WEBVTT - Surveillance: Risk Management with McWilliams

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<v Speaker 1>This is the Bloomberg Surveillance Podcast. I'm Tom Keane, along

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<v Speaker 1>with Jonathan Farrow and Lisa Abramowitz. Join us each day

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<v Speaker 1>for insight from the best an economics, geopolitics, finance and investment.

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<v Speaker 1>Subscribe to Bloomberg Surveillance on demand on Apple, Spotify and

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<v Speaker 1>the Bloomberg Terminal, and the Bloomberg Business app. John one

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<v Speaker 1>of the things we want to do is get qualified

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<v Speaker 1>people to talk to her and do that right now.

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<v Speaker 1>The story is extraordinary. Jelenac Williams is a former FDIC chair. Yes, Akravth,

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<v Speaker 1>Swain and Moore, but far more than that, She's enjoyed

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<v Speaker 1>the failure of deposit insurance. Her father was flatten in

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<v Speaker 1>Yugoslavia years and years ago over a failure of a bank.

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<v Speaker 1>She wanted into Berkeley sterling academic career, including service in

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<v Speaker 1>the law business in Palo Alto, California. There's no one

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<v Speaker 1>more qualified to talk about this banking mess in the

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<v Speaker 1>former FDIIC chair, Jo Thank you so much for joining

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<v Speaker 1>us this morning. Let me cut to the chase right now.

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<v Speaker 1>Does this crisis have staying power or are we solving

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<v Speaker 1>idiosyncratic tech banking problems?

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<v Speaker 2>I would say, and thank you, by the way for

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<v Speaker 2>having me this morning. I would say that we're at

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<v Speaker 2>the place where this crisis should not have had staying power,

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<v Speaker 2>and yet here we are about five six weeks in,

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<v Speaker 2>and I'm hoping that we're at the tail end of that.

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<v Speaker 3>The government does have a number.

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<v Speaker 2>Of tools they need to use, and I'm happy to

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<v Speaker 2>chat with you.

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<v Speaker 3>About what those tools are.

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<v Speaker 2>But the problems are not so much indiosyncratic as much

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<v Speaker 2>as this point, we have created a crisis of confidence

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<v Speaker 2>in the banking system and that's where we are.

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<v Speaker 1>How does real estate fold into this? Many will say, Okay,

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<v Speaker 1>it's not going to be the drama we've seen over

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<v Speaker 1>the last number of weeks. But commercial real estate, what

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<v Speaker 1>do you observe there?

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<v Speaker 2>A lot of the banks have, actually, especially regional banks,

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<v Speaker 2>have high concentrations and exposure to commercial real estate. In

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<v Speaker 2>good times, they're generally able to navigate the concentrations in.

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<v Speaker 3>Their portfolio very well.

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<v Speaker 2>But again, we are the point where there's so much

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<v Speaker 2>volatility in the marketplace with the market expectations of the banks,

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<v Speaker 2>and frankly, the empty offices in a number of commercial

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<v Speaker 2>markets in the United States are not going to.

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<v Speaker 4>Help that, Jelena. Should these banks be in that business?

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<v Speaker 4>I mean, this is sort of one of the questions

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<v Speaker 4>at a time or seeing the number of smaller and

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<v Speaker 4>regional banks shrink dramatically over the past few years, should

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<v Speaker 4>it be their business to provide a majority of the

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<v Speaker 4>commercial industrial loans, the majority of the commercial real estate lending?

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<v Speaker 2>You know, I think this goes back to the intrinsic

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<v Speaker 2>question of the tiered banking says system in the United States.

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<v Speaker 2>You have different levels of banks and different sizes, so

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<v Speaker 2>one of them, you know, you have community banks. There

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<v Speaker 2>are generally banks below ten billion dollars in asset, mid

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<v Speaker 2>size banks above that, and I would say below one

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<v Speaker 2>hundred billion. Then you get into the regional land, and

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<v Speaker 2>that regional land is about one hundred billion to as

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<v Speaker 2>high as like five hundred billion. Above that, you get

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<v Speaker 2>into the very large banks. And the truth of the

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<v Speaker 2>matter is that if those banks, the regional banks and

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<v Speaker 2>mid sized banks and community banks are not financing local

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<v Speaker 2>real estate commercial real estate transactions, they won't get financed.

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<v Speaker 2>The role of these banks in the US economy is

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<v Speaker 2>so high that people actually frankly underestimate what these banks

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<v Speaker 2>mean for our financial ecosystem. So should they be in it?

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<v Speaker 2>Should they not be in it? It's almost irrelevant that

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<v Speaker 2>they are in it. They need to manage the risk

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<v Speaker 2>in their portfolios and with the rising interest rate environment,

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<v Speaker 2>it's going to be incredibly difficult for them. And frankly,

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<v Speaker 2>the pandemic didn't help with people not wanting to come

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<v Speaker 2>back to offices.

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<v Speaker 3>And you have tens of thousands of.

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<v Speaker 2>Square fit of commercial real estate, even in some of

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<v Speaker 2>the most prime locations, sitting empty. I was just in

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<v Speaker 2>San Francisco a couple of weeks ago, and it's a

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<v Speaker 2>ghost down.

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<v Speaker 4>Well, as a former regulator yourself, should there also be

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<v Speaker 4>the same kind of regulatory scrutiny and requirements at some

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<v Speaker 4>of these regional banks as there are at larger banks.

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<v Speaker 3>No, actually, absolutely not.

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<v Speaker 2>And here's why our regulatory system needs to account for

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<v Speaker 2>different tiers and different I would say strata in our

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<v Speaker 2>banking sector. These banks present different types of risks than

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<v Speaker 2>the GESIS, the global systemically important banks. They present different

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<v Speaker 2>type of risk than mid sized banks, and the job

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<v Speaker 2>of the regulators is basically to accommodate that risk. The

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<v Speaker 2>job of the bank is to manage that risk. The

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<v Speaker 2>bottom line is when the bank fails to manage that risk,

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<v Speaker 2>you get into in a situation that we have been

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<v Speaker 2>in the past few weeks. But it's not you know,

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<v Speaker 2>as much a blame as we can put on the

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<v Speaker 2>banks and the bank risk management in some of the

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<v Speaker 2>failed bank situations, I think there is there is a

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<v Speaker 2>portion of blame that goes on the US government.

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<v Speaker 1>I just looked at the bank assessment rates that the

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<v Speaker 1>FDI CE and my eyes glazed over. Ms McWilliams. I

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<v Speaker 1>mean it's complex, to say the least. How much does

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<v Speaker 1>JP Morgan or Bank of America pay each year for

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<v Speaker 1>FDIC insurance? Do you have a number?

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<v Speaker 3>Well, there is a number. You can go to the FDIC.

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<v Speaker 2>I don't want to single out a bank. It's a

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<v Speaker 2>lot of money. It is a lot of money. There

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<v Speaker 2>are two different sets of formulas. There is a complex

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<v Speaker 2>bank formula. There is a less complex or a small

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<v Speaker 2>bank formula.

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<v Speaker 1>I don't mean interrupt, but I am Senator Warren would say,

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<v Speaker 1>raise the raid on James Diamond and Brian moynan. Is

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<v Speaker 1>there wiggle room here for the big guys to pay more?

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<v Speaker 1>FDI Insurance to take the load off the back of

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<v Speaker 1>Andrew Jackson's four thousand banks.

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<v Speaker 2>So it is very possible that the FDIC may just

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<v Speaker 2>come out in that direction with the special assessment that

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<v Speaker 2>they need to impose to make the deposit Insurance Fund whole.

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<v Speaker 2>As you know, some of the banks that have failed

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<v Speaker 2>and have been subsequently sold have created a deficit for

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<v Speaker 2>the Deposit Insurance Fund and as a result of that,

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<v Speaker 2>there is going to be a special assessment, and I

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<v Speaker 2>believe that's where the.

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<v Speaker 3>FDIC is heading.

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<v Speaker 4>Elena, Are you concerned about the Federal Reserve in its

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<v Speaker 4>role as regulator? Do you put the blame there? It

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<v Speaker 4>seems like everyone's just basically quietly blaming Randy Quarrels and

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<v Speaker 4>then leaving it at that, But do you think that

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<v Speaker 4>this is something endemic in the oversight and the enforcement

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<v Speaker 4>role that they've fed often plays.

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<v Speaker 2>Quite frankly, to blame prior vice chairman for supervision for

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<v Speaker 2>something that has happened about a year and a half

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<v Speaker 2>after he left office is a little bit preposterous. But

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<v Speaker 2>I do think as a former Federal Reserve staff or

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<v Speaker 2>I was there during two thousand and seven, eight nine

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<v Speaker 2>ten crisis, I will tell you this. They're good people

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<v Speaker 2>working at the Fed. They have a lot of mandates

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<v Speaker 2>they have to satisfy. But we are at a place

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<v Speaker 2>that is about financial stability and the whole debate about

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<v Speaker 2>monetary policy and financial stability. We're at the place if

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<v Speaker 2>the banks are not stabilized, are not going to have

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<v Speaker 2>financial stability. And so to the extent the Federal Reserve

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<v Speaker 2>takes its financial stability mandate seriously, I think it's long

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<v Speaker 2>overdue that they take a look at the banking situation

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<v Speaker 2>in the United States and what the interest rate rises

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<v Speaker 2>have done to the banking sector as they contemplate where

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<v Speaker 2>to keep the interest rates.

