1 00:00:03,120 --> 00:00:08,320 Speaker 1: You're listening to Bloomberg Law with June Grosso from Bloomberg Radio. 2 00:00:09,160 --> 00:00:16,680 Speaker 2: Will this institution survive the stench that this creates in 3 00:00:16,720 --> 00:00:24,920 Speaker 2: the public perception that the Constitution and its reading are 4 00:00:25,040 --> 00:00:29,960 Speaker 2: just political acts. I don't see how it is possible. 5 00:00:30,440 --> 00:00:34,360 Speaker 3: Justice Sonia Sotomayor is one of the justices who've expressed 6 00:00:34,440 --> 00:00:38,000 Speaker 3: concern about the legitimacy of the Supreme Court. The Court 7 00:00:38,040 --> 00:00:41,680 Speaker 3: has faced a string of ethics scandals and controversies over 8 00:00:41,720 --> 00:00:45,239 Speaker 3: the past year, and Justice Clarence Thomas is in the 9 00:00:45,280 --> 00:00:49,560 Speaker 3: ethics spotlight again with revelations from a pro public a 10 00:00:49,680 --> 00:00:53,120 Speaker 3: report that he and his wife accepted lavish trips around 11 00:00:53,200 --> 00:00:57,800 Speaker 3: the world, including private yachts and jets and luxury accommodations 12 00:00:58,040 --> 00:01:01,840 Speaker 3: for more than two decades, trips worth hundreds of thousands 13 00:01:01,840 --> 00:01:06,360 Speaker 3: of dollars funded by Republican billionaire donor Harlan Crowe, trips 14 00:01:06,360 --> 00:01:10,640 Speaker 3: which Thomas never reported, And now an even more damaging 15 00:01:10,720 --> 00:01:14,880 Speaker 3: revelation involving money flowing from Crow to Thomas for the 16 00:01:14,920 --> 00:01:18,240 Speaker 3: sale of three Georgia properties in twenty fourteen for one 17 00:01:18,319 --> 00:01:22,120 Speaker 3: hundred and thirty four thousand dollars, which Thomas also failed 18 00:01:22,160 --> 00:01:26,320 Speaker 3: to disclose. Will Thomas's description of a loss of trust 19 00:01:26,360 --> 00:01:29,120 Speaker 3: on the Court after the leak draft of the Dobbs 20 00:01:29,160 --> 00:01:31,800 Speaker 3: decision apply to him now. 21 00:01:32,640 --> 00:01:36,160 Speaker 1: And look where we are where now? That trust or 22 00:01:36,200 --> 00:01:41,600 Speaker 1: that belief is gone forever. And when you lose that trust, 23 00:01:42,400 --> 00:01:47,319 Speaker 1: especially in the institution that I'm in, it changes the 24 00:01:47,360 --> 00:01:51,760 Speaker 1: institution fundamentally. You begin to look over your shoulder. It's 25 00:01:51,840 --> 00:01:56,160 Speaker 1: like kind of an infidelity that you can explain it, 26 00:01:56,240 --> 00:01:57,360 Speaker 1: but you can't undo it. 27 00:01:57,840 --> 00:02:01,080 Speaker 3: My guest is David Super, a professor at Georgetown Law 28 00:02:01,120 --> 00:02:05,000 Speaker 3: School and an expert in constitutional law. Let's discuss the 29 00:02:05,000 --> 00:02:08,440 Speaker 3: trips first. What was your initial reaction when you heard 30 00:02:08,480 --> 00:02:12,800 Speaker 3: about these opulent trips that Thomas failed to report. 31 00:02:13,520 --> 00:02:18,000 Speaker 4: I was shocked. I disagree with Justice Thomas on a 32 00:02:18,080 --> 00:02:21,079 Speaker 4: number of issues, strongly agree with him on some others. 33 00:02:21,360 --> 00:02:26,280 Speaker 4: But I thought that he took the Court seriously enough 34 00:02:26,320 --> 00:02:30,120 Speaker 4: that he would not subject it to this sort of embarrassment. 35 00:02:30,639 --> 00:02:35,480 Speaker 3: All the justices must file annual financial disclosures. What are 36 00:02:35,520 --> 00:02:38,800 Speaker 3: the rules for them about reporting gifts? 37 00:02:39,480 --> 00:02:48,200 Speaker 4: The rules are relatively unclear, and there have been many 38 00:02:48,240 --> 00:02:51,320 Speaker 4: people who've asked the Court to clarify the rules or 39 00:02:51,360 --> 00:02:54,120 Speaker 4: to tighten the rules. And the Court has shown very 40 00:02:54,120 --> 00:02:58,240 Speaker 4: little interest in that. But the basic principle is that 41 00:02:58,280 --> 00:03:04,639 Speaker 4: their disclosures are those to show potential interests or conflicts 42 00:03:04,680 --> 00:03:07,640 Speaker 4: that they could have that can allow members of the 43 00:03:07,680 --> 00:03:10,800 Speaker 4: public to be confident that they're not sitting on cases 44 00:03:11,000 --> 00:03:15,200 Speaker 4: where they might be improperly influenced. The standard for judges, 45 00:03:15,600 --> 00:03:18,880 Speaker 4: and the standard the Court has upheld with respect to 46 00:03:18,919 --> 00:03:23,440 Speaker 4: other judges, is that they should avoid not just impropriety, 47 00:03:23,480 --> 00:03:27,720 Speaker 4: but the appearance of impropriety. And part of the point 48 00:03:27,840 --> 00:03:32,200 Speaker 4: of the annual disclosures is to avoid the appearance of 49 00:03:32,240 --> 00:03:36,840 Speaker 4: impropriety by letting everybody know what a justice is receiving. 