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Speaker 1: Welcome to tech Stuff, a production from iHeartRadio. Hey there,

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Speaker 1: and welcome to tech Stuff. I'm your host, Jonathan Strickland.

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Speaker 1: I'm an executive producer with iHeartRadio and How the tech

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Speaker 1: Are Yet it is a Friday, which means it's time

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Speaker 1: for a classic episode of tech Stuff. This one is

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Speaker 1: titled Apple versus the FBI, and originally it published on

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Speaker 1: March second, twenty sixteen. This is sort of an ongoing

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Speaker 1: struggle between companies like Apple and various agencies because, as

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Speaker 1: we will hear in this episode, the FBI wanted ways

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Speaker 1: to be able to access locked iPhones that had been

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Speaker 1: recovered from say a suspect, and Apple is trying to

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Speaker 1: do its best to maintain consumer confidence by tecting their

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Speaker 1: data and their devices. We've heard similar things, which I'll

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Speaker 1: talk about more at the end of this episode, that

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Speaker 1: have involved other law enforcement agencies and investigative agencies here

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Speaker 1: in the United States. But first let's listen to this

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Speaker 1: classic episode from twenty sixteen. So we're gonna talk about

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Speaker 1: something that's actually we're gonna have to work very hard

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Speaker 1: for multiple reasons because we're talking about Apple versus the FBI.

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Speaker 1: The whole story that's unfolding as we record this, and

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Speaker 1: to talk about what is behind that case, what are

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Speaker 1: the implications, what is the FBI's argument, what is Apple's argument?

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Speaker 1: And in addition to that, we have, of course the

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Speaker 1: added responsibility of remembering that this is all centered around

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Speaker 1: a truly awful crime. Yes, absolutely so. The what we're

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Speaker 1: what we're talking about specifically hit inanstream news when Apple

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Speaker 1: did something that a lot of tech companies have never done.

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Speaker 1: They issued a blanket statement letter and went public. Yeah,

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Speaker 1: with they went public with a response to an FBI request.

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Speaker 1: But I guess I'm getting ahead of it. What was

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Speaker 1: the crime? Well, let's yeah, let's I'll give you the

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Speaker 1: background on what's happened and we'll build from there. So

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Speaker 1: first we have to look back on December second, twenty

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Speaker 1: fifteen in San Bernardino, California. That's in southern California, and

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Speaker 1: that's when two well an American citizen and a legal

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Speaker 1: resident husband wife team, both of Pakistani descent, committed a

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Speaker 1: mass shooting. It was a Sayed Rizwantharouk and tash Fen

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Speaker 1: Malik who committed this act, and it happened at the

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Speaker 1: Department of Public Health. They were having an event that

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Speaker 1: was starting off as a training event and then it

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Speaker 1: was supposed to transition into a holiday event. And after

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Speaker 1: the training element, Farouk, who was actually at the event,

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Speaker 1: he was in the employee of the Department of Public Health,

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Speaker 1: he was a food inspector, left, came back with his wife.

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Speaker 1: They were both heavily armed and they both started firing

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Speaker 1: into the crowd of people at the Department of Public Health.

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Speaker 1: Fourteen people were killed, twenty two injured. Very serious crime.

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Speaker 1: Then far and Malik left. They fled the scene. Turned

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Speaker 1: out they had also left behind an explosive device, which

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Speaker 1: thankfully did not detonate. Failed to detonate, and they fled

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Speaker 1: in a vehicle that they had rented a few days before,

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Speaker 1: and several hours later law enforcement tracked them down. There

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Speaker 1: was a confrontation, there was a shootout, and then both

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Speaker 1: of the shooters died as a result of that shootout.

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Speaker 1: The FBI has stated that they believed, based upon the

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Speaker 1: evidence they were able to find that the two were

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Speaker 1: acting on their own, that they were not part of

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Speaker 1: some sort of terrorist cell in the United States. However,

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Speaker 1: they can't be absolutely certain of that. That's where the

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Speaker 1: crux of this issue with Apple is going to come

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Speaker 1: into play, and the big part of it is they

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Speaker 1: can't account for it's just less than twenty minutes of

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Speaker 1: the activity that happened between the shooting or leading up

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Speaker 1: to the shooting, and around the shooting, because they're thinking

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Speaker 1: that there's a possibility that something that happened within that

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Speaker 1: time could give them more information and at least allow

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Speaker 1: them to confirm whether or not they truly acted on

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Speaker 1: their own or if they were under the direction of

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Speaker 1: some other group, which could potentially and this is an

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Speaker 1: FBI argument, which could potentially give the government the ability

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Speaker 1: to prevent a future attack. And more to that point,

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Speaker 1: neither of them had been listed in any database as

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Speaker 1: a potential threat, So that puts extra pressure on the government,

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Speaker 1: right because citizens say, well, why did this happen? The

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Speaker 1: government says, we followed procedure and neither of them registered

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Speaker 1: on any of our There were no red flags, so

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Speaker 1: we had no way of knowing. And that means there's

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Speaker 1: actual extra pressure on the FBI to investigate this thoroughly,

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Speaker 1: partially to show that in fact, everything that could be

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Speaker 1: done had been done short of taking some extreme step

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Speaker 1: that none of us want to see, right, the idea

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Speaker 1: of like, Okay, everyone of Pakistani descent has to leave

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Speaker 1: the country. That's ridiculous. We would that's that's returning to

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Speaker 1: an era of the United States history that we do

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Speaker 1: not want to revisit, a World War two internment camp situation. Yeah,

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Speaker 1: we don't want that. We don't want that because it

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Speaker 1: is never fair to lump innocent people in for or

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Speaker 1: that one of them might be guilty. That's not cool, right,

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Speaker 1: this is I'm already getting angry and i haven't even

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Speaker 1: gotten to the part about the apple stuff yet. I'm

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Speaker 1: going for a slow burned thing myself. That's fair. So

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Speaker 1: one of the thing that's that all of this is about,

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Speaker 1: ostensibly any at any rate, is an iPhone. It's specifically

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Speaker 1: an iPhone five C probably running iOS nine. That's based

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Speaker 1: upon the various public filings we've seen about this. And

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Speaker 1: it was county owned. It was owned by the Department

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Speaker 1: of Public Health and then issued to Farouk who worked

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Speaker 1: for the department Department of Public Health, so it was

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Speaker 1: county owned. The FBI went to the county and said,

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Speaker 1: we want your permission to access the contents on this phone.

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Speaker 1: The county said, of course, you have our permission, you

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Speaker 1: can access it. Now, if that's all their worked to it,

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Speaker 1: it'd be fine. Sure, I would just access the phone.

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Speaker 1: They've already received permission from the phone's owner, and they

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Speaker 1: could cull through it to look for any evidence that

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Speaker 1: would lead them to more information about this crime. But

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Speaker 1: there is a security measure on the phone, and it's

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Speaker 1: a very simple one. It's on lots of smartphones. It's

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Speaker 1: a little password. In this case, it's a four or

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Speaker 1: six digit pin which can be alpha numeric if you

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Speaker 1: activate that option on the six digit. So it's one

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Speaker 1: of the two, we don't know which, and without that pen,

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Speaker 1: you cannot access the information because the way the pen works.

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Speaker 1: This is where we get into the tech stuff. Been right.

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Speaker 1: There are two levels of encryption, or two keys to

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Speaker 1: this encryption. One of the keys is the pen. The

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Speaker 1: other key is hard coded onto the device itself. All right,

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Speaker 1: It's only it's if you think about movies like those

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Speaker 1: nineteen eighties movies with the nuclear power, where you have

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Speaker 1: to have two generals put their keys into the same

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Speaker 1: sort of thing. So if you don't have the pin,

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Speaker 1: it can't combine with the hardware key, and therefore you

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Speaker 1: cannot unlock the information. The idea here is that Apple

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Speaker 1: doesn't have the pen right, which is cool because it

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Speaker 1: means that if you or I or you listeners have

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Speaker 1: an iPhone, it means you can trust Apple. Because they

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Speaker 1: don't know your pin right, they can't access your phone.

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Speaker 1: You know, that was the whole point, right, Two points one.

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Speaker 1: Apple wanted to make its secure enough so that consumers

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Speaker 1: would say, I feel good about buying an iPhone because

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Speaker 1: I know whatever I store on it, whether it's something

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Speaker 1: that's personal or it's just you know, it's no one

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Speaker 1: else's business, whatever it may be, sure no one else

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Speaker 1: is going to have access to that unless I give

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Speaker 1: them my pen. It's good for Apple, not just because

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Speaker 1: consumers are happy, but because Apple then has an out.

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Speaker 1: If the government comes to Apple and says, hey, we

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Speaker 1: want you to break into this phone, they can literally

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Speaker 1: say we cannot do that. It's not that we will not,

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Speaker 1: it's that we literally physically cannot grant your request because

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Speaker 1: it's impossible. And there's also I would just to expound

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Speaker 1: that point a little bit further. This I'm not suggesting

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Speaker 1: as their conscious will or intention, but this also removes

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Speaker 1: possible culpability. Yes, yes, so all of these are very

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Speaker 1: important points, right, So let's get into a little bit

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Speaker 1: more of why the FBI is coming to Apple. So

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Speaker 1: let's say that it's a four digit pin. Okay, all right,

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Speaker 1: all numeric, all numeric, simplest version. That means there are

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Speaker 1: ten thousand combinations that are possible for that pen. That's it.

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Speaker 1: That's you're limited to ten thousand, okay, which is that's

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Speaker 1: a lot, but it's not that much if you're going

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Speaker 1: to do something like a brute force attack. Right. So,

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Speaker 1: if you do a brute force attack on a normal system,

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Speaker 1: and there are only ten thousand variations, it's with a

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Speaker 1: fast enough computer, it's just a matter of minutes, right,

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Speaker 1: But there are some limitations on the iPhone that make

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Speaker 1: this harder. Does it freeze if you enter the incorrect pin? Oh?

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Speaker 1: It does more than freeze, all right. So first of all,

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Speaker 1: there is an eighty millisecond delay when you enter a

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Speaker 1: pin and when it gets verified that it is or

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Speaker 1: is not the correct one when the key turns right.

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Speaker 1: So with that eighty millisecond delay, that doesn't sound like much,

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Speaker 1: but it means you can't just blast a whole bunch

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Speaker 1: of numbers through. Also, you have to type it in

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Speaker 1: on a screen. You can't hook it up to a

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Speaker 1: computer and just digitally send the various pin combinations to

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Speaker 1: try and get through. You have to actually tap them

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Speaker 1: on the screen to do it over and over. So

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Speaker 1: that means you tap in the number eighty milliseconds pass,

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Speaker 1: you get the confirmation or denial. Tap in a number next.

