39.840 mass intimidation tactic. Meta pointed out a situation that emerged 0:10:39.840 --> 0:10:43.400 in Europe, specifically in Italy and in France, in which 0:10:43.480 --> 0:10:48.440 anti vaxers were brigading against medical professionals and politicians and 0:10:48.480 --> 0:10:52.920 folks like journalists. And you know, there was a time 0:10:53.160 --> 0:10:55.560 when I really thought the idea of social networks, like 0:10:55.640 --> 0:10:58.920 online social networks, that that was a good thing, that 0:10:59.040 --> 0:11:02.240 it was connecting people together, that was the democracy of 0:11:02.280 --> 0:11:04.160 the web, and it would allow for the freedom of 0:11:04.200 --> 0:11:07.360 expression on a scale never before seen. But y'all, it's 0:11:07.440 --> 0:11:10.360 really hard for me to look at online social networks 0:11:10.400 --> 0:11:14.080 today as anything other than toxic. It could be that 0:11:14.160 --> 0:11:17.640 I'm just getting too old and too cynical, but yeah, 0:11:17.840 --> 0:11:21.559 um ugly stuff. I'm glad to see that the companies 0:11:21.640 --> 0:11:25.520 are trying to fight against that. Obviously, it will be 0:11:25.559 --> 0:11:29.320 a never ending battle that there will always be entities 0:11:29.360 --> 0:11:31.880 out there that are trying to use these platforms to 0:11:32.000 --> 0:11:35.280 further their own agenda. But I'm glad to see, at 0:11:35.320 --> 0:11:37.800 least in this case, that there are some actions being taken. 0:11:38.520 --> 0:11:42.440 Microsoft announced that it has sees servers that the company says, 0:11:42.480 --> 0:11:44.439 we're being used by a group of hackers based out 0:11:44.440 --> 0:11:49.200 of China. Microsoft has called the group Nickel, and the 0:11:49.240 --> 0:11:52.959 company says it had been tracking Nickel's activities since two 0:11:53.000 --> 0:11:56.360 thousand and sixteen. The group have been focused on gathering 0:11:56.400 --> 0:11:59.120 intelligence with these servers, primarily as a way to find 0:11:59.160 --> 0:12:03.439 effective means to silence or compromise targets. So you might say, well, 0:12:03.440 --> 0:12:05.280 what kind of targets, Well, you know, this is a 0:12:05.400 --> 0:12:09.160 China based hacker group, So, as I'm sure all of 0:12:09.200 --> 0:12:13.679 you have guessed, the targets are typically people and entities 0:12:13.720 --> 0:12:17.240 that the Chinese government has viewed as being a problem, 0:12:17.280 --> 0:12:21.839 including human rights organizations and journalists. So the hacker group 0:12:21.920 --> 0:12:26.480 typically performs reconnaissance on these targets to determine what kind 0:12:26.480 --> 0:12:29.839 of software and technology they are using that gives them 0:12:29.840 --> 0:12:32.200 the information they need in order to start hunting for 0:12:32.280 --> 0:12:36.120 potential exploits that they can use to compromise the targets 0:12:36.120 --> 0:12:42.000 devices and perhaps do surveillance or lock down the devices, 0:12:42.040 --> 0:12:46.240 et cetera. Microsoft obtained a court order allowing the company 0:12:46.520 --> 0:12:49.920 to seize the servers and redirect traffic so that it 0:12:50.040 --> 0:12:53.520 doesn't go to Nichols hackers. Instead, the traffic will go 0:12:53.559 --> 0:12:56.120 to Microsoft, which will then use the information to study 0:12:56.160 --> 0:13:00.360 the hackers techniques and potentially their goals. Now does that 0:13:00.400 --> 0:13:02.480 mean that Nicol is out of commission because all these 0:13:02.480 --> 0:13:06.560 servers got seized. Not hardly. Microsoft warns that the group 0:13:06.600 --> 0:13:10.040 is still very much capable of acting against targets. This 0:13:10.120 --> 0:13:13.840 was just part of their operations that's now been disrupted. Essentially, 0:13:13.840 --> 0:13:17.480 the intelligence gathering part of their operations has hit a snag. 0:13:17.760 --> 0:13:20.280 So the hackers still have the tools to attack targets 0:13:20.280 --> 0:13:23.080 through malware and exploits, they just don't have the same 0:13:23.080 --> 0:13:26.560 ability to gather information about their targets as they used to, 0:13:26.840 --> 0:13:30.959 and even that is probably a temporary situation. Microsoft has 0:13:31.000 --> 0:13:35.199 become one of the leading companies crusading against hackers, particularly 0:13:35.280 --> 0:13:39.120 hackers that are financially motivated and that target companies and 0:13:39.160 --> 0:13:41.560 you might wonder, well, how did this happen? Why did 0:13:41.679 --> 0:13:45.000 Microsoft take the torch on this one? Well, you gotta 0:13:45.000 --> 0:13:48.720 remember a lot of those companies happen to be Microsoft customers, 0:13:48.920 --> 0:13:51.680 and in some cases, Microsoft is doing this because it 0:13:51.720 --> 0:13:55.199 doesn't want its own products to be uh the gateway 0:13:55.200 --> 0:14:00.560 that hackers used to get access to a potential client's systems. 0:14:00.880 --> 0:14:04.640 So there's a pretty big motivator going on right there. Alright, 0:14:04.679 --> 0:14:07.240 we have some more news stories to cover in this episode. 0:14:07.520 --> 0:14:10.160 Before we get to that, let's take a quick break. 0:14:17.800 --> 0:14:20.920 We're back. So about a year ago, word got out 0:14:20.960 --> 0:14:23.560 that a Russian backed hacker group And yeah, I know, 0:14:23.680 --> 0:14:26.520 there's a lot about hackers in this episode. Not my fault, 0:14:26.880 --> 0:14:29.160 they just keep making the news. Anyway, a year ago, 0:14:29.280 --> 0:14:32.720 this Russian backed hacker group, actually two groups, had managed 0:14:32.760 --> 0:14:36.400 to compromise a product from the company's Solar Winds and 0:14:36.520 --> 0:14:39.960 through an exploit, we're able to target around one hundred 0:14:39.960 --> 0:14:43.040 of Solar Winds high profile clients. They're able to infect 0:14:43.360 --> 0:14:46.200 thousands of clients, but they were specifically targeting around a 0:14:46.280 --> 0:14:49.800 hundred of them, which included like nine federal agencies in 0:14:49.840 --> 0:14:52.840 the United States. The hackers were able to create what 0:14:52.920 --> 0:14:57.120 was called a supply chain attack, So they were focusing 0:14:57.960 --> 0:15:03.280 not on their ultimate targets right list of one hundred organizations. Instead, 0:15:03.400 --> 0:15:06.960 they were focusing on a trusted vendor that all of 0:15:07.000 --> 0:15:12.200 those targets were using. They all were buying software from 0:15:12.240 --> 0:15:14.800 Solar Winds. So the thought the hackers had was, well, 0:15:14.840 --> 0:15:18.840 if we can infect the software that everyone is purchasing, 0:15:19.480 --> 0:15:22.760 then we can infiltrate all these systems without having to 0:15:22.800 --> 0:15:26.480 target each one individually. By compromising the vendor, the hackers 0:15:26.480 --> 0:15:30.600 were able to exploit the trust that these companies had 0:15:30.640 --> 0:15:34.480 in that vendor and then use maliciously altered products to 0:15:34.520 --> 0:15:38.000 gain access to the targeted systems. Now, the hacking groups 0:15:38.040 --> 0:15:41.840 responsible for that attack are targeting cloud solution providers or 0:15:41.920 --> 0:15:46.480 c sps. These are companies that, as the name says, 0:15:46.520 --> 0:15:52.840 they provide cloud computing solutions to customers. So the ideas 0:15:53.640 --> 0:15:57.440 infiltrate the CSP and you know, make sure you're hiding 0:15:57.480 --> 0:16:01.560 from detection, and then you can snoop on that CSPs customers. 0:16:01.640 --> 0:16:05.680 You can potentially develop techniques to infiltrate systems that way. 0:16:05.760 --> 0:16:11.040 Because so much of companies work nowadays moved to the cloud, 0:16:11.520 --> 0:16:13.680 so it's another way to get access to targets without 0:16:13.760 --> 0:16:17.560 having to focus on them individually. Security researchers have pointed 0:16:17.560 --> 0:16:20.040 out that the hacker groups are quick to develop and 0:16:20.080 --> 0:16:23.960 adopt new techniques, which makes them particularly difficult to combat. 