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Speaker 1: Welcome to tech Stuff, a production from I Heart Radio.

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Speaker 1: Hey there, and welcome to tech Stuff. I'm your host,

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Speaker 1: Jonathan Strickland. I'm an executive producer with I Heart Radio

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Speaker 1: and Hell the Tech are you. It's time for a

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Speaker 1: tech Stuff classic episode. This one's a secret well. It

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Speaker 1: published on April two thousand fifteen, and it is titled

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Speaker 1: The Secret space Plane. Enjoy. So we're talking about a

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Speaker 1: space plane, secret space plane, and uh, it's been reported

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Speaker 1: on in the news several times. There's a at an

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Speaker 1: upcoming launch that should be happening in May of um

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Speaker 1: it is. As we record this, it's early April, so

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Speaker 1: obviously that's still always out and depending on weather and stuff,

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Speaker 1: it could end up being pushed back. But we wanted

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Speaker 1: to talk about what this plane is and we'd love

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Speaker 1: to talk about what it's doing. But as you'll find out,

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Speaker 1: that's a little complicated. There are some guesses, and as

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Speaker 1: we continue through today's episode, we will arrive at some

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Speaker 1: of that. But to be absolutely honest from the jump,

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Speaker 1: the people who do know what it's doing are totally

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Speaker 1: not allowed to talk about it. Yeah, this is like

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Speaker 1: almost Area fifty one level secrecy right where people it's

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Speaker 1: it's it's common knowledge that the thing exists, but not

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Speaker 1: common knowledge of what's going on with It's very much

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Speaker 1: like Area fifty one, what's for many years. So the

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Speaker 1: setup I have on this is on Friday October, an

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Speaker 1: unmanned plane landed autonomously, I should add, at Vandenburg Air

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Speaker 1: Force Base in California, and it had spent six hundred

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Speaker 1: seven in the four days, nearly two full years in

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Speaker 1: lower thorbit in space. It flew for two years up

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Speaker 1: in space. Yeah, um, so the landing marked the end

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Speaker 1: of the I call it a test flight, but really

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Speaker 1: you could just call it a mission of the X

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Speaker 1: thirty seven B space plane, also known as the Orbital

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Speaker 1: Test Vehicle or O t V. And there are two

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Speaker 1: of those planes in existence and together they've logged more

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Speaker 1: than one thousand, three hundred sixty seven days in orbit total.

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Speaker 1: Uh and that's across three missions. So that's a lot

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Speaker 1: of time at once. So you might want to know

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Speaker 1: what's going on. And the thing is, like we mentioned,

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Speaker 1: so need to know basis that you don't need to know,

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Speaker 1: and neither do we. Well, I think eventually that we're

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Speaker 1: going to know, we being the public, eventually we have

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Speaker 1: to know. Um, But there's there's a story behind this.

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Speaker 1: It's a culmination of stuff that began decades ago. Right, Yeah,

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Speaker 1: it started back in the nineteen nineties. Uh So turn

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Speaker 1: your watch back, if you will, to the magical decade

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Speaker 1: of the nineties. Grunge music is all the rage. You know,

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Speaker 1: the Generation xers are making sardonic entertainment left and right,

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Speaker 1: Empire records, that kind of thing. Um. So, NASA at

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Speaker 1: that point was looking into the future of space exploration,

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Speaker 1: particularly the type that doesn't need human beings on spacecraft. Yeah.

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Speaker 1: Humans are such a hassle in space. You have to

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Speaker 1: you have to spend so much time, technology and money

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Speaker 1: just like make them not die. Yeah, get the little

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Speaker 1: guys up there and back. Yeah. Yeah, keeping keeping humans

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Speaker 1: alive in space is a tall order because there's a

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Speaker 1: lot of stuff in space that is really deadly. Right.

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Speaker 1: It's not our neck of the woods, a vacuum of space.

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Speaker 1: You've got radiation, You've got micro gravity, which over a

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Speaker 1: long enough time period can cause some serious health problems.

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Speaker 1: Objects at high speeds, yeah, space debris, all this sort

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Speaker 1: of stuff. And you know, clearly the space age we've

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Speaker 1: had our share of tragedies and you know, we definitely

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Speaker 1: aren't making light of that. That's one of the reasons

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Speaker 1: why so much effort and money has have been put

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Speaker 1: forward into these unmanned missions. And can we find ways

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Speaker 1: of getting stuff to space, let's say, like a like

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Speaker 1: a refueling mission or a you know, uh, you're replenishing

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Speaker 1: inventory aboard the International Space Station without the need for

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Speaker 1: a manned space flight. And so there there's a real

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Speaker 1: reason why NASA was interested in this, and um they were,

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Speaker 1: you know. Apart from that, it also reduces cost. Yeah,

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Speaker 1: you don't have to have a life support system for

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Speaker 1: a example, in an unmanned spacecraft. That alone will save

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Speaker 1: you millions of bucks. Right. So in NASA announced that

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Speaker 1: it was developing a pair of vehicles, one called the

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Speaker 1: orbital Vehicle and one called the Approach and Landing Test

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Speaker 1: Vehicle or a L t V UH. And the a

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Speaker 1: l t V S purpose was to test the approach

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Speaker 1: and landing systems of an unmanned plane, so this one

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Speaker 1: was not designed to go into space. The a L

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Speaker 1: t V and UH. NASA partnered with Boeing and the

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Speaker 1: Air Force in order to get this program going. So

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Speaker 1: the A L T V was just an unmantened I

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Speaker 1: say just it was an unmanned plane, because it was

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Speaker 1: amazing to me that you could build an autonomous vehicle

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Speaker 1: that could land a plane, yeah, on a landing strip. Well,

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Speaker 1: in this case, it wasn't taking off because what they

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Speaker 1: did with this was they would lift it up on

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Speaker 1: another vehicle and then drop it, and then they would

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Speaker 1: allow the unmanned vehicle to fly itself to the proper

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Speaker 1: landing destiny action and land so the al V it

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Speaker 1: could not take off on its own, it couldn't go

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Speaker 1: into space. But it was designed mainly as a test

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Speaker 1: platform for the autonomous guidance system and landing sort of

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Speaker 1: a proof of concept, Yeah, because I mean, obviously, if

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Speaker 1: you want to build upon this and create a vehicle,

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Speaker 1: an unmanned vehicle that can go into space, first you

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Speaker 1: want to make absolutely certain that you have taken steps

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Speaker 1: to a show that it can land before you pour

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Speaker 1: in all the money that is necessary for it to

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Speaker 1: be able to survive the rigors of space travel. Yeah.

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Speaker 1: And there's a little bit of a I guess a

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Speaker 1: geopolitical calculation with this kind of stuff too, because if

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Speaker 1: in orbit decays, right, if the thing gets into space

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Speaker 1: and it crashes or it just doesn't land where it's

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Speaker 1: supposed to. Then not only have you the launching party

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Speaker 1: lost billions of dollars, right, but you've also given all

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Speaker 1: of this research to another country, and maybe not a

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Speaker 1: friendly one. Yeah exactly. I mean we've seen this sort

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Speaker 1: of stuff throughout the history of the uh well really

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Speaker 1: the Cold War is you know, like things like the

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Speaker 1: you two's YouTube spy plane going down and the fact

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Speaker 1: that that was a huge concern that that uh, the

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Speaker 1: the adversaries to the United States had suddenly gained access

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Speaker 1: to some of that technology. Uh well, you know that's

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Speaker 1: clearly another concern for this sort of stuff. You want

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Speaker 1: to make sure that everything is working properly before you

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Speaker 1: ever put it towards any kind of sensitive use or

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Speaker 1: even just a scientific experiment or whatever. Like maybe it's

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Speaker 1: too you know, um deploy a satellite or something, or

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Speaker 1: even even something more sophisticated, like to fix a satellite

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Speaker 1: to repair solar panels. Yeah. Yeah, So this, like I said,

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Speaker 1: Boeing was partnering with NASA to develop these uh it

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Speaker 1: would ultimately under this part of the the program own

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Speaker 1: it would only develop the altar V for NASA. That's

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Speaker 1: as far as it got it. But it was designated

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Speaker 1: as the X thirty seven A aircraft or spacecraft. Really yeah, yeah, yeah,

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Speaker 1: it's so much easier to say that than uh, you know,

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Speaker 1: alt V or whatever. So it was similar to an

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Speaker 1: earlier unmanned aircraft that was again made by Boeing, but

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Speaker 1: this one was operated by the Air Force. It was

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Speaker 1: the X forty A H And again the X forty

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Speaker 1: A was meant as a test platform for things that

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Speaker 1: would ultimately go on an unmanned space plane type vehicle.

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Speaker 1: Uh so another proof of concept, kind of like the

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Speaker 1: idea that we want to make sure that we get,

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Speaker 1: you know, take the right steps. We're not gonna we're

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Speaker 1: not gonna leap and jump over like six steps of development.

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Speaker 1: We're gonna use this as an incremental approach. So the

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Speaker 1: X forty A could not actually go into space, but

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Speaker 1: again was to test certain technologies. It also was too

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Speaker 1: small for NASA, and could we yeah, it was too

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Speaker 1: small for naty could we Before we go on, could

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Speaker 1: you talk a little bit about just, uh the dramatic

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Speaker 1: waste in typical conventional launches. Oh? Sure, Like yeah, I mean,

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Speaker 1: like so generally speaking, the rule of thumb is that

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Speaker 1: a launch with a government funded space launch is about

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Speaker 1: ten tho dollars per pound. Per pound, every pound of

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Speaker 1: payload that you want to put into space cost ten grand.

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Speaker 1: So imagine that you have a vehicle that has all

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Speaker 1: these different support systems on it for astronauts. That adds

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Speaker 1: to the weight, plus then you have the payload of

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Speaker 1: the spacecraft itself. So something like the Space Shuttle program,

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Speaker 1: which was designed to take material into space, either as

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Speaker 1: like a satellite to be deployed, or tools to repair

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Speaker 1: things that already existed like the hubble Um, or even

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Speaker 1: just a trip to the International Space Station to bring

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Speaker 1: supplies up there. All of that weight is a factor

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Speaker 1: in the cost of launch. If you do an unmanned

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Speaker 1: spacecraft and you reduce the weight of the spacecraft, you've

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Speaker 1: reduced the You know, even even though the X three

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Speaker 1: seven A was larger than the X forty A, it's

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Speaker 1: still significantly smaller than a space shuttle, and that means

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Speaker 1: that it would cost less to put up. You know,

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Speaker 1: you have to use less fuel, so it costs less

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Speaker 1: to put it up into lower thorbit. And when I

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Speaker 1: say less, it's still really expensive. By the way when

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Speaker 1: I the reason why I stressed government funded space launch

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Speaker 1: is there a lot of private companies that have been

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Speaker 1: arguing that by privatizing they could bring down the price

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Speaker 1: of launching payloads into space. So things like space x

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Speaker 1: have really helped to to reduce that cost. So then

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Speaker 1: getting into the differences between the X forty A and

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Speaker 1: the X thirty seven A, despite the fact that it's

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Speaker 1: a lower number of the X three seven A is

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Speaker 1: a bigger spacecraft. It's a larger than the X forty A.

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Speaker 1: And there are other differences as well. Once we get

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Speaker 1: to the one that actually was designed to go into space, Yeah,

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Speaker 1: that one's got advanced thermal protection spacecraft systems, that kind

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Speaker 1: of thing. So the seven A and the forty A

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Speaker 1: were both designed just to be test platforms, so they

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Speaker 1: didn't need all that all the extra stuff. So we're

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Speaker 1: going through this incremental testing and starting to see if

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Speaker 1: we can really make this this vision a reality, this autonomous,

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Speaker 1: super secret spacecraft, which I just love the idea of it.

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Speaker 1: H out at than how um, how do the bureaucratic changes.

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Speaker 1: So yeah, this we're talking a lot about NASA right now,

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Speaker 1: and you might be thinking, well, why is this space

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Speaker 1: plane so secret. NASA is not about secrecy, and it's not.

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Speaker 1: The thirty seven A wasn't meant to be secret at all.

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Speaker 1: In fact, that's a lot of the information you can

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Speaker 1: find about the spacecraft is right there on NASA as

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Speaker 1: website because it's it's all publicly available. But some changes

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Speaker 1: would end up making the let's say, the stewardship of

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Speaker 1: the thirty seven X three seven program change hands. So first,

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Speaker 1: in two thousand one, the Air Force withdrew its support

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Speaker 1: for the project. It's financial support. It was one of

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Speaker 1: three parties that was partner to fund this, the other

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Speaker 1: two being NASA and Boeing. Air Force pulls out in

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Speaker 1: two thousand one, NASA keeps going with the partnership with Boeing. Uh.

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Speaker 1: They had to end up, um, you know, going to

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Speaker 1: the government and saying, hey, we need grants and stuff

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Speaker 1: in order for this to keep going, otherwise the project's

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Speaker 1: gonna collapse from the inside. This continues until two thousand four,

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Speaker 1: and that's when NASA ends up handing over the control

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Speaker 1: of the X thirty seven program to the Defense Advanced

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Speaker 1: Research Projects Agency also known as DARPA, which I've talked

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Speaker 1: about multiple times this podcast. Yeah, we've talked about a

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Speaker 1: couple of other shows to DARPA. I'm assuming that people

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Speaker 1: have heard this name before, but the rumors are true.

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Speaker 1: It is the closest thing the US has to a

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Speaker 1: mad science department. Yeah, it's the Department of Defense is

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Speaker 1: mad science department. And and it's not like DARPA is

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Speaker 1: filled with a bunch of yeah in lab coats, like

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Speaker 1: locked away forty forty levels underground. In fact, mostly what

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Speaker 1: DARPA does is invite other entities to develop for specific purposes.

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Speaker 1: So I did an episode not long ago talking about

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Speaker 1: how DARPA was instrumental in the rapid development of autonomous

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Speaker 1: car technology. Yeah. Um so in this it's very akin

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Speaker 1: to that. This is an autonomous spacecraft technology. So you know,

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Speaker 1: you're you're talking about the continuation of an idea and

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Speaker 1: just expanding it, you know, expanding the parameters. Really uh So,

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Speaker 1: in this case, DARPA takes over, and it meant that

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Speaker 1: the X three seven fell under the control of the

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Speaker 1: Department of Defense, which also meant that the X three

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Speaker 1: seven suddenly became a classified project. It was no longer

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Speaker 1: this this you know, very public facing project from NASA.