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Speaker 1: If you hit ten consecutive incorrect pen entries, the phone

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Speaker 1: interprets that as saying someone else who is not the

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Speaker 1: owner has gotten possession of this phone. So in order

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Speaker 1: to protect the owner's information, we're scrambling everything and you

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Speaker 1: lose all the metadata. Everything is useless. So even if

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Speaker 1: you got the pen afterward, you would not be able

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Speaker 1: to access the stuff you were looking for in the

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Speaker 1: first place. You would maybe be able to turn on

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Speaker 1: the phone, but there wouldn't be anything there to find. Yeah,

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Speaker 1: you would have just you would have just it would

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Speaker 1: be like you just accidentally set fire to the file room,

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Speaker 1: Like you know, like you can't get into the file

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Speaker 1: room door, and whatever you try and do accidentally sets

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Speaker 1: a fire inside the file room. You then get the

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Speaker 1: key to the file room, and then you think, well,

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Speaker 1: what's the point lady lost everything, and it's it's virtually assured.

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Speaker 1: Yeah that out of those thousand, yeah, out of those

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Speaker 1: ten thousand tries, your first ten are going to be wrong. Yeah,

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Speaker 1: I mean just the odds are pretty much against you,

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Speaker 1: unless you're ridiculously lucky. So there's that, and of course

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Speaker 1: they don't they also if it were an actual later iPhone,

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Speaker 1: if it weren't the iPhone five C, they would have

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Speaker 1: an added problem, which is that with the later models

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Speaker 1: there's an additional delay after four failed tries. So if

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Speaker 1: you try four times and fail, it will then give

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Speaker 1: you a five second delay before you can try the

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Speaker 1: fifth time. After that, it gives you a fifteen second

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Speaker 1: delay after that, like by the time you get to

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Speaker 1: the ninth try, it's an hour delay. Like, think about

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Speaker 1: what you're doing, right, So, but the five C doesn't

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Speaker 1: have that, so you may have read about that delay.

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Speaker 1: It does not qualify for this particular space. Through force

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Speaker 1: won't work in the most basic pin situation. But in

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Speaker 1: the sixth digit alpha numeric, I just imagine the same

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Speaker 1: rules apply, but the yeah, yeah, yeah exactly, But the

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Speaker 1: possible answers are much greater because now you've got six

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Speaker 1: digits you've also got the possibility of alpha characters in

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Speaker 1: their alphabet characters. I believe so. Um so, anyway, from

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Speaker 1: why I hear, if you were to try and use

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Speaker 1: brute force on a six digit alpha numeric one, it

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Speaker 1: would take you with a with a fast computer that

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Speaker 1: had been optimized for this, it would take you about

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Speaker 1: six years to break through it. And that's going through

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Speaker 1: all the different possible combinations, assuming that there's not another

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Speaker 1: kill switch type deal like there is with the iPhone.

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Speaker 1: By the way, that's software that Apple has built into

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Speaker 1: the iPhone, or really firmware that Apple is built into

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Speaker 1: the iPhone. It's not like it's a fundamental you know

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Speaker 1: quality that all smartphones. Oh right, yeah, yeah, that's that's

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Speaker 1: specific to Apple phones. Right, So you've got this problem, right,

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Speaker 1: You have the FBI. They've gotten permission from the owner

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Speaker 1: of the phone to access the phone's contents, but the

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Speaker 1: owner of the phone doesn't know the pen because the

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Speaker 1: owner of the phone had had issued it to an employee.

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Speaker 1: The employee had come up with the pen, So they

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Speaker 1: don't know. If it's a four digit, they don't know,

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Speaker 1: if it's a six digit, they don't know. They don't

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Speaker 1: know if this this feature where after ten tries everything

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Speaker 1: gets erased. They don't know if that's necessarily active because

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Speaker 1: you can turn it off, but all indications point to

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Speaker 1: it being on. For one, it was on when the

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Speaker 1: phone was issued to Farouk right, and people typically don't

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Speaker 1: change their defaults vs phone users. So FBI wants Apple

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Speaker 1: to do something particular, and it's something different from what

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Speaker 1: we've talked about in previous episodes about a backdoor entrance

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Speaker 1: into a system. It's not quite the same thing. So

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Speaker 1: you've got this phone, you can't brute force attack it

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Speaker 1: without risking damaging the contents. Apple cannot access the information

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Speaker 1: on this phone by design, they did not want that

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Speaker 1: to have that capability. So what the FBI wants Apple

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Speaker 1: to do is build a new version of iOS just

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Speaker 1: for this phone, a specific iOS for this own that

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Speaker 1: disables the safety features that would one prevent brute force

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Speaker 1: attacks from happening quickly, to allow brute force attacks to

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Speaker 1: happen by hooking up the phone to a computer so

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Speaker 1: you don't have to tap those numbers in it shore

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Speaker 1: and three disabling that kill switch. So what the FBI

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Speaker 1: wants Apple to do is to build up a brand

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Speaker 1: new iOS again just for this one phone, and then

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Speaker 1: install it on the phone. This would all you know,

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Speaker 1: hypothetically happen on Apple grounds, like at an Apple location,

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Speaker 1: either at the corporate headquarters or wherever. And then in theory,

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Speaker 1: you would then destroy the the the custom iOS because

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Speaker 1: you only needed it for that one phone, right, because

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Speaker 1: it was so easy to toss the one ring, bring

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Speaker 1: it back to more door and destroy it. Right. Yeah, yeah,

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Speaker 1: you know what, Mount Doom plenty of backdoors. It's fine,

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Speaker 1: it's integral to the plot. That was That was Sauron's

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Speaker 1: problem was that he did not plug the security vulnerabilities

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Speaker 1: into Mount Doom. I mean, that's that's a classic example,

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Speaker 1: like you know, right up there with the whole land

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Speaker 1: War with Asia thing. So FBI has been very very

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Speaker 1: careful in framing this in a way that presents it

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Speaker 1: as a reasonable request, one time thing. That's a that's

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Speaker 1: a big deal, right saying this is for one phone

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Speaker 1: and one phone only, you would you know, we're suggesting

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Speaker 1: the Apple creates an iOS that's directly tied to a

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Speaker 1: unique identifier on that phone, meaning even if the iOS

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Speaker 1: were somehow to leak, sure it would not be applicable

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Speaker 1: to any other device on the market, so it could

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Speaker 1: only work for this one phone. So that that sounds

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Speaker 1: good in its current form. That's that's important. They didn't

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Speaker 1: go so far as to say that that's the important

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Speaker 1: part that's left out, but yeah, so that's that was reasonable.

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Speaker 1: You could argue saying this is for one case only.

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Speaker 1: It's it's an important case. People died as a result, extraordinary,

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Speaker 1: and we need to have a clear timeline because we

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Speaker 1: don't know if there's something what is there something planned

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Speaker 1: for December second, twenty sixteen, right, or was there another

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Speaker 1: person involved that we need to get hold of, because

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Speaker 1: otherwise that this could happen again. So they've said, you know,

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Speaker 1: one time only, use going to destroy it after that

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Speaker 1: use Hey, an Apple, if you don't want to make

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Speaker 1: this iOS, that's fine, you don't have to do it.

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Speaker 1: We'll do it. We'll hire some people to reverse engineer it,

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Speaker 1: build out an iOS ourselves. Here's the thing, though, Those

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Speaker 1: iPhones will only verify firmware if there's a special Apple

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Speaker 1: digital signature attached to the firmware. So in other words,

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Speaker 1: if the digital signature, which is unique to Apple, if

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Speaker 1: that's not in there, it won't be verified by the device,

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Speaker 1: it won't be loaded on because Apple famously wants to

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Speaker 1: make sure that their hardware and software works together. And

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Speaker 1: that's it. No one else gets to play in that

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Speaker 1: play box. Yeah, it's the same with their Matt computers forever, right,

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Speaker 1: Like you were really meant to run Apple software on

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Speaker 1: Apple hardware and never the twain shall part, right, So,

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Speaker 1: same thing with this iPhone. So the fbis is so

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Speaker 1: we're not even asking you to give us the digital signature,

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Speaker 1: which would be disastrous if Apple did that. The whole

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Speaker 1: point of the signature is to make sure that only

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Speaker 1: Apple can do this stuff. What they're saying is will

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Speaker 1: make this iOS, will give it to you. Yes, you

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Speaker 1: will sign off and send it. Right, you give a

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Speaker 1: little stamp of approval with your little digital signature, and

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Speaker 1: then we can load it onto this phone. But that

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Speaker 1: way you don't even have to build the code. See

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Speaker 1: we're being really reasonable. We'll be back with more with

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Speaker 1: Apple versus the FBI after these quick messages. So here's

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Speaker 1: here's the other issue. Apple kind of shot itself in

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Speaker 1: the foot. See this is kind of a workaround already,

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Speaker 1: this idea of being able to create a new kind

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Speaker 1: of firmware to work around the security measures while not

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Speaker 1: affecting any of the underlying data. The reason why that's

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Speaker 1: possible at all is that Apple has allowed for the

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Speaker 1: possibility of issuing a firmware update to a phone without

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Speaker 1: the phone's owner having to accept it. Ah. Yes, see,

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Speaker 1: if Apple had designed this so that when it pushed

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Speaker 1: out a firmware update, you, as the user, had to

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Speaker 1: log into your phone and accept it, there'd be no

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Speaker 1: way for Apple to do this because you would already

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Speaker 1: have to have the pen in order to accept the update.

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Speaker 1: So you can't work your way around the pin because

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Speaker 1: even the update to try and do the workaround would

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Speaker 1: still need the pen. But that's not the case. Apple

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Speaker 1: can issue a firmware update without the user's consent. This,

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Speaker 1: by the way, also a security problem. Not just a

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Speaker 1: security problem in this particular case. But what if someone

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Speaker 1: at Apple, you know, decided to code it in so

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Speaker 1: that you could activate the microphone remotely. Yeah, and they

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Speaker 1: and they shoot this firmware update out and you don't

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Speaker 1: have the ability to deny it. You might not even

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Speaker 1: be aware that it happens unless you happen to be

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Speaker 1: using your phone when the firmware update gets pushed to

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Speaker 1: your phone. That's an issue. So because Apple can do this,

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Speaker 1: that gives FBI the the leg up to make this request.

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Speaker 1: So the FBI just is trying to be as reasonable

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Speaker 1: as possible in their request while avoiding the addressing the

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Speaker 1: problems that could arise should Apple agree to it. And yeah,

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Speaker 1: that's that's the thing. Okay, that's that's that's the thing.

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Speaker 1: No matter how single use this might be. Yeah, no

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Speaker 1: matter how noble or even crucial the cause, right, there's

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Speaker 1: not there is not a practical way that this would

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Speaker 1: work without severe repercussions. Yeah, there's a there's a word

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Speaker 1: I like to use in this case. It's called precedent. Ah.

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Speaker 1: So when you said a precedent where Apple agrees, acquiesces, surrenders,

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Speaker 1: is compelled to however you want to put it, to

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Speaker 1: agree to FBI's demands, you can't undo that. That has happened.