50 00:03:37,560 --> 00:03:41,680 Speaker 3: Thomas has disclosed gifts and trips before. The Los Angeles 51 00:03:41,760 --> 00:03:45,119 Speaker 3: Times report in two thousand and four that in previous 52 00:03:45,240 --> 00:03:48,800 Speaker 3: years Thomas had disclosed a trip paid for by Crowe, 53 00:03:49,000 --> 00:03:51,840 Speaker 3: as well as several gifts. There was a twenty fifteen 54 00:03:51,880 --> 00:03:56,080 Speaker 3: gift from crow of a bronze bust of abolitionist Frederick Douglass, 55 00:03:56,160 --> 00:03:58,760 Speaker 3: valued at more than six thousand dollars, and in the 56 00:03:58,880 --> 00:04:02,040 Speaker 3: year he took that night a vacation to Indonesia that 57 00:04:02,200 --> 00:04:05,600 Speaker 3: might have wrecked up about half a million dollars. He 58 00:04:05,680 --> 00:04:09,040 Speaker 3: did disclose five trips that were paid for by someone else, 59 00:04:09,080 --> 00:04:14,120 Speaker 3: a series of teaching and speaking engagements at US colleges 60 00:04:14,600 --> 00:04:18,159 Speaker 3: and law schools. Is there a reason why he might 61 00:04:18,240 --> 00:04:22,279 Speaker 3: have excluded those trips paid for by Crow? 62 00:04:22,880 --> 00:04:27,039 Speaker 4: The reason that he's given is that the Crow trips 63 00:04:27,080 --> 00:04:32,279 Speaker 4: were personal and the speaking engagements were professional. That really 64 00:04:32,960 --> 00:04:39,640 Speaker 4: doesn't stand even the most cursory examination, because we benefit 65 00:04:39,839 --> 00:04:43,800 Speaker 4: from both our personal lives and our professional lives, and 66 00:04:43,839 --> 00:04:46,279 Speaker 4: we have interests that come from our personal lives. And 67 00:04:46,400 --> 00:04:50,920 Speaker 4: judges recuse themselves for either personal or professional reasons. They 68 00:04:50,960 --> 00:04:54,280 Speaker 4: recuse themselves because they own stock in the company. They 69 00:04:54,320 --> 00:04:57,600 Speaker 4: recuse themselves because they have family connected with the company. 70 00:04:57,600 --> 00:05:01,599 Speaker 4: It's very common, though, the no that these being personal 71 00:05:01,800 --> 00:05:05,280 Speaker 4: rather than professional doesn't bear much scrutiny. 72 00:05:05,880 --> 00:05:09,480 Speaker 3: If Thomas were a regular judge and not a justice, 73 00:05:09,920 --> 00:05:13,840 Speaker 3: would that sort of loophole, i'll call it of the 74 00:05:14,080 --> 00:05:20,400 Speaker 3: exemption for social and personal hospitality. Would that loophole still apply? 75 00:05:22,400 --> 00:05:27,280 Speaker 4: Hospitality means having someone over for dinner. When it's something 76 00:05:27,960 --> 00:05:32,359 Speaker 4: in this scope, it's very hard to call that hospitality 77 00:05:32,920 --> 00:05:36,680 Speaker 4: in many state court systems. If he were a regular judge, 78 00:05:36,680 --> 00:05:39,359 Speaker 4: and in some even if he was a state Supreme 79 00:05:39,400 --> 00:05:43,960 Speaker 4: Court justice. This would lead to complaints to a judicial 80 00:05:44,000 --> 00:05:48,520 Speaker 4: tenure commission and the possible termination of the justice from 81 00:05:48,600 --> 00:05:52,719 Speaker 4: that position. Were he a regular district or circuit court 82 00:05:52,800 --> 00:05:57,200 Speaker 4: federal judge, it's certainly possible that one could imagine Congress 83 00:05:57,240 --> 00:06:00,640 Speaker 4: beginning impeachment proceedings because of this sort of thing. It's 84 00:06:00,720 --> 00:06:03,640 Speaker 4: not going to happen because he's a Supreme Court justice. 85 00:06:03,920 --> 00:06:07,920 Speaker 3: Now, is the real estate transaction with this Republican mega 86 00:06:07,960 --> 00:06:11,520 Speaker 3: donor different from the trips paid for by him? 87 00:06:11,880 --> 00:06:15,479 Speaker 4: It certainly is. The argument about the trips was that 88 00:06:15,520 --> 00:06:20,039 Speaker 4: it was personal hospitality, very extravagant personal hospitality. But that 89 00:06:20,240 --> 00:06:24,360 Speaker 4: was the argument. A real estate transaction isn't that. And 90 00:06:24,640 --> 00:06:29,360 Speaker 4: it's well known that if you want to pass money 91 00:06:29,360 --> 00:06:32,400 Speaker 4: to somebody without being noticed, that one way to do 92 00:06:32,480 --> 00:06:36,800 Speaker 4: it is to enter into a very unprofitable transaction with them. 93 00:06:36,839 --> 00:06:38,800 Speaker 4: And that's the decision that's been raised here. 94 00:06:39,080 --> 00:06:42,440 Speaker 3: And what's the penalty for failing to disclose this transaction. 95 00:06:43,120 --> 00:06:47,800 Speaker 4: The penalty would be impeachment and removal from office. The 96 00:06:47,839 --> 00:06:52,080 Speaker 4: informal penalty would be a severe loss of credibility. 