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Speaker 1: Now it's a classified project under the Department of Defense. Yeah,

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Speaker 1: which you know, which is kind of a bummer, but

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Speaker 1: also understandable given that the kind of technology that they

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Speaker 1: would be working on is not something you want or

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Speaker 1: or really can have open sourced, you know, because other

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Speaker 1: countries will get involved, other countries will reverse engineer, and

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Speaker 1: there's a lot of um Again, this is this is

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Speaker 1: where I think we start to see a political aspect

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Speaker 1: to become even more apparent. But but the story is

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Speaker 1: not done yet, right. So remember the Air Force had

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Speaker 1: pulled sort of it's it's supporting two thousand one November

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Speaker 1: two thousand six and announces it's going to develop a

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Speaker 1: variation of the X thirty seven A. Remember the orbital

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Speaker 1: vehicle that NASA had proposed. They never got to the

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Speaker 1: point where that was actually built. They had built the

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Speaker 1: one that was the approach and landing test vehicle, but

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Speaker 1: not the orbital one. And the Air Force wanted to

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Speaker 1: build an orbital vehicle. Uh. They called it the orbital

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Speaker 1: test vehicle, so the O t V UH, and they

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Speaker 1: designated it the X thirty seven B. So thirty seven

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Speaker 1: A was the one that NASA used to test this

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Speaker 1: approach and landing uh technology, and this one was meant

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Speaker 1: to actually go into space. Uh. So the top secret

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Speaker 1: program falls to the control of the Air Force. Now,

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Speaker 1: the official word from the Air Force as to the

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Speaker 1: purpose of the X thirty seven program is This is

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Speaker 1: a direct quote from their website. The X thirty seven

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Speaker 1: B Orbital Test Vehicle or O t V is an

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Speaker 1: experimental test program to demonstrate technologies for a reliable, reusable,

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Speaker 1: unmanned space ace test platform for the US Air Force.

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Speaker 1: The primary objectives of the X thirty seven B are

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Speaker 1: twofold reusable spacecraft technologies for America's future in space and

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Speaker 1: operating experiments which can be returned to and examined on Earth. So, um,

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Speaker 1: there's some important stuff in there that really does play

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Speaker 1: into the purpose of this thing. The big one being

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Speaker 1: that it is a reusable spacecraft, so it's not a

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Speaker 1: one and done right uh. And this was the same

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Speaker 1: purpose for the Space Shuttle program. It was the difference

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Speaker 1: between that and previous programs where like a capsule would

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Speaker 1: go up and come back down and then once it

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Speaker 1: came down it had to be retired. You couldn't use

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Speaker 1: it again. This is the difference between you know, those

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Speaker 1: and and those previous UH spacecraft and things like the

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Speaker 1: Space Shuttle and the X thirty seven spacecraft. Yeah, we're

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Speaker 1: kind of locked into it at this point because we've

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Speaker 1: put so much money in at the front, so we'll

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Speaker 1: have to we'll have to make that money back. Um.

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Speaker 1: I'm I'm just tickled because what I love about these

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Speaker 1: relatively obtuse kind of explanations is that there there's clearly, um,

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Speaker 1: there's clearly a reliance on vague language. The word test

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Speaker 1: is used three times in the first sentence, and the

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Speaker 1: substantive You are right, they are seeing substantive things. The

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Speaker 1: reusable spacecraft is probably the biggest part of it. Another

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Speaker 1: part is the testing of the instruments, which, again, although

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Speaker 1: you and I don't really know that, that seems like

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Speaker 1: one of the best guesses. Yeah, and you know, you

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Speaker 1: could argue that part of this, the existence of this

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Speaker 1: is really just too incrementally build towards a future spacecraft

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Speaker 1: that has not yet been designed for specific purposes that

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Speaker 1: may go beyond this testing that we're talking about. Uh.

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Speaker 1: And another one maybe that it's to test related technology

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Speaker 1: that are not intended to make the spacecraft itself more effective,

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Speaker 1: but rather just say Hey, we built this sensor. The

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Speaker 1: sensor is meant to do this specific task when it's

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Speaker 1: in space, but we don't know if the sensor can

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Speaker 1: actually withstand being in space, like being exposed to radiation.

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Speaker 1: But then you think, oh, I've got this unmanned vehicle.

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Speaker 1: I can put it up into orbit for hundreds of

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Speaker 1: days at a time and expose the sensor to the

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Speaker 1: same kinds of radiation it will would experience if it

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Speaker 1: were incorporated into some other type of spacecraft, and then

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Speaker 1: we can test and see if in fact the thing

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Speaker 1: we designed will still work, you know, once it's in space.

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Speaker 1: So those are I mean, that's a valid thing. But

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Speaker 1: but because of the secrecy involved, the fact that these

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Speaker 1: these details cannot legally be shared, has led to some

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Speaker 1: really interesting hypotheses, some more grounded than others. I like

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Speaker 1: to use the term grounded. Yes, space ground here all day.

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Speaker 1: I'm surprised we got this far without another space fund.

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Speaker 1: We've got a ton in the notes, and they were all,

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Speaker 1: well unintentional, might be going a bit far, Like I

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Speaker 1: would realize that while typing it out, I'm like, oh, well, okay,

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Speaker 1: but we do know, we do know a lot about

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Speaker 1: the X thirty seven. You can see pictures of it online.

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Speaker 1: You can see some great footage of it that comes

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Speaker 1: from I think ultimately from the Air Force themselves. Yeah. Yeah,

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Speaker 1: because I mean the landing is impressive, right, the fact

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Speaker 1: that this is landing autonomously, so it's unmanned. But it's

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Speaker 1: not just unmanned. There's no one remote controlling this aircraft

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Speaker 1: when it comes down and land, right, it's not a drone.

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Speaker 1: That's very important. Yeah, it's it's it's fully under its

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Speaker 1: own nat navigation power. Uh. So here's some of the

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Speaker 1: facts that we know about it. And a lot of

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Speaker 1: this is because, again, it started its life out as

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Speaker 1: a NASA project, so there were some details that were

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Speaker 1: already out there and the Air Force is like, well, heck,

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Speaker 1: we don't care about this part. This isn't the important part.

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Speaker 1: Just don't talk about the lasers, right, yeah, I mean

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Speaker 1: the tickle device. Yeah, it's just there to tickle space.

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Speaker 1: That's all it's meant to do. So here's what we

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Speaker 1: do know. Uh. It is twenty nine ft three inches long,

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Speaker 1: which is about eight point nine ms. When it's on

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Speaker 1: its landing gear, it is nine ft six inches tall

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Speaker 1: or about two point nine ms now at that space.

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Speaker 1: Even if you had a pressurized cabin, you wouldn't be

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Speaker 1: able to really have astronauts right in it. Uh. The

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Speaker 1: X three seven B does not have a pressurized cabin,

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Speaker 1: so it cannot carry up anything living, at least nothing

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Speaker 1: that you expect to remain. So it's it could carry

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Speaker 1: up non animate uh like cargo that could and not

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Speaker 1: a whole lot of it at that's at that size

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Speaker 1: from wing tip to wing tip, it is four ft

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Speaker 1: eleven inches wide or four point five meters, and it

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Speaker 1: weighs a slimming eleven thousand pounds or four thousand UH.

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Speaker 1: It's power system it uses lithium ion batteries to to

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Speaker 1: supply power to its um it's thrusters, but it is

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Speaker 1: uh it's got gallium arsenide solar cells to recharge those.

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Speaker 1: That's why it can stay in space so long. Because

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Speaker 1: that's the question that a lot of people have at

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Speaker 1: the beginning, is how does it manage to retain power

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Speaker 1: for that long and returned to its original um you know,

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Speaker 1: returned to its launch point on its own power. This

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Speaker 1: is not necessarily a powerful vehicle on its own No,

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Speaker 1: it cannot take off from Earth and it certainly cannot

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Speaker 1: escape Earth's gravity on its own. It has to have

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Speaker 1: a launch vehicle, also more commonly referred to by we

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Speaker 1: mere mortals as rockets. So you guess, trap one of

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Speaker 1: these suckers onto a rocket UM, typically an Atlas V

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Speaker 1: Applas Atlas five. I guess I should say, let's say

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Speaker 1: V call I X I I UM the Atlas five rocket.

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Speaker 1: You have to strap it up to one of those

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Speaker 1: suckers to get it out into space in the first place. So,

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Speaker 1: and that actually has raised some folks um objections to

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Speaker 1: this whole approach, but we'll get into that a little bit.

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Speaker 1: So the way it would work is originally they were

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Speaker 1: thinking about having this kind of piggyback onto a space shuttle,

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Speaker 1: so if you were going to launch a space shutle,

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Speaker 1: you could also launch a space plane. However, the Columbia

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Speaker 1: disaster really caused NASA to reevaluate the space shuttle program

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Speaker 1: for quite some time. In fact, it was it was

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Speaker 1: put on the ground for a good long time after

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Speaker 1: the Columbia disaster, as NASA was reevaluating the program and

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Speaker 1: seeing how to make it so that that kind of

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Speaker 1: tragedy would never happen again, so that meant that that

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Speaker 1: would no longer be a viable means of getting the

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Speaker 1: X thirty event into space. So at that point, the

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Speaker 1: reevaluation for X thirty seven mint they looked at it

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Speaker 1: as a payload for other launch vehicles, and they settled

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Speaker 1: on the United Launch Alliance at last five. We'll be

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Speaker 1: back with more about the secret space plane after these messages.

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Speaker 1: So the launch vehicle delivers the X thirty seven to

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Speaker 1: low Earth orbit. Low Earth orbit is the same orbit

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Speaker 1: that you find the International Space Station. It's the same

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Speaker 1: Earth orbit the Hubble spacecraft or Hubble space telescope is in.

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Speaker 1: It's the same Earth orbit. Or it's the same orbit

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Speaker 1: that all the Space Shuttle missions went to. So in

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Speaker 1: other words, there have only been a couple of times

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Speaker 1: that human beings have ever gone beyond beyond low Earth orbit.

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Speaker 1: Those times would be when we sent people to the Moon. Otherwise,

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Speaker 1: everything has been in low Earth orbit, which is relatively

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Speaker 1: close to the Earth. From our perspective, it's way the

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Speaker 1: heck out there. But if you were to look at

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Speaker 1: Earth from a much like not even a bird's eye view, obviously,

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Speaker 1: but much further out, you would say, oh, lower th

393
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Speaker 1: orbit is still very much in the neighborhood. Yeah, a

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Speaker 1: space bird. Well, I guess one of the great ways

395
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Speaker 1: to imagine this is if you look at a picture

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Speaker 1: with the distance between Earth's Moon and Earth and then

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Speaker 1: you see the line your Earth orbit is very very close. Yeah, exactly,

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Speaker 1: And it's also where a lot of space debris happens

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Speaker 1: to be. There's other space because we do have satellites

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Speaker 1: that are much further out right, We've got like the

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Speaker 1: the geosynchronous satellites are much further out than lower th orbit.

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Speaker 1: But those were delivered by unmanned spacecraft. They weren't They

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Speaker 1: weren't put there by astronauts. Uh, So that that is,

404
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Speaker 1: you know, we do have stuff that's further out, but

405
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Speaker 1: it's not stuff from manned missions. And this unmanned mission

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Speaker 1: would end up going and that's say, very low Earth orbit. Uh,

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Speaker 1: and it could stay. Originally, I think they were planning

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Speaker 1: on having it stayed between two entered in three days. Yeah,

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Speaker 1: that would be pretty much the limit that was originally,

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Speaker 1: or at least that was kind of what the mission

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Speaker 1: parameters were going to be. But as it turns out,

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Speaker 1: it can stay up there much longer than that. So

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Speaker 1: the very first mission for an X thirty seven launched

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Speaker 1: on April and landed on December three. Landed without a hitch.

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Speaker 1: Some of their tests landings that they did where they

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Speaker 1: just dropped one of these X thirty seven's from another aircraft,

417
00:25:32,400 --> 00:25:36,040
Speaker 1: some of them were successful, not all of them were. Yeah,

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Speaker 1: they had some issues where I think on the very

419
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Speaker 1: I think the very first time they tried to land

420
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Speaker 1: one um when the mission hadn't been scrapped for weather.