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Speaker 1: And perhaps more importantly, not only has it happened in

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Speaker 1: the US government, but now other governments that operate where

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Speaker 1: Apple sells products could come to Apple and say, we

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Speaker 1: know you can do this because you have done it,

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Speaker 1: and we know you will do this because you did

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Speaker 1: do it. So if you want to do business in

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Speaker 1: our country, you know, the one that starts with Chu

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Speaker 1: and ends with Aina. You will do this for us.

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Speaker 1: And when you're talking about a government like China's government,

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Speaker 1: you could see how this could be used to an

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Speaker 1: abusive extent. Anyone who is identified as a dissident could

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Speaker 1: be targeted. And China's an enormous market. Right, Apple cannot,

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Speaker 1: as a publicly traded company turn its back on the

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Speaker 1: biggest emerging market in the world, not even emerging, it's emerged,

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Speaker 1: the biggest market in the world. Also, it's a there

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Speaker 1: are manufacturing basis for apples in China. That's part of it.

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Speaker 1: That's already been a security concern. Let's also consider I mean,

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Speaker 1: if we're being honest, Okay, how how do I say

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Speaker 1: this correctly? Jonathan? Oh? Yes, Okay. While there is no

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Speaker 1: universally acknowledged proof that corporate corporate espionage projects or operations

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Speaker 1: coming from China are sponsored by the government, right, there

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Speaker 1: is widespread certitude that that is the case. Ockham's razor, right, Right,

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Speaker 1: Ockom's razor. You look at it and you think, okay,

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Speaker 1: it is entirely possible that any hackers operating in China One,

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Speaker 1: maybe they're not Chinese. Unlikely but possible too. Maybe they're

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Speaker 1: operating from a different country and using proxies to go

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Speaker 1: through China. But considering the firewall of China, that seems

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Speaker 1: like that extra headache for those hackers. Three, they could

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Speaker 1: be operating. They could be Chinese and operating in China,

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Speaker 1: but not be directed by the Chinese government, in which

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Speaker 1: case they would still have to use proxies in order

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Speaker 1: to access that level of infrastructure. It just gets to

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Speaker 1: a point where you think the simplest explanation is, in fact,

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Speaker 1: there are these state backed hackers that are doing this

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Speaker 1: on behalf or on the request of Chinese government. If

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Speaker 1: not on the request, at least with the implicit approval.

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Speaker 1: There we go at least someone looking the other way.

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Speaker 1: But even that's not enough. There's assistance involved anyway. I'm

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Speaker 1: derailing us as well. The point being that if if

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Speaker 1: Apple were to agree to this FBI request, that is

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Speaker 1: a distinct possibility that it would face not only future

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Speaker 1: requests from from other government agencies as well as the FBI,

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Speaker 1: but from other countries as well, and that it would

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Speaker 1: it would be the wedge that drives open the possibility

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Speaker 1: of the things like these backdoors that Apple and other

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Speaker 1: companies have been resisting for years now. No, there is

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Speaker 1: one other there there is a case that I think

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Speaker 1: we should clarify here. Um when we talk about precedent,

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Speaker 1: there have been precedents in the in the legal past

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Speaker 1: wherein Uncle Sam was allowed to compel a company right

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Speaker 1: to do and this is different. But we do need

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Speaker 1: to I think we need to differentiate these because it

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Speaker 1: is legal in the US to compel a third party,

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Speaker 1: whether an individual or a corporation to um help how

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Speaker 1: do they word it, like execute a court order or

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Speaker 1: something like. Yeah, So you're you're talking about the all

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Speaker 1: Ritz Act, right, which is a very old thing, back

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Speaker 1: to what's seventeen eighty nine. Okay, US wasn't even the

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Speaker 1: US very much the right. This is not a smartphone

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Speaker 1: specific law. There were still occasional battles with the British

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Speaker 1: going on. Okay, seventeen eighty nine, so all the states

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Speaker 1: were here, yet many of them were not here yet. Yes,

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Speaker 1: seventeen eighty nine is when this want was first written

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Speaker 1: down as part of the Judiciary Act. So specifically, what

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Speaker 1: the all Ritz Act allows the government to do is

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Speaker 1: to compel a third party to accommodate federal orders like

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Speaker 1: a search warrant. So, in other words, the federal government

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Speaker 1: can issue a search warrant to law enforcement. The law

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Speaker 1: enforcement can go to let's say it's an apartment building.

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Speaker 1: They can go to the manager of the apartment building

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Speaker 1: and say, we have the search warrant. The all Ritz

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Speaker 1: Act tells us that you have to allow us to

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Speaker 1: go into this apartment to search it. And then the

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Speaker 1: apartment owners says all right and lets them in. Now,

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Speaker 1: this serves a couple of different purposes. It expedites the

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Speaker 1: work of the federal government in investigations and things of

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Speaker 1: that nature. And it also provides a protection to those

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Speaker 1: third parties because the third party is having to comply

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Speaker 1: with a federal request. And if you are a person

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Speaker 1: like an apartment manager and your other tenants are coming

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Speaker 1: to you and saying why are you letting them into

429
00:27:13,920 --> 00:27:17,600
Speaker 1: someone's room without their permission, you can say I have

430
00:27:17,720 --> 00:27:21,000
Speaker 1: to by law. That protects you as the owner as well,

431
00:27:21,520 --> 00:27:24,560
Speaker 1: because it means that you're not you're not You're not

432
00:27:24,600 --> 00:27:27,160
Speaker 1: a rat. You know you're you're you're following the law.

433
00:27:27,240 --> 00:27:30,760
Speaker 1: You're obeying the law. Right, So automatically, anything you do

434
00:27:30,840 --> 00:27:33,960
Speaker 1: in the assistance of the execution of that court order

435
00:27:34,880 --> 00:27:39,280
Speaker 1: is automatically legal. I mean as long as you're yeah,

436
00:27:39,320 --> 00:27:41,840
Speaker 1: as long as they're not saying, hey, we need a

437
00:27:41,840 --> 00:27:44,040
Speaker 1: search warr and you go sure, Hey, while I'm on

438
00:27:44,080 --> 00:27:46,840
Speaker 1: the way, do you mind even steal the car right

439
00:27:47,119 --> 00:27:49,320
Speaker 1: or there? Or they can't say, hey, we're going to

440
00:27:49,359 --> 00:27:51,320
Speaker 1: get a search warrant? Do you want to just lessen

441
00:27:51,520 --> 00:27:56,639
Speaker 1: now right? That would not be cool. But there's a

442
00:27:56,720 --> 00:28:01,000
Speaker 1: very important idea that's attached to the US all Ritz Act,

443
00:28:01,880 --> 00:28:04,399
Speaker 1: which is that, and the Supreme Court has ruled on this,

444
00:28:05,880 --> 00:28:09,320
Speaker 1: you cannot rely on the all Ritz Act to compel

445
00:28:09,359 --> 00:28:14,119
Speaker 1: a third party to action if it creates an unreasonable

446
00:28:14,160 --> 00:28:18,000
Speaker 1: burden upon that party. So you might say, well, what's

447
00:28:18,000 --> 00:28:20,959
Speaker 1: the unreasonable burden for Apple? I mean, all they're asking

448
00:28:21,000 --> 00:28:26,879
Speaker 1: for is a way around this security system, just time,

449
00:28:26,960 --> 00:28:29,480
Speaker 1: just the one time. So there are actually several counter

450
00:28:29,680 --> 00:28:34,119
Speaker 1: arguments to this. Um. First, uh, you know, Apple is

451
00:28:34,160 --> 00:28:37,640
Speaker 1: saying their programmers may not even know how to make

452
00:28:37,680 --> 00:28:41,920
Speaker 1: the code that would allow for this to happen. They like, listen,

453
00:28:41,920 --> 00:28:44,480
Speaker 1: we don't even know that we can build this yet,

454
00:28:45,080 --> 00:28:46,960
Speaker 1: So you're asking us to do something that we don't

455
00:28:47,040 --> 00:28:50,760
Speaker 1: know we can build. So that's an unreasonable burden because

456
00:28:50,760 --> 00:28:54,280
Speaker 1: it means we have to dedicate our assets to from

457
00:28:54,600 --> 00:28:57,320
Speaker 1: from projects that they should be working on to trying

458
00:28:57,320 --> 00:29:00,040
Speaker 1: to figure out if this thing is possible and if so,

459
00:29:00,080 --> 00:29:03,680
Speaker 1: how to do it now. The FBI's argument was essentially, hey,

460
00:29:03,720 --> 00:29:05,760
Speaker 1: you're in the business of writing codes. There should be

461
00:29:05,760 --> 00:29:12,560
Speaker 1: no problem, right. I would desperately need a bleep sound

462
00:29:12,600 --> 00:29:15,760
Speaker 1: effect right now. But I call BS. Let's be nice.

463
00:29:15,840 --> 00:29:19,240
Speaker 1: I'll call BS on that argument, because to me, that's

464
00:29:19,240 --> 00:29:21,800
Speaker 1: the same as coming up to Let's say, let's say

465
00:29:21,800 --> 00:29:24,840
Speaker 1: Ben that you are a cook, yes, and you cook

466
00:29:25,240 --> 00:29:29,560
Speaker 1: in an Italian restaurant. You're you're the Italian restaurant's head cook.

