WEBVTT - TechStuff Classic: Apple vs the FBI 0:00:04.360 --> 0:00:12.280 Welcome to tech Stuff, a production from iHeartRadio. Hey there, 0:00:12.320 --> 0:00:15.920 and welcome to tech Stuff. I'm your host, Jonathan Strickland. 0:00:16.040 --> 0:00:19.919 I'm an executive producer with iHeartRadio and How the tech 0:00:20.120 --> 0:00:23.119 Are Yet it is a Friday, which means it's time 0:00:23.120 --> 0:00:26.119 for a classic episode of tech Stuff. This one is 0:00:26.120 --> 0:00:30.600 titled Apple versus the FBI, and originally it published on 0:00:30.680 --> 0:00:37.240 March second, twenty sixteen. This is sort of an ongoing 0:00:37.760 --> 0:00:42.560 struggle between companies like Apple and various agencies because, as 0:00:42.600 --> 0:00:45.760 we will hear in this episode, the FBI wanted ways 0:00:45.800 --> 0:00:49.720 to be able to access locked iPhones that had been 0:00:49.760 --> 0:00:55.680 recovered from say a suspect, and Apple is trying to 0:00:55.960 --> 0:01:01.560 do its best to maintain consumer confidence by tecting their 0:01:01.800 --> 0:01:06.040 data and their devices. We've heard similar things, which I'll 0:01:06.040 --> 0:01:09.040 talk about more at the end of this episode, that 0:01:09.120 --> 0:01:14.520 have involved other law enforcement agencies and investigative agencies here 0:01:14.560 --> 0:01:17.320 in the United States. But first let's listen to this 0:01:17.360 --> 0:01:21.520 classic episode from twenty sixteen. So we're gonna talk about 0:01:21.600 --> 0:01:24.400 something that's actually we're gonna have to work very hard 0:01:24.400 --> 0:01:27.440 for multiple reasons because we're talking about Apple versus the FBI. 0:01:28.560 --> 0:01:33.759 The whole story that's unfolding as we record this, and 0:01:33.840 --> 0:01:36.800 to talk about what is behind that case, what are 0:01:36.840 --> 0:01:41.560 the implications, what is the FBI's argument, what is Apple's argument? 0:01:42.040 --> 0:01:44.959 And in addition to that, we have, of course the 0:01:45.000 --> 0:01:51.320 added responsibility of remembering that this is all centered around 0:01:51.480 --> 0:01:57.000 a truly awful crime. Yes, absolutely so. The what we're 0:01:57.080 --> 0:02:02.040 what we're talking about specifically hit inanstream news when Apple 0:02:02.440 --> 0:02:06.040 did something that a lot of tech companies have never done. 0:02:06.560 --> 0:02:11.959 They issued a blanket statement letter and went public. Yeah, 0:02:12.280 --> 0:02:16.840 with they went public with a response to an FBI request. 0:02:16.840 --> 0:02:18.440 But I guess I'm getting ahead of it. What was 0:02:18.480 --> 0:02:20.640 the crime? Well, let's yeah, let's I'll give you the 0:02:20.639 --> 0:02:24.760 background on what's happened and we'll build from there. So 0:02:25.280 --> 0:02:28.160 first we have to look back on December second, twenty 0:02:28.360 --> 0:02:33.359 fifteen in San Bernardino, California. That's in southern California, and 0:02:33.400 --> 0:02:37.400 that's when two well an American citizen and a legal 0:02:37.440 --> 0:02:44.519 resident husband wife team, both of Pakistani descent, committed a 0:02:45.720 --> 0:02:50.680 mass shooting. It was a Sayed Rizwantharouk and tash Fen 0:02:51.040 --> 0:02:54.760 Malik who committed this act, and it happened at the 0:02:54.760 --> 0:02:58.200 Department of Public Health. They were having an event that 0:02:58.280 --> 0:03:00.800 was starting off as a training event and then it 0:03:00.840 --> 0:03:06.799 was supposed to transition into a holiday event. And after 0:03:06.840 --> 0:03:09.360 the training element, Farouk, who was actually at the event, 0:03:09.400 --> 0:03:12.000 he was in the employee of the Department of Public Health, 0:03:12.040 --> 0:03:16.440 he was a food inspector, left, came back with his wife. 0:03:16.480 --> 0:03:19.679 They were both heavily armed and they both started firing 0:03:19.760 --> 0:03:23.000 into the crowd of people at the Department of Public Health. 0:03:23.000 --> 0:03:28.120 Fourteen people were killed, twenty two injured. Very serious crime. 