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<v Speaker 5>Yelena, thank you for wank and on all of this.

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<v Speaker 5>Thank you. Jelena McWilliams stack.

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<v Speaker 1>DA Lipsyng joins this chief Global Economist at PGUM Fixed

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<v Speaker 1>Income with serious experience recently in the White House, in

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<v Speaker 1>the in the office. Is it tomorrow They're going to

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<v Speaker 1>have a meeting a conon fab on the debt. It's

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<v Speaker 1>all politics, isn't it?

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<v Speaker 6>More in more than Lisa, Look, talking is always better

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<v Speaker 6>than not talking. But I'd be surprised if we get

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<v Speaker 6>a decisive break through tomorrow. The incentives are just not

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<v Speaker 6>yet in place. McCarthy is his speakership. If he folds

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<v Speaker 6>early to the president with a clean increase in the

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<v Speaker 6>debt limit, the President can't give a nod to anything

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<v Speaker 6>near the scale of spending cuts proposed by McCarthy because

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<v Speaker 6>they would undercut much of his domestic agenda and lose

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<v Speaker 6>his political base. So I'm afraid market stress is still

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<v Speaker 6>what's needed to create cover for face saving compromise. And

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<v Speaker 6>that's why perversely market complacency asty.

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<v Speaker 1>You and Jeane Spirling have been very good at this

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<v Speaker 1>of trying to link this policy dynamic into Wall Street.

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<v Speaker 1>As Lisa mentioned earlier, Wall Street seems soundly removed from

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<v Speaker 1>this discussion, this debate. Are they correct on that, to

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<v Speaker 1>be removed to not worry about this debt crisis?

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<v Speaker 6>You know, look, it's muscle memory, and that muscle memory

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<v Speaker 6>is dangerous because the context has changed pretty dramatically from

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<v Speaker 6>the last time we had a serious flirtation with default

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<v Speaker 6>back in twenty eleven. For one, Congress is as polarized

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<v Speaker 6>as it's been in our country's history. Second, you know

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<v Speaker 6>we are we are trying to roll over a debt

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<v Speaker 6>stock that's twice as large as it was in twenty

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<v Speaker 6>eleven three four, and holdings of treasuries are up to

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<v Speaker 6>seven trillion dollars. That's almost three trillion higher than what

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<v Speaker 6>we had in twenty eleven. Or back in twenty eleven,

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<v Speaker 6>Europe was in an existential debt crisis. China have yet

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<v Speaker 6>to lure serious influence were abroad. Digital assets had yet

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<v Speaker 6>to go mainstream. There were no alternatives to dollars. That's changed.

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<v Speaker 6>And lastly, and I think most importantly, we're currently the

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<v Speaker 6>US spearheading the most severe economic sanctions campaign against the

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<v Speaker 6>G twenty country and financial history that creates incentives, geopolitical

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<v Speaker 6>incentives for countries to hedge. The debt ceiling just needlessly

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<v Speaker 6>adds impetus to those incentives at a time of geopolitical peril.

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<v Speaker 4>Why do you think, Dalli, from your vantage point of

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<v Speaker 4>having worked at the White House, of having worked at

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<v Speaker 4>the Treasury, of having worked at the Fed, all of

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<v Speaker 4>these different agencies, why do you think things have gotten

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<v Speaker 4>so dysfunctional in Washington, d C.

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<v Speaker 6>Yeah, I mean, that's ceiling really is just symptomatic of

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<v Speaker 6>that polarization, Lisa, I mean, I think it's derivative about

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<v Speaker 6>the atomization of the media, extreme levels of inequality and

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<v Speaker 6>technology that allows political movements to gain scale at speeds

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<v Speaker 6>that we haven't seen before. And look, now we're on

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<v Speaker 6>the cost of doing something that great powers just don't do.

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<v Speaker 6>They don't default, they don't talk about default, they don't

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<v Speaker 6>think about default. And your measure of greatness is when

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<v Speaker 6>no country questions whether you would ever do so. Some

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<v Speaker 6>people brought us to this point.

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<v Speaker 4>Some people would say, de leip that there are already

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<v Speaker 4>our economic consequences to even having this discussion in such

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<v Speaker 4>real time, And given the fact that it does have

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<v Speaker 4>a different kind of more polarized nature to it, what

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<v Speaker 4>are the longer term impacts, even if there is a

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<v Speaker 4>solution that is found the last minute, when the market

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<v Speaker 4>finally wakes up and applies the real pressure that Washington's

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<v Speaker 4>waiting for.

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<v Speaker 6>Lisa dollar primacy is a national treasure. It allows us

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<v Speaker 6>to fund our government at twenty to fifty basis points

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<v Speaker 6>cheaper than otherwise would that as up to real money

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<v Speaker 6>one hundred and fifty billion dollars for every fifty basis

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<v Speaker 6>points on treasure yields. It allows us to absorb a

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<v Speaker 6>shock like the twenty eleven downgrade of our credit rating,

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<v Speaker 6>and it allows us to deliver a shock. All of

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<v Speaker 6>that is being put at risk in terms of the

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<v Speaker 6>long term scarring effects of this type of debate. Just remember,

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<v Speaker 6>dollar primacy is nothing more than a network. Okay, it's

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<v Speaker 6>rooted in trust and inertia and an assumed lack of alternatives.

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<v Speaker 6>But every network, whether it's in biology or ecology or

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<v Speaker 6>in finance, they have tipping points. They're usually psychological tipping

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<v Speaker 6>points that you can't see in advance. And we're now

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<v Speaker 6>pushing ourselves towards what I would consider to be a

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<v Speaker 6>very dangerous place the closer we get to the X state.

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<v Speaker 6>So this is very serious.

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<v Speaker 7>A lot is at stake.

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<v Speaker 4>Well, this is actually a really important point that a

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<v Speaker 4>lot of people argue against, saying that the loss of

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<v Speaker 4>the dollars supremacy as the global currency has been overstated.

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<v Speaker 4>The death of the dollar has been perhaps overwrought. However,

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<v Speaker 4>other people like yourself saying, actually it's becoming much more real.

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<v Speaker 4>What are you looking for in the data to show

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<v Speaker 4>that that is actually that what is transpiring, that people

0:12:05.080 --> 0:12:08.400
<v Speaker 4>are moving away from the dollar is the main dominant

0:12:08.440 --> 0:12:09.560
<v Speaker 4>currency of exchange.

0:12:10.280 --> 0:12:11.880
<v Speaker 6>You're not going to see it on paper. I mean

0:12:11.880 --> 0:12:14.440
<v Speaker 6>the measure of privacy is really you use the dollar

0:12:14.480 --> 0:12:16.960
<v Speaker 6>to buyer sell stuff? Do you use it to borrow money?

0:12:17.960 --> 0:12:21.520
<v Speaker 6>And do you use it to price transactions? And on paper,

0:12:21.559 --> 0:12:24.000
<v Speaker 6>there's nothing to see here. This is a tail risk.

0:12:24.280 --> 0:12:28.600
<v Speaker 6>But we're gambling with an exorbitant privilege that has incalculable benefits,

0:12:28.920 --> 0:12:30.680
<v Speaker 6>and so it's the kind of tail risk that you

0:12:30.679 --> 0:12:32.559
<v Speaker 6>should never take. That's the point.

0:12:34.320 --> 0:12:36.400
<v Speaker 1>I look, dullypitt this and it's a history which you

0:12:36.480 --> 0:12:41.000
<v Speaker 1>studied at Carolina and also up at MIT, the ageless

0:12:41.080 --> 0:12:44.120
<v Speaker 1>history of our debt caution. I'm going to call it

0:12:44.240 --> 0:12:48.960
<v Speaker 1>our almost debt religiosity. What do the people where they say,

0:12:49.480 --> 0:12:51.400
<v Speaker 1>we got to get rid of the debt. It's just

0:12:51.480 --> 0:12:55.200
<v Speaker 1>like Apple's corporate debt. Kyle Browner and others wrote a

0:12:55.200 --> 0:12:58.640
<v Speaker 1>book forty years ago saying, no, it's not. How do

0:12:58.679 --> 0:13:03.040
<v Speaker 1>you respond to people that viscerally feel this government debt

0:13:03.240 --> 0:13:03.800
<v Speaker 1>is bad?