467
00:29:29,800 --> 00:29:32,200
Speaker 1: Three initial in stars. I go up to you and

468
00:29:32,240 --> 00:29:35,040
Speaker 1: I say, hey, listen, I'm from the federal government. I

469
00:29:35,120 --> 00:29:39,040
Speaker 1: got this, uh, this this executive order, this federal order

470
00:29:39,840 --> 00:29:42,959
Speaker 1: for you. Okay, all right, you have to now go

471
00:29:43,040 --> 00:29:48,160
Speaker 1: and make a dinner of Peruvian food right now for

472
00:29:48,360 --> 00:29:50,960
Speaker 1: thirty people that are in the restaurant. You can do

473
00:29:51,000 --> 00:29:55,560
Speaker 1: it because you cook right exactly. Or it's like saying, yeah,

474
00:29:55,800 --> 00:29:58,400
Speaker 1: it would be a disastrous Peruvian dinner at very least

475
00:29:58,400 --> 00:30:03,080
Speaker 1: a looser interpretation, like for another example, let's say to

476
00:30:03,160 --> 00:30:06,120
Speaker 1: make it even broader. Yeah, because I think this is

477
00:30:06,240 --> 00:30:09,760
Speaker 1: this is pretty good too. So, uh, Jonathan, let's say

478
00:30:09,800 --> 00:30:14,600
Speaker 1: that you are a doctor. All right, Okay, you're at

479
00:30:14,600 --> 00:30:18,240
Speaker 1: your doctor, doctor Strickland, doctor Strickling. Hey, hey call me Jonathan,

480
00:30:18,240 --> 00:30:22,720
Speaker 1: doctor Strickland's my dad. You right, So you're an easy

481
00:30:22,760 --> 00:30:27,440
Speaker 1: going doctor, clearly, Um, and you are, and uh you

482
00:30:27,600 --> 00:30:30,000
Speaker 1: you're an ear nose and throat man. Okay yea. And

483
00:30:30,600 --> 00:30:34,840
Speaker 1: uh so I come up to un say I'm from

484
00:30:35,000 --> 00:30:39,080
Speaker 1: the federal government. I have an executive order but not

485
00:30:39,120 --> 00:30:41,680
Speaker 1: an appointment. So you're already kind of irritated, right, and

486
00:30:41,920 --> 00:30:46,240
Speaker 1: I'm like, and I say, I need you to make

487
00:30:46,280 --> 00:30:50,400
Speaker 1: the cure for cancer. Yeah that's a bit much. Yeah,

488
00:30:50,440 --> 00:30:52,920
Speaker 1: I mean you're a doctor, right, you know about organs

489
00:30:52,960 --> 00:30:56,880
Speaker 1: and stuff cancer affects bodies. Or going to Harley Davidson

490
00:30:57,120 --> 00:31:00,800
Speaker 1: Davidson and saying, look, you you make stuff where wheels

491
00:31:00,800 --> 00:31:03,680
Speaker 1: are connected to chassis and they turn and a motor

492
00:31:03,880 --> 00:31:06,640
Speaker 1: keeps things going. I need you to make a bus. Yeah,

493
00:31:06,920 --> 00:31:09,680
Speaker 1: I mean, as you see where the where it's ridiculous.

494
00:31:09,720 --> 00:31:14,240
Speaker 1: It's it's you can't argue that because this company is

495
00:31:14,280 --> 00:31:16,360
Speaker 1: in the business of doing this one thing, which by

496
00:31:16,360 --> 00:31:18,840
Speaker 1: the way, is just one part of Apple's business, absolutely,

497
00:31:19,200 --> 00:31:21,959
Speaker 1: that they are capable of making this other thing that

498
00:31:22,080 --> 00:31:24,800
Speaker 1: happens to fall into that same category. That is ludicrous

499
00:31:24,800 --> 00:31:26,440
Speaker 1: on the face of it. So that's argument number one

500
00:31:26,960 --> 00:31:30,920
Speaker 1: about it being a burden. Okay. The second burden is

501
00:31:30,920 --> 00:31:33,320
Speaker 1: the one that we've already touched on. It sets a precedent.

502
00:31:33,360 --> 00:31:35,920
Speaker 1: If Apple can be forced to attack the security of

503
00:31:35,920 --> 00:31:39,040
Speaker 1: its own system in this case, it could happen again

504
00:31:39,240 --> 00:31:43,840
Speaker 1: and that would be a disastrous result for consumer uh,

505
00:31:44,160 --> 00:31:47,440
Speaker 1: you know, confidence in Apple's products. Right, that's very bad

506
00:31:47,480 --> 00:31:49,800
Speaker 1: for Apple's bottom line. So if Apple says, look, you

507
00:31:49,840 --> 00:31:54,280
Speaker 1: will make us lose millions, if not billions of dollars

508
00:31:54,320 --> 00:31:58,440
Speaker 1: in revenue, how is that not an unreasonable burden? How

509
00:31:58,480 --> 00:32:02,520
Speaker 1: can you argue that that burden is reasonable? Right exactly?

510
00:32:02,560 --> 00:32:04,920
Speaker 1: And that's so. And not only that, but then you

511
00:32:04,960 --> 00:32:09,960
Speaker 1: get into the foreign agent approach, the foreign state approach,

512
00:32:10,000 --> 00:32:13,280
Speaker 1: saying what if this means that China comes to us

513
00:32:13,280 --> 00:32:16,280
Speaker 1: and says, because of this other thing that we agreed

514
00:32:16,320 --> 00:32:18,240
Speaker 1: to do, we now have to do it in China

515
00:32:18,360 --> 00:32:23,640
Speaker 1: all the time, and real human beings are being pursued

516
00:32:24,000 --> 00:32:28,480
Speaker 1: and their lives are turned upside down and ruined as

517
00:32:28,520 --> 00:32:31,120
Speaker 1: a result of it. And it's all because we have

518
00:32:31,240 --> 00:32:34,480
Speaker 1: to comply, because this has already set a precedent that's

519
00:32:34,480 --> 00:32:39,680
Speaker 1: an unreasonable burden. And finally, they've even said that it's

520
00:32:39,680 --> 00:32:43,360
Speaker 1: a violation of their right to free speech. And the

521
00:32:43,440 --> 00:32:46,280
Speaker 1: reason for that is because code has been ruled as

522
00:32:46,320 --> 00:32:49,240
Speaker 1: a type of free speech in the past, and if

523
00:32:49,240 --> 00:32:53,800
Speaker 1: the government compels Apple to write code that Apple doesn't

524
00:32:53,840 --> 00:32:59,120
Speaker 1: believe in, they're being compelled to speak against their own beliefs,

525
00:32:59,200 --> 00:33:03,000
Speaker 1: thus a violation of free speech. Now that argument, most

526
00:33:03,000 --> 00:33:05,040
Speaker 1: people are saying it's probably the weakest of all of

527
00:33:05,120 --> 00:33:07,640
Speaker 1: their styling on it a little, but I gotta admit

528
00:33:07,720 --> 00:33:11,840
Speaker 1: that's pretty awesome style. Well, yeah, that is. I enjoy it.

529
00:33:11,880 --> 00:33:16,000
Speaker 1: And there, while it's reaching, it's not invalid. And let's

530
00:33:16,040 --> 00:33:21,040
Speaker 1: consider that Apple legally, in this kind of case, is

531
00:33:21,120 --> 00:33:25,560
Speaker 1: playing against Uncle Sam and on its home territory right.

532
00:33:25,720 --> 00:33:29,960
Speaker 1: And this means that you you might often wonder why

533
00:33:30,160 --> 00:33:33,680
Speaker 1: when there are suits or countersuits or legal problems, why

534
00:33:33,880 --> 00:33:38,280
Speaker 1: so many cases open with just this laundry list of arguments,

535
00:33:38,480 --> 00:33:41,680
Speaker 1: And it's because it's you know, if we could go

536
00:33:41,720 --> 00:33:46,400
Speaker 1: back to my Italian restaurant, you're just throwing this spaghetti

537
00:33:46,440 --> 00:33:49,400
Speaker 1: at the wall. It's a scattered gun approach, it absolutely is,

538
00:33:49,960 --> 00:33:52,680
Speaker 1: or if you prefer, it's casting a very wide net

539
00:33:52,720 --> 00:33:56,920
Speaker 1: because you aren't sure which tactic is necessarily going to

540
00:33:56,960 --> 00:33:59,120
Speaker 1: be your best one from the starting gate, so you

541
00:33:59,160 --> 00:34:01,760
Speaker 1: want to throw out all of them at once, and

542
00:34:01,800 --> 00:34:04,520
Speaker 1: if it's if it's a compelling enough argument, then you

543
00:34:04,560 --> 00:34:07,520
Speaker 1: can get things thrown out before they go any further.

544
00:34:08,600 --> 00:34:11,799
Speaker 1: And in fact, Apple has said that they're willing to

545
00:34:11,880 --> 00:34:13,839
Speaker 1: go all the way to the Supreme Court with this

546
00:34:13,880 --> 00:34:18,280
Speaker 1: particular fight. The CEO said that publicly. Yeah, which interesting

547
00:34:18,280 --> 00:34:23,160
Speaker 1: because I you know, we recently lost a US Supreme

548
00:34:23,160 --> 00:34:26,240
Speaker 1: Court justice here in the United States, and I actually

549
00:34:26,239 --> 00:34:28,160
Speaker 1: think he probably would have sided with Apple on this

550
00:34:28,200 --> 00:34:33,440
Speaker 1: one because of his very strict view of the constitution,

551
00:34:33,560 --> 00:34:38,400
Speaker 1: right he's an originalist antonin Scalia. Yeah, So going back

552
00:34:38,560 --> 00:34:40,440
Speaker 1: to this argument of it, I'm going to read a

553
00:34:40,520 --> 00:34:42,560
Speaker 1: quote and I want to see what your reaction is,

554
00:34:43,560 --> 00:34:47,160
Speaker 1: because I know what mine was. This is from Congressman

555
00:34:47,320 --> 00:34:53,040
Speaker 1: David Jolly of Florida, who said Apple's leadership risks having

556
00:34:53,080 --> 00:34:57,920
Speaker 1: blood on their hands. Ben is shaking his head and

557
00:34:58,000 --> 00:35:01,680
Speaker 1: looking at me in disdain. Not at me, he's looking

558
00:35:01,719 --> 00:35:06,320
Speaker 1: through me. It's absolutely insincere, first off, and it's usually

559
00:35:06,840 --> 00:35:13,759
Speaker 1: whenever you listeners, whenever you hear people make lurid imagery

560
00:35:13,840 --> 00:35:22,160
Speaker 1: based appeals to emotion, right, or these these hyperbolic accusations

561
00:35:22,520 --> 00:35:26,680
Speaker 1: that this is the bread and butter of I'll say

562
00:35:26,680 --> 00:35:31,840
Speaker 1: it the political class theater exactly. That's a great phrase.

563
00:35:31,880 --> 00:35:36,440
Speaker 1: And so to say this in such a way, what

564
00:35:36,480 --> 00:35:39,800
Speaker 1: it does is psychologically you get an image of somebody

565
00:35:40,239 --> 00:35:44,160
Speaker 1: with with literal blood on their hands, and then you

566
00:35:44,200 --> 00:35:48,800
Speaker 1: know they're trying to cast aspersion against Apple, not by

567
00:35:48,960 --> 00:35:52,680
Speaker 1: not by making any point about the arguments Apple is

568
00:35:52,719 --> 00:35:57,319
Speaker 1: making right, but by going instantly to, uh, these people

569
00:35:57,360 --> 00:36:00,200
Speaker 1: are murderers, right if we don't do why are you

570
00:36:00,239 --> 00:36:05,719
Speaker 1: defending murderers? That's that's that's essentially you know, uh, the

571
00:36:05,840 --> 00:36:08,839
Speaker 1: argument about you know, it's it's one of those those

572
00:36:08,960 --> 00:36:11,720
Speaker 1: legal arguments you will hear occasionally. This is an illegal argument,

573
00:36:11,760 --> 00:36:13,719
Speaker 1: but it's like the legal arguments you will occasionally hear

574
00:36:13,760 --> 00:36:16,520
Speaker 1: where it's clear that the lawyer is trying to appeal

575
00:36:16,560 --> 00:36:19,600
Speaker 1: to the jury's sense of emotion. Sure as opposed to

576
00:36:19,800 --> 00:36:23,000
Speaker 1: addressing the facts of the case itself. Right, Um, so,

577
00:36:23,280 --> 00:36:26,160
Speaker 1: I agree entirely with you. The first reaction I had was,

578
00:36:26,840 --> 00:36:31,000
Speaker 1: I'm offended by that statement. I mean, it's condescending and

579
00:36:31,040 --> 00:36:34,800
Speaker 1: it imagines that it imagines that the person that would

580
00:36:34,800 --> 00:36:38,000
Speaker 1: be swayed by that is not intelligent enough to read,

581
00:36:38,239 --> 00:36:42,160
Speaker 1: and it it deflects the fact that there are two

582
00:36:42,200 --> 00:36:48,880
Speaker 1: people who were responsible for that terrible exact attack, two people,

583
00:36:49,320 --> 00:36:51,080
Speaker 1: and those two people are the people who are holding

584
00:36:51,080 --> 00:36:53,160
Speaker 1: the guns and pulling the trigger and aiming at people.