97 00:06:52,279 --> 00:06:54,960 Speaker 3: Some have called for his impeachment. I mean, why should 98 00:06:55,000 --> 00:06:59,120 Speaker 3: a Supreme Court justice be exempt from the rules that 99 00:06:59,279 --> 00:07:01,120 Speaker 3: other judge are subjected to. 100 00:07:01,520 --> 00:07:04,839 Speaker 4: They shouldn't. They should be subject to much higher rules 101 00:07:04,920 --> 00:07:09,120 Speaker 4: because there's no appeal from a Supreme Court decision. The 102 00:07:09,160 --> 00:07:12,320 Speaker 4: standards to the Court should be much much higher, commensurate 103 00:07:12,400 --> 00:07:16,520 Speaker 4: with their greater power. And indeed, former Associate Justice Aide 104 00:07:16,520 --> 00:07:20,280 Speaker 4: Fortis was forced off of the Supreme Court for doing 105 00:07:20,680 --> 00:07:24,000 Speaker 4: arguably a lot less than Justice Thomas did. And when 106 00:07:24,520 --> 00:07:28,200 Speaker 4: Justice Fortis was forced off the Court, the entire court 107 00:07:28,440 --> 00:07:33,960 Speaker 4: and Washington political establishment insisted that he go. Liberals who 108 00:07:34,040 --> 00:07:38,680 Speaker 4: agreed within conservatives who did not. Everyone agreed that taking 109 00:07:38,960 --> 00:07:42,720 Speaker 4: substantial money from, in that case, a friend of his, 110 00:07:43,120 --> 00:07:46,920 Speaker 4: but a friend who also had interest in legal matters, 111 00:07:47,400 --> 00:07:52,239 Speaker 4: was inappropriate. The standards clearly have changed, where everyone agreed 112 00:07:52,280 --> 00:07:56,360 Speaker 4: that Justice fort Is needed to step down, and only 113 00:07:56,800 --> 00:08:02,120 Speaker 4: some of his political opponents are saying that about Justice Thomas. 114 00:08:02,640 --> 00:08:07,240 Speaker 3: There are arguments that none of this affected Justice Thomas's 115 00:08:07,320 --> 00:08:09,560 Speaker 3: votes because he's extremely conservative. 116 00:08:09,600 --> 00:08:14,320 Speaker 4: Anyway, That's true that he has always been conservative, but many, 117 00:08:14,400 --> 00:08:19,040 Speaker 4: maybe most justices change their approach over time. Some like 118 00:08:19,320 --> 00:08:24,440 Speaker 4: Justice Black, Justice White, become more conservative. Others like Justice Stevens, 119 00:08:24,520 --> 00:08:28,600 Speaker 4: Justice Black than Justice suitor become more liberal. The fact 120 00:08:28,880 --> 00:08:34,880 Speaker 4: that Justice Thomas had these very extensive financial relationships with 121 00:08:34,960 --> 00:08:39,120 Speaker 4: an ideological conservative made it much less likely that he 122 00:08:39,240 --> 00:08:42,760 Speaker 4: would have his views of all the way other justices did. 123 00:08:42,880 --> 00:08:46,280 Speaker 4: We'll never know whether he would have been more moderate 124 00:08:46,760 --> 00:08:49,360 Speaker 4: if he hadn't had this relationship with mister Crow. 125 00:08:49,679 --> 00:08:54,040 Speaker 3: Democratic senators on the Judiciary Committee have called on the 126 00:08:54,120 --> 00:08:57,720 Speaker 3: Chief Justice to investigate this. First of all, do you 127 00:08:57,720 --> 00:09:00,160 Speaker 3: think he'll even do that? And second I would or 128 00:09:00,200 --> 00:09:03,360 Speaker 3: what the point of it is? When the leak investigation 129 00:09:03,800 --> 00:09:08,000 Speaker 3: ended in either not finding out who leaked the draft 130 00:09:08,240 --> 00:09:11,960 Speaker 3: of the DABS decision or not telling us who leaked 131 00:09:11,960 --> 00:09:13,199 Speaker 3: the draft, the. 132 00:09:13,800 --> 00:09:17,360 Speaker 4: Call for anyone other than the House Judiciary Committey to 133 00:09:17,440 --> 00:09:22,199 Speaker 4: investigate is absurd because other than the House Judiciary Committee 134 00:09:22,320 --> 00:09:26,360 Speaker 4: has any authority over this. As you say, the Chief 135 00:09:26,520 --> 00:09:31,160 Speaker 4: Justice has limited capacity to investigate and even more limited 136 00:09:31,240 --> 00:09:34,679 Speaker 4: interest in embarrassing the court. The Chief Justice, more than 137 00:09:34,720 --> 00:09:38,760 Speaker 4: any other justice, has spoken fervently about the importance of 138 00:09:38,920 --> 00:09:42,040 Speaker 4: maintaining the Court's public image, and it's hard to see 139 00:09:42,040 --> 00:09:45,520 Speaker 4: how an investigation of this kind would support that. But 140 00:09:45,640 --> 00:09:49,280 Speaker 4: even if he found things that were deeply disturbing, there's 141 00:09:49,320 --> 00:09:52,720 Speaker 4: nothing that the Chief Justice has the authority to do. 142 00:09:53,120 --> 00:09:57,400 Speaker 4: The other eight justices have no authority to exclude one 143 00:09:57,440 --> 00:10:01,080 Speaker 4: of their own from the court or to deny