0:13:04.640 --> 0:13:08.280
<v Speaker 6>Yeah, this is a legitimate question, Tom, I don't think

0:13:08.280 --> 0:13:11.240
<v Speaker 6>we're in a crisis. However, so long as our nominal

0:13:11.280 --> 0:13:14.040
<v Speaker 6>GDP growth is higher than the average interest we pay,

0:13:14.600 --> 0:13:18.160
<v Speaker 6>the math of debt sustainability improves over time, and right now,

0:13:18.160 --> 0:13:21.000
<v Speaker 6>that's the case, our nominal GDP growth year every year

0:13:21.160 --> 0:13:23.880
<v Speaker 6>is about seven percent. It's actually been in the double

0:13:23.920 --> 0:13:26.240
<v Speaker 6>digits with much of the past two years. The way

0:13:26.280 --> 0:13:28.320
<v Speaker 6>that average interest rate in our public debt is two

0:13:28.360 --> 0:13:31.800
<v Speaker 6>point six percent. Now for that to be sustained, of course,

0:13:31.880 --> 0:13:34.640
<v Speaker 6>the market has to believe the money we're borrowing will

0:13:34.679 --> 0:13:37.320
<v Speaker 6>be put to productive use. That's the key question, and

0:13:37.559 --> 0:13:40.359
<v Speaker 6>I think look that argues for the kind of investments

0:13:40.760 --> 0:13:43.200
<v Speaker 6>that the public sector is making, where the private sector

0:13:43.240 --> 0:13:47.840
<v Speaker 6>is underinvested, R and D infrastructure, technology programs that grow

0:13:47.840 --> 0:13:51.320
<v Speaker 6>a workforce make them more productive. That's really the measure

0:13:51.360 --> 0:13:54.120
<v Speaker 6>of whether the debt that we're borrowing is going to

0:13:54.280 --> 0:13:57.000
<v Speaker 6>raise our nominal GDP growth to levels that can sustain

0:13:57.160 --> 0:13:58.439
<v Speaker 6>arising interest rate costs.

0:13:58.520 --> 0:14:02.880
<v Speaker 1>And with that beautiful explanation good enough for Olivia Blanchard

0:14:02.920 --> 0:14:06.360
<v Speaker 1>to Joseph Stieglitz as they've studied this as well. Wrapped

0:14:06.360 --> 0:14:10.080
<v Speaker 1>around our start and the rest, the trust mechanism is

0:14:10.080 --> 0:14:14.439
<v Speaker 1>that government will put it into good projects. Can't that

0:14:14.559 --> 0:14:19.240
<v Speaker 1>be discussed tomorrow among a fractured polity in Washington?

0:14:20.120 --> 0:14:22.120
<v Speaker 6>It can, but not with a gun to our head.

0:14:22.800 --> 0:14:25.560
<v Speaker 6>The consequence of not reaching agreement can't be we're going

0:14:25.640 --> 0:14:29.280
<v Speaker 6>to burn the house down. We absolutely should have a

0:14:29.320 --> 0:14:32.040
<v Speaker 6>discussion about spending in revenue levels. How are we going

0:14:32.120 --> 0:14:34.560
<v Speaker 6>to use our resources to solve structural problems that the

0:14:34.560 --> 0:14:39.320
<v Speaker 6>private sector will solve by itself, Extreme inequality, social disparity, vulnerabilities,

0:14:39.360 --> 0:14:42.480
<v Speaker 6>are supply chains, the climate crisis, All of that should

0:14:42.480 --> 0:14:44.280
<v Speaker 6>be on the table. The point is, how do we

0:14:44.360 --> 0:14:46.960
<v Speaker 6>have that discussion in a way that doesn't make us

0:14:46.960 --> 0:14:49.880
<v Speaker 6>a global spectacle. That's the question.

0:14:50.560 --> 0:14:54.840
<v Speaker 1>This has been wonderful. Dully's saying my most favorite discussion

0:14:54.920 --> 0:14:57.840
<v Speaker 1>so far in this debt idiocy. He's a pGEM fixed income.

0:15:02.200 --> 0:15:04.520
<v Speaker 5>Well, it's around a table. David Libovitz, the Global Market

0:15:04.560 --> 0:15:07.680
<v Speaker 5>Strategistic JP, Morgan Asset Management, David Good, Mornings here morning.

0:15:07.920 --> 0:15:09.920
<v Speaker 5>How long before we're talking about a June hike again?

0:15:10.240 --> 0:15:13.040
<v Speaker 7>So it's interesting and the point that I think you

0:15:13.080 --> 0:15:15.720
<v Speaker 7>all were discussing prior to the break, I think is

0:15:15.760 --> 0:15:19.040
<v Speaker 7>really what investors need to focus on, which is everybody's

0:15:19.080 --> 0:15:21.680
<v Speaker 7>expecting that the FED is done. Everybody's expecting that the

0:15:21.680 --> 0:15:23.560
<v Speaker 7>FED is going to start cutting rates at some point

0:15:23.560 --> 0:15:25.560
<v Speaker 7>in the back half of this year. If you think

0:15:25.600 --> 0:15:27.960
<v Speaker 7>about where the risk lies relative to that view, it

0:15:28.040 --> 0:15:30.160
<v Speaker 7>very much lies to the upside, right, So the risk

0:15:30.200 --> 0:15:32.440
<v Speaker 7>here is that people find themselves flat footed. I would

0:15:32.440 --> 0:15:34.320
<v Speaker 7>agree with you on the inflation point. The rate of

0:15:34.360 --> 0:15:37.760
<v Speaker 7>inflation is entirely too high, not to mention Pal's favorite

0:15:37.800 --> 0:15:41.200
<v Speaker 7>indicator continues to trend higher, right, which nobody's really talking about.

0:15:41.240 --> 0:15:44.320
<v Speaker 7>And so you know, is the FED gonna do four, five,

0:15:44.440 --> 0:15:47.320
<v Speaker 7>six more twenty five basis point hikes? Probably not. But

0:15:47.320 --> 0:15:49.560
<v Speaker 7>if you're thinking about a portfolio and you're thinking about

0:15:49.560 --> 0:15:51.960
<v Speaker 7>what could give the market jitters going forward, I think

0:15:51.960 --> 0:15:54.160
<v Speaker 7>it very much lies in that upside risk about around

0:15:54.200 --> 0:15:56.920
<v Speaker 7>the Fed doing more than the market expects. That could

0:15:56.960 --> 0:15:58.920
<v Speaker 7>even be staying on hold given the way futures a

0:15:58.960 --> 0:16:00.960
<v Speaker 7>price today. But again, very much view of the risk as

0:16:00.960 --> 0:16:02.000
<v Speaker 7>being to the upside.

0:16:02.120 --> 0:16:04.400
<v Speaker 5>Equity data ship, what does it come from? If that's

0:16:04.400 --> 0:16:05.080
<v Speaker 5>your backdrop?

0:16:05.480 --> 0:16:08.040
<v Speaker 7>So I think, you know, the interesting thing that we've

0:16:08.080 --> 0:16:10.280
<v Speaker 7>spent a lot of time talking to clients about is,

0:16:10.320 --> 0:16:12.200
<v Speaker 7>you know, back in March when when we started to

0:16:12.240 --> 0:16:15.640
<v Speaker 7>see stress in the banking system, why aren't equities going down?

0:16:15.680 --> 0:16:17.920
<v Speaker 7>And the answer was the ten year fil fifty basis

0:16:17.920 --> 0:16:19.840
<v Speaker 7>points and that boosted all of the tech names, and

0:16:20.160 --> 0:16:22.200
<v Speaker 7>that allowed the s and P. Five hundred to keep

0:16:22.240 --> 0:16:24.560
<v Speaker 7>its head above water. I don't think you're going to

0:16:24.600 --> 0:16:28.000
<v Speaker 7>see the market, the market broadly do particularly well in

0:16:28.000 --> 0:16:30.400
<v Speaker 7>that environment because the big heavyweights in the market are

0:16:30.440 --> 0:16:33.120
<v Speaker 7>just too sensitive to the overall movement of rates, and

0:16:33.200 --> 0:16:35.120
<v Speaker 7>so I think what you end up seeing is kind

0:16:35.160 --> 0:16:38.200
<v Speaker 7>of a nowhere market right where the average stock arguably

0:16:38.200 --> 0:16:42.120
<v Speaker 7>starts doing a little bit better, maybe some utilities, healthcare staples,

0:16:42.160 --> 0:16:43.920
<v Speaker 7>but you know, tech's not going to lead us out

0:16:43.920 --> 0:16:45.360
<v Speaker 7>of this hole if the risk to rates is to

0:16:45.360 --> 0:16:45.800
<v Speaker 7>the upside.

0:16:45.920 --> 0:16:47.840
<v Speaker 1>I want you to talk about this because you're going

0:16:47.880 --> 0:16:51.000
<v Speaker 1>into institutional and high network people and they're scared. You

0:16:51.040 --> 0:16:53.800
<v Speaker 1>know what. The bottom line here is the rest of

0:16:53.800 --> 0:16:56.160
<v Speaker 1>the market is witnessed by the SPX has come out

0:16:56.160 --> 0:16:58.880
<v Speaker 1>of a brutal bear market in October and it's made

0:16:58.960 --> 0:17:02.240
<v Speaker 1>back a huge part of that loss. I think that's

0:17:02.320 --> 0:17:06.760
<v Speaker 1>underplayed by people addicted to covering Apple every fifteen minutes breathless.