585
00:36:53,239 --> 00:36:55,160
Speaker 1: Those those are the ones who have blood on their hands,

586
00:36:55,200 --> 00:36:57,319
Speaker 1: and of course they're they're both dead now, they both

587
00:36:57,400 --> 00:37:01,840
Speaker 1: died in the shootout with the law enforced. But the

588
00:37:01,960 --> 00:37:04,720
Speaker 1: point being that they're the ones responsible, not Apple. Apple

589
00:37:04,760 --> 00:37:08,520
Speaker 1: did nothing in relation to this crime. In fact, Apple

590
00:37:08,560 --> 00:37:12,760
Speaker 1: didn't give the fricking phone to Furut that was issued

591
00:37:12,800 --> 00:37:16,280
Speaker 1: by the county. Apple just made some made a device

592
00:37:16,760 --> 00:37:19,640
Speaker 1: that has this level of security on it that people wanted.

593
00:37:19,719 --> 00:37:22,919
Speaker 1: People wanted that level of security. They want the reassurance

594
00:37:23,000 --> 00:37:27,480
Speaker 1: that Apple itself can't access their phones without their permission.

595
00:37:28,600 --> 00:37:32,359
Speaker 1: It's a very important cornerstone of security. In fact, if

596
00:37:32,360 --> 00:37:36,919
Speaker 1: you look at iOS eight or earlier, Apple could bypass security,

597
00:37:36,760 --> 00:37:41,040
Speaker 1: they could access the information on a phone without your pen,

598
00:37:41,560 --> 00:37:45,600
Speaker 1: without you acquiescing and allowing that to happen. But they

599
00:37:45,640 --> 00:37:50,000
Speaker 1: specifically change that with iOS nine. They made it so

600
00:37:50,040 --> 00:37:53,080
Speaker 1: that they could not do that because they said, it's

601
00:37:53,120 --> 00:37:57,640
Speaker 1: important for consumers to trust the company. And how can

602
00:37:57,680 --> 00:37:59,640
Speaker 1: you build trust if you know in the back of

603
00:37:59,640 --> 00:38:02,760
Speaker 1: your mind and this company could at any moment access

604
00:38:02,960 --> 00:38:07,160
Speaker 1: my private information that I have not chosen to share

605
00:38:07,200 --> 00:38:11,200
Speaker 1: with them, Well, you know that trust is destroyed in

606
00:38:11,239 --> 00:38:14,120
Speaker 1: that case, right, kind of brings us back to that

607
00:38:14,239 --> 00:38:20,040
Speaker 1: unreasonable burden. So these arguments are continuing. I think the

608
00:38:20,080 --> 00:38:24,799
Speaker 1: next stage doesn't start till till March tenth, and we're

609
00:38:24,800 --> 00:38:30,839
Speaker 1: recording this on February twenty sixth. So I am very

610
00:38:30,880 --> 00:38:35,000
Speaker 1: hopeful that the government sides with Apple on this ultimately,

611
00:38:35,080 --> 00:38:37,720
Speaker 1: that when this gets the courts at any rate side

612
00:38:37,719 --> 00:38:42,200
Speaker 1: with Apple on this, because if they do not, this

613
00:38:42,440 --> 00:38:45,880
Speaker 1: is the This could be like the snowball effect where

614
00:38:46,239 --> 00:38:49,799
Speaker 1: we see more requests of this nature come in and

615
00:38:49,840 --> 00:38:53,960
Speaker 1: thence it. Once it's been established as precedent, it's much

616
00:38:53,960 --> 00:38:56,560
Speaker 1: easier to happen in the future, and it's easier to

617
00:38:56,600 --> 00:39:01,080
Speaker 1: see larger requests, like things that are that go beyond

618
00:39:01,200 --> 00:39:03,360
Speaker 1: all we need you to help us circumvent the security

619
00:39:03,960 --> 00:39:06,400
Speaker 1: and may go into we need you. We finally are

620
00:39:06,400 --> 00:39:08,719
Speaker 1: going to get what we wanted all this time. We

621
00:39:08,760 --> 00:39:12,680
Speaker 1: want a direct path that like a doorway that's labeled

622
00:39:12,719 --> 00:39:16,160
Speaker 1: FBI that lets us go straight into the data that

623
00:39:16,280 --> 00:39:19,440
Speaker 1: your users are storing on their devices, which leads to

624
00:39:19,640 --> 00:39:23,640
Speaker 1: because the FBI, this leads to a horrific situation, because

625
00:39:23,680 --> 00:39:28,440
Speaker 1: the FBI is an institution sure made up of individuals.

626
00:39:28,680 --> 00:39:32,400
Speaker 1: Remember when the Snowden leaks revealed to us the extent

627
00:39:32,600 --> 00:39:35,879
Speaker 1: of unethical use of surveillance by the NSA. People would

628
00:39:35,920 --> 00:39:39,600
Speaker 1: look up their ex girlfriends or they were star ex boyfriends. Yeah,

629
00:39:39,640 --> 00:39:42,040
Speaker 1: they were just looking up people that they were interested

630
00:39:42,080 --> 00:39:44,960
Speaker 1: in with absolutely no oversight. As a matter of fact,

631
00:39:45,239 --> 00:39:50,160
Speaker 1: when we talked about the Chinese government looking the other

632
00:39:50,160 --> 00:39:54,400
Speaker 1: way for hackers, that was the same thing that occurred

633
00:39:54,440 --> 00:40:00,840
Speaker 1: with the NSA. To assume that, for some reason, given

634
00:40:00,840 --> 00:40:05,520
Speaker 1: the opportunity, individuals in another law enforcement branch or another

635
00:40:05,960 --> 00:40:11,120
Speaker 1: institution would not do the same thing, yeah, is cartoonishly naive.

636
00:40:12,040 --> 00:40:17,479
Speaker 1: We will conclude our twenty sixteen discussion about Apple versus

637
00:40:17,520 --> 00:40:29,840
Speaker 1: the FBI after this quick break, you know, using the

638
00:40:29,920 --> 00:40:32,200
Speaker 1: argument of this is a one time use, that wouldn't

639
00:40:32,239 --> 00:40:35,239
Speaker 1: stop the FBI from requesting another one time use, or

640
00:40:35,280 --> 00:40:38,080
Speaker 1: another one time use, or even extending that beyond it,

641
00:40:38,160 --> 00:40:41,520
Speaker 1: saying all right now, we want a one size fits

642
00:40:41,600 --> 00:40:44,120
Speaker 1: all approach to doing the same thing because it's too

643
00:40:44,160 --> 00:40:46,560
Speaker 1: much time for us. And don't worry, we'll get a

644
00:40:46,600 --> 00:40:49,799
Speaker 1: cord order before we do it. Will make sure that

645
00:40:49,840 --> 00:40:53,000
Speaker 1: nobody else gets access to this ability. And you'll know

646
00:40:53,080 --> 00:40:56,720
Speaker 1: that the cord order is good because they'll be classified.

647
00:40:57,280 --> 00:40:59,520
Speaker 1: So we'll just inform you when the orders are approved.

648
00:40:59,600 --> 00:41:02,080
Speaker 1: I have said it many times that there is no

649
00:41:02,160 --> 00:41:07,279
Speaker 1: way to ensure security by enforcing a vulnerability. Yeah, and

650
00:41:07,400 --> 00:41:10,879
Speaker 1: I think that's a way to encapsulate it. But there

651
00:41:11,000 --> 00:41:13,400
Speaker 1: is a question that I have that I'm sure a

652
00:41:13,440 --> 00:41:16,200
Speaker 1: lot of you have as well, ladies and gentlemen, which is,

653
00:41:17,000 --> 00:41:20,760
Speaker 1: let's say the worst happens, Yes, okay, worst happens court

654
00:41:20,920 --> 00:41:27,040
Speaker 1: rules in favor of the FBI, and Apple says, nah,

655
00:41:27,080 --> 00:41:31,080
Speaker 1: we're not going to do it. Well, I mean if

656
00:41:31,160 --> 00:41:33,360
Speaker 1: if the court, assuming he goes all the way up

657
00:41:33,360 --> 00:41:35,960
Speaker 1: to the Supreme Court, this could end up becoming a

658
00:41:36,000 --> 00:41:41,600
Speaker 1: matter of law where it's codified that companies have to

659
00:41:41,640 --> 00:41:44,279
Speaker 1: obey that within the United States, which would mean far

660
00:41:44,440 --> 00:41:49,280
Speaker 1: reaching implications, not just for Apple, but for all companies, everyone,

661
00:41:49,640 --> 00:41:53,040
Speaker 1: any any tech company, any company really that any company

662
00:41:53,120 --> 00:41:55,600
Speaker 1: doing business in the US, not even based here, but

663
00:41:55,760 --> 00:42:00,000
Speaker 1: just doing business. So that's a big deal. It's it's

664
00:42:00,000 --> 00:42:06,839
Speaker 1: potentially disastrous for privacy. There's rampant possibilities of misuse. We've

665
00:42:06,880 --> 00:42:11,160
Speaker 1: talked about the possibility that if you do create a vulnerability,

666
00:42:12,040 --> 00:42:14,319
Speaker 1: someone somewhere is going to try and figure out a

667
00:42:14,360 --> 00:42:18,040
Speaker 1: way to also gain access to that vulnerability, right, And

668
00:42:18,120 --> 00:42:23,360
Speaker 1: these are not necessarily other law agencies or intelligence agencies,

669
00:42:23,440 --> 00:42:25,640
Speaker 1: or maybe they are intelligence agencies. They just have to

670
00:42:25,680 --> 00:42:28,560
Speaker 1: be intelligence agencies working for a different country. And yeah,

671
00:42:28,600 --> 00:42:31,280
Speaker 1: and here's the problem, because we've talked about this before,

672
00:42:31,360 --> 00:42:35,160
Speaker 1: man I. Legislation, I think we talked about this with