421
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Speaker 1: It ended up landing on the landing strip, but it

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Speaker 1: overshot a little bit and rolled off the end and

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Speaker 1: sustained minor damage. No. No, And then remember they built

424
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Speaker 1: two of these things. Originally they were just going to

425
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Speaker 1: do one, but they ended up building two. So that

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Speaker 1: first mission lasted two hundred twenty four days, and the

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Speaker 1: X thirty seven traveled approximately ninety one million miles in

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Speaker 1: those two four days, which is about a hundred forty

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Speaker 1: six million kilometers. The second mission was launched on March

430
00:26:19,080 --> 00:26:22,360
Speaker 1: five eleven. Now this was the second of the two

431
00:26:22,520 --> 00:26:25,159
Speaker 1: X thirty seven, so it wasn't the same one that

432
00:26:25,240 --> 00:26:29,320
Speaker 1: went up in important to remember because remember the whole

433
00:26:29,320 --> 00:26:32,480
Speaker 1: purpose of these was so you have reusable the idea

434
00:26:32,520 --> 00:26:35,600
Speaker 1: being you could turn it around fairly quickly and launch

435
00:26:35,640 --> 00:26:38,159
Speaker 1: it for a new mission. But they didn't reuse the

436
00:26:38,160 --> 00:26:41,800
Speaker 1: original one, not for this one. They decided, all right,

437
00:26:41,800 --> 00:26:44,000
Speaker 1: we're going to stagger these. So the second one went

438
00:26:44,080 --> 00:26:49,000
Speaker 1: up in on March two thousand eleven. Uh, this was

439
00:26:49,080 --> 00:26:52,679
Speaker 1: supposed to only last only is a weird way of

440
00:26:52,680 --> 00:26:56,160
Speaker 1: putting it. Only last two hundred seventy days as an

441
00:26:56,200 --> 00:26:59,400
Speaker 1: incredibly long time to just be you know, just being

442
00:26:59,440 --> 00:27:01,800
Speaker 1: a space craft. Remember it's not the International Space Station

443
00:27:01,880 --> 00:27:05,120
Speaker 1: or anything like that. But on November twenty nine, two

444
00:27:05,119 --> 00:27:06,920
Speaker 1: tho eleven, the Air Force announced it was going to

445
00:27:07,040 --> 00:27:09,199
Speaker 1: extend the mission, you know, just let go for a

446
00:27:09,200 --> 00:27:14,280
Speaker 1: while off. So it eventually landed on June twelve, which

447
00:27:14,320 --> 00:27:17,439
Speaker 1: means it lasted four hundred sixty nine days. That is

448
00:27:17,600 --> 00:27:21,760
Speaker 1: mind blowing. Yeah, so the spacecraft was just orbiting Earth

449
00:27:22,560 --> 00:27:25,040
Speaker 1: for four six days. Sometimes, by the way, it's low

450
00:27:25,160 --> 00:27:30,840
Speaker 1: enough that you can spot it. Amateur satellite investigators or

451
00:27:30,880 --> 00:27:34,760
Speaker 1: observers can check it out. You can go online, uh

452
00:27:34,880 --> 00:27:38,680
Speaker 1: and find the find the correct forums, which allow you

453
00:27:38,760 --> 00:27:43,320
Speaker 1: to track pretty much anything that is in orbit. If

454
00:27:43,359 --> 00:27:46,520
Speaker 1: it's close enough to be seen, it's it's the Great

455
00:27:46,600 --> 00:27:50,800
Speaker 1: Achilles heel of secrecy in space. Yeah. Yeah, if you're like, hey,

456
00:27:50,840 --> 00:27:54,200
Speaker 1: that's stars moving, the chances are it's not a star,

457
00:27:54,400 --> 00:27:57,800
Speaker 1: and it's not. It's not the Death Star. Probably probably,

458
00:27:57,800 --> 00:28:01,439
Speaker 1: it's more likely a space station or a spacecraft. Um.

459
00:28:01,520 --> 00:28:05,960
Speaker 1: So the third mission launched onto Samarrella at h and

460
00:28:06,000 --> 00:28:10,399
Speaker 1: this one was the same spacecraft that did the launched

461
00:28:10,440 --> 00:28:12,679
Speaker 1: So this was the first one, the first X thirty

462
00:28:12,720 --> 00:28:20,119
Speaker 1: seven b Um. Now this particular one, uh, lasted for

463
00:28:20,320 --> 00:28:22,119
Speaker 1: six hundred seventy four days. This is the one we

464
00:28:22,119 --> 00:28:24,919
Speaker 1: talked about where it was just shy of two years. Um,

465
00:28:25,560 --> 00:28:28,760
Speaker 1: pretty amazing that it could stay up that long. It

466
00:28:28,920 --> 00:28:31,600
Speaker 1: landed on October seventeen, So this is the one I

467
00:28:31,640 --> 00:28:34,959
Speaker 1: was referring to at the top of the show. And uh,

468
00:28:35,080 --> 00:28:38,240
Speaker 1: the fourth mission is scheduled to launch on May six,

469
00:28:39,240 --> 00:28:41,720
Speaker 1: but again we're in early April as we record this,

470
00:28:41,840 --> 00:28:45,760
Speaker 1: so that's still in our future, right. But what happens

471
00:28:45,800 --> 00:28:51,000
Speaker 1: on these missions, that's a great question. Then Remember how

472
00:28:51,040 --> 00:28:53,560
Speaker 1: I said it was classified in top secret? Do you

473
00:28:53,600 --> 00:28:56,240
Speaker 1: think I have that clearance? Where are we going? I

474
00:28:56,280 --> 00:28:58,760
Speaker 1: thought this was I thought you were doing a bit.

475
00:28:59,040 --> 00:29:01,160
Speaker 1: You're the guy who who knows the stuff. They don't

476
00:29:01,160 --> 00:29:03,200
Speaker 1: want you to know if anything, I should be asking

477
00:29:03,240 --> 00:29:06,360
Speaker 1: you this question. Well, uh yeah, well here's the thing,

478
00:29:06,680 --> 00:29:08,840
Speaker 1: and and and thank you for the shout out. But

479
00:29:09,920 --> 00:29:14,840
Speaker 1: rumors proliferate in the in the absence of Transparency's actually

480
00:29:14,880 --> 00:29:18,680
Speaker 1: absolutely like if you you know, you obviously can't deny

481
00:29:18,720 --> 00:29:22,760
Speaker 1: the existence of this thing, because we all know it exists,

482
00:29:23,320 --> 00:29:26,719
Speaker 1: but if you cannot also explain the reason for it,

483
00:29:26,840 --> 00:29:29,880
Speaker 1: or what its purposes or what it is doing, then

484
00:29:29,960 --> 00:29:33,560
Speaker 1: in the absence that vacuum of information, nature of whorrors

485
00:29:33,560 --> 00:29:37,760
Speaker 1: a vacuum. So we'll fill it with conjecture. Don't worry

486
00:29:37,760 --> 00:29:40,200
Speaker 1: about not telling us what it does. We will take

487
00:29:40,240 --> 00:29:43,440
Speaker 1: care of that for you by suggesting every kind of

488
00:29:43,480 --> 00:29:47,200
Speaker 1: hypothesis you can imagine. Okay, But with all that being said,

489
00:29:47,720 --> 00:29:50,520
Speaker 1: now we get to do one of the most enjoyable,

490
00:29:50,600 --> 00:29:55,760
Speaker 1: fascinating and sometimes slippery slopish kind of things, which is

491
00:29:56,040 --> 00:29:59,400
Speaker 1: we begin to assemble some of the facts we definitely

492
00:29:59,480 --> 00:30:02,600
Speaker 1: know and see if that builds out toward a larger picture.

493
00:30:02,680 --> 00:30:05,040
Speaker 1: Right all right, Yeah, So here's here's what we know.

494
00:30:05,600 --> 00:30:08,240
Speaker 1: DARPA took control of it. It's part of the Department

495
00:30:08,280 --> 00:30:11,400
Speaker 1: of Defense. The Air Force is running it, so it's

496
00:30:11,440 --> 00:30:15,040
Speaker 1: a military operation. With it being a military operation, you

497
00:30:15,040 --> 00:30:17,800
Speaker 1: can therefore assume that it's going to be doing some

498
00:30:18,720 --> 00:30:24,240
Speaker 1: things that would in the long term support military operations. Right,

499
00:30:24,320 --> 00:30:28,240
Speaker 1: it's not. It's not gonna be a cable television satellite

500
00:30:28,240 --> 00:30:31,800
Speaker 1: deployment device. That's not gonna help you know, the air forces.

501
00:30:31,840 --> 00:30:34,200
Speaker 1: Like we're strapped for cash. Let's see if Comcast wants

502
00:30:34,240 --> 00:30:36,239
Speaker 1: us to put something up in the sky, that's not

503
00:30:36,280 --> 00:30:40,640
Speaker 1: gonna happen. So therefore we narrow that the down the

504
00:30:40,760 --> 00:30:45,000
Speaker 1: possible uses for this to military things that would benefit

505
00:30:45,040 --> 00:30:48,640
Speaker 1: the military in some form or fashion. Yeah, that makes sense,

506
00:30:48,880 --> 00:30:53,760
Speaker 1: So that gives us some some direction. Uh So. One

507
00:30:53,760 --> 00:30:58,280
Speaker 1: of the popular hypotheses is that the X three seven

508
00:30:58,360 --> 00:31:02,000
Speaker 1: is acting like a spy settle light which maybe to

509
00:31:02,280 --> 00:31:08,280
Speaker 1: spy upon land targets or even other spacecraft other targets

510
00:31:08,280 --> 00:31:11,040
Speaker 1: in space, so it could be a satellite. Um. In fact,

511
00:31:11,040 --> 00:31:14,400
Speaker 1: there were a lot of people saying, hey, this you know,

512
00:31:14,480 --> 00:31:18,480
Speaker 1: most recent test had the spacecraft, the X thirty seven,

513
00:31:19,480 --> 00:31:23,440
Speaker 1: on the same general orbit as a Chinese satellite. Yeah,

514
00:31:23,480 --> 00:31:27,640
Speaker 1: the Tongue Young one or some and yeah, and that's

515
00:31:27,680 --> 00:31:30,080
Speaker 1: a that's a space lab has been up for a while.

516
00:31:30,160 --> 00:31:34,080
Speaker 1: It has its own refueling, So of course people people

517
00:31:34,080 --> 00:31:37,680
Speaker 1: would guess that this is a satellite either spine on

518
00:31:37,760 --> 00:31:42,400
Speaker 1: other satellites or giving imagery from the ground mapping. In

519
00:31:42,440 --> 00:31:45,920
Speaker 1: other words, in the orbitable path of the X thirty

520
00:31:46,000 --> 00:31:50,480
Speaker 1: seven B takes it over on Southeast Asia, Latin America,

521
00:31:50,960 --> 00:31:53,840
Speaker 1: parts the Middle East, notably I Rock. So it's not

522
00:31:54,120 --> 00:31:57,640
Speaker 1: an unreasonable guess. Yeah, you can understand why people would

523
00:31:57,760 --> 00:32:02,760
Speaker 1: would suggest this. And we don't know all the equipment

524
00:32:02,760 --> 00:32:05,000
Speaker 1: that's aboard the X thirty seven years. I have noticed

525
00:32:05,000 --> 00:32:07,360
Speaker 1: that we didn't give you a rundown on like it

526
00:32:07,440 --> 00:32:09,840
Speaker 1: has this kind of camera system on it or because

527
00:32:09,880 --> 00:32:12,040
Speaker 1: we don't know, but we'd love to do that. But

528
00:32:12,320 --> 00:32:14,000
Speaker 1: the stuff we do know is sort of vague. We

529
00:32:14,040 --> 00:32:16,640
Speaker 1: know it has the solar array, right, we know that.

530
00:32:17,280 --> 00:32:19,800
Speaker 1: We know that's what allows it to stay up for

531
00:32:19,840 --> 00:32:22,680
Speaker 1: so long. Uh, you know, I can't say that would

532
00:32:22,680 --> 00:32:25,200
Speaker 1: be able to stay up indefinitely, but it certainly is

533
00:32:25,200 --> 00:32:27,520
Speaker 1: staying up there an incredibly long amount of time for

534
00:32:28,120 --> 00:32:31,160
Speaker 1: something designed to fly up and fly back down. You

535
00:32:31,160 --> 00:32:34,760
Speaker 1: know it's not again, it's not space station. Um. So

536
00:32:36,120 --> 00:32:39,000
Speaker 1: here's the thing about the idea of it spying on

537
00:32:39,040 --> 00:32:44,520
Speaker 1: the space Lab. That's not really physically possible, right, yeah, absolutely,

538
00:32:44,720 --> 00:32:47,480
Speaker 1: because you can you can check out some of the

539
00:32:47,520 --> 00:32:51,760
Speaker 1: words from the analysts. This idea of it following a

540
00:32:51,800 --> 00:32:56,160
Speaker 1: satellite came about from that speculation. But there's a guy

541
00:32:56,200 --> 00:33:00,320
Speaker 1: named Jim Oberg who is who is a space analyst,

542
00:33:00,400 --> 00:33:02,560
Speaker 1: which is a great job to have. Yeah, I would

543
00:33:02,560 --> 00:33:06,800
Speaker 1: love to have that job. Looks pretty empty to me. Yeah,

544
00:33:07,080 --> 00:33:10,440
Speaker 1: I believe that's a star. No, it's moving, Yeah, exactly.

545
00:33:10,480 --> 00:33:13,240
Speaker 1: We'd be very good at that. Yeah, I think I

546
00:33:13,280 --> 00:33:17,080
Speaker 1: think we got a new podcast, so so um, let's

547
00:33:17,120 --> 00:33:19,840
Speaker 1: go ahead and and uh, we'll we'll finish quoting Jim

548
00:33:19,840 --> 00:33:21,760
Speaker 1: and invite him to the show later on our on

549
00:33:21,800 --> 00:33:25,400
Speaker 1: our space anitles stuff. Uh. He points out that these

550
00:33:25,440 --> 00:33:29,280
Speaker 1: two objects, the Chinese Space Lab and the X thirty

551
00:33:29,320 --> 00:33:32,800
Speaker 1: seven B, there in orbits that crossed the equator about

552
00:33:32,920 --> 00:33:36,120
Speaker 1: ninety degrees apart. So when they do criss cross each

553
00:33:36,120 --> 00:33:39,680
Speaker 1: other's paths, they're going thousands of meters per second. So

554
00:33:39,920 --> 00:33:43,360
Speaker 1: how how can you make an observation You're you're going

555
00:33:43,440 --> 00:33:47,120
Speaker 1: by so quickly that there's no there's no way to

556
00:33:47,120 --> 00:33:50,400
Speaker 1: get any meaningful information. Um, it would be kind of like,

557
00:33:50,760 --> 00:33:53,760
Speaker 1: let's let's imagine that Ben for a moment, that that

558
00:33:53,840 --> 00:33:58,280
Speaker 1: you're writing with Scott. Okay, yeah, Scott, Scott from car stuff,

559
00:33:58,400 --> 00:34:02,600
Speaker 1: because you guys do car stuff. To Scott, he's got

560
00:34:02,600 --> 00:34:06,600
Speaker 1: a lead foot man. He likes he likes to drive fast.

561
00:34:07,240 --> 00:34:10,759
Speaker 1: So let's say that he's driving by uh, you're you're

562
00:34:10,800 --> 00:34:13,200
Speaker 1: in the passenger seat. He's he's flying down the road.

563
00:34:13,239 --> 00:34:17,920
Speaker 1: He's in one of his his amazingly souped up muscle cars.