0:17:06.960 --> 0:17:08.960
<v Speaker 1>Do you look at this as the bottom of a

0:17:09.040 --> 0:17:12.480
<v Speaker 1>market in October and we're climbing out of it into

0:17:12.520 --> 0:17:15.679
<v Speaker 1>a positive return for everything else besides Apple.

0:17:16.200 --> 0:17:18.199
<v Speaker 7>So I think at the end of the day, the

0:17:18.280 --> 0:17:21.800
<v Speaker 7>problem with saying that October was the low. It reminds

0:17:21.840 --> 0:17:23.560
<v Speaker 7>me of people telling me that June was the low

0:17:23.840 --> 0:17:25.560
<v Speaker 7>right in the middle of last year, and we had

0:17:25.560 --> 0:17:28.800
<v Speaker 7>priced it in recession because the median decline excuse me,

0:17:28.800 --> 0:17:31.560
<v Speaker 7>as twenty five percent peaked to troth and we did

0:17:31.560 --> 0:17:33.359
<v Speaker 7>that right, So we must have priced it in. But

0:17:33.840 --> 0:17:35.879
<v Speaker 7>let's talk about the growth data. Let's talk about the

0:17:35.960 --> 0:17:38.000
<v Speaker 7>jobs report. I mean, this is not an economy that

0:17:38.080 --> 0:17:40.760
<v Speaker 7>is anywhere close to being in recession in our view

0:17:40.800 --> 0:17:42.800
<v Speaker 7>when you look across the board. I don't think we

0:17:42.880 --> 0:17:46.160
<v Speaker 7>necessarily set a new low, but we could arguably retest

0:17:46.280 --> 0:17:48.560
<v Speaker 7>those existing lows at some time before the end of

0:17:48.560 --> 0:17:48.840
<v Speaker 7>the year.

0:17:48.960 --> 0:17:50.440
<v Speaker 4>So it's good news good news again.

0:17:50.680 --> 0:17:53.760
<v Speaker 7>I think good news right now. It's an interesting question

0:17:53.800 --> 0:17:56.720
<v Speaker 7>because the market has shifted its focus away from inflation

0:17:56.880 --> 0:17:59.480
<v Speaker 7>and back to growth, and on the one hand, that's

0:17:59.480 --> 0:18:02.640
<v Speaker 7>allowed the negative correlation between stocks and bonds to take

0:18:02.680 --> 0:18:05.520
<v Speaker 7>hold again, and so market performance this year has very

0:18:05.560 --> 0:18:07.800
<v Speaker 7>much been better. But I worry that if the inflation

0:18:07.920 --> 0:18:11.119
<v Speaker 7>data doesn't cool off, then good news becomes bad news

0:18:11.200 --> 0:18:12.520
<v Speaker 7>because it means that the FED is going to have

0:18:12.560 --> 0:18:14.359
<v Speaker 7>to do more. So we're in this kind of weird,

0:18:14.480 --> 0:18:17.640
<v Speaker 7>nebulous state today. Where it just doesn't seem to us

0:18:17.680 --> 0:18:20.760
<v Speaker 7>like investors broadly are accurately pricing in the risks around

0:18:20.760 --> 0:18:23.000
<v Speaker 7>monetary policy that we see on the horizon.

0:18:23.240 --> 0:18:26.119
<v Speaker 4>If there is another bank failure or another bank jitter

0:18:26.320 --> 0:18:30.040
<v Speaker 4>that emerges, does the data matter about inflation or do

0:18:30.119 --> 0:18:32.000
<v Speaker 4>people basically discount the FED no matter what.

0:18:32.520 --> 0:18:34.360
<v Speaker 7>So I think that that's the problem, and that's what's

0:18:34.359 --> 0:18:36.600
<v Speaker 7>happening today, is that people are saying, look what's going

0:18:36.640 --> 0:18:38.960
<v Speaker 7>on in the banking space. You know, it looks and

0:18:39.040 --> 0:18:41.560
<v Speaker 7>feels and smells like something we may have seen before.

0:18:41.960 --> 0:18:44.000
<v Speaker 7>The Fed's going to have to go on hold. But

0:18:44.280 --> 0:18:46.760
<v Speaker 7>you know, again, I would make the point that banks

0:18:46.800 --> 0:18:49.760
<v Speaker 7>fail every single year, right, it's just not usually the

0:18:49.800 --> 0:18:52.520
<v Speaker 7>sixteenth largest bank by assets, And that's what really caught

0:18:52.520 --> 0:18:54.680
<v Speaker 7>people's attention. And so, you know, I think we could

0:18:54.680 --> 0:18:58.560
<v Speaker 7>see continued stress in the banking system broadly, but very

0:18:58.640 --> 0:19:00.600
<v Speaker 7>much at the lower end, as we work through some

0:19:00.640 --> 0:19:02.879
<v Speaker 7>of these COVID excesses and we work through the duration

0:19:03.000 --> 0:19:06.000
<v Speaker 7>mismatch that we know exists today. I'm not sure that

0:19:06.000 --> 0:19:07.720
<v Speaker 7>we're out of the woods, but I do think that

0:19:07.760 --> 0:19:09.360
<v Speaker 7>the big booms have probably been heard.

0:19:09.400 --> 0:19:11.119
<v Speaker 1>I don't want to get in trouble with mister Diamond.

0:19:11.119 --> 0:19:13.560
<v Speaker 1>He hangs on your earvy word. But the bottom line is,

0:19:13.600 --> 0:19:15.399
<v Speaker 1>are we going to see a banking roll up in

0:19:15.400 --> 0:19:17.960
<v Speaker 1>this country? Keep JP Morgan out of it. Are we

0:19:17.960 --> 0:19:20.160
<v Speaker 1>going to see a banking roll up in this country?

0:19:20.359 --> 0:19:22.439
<v Speaker 7>Well? I think what's interesting that really ties back to

0:19:22.480 --> 0:19:24.639
<v Speaker 7>the structure of the US banking system right, which is

0:19:24.720 --> 0:19:27.520
<v Speaker 7>much more fragmented than what you see in other parts

0:19:27.520 --> 0:19:30.480
<v Speaker 7>of the world, and so arguably that caters more to

0:19:30.840 --> 0:19:32.639
<v Speaker 7>M and A activity than would be the case in

0:19:32.680 --> 0:19:35.000
<v Speaker 7>some place like Europe. I think it would be premature

0:19:35.040 --> 0:19:37.840
<v Speaker 7>to say that we've seen the end of consolidation in banking.

0:19:37.880 --> 0:19:40.320
<v Speaker 1>He read. That's like when Powell's and his press conference

0:19:40.400 --> 0:19:43.720
<v Speaker 1>reading off the piece of paper David did that absolutely

0:19:43.800 --> 0:19:44.239
<v Speaker 1>nailed them.

0:19:44.440 --> 0:19:47.160
<v Speaker 5>Please you mentioned a bank failures and how much more

0:19:47.200 --> 0:19:50.200
<v Speaker 5>regular they are related to how much they get talked about.

0:19:50.240 --> 0:19:52.439
<v Speaker 5>The FDIC has got a nice little table. You can

0:19:52.480 --> 0:19:55.760
<v Speaker 5>access it easily on Google. I just did twenty seventeen

0:19:55.840 --> 0:19:58.920
<v Speaker 5>eight banks in America failed. I don't remember talking about

0:19:58.920 --> 0:20:01.959
<v Speaker 5>in twenty seventeen, twenty twenty four went under, twenty nineteen

0:20:02.040 --> 0:20:04.760
<v Speaker 5>four went under. There's a reason, and you've pointed out

0:20:05.000 --> 0:20:07.720
<v Speaker 5>they're that much bigger this time around, and there seems

0:20:07.760 --> 0:20:10.800
<v Speaker 5>to be a feeling that perhaps that can bleed into

0:20:11.240 --> 0:20:13.399
<v Speaker 5>and towards a credit crunch. More broadly, do you have

0:20:13.440 --> 0:20:16.080
<v Speaker 5>those fears that we do get that credit crunch ultimately?

0:20:16.400 --> 0:20:18.360
<v Speaker 5>And that's why you shouldn't be pricing in high up

0:20:18.560 --> 0:20:20.680
<v Speaker 5>higher rates off the back of this robust data, because

0:20:20.760 --> 0:20:22.680
<v Speaker 5>ultimately the banks are going to take care of business.