them 144 00:10:01,120 --> 00:10:04,959 Speaker 4: the ability to vote on cases. So the Chief Justice 145 00:10:05,120 --> 00:10:09,440 Speaker 4: perhaps could investigate more gently than outsiders, but as you say, 146 00:10:09,480 --> 00:10:11,600 Speaker 4: it's not clear that he would, and it's not clear 147 00:10:11,640 --> 00:10:14,560 Speaker 4: that he would disclose the result, And whatever he found, 148 00:10:14,600 --> 00:10:17,079 Speaker 4: he has very little authority to do anything about it. 149 00:10:17,800 --> 00:10:20,880 Speaker 3: The lawmakers also asked Roberts to take the lead in 150 00:10:20,960 --> 00:10:25,160 Speaker 3: adopting a code of conduct that would, for the first time, 151 00:10:25,600 --> 00:10:29,040 Speaker 3: subject the justices to the types of standards that are 152 00:10:29,080 --> 00:10:33,440 Speaker 3: now applied to other federal judges. Roberts in the past 153 00:10:33,480 --> 00:10:37,720 Speaker 3: has not embraced that idea. Neither have the justices. Might 154 00:10:37,800 --> 00:10:38,960 Speaker 3: this move them? 155 00:10:39,440 --> 00:10:42,840 Speaker 4: I think it might because the Court is being so 156 00:10:43,080 --> 00:10:48,720 Speaker 4: severely embarrassed by this and wouldn't deal with the problems 157 00:10:48,760 --> 00:10:52,200 Speaker 4: with Justice Thomas, but it would give them something to 158 00:10:52,240 --> 00:10:58,480 Speaker 4: say back to the concerns about how corrupt this certainly looks. 159 00:10:58,559 --> 00:11:02,200 Speaker 4: There've been a number of incidents of this kind over 160 00:11:02,240 --> 00:11:05,360 Speaker 4: the last number of years, but this is by far 161 00:11:05,480 --> 00:11:09,760 Speaker 4: the worst, and I think this could well drive the 162 00:11:09,880 --> 00:11:12,800 Speaker 4: Justice to want to do something. My suspicion is that 163 00:11:12,840 --> 00:11:15,160 Speaker 4: if they did an act to new code of conduct, 164 00:11:15,360 --> 00:11:17,680 Speaker 4: it would have plenty of loopholes in it, but that 165 00:11:17,720 --> 00:11:20,400 Speaker 4: there would at least be the appearance of typening things up. 166 00:11:20,720 --> 00:11:23,280 Speaker 3: Thanks so much for being on the show, Bes, Professor 167 00:11:23,360 --> 00:11:27,120 Speaker 3: David super of Georgetown Law School. Coming up next, The 168 00:11:27,160 --> 00:11:31,640 Speaker 3: Manhattan DA sues Congressman Jim Jordan and the Judiciary Committee 169 00:11:31,760 --> 00:11:37,080 Speaker 3: you're listening to Bloomberg. Senators have also vowed to consider 170 00:11:37,200 --> 00:11:41,360 Speaker 3: legislation to resolve this issue. If the Supreme Court doesn't 171 00:11:41,360 --> 00:11:44,480 Speaker 3: act on its own. That doesn't seem likely because they'd 172 00:11:44,520 --> 00:11:48,960 Speaker 3: need at least nine Senate Republicans and the House is 173 00:11:49,000 --> 00:11:53,199 Speaker 3: controlled by Republicans. But even if it succeeds, the Chief 174 00:11:53,200 --> 00:11:57,360 Speaker 3: has suggested that Congress might not have the constitutional power 175 00:11:57,880 --> 00:12:01,800 Speaker 3: to impose ethics rules on the justices. Do you think 176 00:12:01,920 --> 00:12:03,400 Speaker 3: that is the case or not. 177 00:12:04,200 --> 00:12:09,000 Speaker 4: If five Supreme Court justices say it's unconstitutional, then for 178 00:12:09,080 --> 00:12:14,880 Speaker 4: practical purposes it's unconstitutional. I would find that a bizarre holding. However, 179 00:12:15,400 --> 00:12:22,280 Speaker 4: because Congress has imposed numerous ethics requirements on the executive branch, 180 00:12:22,920 --> 00:12:26,800 Speaker 4: it cannot pass a law saying that the president must 181 00:12:26,840 --> 00:12:31,160 Speaker 4: resign or loses office if they don't do X or Y, 182 00:12:31,200 --> 00:12:37,119 Speaker 4: but they can and have imposed various disclosure requirements on presidents. 183 00:12:37,120 --> 00:12:41,240 Speaker 4: The Presidential Documents Act that's been in the news quite 184 00:12:41,280 --> 00:12:45,959 Speaker 4: a bit lately is a limitation on how the President 185 00:12:46,240 --> 00:12:51,080 Speaker 4: conducts him self designed to lead to transparency. And I 186 00:12:51,120 --> 00:12:54,839 Speaker 4: would have trouble seeing how Congress would be barred from 187 00:12:54,960 --> 00:12:59,360 Speaker 4: imposing similar standards on justices. Now it's a justice chose 188 00:12:59,440 --> 00:13:03,320 Speaker 4: to disregard those standards, the only remedy would be impeachment 189 00:13:03,360 --> 00:13:07,040 Speaker 4: and removal. But Congress clearly could put standards like that 190 00:13:07,200 --> 00:13:07,720 Speaker 4: out there. 