0:16:24.240 --> 0:16:27.800 It's also a drastic contrast with the shoddy disinformation campaign 0:16:27.840 --> 0:16:31.320 out of China we talked about earlier their nine and Day. Really, 0:16:31.840 --> 0:16:34.840 here in the United States, there's an ongoing political battle 0:16:34.960 --> 0:16:37.880 that frames itself as a freedom of speech battle, and 0:16:37.920 --> 0:16:40.600 what it really comes down to is whether social networking 0:16:40.640 --> 0:16:45.920 platforms have the right to moderate content that is objectionable. Now, 0:16:45.920 --> 0:16:48.240 I don't want to get too political on here. First 0:16:48.240 --> 0:16:51.560 of all, I think everyone here knows how I lean politically. 0:16:51.880 --> 0:16:55.320 It's not really a secret, and I don't want to 0:16:55.400 --> 0:16:59.840 impart my bias on this story. But essentially this was 0:17:00.160 --> 0:17:04.240 ah There was a law in Texas that was proposed 0:17:04.280 --> 0:17:08.520 and passed and signed into law that was created by 0:17:08.880 --> 0:17:13.000 conservatives who objected to platforms like Facebook and Twitter that 0:17:13.080 --> 0:17:17.760 were removing posts and banning accounts belonging to mostly conservative 0:17:17.760 --> 0:17:21.679 politicians who were adamant on passing on misinformation on everything 0:17:21.720 --> 0:17:26.520 from the elections to COVID nineteen Texas passed a law 0:17:27.080 --> 0:17:30.200 that said platforms would be banned from doing that. They 0:17:30.240 --> 0:17:36.680 were saying that the platforms were effectively censoring uh individuals. Well, 0:17:36.720 --> 0:17:42.520 now a federal judge has placed an injunction against that law, 0:17:42.600 --> 0:17:48.760 meaning it cannot be enforced, saying that the law has 0:17:49.119 --> 0:17:53.800 hypocritically effectively censored the social network platforms when it says 0:17:53.800 --> 0:17:57.119 they're not allowed to moderate users submitted content. The judge 0:17:57.160 --> 0:18:01.720 said that the law is quote replete with institutional defects, 0:18:01.760 --> 0:18:08.080 including unconstitutional content and speaker based infringement on editorial discretion, 0:18:08.440 --> 0:18:14.320 and onerously burdensome disclosure and operational requirements end quote. Now, 0:18:14.320 --> 0:18:17.399 according to Ours Technica, the law as it was written 0:18:17.440 --> 0:18:20.920 wouldn't apply to conservative social networks like Parlor and gab 0:18:21.400 --> 0:18:26.080 because this law specifically targeted platforms that had at least 0:18:26.200 --> 0:18:29.920 fifty million monthly users, and Parlor and gab are below 0:18:29.960 --> 0:18:34.640 that threshold. One Texas senator proposed lowering that to twenty 0:18:34.680 --> 0:18:37.840 five million monthly users, and that would have in fact 0:18:37.960 --> 0:18:41.240 lumped Gab and Parlor into all the others, but the 0:18:41.280 --> 0:18:44.560 Senate rejected that proposal, which does make it sound like 0:18:44.600 --> 0:18:47.480 this was less about guaranteeing the right of free speech 0:18:47.840 --> 0:18:51.560 for conservatives and more about restricting the moderating policies of 0:18:51.680 --> 0:18:55.680 larger social networks. Over in the UK, the High Court 0:18:55.760 --> 0:18:58.879 has ruled that Uber's business model is unlawful and the 0:18:58.880 --> 0:19:02.200 company must comply with rules set out by the Private 0:19:02.280 --> 0:19:06.119 Higher Vehicle sect. That act actually predates Uber, it was 0:19:06.160 --> 0:19:11.000 first passed into law back in UK courts had previously 0:19:11.080 --> 0:19:15.040 overruled Uber's claim that drivers are contractors and not workers. 