WEBVTT - Former CFTC Chair on How to Regulate Stablecoins Without Passing Any New Laws

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<v Speaker 1>Hello and welcome to another episode of the all thoughts podcast.

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<v Speaker 1>I'm Tracy allowatt and I'm Joe Wi. Isn't they so, Joe? UH,

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<v Speaker 1>didn't we say recently that we were going to be

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<v Speaker 1>talking about stable coin regulations more? There's never enough, you know.

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<v Speaker 1>I actually I have. I think there are lots of

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<v Speaker 1>reasons to continue to focus on stable coin regulation. Why? Well,

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<v Speaker 1>I think the biggest one in my mind, is this

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<v Speaker 1>sort of thing I internalized from the great financial crisis,

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<v Speaker 1>which is that things blow up when they're promised to

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<v Speaker 1>be stable. Yeah, I think that's exactly and to me

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<v Speaker 1>it's like, I know, I do not expect to experience

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<v Speaker 1>in my lifetime like a bitcoin crisis, because people know

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<v Speaker 1>that bitcoin crisis or a dogecoin. People know that these

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<v Speaker 1>coins are extremely volatile. They don't bucket them into, uh,

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<v Speaker 1>you know, parts of their portfolio that are expected to

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<v Speaker 1>be safe, and so they can fall like a stock can,

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<v Speaker 1>whereas we know that, you know when something is like

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<v Speaker 1>triple a or dollar peg or whatever, that's where trouble

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<v Speaker 1>can theoretically start. Yeah, so two things there. I totally agree.

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<v Speaker 1>The other thing is, if you think about crypto broadly,

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<v Speaker 1>stable coins are really the way in which the traditional

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<v Speaker 1>financial system interacts the most or one of the most

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<v Speaker 1>important ways with crypto. So stable coins are interesting because

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<v Speaker 1>they build up these reserves of financial assets, things like

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<v Speaker 1>commercial paper, and there's a concern there that maybe if

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<v Speaker 1>you had a stable coin experience a big amount of trouble,

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<v Speaker 1>that it could affect the CP market more broadly and

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<v Speaker 1>affect the financial system more broadly. And also there's a

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<v Speaker 1>good argument that stable coins are the one killer APP

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<v Speaker 1>of Crypto, that where do people actually use crypto? It's

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<v Speaker 1>like tether, U, s DC. These are huge things, right,

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<v Speaker 1>and so he's like, well, what do people use crypto for? Well,

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<v Speaker 1>stable coins are like popular and why spread and therefore,

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<v Speaker 1>you know, it's an area to be putting a lot

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<v Speaker 1>of attention. Well, also, I think that they promise something,

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<v Speaker 1>which is the fact that they promise something, which is stability,

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<v Speaker 1>kind of makes them easier to regulate. Like, you know what,

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<v Speaker 1>what are other crypto tokens actually promising? Like they're not

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<v Speaker 1>necessarily promising that safety net as you are discussing, but

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<v Speaker 1>stable coins are, and so it naturally draws in regulatory interests,

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<v Speaker 1>and this is a real, key, key point that you

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<v Speaker 1>you bring up, which is that, yeah, like there is

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<v Speaker 1>this there is this promise, there is this expectation. You

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<v Speaker 1>can also sort of judge whether the promise is being kept. Like,

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<v Speaker 1>does this coin have a dollar in the bank? Is

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<v Speaker 1>like a pretty simple binary question. What would be the

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<v Speaker 1>equivalent for doge client? Well, more difficult to answer than

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<v Speaker 1>you might expect. Sometimes Fair enough, but we are going

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<v Speaker 1>to be discussing all of this with someone who I

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<v Speaker 1>think comes at it from a very interesting perspective. So

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<v Speaker 1>we recently spoke to Senator Pat to me about this.

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<v Speaker 1>He was talking about the stable coin bill going through Congress,

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<v Speaker 1>but what if there was another way to regulate stable coin?

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<v Speaker 1>Let's all right, without further ado, then, we are going

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<v Speaker 1>to be speaking to Timothy Massad. He is, of course,

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<v Speaker 1>a research fellow at the Harvard Kennedy School and also

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<v Speaker 1>the former chairman of the CFTC under president, literally the

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<v Speaker 1>perfect guest. Yeah, definitely, Tim thank you so much for

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<v Speaker 1>joining us. Thank you for having me. I'm a big

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<v Speaker 1>fan of the show. Thanks. Thank you for saying that. Yeah,

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<v Speaker 1>text and the mail. Uh. So, why don't we go ahead?