564
00:34:18,239 --> 00:34:21,120
Speaker 1: By the way, tostally making this up. But let's let's

565
00:34:21,120 --> 00:34:23,279
Speaker 1: say that he's or sports vehicle. Let's say it's either

566
00:34:23,400 --> 00:34:25,480
Speaker 1: faster than a muscle car. It's a sports car that's

567
00:34:25,600 --> 00:34:27,920
Speaker 1: designed to go fast. It's it's one of those that

568
00:34:28,000 --> 00:34:32,120
Speaker 1: was converted from an old race car. And you zoom

569
00:34:32,280 --> 00:34:36,799
Speaker 1: past a person that neither of you know, and he

570
00:34:36,840 --> 00:34:40,160
Speaker 1: asks you what colored their eyes were. It's like that,

571
00:34:40,320 --> 00:34:44,920
Speaker 1: except multiply it by way faster speeds. So it's just

572
00:34:44,960 --> 00:34:48,040
Speaker 1: it's it's impossible to get any kind of meaningful information

573
00:34:48,120 --> 00:34:52,160
Speaker 1: from that. So what's another hypothesis. How about it's not

574
00:34:52,440 --> 00:34:56,640
Speaker 1: actually doing any spying of its own, it's just testing

575
00:34:56,719 --> 00:35:01,359
Speaker 1: spy technology. Okay, like, what why would they be doing that. Well,

576
00:35:01,440 --> 00:35:04,600
Speaker 1: let's say that again, kind of like that idea of

577
00:35:04,680 --> 00:35:08,160
Speaker 1: these sensors that you might want in order to uh

578
00:35:08,400 --> 00:35:13,920
Speaker 1: to monitor something like uh nuclear deployment in another country,

579
00:35:14,080 --> 00:35:16,840
Speaker 1: or any other kind of sensor you can imagine that

580
00:35:16,880 --> 00:35:20,280
Speaker 1: would be useful for military purposes. And they've built these

581
00:35:20,400 --> 00:35:23,320
Speaker 1: on Earth. See here's the downfall that we have about

582
00:35:23,320 --> 00:35:26,439
Speaker 1: our our technologies for space. We have to build them

583
00:35:26,480 --> 00:35:30,920
Speaker 1: for the most part here on Earth. Sore. Yeah, that's

584
00:35:30,960 --> 00:35:33,759
Speaker 1: where we keep all our stuff, right, That's the way

585
00:35:33,800 --> 00:35:36,080
Speaker 1: the tick would say, not the Earth. That's where I

586
00:35:36,160 --> 00:35:39,839
Speaker 1: keep all my stuff. So because we have all that

587
00:35:39,920 --> 00:35:42,600
Speaker 1: stuff here and we're developing everything here, we're building it here,

588
00:35:42,920 --> 00:35:46,640
Speaker 1: we can never be fully certain that the thing we

589
00:35:46,760 --> 00:35:49,960
Speaker 1: designed here on Earth is going to work the way

590
00:35:50,000 --> 00:35:53,680
Speaker 1: we had intended once it's in space. So it may

591
00:35:53,800 --> 00:35:58,120
Speaker 1: be that this is acting as a platform to test

592
00:35:58,160 --> 00:36:01,440
Speaker 1: these technologies, see if they are in fact viable in

593
00:36:01,480 --> 00:36:05,520
Speaker 1: a space environment, and return to Earth, so that we

594
00:36:05,560 --> 00:36:09,120
Speaker 1: can be certain that the stuff we developed is in

595
00:36:09,200 --> 00:36:11,440
Speaker 1: fact doing what it was intended to do, or at

596
00:36:11,480 --> 00:36:14,080
Speaker 1: least figure out how it broke. Yeah, exactly. Yeah, if

597
00:36:14,080 --> 00:36:16,319
Speaker 1: it's not working, then we try and figure out why

598
00:36:16,400 --> 00:36:19,040
Speaker 1: is it not working? What caused that? What was the

599
00:36:19,080 --> 00:36:24,120
Speaker 1: thing was? Did it encounter a like some cosmic radiation

600
00:36:24,200 --> 00:36:26,759
Speaker 1: and it ended up messing everything up? If so, is

601
00:36:26,800 --> 00:36:28,840
Speaker 1: there some way we can shield it from that that

602
00:36:28,960 --> 00:36:31,960
Speaker 1: kind of thing? I think actually that this is probably

603
00:36:31,960 --> 00:36:37,239
Speaker 1: the the most likely out of all the different hypotheses. Yeah,

604
00:36:37,320 --> 00:36:39,920
Speaker 1: I agree, because pretty much what the Air Force has said,

605
00:36:40,760 --> 00:36:44,360
Speaker 1: and and it's it has precedent behind it because they've

606
00:36:44,400 --> 00:36:47,960
Speaker 1: continually built these platforms, as you said earlier, So it

607
00:36:48,000 --> 00:36:50,760
Speaker 1: makes sense. And you also want to check because especially

608
00:36:50,800 --> 00:36:54,240
Speaker 1: if this is new, uh new technology of any sort,

609
00:36:54,400 --> 00:36:56,319
Speaker 1: it's going to be a little bit delicate and you know,

610
00:36:56,560 --> 00:37:01,239
Speaker 1: sensors are well sensitive. Yeah yeah, And and you could

611
00:37:01,280 --> 00:37:03,080
Speaker 1: even argue that maybe it doesn't even go that far.

612
00:37:03,160 --> 00:37:06,040
Speaker 1: Maybe it's just the Air Force wanting to test this

613
00:37:06,160 --> 00:37:11,400
Speaker 1: autonomous uh nature and to make sure that they can

614
00:37:11,440 --> 00:37:15,720
Speaker 1: rely upon it even if the mission extends much further

615
00:37:15,800 --> 00:37:19,960
Speaker 1: out than what was originally anticipated. That's valuable information to know.

616
00:37:20,200 --> 00:37:25,040
Speaker 1: Maybe it's not doing anything remotely you know, secret right now,

617
00:37:25,120 --> 00:37:28,720
Speaker 1: other than just making sure it works, which that's important

618
00:37:28,760 --> 00:37:32,759
Speaker 1: to know, and we can't know without the tests. So

619
00:37:33,640 --> 00:37:37,279
Speaker 1: then there's another hypothesis where um, the X thirty seven

620
00:37:37,320 --> 00:37:41,640
Speaker 1: is a delivery mechanism for space weapons space weapon. How

621
00:37:41,680 --> 00:37:45,120
Speaker 1: do we define space weapons? That's an excellent question. It's

622
00:37:45,160 --> 00:37:47,560
Speaker 1: one that cannot be answered right now, because it's a

623
00:37:47,640 --> 00:37:50,880
Speaker 1: question that comes up over and over in treaty discussions

624
00:37:51,160 --> 00:37:57,680
Speaker 1: and uh arms control discussions. People disagree over and by

625
00:37:57,719 --> 00:38:01,279
Speaker 1: people I mean states like country. These disagree over the

626
00:38:01,280 --> 00:38:04,960
Speaker 1: definition of space weapons. So for example, perhaps you have

627
00:38:05,000 --> 00:38:09,280
Speaker 1: a missile detection system, like a satellite system that's deployed.

628
00:38:09,920 --> 00:38:12,480
Speaker 1: Some would argue that as a space weapon. Now it

629
00:38:12,560 --> 00:38:15,520
Speaker 1: might be up space weapon in the form of defense,

630
00:38:16,800 --> 00:38:20,960
Speaker 1: but they would still argue that counts under certain definitions.

631
00:38:21,000 --> 00:38:24,880
Speaker 1: And other states, presumably the states that actually have missile

632
00:38:25,280 --> 00:38:29,279
Speaker 1: detection systems in place, would say this totally doesn't count

633
00:38:29,320 --> 00:38:32,400
Speaker 1: as a space weapon. And we'll talk more about why

634
00:38:32,440 --> 00:38:36,600
Speaker 1: they would say that a little bit later. But the Pentagon,

635
00:38:36,840 --> 00:38:39,719
Speaker 1: just for the record, denies that in fact, the X

636
00:38:39,719 --> 00:38:42,320
Speaker 1: thirty seven has anything to do with space weapon deployment.

637
00:38:42,440 --> 00:38:47,120
Speaker 1: Explicitly denies it. And also, you know this concern about

638
00:38:47,280 --> 00:38:50,400
Speaker 1: space weapons and militarization. I know, we'll talk about it

639
00:38:50,400 --> 00:38:53,040
Speaker 1: a little bit later, but there is also precedent in

640
00:38:54,239 --> 00:39:01,400
Speaker 1: unclassified public record Pentagon statements, especially under Rumsfelds heading of

641
00:39:01,520 --> 00:39:06,799
Speaker 1: the administration, Donald Rumsfeld, there is an active desire on

642
00:39:06,840 --> 00:39:09,960
Speaker 1: the part of not just the US but other countries

643
00:39:10,320 --> 00:39:14,880
Speaker 1: to to explore the possibilities of defensive capability in space.

644
00:39:15,360 --> 00:39:17,359
Speaker 1: It just makes sense. It's not a secret. I mean,

645
00:39:17,680 --> 00:39:21,759
Speaker 1: anyone who lived through the eighties remembers the star Wars program,

646
00:39:21,760 --> 00:39:24,400
Speaker 1: the so called star Wars program, which was a proposed

647
00:39:24,400 --> 00:39:29,960
Speaker 1: and ultimately abandoned plan to put an anti missile system

648
00:39:30,040 --> 00:39:34,319
Speaker 1: into space to protect against the potential first strike situation

649
00:39:35,080 --> 00:39:37,440
Speaker 1: or even you know, not even a first strike, but

650
00:39:37,480 --> 00:39:41,560
Speaker 1: maybe even a counter strike if you're being super cynical

651
00:39:42,160 --> 00:39:45,200
Speaker 1: of uh, you know, a system meant to to uh

652
00:39:45,520 --> 00:39:50,880
Speaker 1: disarm or disable incoming missiles that could target the United States. Ultimately,

653
00:39:50,920 --> 00:39:55,120
Speaker 1: it didn't go into place. Um and I want to

654
00:39:55,160 --> 00:39:57,240
Speaker 1: say I've done an episode about that, but if I haven't,

655
00:39:57,239 --> 00:40:01,520
Speaker 1: I absolutely need to. Yeah, I feel we talked about this,

656
00:40:01,640 --> 00:40:03,480
Speaker 1: maybe we talked about off air, but that would be

657
00:40:03,520 --> 00:40:06,640
Speaker 1: that would be a fantastic episode. Uh, It's it's such

658
00:40:06,680 --> 00:40:09,319
Speaker 1: an it's such an interesting thing. We could also talk

659
00:40:09,360 --> 00:40:13,239
Speaker 1: about dead hands systems, but that's a story for another day,

660
00:40:13,440 --> 00:40:18,560
Speaker 1: A strange love stuff. Yeah, I'm almost certain that Chris

661
00:40:18,560 --> 00:40:20,479
Speaker 1: and I did one episode on it at some point,

662
00:40:20,520 --> 00:40:22,360
Speaker 1: but I'll have to do as search because once you

663
00:40:22,400 --> 00:40:27,800
Speaker 1: do around seven hundred episodes, you really can't remember what kinds. Yeah. Well,

664
00:40:27,840 --> 00:40:30,600
Speaker 1: and for me, honestly, after I did about ten episodes,

665
00:40:30,600 --> 00:40:35,120
Speaker 1: I was But so anyway, there are other hypotheses as

666
00:40:35,120 --> 00:40:38,080
Speaker 1: well or other other um statements that have come out

667
00:40:38,120 --> 00:40:42,040
Speaker 1: from various experts about the potential use of the X

668
00:40:42,080 --> 00:40:46,200
Speaker 1: thirty seven. Uh. Laura Grego of the Global Security Program

669
00:40:46,200 --> 00:40:50,080
Speaker 1: at the Union of Concerned Scientists says that the design

670
00:40:50,080 --> 00:40:52,520
Speaker 1: of the X thirty seven really limits what it could

671
00:40:52,520 --> 00:40:55,920
Speaker 1: be able to do, and she says that really can't

672
00:40:55,920 --> 00:40:59,280
Speaker 1: maneuver easily in orbit, so it would be very limited

673
00:40:59,280 --> 00:41:03,040
Speaker 1: in its use as either spy technology or a space weapon.

674
00:41:03,560 --> 00:41:07,000
Speaker 1: Like we were saying earlier, you can sometimes see this

675
00:41:07,080 --> 00:41:11,200
Speaker 1: thing from Earth, so maneuvering it is it's really hard

676
00:41:11,239 --> 00:41:14,080
Speaker 1: to make that a secret, right, right. Let's say, like

677
00:41:14,160 --> 00:41:16,880
Speaker 1: if if everyone notices that the X thirty seven happens

678
00:41:16,920 --> 00:41:20,000
Speaker 1: to be in a particular quadrant that's near say a

679
00:41:20,120 --> 00:41:23,640
Speaker 1: Russian spy satellite, and that spy satellite suddenly goes offline.

680
00:41:24,000 --> 00:41:26,800
Speaker 1: It does not take a lot of imagination to connect

681
00:41:26,840 --> 00:41:32,759
Speaker 1: those two things together. Yeah, so probably not going to

682
00:41:32,800 --> 00:41:36,960
Speaker 1: be used for clandestine purposes in that case. Um. She

683
00:41:37,040 --> 00:41:39,400
Speaker 1: also says it's not large enough to be a satellite launcher.

684
00:41:39,440 --> 00:41:42,120
Speaker 1: It doesn't have the cargo capacity to hold most satellites.