0:03:28.520 --> 0:03:35.640 Then far and Malik left. They fled the scene. Turned 0:03:35.640 --> 0:03:38.720 out they had also left behind an explosive device, which 0:03:38.800 --> 0:03:44.320 thankfully did not detonate. Failed to detonate, and they fled 0:03:44.480 --> 0:03:48.760 in a vehicle that they had rented a few days before, 0:03:49.400 --> 0:03:52.640 and several hours later law enforcement tracked them down. There 0:03:52.720 --> 0:03:56.800 was a confrontation, there was a shootout, and then both 0:03:57.040 --> 0:04:00.520 of the shooters died as a result of that shootout. 0:04:00.960 --> 0:04:04.400 The FBI has stated that they believed, based upon the 0:04:04.480 --> 0:04:06.800 evidence they were able to find that the two were 0:04:06.840 --> 0:04:09.120 acting on their own, that they were not part of 0:04:09.160 --> 0:04:12.760 some sort of terrorist cell in the United States. However, 0:04:12.760 --> 0:04:15.520 they can't be absolutely certain of that. That's where the 0:04:16.000 --> 0:04:19.080 crux of this issue with Apple is going to come 0:04:19.120 --> 0:04:22.920 into play, and the big part of it is they 0:04:22.960 --> 0:04:28.240 can't account for it's just less than twenty minutes of 0:04:28.279 --> 0:04:33.320 the activity that happened between the shooting or leading up 0:04:33.320 --> 0:04:36.200 to the shooting, and around the shooting, because they're thinking 0:04:36.200 --> 0:04:39.760 that there's a possibility that something that happened within that 0:04:39.839 --> 0:04:42.559 time could give them more information and at least allow 0:04:42.600 --> 0:04:46.479 them to confirm whether or not they truly acted on 0:04:46.480 --> 0:04:49.039 their own or if they were under the direction of 0:04:49.160 --> 0:04:52.880 some other group, which could potentially and this is an 0:04:52.880 --> 0:04:57.320 FBI argument, which could potentially give the government the ability 0:04:57.400 --> 0:05:01.000 to prevent a future attack. And more to that point, 0:05:01.040 --> 0:05:04.640 neither of them had been listed in any database as 0:05:04.640 --> 0:05:09.240 a potential threat, So that puts extra pressure on the government, 0:05:09.320 --> 0:05:14.720 right because citizens say, well, why did this happen? The 0:05:14.720 --> 0:05:20.080 government says, we followed procedure and neither of them registered 0:05:20.120 --> 0:05:23.080 on any of our There were no red flags, so 0:05:23.120 --> 0:05:26.560 we had no way of knowing. And that means there's 0:05:26.600 --> 0:05:30.120 actual extra pressure on the FBI to investigate this thoroughly, 0:05:31.160 --> 0:05:34.200 partially to show that in fact, everything that could be 0:05:34.279 --> 0:05:38.680 done had been done short of taking some extreme step 0:05:38.720 --> 0:05:41.159 that none of us want to see, right, the idea 0:05:41.160 --> 0:05:44.160 of like, Okay, everyone of Pakistani descent has to leave 0:05:44.200 --> 0:05:47.800 the country. That's ridiculous. We would that's that's returning to 0:05:47.839 --> 0:05:49.800 an era of the United States history that we do 0:05:49.880 --> 0:05:53.640 not want to revisit, a World War two internment camp situation. Yeah, 0:05:53.680 --> 0:05:56.839 we don't want that. We don't want that because it 0:05:57.000 --> 0:06:00.200 is never fair to lump innocent people in for or 0:06:00.240 --> 0:06:03.360 that one of them might be guilty. That's not cool, right, 0:06:03.520 --> 0:06:05.440 this is I'm already getting angry and i haven't even 0:06:05.440 --> 0:06:07.400 gotten to the part about the apple stuff yet. I'm 0:06:07.440 --> 0:06:10.320 going for a slow burned thing myself. That's fair. So 0:06:10.440 --> 0:06:13.839 one of the thing that's that all of this is about, 0:06:14.040 --> 0:06:18.880 ostensibly any at any rate, is an iPhone. It's specifically 0:06:18.880 --> 0:06:23.560 an iPhone five C probably running iOS nine. That's based 0:06:23.640 --> 0:06:30.239 upon the various public filings we've seen about this. And 0:06:30.520 --> 0:06:33.040 it was county owned. It was owned by the Department 0:06:33.080 --> 0:06:36.559 of Public Health and then issued to Farouk who worked 0:06:36.560 --> 0:06:39.839 for the department Department of Public Health, so it was 0:06:39.880 --> 0:06:42.359 county owned. The FBI went to the county and said, 0:06:42.400 --> 0:06:45.760 we want your permission to access the contents on this phone. 