673
00:42:35,200 --> 00:42:42,799
Speaker 1: autonomous vehicles before. Legislation is almost always outpaced by technological innovation. YEA, yes, yeah,

674
00:42:42,880 --> 00:42:45,960
Speaker 1: but you will almost always see a case where someone

675
00:42:46,000 --> 00:42:48,680
Speaker 1: has figured out something really interesting to do with technology,

676
00:42:48,760 --> 00:42:52,040
Speaker 1: or perhaps even really scary things they could do with technology,

677
00:42:52,400 --> 00:42:54,760
Speaker 1: and there are no laws to cover it because before

678
00:42:54,920 --> 00:42:57,560
Speaker 1: that person figured it out, it didn't exist. So you

679
00:42:57,600 --> 00:42:59,839
Speaker 1: don't write laws for stuff that doesn't exist. We don't

680
00:43:00,080 --> 00:43:04,200
Speaker 1: have a law saying listen, guys, I I just it's

681
00:43:04,280 --> 00:43:06,160
Speaker 1: keeping me up at night. We have got to write

682
00:43:06,160 --> 00:43:09,359
Speaker 1: a law about what happens in the case that the

683
00:43:09,440 --> 00:43:12,920
Speaker 1: Lochness Monster is real, gets out of Scotland, comes over

684
00:43:12,920 --> 00:43:15,040
Speaker 1: to New Jersey and starts to eat people. We need

685
00:43:15,080 --> 00:43:19,960
Speaker 1: a law to protect us from this potential catastrophe, right,

686
00:43:20,080 --> 00:43:23,920
Speaker 1: I'm ridiculous. Yeah, Like if we're senators, everyone in the

687
00:43:23,960 --> 00:43:26,640
Speaker 1: audience and you, Jonathan, myself, and then one of us

688
00:43:26,680 --> 00:43:30,640
Speaker 1: walks in and says, guys, I know that. I know

689
00:43:30,719 --> 00:43:33,120
Speaker 1: that we have some other issues coming up, and we

690
00:43:33,200 --> 00:43:36,240
Speaker 1: have to nominate this court justice, and there's an election

691
00:43:36,320 --> 00:43:40,000
Speaker 1: coming up. But I think we need to look into

692
00:43:40,000 --> 00:43:42,000
Speaker 1: the future and look at the big picture, which is

693
00:43:42,120 --> 00:43:46,960
Speaker 1: moon boot theft, right, because I don't want people shoeless

694
00:43:46,960 --> 00:43:49,640
Speaker 1: on the Moon when and if we build a colony there. Yeah,

695
00:43:49,640 --> 00:43:53,879
Speaker 1: I think arguing, for example, for robot rites right now

696
00:43:53,960 --> 00:43:56,480
Speaker 1: might be a little premature that kind of thing. Maybe

697
00:43:56,480 --> 00:43:59,000
Speaker 1: not forever, but for now, it's definitely it's good to

698
00:43:59,040 --> 00:44:02,360
Speaker 1: think about. But you know, you make a very astute

699
00:44:02,400 --> 00:44:06,320
Speaker 1: point when you say, if we're talking about codifying something

700
00:44:06,400 --> 00:44:09,880
Speaker 1: or codifying a law, then what happens is once the

701
00:44:10,000 --> 00:44:14,920
Speaker 1: Supreme Court rules on something like this and it becomes

702
00:44:15,040 --> 00:44:18,359
Speaker 1: a matter of law, it is much It is very,

703
00:44:18,480 --> 00:44:22,319
Speaker 1: very difficult to get that kind of ruling. The Supremes

704
00:44:22,320 --> 00:44:25,399
Speaker 1: are pretty busy people. Yep, they don't hear every case

705
00:44:25,440 --> 00:44:28,440
Speaker 1: that's brought before. They absolutely don't. And then but the

706
00:44:28,480 --> 00:44:31,000
Speaker 1: thing is, you think it's hard to get one of

707
00:44:31,080 --> 00:44:35,680
Speaker 1: the to get those justices to change the substance of

708
00:44:35,719 --> 00:44:39,879
Speaker 1: American jurisprudence. Imagine trying to get them to change it back.

709
00:44:40,000 --> 00:44:43,759
Speaker 1: This is like a Pandora's box Pandora's jar situation. Yeah,

710
00:44:43,800 --> 00:44:46,640
Speaker 1: now this is not not good. You don't want this

711
00:44:46,760 --> 00:44:50,360
Speaker 1: to happen for multiple reasons. Now, all that being said,

712
00:44:51,640 --> 00:44:54,319
Speaker 1: are our sympathies with the families of those who are

713
00:44:54,360 --> 00:44:57,440
Speaker 1: wounded and killed as a result of this mass shooting.

714
00:44:57,480 --> 00:45:01,440
Speaker 1: Absolutely I feel off for them. And if there were

715
00:45:01,480 --> 00:45:04,839
Speaker 1: any other way to get to that information that did

716
00:45:04,920 --> 00:45:09,160
Speaker 1: not require Apple to be complicit in destroying its own security,

717
00:45:09,800 --> 00:45:12,399
Speaker 1: I would be in favor of it. And in fact,

718
00:45:12,440 --> 00:45:14,840
Speaker 1: the FBI has taken such pains they got access to

719
00:45:14,840 --> 00:45:19,279
Speaker 1: the iCloud backups that this phone creates. The problem being

720
00:45:19,320 --> 00:45:21,480
Speaker 1: that the phone didn't have an iCloud backup for the

721
00:45:21,520 --> 00:45:25,319
Speaker 1: month leading up to the actual attacks, So there could

722
00:45:25,320 --> 00:45:27,680
Speaker 1: be information on the phone that's not on the cloud,

723
00:45:27,960 --> 00:45:30,359
Speaker 1: and that's why the FBI wants to get access to that.

724
00:45:30,520 --> 00:45:35,120
Speaker 1: I totally understand the reasoning behind it, but two things,

725
00:45:35,160 --> 00:45:39,080
Speaker 1: of course, keep me from being completely sympathetic. One is

726
00:45:39,120 --> 00:45:41,720
Speaker 1: that the FBI has for years been trying to get

727
00:45:42,080 --> 00:45:45,879
Speaker 1: backdoor access to multiple systems exactly. Yeah, So that so

728
00:45:46,440 --> 00:45:50,319
Speaker 1: you could argue that perhaps this mass shooting is being

729
00:45:50,520 --> 00:45:55,040
Speaker 1: leveraged cynically by the FBI in order to further their goals,

730
00:45:55,520 --> 00:46:00,440
Speaker 1: because it's hard to say no to such an emotionally

731
00:46:00,960 --> 00:46:06,040
Speaker 1: devastating event. Opportunistically, I would say, yeah, I do know,

732
00:46:06,360 --> 00:46:10,920
Speaker 1: I believe it. And this is just my personal opinion

733
00:46:11,600 --> 00:46:17,280
Speaker 1: based on again precedent. It is completely within the realm

734
00:46:17,320 --> 00:46:23,120
Speaker 1: of not only possibility but plausibility that an institution would

735
00:46:23,160 --> 00:46:27,160
Speaker 1: wait for an opportune time to make this this kind

736
00:46:27,280 --> 00:46:33,080
Speaker 1: of legislation, like the argument for Internet surveillance, based on saying, hey,

737
00:46:33,280 --> 00:46:36,000
Speaker 1: we need to protect people, we need to protect you

738
00:46:36,520 --> 00:46:43,000
Speaker 1: from inappropriate content and your children, think of the kids. Right, Really,

739
00:46:43,040 --> 00:46:45,440
Speaker 1: this is this is a lot of the same stuff

740
00:46:45,480 --> 00:46:48,759
Speaker 1: we heard in the wake of the Patriot Act. Absolutely

741
00:46:49,040 --> 00:46:52,080
Speaker 1: where a lot of people felt the Patriot Act was

742
00:46:52,239 --> 00:46:57,200
Speaker 1: a reactionary piece of legislation that was drafted far too

743
00:46:57,239 --> 00:47:00,319
Speaker 1: quickly and what had had reached far far are too

744
00:47:00,360 --> 00:47:06,120
Speaker 1: why for what it was proposing, what what everyone claimed

745
00:47:06,120 --> 00:47:10,719
Speaker 1: it was all about? Right, and uh, that was a

746
00:47:10,719 --> 00:47:14,560
Speaker 1: big mess. This is also potentially a really big mess.

747
00:47:14,600 --> 00:47:17,040
Speaker 1: And the Patriot Act, the substance of it was pretty

748
00:47:17,120 --> 00:47:20,520
Speaker 1: much had been written in advance. Yeah, yeah, which is

749
00:47:20,560 --> 00:47:24,080
Speaker 1: pretty like now that used to be a controversial statement,

750
00:47:24,120 --> 00:47:27,440
Speaker 1: but now it's acknowledged. Yeah, so this is this is uh,

751
00:47:27,600 --> 00:47:29,480
Speaker 1: I mean the fact that the FBI has had this

752
00:47:29,560 --> 00:47:33,839
Speaker 1: plan for a while, not this specific implementation, but this

753
00:47:34,080 --> 00:47:38,120
Speaker 1: desire to get this workaround access to things. And I mean,

754
00:47:38,160 --> 00:47:41,400
Speaker 1: I totally understand their point of view. Two, they're trying

755
00:47:41,440 --> 00:47:45,040
Speaker 1: to investigate things. It's not like the FBI is necessarily

756
00:47:45,080 --> 00:47:48,200
Speaker 1: made up of the cigarette smoking man and all of

757
00:47:48,200 --> 00:47:50,759
Speaker 1: his cronies. You know, I'm not I'm not going I don't.