685
00:41:42,160 --> 00:41:45,480
Speaker 1: I mean, if you're talking about like the small cluster

686
00:41:45,560 --> 00:41:49,160
Speaker 1: satellites that some people have referred to. Maybe, but it's

687
00:41:49,239 --> 00:41:53,520
Speaker 1: not designed to carry anything of substantial size, so that's

688
00:41:53,560 --> 00:41:55,640
Speaker 1: probably not what it's being used. What it can do,

689
00:41:55,760 --> 00:41:58,759
Speaker 1: she says, is carry cargo up into space and that's

690
00:41:58,760 --> 00:42:03,480
Speaker 1: about it. Then you have another expert, Mark Gubrand or Gubrid,

691
00:42:03,640 --> 00:42:06,880
Speaker 1: who is an adjunct assistant professor of physics and Astronomy

692
00:42:06,880 --> 00:42:09,759
Speaker 1: at the University of North Carolina Chapel Hill, who says

693
00:42:09,800 --> 00:42:12,520
Speaker 1: that space planes like the X thirty seven are not

694
00:42:12,680 --> 00:42:16,480
Speaker 1: more effective than traditional launches of satellites or space weapons,

695
00:42:16,560 --> 00:42:20,040
Speaker 1: even potential space weapons. So in other words, putting them

696
00:42:20,080 --> 00:42:24,240
Speaker 1: into other types of spacecraft to go up into space

697
00:42:24,320 --> 00:42:26,919
Speaker 1: that that aren't designed to come back down, so there's

698
00:42:26,960 --> 00:42:30,360
Speaker 1: no real advantage, Like, yeah, you've got the reusable factor,

699
00:42:30,400 --> 00:42:33,600
Speaker 1: which presumably would cut down on the cost somewhat of

700
00:42:33,600 --> 00:42:38,480
Speaker 1: space launches, but that it's such a complicated endeavor and

701
00:42:38,480 --> 00:42:40,520
Speaker 1: it's really designed to stay up there for a really

702
00:42:40,560 --> 00:42:43,239
Speaker 1: long time, that it doesn't make sense to use it

703
00:42:43,280 --> 00:42:46,320
Speaker 1: as a delivery mechanism. There's no reason why your delivery

704
00:42:46,320 --> 00:42:49,800
Speaker 1: mechanism would need to remain up in low Earth orbit

705
00:42:50,560 --> 00:42:53,440
Speaker 1: for hundreds of days. You just get out there, you

706
00:42:53,480 --> 00:42:56,600
Speaker 1: deliver it, you're done. So his argument is that, well,

707
00:42:56,680 --> 00:42:59,000
Speaker 1: it doesn't really make sense. In fact, he would argue

708
00:42:59,040 --> 00:43:02,120
Speaker 1: that the only reason at the program still exists because

709
00:43:02,120 --> 00:43:04,680
Speaker 1: it has so much momentum, that there was so much

710
00:43:04,760 --> 00:43:09,080
Speaker 1: money and effort put into developing it, that it would

711
00:43:09,480 --> 00:43:11,600
Speaker 1: you know, it's kind of taken a life of its own.

712
00:43:11,960 --> 00:43:14,279
Speaker 1: It's a soak cost at this point. Yeah, saying that,

713
00:43:14,320 --> 00:43:17,560
Speaker 1: you know, it doesn't make sense compared to the alternatives. However,

714
00:43:18,080 --> 00:43:21,240
Speaker 1: it's we already got the ball rolling and now it's

715
00:43:21,280 --> 00:43:24,600
Speaker 1: going to continue to roll right wherever it ends up rolling.

716
00:43:24,640 --> 00:43:27,759
Speaker 1: And then there's another interesting thing that you have proposed.

717
00:43:27,960 --> 00:43:29,960
Speaker 1: You said, what what if it's what if there's a

718
00:43:30,000 --> 00:43:33,400
Speaker 1: psychological aspect? Yeah, there there's some who have suggested that

719
00:43:33,440 --> 00:43:37,120
Speaker 1: perhaps at least part of the reason why this project.

720
00:43:37,320 --> 00:43:40,000
Speaker 1: Let's say that the project ultimately people say, yeah, there's

721
00:43:40,000 --> 00:43:43,200
Speaker 1: no there's no practical reason to continue it because we

722
00:43:43,239 --> 00:43:46,919
Speaker 1: can accomplish a lot of the same goals using alternative

723
00:43:46,960 --> 00:43:51,719
Speaker 1: means that don't require this autonomous vehicle. UM. Some have said, well,

724
00:43:51,760 --> 00:43:56,440
Speaker 1: maybe it's just a kind of freak out potential adversaries

725
00:43:56,520 --> 00:44:02,000
Speaker 1: like the Chinese. I like, okay, first off, that sounds

726
00:44:02,160 --> 00:44:05,160
Speaker 1: so ridiculous on the offset. It sounds like a billion

727
00:44:05,200 --> 00:44:08,680
Speaker 1: dollar prank, you know, I agree, like, like, hey, guys,

728
00:44:08,719 --> 00:44:12,400
Speaker 1: you know, I'm concerned about what's happening over in China,

729
00:44:12,480 --> 00:44:15,319
Speaker 1: and obviously we can't declare war or anything like that,

730
00:44:15,440 --> 00:44:19,800
Speaker 1: but how do we scare them? Now? You could say that, however,

731
00:44:19,880 --> 00:44:22,719
Speaker 1: SPOT think was kind of that, you know, that's not

732
00:44:22,760 --> 00:44:25,520
Speaker 1: a bad that's not a bad comparison, and we we

733
00:44:25,560 --> 00:44:29,080
Speaker 1: do know that right now, there's there's this very um

734
00:44:29,120 --> 00:44:34,279
Speaker 1: sensitive is a good word, A sensitive and ongoing uh

735
00:44:34,880 --> 00:44:39,279
Speaker 1: elbow knocking between nations in space. UM. One thing that

736
00:44:39,320 --> 00:44:42,560
Speaker 1: working on this episode made me think about was the

737
00:44:42,640 --> 00:44:45,640
Speaker 1: incident in two thousand seven where the Chinese government shot

738
00:44:45,680 --> 00:44:49,560
Speaker 1: a satellite down from space and it was it was

739
00:44:50,080 --> 00:44:52,960
Speaker 1: pitched to the public as like whom it was bad

740
00:44:53,040 --> 00:44:56,720
Speaker 1: and we wanted to make sure that nothing terrible happened

741
00:44:56,719 --> 00:44:58,239
Speaker 1: to it, so we took care of it. But it

742
00:44:58,320 --> 00:45:01,640
Speaker 1: was also there was a sigh logical aspect between the

743
00:45:01,719 --> 00:45:04,920
Speaker 1: countries right too. Here's what we can do, ye look

744
00:45:04,920 --> 00:45:07,640
Speaker 1: at our capability. We can bring down a satellite from

745
00:45:07,920 --> 00:45:10,880
Speaker 1: the surface, like we can launch an attack from the

746
00:45:10,920 --> 00:45:13,920
Speaker 1: surface of the Earth and bring down a satellite. Also,

747
00:45:13,960 --> 00:45:17,280
Speaker 1: the rest of the world said, guys, don't don't clutter

748
00:45:17,360 --> 00:45:20,640
Speaker 1: up space more than it already. You are literally making

749
00:45:20,680 --> 00:45:23,640
Speaker 1: it more dangerous for everything else that's out in low

750
00:45:23,640 --> 00:45:26,200
Speaker 1: earth orbit. I mean, maybe that's the reason there hasn't

751
00:45:26,239 --> 00:45:30,080
Speaker 1: been any extraterrestrial contact. Maybe we're the equivalent of people

752
00:45:30,120 --> 00:45:33,000
Speaker 1: who have refrigerators and stuff in their yard, or or

753
00:45:33,200 --> 00:45:36,520
Speaker 1: or the equivalent of like, well, you know, I really

754
00:45:36,520 --> 00:45:39,399
Speaker 1: want to check out that beautiful waterfall, but there's all

755
00:45:39,440 --> 00:45:43,200
Speaker 1: this abandoned barbed wire and broken glass here. I'm kind

756
00:45:43,200 --> 00:45:44,880
Speaker 1: of scared that if I try and walk through there,

757
00:45:44,880 --> 00:45:47,360
Speaker 1: I'm going to cut myself up. Like that's that's because

758
00:45:47,360 --> 00:45:50,200
Speaker 1: I mean, space debris a serious problem, not just for

759
00:45:50,400 --> 00:45:54,360
Speaker 1: manned missions, but unmanned spacecraft as well. Like you know,

760
00:45:54,480 --> 00:45:57,840
Speaker 1: we could have communications satellites that would get taken down

761
00:45:58,000 --> 00:46:01,560
Speaker 1: if they encountered space debris. We're talking about things that

762
00:46:01,600 --> 00:46:05,400
Speaker 1: could be really tiny, I mean just like a couple

763
00:46:05,400 --> 00:46:09,400
Speaker 1: of centimeters per side, but traveling at those amazing speeds,

764
00:46:09,880 --> 00:46:12,200
Speaker 1: they could do massive amounts of damage if they collide

765
00:46:12,200 --> 00:46:15,560
Speaker 1: with something. Now, on the positive side, space is really big,

766
00:46:16,160 --> 00:46:20,439
Speaker 1: right on the On the the less positive side, first

767
00:46:20,440 --> 00:46:23,280
Speaker 1: of all, there all all of these things are largely

768
00:46:23,320 --> 00:46:27,440
Speaker 1: in the same general orbit, you know, lower thorbit. Secondly,

769
00:46:27,960 --> 00:46:31,279
Speaker 1: the more debris you have, the more the greater the

770
00:46:31,280 --> 00:46:35,359
Speaker 1: odds increase of some sort of unintended collision. We've got

771
00:46:35,440 --> 00:46:38,040
Speaker 1: a bit more about this secret space plane to talk about,

772
00:46:38,040 --> 00:46:49,640
Speaker 1: but first let's take a quick break. So making more

773
00:46:50,440 --> 00:46:53,640
Speaker 1: garbage up there is not great. And then there's also,

774
00:46:54,280 --> 00:46:58,240
Speaker 1: um a quote that you found from the London Times. Ah, yes, uh,

775
00:46:58,239 --> 00:47:03,000
Speaker 1: well back and unnamed Air force official yeah or woman

776
00:47:03,480 --> 00:47:08,120
Speaker 1: or that person, yes, a recurring character. An unnamed Air

777
00:47:08,160 --> 00:47:12,239
Speaker 1: Force official did note that the ultimate goal of the

778
00:47:12,360 --> 00:47:16,680
Speaker 1: X thirty seven B is to aid terrestrial war fighters,

779
00:47:17,040 --> 00:47:20,000
Speaker 1: which is still pretty vague. It's super vague, but it

780
00:47:20,040 --> 00:47:23,440
Speaker 1: does confirm that there is a military aspect by the

781
00:47:23,480 --> 00:47:27,360
Speaker 1: Air Force who knew. Yeah, right, I think again, you know,

782
00:47:27,400 --> 00:47:31,680
Speaker 1: we see people chasing explanations or speculation about what this is.

783
00:47:31,920 --> 00:47:36,319
Speaker 1: But there's clearly something about UM an informational edge that

784
00:47:36,520 --> 00:47:39,120
Speaker 1: I think he's in there. And you know, to be

785
00:47:39,160 --> 00:47:42,560
Speaker 1: fair that that phrasing, it could mean anything, right, it

786
00:47:42,600 --> 00:47:46,440
Speaker 1: could anything. It could It could mean reconnaissance. It could

787
00:47:46,480 --> 00:47:51,000
Speaker 1: mean support in the sense of uh sending up a

788
00:47:51,120 --> 00:47:54,960
Speaker 1: new satellite, small satellite, I guess, or or some other

789
00:47:55,040 --> 00:47:58,280
Speaker 1: kind of payload. Or it could mean some kind of weaponization.

790
00:47:58,360 --> 00:48:01,279
Speaker 1: I mean, it's so vaguely find that it could mean

791
00:48:01,320 --> 00:48:03,880
Speaker 1: any of those things. So again, and more often than not,

792
00:48:03,960 --> 00:48:07,200
Speaker 1: it fuels the speculation as opposed to oh now I

793
00:48:07,280 --> 00:48:10,880
Speaker 1: understand exactly. Yeah, it's there's there's something a little platitude

794
00:48:10,920 --> 00:48:13,880
Speaker 1: and this about it. But but this brings us to

795
00:48:13,880 --> 00:48:19,160
Speaker 1: a bigger issue, which you and I have been fascinated by. Yeah,

796
00:48:19,560 --> 00:48:24,680
Speaker 1: the concept of weaponization of space, like putting weapons into

797
00:48:24,719 --> 00:48:28,879
Speaker 1: space for the purposes of warfare. So we're talking like

798
00:48:29,920 --> 00:48:34,400
Speaker 1: everything from those missile defense systems to something that's more

799
00:48:34,440 --> 00:48:39,000
Speaker 1: of an attack based form of warfare, something like a

800
00:48:39,200 --> 00:48:43,759
Speaker 1: system that could either launch missiles or other types of

801
00:48:43,800 --> 00:48:50,800
Speaker 1: weaponry from space or support some other coordinated warfare efforts. Uh.

802
00:48:50,920 --> 00:48:54,480
Speaker 1: And obviously this is one of those things that is

803
00:48:55,200 --> 00:48:58,880
Speaker 1: a very delicate subject, particularly when you look at the

804
00:48:58,920 --> 00:49:02,360
Speaker 1: Earth and you say how many nations are actually space

805
00:49:02,400 --> 00:49:07,120
Speaker 1: faring nations? Right, not as many as you think there there. Um,

806
00:49:07,160 --> 00:49:10,200
Speaker 1: there are some big strides being made that will change

807
00:49:10,239 --> 00:49:14,200
Speaker 1: the game, but right now the a lot of other

808
00:49:14,280 --> 00:49:17,040
Speaker 1: nations are still catching up to what the US and

809
00:49:17,200 --> 00:49:19,759
Speaker 1: Russia did in the eighties. Yeah, so you've got things

810
00:49:19,760 --> 00:49:23,799
Speaker 1: like you've got coalitions like the European Space Agency, and

811
00:49:23,840 --> 00:49:28,080
Speaker 1: you've got countries like India or China or Japan that

812
00:49:28,280 --> 00:49:31,720
Speaker 1: all have to some extent worked on this sort of stuff,

813
00:49:31,760 --> 00:49:34,759
Speaker 1: some of them using the resources of other nations in

814
00:49:34,880 --> 00:49:37,960
Speaker 1: order to actually launch things. But it is one of

815
00:49:37,960 --> 00:49:41,319
Speaker 1: those deals where you know you have the the potential

816
00:49:41,600 --> 00:49:45,800
Speaker 1: to affect a huge number of people, some of whom

817
00:49:45,960 --> 00:49:48,840
Speaker 1: are living in nations that have absolutely no capability of

818
00:49:48,880 --> 00:49:52,319
Speaker 1: going into space at the moment. So it ends up

819
00:49:52,400 --> 00:49:55,080
Speaker 1: raising some concerns, and in fact, the space race itself

820
00:49:56,160 --> 00:49:58,640
Speaker 1: raised a lot of concerns. You get to a point

821
00:49:58,640 --> 00:50:03,080
Speaker 1: where h the then Soviet Union can launch a satellite

822
00:50:03,080 --> 00:50:06,799
Speaker 1: into space. In this case, Sputnik Spotney could not do much.