0:06:45.760 --> 0:06:48.039 The county said, of course, you have our permission, you 0:06:48.040 --> 0:06:51.200 can access it. Now, if that's all their worked to it, 0:06:51.200 --> 0:06:53.680 it'd be fine. Sure, I would just access the phone. 0:06:53.960 --> 0:06:57.040 They've already received permission from the phone's owner, and they 0:06:57.040 --> 0:06:59.839 could cull through it to look for any evidence that 0:07:00.080 --> 0:07:03.440 would lead them to more information about this crime. But 0:07:05.480 --> 0:07:08.880 there is a security measure on the phone, and it's 0:07:08.920 --> 0:07:11.960 a very simple one. It's on lots of smartphones. It's 0:07:12.560 --> 0:07:16.640 a little password. In this case, it's a four or 0:07:16.640 --> 0:07:21.000 six digit pin which can be alpha numeric if you 0:07:21.240 --> 0:07:24.680 activate that option on the six digit. So it's one 0:07:24.720 --> 0:07:29.080 of the two, we don't know which, and without that pen, 0:07:29.800 --> 0:07:34.960 you cannot access the information because the way the pen works. 0:07:34.960 --> 0:07:36.600 This is where we get into the tech stuff. Been right. 0:07:37.480 --> 0:07:40.400 There are two levels of encryption, or two keys to 0:07:40.440 --> 0:07:43.760 this encryption. One of the keys is the pen. The 0:07:43.800 --> 0:07:48.600 other key is hard coded onto the device itself. All right, 0:07:48.960 --> 0:07:51.240 It's only it's if you think about movies like those 0:07:51.320 --> 0:07:54.000 nineteen eighties movies with the nuclear power, where you have 0:07:54.040 --> 0:07:57.640 to have two generals put their keys into the same 0:07:57.640 --> 0:07:59.640 sort of thing. So if you don't have the pin, 0:08:00.320 --> 0:08:03.360 it can't combine with the hardware key, and therefore you 0:08:03.400 --> 0:08:08.160 cannot unlock the information. The idea here is that Apple 0:08:08.640 --> 0:08:13.600 doesn't have the pen right, which is cool because it 0:08:13.640 --> 0:08:17.440 means that if you or I or you listeners have 0:08:17.840 --> 0:08:21.800 an iPhone, it means you can trust Apple. Because they 0:08:21.880 --> 0:08:24.920 don't know your pin right, they can't access your phone. 0:08:26.560 --> 0:08:29.640 You know, that was the whole point, right, Two points one. 0:08:29.680 --> 0:08:32.679 Apple wanted to make its secure enough so that consumers 0:08:32.679 --> 0:08:36.280 would say, I feel good about buying an iPhone because 0:08:36.360 --> 0:08:39.400 I know whatever I store on it, whether it's something 0:08:39.440 --> 0:08:41.840 that's personal or it's just you know, it's no one 0:08:41.840 --> 0:08:44.800 else's business, whatever it may be, sure no one else 0:08:44.840 --> 0:08:46.480 is going to have access to that unless I give 0:08:46.520 --> 0:08:51.040 them my pen. It's good for Apple, not just because 0:08:51.080 --> 0:08:54.240 consumers are happy, but because Apple then has an out. 0:08:54.360 --> 0:08:56.120 If the government comes to Apple and says, hey, we 0:08:56.160 --> 0:08:58.280 want you to break into this phone, they can literally 0:08:58.320 --> 0:09:01.120 say we cannot do that. It's not that we will not, 0:09:01.320 --> 0:09:05.079 it's that we literally physically cannot grant your request because 0:09:05.120 --> 0:09:09.280 it's impossible. And there's also I would just to expound 0:09:09.320 --> 0:09:13.199 that point a little bit further. This I'm not suggesting 0:09:13.240 --> 0:09:17.480 as their conscious will or intention, but this also removes 0:09:17.520 --> 0:09:22.760 possible culpability. Yes, yes, so all of these are very 0:09:22.800 --> 0:09:25.800 important points, right, So let's get into a little bit 0:09:25.800 --> 0:09:28.520 more of why the FBI is coming to Apple. So 0:09:29.520 --> 0:09:32.360 let's say that it's a four digit pin. Okay, all right, 0:09:32.559 --> 0:09:37.160 all numeric, all numeric, simplest version. That means there are 0:09:37.200 --> 0:09:41.760 ten thousand