191 00:13:07,920 --> 00:13:11,240 Speaker 3: You refer to this, but the Supreme Court has had 192 00:13:11,440 --> 00:13:15,600 Speaker 3: one problem after the other, one ethical issue after the other, 193 00:13:15,720 --> 00:13:19,320 Speaker 3: several involving Justice Thomas. Do you think that this will 194 00:13:19,559 --> 00:13:24,920 Speaker 3: lead to less public confidence in the Court than even now? 195 00:13:25,640 --> 00:13:31,599 Speaker 4: I think the combination of substantive rulings that are upsetting 196 00:13:31,679 --> 00:13:35,480 Speaker 4: to a large fraction of the public and a sense 197 00:13:36,280 --> 00:13:41,720 Speaker 4: that the Court's ethics are in bad shape is quite lethal. 198 00:13:41,800 --> 00:13:45,200 Speaker 4: I think either one of those by itself might not 199 00:13:45,360 --> 00:13:48,640 Speaker 4: be a problem, But the Court has made several radical 200 00:13:48,679 --> 00:13:53,040 Speaker 4: decisions lately. There's indications it has several more in store 201 00:13:53,160 --> 00:13:57,439 Speaker 4: for us later this year, and when you combine that 202 00:13:57,520 --> 00:14:02,680 Speaker 4: with a sense that the Court is receiving large sums 203 00:14:02,720 --> 00:14:07,200 Speaker 4: from private parties, that justice are ruling on cases in 204 00:14:07,240 --> 00:14:12,200 Speaker 4: which their family members are highly interested, that justices are 205 00:14:12,840 --> 00:14:17,600 Speaker 4: crafting their opinions through the news media with leak, that 206 00:14:18,360 --> 00:14:22,400 Speaker 4: is certainly going to persuade the public that these decisions 207 00:14:22,440 --> 00:14:26,560 Speaker 4: are not reasoned attempts to get at the correct answer, 208 00:14:27,120 --> 00:14:30,760 Speaker 4: but rather the response of interest group, politics, and ideology. 209 00:14:31,040 --> 00:14:33,280 Speaker 4: One thought I have I sort of alluded to earlier 210 00:14:33,480 --> 00:14:37,000 Speaker 4: is that I would really love to hear people who 211 00:14:37,040 --> 00:14:41,760 Speaker 4: are defending Justice Thomas explain how this is different than 212 00:14:42,200 --> 00:14:45,920 Speaker 4: Justice Fortis. It's actually much worse than Justice Fortis. And 213 00:14:45,920 --> 00:14:48,200 Speaker 4: I would like them either to say that Justice Fortis 214 00:14:48,400 --> 00:14:53,240 Speaker 4: was improperly forced off the court or explain why removing 215 00:14:53,360 --> 00:14:56,400 Speaker 4: Justice Fortas was appropriate and Justice Thomas should stay. 216 00:14:56,960 --> 00:14:58,760 Speaker 3: Thanks so much for being on the show. It's always 217 00:14:58,800 --> 00:15:01,800 Speaker 3: a pleasure to have you. That's Professor David super of 218 00:15:01,960 --> 00:15:08,480 Speaker 3: Georgetown Law School. Attorney Stephen Donziger is an environmental activist 219 00:15:08,520 --> 00:15:12,520 Speaker 3: who took on Chevron and ended up disbarred and imprisoned 220 00:15:12,560 --> 00:15:15,840 Speaker 3: for contempt of court. It's the conviction for contempt of 221 00:15:15,960 --> 00:15:19,320 Speaker 3: Court that ended up before the Supreme Court. New York 222 00:15:19,360 --> 00:15:23,320 Speaker 3: Federal Judge Lewis Kaplan charged Donziger with contempt in twenty 223 00:15:23,400 --> 00:15:27,440 Speaker 3: nineteen after he refused to turn over his electronic devices 224 00:15:27,440 --> 00:15:30,880 Speaker 3: for Chevron's forensic experts to review. When the U. S. 225 00:15:30,920 --> 00:15:35,360 Speaker 3: Attorney of Manhattant declined to prosecute Donziger, the judge appointed 226 00:15:35,360 --> 00:15:38,880 Speaker 3: a private attorney to prosecute him, ending in a six 227 00:15:38,960 --> 00:15:42,800 Speaker 3: month sentence for Donziger. The Supreme Court refused to hear 228 00:15:42,920 --> 00:15:47,080 Speaker 3: Donziger's appeal, and Justice Neil Gorsich wrote a blistering dissent, 229 00:15:47,280 --> 00:15:51,400 Speaker 3: joined by Justice Brett Kavanaugh. Gorsech wrote, in this country, 230 00:15:51,520 --> 00:15:54,720 Speaker 3: judges have no more power to initiate a prosecution of 231 00:15:54,760 --> 00:15:58,000 Speaker 3: those who come before them than prosecutors have to sit 232 00:15:58,080 --> 00:16:01,320 Speaker 3: in judgment of those they charge. Joining me is Professor 233 00:16:01,320 --> 00:16:04,440 Speaker 3: Harold Krant of the Chicago Kent College of Law, hell 234 00:16:04,440 --> 00:16:07,400 Speaker 3: tell us about Donziger in his case, this case. 235 00:16:07,560 --> 00:16:12,160 Speaker 5: Is an incredible story of environmental activism likely gone bad. 236 00:16:12,640 --> 00:16:17,640 Speaker 5: The environmental activist Stephen Donziger represented indigenous groups who protested 237 00:16:17,680 --> 00:16:21,800 Speaker 5: against Chevron the oil companies despoiling of the earth in 238 00:16:22,320 --> 00:16:27,040 Speaker 5: letting effluence go wild. In Ecuador, and