823
00:50:06,840 --> 00:50:10,800
Speaker 1: It essentially beat Essentially, all it really did was send

824
00:50:10,840 --> 00:50:14,320
Speaker 1: a message that said I'm still here until until it

825
00:50:14,400 --> 00:50:19,120
Speaker 1: stopped UM. But that was enough to terrify people in

826
00:50:19,160 --> 00:50:23,040
Speaker 1: the United States because the other implication was that if

827
00:50:23,080 --> 00:50:25,759
Speaker 1: the Soviet Union could send a rocket all the way

828
00:50:25,760 --> 00:50:28,160
Speaker 1: out into space, it could also send a rocket all

829
00:50:28,160 --> 00:50:32,600
Speaker 1: the way over to the United States. So it raised

830
00:50:32,640 --> 00:50:37,520
Speaker 1: a lot of of concerns, not just about intercontinental ballistic missiles,

831
00:50:37,560 --> 00:50:41,759
Speaker 1: but also are we one day going to have war

832
00:50:41,880 --> 00:50:46,160
Speaker 1: breakout where the weapons are in space? Because that is terrifying,

833
00:50:46,719 --> 00:50:50,200
Speaker 1: just a nuclear weapon dropping from near Earth orbit. Yeah.

834
00:50:50,640 --> 00:50:54,600
Speaker 1: So in nineteen sixty seven, several countries came together and

835
00:50:54,640 --> 00:50:57,360
Speaker 1: there was an open signing in nineteen sixty seven that

836
00:50:58,280 --> 00:51:01,520
Speaker 1: took place in UM the so Union and the United

837
00:51:01,560 --> 00:51:04,440
Speaker 1: Kingdom and the United States for a treaty that is

838
00:51:04,480 --> 00:51:08,560
Speaker 1: called here's the full name, the Treaty on Principles Governing

839
00:51:08,600 --> 00:51:11,960
Speaker 1: the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of

840
00:51:12,000 --> 00:51:18,040
Speaker 1: Outer Space, including the Moon and other celestial bodies. I

841
00:51:18,040 --> 00:51:19,759
Speaker 1: guess they didn't have a lot of time to work

842
00:51:19,760 --> 00:51:22,560
Speaker 1: on the title, were working on the actual agreement. It

843
00:51:22,600 --> 00:51:26,320
Speaker 1: wasn't so zippy with the title. It is informally referred

844
00:51:26,320 --> 00:51:28,879
Speaker 1: to as the Outer Space Treaty, which, oh, that makes

845
00:51:28,880 --> 00:51:32,200
Speaker 1: a lot more sangiesier. So set up a lot of

846
00:51:32,239 --> 00:51:36,960
Speaker 1: ground rules about about space because obviously at that point

847
00:51:37,000 --> 00:51:40,759
Speaker 1: only really two nations were in the space game, but

848
00:51:40,840 --> 00:51:45,400
Speaker 1: they were two nations that were philosophically opposed to one another.

849
00:51:45,440 --> 00:51:48,600
Speaker 1: They were in the middle of a Cold war. Uh,

850
00:51:48,640 --> 00:51:51,719
Speaker 1: And so you have all these other countries saying, you

851
00:51:51,760 --> 00:51:54,320
Speaker 1: guys are getting like, first of all, you're really angry

852
00:51:54,360 --> 00:51:57,879
Speaker 1: at each other. Secondly, you've both amassed a huge number

853
00:51:57,920 --> 00:52:00,759
Speaker 1: of weapons. Third you've demonstrated that you are very much

854
00:52:00,800 --> 00:52:03,799
Speaker 1: interested in going in the outer space, and we would

855
00:52:03,840 --> 00:52:06,799
Speaker 1: like to have to have us all kind of calm down,

856
00:52:07,320 --> 00:52:11,600
Speaker 1: set some ground rules and just chill out a little bit.

857
00:52:11,640 --> 00:52:14,880
Speaker 1: But these are these are actually some fantastic rules, to

858
00:52:14,920 --> 00:52:17,680
Speaker 1: the point where I wish more nations were on board

859
00:52:17,719 --> 00:52:20,880
Speaker 1: with this plan. But what are all right? So, first,

860
00:52:20,960 --> 00:52:24,440
Speaker 1: space exploration as discoveries belong to all humans, not just

861
00:52:24,520 --> 00:52:28,279
Speaker 1: one nation, so you can't hoard all the info. So yeah,

862
00:52:28,320 --> 00:52:31,400
Speaker 1: it's it's saying, look, there's the potential for what we

863
00:52:31,480 --> 00:52:34,600
Speaker 1: learn out in space to benefit all of humanity. We

864
00:52:34,719 --> 00:52:38,839
Speaker 1: cannot silo that information so that one nation benefits at

865
00:52:38,840 --> 00:52:42,160
Speaker 1: the expense of everybody else. So there was an agreement

866
00:52:42,200 --> 00:52:45,040
Speaker 1: that anything we learned that can become a benefit needs

867
00:52:45,080 --> 00:52:49,239
Speaker 1: to be shared with everyone. Anyone who with a technological

868
00:52:49,280 --> 00:52:52,640
Speaker 1: capacity can explore space, so it can't be off limits

869
00:52:52,640 --> 00:52:55,680
Speaker 1: to anyone. So in other words, if the United States

870
00:52:55,680 --> 00:52:59,359
Speaker 1: has to developed this space faring technology and then some

871
00:52:59,440 --> 00:53:02,799
Speaker 1: other country that the US is maybe not so friendly with, does,

872
00:53:02,960 --> 00:53:05,840
Speaker 1: the US can't move to block them, right like Iran.

873
00:53:06,040 --> 00:53:09,600
Speaker 1: You will hear stuff about the Iranian Space Agency, and

874
00:53:10,160 --> 00:53:12,839
Speaker 1: you know, for some people it might seem strange that, uh,

875
00:53:13,320 --> 00:53:16,240
Speaker 1: it might seem strange that there's such controversy over nuclear

876
00:53:16,280 --> 00:53:21,799
Speaker 1: weapons but relatively little controversy over um any space exploration.

877
00:53:22,200 --> 00:53:26,640
Speaker 1: Because this, yeah, exactly saying that, you know, philosophical disagreements

878
00:53:26,719 --> 00:53:32,880
Speaker 1: or ideological disagreements or or political arguments aside. All nations,

879
00:53:32,920 --> 00:53:36,480
Speaker 1: all states have a right to space exploration if they

880
00:53:36,520 --> 00:53:40,600
Speaker 1: have the technological capacity to do so. Uh, you can't

881
00:53:40,640 --> 00:53:44,359
Speaker 1: claim space property. Yeah, you can't. Can't go out there

882
00:53:44,360 --> 00:53:46,600
Speaker 1: and say this part of space belongs to the US

883
00:53:46,760 --> 00:53:50,719
Speaker 1: or to the Russia or to whatever. Uh, So you

884
00:53:50,760 --> 00:53:52,759
Speaker 1: can't land on the Moon plan a flag and say

885
00:53:52,760 --> 00:53:55,480
Speaker 1: that it belongs to you. Now, So, Eddie, Iszard's whole

886
00:53:55,560 --> 00:53:58,440
Speaker 1: routine about how you can conquer just as long as

887
00:53:58,440 --> 00:54:01,120
Speaker 1: you have a flag does not apply to outer space.

888
00:54:01,360 --> 00:54:03,680
Speaker 1: He's going to be so upset nobody telling you guys,

889
00:54:03,880 --> 00:54:06,400
Speaker 1: right well, this also means that the US can't lay

890
00:54:06,440 --> 00:54:09,040
Speaker 1: claim to the Moon because we have an American flag

891
00:54:09,719 --> 00:54:13,040
Speaker 1: up there. Um, obviously the American flag is really in

892
00:54:13,080 --> 00:54:17,720
Speaker 1: this sound studio someplace, the whole hoax deal. And because

893
00:54:17,760 --> 00:54:20,640
Speaker 1: somebody already sold off most of the property on the Moon.

894
00:54:20,719 --> 00:54:24,359
Speaker 1: I have a couple of acres myself. Yeah, you love those.

895
00:54:24,600 --> 00:54:26,400
Speaker 1: I mean, I'm sure those businesses are all on the

896
00:54:26,400 --> 00:54:29,680
Speaker 1: open up right. Yeah. Whenever you hear something like a

897
00:54:29,280 --> 00:54:34,399
Speaker 1: a company offering up space real estate, this treaty says

898
00:54:34,480 --> 00:54:37,160
Speaker 1: that's not legal, at least not for states to do. So.

899
00:54:37,239 --> 00:54:39,719
Speaker 1: Governments can't do it. If you say, well, I'm a

900
00:54:39,719 --> 00:54:42,120
Speaker 1: private individual, therefore I can claim it. I'm sure you're

901
00:54:42,120 --> 00:54:44,480
Speaker 1: going to have that. That's gonna be very difficult to

902
00:54:44,480 --> 00:54:46,960
Speaker 1: defend that. Not that not that there's any reason to

903
00:54:47,000 --> 00:54:51,880
Speaker 1: defend it. Right now, it's totally not practical, but anyway. Um. Also,

904
00:54:52,080 --> 00:54:55,040
Speaker 1: no one is allowed to create weapons of mass destruction

905
00:54:55,040 --> 00:54:57,280
Speaker 1: and place them in space. This is a big one.

906
00:54:59,080 --> 00:55:03,040
Speaker 1: And yeah, now it's talking about weapons of mass destruction,

907
00:55:03,520 --> 00:55:07,480
Speaker 1: so it's a very specific definition of the type of weaponry. Right.

908
00:55:07,600 --> 00:55:12,120
Speaker 1: We're talking about a weapon capable of killing or otherwise

909
00:55:12,239 --> 00:55:15,759
Speaker 1: injuring a huge number of folks at one go. Right, Yeah,

910
00:55:15,760 --> 00:55:20,200
Speaker 1: a catastrophic effect every time the weapons used. So any

911
00:55:20,200 --> 00:55:22,799
Speaker 1: weapon that does not fall under that category is not

912
00:55:24,400 --> 00:55:29,239
Speaker 1: you know, it's not prohibited under these terms, and that

913
00:55:29,280 --> 00:55:34,680
Speaker 1: has led to discussions of other treaties that would end

914
00:55:34,719 --> 00:55:36,480
Speaker 1: up filling in some of those gaps. We will get

915
00:55:36,480 --> 00:55:39,839
Speaker 1: to that in a second. Other rules include the fact

916
00:55:39,880 --> 00:55:43,200
Speaker 1: that celestial bodies can only be used for peaceful purposes.

917
00:55:43,520 --> 00:55:46,000
Speaker 1: That one's so interesting to me because you know what

918
00:55:46,000 --> 00:55:50,959
Speaker 1: what that also encompasses, right. That means not weaponizing an asteroid,

919
00:55:51,480 --> 00:55:54,719
Speaker 1: for instance, or altering the path of something else in

920
00:55:54,800 --> 00:55:58,120
Speaker 1: space so that it collides with the planet. You can't

921
00:55:58,200 --> 00:56:01,000
Speaker 1: use an asteroid as a projectile weapon and aim it

922
00:56:01,239 --> 00:56:06,240
Speaker 1: on at like you know, Russia, um, which you wouldn't

923
00:56:06,239 --> 00:56:09,359
Speaker 1: want to do anyway. I mean, like you don't want

924
00:56:09,360 --> 00:56:14,000
Speaker 1: to cause a planet wide extinction level event, which is

925
00:56:14,560 --> 00:56:17,560
Speaker 1: you know, like I mean, this is the kind of

926
00:56:17,560 --> 00:56:21,920
Speaker 1: stuff that that has killed off entire you know, populations,

927
00:56:22,160 --> 00:56:28,080
Speaker 1: entire you know, species, collections of species, your past. So yeah,

928
00:56:28,200 --> 00:56:31,839
Speaker 1: you cannot use celestial bodies for any you know, uh,

929
00:56:32,200 --> 00:56:36,680
Speaker 1: for any non peaceful purpose. Governments are responsible for space activities,

930
00:56:36,719 --> 00:56:39,920
Speaker 1: even if the activities themselves are carried out by private organizations,

931
00:56:39,960 --> 00:56:44,759
Speaker 1: which is very forward thinking since only state run operations

932
00:56:44,760 --> 00:56:48,880
Speaker 1: had existed at that point. So in other words, if

933
00:56:48,920 --> 00:56:53,720
Speaker 1: space X does something really dumb mountain space, the United

934
00:56:53,760 --> 00:56:57,200
Speaker 1: States government would be held accountable for that, because that's uh,

935
00:56:57,239 --> 00:57:00,239
Speaker 1: the presumably if they launched from the United States. I mean,

936
00:57:00,239 --> 00:57:04,200
Speaker 1: it is a US centered organization, So even though it's

937
00:57:04,200 --> 00:57:07,080
Speaker 1: not run by the government, the US would still be

938
00:57:07,080 --> 00:57:10,839
Speaker 1: held responsible because they would essentially be allowing for it

939
00:57:10,880 --> 00:57:15,480
Speaker 1: to happen. Be aware of space billionaires, because there you

940
00:57:15,480 --> 00:57:18,240
Speaker 1: could get a lot of trouble with your home country. Yeah, yeah,

941
00:57:18,320 --> 00:57:20,120
Speaker 1: your home country would get into a lot of trouble

942
00:57:20,200 --> 00:57:25,960
Speaker 1: and stuff trickles down, right, So we should say host country.