combinations that are possible for that pen. That's it. 0:09:41.880 --> 0:09:44.840 That's you're limited to ten thousand, okay, which is that's 0:09:44.840 --> 0:09:47.280 a lot, but it's not that much if you're going 0:09:47.280 --> 0:09:50.080 to do something like a brute force attack. Right. So, 0:09:50.120 --> 0:09:52.840 if you do a brute force attack on a normal system, 0:09:53.120 --> 0:09:55.720 and there are only ten thousand variations, it's with a 0:09:55.720 --> 0:09:58.000 fast enough computer, it's just a matter of minutes, right, 0:09:58.240 --> 0:10:01.600 But there are some limitations on the iPhone that make 0:10:01.679 --> 0:10:06.760 this harder. Does it freeze if you enter the incorrect pin? Oh? 0:10:06.800 --> 0:10:09.640 It does more than freeze, all right. So first of all, 0:10:09.640 --> 0:10:13.000 there is an eighty millisecond delay when you enter a 0:10:13.000 --> 0:10:15.480 pin and when it gets verified that it is or 0:10:15.640 --> 0:10:18.080 is not the correct one when the key turns right. 0:10:18.200 --> 0:10:21.160 So with that eighty millisecond delay, that doesn't sound like much, 0:10:21.240 --> 0:10:23.800 but it means you can't just blast a whole bunch 0:10:23.840 --> 0:10:26.400 of numbers through. Also, you have to type it in 0:10:26.480 --> 0:10:28.679 on a screen. You can't hook it up to a 0:10:28.720 --> 0:10:33.120 computer and just digitally send the various pin combinations to 0:10:33.160 --> 0:10:35.280 try and get through. You have to actually tap them 0:10:35.320 --> 0:10:37.640 on the screen to do it over and over. So 0:10:37.679 --> 0:10:41.040 that means you tap in the number eighty milliseconds pass, 0:10:41.080 --> 0:10:45.600 you get the confirmation or denial. Tap in a number next. 0:10:47.920 --> 0:10:53.959 If you hit ten consecutive incorrect pen entries, the phone 0:10:53.960 --> 0:10:56.679 interprets that as saying someone else who is not the 0:10:56.679 --> 0:10:59.360 owner has gotten possession of this phone. So in order 0:10:59.400 --> 0:11:03.800 to protect the owner's information, we're scrambling everything and you 0:11:03.920 --> 0:11:08.160 lose all the metadata. Everything is useless. So even if 0:11:08.200 --> 0:11:10.319 you got the pen afterward, you would not be able 0:11:10.360 --> 0:11:11.920 to access the stuff you were looking for in the 0:11:11.920 --> 0:11:14.400 first place. You would maybe be able to turn on 0:11:14.440 --> 0:11:16.959 the phone, but there wouldn't be anything there to find. Yeah, 0:11:16.800 --> 0:11:19.800 you would have just you would have just it would 0:11:19.840 --> 0:11:22.680 be like you just accidentally set fire to the file room, 0:11:23.400 --> 0:11:25.280 Like you know, like you can't get into the file 0:11:25.360 --> 0:11:28.400 room door, and whatever you try and do accidentally sets 0:11:28.400 --> 0:11:30.520 a fire inside the file room. You then get the 0:11:30.600 --> 0:11:32.280 key to the file room, and then you think, well, 0:11:32.679 --> 0:11:37.199 what's the point lady lost everything, and it's it's virtually assured. 0:11:37.720 --> 0:11:42.000 Yeah that out of those thousand, yeah, out of those 0:11:42.000 --> 0:11:46.000 ten thousand tries, your first ten are going to be wrong. Yeah, 0:11:46.040 --> 0:11:48.400 I mean just the odds are pretty much against you, 0:11:48.559 --> 0:11:54.640 unless you're ridiculously lucky. So there's that, and of course 0:11:54.679 --> 0:11:58.280 they don't they also if it were an actual later iPhone, 0:11:58.320 --> 0:12:01.360 if it weren't the iPhone five C, they would have 0:12:01.400 --> 0:12:05.640 an added problem, which is that with the later models 0:12:06.040 --> 0:12:10.640 there's an additional delay after four failed tries. So if 0:12:10.640 --> 0:12:13.360 you try four times and fail, it will then give 0:12:13.400 --> 0:12:15.400 you a five second delay before you can try the 0:12:15.400 --> 0:12:17.920 fifth time. After that, it gives you a fifteen second 0:12:17.960 --> 0:12:20.440 delay after that, like by the time you get to 0:12:20.480 --> 0:12:24.000 the ninth try, it's an hour delay. Like, think about 0:12:24.040 --> 0:12:27.400 what you're doing, right, So, but the five C doesn't 0:12:27.400 --> 0:12:29.760 have that, so you may have read about that delay. 