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<v Speaker 1>And this is a question I asked senator to me

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<v Speaker 1>as well, but why the interest in stable coins? Like,

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<v Speaker 1>what is it that is drawing this regulatory scrutiny at

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<v Speaker 1>this moment in time? Sure, well, they're not that big

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<v Speaker 1>relative to the financial senator, but they are growing very

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<v Speaker 1>quickly and that's one of the concerns and obviously recently

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<v Speaker 1>when we had that fall in crypto prices and we

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<v Speaker 1>saw the crash of terra, which is an Algorithmic stert

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<v Speaker 1>staple coin, that heightened the concern. There's a view that,

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<v Speaker 1>you know, these things could grow very quickly and, frankly,

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<v Speaker 1>that there's an opportunity here. They could help modernized payments

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<v Speaker 1>and increased competition. So I think it is right for

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<v Speaker 1>regulators to be focused on them and of course facebook's

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<v Speaker 1>proposal of libra was really what uh captivated or really

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<v Speaker 1>regulators to focus in on this. I actually hadn't realized that.

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<v Speaker 1>talked to us a little bit more about that because

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<v Speaker 1>you know, remember the Libre Splash was during the team

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<v Speaker 1>boom and it just seems so unwieldy and I'm not

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<v Speaker 1>really surprised it never got off the ground, but I

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<v Speaker 1>don't think I had appreciated the degree to which that

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<v Speaker 1>was a catalyzing moment for regulators. Can you talk about

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<v Speaker 1>what happened there? But yeah, it was. It was really

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<v Speaker 1>a huge moment, not just for the regulation of stample

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<v Speaker 1>coins but also for the development of Central Bank digital currencies.

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<v Speaker 1>You know, before were facebook announced that chair Powell testified

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<v Speaker 1>and he kind of brushed off a question about cryptocurrencies

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<v Speaker 1>by saying, you know, we don't, we don't regulate that.

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<v Speaker 1>We regulate banks when stable when facebook made its proposal,

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<v Speaker 1>and you will recall, the initial proposal was for essentially

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<v Speaker 1>a stable coin. They didn't call it that, but it

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<v Speaker 1>was a stable coin based on a basket of currencies,

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<v Speaker 1>not just one currency but the dollar, the euro, the

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<v Speaker 1>pound and a few others. And so central bankers around

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<v Speaker 1>the world immediately were alarmed because they thought, boy, this

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<v Speaker 1>could actually displace sovereign currencies. FACEBOOK has, you know, two

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<v Speaker 1>billion plus users. What if they all use it? It

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<v Speaker 1>also prompted some countries to really accelerate their CBDC development,

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<v Speaker 1>in particular China. I was over in China shortly after

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<v Speaker 1>the facebook announcement was was made and, uh, you know,

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<v Speaker 1>all every want in Congress sort of looked at facebook

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<v Speaker 1>and said, Oh, you're gonna undermine the US dollar. Well,

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<v Speaker 1>every government official I spoke to in China had had

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<v Speaker 1>the opposite reaction. They saw libra as essentially a way

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<v Speaker 1>to backdoor dollarize other economies, because the dollar would be

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<v Speaker 1>the main component. So they got very worried about it

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<v Speaker 1>and they accelerated their CBDC research because of interesting. So

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<v Speaker 1>you know it was. It was big from the standpoint

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<v Speaker 1>of causing people to recognize stable coins as an issue

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<v Speaker 1>and also from cbdcs right. So fast forward to today

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<v Speaker 1>and we have the president's working group report that came

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<v Speaker 1>out last year. I think we have this bill that

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<v Speaker 1>may or may not be working its way through Congress.

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<v Speaker 1>We have a lot of people talking in general about

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<v Speaker 1>stable coin regulation. Would you characterize stable coin regulation as

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<v Speaker 1>different to Crypto regulation more broadly, like, is there a

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<v Speaker 1>different set of requirements that you're trying to satisfy here? Well,

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<v Speaker 1>it is different because stable coins are seen primarily as

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<v Speaker 1>payment mechanisms. Um, and the first thing to to realize

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<v Speaker 1>is that the regulation today is really inadequate. It's a

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<v Speaker 1>very light touch. Um, these are regulated under State Law

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<v Speaker 1>under what we call money service business laws or money

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<v Speaker 1>transmitter laws. Those laws originated with the Telegraph okay, and