there was wrangling 239 00:16:27,080 --> 00:16:31,640 Speaker 5: about where this lawsuit would take place, and Chevron sought 240 00:16:31,680 --> 00:16:34,720 Speaker 5: to have the trial be decided in Ecuador. It got 241 00:16:34,720 --> 00:16:38,440 Speaker 5: its wish, and Donziger was able to get eight billion 242 00:16:38,520 --> 00:16:41,800 Speaker 5: dollar verdict on half of his clients. Chevron then turned 243 00:16:41,800 --> 00:16:44,720 Speaker 5: around and said that the eight billion dollar verdict was 244 00:16:44,960 --> 00:16:49,120 Speaker 5: produced by fraud and convinced a New York court that 245 00:16:49,120 --> 00:16:51,960 Speaker 5: that in fact was the case. This then series of 246 00:16:52,000 --> 00:16:56,560 Speaker 5: events followed that finding a fraud because then Chevron tried 247 00:16:56,600 --> 00:17:00,560 Speaker 5: to find whether Donziger hidden some of them that it 248 00:17:00,600 --> 00:17:04,400 Speaker 5: had been paid pursuing to the judgment, and in looking 249 00:17:04,480 --> 00:17:07,800 Speaker 5: at his bank statements, looking at his emails, and Donziger 250 00:17:07,800 --> 00:17:11,640 Speaker 5: then refused to turn over all of his private information 251 00:17:11,760 --> 00:17:14,679 Speaker 5: to the New York court. That's what starts this case, 252 00:17:14,960 --> 00:17:18,800 Speaker 5: because then the question is did Donziger in effect commit 253 00:17:18,880 --> 00:17:22,320 Speaker 5: a contempt on the court by refusing to abide by 254 00:17:22,440 --> 00:17:26,520 Speaker 5: its turnover order to give them all the personal documents? 255 00:17:26,960 --> 00:17:30,280 Speaker 5: And the court in New York asked the Justice Department 256 00:17:30,680 --> 00:17:34,399 Speaker 5: to bring a case to prosecute Donziger for failure to 257 00:17:34,440 --> 00:17:37,440 Speaker 5: abide by the order, and the Justice Department considered it 258 00:17:37,480 --> 00:17:39,240 Speaker 5: and decided it was not a good use of its 259 00:17:39,280 --> 00:17:42,919 Speaker 5: resources and so declined to prosecute Donziger for violating the 260 00:17:42,960 --> 00:17:48,040 Speaker 5: court order. Thereupon, the judge decided to appoint the prosecutor 261 00:17:48,160 --> 00:17:52,480 Speaker 5: to champion the event and prosecute Donziger for violating the 262 00:17:52,520 --> 00:17:55,879 Speaker 5: court's order, and that gave rise to the decision of 263 00:17:55,920 --> 00:17:58,240 Speaker 5: the Second Circuit, which in a two to one vote 264 00:17:58,400 --> 00:18:02,960 Speaker 5: upheld the court's decision to appoint a special private prosecutor 265 00:18:03,040 --> 00:18:07,240 Speaker 5: to determine whether Donziger had violated the court order. And 266 00:18:07,440 --> 00:18:11,000 Speaker 5: the Second Circuit held that the district Court's decision to 267 00:18:11,480 --> 00:18:14,520 Speaker 5: impose a six month sentence and a fine was entirely 268 00:18:14,760 --> 00:18:19,399 Speaker 5: appropriate over a vigorous descent, and that led to the curpetition, 269 00:18:19,720 --> 00:18:23,480 Speaker 5: which was recently rejected by the Supreme Court over the 270 00:18:23,520 --> 00:18:28,560 Speaker 5: descents of both Justice Gorsuch and Justice Kavanaugh. 271 00:18:28,840 --> 00:18:31,320 Speaker 3: That was an extraordinary thing for a judge to do. 272 00:18:31,800 --> 00:18:33,119 Speaker 3: That doesn't often happen. 273 00:18:33,600 --> 00:18:35,600 Speaker 5: So the theory is that a court must have the 274 00:18:35,640 --> 00:18:40,400 Speaker 5: authority to vindicate its own power by punishing those who 275 00:18:40,400 --> 00:18:43,320 Speaker 5: have tried to interfere with this process, and that those 276 00:18:43,320 --> 00:18:47,199 Speaker 5: are called sort of contempt orders in court. So if 277 00:18:47,240 --> 00:18:51,080 Speaker 5: someone screams and yells or insults the judge that the 278 00:18:51,160 --> 00:18:54,679 Speaker 5: judge has the power to issue a contempt and to 279 00:18:54,760 --> 00:18:58,200 Speaker 5: prosecute it if it happened before him or her. In addition, 280 00:18:58,440 --> 00:19:00,840 Speaker 5: the Supreme Court did decide case a number of years 281 00:19:00,880 --> 00:19:04,600 Speaker 5: ago in which a court appointed a special prosecutor to 282 00:19:05,280 --> 00:19:09,400 Speaker 5: prosecute not a contempt flowing from an in court conduct, 283 00:19:09,400 --> 00:19:13,359 Speaker 5: but a contempt flowing from a violation of a court's order. 284 00:19:13,800 --> 00:19:17,800 Speaker 5: This is rare. Rule forty two allows a court to 285 00:19:17,800 --> 00:19:22,240 Speaker 5: appoint a special prosecutor in an extraordinary case. And so, 286 00:19:23,080 --> 00:19:24,960 Speaker 5: although this case is not on all fours with that, 287 00:19:25,440 --> 00:19:29,200 Speaker 5: this case does involve how to apply rule forty two 288 00:19:29,520 --> 00:19:33,280 Speaker 5: and ask whether Rule forty two is constitutional for a 289 00:19:33,359 --> 00:19:34,320 Speaker 5: variety of reasons. 