943
00:57:26,000 --> 00:57:28,440
Speaker 1: That's what I mean, that's true, that's true. That's probably

944
00:57:28,440 --> 00:57:31,200
Speaker 1: the best way of putting it. Uh So if your stuff,

945
00:57:31,360 --> 00:57:34,720
Speaker 1: meaning a state's property, falls out of the sky and

946
00:57:34,840 --> 00:57:37,240
Speaker 1: damages someone, you are at faults. So, in other words,

947
00:57:37,680 --> 00:57:40,720
Speaker 1: if the US puts up a satellite and the satellites

948
00:57:40,840 --> 00:57:45,600
Speaker 1: orbit decays, and the decaying orbit means the satellite starts

949
00:57:45,640 --> 00:57:49,960
Speaker 1: to fall into the Earth and does not burn up entirely,

950
00:57:50,200 --> 00:57:53,840
Speaker 1: and it ends up colliding with like a public library

951
00:57:53,920 --> 00:57:58,320
Speaker 1: over in Eastern Europe leaking dangerous chemicals, that US the

952
00:57:58,440 --> 00:58:00,600
Speaker 1: US is at fault. There's because they were the ones

953
00:58:00,600 --> 00:58:01,919
Speaker 1: who put it up there, and they did not find

954
00:58:01,960 --> 00:58:05,880
Speaker 1: a way to um to bring it down safely. Usually

955
00:58:07,560 --> 00:58:10,520
Speaker 1: things like that are done in a controlled way, where

956
00:58:11,480 --> 00:58:15,040
Speaker 1: it's purposefully brought down so that anything that would make

957
00:58:15,080 --> 00:58:18,240
Speaker 1: it through the atmosphere. The rare instance that that actually

958
00:58:18,240 --> 00:58:22,080
Speaker 1: does happen with land in an ocean, for example. UM,

959
00:58:22,280 --> 00:58:24,520
Speaker 1: but you know, it's always possible that you could have

960
00:58:24,560 --> 00:58:28,160
Speaker 1: a situation where you know, the the spacecraft is not

961
00:58:28,240 --> 00:58:31,760
Speaker 1: responding to your commands to have it, you know, de

962
00:58:32,040 --> 00:58:35,440
Speaker 1: orbit in a in a controlled way. And that's kind

963
00:58:35,440 --> 00:58:38,480
Speaker 1: of what this is covering. Also, states are not supposed

964
00:58:38,520 --> 00:58:43,480
Speaker 1: to contaminate celestial bodies, no littering I'm talking to But look,

965
00:58:44,320 --> 00:58:48,960
Speaker 1: take on any photographs, leave only footprints, right, and maybe

966
00:58:48,960 --> 00:58:51,680
Speaker 1: a flag and maybe a couple of lunar landers. I mean,

967
00:58:51,720 --> 00:58:54,320
Speaker 1: come on, the moon is pretty big. That's not really littering, right.

968
00:58:55,040 --> 00:58:58,560
Speaker 1: Uh So, over time, obviously this has been kind of updated.

969
00:58:59,160 --> 00:59:02,480
Speaker 1: But there have been other post treaties that would end

970
00:59:02,560 --> 00:59:06,240
Speaker 1: up beefing up these rules and defining them further, but

971
00:59:06,360 --> 00:59:10,360
Speaker 1: they have had limited success in adoption. And there are

972
00:59:10,360 --> 00:59:12,720
Speaker 1: a lot of reasons for that. So a proposed treaty

973
00:59:12,720 --> 00:59:16,320
Speaker 1: in fourteen would have placed more limitations on weapons and space,

974
00:59:16,360 --> 00:59:19,880
Speaker 1: at least in theory. The draft treaty is formally called

975
00:59:19,880 --> 00:59:23,600
Speaker 1: the Treaty on the Prevention of the Placement of Weapons

976
00:59:23,640 --> 00:59:26,240
Speaker 1: in Outer Space and of the Threat or Use of

977
00:59:26,320 --> 00:59:30,720
Speaker 1: Force against Outer Space Objects. So it's supposed to limit

978
00:59:30,840 --> 00:59:34,320
Speaker 1: states abilities to do things like launch missile attacks on

979
00:59:34,360 --> 00:59:39,120
Speaker 1: satellites or or put weaponization into space, even if it's

980
00:59:39,160 --> 00:59:44,800
Speaker 1: not mass destruction. And there were two countries that submitted

981
00:59:44,800 --> 00:59:48,040
Speaker 1: this treaty to the United Nations, and it was Russia

982
00:59:48,120 --> 00:59:52,760
Speaker 1: and China. Now, the United States opposed the treaty and

983
00:59:52,760 --> 00:59:56,280
Speaker 1: said it would not sign such a treaty. And you

984
00:59:56,360 --> 00:59:59,360
Speaker 1: might think well, why would the US say, no, I'm

985
00:59:59,360 --> 01:00:01,200
Speaker 1: not going to sign an treaty that doesn't allow us

986
01:00:01,200 --> 01:00:03,400
Speaker 1: to weaponize space. Does that mean the US is very

987
01:00:03,480 --> 01:00:07,400
Speaker 1: much interested in sending up tons of weapons into space. Yeah,

988
01:00:07,520 --> 01:00:09,400
Speaker 1: that that part is hard to answer, But I can

989
01:00:09,600 --> 01:00:12,960
Speaker 1: tell you what the official answers have been, which is

990
01:00:13,000 --> 01:00:18,840
Speaker 1: that China and this is there. I am paraphrasing, but

991
01:00:18,920 --> 01:00:23,200
Speaker 1: this is their perspective, not necessarily my own. China and

992
01:00:23,240 --> 01:00:27,360
Speaker 1: Russia don't play fair. That's that's what they're That's what

993
01:00:27,600 --> 01:00:31,240
Speaker 1: essentially the message has been, is that that this treaty

994
01:00:31,400 --> 01:00:34,680
Speaker 1: is something that if the United States signed it, because

995
01:00:34,720 --> 01:00:37,240
Speaker 1: the US are the good guys. Remember this is a narrative.

996
01:00:37,280 --> 01:00:40,600
Speaker 1: They're saying that the US are the good guys. The

997
01:00:40,720 --> 01:00:44,400
Speaker 1: US would abide by this treaty, but Russia and China

998
01:00:44,520 --> 01:00:48,960
Speaker 1: their tricks, ee, my precious, and they would totally ignore

999
01:00:49,040 --> 01:00:51,400
Speaker 1: the treaty and say, look at the dumb Americans. They're

1000
01:00:51,480 --> 01:00:54,360
Speaker 1: totally abiding by these rules we've set, whereas we're actually

1001
01:00:54,400 --> 01:00:56,400
Speaker 1: going to send up as many weapons into space as

1002
01:00:56,440 --> 01:00:59,920
Speaker 1: we can, and we're going to end up getting dominance.

1003
01:01:00,040 --> 01:01:02,120
Speaker 1: It will be an arms race in space that we

1004
01:01:02,160 --> 01:01:04,720
Speaker 1: will have a leg up on because we're not paying

1005
01:01:04,760 --> 01:01:09,320
Speaker 1: attention to the treaty. It's difficult because there it goes

1006
01:01:09,360 --> 01:01:12,960
Speaker 1: back to this idea of verification, right, and that is

1007
01:01:13,000 --> 01:01:18,360
Speaker 1: such a tricky, nearly impossible thing when you're talking about

1008
01:01:18,480 --> 01:01:20,760
Speaker 1: state secrets like this. How do you how do you

1009
01:01:20,880 --> 01:01:24,800
Speaker 1: verify that no one is up to anything shady? Right? Yeah?

1010
01:01:24,800 --> 01:01:26,840
Speaker 1: That was in fact that that was actually the way

1011
01:01:26,840 --> 01:01:32,360
Speaker 1: the us UH representatives worded it. They said, well, and

1012
01:01:32,520 --> 01:01:35,600
Speaker 1: other people have essentially said more or less what I said,

1013
01:01:35,640 --> 01:01:39,160
Speaker 1: just a nicer language, but the the specific line was

1014
01:01:39,240 --> 01:01:43,160
Speaker 1: that this treaty as it stands is impossible to verify,

1015
01:01:43,320 --> 01:01:48,560
Speaker 1: meaning that you cannot there's no there's no regulatory agency

1016
01:01:49,280 --> 01:01:52,920
Speaker 1: that could monitor states and make certain that no one

1017
01:01:53,040 --> 01:01:55,360
Speaker 1: was actually doing what the treaty said. So, in other words,

1018
01:01:55,400 --> 01:01:57,680
Speaker 1: they said that you can't enforce the treaty because you

1019
01:01:57,720 --> 01:02:01,080
Speaker 1: cannot be certain that people are abide by it, and

1020
01:02:01,120 --> 01:02:03,360
Speaker 1: so it ends up being a meaningless treaty. In the

1021
01:02:03,400 --> 01:02:06,440
Speaker 1: first place. It doesn't work because there's no means to

1022
01:02:07,120 --> 01:02:10,040
Speaker 1: monitor and therefore enforce it. So if there's no way

1023
01:02:10,080 --> 01:02:11,840
Speaker 1: to do that, then the treaty might as well not

1024
01:02:11,920 --> 01:02:15,400
Speaker 1: even exist, because what you are doing is creating a

1025
01:02:15,440 --> 01:02:18,560
Speaker 1: pressure on countries that want to follow it in good faith,

1026
01:02:18,640 --> 01:02:23,040
Speaker 1: while other countries may not share that and they'll just

1027
01:02:23,280 --> 01:02:26,240
Speaker 1: they'll violate it anyway, and there's no way to tell

1028
01:02:26,280 --> 01:02:28,320
Speaker 1: that they're violating it, because again there's no way to

1029
01:02:28,360 --> 01:02:32,160
Speaker 1: monitor it and verify it. So, um, I I totally

1030
01:02:32,160 --> 01:02:35,240
Speaker 1: get their point, Like, I don't disagree with that, And

1031
01:02:35,880 --> 01:02:39,120
Speaker 1: some might say, well, there's also ulterior motives that could

1032
01:02:39,160 --> 01:02:41,840
Speaker 1: be in play. Let's say that the United States wants

1033
01:02:41,880 --> 01:02:44,680
Speaker 1: to be able to have the option to send weapons,

1034
01:02:44,720 --> 01:02:47,400
Speaker 1: even if they're not weapons of mass destruction up into space.

1035
01:02:48,000 --> 01:02:50,320
Speaker 1: Send signing such a treaty would say that they would

1036
01:02:50,320 --> 01:02:52,880
Speaker 1: not do that, and maybe they want the option to

1037
01:02:53,080 --> 01:02:56,800
Speaker 1: remain open. It may be that they're even specific plans

1038
01:02:56,840 --> 01:03:00,320
Speaker 1: in place that we're not privy to and obviously would

1039
01:03:00,320 --> 01:03:03,160
Speaker 1: not be privy to. I'd like to think that that's

1040
01:03:03,160 --> 01:03:05,480
Speaker 1: not the case. But at the same time, I'd also

1041
01:03:05,560 --> 01:03:08,120
Speaker 1: like to think the government's not looking at all my emails,

1042
01:03:08,120 --> 01:03:11,240
Speaker 1: and that unfortunately has proven to be false. So yeah,

1043
01:03:11,240 --> 01:03:13,960
Speaker 1: it's always weird when an intern at the n s

1044
01:03:14,040 --> 01:03:17,880
Speaker 1: a response to when your emails, Yeah, yeah, like you

1045
01:03:18,120 --> 01:03:21,120
Speaker 1: send any Like I'm emailing you and the n s

1046
01:03:21,160 --> 01:03:24,040
Speaker 1: A interns, like, oh, Ben's that lunch right now, He's

1047
01:03:24,080 --> 01:03:27,080
Speaker 1: not going to respond until like four, Gary, I appreciate it,

1048
01:03:27,400 --> 01:03:30,160
Speaker 1: but school that stops kind of creepy, like say hi

1049
01:03:30,240 --> 01:03:33,080
Speaker 1: to your dad for me. Uh yeah, that that would

1050
01:03:33,080 --> 01:03:37,360
Speaker 1: be weird, but also just just annoying here. Also, we

1051
01:03:37,480 --> 01:03:42,640
Speaker 1: know that the ability to interfere with another state satellites,

1052
01:03:43,200 --> 01:03:47,240
Speaker 1: it could be so crucial and so pivotal that it's

1053
01:03:47,280 --> 01:03:49,600
Speaker 1: going to happen. Somebody's going to try to do that.

1054
01:03:50,760 --> 01:03:52,920
Speaker 1: As as you've said before, you said in our notes here,

1055
01:03:54,520 --> 01:03:58,680
Speaker 1: this space war stuff is not some distant sci fi thing.

1056
01:03:58,960 --> 01:04:01,280
Speaker 1: It's real, and it's kind of we're kind of in

1057
01:04:01,280 --> 01:04:03,480
Speaker 1: the middle of the story. Yeah, the idea that you know,

1058
01:04:03,600 --> 01:04:07,160
Speaker 1: China bringing down a satellite by firing a missile at

1059
01:04:07,160 --> 01:04:11,000
Speaker 1: it purely because that was the most effective means of

1060
01:04:11,000 --> 01:04:15,160
Speaker 1: taking down the satellite does not ring true, right. It

1061
01:04:15,240 --> 01:04:18,280
Speaker 1: definitely seems more like a demonstration of here's what we

1062
01:04:18,320 --> 01:04:21,760
Speaker 1: are capable of doing. So if we ever enter an

1063
01:04:21,800 --> 01:04:25,680
Speaker 1: actual like conflict, whether it's an official war or not,

1064
01:04:26,440 --> 01:04:29,640
Speaker 1: we have the capability of bringing down your satellites. And

1065
01:04:30,000 --> 01:04:33,280
Speaker 1: so yeah, I mean we're talking about satellites that could

1066
01:04:33,320 --> 01:04:38,360
Speaker 1: provide communication, GPS data, all this kind of stuff. I mean, obviously,

1067
01:04:38,400 --> 01:04:40,720
Speaker 1: the further out the satellite is, the harder it is

1068
01:04:40,760 --> 01:04:42,680
Speaker 1: for you to create a system that's going to be

1069
01:04:42,760 --> 01:04:44,720
Speaker 1: capable of bringing it down. You're gonna be able to

1070
01:04:44,800 --> 01:04:46,600
Speaker 1: hit the ones that are more in lower thorbit than

1071
01:04:46,640 --> 01:04:49,000
Speaker 1: the ones that are further out. I mean, you're talking

1072
01:04:49,040 --> 01:04:52,560
Speaker 1: about a target that's further out is and it's moving

1073
01:04:52,560 --> 01:04:55,960
Speaker 1: at an incredible speed like that. I'm not saying it's impossible.