0:12:29.800 --> 0:12:33.679 It does not qualify for this particular space. Through force 0:12:33.800 --> 0:12:37.320 won't work in the most basic pin situation. But in 0:12:37.360 --> 0:12:40.520 the sixth digit alpha numeric, I just imagine the same 0:12:40.600 --> 0:12:44.280 rules apply, but the yeah, yeah, yeah exactly, But the 0:12:44.559 --> 0:12:48.720 possible answers are much greater because now you've got six 0:12:48.760 --> 0:12:53.360 digits you've also got the possibility of alpha characters in 0:12:53.360 --> 0:12:59.240 their alphabet characters. I believe so. Um so, anyway, from 0:12:59.240 --> 0:13:00.960 why I hear, if you were to try and use 0:13:00.960 --> 0:13:04.599 brute force on a six digit alpha numeric one, it 0:13:04.600 --> 0:13:06.920 would take you with a with a fast computer that 0:13:07.000 --> 0:13:09.560 had been optimized for this, it would take you about 0:13:09.600 --> 0:13:12.760 six years to break through it. And that's going through 0:13:12.800 --> 0:13:16.360 all the different possible combinations, assuming that there's not another 0:13:16.480 --> 0:13:19.200 kill switch type deal like there is with the iPhone. 0:13:19.320 --> 0:13:22.080 By the way, that's software that Apple has built into 0:13:22.200 --> 0:13:25.319 the iPhone, or really firmware that Apple is built into 0:13:25.360 --> 0:13:29.760 the iPhone. It's not like it's a fundamental you know 0:13:29.920 --> 0:13:33.480 quality that all smartphones. Oh right, yeah, yeah, that's that's 0:13:33.520 --> 0:13:38.520 specific to Apple phones. Right, So you've got this problem, right, 0:13:38.520 --> 0:13:41.240 You have the FBI. They've gotten permission from the owner 0:13:41.320 --> 0:13:45.400 of the phone to access the phone's contents, but the 0:13:45.440 --> 0:13:48.040 owner of the phone doesn't know the pen because the 0:13:48.080 --> 0:13:51.599 owner of the phone had had issued it to an employee. 0:13:51.640 --> 0:13:54.320 The employee had come up with the pen, So they 0:13:54.320 --> 0:13:55.800 don't know. If it's a four digit, they don't know, 0:13:55.840 --> 0:13:59.080 if it's a six digit, they don't know. They don't 0:13:59.120 --> 0:14:02.520 know if this this feature where after ten tries everything 0:14:02.559 --> 0:14:05.280 gets erased. They don't know if that's necessarily active because 0:14:05.280 --> 0:14:09.120 you can turn it off, but all indications point to 0:14:09.160 --> 0:14:12.320 it being on. For one, it was on when the 0:14:12.360 --> 0:14:16.800 phone was issued to Farouk right, and people typically don't 0:14:17.000 --> 0:14:22.440 change their defaults vs phone users. So FBI wants Apple 0:14:22.520 --> 0:14:27.000 to do something particular, and it's something different from what 0:14:27.160 --> 0:14:31.800 we've talked about in previous episodes about a backdoor entrance 0:14:31.920 --> 0:14:35.000 into a system. It's not quite the same thing. So 0:14:35.920 --> 0:14:38.760 you've got this phone, you can't brute force attack it 0:14:38.840 --> 0:14:45.080 without risking damaging the contents. Apple cannot access the information 0:14:45.080 --> 0:14:47.880 on this phone by design, they did not want that 0:14:48.000 --> 0:14:52.080 to have that capability. So what the FBI wants Apple 0:14:52.120 --> 0:14:56.680 to do is build a new version of iOS just 0:14:56.840 --> 0:15:00.320 for this phone, a specific iOS for this own that 0:15:00.400 --> 0:15:06.000 disables the safety features that would one prevent brute force 0:15:06.040 --> 0:15:11.000 attacks from happening quickly, to allow brute force attacks to 0:15:11.040 --> 0:15:13.720 happen by hooking up the phone to a computer so 0:15:13.760 --> 0:15:15.520 you don't have to tap those numbers in it shore 0:15:16.240 --> 0:15:21.440 and three disabling that kill switch. So what the FBI 0:15:21.520 --> 0:15:24.000 wants Apple to do is to build up a brand 0:15:24.000 --> 0:15:29.440 new iOS again just for this one phone, and then 0:15:29.200 --> 0:15:32.640 install it on the phone. This would all you know, 