0:20:23.240 --> 0:20:26.280
<v Speaker 7>So I think that you do get a further tightening

0:20:26.320 --> 0:20:28.680
<v Speaker 7>and credit conditions. But I think the mistake that people

0:20:28.760 --> 0:20:31.400
<v Speaker 7>are making is they hear the word bank and they

0:20:31.400 --> 0:20:34.320
<v Speaker 7>think two thousand and eight, and structurally, this is a

0:20:34.520 --> 0:20:37.000
<v Speaker 7>very different issue than what we were dealing with fifteen

0:20:37.080 --> 0:20:39.800
<v Speaker 7>years ago. And so could the market, right, we're back

0:20:39.840 --> 0:20:41.920
<v Speaker 7>to the market doing the Fed's job for them. Could

0:20:41.960 --> 0:20:44.440
<v Speaker 7>the market do some additional tightening and maybe that means

0:20:44.480 --> 0:20:47.720
<v Speaker 7>the FED doesn't need to continue hiking rates. Absolutely, I

0:20:47.760 --> 0:20:50.439
<v Speaker 7>wouldn't be surprised to see that occur. You're actually already

0:20:50.480 --> 0:20:52.320
<v Speaker 7>seeing right in some of the more cyclical parts of

0:20:52.359 --> 0:20:55.840
<v Speaker 7>the economy, things like manufacturing cracks begin to form. But

0:20:56.560 --> 0:20:59.320
<v Speaker 7>is the banking situation in general going to you know,

0:20:59.359 --> 0:21:01.280
<v Speaker 7>get a FED, get the FED to do a complete

0:21:01.280 --> 0:21:03.600
<v Speaker 7>about face. I think that that's a bit of a risk.

0:21:03.640 --> 0:21:06.800
<v Speaker 7>I think, if anything, it speeds up any potential rate

0:21:06.840 --> 0:21:10.040
<v Speaker 7>cuts later on this year. But I still think summertime

0:21:10.119 --> 0:21:12.800
<v Speaker 7>for you know, easy monetary policy may be a little

0:21:12.800 --> 0:21:13.400
<v Speaker 7>bit premature.

0:21:13.520 --> 0:21:15.879
<v Speaker 5>David appreciate it. Thank you, buddy, David Levitz, the of

0:21:15.960 --> 0:21:17.360
<v Speaker 5>jp MULKAN Asset Management.

0:21:27.600 --> 0:21:30.200
<v Speaker 1>It's a really important time to talk to so Broader

0:21:30.280 --> 0:21:32.880
<v Speaker 1>a job ahead of US rate strategy at sock Gen

0:21:33.440 --> 0:21:36.720
<v Speaker 1>over the silence over the weekend off of a shocking

0:21:36.800 --> 0:21:40.240
<v Speaker 1>jobs report and maybe a reset of what interest rates

0:21:40.240 --> 0:21:43.520
<v Speaker 1>will do as the thermometer of the system. Sobrada, did

0:21:43.560 --> 0:21:46.440
<v Speaker 1>you adjust? If I say to you, where's the ten

0:21:46.520 --> 0:21:50.320
<v Speaker 1>year yield twelve months out? Is this an adjustable number

0:21:50.440 --> 0:21:54.399
<v Speaker 1>or is it one big sock Gen guess No.

0:21:54.560 --> 0:21:58.879
<v Speaker 8>I think we've kept our forecast relatively stable. You know,

0:21:58.920 --> 0:22:01.080
<v Speaker 8>we've seen sort of this up and down motion in

0:22:01.160 --> 0:22:03.480
<v Speaker 8>the in the data week after week. You know, on

0:22:03.520 --> 0:22:06.320
<v Speaker 8>the one side you have the digional banking crisis. On

0:22:06.320 --> 0:22:10.119
<v Speaker 8>the other side you have strong fundamentals. But if you

0:22:10.160 --> 0:22:14.360
<v Speaker 8>look at the bond market broadly speaking, from early March

0:22:14.560 --> 0:22:18.760
<v Speaker 8>to now, really nothing has moved much. The two year

0:22:18.920 --> 0:22:23.040
<v Speaker 8>has stayed around four percent. Broadly speaking, the tenure has

0:22:23.080 --> 0:22:27.120
<v Speaker 8>stayed between three forty and three sixty, and the two

0:22:27.160 --> 0:22:30.639
<v Speaker 8>Stents curve has been anywhere around negative fifty five negative

0:22:30.640 --> 0:22:33.280
<v Speaker 8>fifty basis points. So it's been a lot of movement,

0:22:33.320 --> 0:22:37.040
<v Speaker 8>but within a very very narrow rage because the market

0:22:37.200 --> 0:22:41.199
<v Speaker 8>really lacks clear conviction on where we go from here.

0:22:41.640 --> 0:22:44.679
<v Speaker 8>But that said, I think that risks continue to be

0:22:44.800 --> 0:22:48.480
<v Speaker 8>skewed to the downside for years. If we do get

0:22:48.520 --> 0:22:51.280
<v Speaker 8>strong data, the market's going to dismiss it. If we

0:22:51.320 --> 0:22:52.920
<v Speaker 8>do get weak data, I think you want to see

0:22:52.920 --> 0:22:55.080
<v Speaker 8>a little bit more of an outsized move lower in yields.

0:22:55.119 --> 0:22:57.120
<v Speaker 1>You went right where I want to go, Sobrada, If

0:22:57.119 --> 0:23:00.960
<v Speaker 1>I look at the Bloomberg Total Return Aggregate all in index,

0:23:01.040 --> 0:23:04.679
<v Speaker 1>it's a price index, folks, and it's basically a straight line.

0:23:04.720 --> 0:23:07.720
<v Speaker 1>I think Bill Gross, Muhammad al Arian's success at PIMCO

0:23:08.280 --> 0:23:11.760
<v Speaker 1>for fifteen years and then, as you know, Sobroada down

0:23:11.840 --> 0:23:15.119
<v Speaker 1>seventeen percent and the mother of all all in bond

0:23:15.160 --> 0:23:18.720
<v Speaker 1>bear markets. And yes there's been a bounce, but we

0:23:18.800 --> 0:23:21.600
<v Speaker 1>don't talk about it like we talk about stock bounces.

0:23:21.920 --> 0:23:25.480
<v Speaker 1>Are we bouncing off a bond bear market? To something constructive.

0:23:26.960 --> 0:23:29.919
<v Speaker 8>Yeah, it certainly seems that way. Yels do seem like

0:23:29.960 --> 0:23:34.679
<v Speaker 8>they peaked around four percent and tens in the second

0:23:34.680 --> 0:23:37.960
<v Speaker 8>in the so she said fourth quarter of last year,

0:23:38.000 --> 0:23:40.879
<v Speaker 8>and the trajectory seems to be towards lower yels. I

0:23:40.880 --> 0:23:43.520
<v Speaker 8>think that this time around, the key difference is that

0:23:43.560 --> 0:23:46.200
<v Speaker 8>we might you know, FED funds rate nobody's expecting Fed

0:23:46.240 --> 0:23:48.800
<v Speaker 8>FUNDRAI to get back to the zero lower bound, and

0:23:49.080 --> 0:23:51.119
<v Speaker 8>the decline in years from her on is going to

0:23:51.160 --> 0:23:53.560
<v Speaker 8>be much more modest and gradual. You know, even in

0:23:53.600 --> 0:23:56.040
<v Speaker 8>our own forecast we have teny years only getting to

0:23:56.080 --> 0:23:58.639
<v Speaker 8>three and a quarter percent by the end of the year. Why,

0:23:58.720 --> 0:24:00.920
<v Speaker 8>because of the fact that you have blown will bond

0:24:00.960 --> 0:24:04.199
<v Speaker 8>yields continue to rise and the easyb is poised to

0:24:04.440 --> 0:24:09.800
<v Speaker 8>hike more. The Bank of Japan could widen its YCC

0:24:10.040 --> 0:24:13.280
<v Speaker 8>band at the June meeting. So in this sort of context,

0:24:13.280 --> 0:24:16.280
<v Speaker 8>and inflation is also high and sticky, it's going to

0:24:16.320 --> 0:24:18.719
<v Speaker 8>be very hard for a meaningful decline in yields from

0:24:18.760 --> 0:24:20.560
<v Speaker 8>here on as well. So it's going to be one

0:24:20.600 --> 0:24:23.880
<v Speaker 8>of those situations where yields remain range bound, we get

0:24:24.119 --> 0:24:27.360
<v Speaker 8>perhaps very weak data, we price down to a lower range,

0:24:27.520 --> 0:24:29.160
<v Speaker 8>But we're not going to go back to the zero

0:24:29.200 --> 0:24:31.879
<v Speaker 8>lower bound and fed funds and tenny yield decline is

0:24:31.880 --> 0:24:34.280
<v Speaker 8>going to be a lot more gradual than that context.