758
00:47:50,840 --> 00:47:54,600
Speaker 1: I don't mean to to uh disparage then I don't

759
00:47:54,640 --> 00:47:57,040
Speaker 1: want to demonize them, Right, That's not That's not what

760
00:47:57,120 --> 00:48:00,400
Speaker 1: I'm trying to get at. Either. The FBI's intends may

761
00:48:00,480 --> 00:48:03,360
Speaker 1: in fact be nothing but noble that they want this

762
00:48:03,640 --> 00:48:09,480
Speaker 1: in the efforts to investigate, solve crime, prevent crime from happening,

763
00:48:09,920 --> 00:48:15,319
Speaker 1: and not in any way that is malevolent. However, the

764
00:48:15,360 --> 00:48:18,279
Speaker 1: fact remains, whether their intentions are noble or not, it

765
00:48:18,320 --> 00:48:22,880
Speaker 1: opens up this opportunity for people whose intentions are demonstrably

766
00:48:23,000 --> 00:48:27,600
Speaker 1: not noble to take advantage of those same opportunities. Well, yeah,

767
00:48:27,640 --> 00:48:29,600
Speaker 1: and you know, I'm glad you said that, because I

768
00:48:29,600 --> 00:48:31,520
Speaker 1: wanted to see something that I want to add to

769
00:48:31,560 --> 00:48:34,760
Speaker 1: this something that is rarely said when we talk about

770
00:48:35,640 --> 00:48:39,799
Speaker 1: government surveillance or concerns about privacy. Right, one thing that

771
00:48:39,920 --> 00:48:45,680
Speaker 1: is rarely said is that law enforcement agencies, law enforcement institutions,

772
00:48:45,719 --> 00:48:52,480
Speaker 1: and individuals in the US actually do quite an extraordinary

773
00:48:52,560 --> 00:48:56,080
Speaker 1: job compared to a lot of places. If you're fortunate

774
00:48:56,160 --> 00:48:58,080
Speaker 1: enough to grow up in a place that has rule

775
00:48:58,120 --> 00:49:00,960
Speaker 1: of law, where you can walk down this street in

776
00:49:01,000 --> 00:49:03,640
Speaker 1: the dark, or you can say you can say, uh,

777
00:49:03,920 --> 00:49:07,239
Speaker 1: you know, whomever your senator president is, you can go

778
00:49:07,320 --> 00:49:10,920
Speaker 1: on the internet and say I think they stink yeah,

779
00:49:10,920 --> 00:49:13,120
Speaker 1: I think you're in jerk. Yeah, I think you're the

780
00:49:14,200 --> 00:49:18,000
Speaker 1: piece of bologna with shoes. And then but in other countries,

781
00:49:18,080 --> 00:49:21,680
Speaker 1: we you know, people get arrested for that, people get imprisoned.

782
00:49:22,000 --> 00:49:25,399
Speaker 1: So we're not get a race, yes, like not just

783
00:49:26,080 --> 00:49:30,120
Speaker 1: arrested or imprisoned, but the government in some countries will

784
00:49:30,160 --> 00:49:32,960
Speaker 1: take steps to make it seem like that person was

785
00:49:33,000 --> 00:49:35,759
Speaker 1: never a person exactly. They'll keep the photos, but you

786
00:49:35,800 --> 00:49:38,960
Speaker 1: won't be in them. And I say that because it's

787
00:49:38,960 --> 00:49:43,120
Speaker 1: a sense of much needed perspective. However, you know, I'm

788
00:49:43,160 --> 00:49:51,200
Speaker 1: not demonizing the people who work at the FBI institutions,

789
00:49:51,239 --> 00:49:59,520
Speaker 1: whether private or public, seek power, they seek further influence.

790
00:49:59,520 --> 00:50:03,000
Speaker 1: And that's it's not because it's some sort of James

791
00:50:03,040 --> 00:50:08,400
Speaker 1: Bond super villain thing. It's not specter. And it's because

792
00:50:08,560 --> 00:50:14,440
Speaker 1: it allows for it allows for an easier, more efficient

793
00:50:14,600 --> 00:50:18,759
Speaker 1: pursuit of whatever the original mission would be. Right, all right,

794
00:50:18,760 --> 00:50:20,520
Speaker 1: we got a little bit more to say on this

795
00:50:20,560 --> 00:50:22,720
Speaker 1: topic before we get to that, though, Let's take another

796
00:50:22,800 --> 00:50:34,720
Speaker 1: quick break. Ben and I we both talk about things

797
00:50:34,719 --> 00:50:37,320
Speaker 1: that here at work where we say, gosh, I wish

798
00:50:37,320 --> 00:50:39,719
Speaker 1: we had X because it would make our lives so

799
00:50:39,800 --> 00:50:43,560
Speaker 1: much easier. Well, even if we got X, we would

800
00:50:43,600 --> 00:50:45,520
Speaker 1: come up with why. That would be the next one. Right,

801
00:50:46,040 --> 00:50:48,440
Speaker 1: we get X. X is awesome, X is helping us out.

802
00:50:48,480 --> 00:50:50,399
Speaker 1: We're like, oh man, it's so good to have X here.

803
00:50:50,480 --> 00:50:52,640
Speaker 1: But you know what, Yeah, it would be great if

804
00:50:52,680 --> 00:50:54,680
Speaker 1: we had WHY because if we had WHY, we could

805
00:50:54,719 --> 00:50:57,200
Speaker 1: really do our jobs. Well, we get why, and then

806
00:50:57,200 --> 00:51:00,520
Speaker 1: you know, man, X and why or work out like

807
00:51:00,560 --> 00:51:03,160
Speaker 1: a dream. But boy, if we had Z, can you

808
00:51:03,200 --> 00:51:06,359
Speaker 1: imagine the level we get to now what we do, Ben,

809
00:51:06,960 --> 00:51:11,680
Speaker 1: We make fun audio podcasts, videos and articles that go

810
00:51:11,840 --> 00:51:16,000
Speaker 1: on the intranet and that's awesome. And so really our

811
00:51:16,040 --> 00:51:22,120
Speaker 1: capacity to do horrible, horrible harm is fairly limited. I

812
00:51:22,160 --> 00:51:26,120
Speaker 1: mean in respect to how our jobs comparatively. Yeah, yeah, Nick. Granted,

813
00:51:26,120 --> 00:51:28,080
Speaker 1: if either of us wanted to go outside and just

814
00:51:28,080 --> 00:51:31,000
Speaker 1: start throwing Kingo pops popsicles at people, we could go

815
00:51:31,080 --> 00:51:34,920
Speaker 1: on a popsicle rampage havoc. But that's that's not job related.

816
00:51:36,280 --> 00:51:40,759
Speaker 1: The FBI, the CIA, the NSA, a lot of those

817
00:51:40,760 --> 00:51:46,360
Speaker 1: three letter organizations, in pursuit of what they need to

818
00:51:46,400 --> 00:51:51,440
Speaker 1: do in order to fulfill their their organization's mission, in

819
00:51:51,480 --> 00:51:55,840
Speaker 1: some cases will step over lines that we cannot allow

820
00:51:55,960 --> 00:52:00,160
Speaker 1: people to cross because it creates a system that is

821
00:52:00,200 --> 00:52:03,400
Speaker 1: at least as dangerous as whatever problem they're trying to solve.

822
00:52:03,600 --> 00:52:09,320
Speaker 1: You know. Another example of this is the the idea

823
00:52:10,000 --> 00:52:16,200
Speaker 1: that the idea of absolute prevention. Like you know, there

824
00:52:16,239 --> 00:52:20,719
Speaker 1: was the old conversation about tortures several years ago, when

825
00:52:20,840 --> 00:52:25,520
Speaker 1: it was the ticking time bomb argument, which was, should

826
00:52:25,560 --> 00:52:30,120
Speaker 1: torture be legal if there is a criminal in custody

827
00:52:30,320 --> 00:52:35,319
Speaker 1: who is suspected of having knowledge of another nine to

828
00:52:35,320 --> 00:52:40,000
Speaker 1: eleven here? Yeah? Yeah, Jack Bauer from twenty four kind

829
00:52:40,000 --> 00:52:45,600
Speaker 1: of argument, Should torture, while reprehensible, be allowed when it

830
00:52:45,640 --> 00:52:52,759
Speaker 1: gets results? And this, this kind of reasoning is dangerous.

831
00:52:52,880 --> 00:52:56,440
Speaker 1: Not I'm not saying that because of any desire to

832
00:52:56,480 --> 00:53:00,319
Speaker 1: see human tragedy, but I'm saying it's dangerous because of

833
00:53:00,360 --> 00:53:03,479
Speaker 1: the assumptions it makes. Yes, that a special case will

834
00:53:03,480 --> 00:53:07,360
Speaker 1: remain a special case, right, and that perhaps the next case,

835
00:53:07,360 --> 00:53:11,799
Speaker 1: which maybe isn't quite so special, like, well, you know,

836
00:53:12,680 --> 00:53:16,560
Speaker 1: we've done it before, so what's the deal here? Yeah?

837
00:53:16,640 --> 00:53:19,240
Speaker 1: I mean you were cool last time. What happens? Yeah?

838
00:53:19,280 --> 00:53:23,640
Speaker 1: So this is this is exactly why neither I think

839
00:53:23,640 --> 00:53:25,880
Speaker 1: I feel pretty strongly about this. I think I'm on

840
00:53:25,880 --> 00:53:28,960
Speaker 1: the right track that neither you nor I feel that

841
00:53:29,320 --> 00:53:32,319
Speaker 1: the FBI should win out in this particular case. I

842
00:53:32,360 --> 00:53:35,960
Speaker 1: think this is something where we really need to see

843
00:53:36,000 --> 00:53:39,360
Speaker 1: Apple come out on top. I am not a huge

844
00:53:39,400 --> 00:53:41,720
Speaker 1: fan of Apple. I don't own a lot of Apple

845
00:53:41,760 --> 00:53:46,120
Speaker 1: products I have. Apple does not sponsored this show. I'm

846
00:53:46,160 --> 00:53:49,600
Speaker 1: not getting any money from Apple. If anything, I'm losing

847
00:53:49,640 --> 00:53:52,319
Speaker 1: money to Apple because my wife is a fan. She

848
00:53:52,360 --> 00:53:54,880
Speaker 1: wants to get an Apple Watch, but I am not.

849
00:53:55,120 --> 00:53:58,879
Speaker 1: I'm not getting anything from Apple. I do think they're

850
00:53:58,880 --> 00:54:01,759
Speaker 1: in the right, but because I don't want to see

851
00:54:02,400 --> 00:54:06,480
Speaker 1: a precedent where a company that creates a secure system

852
00:54:07,040 --> 00:54:12,360
Speaker 1: has to be or can be compelled to compromise that security.

853
00:54:13,200 --> 00:54:16,719
Speaker 1: It defeats the purpose of the security. And whether it's

854
00:54:16,800 --> 00:54:21,760
Speaker 1: this case, which is extraordinary and very emotional, or something

855
00:54:22,000 --> 00:54:26,440
Speaker 1: much less impactful for the general public, maybe it's something,

856
00:54:26,680 --> 00:54:32,279
Speaker 1: you know, simpler and less dramatic. It doesn't matter. You

857
00:54:32,360 --> 00:54:37,160
Speaker 1: cannot You cannot go down that pathway and expect things

858
00:54:37,160 --> 00:54:39,399
Speaker 1: to turn out all right. You've got to figure out

859
00:54:39,440 --> 00:54:45,320
Speaker 1: other ways to do that kind of investigation. Either Apple

860
00:54:45,400 --> 00:54:50,560
Speaker 1: needs to go in a direction where they can they

861
00:54:50,600 --> 00:54:55,440
Speaker 1: can access user data without having to circumvent a security

862
00:54:55,480 --> 00:54:57,560
Speaker 1: system like this, which means they have to go backwards,

863
00:54:57,600 --> 00:55:01,440
Speaker 1: which can really is not a possibility, or Apple and

864
00:55:01,560 --> 00:55:06,600
Speaker 1: other companies have to create systems where it really is

865
00:55:07,440 --> 00:55:12,200
Speaker 1: impossible for them to access without the consent or the

866
00:55:12,680 --> 00:55:16,799
Speaker 1: actions of the owner of the device. I suspect that

867
00:55:16,880 --> 00:55:19,920
Speaker 1: every company is rushing to develop that kind of approach

868
00:55:20,000 --> 00:55:22,160
Speaker 1: right now, because none of them want to be in

869
00:55:22,160 --> 00:55:28,160
Speaker 1: this position where Facebook, Google, Microsoft all publicly showed support

870
00:55:28,200 --> 00:55:32,439
Speaker 1: for Apple. Apple right now is um you know, part

871
00:55:32,440 --> 00:55:37,240
Speaker 1: of Apple hired a dev that worked on Edward Snowden's

872
00:55:37,239 --> 00:55:41,719
Speaker 1: favorite messaging app, obviasually. Yeah, and I don't know how

873
00:55:41,800 --> 00:55:44,640
Speaker 1: much of that is meant to be like a pr move.