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<v Speaker 1>what they required was, you know, if you walked into

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<v Speaker 1>a Western Union office in Kentucky and you wanted to

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<v Speaker 1>send money to your cousin in Illinois, Western Union had

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<v Speaker 1>to make sure it had money on hand. So money

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<v Speaker 1>service business laws require very minimum capital. UH, they require security, again,

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<v Speaker 1>very we're talking about amounts in the range from zero to,

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<v Speaker 1>you know, maybe a million dollars, maybe two million dollars

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<v Speaker 1>at the high end for some of these states, and

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<v Speaker 1>some of them do have permissible investment rules. That does

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<v Speaker 1>mean if you're registered as a money service business, you

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<v Speaker 1>have to register with Finsen, right, which is a department

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<v Speaker 1>of the Treasury which enforces anti money laundering and rules.

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<v Speaker 1>So that's a good thing. We are imposing those kinds

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<v Speaker 1>of restrictions on stable coins based in the US. But

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<v Speaker 1>this is not a sufficient framework. To suggest it's it's sufficient.

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<v Speaker 1>It's sort of like saying, well, you know, there's no

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<v Speaker 1>difference between an excel spreadsheet and a blockchain. What can

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<v Speaker 1>that do? You know? Um, we people, yeah, I know,

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<v Speaker 1>some people do right, right, right, Um, we need a

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<v Speaker 1>comprehensive framework. What would that involve? Prudential Regulation First, to

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<v Speaker 1>make sure that these stable coins are fully reserved, meaning

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<v Speaker 1>they have cash or Treasury securities backing them. But, more importantly,

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<v Speaker 1>there's no stable in the stable coin today because there's

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<v Speaker 1>no resolution framework. You know, if a bank fails, right,

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<v Speaker 1>we have a well developed framework. The FDI C steps

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<v Speaker 1>in very quickly, usually on weekend. Depositors are insured and,

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<v Speaker 1>you know, life goes on. Everybody's fine. If a stable

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<v Speaker 1>coin were to default, were to collapse, um would be

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<v Speaker 1>handled as a normal bankruptcy, which means the automatic stay applies. Right,

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<v Speaker 1>so holders are not going to get their money for months,

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<v Speaker 1>years potentially, and what we call the Perry Passu rule applies.

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<v Speaker 1>So even though I'm a holder of a stable coin,

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<v Speaker 1>I'm in the same category as all other unsecured credits.

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<v Speaker 1>So if the stable coin issue or has leveraged itself, well,

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<v Speaker 1>you know I'm going to be competing with all of them.

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<v Speaker 1>So that's a big problem. We need a framework that

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<v Speaker 1>ensures good resolution and oversight as well as we've got

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<v Speaker 1>to deal with the operational risks here, because the stable

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<v Speaker 1>coins are trading on a number of decentralized block change

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<v Speaker 1>and we got to look at how resilient, how reliable,

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<v Speaker 1>are those? This is really interesting sort of this second

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<v Speaker 1>have your point, because I guess intuitively, probably everyone sort

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<v Speaker 1>of gets like, yeah, we should have some required disclosure,

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<v Speaker 1>something to make sure the money is actually there. That

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<v Speaker 1>seems like, I guess that's the obvious thing, that's that's

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<v Speaker 1>the easy one, right. The second point, though, is not

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<v Speaker 1>something I had really I've heard many people talk about,

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<v Speaker 1>which is like all right, well, what is the mechanism

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<v Speaker 1>that keeps it stable, particularly in the event of like

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<v Speaker 1>something bad happening? And I see, I have seen some people,

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<v Speaker 1>like on twitter for example, like talk about, say, like

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<v Speaker 1>circles or tether. It's like capital cushion or the equity component,

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<v Speaker 1>and it's often pretty thing. So what do you talk

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<v Speaker 1>to us a little bit more about what you see

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<v Speaker 1>as lacking, or what you see is the risks on

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<v Speaker 1>that sort of like second component? Sure, Um, well, certainly

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<v Speaker 1>capital helps prevent a bankruptcy, right, because it gives you

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<v Speaker 1>a way to absorb lawsuit. But the point is that

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<v Speaker 1>even with that you still need a resolution framework, you

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<v Speaker 1>still need a way so that you know, this is

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<v Speaker 1>a financial institution, we don't want it to and it's

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<v Speaker 1>a payment company, we don't want it to go through

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<v Speaker 1>the normal bankruptcy where where people are held up. So

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<v Speaker 1>that's why I think we really need a more comprehensive approach.