0:24:33.880 --> 0:24:36.359
<v Speaker 4>Supatra, What do people do when there's kind of this

0:24:36.400 --> 0:24:38.840
<v Speaker 4>tight trading range and you don't really expect it to

0:24:38.880 --> 0:24:41.679
<v Speaker 4>break out? I mean they basically just clock in for

0:24:41.720 --> 0:24:44.400
<v Speaker 4>an hour, making sure nothing changes, and then go take

0:24:44.440 --> 0:24:47.880
<v Speaker 4>a break. I'm serious, Like, I'm just wondering how sort

0:24:47.880 --> 0:24:50.679
<v Speaker 4>of sleepy things are out there as people realize that

0:24:50.720 --> 0:24:54.480
<v Speaker 4>there is no conviction and there's very little visibility to

0:24:54.520 --> 0:24:55.960
<v Speaker 4>get an edge at one side or another.

0:24:57.040 --> 0:25:00.880
<v Speaker 8>Well, you can trade the volatility within the range because

0:25:01.280 --> 0:25:04.000
<v Speaker 8>you've seen pretty sharp moves in gamma, so you probably

0:25:04.040 --> 0:25:06.000
<v Speaker 8>want to be long gamma in the balls to the

0:25:06.080 --> 0:25:09.360
<v Speaker 8>market and maybe pick up some returns there. But you're

0:25:09.400 --> 0:25:14.240
<v Speaker 8>absolutely right, there are no larger directional moves to uh

0:25:14.320 --> 0:25:16.920
<v Speaker 8>to to to play in this market given the fact

0:25:16.960 --> 0:25:20.879
<v Speaker 8>that years have been ranged bound and people are positioning

0:25:20.880 --> 0:25:23.840
<v Speaker 8>for the for the next leg lower in yields because

0:25:23.880 --> 0:25:27.160
<v Speaker 8>that seems to be the broader directional they given tightening

0:25:27.160 --> 0:25:29.520
<v Speaker 8>credit conditions. I mean, we know that policy works with

0:25:29.560 --> 0:25:32.160
<v Speaker 8>long and variable lags and the employment picture is going

0:25:32.160 --> 0:25:35.480
<v Speaker 8>to remain relatively strong until the bottom falls off. So

0:25:36.000 --> 0:25:38.360
<v Speaker 8>you're going to you're kind of positioning, if you will,

0:25:38.400 --> 0:25:40.960
<v Speaker 8>for that sort of scenario where you see a meaningful

0:25:41.000 --> 0:25:43.040
<v Speaker 8>store on in the second half, then you could see

0:25:43.040 --> 0:25:46.520
<v Speaker 8>that next leg lower in yields. But again, you know,

0:25:46.640 --> 0:25:49.640
<v Speaker 8>as you were speaking earlier in your program, I think

0:25:49.640 --> 0:25:53.119
<v Speaker 8>that the market is underpricing the risk of the FED

0:25:53.240 --> 0:25:55.040
<v Speaker 8>remaining on hold for the remainder of the year. We're

0:25:55.040 --> 0:25:57.760
<v Speaker 8>pressing in cuts for the second half of the year,

0:25:58.520 --> 0:26:00.600
<v Speaker 8>if you know, if we can get as a regional

0:26:00.640 --> 0:26:03.040
<v Speaker 8>banking crisis, I don't see any reason for the FED

0:26:03.080 --> 0:26:06.720
<v Speaker 8>to jump into cut cutting rates in the second half.

0:26:06.920 --> 0:26:09.240
<v Speaker 4>What would it take to not be past the regional

0:26:09.280 --> 0:26:11.880
<v Speaker 4>banking crisis? I mean, at a certain point people are

0:26:11.880 --> 0:26:14.800
<v Speaker 4>pricing in that it will persist. When do we signal

0:26:14.800 --> 0:26:15.440
<v Speaker 4>the all clear?

0:26:17.359 --> 0:26:20.080
<v Speaker 8>You know, that's a very very difficult, you know, question

0:26:20.200 --> 0:26:23.919
<v Speaker 8>to answer, because you're looking at an economy of haves

0:26:23.920 --> 0:26:26.560
<v Speaker 8>and have nots. The larger banks are doing, you know,

0:26:26.680 --> 0:26:31.879
<v Speaker 8>quite well. The smaller banks and the small business business areas,

0:26:31.920 --> 0:26:33.960
<v Speaker 8>if you will, are coming under a lot of pressure

0:26:34.240 --> 0:26:37.280
<v Speaker 8>because of the dependencies to regional banks. So this sort

0:26:37.280 --> 0:26:40.239
<v Speaker 8>of bifurcation is going to really muddy the picture, and

0:26:40.280 --> 0:26:43.040
<v Speaker 8>in some respects even that the Fed continues to say say,

0:26:43.160 --> 0:26:47.359
<v Speaker 8>say that the financial stability concerns they have tools to

0:26:47.400 --> 0:26:50.320
<v Speaker 8>deal with that, they have tools to deal with inflation. Uh.

0:26:50.400 --> 0:26:55.480
<v Speaker 8>These two uh, you know, uh, these two opposing factors

0:26:55.840 --> 0:26:57.879
<v Speaker 8>are going to make it very very difficult for the

0:26:57.920 --> 0:27:01.600
<v Speaker 8>Fed to really just policy in a meaningful way. They

0:27:01.640 --> 0:27:04.160
<v Speaker 8>can't cut rates for financial stability and they can't high

0:27:04.240 --> 0:27:07.600
<v Speaker 8>rates for inflation. So that's where policy gets very tricky.

0:27:07.800 --> 0:27:09.560
<v Speaker 8>They're probably going to be on hold for the remainder

0:27:09.560 --> 0:27:10.040
<v Speaker 8>of the year.

0:27:10.040 --> 0:27:11.679
<v Speaker 5>So badger. Never mind the Fed, We've got to talk

0:27:11.720 --> 0:27:15.600
<v Speaker 5>about the ECB. Eric Nilsen Uni Credit Fantastic note over

0:27:15.640 --> 0:27:17.879
<v Speaker 5>the weekend said this, My fear is that as the

0:27:17.960 --> 0:27:20.320
<v Speaker 5>lacked defects of a monetary policy tightening now begin to

0:27:20.400 --> 0:27:25.520
<v Speaker 5>hit the economies, the European underperformance will be longer deeper

0:27:25.720 --> 0:27:29.760
<v Speaker 5>than needed because of excessive monetary tightening. Savanta industrial production

0:27:29.840 --> 0:27:33.440
<v Speaker 5>in Germany this morning, downside, surprise factory orders last week,

0:27:33.720 --> 0:27:37.359
<v Speaker 5>ugly earnings from mess don't really scream that trade is

0:27:37.359 --> 0:27:39.960
<v Speaker 5>good right now, Sabantra, do you think is a real

0:27:40.040 --> 0:27:42.160
<v Speaker 5>risk here that perhaps the ECB, relative to the FED,

0:27:42.240 --> 0:27:44.399
<v Speaker 5>is the central bank most at risk of making a

0:27:44.400 --> 0:27:46.080
<v Speaker 5>policy mistake at the moment.

0:27:47.160 --> 0:27:47.720
<v Speaker 3>Well, that is.

0:27:47.680 --> 0:27:50.560
<v Speaker 8>Always a problem when you're following the FED and not

0:27:50.760 --> 0:27:53.399
<v Speaker 8>leading the FED in an inflationary environment or a hiking

0:27:53.400 --> 0:27:56.880
<v Speaker 8>and randal. Broadly speaking, this almost always happens in every

0:27:57.040 --> 0:28:02.879
<v Speaker 8>cycle where the easy be you know, overshoots or delivers

0:28:03.160 --> 0:28:06.080
<v Speaker 8>more hikes because they're singularly focused on inflation but not

0:28:06.520 --> 0:28:09.120
<v Speaker 8>broader economic fundamentals, and then they have to play catch

0:28:09.200 --> 0:28:12.520
<v Speaker 8>up on the downside to the to the US. I

0:28:12.560 --> 0:28:15.240
<v Speaker 8>mean broadly speaking, you know, if anything, coming into this year,

0:28:15.320 --> 0:28:17.360
<v Speaker 8>I think a lot of people who are expecting the

0:28:17.400 --> 0:28:20.800
<v Speaker 8>European economy to go into a recession. The European economies

0:28:21.080 --> 0:28:23.440
<v Speaker 8>and UK even has done a lot better than people

0:28:23.480 --> 0:28:26.560
<v Speaker 8>had broadly expected. That said, a slow down is to

0:28:26.600 --> 0:28:29.480
<v Speaker 8>be expected given how aggressively the ECB has high grades.

0:28:29.880 --> 0:28:33.280
<v Speaker 8>So you know, the the trajectory I think ultimately will

0:28:33.320 --> 0:28:35.000
<v Speaker 8>be that the FED will have to pivot and the

0:28:35.000 --> 0:28:37.360
<v Speaker 8>ECB will have to pivot shortly thereafter.

0:28:37.800 --> 0:28:41.280
<v Speaker 5>So bat wonderful to get a perspective, as always, Sabato Chapa,

0:28:41.000 --> 0:28:43.240
<v Speaker 5>the of selk Gen. I'm the lightest on the FED

0:28:43.280 --> 0:28:43.800
<v Speaker 5>and the ECP.