1074
01:04:56,040 --> 01:04:59,480
Speaker 1: It certainly isn't. It's just a lot harder, But at

1075
01:04:59,480 --> 01:05:04,920
Speaker 1: any rate, the capability has been demonstrated. And uh, that

1076
01:05:05,120 --> 01:05:08,840
Speaker 1: is a very vulnerable and valid target if you are

1077
01:05:09,000 --> 01:05:12,880
Speaker 1: if you're very serious about warfare, right, yeah, absolutely, And

1078
01:05:12,960 --> 01:05:18,240
Speaker 1: this this brings us all back around to the subject

1079
01:05:18,320 --> 01:05:21,120
Speaker 1: we looked at today, which is the X thirty seven.

1080
01:05:21,160 --> 01:05:23,120
Speaker 1: And I gotta tell you, man, I've been holding onto

1081
01:05:23,120 --> 01:05:25,400
Speaker 1: this reference to the whole show, so okay, I've just

1082
01:05:25,440 --> 01:05:29,600
Speaker 1: gotta let it go. There's something about an unmanned vehicle

1083
01:05:29,920 --> 01:05:32,400
Speaker 1: in the darkness of space, just sort of orbiting in

1084
01:05:32,400 --> 01:05:35,000
Speaker 1: the silence that is so very event horizon to me.

1085
01:05:35,600 --> 01:05:37,560
Speaker 1: What's gonna come back the next time at Lands John

1086
01:05:38,880 --> 01:05:41,320
Speaker 1: a little hitchhiker. Yeah, I found your thing. Man, I

1087
01:05:41,320 --> 01:05:43,000
Speaker 1: don't know what happened to the drive out. He was

1088
01:05:43,040 --> 01:05:47,080
Speaker 1: gone when I got on. I promise you thanks. I've

1089
01:05:47,080 --> 01:05:49,720
Speaker 1: been working on that character for a while. Um. Yeah.

1090
01:05:49,840 --> 01:05:52,600
Speaker 1: And it's interesting because you know, this is not necessarily

1091
01:05:53,400 --> 01:05:57,120
Speaker 1: the end of the the space plane discussion. There's been

1092
01:05:57,280 --> 01:06:00,160
Speaker 1: some other talks about what the space plane my do,

1093
01:06:00,360 --> 01:06:04,480
Speaker 1: even in in light of the counter argument saying that

1094
01:06:04,560 --> 01:06:08,560
Speaker 1: perhaps it's not the most um efficient or useful means

1095
01:06:08,560 --> 01:06:11,040
Speaker 1: of getting things into space. The Air Force itself had

1096
01:06:11,080 --> 01:06:13,760
Speaker 1: announced back in twenty eleven that it would develop a

1097
01:06:13,760 --> 01:06:17,040
Speaker 1: new spacecraft based on the same design that would be

1098
01:06:17,120 --> 01:06:20,800
Speaker 1: even larger than the X three seven be Remember the

1099
01:06:20,800 --> 01:06:25,240
Speaker 1: thirty seven is larger than the X forty. This one

1100
01:06:25,320 --> 01:06:28,560
Speaker 1: would be bigger than the X thirty seven, and the

1101
01:06:28,680 --> 01:06:33,160
Speaker 1: numbers ranged between like a hundred sixty and so bigger

1102
01:06:33,360 --> 01:06:35,920
Speaker 1: by almost a factor of two when you get to

1103
01:06:35,920 --> 01:06:39,480
Speaker 1: the higher ends. And uh, this one would potentially have

1104
01:06:39,560 --> 01:06:44,520
Speaker 1: a pressurized compartment, which means that could carry stuff what lives. Yeah,

1105
01:06:44,600 --> 01:06:48,680
Speaker 1: and and the it has been suggested, could carry a

1106
01:06:49,120 --> 01:06:53,240
Speaker 1: group of astronauts up to six into space. They don't

1107
01:06:53,240 --> 01:06:55,800
Speaker 1: have to pilot the thing because it could still have

1108
01:06:55,840 --> 01:06:59,280
Speaker 1: autonomous control, although they said it would also have manual control,

1109
01:07:00,080 --> 01:07:04,320
Speaker 1: so uh, astronauts could presumably I assume astronauts. Maybe they

1110
01:07:04,400 --> 01:07:07,800
Speaker 1: mean manual control from the ground, which is also a possibility,

1111
01:07:07,840 --> 01:07:10,880
Speaker 1: but that, um, the astronauts would not necessarily have to

1112
01:07:10,920 --> 01:07:17,040
Speaker 1: pilot this thing. It would be the X thirty seven C. Yeah,

1113
01:07:17,040 --> 01:07:21,400
Speaker 1: no idea if that project is still happening or not,

1114
01:07:21,520 --> 01:07:25,040
Speaker 1: like it was announced inn But again, when you're talking

1115
01:07:25,040 --> 01:07:28,240
Speaker 1: about secret space planes, right, you don't get a lot

1116
01:07:28,240 --> 01:07:31,920
Speaker 1: of updates until they launch one and then it lands

1117
01:07:31,960 --> 01:07:33,760
Speaker 1: and then people are like, oh, so I guess that's

1118
01:07:33,800 --> 01:07:37,320
Speaker 1: still a thing. So we don't know. I mean we

1119
01:07:37,560 --> 01:07:41,360
Speaker 1: I don't know. People know. It's not me, Yeah, I'm

1120
01:07:41,360 --> 01:07:44,600
Speaker 1: not I'm not privy to such information. But it could

1121
01:07:44,600 --> 01:07:46,920
Speaker 1: be that we see a development and who knows, maybe

1122
01:07:46,960 --> 01:07:51,920
Speaker 1: there will be demonstrable uses for space plane technology that

1123
01:07:53,200 --> 01:07:57,320
Speaker 1: uh end up being uh, you know, the best option,

1124
01:07:57,600 --> 01:08:00,520
Speaker 1: and that the objection saying that, hey, you have other

1125
01:08:00,560 --> 01:08:03,120
Speaker 1: means of getting stuff into space that end up being

1126
01:08:03,320 --> 01:08:06,600
Speaker 1: less complicated than this methodology. Maybe that will end up

1127
01:08:06,600 --> 01:08:09,360
Speaker 1: being mood. It's kind of hard to say right now,

1128
01:08:09,360 --> 01:08:13,360
Speaker 1: because obviously if you were to an astronauts up you're

1129
01:08:13,360 --> 01:08:18,880
Speaker 1: probably not doing one of those crazy the body. It

1130
01:08:18,880 --> 01:08:21,800
Speaker 1: would be very very tough on the on the human body.

1131
01:08:21,840 --> 01:08:29,640
Speaker 1: And I can't imagine you could carry enough oxygen, water, food, like, yeah,

1132
01:08:29,680 --> 01:08:31,960
Speaker 1: all the stuff, all the stuff that's necessary to keep

1133
01:08:32,000 --> 01:08:35,599
Speaker 1: people alive. I don't think you could carry all of

1134
01:08:35,640 --> 01:08:39,120
Speaker 1: that aboard a space plane that's designed to be up

1135
01:08:39,120 --> 01:08:41,200
Speaker 1: there for six hundred days. That's just not going to happen.

1136
01:08:41,960 --> 01:08:44,400
Speaker 1: So even if you were to say, well, we want

1137
01:08:44,439 --> 01:08:46,840
Speaker 1: to find out what happens to best not when they're

1138
01:08:46,840 --> 01:08:50,760
Speaker 1: in a spacecraft for two years, and uh, whether or

1139
01:08:50,760 --> 01:08:53,160
Speaker 1: not they come back as the Fantastic Four. I mean,

1140
01:08:53,720 --> 01:08:57,200
Speaker 1: you know, it's worth a shot. But but but one

1141
01:08:57,200 --> 01:08:59,760
Speaker 1: thing we have learned about space radiation is it does

1142
01:08:59,800 --> 01:09:02,360
Speaker 1: not work the way that Marvel Comics may have feeled

1143
01:09:02,400 --> 01:09:05,000
Speaker 1: you as a child. No, it can. It can really

1144
01:09:05,040 --> 01:09:07,880
Speaker 1: mess you up big time. And uh, you know, you're

1145
01:09:07,880 --> 01:09:10,280
Speaker 1: talking about particles that move with a ton of energy

1146
01:09:10,320 --> 01:09:15,559
Speaker 1: that have the capacity to do really like cellular level

1147
01:09:15,640 --> 01:09:19,640
Speaker 1: damage that can end up causing huge issues. Yeah, like

1148
01:09:19,680 --> 01:09:23,360
Speaker 1: irreparable damage. But let's let's go big, because despite these

1149
01:09:23,400 --> 01:09:26,000
Speaker 1: problems right despite the secrecy, and I know it's a

1150
01:09:26,160 --> 01:09:30,280
Speaker 1: wellyon and spooky and stuff. I'm so excited because this

1151
01:09:30,400 --> 01:09:34,800
Speaker 1: gets us one one tiny step closer to one of

1152
01:09:34,840 --> 01:09:37,439
Speaker 1: the one of the big dreams I've had, uh since

1153
01:09:37,439 --> 01:09:40,160
Speaker 1: we started working together, which is the podcast on the Moon.

1154
01:09:40,640 --> 01:09:43,360
Speaker 1: I mean, if they can just get us to the moon, Jonathan,

1155
01:09:43,520 --> 01:09:45,360
Speaker 1: we could do the rest might be uh might be

1156
01:09:45,400 --> 01:09:48,080
Speaker 1: a little quiet up there. I don't know how we're

1157
01:09:48,120 --> 01:09:50,240
Speaker 1: going to talk into the microphones. The way of the

1158
01:09:50,320 --> 01:09:53,600
Speaker 1: set up. We'll just go it's a sound studio. Come on,

1159
01:09:53,760 --> 01:09:55,600
Speaker 1: We'll just so just move the whole studio to the

1160
01:09:56,360 --> 01:09:58,000
Speaker 1: that makes more sense. I was just thinking of the

1161
01:09:58,000 --> 01:10:01,160
Speaker 1: table on the mics, also about how long the cords

1162
01:10:01,200 --> 01:10:04,000
Speaker 1: would have to be, and that anything we asked nol

1163
01:10:04,160 --> 01:10:08,200
Speaker 1: we'd have to wait. Yeah, there'll be there'll be a Yeah,

1164
01:10:08,200 --> 01:10:12,800
Speaker 1: there'd be a noticeable delay. Um. But I'm still in

1165
01:10:12,840 --> 01:10:14,840
Speaker 1: favor of it personally because I think I think that

1166
01:10:14,920 --> 01:10:17,680
Speaker 1: could really position us in a way that other podcasts

1167
01:10:17,680 --> 01:10:21,080
Speaker 1: just haven't thought right to take advantage of that. I mean,

1168
01:10:21,200 --> 01:10:23,439
Speaker 1: it's kind of amazing to me that hasn't avenue. Honestly,

1169
01:10:24,520 --> 01:10:28,880
Speaker 1: don't ideas all right. So anyway, this has been a

1170
01:10:28,880 --> 01:10:31,120
Speaker 1: lot of fun to talk about the you know, even

1171
01:10:31,120 --> 01:10:34,640
Speaker 1: though obviously what we don't know as members of the

1172
01:10:34,640 --> 01:10:38,640
Speaker 1: general public far outweighs what we do know. But it's

1173
01:10:38,640 --> 01:10:41,920
Speaker 1: also fun just to kind of explore the psychology of

1174
01:10:42,200 --> 01:10:45,360
Speaker 1: not just like conspiracy theories in the sense of well,

1175
01:10:45,479 --> 01:10:47,360
Speaker 1: and since we don't have information, we have to fill

1176
01:10:47,439 --> 01:10:52,000
Speaker 1: that vacuum, but also just the idea of what what

1177
01:10:52,080 --> 01:10:55,400
Speaker 1: could be the motives for pursuing this. I mean, obviously

1178
01:10:55,479 --> 01:10:57,639
Speaker 1: we're talking about something that costs a huge amount of money.

1179
01:10:58,240 --> 01:11:01,640
Speaker 1: Maybe ultimately it's just a test of autonomous technology and

1180
01:11:01,720 --> 01:11:06,040
Speaker 1: a new uh a new form like a new new

1181
01:11:06,280 --> 01:11:10,559
Speaker 1: a new environment, and that that ultimately could become really important,

1182
01:11:10,560 --> 01:11:13,920
Speaker 1: but in a totally different implementation. I hope you enjoyed

1183
01:11:13,960 --> 01:11:16,920
Speaker 1: that classic episode of tech Stuff from twenty fifteen. I'll

1184
01:11:16,920 --> 01:11:19,240
Speaker 1: have to do an update on this one, obviously, but

1185
01:11:19,439 --> 01:11:22,599
Speaker 1: if you have suggestions for other topics that I should tackle,

1186
01:11:22,960 --> 01:11:27,519
Speaker 1: whether it's a company, technology, a trend in tech, anything

1187
01:11:27,560 --> 01:11:30,080
Speaker 1: like that, reach out to me on Twitter to handle

1188
01:11:30,080 --> 01:11:32,640
Speaker 1: for the show is tech Stuff h s W I

1189
01:11:32,800 --> 01:11:41,800
Speaker 1: talk to you again really soon. Y. Text Stuff is

1190
01:11:41,800 --> 01:11:45,000
Speaker 1: an I Heart radio production For more podcasts from I

1191
01:11:45,080 --> 01:11:48,680
Speaker 1: heart Radio, visit the i heart Radio app, Apple podcasts,

1192
01:11:48,800 --> 01:11:50,799
Speaker 1: or wherever you listen to your favorite shows.