0:15:32.720 --> 0:15:38.280 hypothetically happen on Apple grounds, like at an Apple location, 0:15:38.480 --> 0:15:43.400 either at the corporate headquarters or wherever. And then in theory, 0:15:44.320 --> 0:15:50.560 you would then destroy the the the custom iOS because 0:15:50.600 --> 0:15:53.480 you only needed it for that one phone, right, because 0:15:53.480 --> 0:15:56.880 it was so easy to toss the one ring, bring 0:15:56.880 --> 0:16:00.000 it back to more door and destroy it. Right. Yeah, yeah, 0:15:59.840 --> 0:16:04.000 you know what, Mount Doom plenty of backdoors. It's fine, 0:16:04.280 --> 0:16:07.440 it's integral to the plot. That was That was Sauron's 0:16:07.520 --> 0:16:11.280 problem was that he did not plug the security vulnerabilities 0:16:11.560 --> 0:16:15.880 into Mount Doom. I mean, that's that's a classic example, 0:16:16.080 --> 0:16:18.200 like you know, right up there with the whole land 0:16:18.200 --> 0:16:22.040 War with Asia thing. So FBI has been very very 0:16:22.040 --> 0:16:25.840 careful in framing this in a way that presents it 0:16:25.920 --> 0:16:30.600 as a reasonable request, one time thing. That's a that's 0:16:30.600 --> 0:16:33.680 a big deal, right saying this is for one phone 0:16:33.680 --> 0:16:36.240 and one phone only, you would you know, we're suggesting 0:16:36.240 --> 0:16:39.400 the Apple creates an iOS that's directly tied to a 0:16:39.880 --> 0:16:44.680 unique identifier on that phone, meaning even if the iOS 0:16:44.760 --> 0:16:47.920 were somehow to leak, sure it would not be applicable 0:16:47.920 --> 0:16:50.480 to any other device on the market, so it could 0:16:50.560 --> 0:16:52.760 only work for this one phone. So that that sounds 0:16:52.760 --> 0:16:57.080 good in its current form. That's that's important. They didn't 0:16:57.120 --> 0:16:59.280 go so far as to say that that's the important 0:16:59.280 --> 0:17:04.320 part that's left out, but yeah, so that's that was reasonable. 0:17:04.359 --> 0:17:06.639 You could argue saying this is for one case only. 0:17:06.760 --> 0:17:10.560 It's it's an important case. People died as a result, extraordinary, 0:17:10.680 --> 0:17:13.879 and we need to have a clear timeline because we 0:17:14.000 --> 0:17:16.520 don't know if there's something what is there something planned 0:17:16.520 --> 0:17:20.399 for December second, twenty sixteen, right, or was there another 0:17:20.440 --> 0:17:23.359 person involved that we need to get hold of, because 0:17:23.400 --> 0:17:29.159 otherwise that this could happen again. So they've said, you know, 0:17:29.320 --> 0:17:31.800 one time only, use going to destroy it after that 0:17:31.960 --> 0:17:35.160 use Hey, an Apple, if you don't want to make 0:17:35.200 --> 0:17:38.560 this iOS, that's fine, you don't have to do it. 0:17:38.680 --> 0:17:41.800 We'll do it. We'll hire some people to reverse engineer it, 0:17:41.920 --> 0:17:46.800 build out an iOS ourselves. Here's the thing, though, Those 0:17:46.840 --> 0:17:52.160 iPhones will only verify firmware if there's a special Apple 0:17:52.280 --> 0:17:56.800 digital signature attached to the firmware. So in other words, 0:17:57.200 --> 0:18:00.960 if the digital signature, which is unique to Apple, if 0:18:01.000 --> 0:18:03.800 that's not in there, it won't be verified by the device, 0:18:03.880 --> 0:18:09.240 it won't be loaded on because Apple famously wants to 0:18:09.320 --> 0:18:12.840 make sure that their hardware and software works together. And 0:18:12.920 --> 0:18:15.119 that's it. No one else gets to play in that 0:18:15.640 --> 0:18:19.280 play box. Yeah, it's the same with their Matt computers forever, right, 0:18:19.359 --> 0:18:23.400 Like you were really meant to run Apple software on 0:18:23.480 --> 0:18:27.200 Apple hardware and never the twain shall part, right, So, 0:18:28.560 --> 0:18:31.879 same thing with this iPhone. So the fbis is so 0:18:32.080 --> 0:18:34.840 we're not even asking you to give us the digital signature, 0:18:34.880 --> 0:18:37.880 which would be disastrous if Apple did that. The whole 0:18:37.920 --> 0:18:40.040 point of the signature is to make sure that only 0:18:40.080 --> 0:18:43.160 Apple can do this stuff. What they're saying is will 0:18:44.000 --> 0:18:47.520 make this iOS, will give it to you. Yes, you 0:18:47.560 --> 0:18:49.719 will sign off and send it. Right, you give a 0:18:49.720 --> 0:18:52.600 little stamp of approval with your little digital signature, and 0:18:52.640 --> 0:18:54.840 then we can load it onto this phone. But that 0:18:54.880 --> 0:18:57.680 way you don't even have to build the code. See 0:18:57.760 --> 0:19:01.920 we're being really reasonable. We'll be back with more with 0:19:02.000 --> 0:19:17.399 Apple versus the FBI after these quick messages. So here's 0:19:17.520 --> 0:19:22.879 here's the other issue. Apple kind of shot itself in 0:19:22.920 --> 0:19:26.440 the foot. See this is kind of a workaround already, 0:19:26.440 --> 0:19:30.280 this idea of being able to create a new kind 0:19:30.280 --> 0:19:34.520 of firmware to work around the security measures while not 0:19:34.640 --> 0:19:38.160 affecting any of the underlying data. The reason why that's 0:19:38.200 --> 0:19:42.040 possible at all is that Apple has allowed for the 0:19:42.080 --> 0:19:46.280 possibility of issuing a firmware update to a phone without 0:19:46.320 --> 0:19:51.760 the phone's owner having to accept it. Ah. Yes, see, 0:19:51.800 --> 0:19:55.959 if Apple had designed this so that when it pushed 0:19:56.000 --> 0:19:59.359 out a firmware update, you, as the user, had to 0:19:59.400 --> 0:20:02.679 log into your phone and accept it, there'd be no 0:20:02.720 --> 0:20:05.000 way for Apple to do this because you would already 0:20:05.000 --> 0:20:08.440 have to have the pen in order to accept the update. 0:20:08.840 --> 0:20:11.439 So you can't work your way around the pin because 0:20:11.480 --> 0:20:13.520 even the update to try and do the workaround would 0:20:13.560 --> 0:20:15.840 still need the pen. But that's not the case. Apple 0:20:16.000 --> 0:20:21.800 can issue a firmware update without the user's consent. This, 0:20:22.000 --> 0:20:25.520 by the way, also a security problem. Not just a 0:20:25.560 --> 0:20:28.720 security problem in this particular case. But what if someone 0:20:28.760 --> 0:20:31.600 at Apple, you know, decided to code it in so 0:20:31.640 --> 0:20:37.080 that you could activate the microphone remotely. Yeah, and they 0:20:37.119 --> 0:20:40.000 and they shoot this firmware update out and you don't 0:20:40.080 --> 0:20:43.600 have the ability to deny it. You might not even 0:20:43.640 --> 0:20:45.800 be aware that it happens unless you happen to be 0:20:45.880 --> 0:20:48.480 using your phone when the firmware update gets pushed to 0:20:48.480 --> 0:20:53.920 your phone. That's an issue. So because Apple can do this, 0:20:54.000 --> 0:20:59.200 that gives FBI the the leg up to make this request. 0:21:00.080 --> 0:21:05.240 So the FBI just is trying to be as reasonable 0:21:05.240 --> 0:21:09.719 as possible in their request while avoiding the addressing the 0:21:09.760 --> 0:21:17.440 problems that could arise should Apple agree to it. And yeah, 0:21:17.480 --> 0:21:22.080 that's that's the thing. Okay, that's that's that's the thing. 0:21:22.240 --> 0:21:27.840 No matter how single use this might be. Yeah, no 0:21:27.880 --> 0:21:34.480 matter how noble or even crucial the cause, right, there's 0:21:34.680 --> 0:21:39.520 not there is not a practical way that this would 0:21:39.560 --> 0:21:43.240 work without severe repercussions. Yeah, there's a there's a word 0:21:43.280 --> 0:21:47.399 I like to use in this case. It's called precedent. Ah. 0:21:47.400 --> 0:21:53.960 So when you said a precedent where Apple agrees, acquiesces, surrenders, 0:21:54.760 --> 0:21:57.720 is compelled to however you want to put it, to 0:21:58.520 --> 0:22:04.840 agree to FBI's demands, you can't undo that. That has happened. 