0:28:48.120 --> 0:28:50.240
<v Speaker 1>This is a joy and we had a huge response

0:28:50.240 --> 0:28:53.840
<v Speaker 1>from Professor two has joined us a few weeks ago.

0:28:53.960 --> 0:28:57.880
<v Speaker 1>He is a Columbia University history professor, but far more

0:28:57.960 --> 0:29:00.800
<v Speaker 1>than that, was the Barton Biggs professor or at Yale

0:29:00.920 --> 0:29:06.320
<v Speaker 1>University and had to replace the giant Paul Kennedy very quickly. Adam,

0:29:06.400 --> 0:29:10.080
<v Speaker 1>what was it like trying to replace Paul Kennedy at Yale?

0:29:10.120 --> 0:29:11.240
<v Speaker 1>I can't imagine.

0:29:11.760 --> 0:29:14.680
<v Speaker 9>It was definitely a lesson in humility to absolutely honest.

0:29:14.720 --> 0:29:16.640
<v Speaker 9>I mean Paul is still going strong, it should be said,

0:29:16.680 --> 0:29:19.280
<v Speaker 9>because when I left, he came back and he's absolutely

0:29:19.760 --> 0:29:23.640
<v Speaker 9>on all cylinders. But yeah, a legend in his own lifetime.

0:29:23.760 --> 0:29:27.000
<v Speaker 1>And I'm Your essay in March is my early choice

0:29:27.000 --> 0:29:29.680
<v Speaker 1>for Essay of the Year in the Financial Times. You

0:29:29.760 --> 0:29:34.560
<v Speaker 1>beautifully walk through the trillion dollar rebalancing as we move

0:29:34.600 --> 0:29:38.880
<v Speaker 1>from pandemic to poly crisis. What is this poly crisis

0:29:38.920 --> 0:29:41.960
<v Speaker 1>for living? And when does the joy end? When do

0:29:42.040 --> 0:29:45.160
<v Speaker 1>we rebalance to some form of stability.

0:29:46.160 --> 0:29:48.320
<v Speaker 9>I think the absolutely first lesson, Tom is that we

0:29:48.400 --> 0:29:51.840
<v Speaker 9>probably don't. I think we actually have to abandon that

0:29:52.640 --> 0:29:55.520
<v Speaker 9>assumption that the best way to think about the world

0:29:55.600 --> 0:29:58.200
<v Speaker 9>is as a self equilibrating system that will move back

0:29:58.240 --> 0:30:01.280
<v Speaker 9>to normality. If you just look at the narrow space

0:30:01.320 --> 0:30:04.120
<v Speaker 9>of finance, does that seem like a reasonable description of

0:30:04.160 --> 0:30:07.120
<v Speaker 9>the world that we've been in since the two thousand

0:30:07.200 --> 0:30:09.440
<v Speaker 9>and eight crisis, or if you're talking about Japan since

0:30:09.480 --> 0:30:11.720
<v Speaker 9>the late nineteen nineties. It doesn't seem to me to

0:30:11.800 --> 0:30:14.400
<v Speaker 9>be that kind of reality. And that's a little bit.

0:30:14.440 --> 0:30:17.160
<v Speaker 9>I think what we're seeing in the banking this mini

0:30:17.200 --> 0:30:21.160
<v Speaker 9>crisis that's unfolding in the banking system, where ultimately the

0:30:21.400 --> 0:30:23.880
<v Speaker 9>big driver of that is the interest rate shock rights

0:30:24.160 --> 0:30:26.560
<v Speaker 9>and the interest rate shock comes somewhere when it comes

0:30:26.560 --> 0:30:29.360
<v Speaker 9>from this unprecedented surge of inflation, which is quite unlike

0:30:29.400 --> 0:30:32.840
<v Speaker 9>any inflation we've seen before, and follows immediately out of

0:30:32.880 --> 0:30:35.760
<v Speaker 9>the COVID shock, which ditto is also quite unlike anything

0:30:35.800 --> 0:30:38.400
<v Speaker 9>we've seen before. So I think we're in this very

0:30:38.520 --> 0:30:41.360
<v Speaker 9>broken play a world of a series of not just

0:30:41.480 --> 0:30:44.760
<v Speaker 9>serious but quite unique and rather unprecedented disruptions.

0:30:44.800 --> 0:30:47.320
<v Speaker 4>Well, and Adam, you say that one of the responses

0:30:47.360 --> 0:30:50.360
<v Speaker 4>to it has been basically bailout and the sort of

0:30:50.400 --> 0:30:53.960
<v Speaker 4>moral hazard of not allowing failure, which you've seen in

0:30:54.000 --> 0:30:56.880
<v Speaker 4>some of the banking institutions in a prior life. We're

0:30:57.080 --> 0:30:59.520
<v Speaker 4>being considered too big to fail or systemic or any

0:30:59.520 --> 0:31:02.560
<v Speaker 4>of these names. So what does that do in terms

0:31:02.680 --> 0:31:04.720
<v Speaker 4>of the zombies. I know that Tom's been talking a

0:31:04.760 --> 0:31:06.480
<v Speaker 4>lot about the zombie roll ups. Do you think that

0:31:06.520 --> 0:31:09.080
<v Speaker 4>we end up with a host of zombies or zombie

0:31:09.160 --> 0:31:11.320
<v Speaker 4>assets that kind of are allowed to persist in a

0:31:11.440 --> 0:31:14.280
<v Speaker 4>sort of inefficient manner for a longer period of time.

0:31:15.080 --> 0:31:18.080
<v Speaker 9>I think we clearly need new forms of discipline, We

0:31:18.120 --> 0:31:20.560
<v Speaker 9>need new forms of workout. And if you look in

0:31:20.600 --> 0:31:23.840
<v Speaker 9>the legal space, if you actually look in the mechanics

0:31:23.840 --> 0:31:27.440
<v Speaker 9>of bankruptcy restructuring in the United States and indeed across

0:31:27.520 --> 0:31:31.640
<v Speaker 9>the world, lawyers and corporate financial officers are very actively

0:31:31.680 --> 0:31:34.600
<v Speaker 9>engaged in that process of trying to figure out new

0:31:34.640 --> 0:31:38.720
<v Speaker 9>forms of discipline which aren't simply the old style Darwinian

0:31:38.800 --> 0:31:43.440
<v Speaker 9>process of free fall bankruptcy, which is increasingly the exception. Right,

0:31:43.480 --> 0:31:46.000
<v Speaker 9>there are forms of discipline which don't have to consist

0:31:46.160 --> 0:31:50.240
<v Speaker 9>in systemically dangerous bank failure, which is the sort of

0:31:50.240 --> 0:31:53.400
<v Speaker 9>type that we have been at risk of. But certainly, Lisi,

0:31:53.440 --> 0:31:55.840
<v Speaker 9>you're right, we need to be thinking very hard about

0:31:55.880 --> 0:31:59.600
<v Speaker 9>how we adjust and how we find new forms of

0:32:00.400 --> 0:32:04.920
<v Speaker 9>yes discipline selection, if you like, in Darwinian terms, to

0:32:04.920 --> 0:32:08.560
<v Speaker 9>to avoid a process of ever greater zombification.

0:32:08.960 --> 0:32:11.480
<v Speaker 4>This morning this weekend, when I was reading about the

0:32:12.040 --> 0:32:14.160
<v Speaker 4>regional banks and sort of where we are and the

0:32:14.200 --> 0:32:16.760
<v Speaker 4>amount of lending that they account for and the amount

0:32:16.760 --> 0:32:19.680
<v Speaker 4>of a real estate commercial real estate in particular that

0:32:19.720 --> 0:32:23.800
<v Speaker 4>they lend to, I wondered, is this model being challenged.

0:32:24.000 --> 0:32:26.800
<v Speaker 4>Is the private sector, private equity, private debts, some of

0:32:26.840 --> 0:32:31.120
<v Speaker 4>these financing companies taking over a greater share of the

0:32:31.160 --> 0:32:34.440
<v Speaker 4>business that regional banks used to do and really render

0:32:34.480 --> 0:32:35.480
<v Speaker 4>them less necessary.

0:32:36.600 --> 0:32:38.960
<v Speaker 9>I think it's actually, I would say, rather the reverse,

0:32:39.000 --> 0:32:41.520
<v Speaker 9>a very healthy reminder just of the actual structure of

0:32:41.560 --> 0:32:45.400
<v Speaker 9>American society and American business, which, as Matt Williams was saying,

0:32:45.480 --> 0:32:49.400
<v Speaker 9>is firmly and solidly routed not in the very large businesses,

0:32:49.920 --> 0:32:53.720
<v Speaker 9>but in a deep undergrowth of small and medium sized enterprise.

0:32:54.520 --> 0:32:57.200
<v Speaker 9>That's where a huge part of the job creation goes on.