290 00:19:35,240 --> 00:19:38,800 Speaker 3: So Justice Neil Gorsitch wrote the Descent. He is joined 291 00:19:38,800 --> 00:19:44,879 Speaker 3: by Justice Kavanaugh. He says, this prosecution raises grave constitutional questions. 292 00:19:45,440 --> 00:19:48,359 Speaker 3: Quote the Constitution gives courts the power to serve as 293 00:19:48,400 --> 00:19:52,040 Speaker 3: a neutral adjudicator in a criminal case, not the power 294 00:19:52,040 --> 00:19:55,800 Speaker 3: to prosecute crimes. Tell us about his descent. 295 00:19:56,359 --> 00:20:00,159 Speaker 5: So, Justice course, it really raises two fundamental challenges to 296 00:20:00,160 --> 00:20:02,560 Speaker 5: what happened here in New York with respect to the 297 00:20:02,640 --> 00:20:06,520 Speaker 5: Donziger prosecution. One is a formal argument, and the other 298 00:20:06,840 --> 00:20:09,680 Speaker 5: is a functional argument. The functional argument, I think will 299 00:20:09,680 --> 00:20:13,240 Speaker 5: make the most powerful because it says a judge is 300 00:20:13,280 --> 00:20:17,320 Speaker 5: an independent and neutral. Here the judge appointed a prosecutor 301 00:20:17,560 --> 00:20:22,280 Speaker 5: after the Justice Department the executive branch refused to appoint 302 00:20:22,280 --> 00:20:25,800 Speaker 5: a prosecutor. So one of the protections for an individual 303 00:20:26,680 --> 00:20:30,879 Speaker 5: is the fact that a politically accountable prosecutor will make 304 00:20:30,880 --> 00:20:35,239 Speaker 5: a determination of whether to pursue a prosecution. And in 305 00:20:35,280 --> 00:20:39,200 Speaker 5: this case that didn't happen because the independent, politically accountable 306 00:20:39,359 --> 00:20:42,320 Speaker 5: the executive branch decided not to prosecutor, that it wasn't 307 00:20:42,359 --> 00:20:45,879 Speaker 5: worth the resources to do so. So was the interested 308 00:20:46,280 --> 00:20:50,040 Speaker 5: court that appointed the prosecutor, sort of deviating from the 309 00:20:50,119 --> 00:20:54,879 Speaker 5: usual judicial robes to become a prosecutor himself. So that 310 00:20:55,080 --> 00:20:58,600 Speaker 5: was one level in terms of the functional separation of 311 00:20:58,640 --> 00:21:01,919 Speaker 5: powers problem. Those were the sort of i'll call the 312 00:21:02,000 --> 00:21:07,119 Speaker 5: functional separation of powers issues that Justice Courtshi's mentioned, But 313 00:21:07,160 --> 00:21:10,280 Speaker 5: there's a formal one as well. Under the appointment's clause 314 00:21:10,359 --> 00:21:14,320 Speaker 5: and Article two of the Constitution, the Constitution says that 315 00:21:14,440 --> 00:21:18,080 Speaker 5: a inferior officer may be appointed by the courts of law, 316 00:21:18,560 --> 00:21:22,200 Speaker 5: or by the President, or by a head of Department 317 00:21:22,560 --> 00:21:27,200 Speaker 5: when Congress so decides. In this case, Congress only indirectly 318 00:21:27,520 --> 00:21:30,960 Speaker 5: decided upon appointment of a special prosecutor who's considered an 319 00:21:30,960 --> 00:21:35,560 Speaker 5: inferior officer, because Congress, through the Rules Enabling Act, allowed 320 00:21:35,560 --> 00:21:39,040 Speaker 5: the Supreme Court to decide on what rules to adopt, 321 00:21:39,359 --> 00:21:42,920 Speaker 5: and this appointment provision was only housed in a rule 322 00:21:43,240 --> 00:21:47,000 Speaker 5: that the Supreme Court articulated, not one that was provided 323 00:21:47,040 --> 00:21:50,359 Speaker 5: by Congress. So therefore, on its face, it appears that 324 00:21:50,440 --> 00:21:53,880 Speaker 5: this is not the type of appointment that is consistent 325 00:21:53,920 --> 00:21:58,679 Speaker 5: with Article two of the Constitution, and the courts in 326 00:21:58,720 --> 00:22:01,439 Speaker 5: the past have held that those kinds of special prosecutors, 327 00:22:01,560 --> 00:22:04,840 Speaker 5: as in the Independent Council Act, are acting like inferior 328 00:22:04,880 --> 00:22:09,159 Speaker 5: officers within the meaning of the Constitution, and so this 329 00:22:09,200 --> 00:22:13,399 Speaker 5: special Prosecutor, like the Independent Council, should be so characterized 330 00:22:13,440 --> 00:22:17,320 Speaker 5: and therefore could only be appointed by if Congresso determined 331 00:22:17,560 --> 00:22:20,080 Speaker 5: again by the President of the Heads of the Department 332 00:22:20,280 --> 00:22:22,160 Speaker 5: or the Courts of Law, so that would be the 333 00:22:22,320 --> 00:22:25,480 Speaker 5: formal separation of powers. Objection that there was appointments Clause 334 00:22:25,600 --> 00:22:28,400 Speaker 5: violation in this case is. 335 00:22:29,160 --> 00:22:35,080 Speaker 3: Concern about the potential that rogue judges will initiate prosecutions 336 00:22:35,119 --> 00:22:38,919 Speaker 3: where the executive branch wouldn't or is his concern more 337 00:22:39,359 --> 00:22:41,800 Speaker 3: that it's a violation of separation of powers. 