0:22:05.880 --> 0:22:09.840 And perhaps more importantly, not only has it happened in 0:22:09.880 --> 0:22:14.080 the US government, but now other governments that operate where 0:22:14.119 --> 0:22:18.080 Apple sells products could come to Apple and say, we 0:22:18.119 --> 0:22:20.400 know you can do this because you have done it, 0:22:20.760 --> 0:22:22.840 and we know you will do this because you did 0:22:22.920 --> 0:22:24.760 do it. So if you want to do business in 0:22:24.800 --> 0:22:28.040 our country, you know, the one that starts with Chu 0:22:28.280 --> 0:22:31.920 and ends with Aina. You will do this for us. 0:22:31.960 --> 0:22:34.760 And when you're talking about a government like China's government, 0:22:35.200 --> 0:22:39.040 you could see how this could be used to an 0:22:39.080 --> 0:22:43.960 abusive extent. Anyone who is identified as a dissident could 0:22:44.000 --> 0:22:50.040 be targeted. And China's an enormous market. Right, Apple cannot, 0:22:50.080 --> 0:22:54.520 as a publicly traded company turn its back on the 0:22:54.520 --> 0:22:58.360 biggest emerging market in the world, not even emerging, it's emerged, 0:22:58.640 --> 0:23:01.239 the biggest market in the world. Also, it's a there 0:23:01.240 --> 0:23:05.439 are manufacturing basis for apples in China. That's part of it. 0:23:05.480 --> 0:23:09.280 That's already been a security concern. Let's also consider I mean, 0:23:09.600 --> 0:23:13.240 if we're being honest, Okay, how how do I say 0:23:13.280 --> 0:23:19.680 this correctly? Jonathan? Oh? Yes, Okay. While there is no 0:23:20.119 --> 0:23:26.360 universally acknowledged proof that corporate corporate espionage projects or operations 0:23:26.440 --> 0:23:31.399 coming from China are sponsored by the government, right, there 0:23:31.640 --> 0:23:38.760 is widespread certitude that that is the case. Ockham's razor, right, Right, 0:23:38.920 --> 0:23:42.360 Ockom's razor. You look at it and you think, okay, 0:23:42.440 --> 0:23:47.040 it is entirely possible that any hackers operating in China One, 0:23:47.480 --> 0:23:52.960 maybe they're not Chinese. Unlikely but possible too. Maybe they're 0:23:52.960 --> 0:23:56.399 operating from a different country and using proxies to go 0:23:56.520 --> 0:23:59.399 through China. But considering the firewall of China, that seems 0:23:59.440 --> 0:24:05.560 like that extra headache for those hackers. Three, they could 0:24:05.600 --> 0:24:08.520 be operating. They could be Chinese and operating in China, 0:24:08.640 --> 0:24:12.160 but not be directed by the Chinese government, in which 0:24:12.160 --> 0:24:15.400 case they would still have to use proxies in order 0:24:15.400 --> 0:24:19.040 to access that level of infrastructure. It just gets to 0:24:19.040 --> 0:24:21.760 a point where you think the simplest explanation is, in fact, 0:24:21.800 --> 0:24:25.399 there are these state backed hackers that are doing this 0:24:25.560 --> 0:24:28.720 on behalf or on the request of Chinese government. If 0:24:28.760 --> 0:24:33.159 not on the request, at least with the implicit approval. 0:24:33.320 --> 0:24:35.240 There we go at least someone looking the other way. 0:24:35.240 --> 0:24:38.120 But even that's not enough. There's assistance involved anyway. I'm 0:24:38.480 --> 0:24:41.359 derailing us as well. The point being that if if 0:24:41.400 --> 0:24:44.960 Apple were to agree to this FBI request, that is 0:24:45.040 --> 0:24:47.720 a distinct possibility that it would face not only future 0:24:47.760 --> 0:24:52.679 requests from from other government agencies as well as the FBI, 0:24:53.040 --> 0:24:56.000 but from other countries as well, and that it would 0:24:56.040 --> 0:24:59.800 it would be the wedge that drives open the possibility 0:24:59.800 --> 0:25:02.520 of the things like these backdoors that Apple and other 0:25:02.520 --> 0:25:06.240 companies have been resisting for years now. No, there is 0:25:06.280 --> 0:25:08.200 one other there there is a case that I think 0:25:08.200 --> 0:25:11.440 we should clarify here. Um when we talk about precedent, 0:25:11.880 --> 0:25:15.080 there have been precedents in the in the legal past 0:25:15.480 --> 0:25:21.680 wherein Uncle Sam was allowed to compel a company right 0:25:21.920 --> 0:25:24.120 to do and this is different. But we do need 0:25:24.160 --> 0:25:27.560 to I think we need to differentiate these because it 0:25:27.680 --> 0:25:32.560 is legal in the US to compel a third party, 0:25:32.600 --> 0:25:37.640