0:32:57.360 --> 0:33:00.360
<v Speaker 9>And the bank ecosystem that the United States have is

0:33:00.800 --> 0:33:05.000
<v Speaker 9>internationally unusual. America has a lot of banks, But what

0:33:05.120 --> 0:33:06.880
<v Speaker 9>I do think we need to be taken care of

0:33:07.000 --> 0:33:10.000
<v Speaker 9>is exactly as you say, the huge shifts which are

0:33:10.040 --> 0:33:13.239
<v Speaker 9>going on and in terms of risk going forward, in

0:33:13.280 --> 0:33:16.480
<v Speaker 9>a way, I'm more worried about that new private equity

0:33:17.440 --> 0:33:21.880
<v Speaker 9>zone of very untransparent finance, trillions of dollars worth of

0:33:21.920 --> 0:33:24.520
<v Speaker 9>it in the SA leverage loan market, then I am

0:33:24.560 --> 0:33:27.720
<v Speaker 9>about the FDIC regulated small than medium sized banks, which,

0:33:27.800 --> 0:33:30.840
<v Speaker 9>on the whole, when they're not terribly managed like Silicon

0:33:30.920 --> 0:33:33.800
<v Speaker 9>Valley Bank was or First Republic, are a crucial part

0:33:33.800 --> 0:33:34.840
<v Speaker 9>of the American economy.

0:33:34.880 --> 0:33:37.720
<v Speaker 1>Adam, you straut of both sides of this with your academics.

0:33:37.720 --> 0:33:40.720
<v Speaker 1>The book Folks Is shut Down, How COVID shook the

0:33:40.760 --> 0:33:44.720
<v Speaker 1>world's economy, Adam TuS cancer. Enough about this effort from

0:33:44.960 --> 0:33:47.840
<v Speaker 1>I'm going to call it eighteen months ago, and Adam,

0:33:48.080 --> 0:33:51.160
<v Speaker 1>I want you to address the polarities in our politics

0:33:51.560 --> 0:33:55.840
<v Speaker 1>with the too small to succeed. I'm absolutely fascinated by

0:33:55.880 --> 0:33:59.440
<v Speaker 1>the focus of an America that is succeeding like Apple

0:33:59.520 --> 0:34:03.560
<v Speaker 1>with an apptless five trunch bond offering this morning. That's

0:34:03.600 --> 0:34:07.840
<v Speaker 1>all you know, Bloomberg surveillance Babbel. There's a huge body

0:34:07.880 --> 0:34:12.359
<v Speaker 1>of America that feels they're too small to succeed. Where

0:34:12.400 --> 0:34:13.880
<v Speaker 1>are they in a number of years.

0:34:14.760 --> 0:34:16.440
<v Speaker 9>This, I think has got to be the big worry.

0:34:16.440 --> 0:34:19.960
<v Speaker 9>I think we're seeing the bifurcation or maybe even a

0:34:19.960 --> 0:34:22.279
<v Speaker 9>three way separation of the US economy right now. There

0:34:22.320 --> 0:34:24.880
<v Speaker 9>are big slices of it which are continuing to thrive.

0:34:24.960 --> 0:34:28.759
<v Speaker 9>Think of the innovative energy space, the Chips Act, the

0:34:28.880 --> 0:34:31.400
<v Speaker 9>kind of money that's pouring into a genuine revival in

0:34:31.440 --> 0:34:35.000
<v Speaker 9>manufacturing investment. But those are big players. And what I

0:34:35.000 --> 0:34:37.240
<v Speaker 9>think we have to worry about is the credit crunch,

0:34:37.280 --> 0:34:39.440
<v Speaker 9>which looks as though it's beginning to unfold. If you

0:34:39.440 --> 0:34:43.040
<v Speaker 9>look at bankruptcies amongst smaller businesses, those numbers are beginning

0:34:43.080 --> 0:34:46.000
<v Speaker 9>to spike that that well as it will make that divide,

0:34:46.080 --> 0:34:50.120
<v Speaker 9>dig that ditch ever ever deeper. And that's ultimately, I think,

0:34:50.160 --> 0:34:53.840
<v Speaker 9>what is then reflected as it should be in democratic politics,

0:34:53.840 --> 0:34:57.640
<v Speaker 9>which ultimately in distorted ways for sure, but nevertheless does

0:34:57.719 --> 0:35:02.239
<v Speaker 9>reflect the broad tidal shifts in American society. And at

0:35:02.239 --> 0:35:05.640
<v Speaker 9>this moment we are think beginning to see the point

0:35:05.719 --> 0:35:09.279
<v Speaker 9>at which the extraordinary labor market story, which is after all,

0:35:09.280 --> 0:35:11.920
<v Speaker 9>the huge success of the recovery from COVID and America's

0:35:11.960 --> 0:35:15.520
<v Speaker 9>never seen unemployment numbers like this could be tipping into

0:35:15.560 --> 0:35:17.759
<v Speaker 9>something rather different, which would be a sort of two

0:35:17.840 --> 0:35:21.160
<v Speaker 9>speed recession or two types of landing. You know, we've

0:35:21.160 --> 0:35:23.480
<v Speaker 9>talked a lot about hard landings and soft landings and

0:35:23.480 --> 0:35:26.320
<v Speaker 9>low landings. What if one bit of the plane lands

0:35:26.400 --> 0:35:29.240
<v Speaker 9>quite hard on the other bit, as it were, sows away.

0:35:29.520 --> 0:35:30.520
<v Speaker 3>Well, just quickly.

0:35:30.560 --> 0:35:33.759
<v Speaker 4>Then you mentioned that you are concerned that there's an

0:35:33.760 --> 0:35:37.560
<v Speaker 4>increasing role of private capital away from some of these

0:35:37.560 --> 0:35:40.840
<v Speaker 4>smaller banks that is playing a part in what you

0:35:40.920 --> 0:35:43.400
<v Speaker 4>see as sort of this bifurcation that's developing.

0:35:44.000 --> 0:35:45.520
<v Speaker 3>Can you explain can you elaborate on that?

0:35:46.320 --> 0:35:46.480
<v Speaker 7>Well?

0:35:46.480 --> 0:35:48.239
<v Speaker 9>That I think would be a third element. This is

0:35:48.280 --> 0:35:50.600
<v Speaker 9>where the story gets really complicated, because I think the

0:35:50.640 --> 0:35:53.720
<v Speaker 9>credit squeeze is going to run through the stressed balance

0:35:53.719 --> 0:35:56.520
<v Speaker 9>sheets of smaller banks. The bit which I think is

0:35:56.680 --> 0:35:59.080
<v Speaker 9>riskiest in a sense, not risky the way that a

0:35:59.239 --> 0:36:01.279
<v Speaker 9>you know, city group getting to into trouble in two

0:36:01.280 --> 0:36:03.359
<v Speaker 9>thousand and eight or Aleman in two thousand and eight

0:36:03.400 --> 0:36:06.719
<v Speaker 9>is risk be it. Nevertheless, high risk is precisely the

0:36:06.760 --> 0:36:09.959
<v Speaker 9>space in between the high yield segment. These are big

0:36:10.120 --> 0:36:13.439
<v Speaker 9>players in that segment. We're not talking about small businesses here,

0:36:13.760 --> 0:36:17.200
<v Speaker 9>but They are very untransparently linked at this point, and

0:36:17.280 --> 0:36:19.920
<v Speaker 9>it's not by accident that in bankruptcy in the United

0:36:19.960 --> 0:36:25.279
<v Speaker 9>States today, the private equity owned firms are absolutely dominating

0:36:25.880 --> 0:36:30.239
<v Speaker 9>the corporate if you like, restructuring and crisis market. That's

0:36:30.280 --> 0:36:32.760
<v Speaker 9>where this sort of capital goes to play. The returns

0:36:32.760 --> 0:36:35.719
<v Speaker 9>are outsized if you can get in, and the privileged

0:36:35.719 --> 0:36:38.440
<v Speaker 9>elite that can play in this market earns those returns.

0:36:38.640 --> 0:36:40.760
<v Speaker 9>The question we're going to face now is what happens

0:36:40.760 --> 0:36:43.319
<v Speaker 9>when the risks come home to roost and where the

0:36:43.360 --> 0:36:45.719
<v Speaker 9>safety nets are and whether they're even appropriate to have

0:36:45.800 --> 0:36:47.640
<v Speaker 9>safety nets for this kind of actor.

0:36:47.440 --> 0:36:50.800
<v Speaker 1>And the new financialization as we move into the decade.

0:36:50.840 --> 0:36:54.160
<v Speaker 1>Adam twos thank you so much with Columbia University. Subscribe

0:36:54.200 --> 0:36:58.000
<v Speaker 1>to the Bloomberg Surveillance podcast on Apple, Spotify, and anywhere

0:36:58.000 --> 0:37:02.400
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0:37:15.719 --> 0:37:19.920
<v Speaker 1>Thanks for listening. I'm Tom Keen, and this is Bloomberg