0:19:15.359 --> 0:19:18.960 According to UK courts, they are workers and thus Uber 0:19:19.040 --> 0:19:23.000 is responsible for meeting obligations as an employer. This new 0:19:23.080 --> 0:19:26.040 ruling says that Uber's attempts to have its contractual approach 0:19:26.160 --> 0:19:28.960 made lawful are just done and dusted. It's a no go, 0:19:29.320 --> 0:19:31.800 which means Uber will need to make fundamental changes in 0:19:31.840 --> 0:19:34.159 how it operates in the UK in order to be 0:19:34.200 --> 0:19:37.680 a legal business. See Part of Uber's argument was that 0:19:37.720 --> 0:19:41.600 when a passenger uses Uber to book a ride, Uber 0:19:41.640 --> 0:19:44.600 acted only as like an agent to connect a driver 0:19:44.840 --> 0:19:47.159 to a passenger and then handle payment and that's it, 0:19:47.640 --> 0:19:51.200 and that the actual contract of passage would just be 0:19:51.200 --> 0:19:54.639 between the driver and the passenger and Uber would be 0:19:54.680 --> 0:19:57.960 out of the picture. But the court says, no, my, 0:19:58.160 --> 0:20:01.000 that's not how it exitn't it Yep, the contract and 0:20:01.040 --> 0:20:04.720 does have the legal obligations relating to that contract. I 0:20:04.760 --> 0:20:08.200 don't know why they talk like that. And so now 0:20:08.520 --> 0:20:12.000 ride hailing companies like Uber, at least in London will 0:20:12.040 --> 0:20:15.480 have to pay more taxes per trip, which likely means 0:20:15.480 --> 0:20:19.000 we're gonna see price hikes in Uber in London in 0:20:19.000 --> 0:20:21.400 the near future. It might also mean that Uber will 0:20:21.440 --> 0:20:25.359 reevaluate operating in the UK at all, because it could 0:20:25.400 --> 0:20:29.880 be in that, you know, without having these loopholes or 0:20:30.240 --> 0:20:33.720 at least in this case uh illegalities in place, Uber 0:20:33.720 --> 0:20:37.440 will be unable to quote unquote disrupt I mean, compete 0:20:37.600 --> 0:20:40.760 with taxi services, So we'll have to see the company, 0:20:40.800 --> 0:20:43.360 Samsung is making a big change, but it's just an 0:20:43.400 --> 0:20:47.760 internal change. The company is dividing into two internal divisions, 0:20:47.880 --> 0:20:52.000 so still one company, but two internal divisions. One is 0:20:52.000 --> 0:20:54.560 going to focus on semiconductors and the other is going 0:20:54.600 --> 0:20:58.520 to focus on consumer electronics like televisions and phones. Each 0:20:58.560 --> 0:21:03.080 division will have its own CEO. So this organizational change 0:21:03.119 --> 0:21:07.560 will likely mean that we won't see much change on 0:21:07.600 --> 0:21:11.159 the outside, at least nothing that's really obvious. But the 0:21:11.160 --> 0:21:14.919 thought is this will allow each internal division to have 0:21:15.119 --> 0:21:18.560 a more unified and focused strategy in the in its 0:21:18.720 --> 0:21:22.920 individual market, rather than having to craft an overall strategy 0:21:23.000 --> 0:21:26.439 for a large company with very different divisions. When you 0:21:26.480 --> 0:21:29.000 do that, when you're trying to create big strategies for 0:21:29.200 --> 0:21:32.520 companies that have a lot of diverse departments, it can 0:21:32.560 --> 0:21:36.679 mean that you end up with a strategy that's okay, 0:21:36.680 --> 0:21:40.439 but not really great for any one division because you 0:21:40.480 --> 0:21:42.960 can't prioritize anything. If you do, then you end up 0:21:43.040 --> 0:21:45.560 leaving others behind. So this is a way to really 0:21:45.600 --> 0:21:50.280 prioritize each of those divisions and focus on them without 0:21:50.320 --> 0:21:54.320 having to worry about leaving something else behind. Cannon, the 0:21:54.440 --> 0:21:57.679 Camera Company, has announced it has developed an image sensor 0:21:57.800 --> 0:22:00.280 that can take high quality photographs even in the arc. 0:22:01.080 --> 0:22:03.520 Now that's a pretty huge development. It's a tricky one 0:22:03.720 --> 0:22:07.600 because image sensors are, you know, by definition, reliant on light. 