338 00:22:43,240 --> 00:22:46,280 Speaker 5: I think they're connected. That separation of powers is intended 339 00:22:46,320 --> 00:22:49,440 Speaker 5: to protect liberty, and it seemed to fall apart here 340 00:22:49,520 --> 00:22:53,480 Speaker 5: because this individual, Stephen Donziger, was not given the benefit 341 00:22:53,560 --> 00:22:56,880 Speaker 5: of sort of an independent decision of whether to prosecute. 342 00:22:57,040 --> 00:23:00,760 Speaker 5: And I think Justice Gorsus was right to raise these concerns. 343 00:23:01,160 --> 00:23:04,440 Speaker 5: And most people think that if there is an exception here, 344 00:23:05,000 --> 00:23:07,960 Speaker 5: that judges do need to have the ability to punish 345 00:23:08,240 --> 00:23:11,040 Speaker 5: contempts in their presence. And again, if someone stands up 346 00:23:11,040 --> 00:23:13,800 Speaker 5: and starts yelling at the judge or starts attacking somebody 347 00:23:13,800 --> 00:23:17,760 Speaker 5: else in the courtroom, that the judge simply cannot continue 348 00:23:18,320 --> 00:23:21,200 Speaker 5: with his or her case with that kind of obstruction. 349 00:23:21,680 --> 00:23:24,760 Speaker 5: Has to have the ability to punish for contempt within 350 00:23:24,880 --> 00:23:28,160 Speaker 5: the presence of the judge, But for violating a court order, 351 00:23:28,680 --> 00:23:32,160 Speaker 5: that just seems like a context for any other kind 352 00:23:32,200 --> 00:23:36,000 Speaker 5: of crime that should be prosecuted by the independent executive branch. 353 00:23:36,480 --> 00:23:39,720 Speaker 5: So I think that the issue here is that when 354 00:23:40,040 --> 00:23:44,639 Speaker 5: a special prosecutor is appointed to look into whether or 355 00:23:44,720 --> 00:23:48,760 Speaker 5: not a individual violated a court order, that is simply 356 00:23:48,800 --> 00:23:51,440 Speaker 5: not a case where there should be a special prosecutor. 357 00:23:51,560 --> 00:23:55,160 Speaker 5: It should be determined by the Department of Justice itself. 358 00:23:56,200 --> 00:24:00,399 Speaker 3: So what surprising is, so you had these two justices dissent, 359 00:24:00,600 --> 00:24:03,879 Speaker 3: you need four in order to take a case. Doesn't 360 00:24:03,880 --> 00:24:07,639 Speaker 3: this seem like an issue that the liberal justices would 361 00:24:07,640 --> 00:24:08,600 Speaker 3: be on board with. 362 00:24:09,320 --> 00:24:11,680 Speaker 5: It is interesting that there were not two other justices 363 00:24:12,040 --> 00:24:16,520 Speaker 5: to agree with, particularly given the fact that obviously controversial, 364 00:24:16,560 --> 00:24:19,159 Speaker 5: but Stephen donzon Or, the defendant in this case, is 365 00:24:19,200 --> 00:24:23,960 Speaker 5: considered a environmental liberal activist and might have garnered some 366 00:24:24,000 --> 00:24:26,800 Speaker 5: sympathy from some of the liberal justices itself. But it 367 00:24:26,840 --> 00:24:28,840 Speaker 5: also has to do with judicial power, and it may 368 00:24:28,880 --> 00:24:33,040 Speaker 5: well be that other justices are not as eager to 369 00:24:33,240 --> 00:24:38,240 Speaker 5: whittle away judicial power as Justices Kavanaugh and Courses said 370 00:24:38,240 --> 00:24:42,280 Speaker 5: they were interested in doing, because taking away the ability 371 00:24:42,320 --> 00:24:45,959 Speaker 5: to appoint a special prosecutor does undermine some of the 372 00:24:46,000 --> 00:24:50,399 Speaker 5: authority that judges not often but occasionally have wielded in 373 00:24:50,440 --> 00:24:50,879 Speaker 5: the past. 374 00:24:51,480 --> 00:24:54,760 Speaker 3: Thanks Hal, That's Professor Harrold Krant of Chicago Kent College 375 00:24:54,800 --> 00:24:56,800 Speaker 3: of Law. And that's it for this edition of the 376 00:24:56,840 --> 00:24:59,720 Speaker 3: Bloomberg Law Show. Remember you can always get the latest 377 00:24:59,760 --> 00:25:02,960 Speaker 3: legal news on our Bloomberg Law podcasts. You can find 378 00:25:02,960 --> 00:25:07,520 Speaker 3: them on Apple Podcasts, Spotify, and at www dot bloomberg 379 00:25:07,600 --> 00:25:11,400 Speaker 3: dot com slash podcast slash Law, and remember to tune 380 00:25:11,400 --> 00:25:14,639 Speaker 3: into The Bloomberg Law Show every weeknight at ten pm 381 00:25:14,680 --> 00:25:18,280 Speaker 3: Wall Street Time. I'm June Grosso and you're listening to 382 00:25:18,320 --> 00:25:18,840 Speaker 3: Bloomberg