874
00:55:44,960 --> 00:55:50,520
Speaker 1: But also they have, um, you know, the leaked Snowden

875
00:55:50,600 --> 00:55:53,120
Speaker 1: papers are out there, and I know I'm harping on them.

876
00:55:53,160 --> 00:55:57,000
Speaker 1: It revealed an ugly behind the scenes look at corporate

877
00:55:57,120 --> 00:56:01,640
Speaker 1: involvement with government request for surveyor you know, so the

878
00:56:01,719 --> 00:56:11,239
Speaker 1: average consumer you me, h, Gary Busey whomever. We have

879
00:56:11,360 --> 00:56:15,640
Speaker 1: much less trust in general in these companies because we

880
00:56:15,719 --> 00:56:20,920
Speaker 1: have a reason not to trust them. Well, we have

881
00:56:21,120 --> 00:56:26,480
Speaker 1: handed over so much of our own personal data. We

882
00:56:26,560 --> 00:56:29,880
Speaker 1: trust that the devices that hold that personal data aren't

883
00:56:29,920 --> 00:56:37,080
Speaker 1: going to just give that away to whatever entity without

884
00:56:37,120 --> 00:56:39,880
Speaker 1: our consent. We trust that that's not going to happen.

885
00:56:40,560 --> 00:56:43,480
Speaker 1: When things like this pop up where we start to

886
00:56:43,560 --> 00:56:48,200
Speaker 1: question that trust, that's problematic. There's someone else that Apple

887
00:56:48,239 --> 00:56:52,560
Speaker 1: has recently hired, Ted Olson. Does that name sound familiar

888
00:56:52,560 --> 00:56:57,480
Speaker 1: to you, Ted? Ted Olson's a lawyer. So Ted Olsen's

889
00:56:57,520 --> 00:57:00,319
Speaker 1: going to be representing Apple. Ted Olson's probably best known

890
00:57:00,400 --> 00:57:05,440
Speaker 1: for representing George W. Bush in the Bush versus Gore

891
00:57:05,800 --> 00:57:10,239
Speaker 1: election fallout. You know, for those of you in the

892
00:57:10,320 --> 00:57:14,040
Speaker 1: United States, when when Bush was running against Gore, there

893
00:57:14,160 --> 00:57:18,480
Speaker 1: was this whole battle about, you know, voting recounts, voting recounts,

894
00:57:19,840 --> 00:57:24,240
Speaker 1: and Olsen represented w George W. Bush on that and

895
00:57:24,400 --> 00:57:27,560
Speaker 1: Bush ended up winning that. So now he's representing Apple

896
00:57:27,640 --> 00:57:32,840
Speaker 1: in this particular battle with the FBI. So interesting to

897
00:57:32,880 --> 00:57:37,880
Speaker 1: see these kinds of personalities involved in this. And now

898
00:57:37,920 --> 00:57:42,520
Speaker 1: I know that with the public perception it's been a

899
00:57:42,560 --> 00:57:46,080
Speaker 1: little c saw ish, but general public, I would argue

900
00:57:46,080 --> 00:57:48,520
Speaker 1: the people who are not necessarily paying attention to the

901
00:57:48,560 --> 00:57:51,240
Speaker 1: text sphere, I think a lot of them are citing

902
00:57:51,280 --> 00:57:55,360
Speaker 1: with the FBI because it's a terrorist story. It's a

903
00:57:55,400 --> 00:58:00,280
Speaker 1: story about trying to establish the most information of about

904
00:58:00,320 --> 00:58:03,720
Speaker 1: these these shooters as possible. Sure, do you think so? Though?

905
00:58:03,880 --> 00:58:06,640
Speaker 1: I do? I think that I think at least a

906
00:58:06,680 --> 00:58:08,720
Speaker 1: lot of polls that I've seen leading up to today,

907
00:58:09,680 --> 00:58:12,640
Speaker 1: the general public tends to side with the FBI because

908
00:58:12,640 --> 00:58:15,520
Speaker 1: the FBI has a very emotional story. Apple's story is

909
00:58:15,600 --> 00:58:22,200
Speaker 1: much more rationally based, intellectually based, and the FBI story

910
00:58:22,880 --> 00:58:30,280
Speaker 1: is is penned on this event, this very emotionally charged Eventum.

911
00:58:30,760 --> 00:58:32,400
Speaker 1: I don't know that that's going to continue. I think.

912
00:58:32,480 --> 00:58:34,720
Speaker 1: I think people who are savvy in the text sphere,

913
00:58:35,560 --> 00:58:37,960
Speaker 1: I think the majority of them side with Apple. But

914
00:58:38,040 --> 00:58:40,440
Speaker 1: it's still because it's still it goes back to the

915
00:58:40,520 --> 00:58:45,680
Speaker 1: taking time bomb argument, you know. Yeah, yeah, So this

916
00:58:45,760 --> 00:58:48,200
Speaker 1: is one of the stories that we definitely had to cover.

917
00:58:48,320 --> 00:58:50,640
Speaker 1: I mean, obviously it's it's such a huge it's probably

918
00:58:50,680 --> 00:58:54,200
Speaker 1: the biggest story in tech right now as we record this. Um,

919
00:58:54,360 --> 00:58:57,760
Speaker 1: And I'm glad that you could join, maybeen to chat

920
00:58:57,760 --> 00:59:00,320
Speaker 1: about this, to kind of give your your insight as well,

921
00:59:00,840 --> 00:59:04,680
Speaker 1: and to talk about why this is so important not

922
00:59:04,760 --> 00:59:08,600
Speaker 1: just from a technology standpoint, but just a philosophical standpoint

923
00:59:09,120 --> 00:59:13,320
Speaker 1: in a matter of law as well. Okay, that concludes

924
00:59:13,400 --> 00:59:17,200
Speaker 1: that twenty sixteen episode on Apple versus the FBI. As

925
00:59:17,240 --> 00:59:20,840
Speaker 1: I mentioned in the intro, this is an ongoing issue,

926
00:59:21,000 --> 00:59:25,200
Speaker 1: and it's not just about accessing physical devices. There have

927
00:59:25,280 --> 00:59:29,160
Speaker 1: also been lots of attempts from the FBI and other

928
00:59:29,240 --> 00:59:32,680
Speaker 1: agencies to convince companies like Apple to give them backdoor

929
00:59:32,760 --> 00:59:37,600
Speaker 1: access to otherwise encrypted forms of communication. As I have

930
00:59:37,680 --> 00:59:42,520
Speaker 1: said repeatedly in various episodes, this is a terrible idea.

931
00:59:42,680 --> 00:59:48,400
Speaker 1: Anytime you create a purposeful backdoor to an otherwise secure system,

932
00:59:48,440 --> 00:59:52,320
Speaker 1: assuming that that is even possible, because it's not always possible.

933
00:59:52,880 --> 00:59:55,960
Speaker 1: But if you do that, all you have done is

934
00:59:56,000 --> 01:00:00,640
Speaker 1: really introduced a vulnerability. You have created a huge target

935
01:00:01,000 --> 01:00:04,440
Speaker 1: for every hacker out there that is that wants to

936
01:00:04,480 --> 01:00:08,760
Speaker 1: be able to infiltrate that system because you have created

937
01:00:08,960 --> 01:00:13,240
Speaker 1: a work around through the otherwise legitimate way to send

938
01:00:13,320 --> 01:00:16,600
Speaker 1: encrypted data back and forth. It is never a good

939
01:00:16,640 --> 01:00:20,320
Speaker 1: idea to do that. It just it decreases security rather

940
01:00:20,400 --> 01:00:25,280
Speaker 1: than increases it. And so this is an ongoing issue

941
01:00:25,560 --> 01:00:31,040
Speaker 1: between investigative agencies and tech companies. I don't expect we're

942
01:00:31,040 --> 01:00:33,360
Speaker 1: going to see it go away anytime soon. There will

943
01:00:33,400 --> 01:00:36,480
Speaker 1: always be a struggle but I sure hope that we

944
01:00:36,560 --> 01:00:39,240
Speaker 1: never get to a point where more and more tech

945
01:00:39,280 --> 01:00:43,520
Speaker 1: companies begin to introduce these backdoors, because it just makes

946
01:00:43,560 --> 01:00:46,640
Speaker 1: everyone less safe in the long run. If you have

947
01:00:46,680 --> 01:00:49,080
Speaker 1: suggestions for topics I should cover in future episodes of

948
01:00:49,080 --> 01:00:51,080
Speaker 1: tech Stuff, please reach out to me and let me know.

949
01:00:51,600 --> 01:00:54,760
Speaker 1: One way, of course, is to download the iHeartRadio app.

950
01:00:54,840 --> 01:00:57,280
Speaker 1: It is free to download, it's free to use. You

951
01:00:57,360 --> 01:00:59,800
Speaker 1: navigate over to tech Stuff using the search field. You'll

952
01:01:00,120 --> 01:01:02,400
Speaker 1: there's a little microphone icon on the tech stuff page.

953
01:01:02,600 --> 01:01:04,560
Speaker 1: You can leave me a voice message up to thirty

954
01:01:04,600 --> 01:01:06,440
Speaker 1: seconds in length let me know what you would like

955
01:01:06,480 --> 01:01:09,360
Speaker 1: me to cover, or if you prefer, you can go

956
01:01:09,400 --> 01:01:11,680
Speaker 1: over to Twitter and send me a message there. The

957
01:01:11,720 --> 01:01:15,280
Speaker 1: handle for the show is tech Stuff HSW and I'll

958
01:01:15,280 --> 01:01:24,600
Speaker 1: talk to you again really soon. Tech Stuff is an

959
01:01:24,600 --> 01:01:30,120
Speaker 1: iHeartRadio production. For more podcasts from iHeartRadio, visit the iHeartRadio app,

960
01:01:30,240 --> 01:01:33,440
Speaker 1: Apple Podcasts, or wherever you listen to your favorite shows.