0:22:08.080 --> 0:22:11.560 The sensor can reportedly capture color photographs, and it uses 0:22:11.640 --> 0:22:15.560 a technology called a single photon avalanche diode. Now I 0:22:15.600 --> 0:22:18.000 would love to tell you how that works, but honestly, 0:22:18.119 --> 0:22:21.800 it's beyond me. Apparently it acts kind of like an amplifier, 0:22:21.880 --> 0:22:25.160 except instead of taking an incoming electric signal and then 0:22:25.240 --> 0:22:28.880 boosting it with a transistor or vacuum tube. This tech 0:22:29.160 --> 0:22:32.119 can take a single incoming photon and use it to 0:22:32.160 --> 0:22:35.800 generate a large number of electrons. The company plans to 0:22:36.080 --> 0:22:39.119 enter mass production with the sensor late next year, and 0:22:39.160 --> 0:22:42.080 I'm really curious to learn more about this tech, though 0:22:42.160 --> 0:22:45.080 I can't claim I'll actually understand how it works any 0:22:45.119 --> 0:22:47.920 better than I do right now, which is to say 0:22:48.400 --> 0:22:52.400 I don't, I don't, I don't. In a previous news episode, 0:22:52.560 --> 0:22:56.239 I talked about how NASA launched a special spacecraft that 0:22:56.280 --> 0:22:58.840 will act as kind of like a battering ram in 0:22:58.880 --> 0:23:01.399 an effort to move an asteroid out of its orbital 0:23:01.440 --> 0:23:05.320 path around a different asteroid. This asteroid is not on 0:23:05.359 --> 0:23:07.720 any sort of collision course with the Earth, but the 0:23:07.720 --> 0:23:10.040 project is a test to see if this would be 0:23:10.040 --> 0:23:14.080 a working strategy to deflect any incoming meteor or asteroid 0:23:14.440 --> 0:23:17.440 so that it doesn't hit the Earth in the future. Well, 0:23:17.520 --> 0:23:19.800 adding onto that story is the fact that NASA has 0:23:19.920 --> 0:23:25.240 unveiled and impact monitoring algorithm called Century too, and yes, 0:23:25.280 --> 0:23:29.560 it is replacing an earlier algorithm called century So the 0:23:29.600 --> 0:23:32.600 purpose of this algorithm is to analyze the paths of 0:23:32.680 --> 0:23:36.560 any as that stands for near Earth asteroids, and then 0:23:36.640 --> 0:23:40.600 calculate impact probabilities, like what is the probability that one 0:23:40.680 --> 0:23:45.480 day this particular asteroid will collide with the Earth. Now, 0:23:45.480 --> 0:23:48.000 as we know, the Earth has been hit with massive 0:23:48.040 --> 0:23:51.560 objects from space before, so it's really just a matter 0:23:51.600 --> 0:23:55.040 of time before it happens again. However, that matter of 0:23:55.040 --> 0:23:57.919 time could be measured in millions of years. Still, it's 0:23:57.960 --> 0:24:00.359 best to know about these things as early as possible 0:24:00.400 --> 0:24:02.760 to give us the best chance to prevent an impact 0:24:02.800 --> 0:24:06.639 from happening. Century too, is meant to calculate those risks 0:24:06.720 --> 0:24:09.400 to give scientists enough warning time to develop a plan 0:24:09.800 --> 0:24:14.199 should any in e A have a high probability of 0:24:14.240 --> 0:24:17.679 colliding with the Earth. Of course, this algorithm will only 0:24:17.720 --> 0:24:20.240 work with the n e as we know about, and 0:24:20.280 --> 0:24:22.240 a lot of NASA's other work in this field is 0:24:22.280 --> 0:24:25.160 all about expanding our knowledge of the neighborhood and looking 0:24:25.200 --> 0:24:29.120 out for other possible planet party crashers. Finally, I've talked 0:24:29.160 --> 0:24:32.240 on the show several times about quantum computing and how 0:24:32.240 --> 0:24:34.959 it has the potential to revolutionize how we deal with 0:24:35.160 --> 0:24:39.239 certain computational problems. I've also mentioned that it could with 0:24:39.320 --> 0:24:44.040 the right algorithmic approach spell an end to modern cryptography. Well, 0:24:44.040 --> 0:24:47.320 now a company called Cambridge Quantum is making hay while 0:24:47.359 --> 0:24:50.560 the sun shines, announcing that it has developed a way 0:24:50.600 --> 0:24:54.800 to generate superior cryptographic keys. Now, from what I can tell, 0:24:55.240 --> 0:24:59.200 these are still traditional cryptographic keys. They're just a more 0:24:59.320 --> 0:25:03.480 robust ursion with a lot more randomness thrown in. So 0:25:03.640 --> 0:25:06.239 random number generation is a very tricky thing to do 0:25:06.280 --> 0:25:09.639 with machines. Because machines rely on sets of instructions in 0:25:09.720 --> 0:25:13.880