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<v Speaker 1>We've suggested this could be done administratively. I've talked a

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<v Speaker 1>senator to me about his legislation. I think it does

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<v Speaker 1>some of the things I'd like to see. It doesn't

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<v Speaker 1>do all of them, but you know, that would involve

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<v Speaker 1>not just prudential requirements on investments, but it would involve

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<v Speaker 1>creating a framework for resolution. It would involve overside, it

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<v Speaker 1>would involve audits, it would involve standards on operational resilience

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<v Speaker 1>and on concentration of power. I mean one of the

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<v Speaker 1>big issues here is should we allow stable coin issuers

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<v Speaker 1>to be affiliated with commercial companies? What if Amazon wants

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<v Speaker 1>to launch a stable coin? Feel about that? Well, talk

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<v Speaker 1>to us about your proposal done, because I think when

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<v Speaker 1>comes to crypto regulation there's often the sense, maybe it's

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<v Speaker 1>unspoken sometimes, but the sense that the existing regulation isn't

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<v Speaker 1>enough to tackle this new technology, this fast changing and

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<v Speaker 1>evolving industry. Um, you know with pat too, me the

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<v Speaker 1>Howe test came up, a number of times, this idea that, well,

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<v Speaker 1>how are you going to use something from the nineteen

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<v Speaker 1>thirties in order to regulate block chains and cryptocurrencies and

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<v Speaker 1>tokens and things like that. But you're suggesting that it

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<v Speaker 1>can be done. So walk us through the proposal. So

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<v Speaker 1>let's talk about stable coins first and then the broader

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<v Speaker 1>crypto market second, because we have a similar proposal but

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<v Speaker 1>it's a different paper. Unstable coins, what I'm saying, with

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<v Speaker 1>my co authors, how Jackson and Dan Owry, to law

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<v Speaker 1>professors is that while legislation would be great, Um, we're

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<v Speaker 1>not sure it will happen, number one, and we're a

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<v Speaker 1>little concerned that it won't be comprehensive. So what we're

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<v Speaker 1>saying is financial regulators today have the authorities they need

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<v Speaker 1>to create a framework to try to bring this activity

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<v Speaker 1>within the banking perimeter. Wouldn't be regulated exactly as a bank,

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<v Speaker 1>but what you would do technically as you set up

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<v Speaker 1>what's called a National Trust Bank, which then has a

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<v Speaker 1>trust below it that is the payment vehicle, and then

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<v Speaker 1>what this gets you is it gets you supervision by

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<v Speaker 1>a banking regulator. But it can be done in a

0:13:25.160 --> 0:13:29.080
<v Speaker 1>way where there's not deposit insurance, right, because we don't

0:13:29.080 --> 0:13:31.800
<v Speaker 1>want that. We want the stable point issuer just to

0:13:31.840 --> 0:13:34.400
<v Speaker 1>hold cash and treasuries and so forth. It doesn't need

0:13:34.440 --> 0:13:38.440
<v Speaker 1>department insurance. It could be coupled with access to a

0:13:38.480 --> 0:13:43.200
<v Speaker 1>Federal Reserve Master Account, which is very useful for settlement efficiency.

0:13:43.640 --> 0:13:46.920
<v Speaker 1>And you know, the office of the controller, which would

0:13:46.920 --> 0:13:49.840
<v Speaker 1>do this, can set a variety of other standards on

0:13:49.920 --> 0:13:52.120
<v Speaker 1>all the other issues we need to worry about, such

0:13:52.160 --> 0:13:57.480
<v Speaker 1>as operational resiliency, such as basic consumer disclosure, consumer protection

0:13:57.480 --> 0:14:00.079
<v Speaker 1>and so forth. But the point is that admit this

0:14:00.200 --> 0:14:02.959
<v Speaker 1>strative Lee. This could be done. It would require all

0:14:02.960 --> 0:14:07.000
<v Speaker 1>the bank regulators to get together and cooperate, something that

0:14:07.040 --> 0:14:10.480
<v Speaker 1>doesn't always happen in our system very well, but it

0:14:10.520 --> 0:14:13.839
<v Speaker 1>could be done today under existing law, and again, we're

0:14:13.840 --> 0:14:16.679
<v Speaker 1>not against legislation. That would be fine, but let's not

0:14:16.720 --> 0:14:35.440
<v Speaker 1>wait around. We could today. WHO WOULD BE? Who is

0:14:35.480 --> 0:14:38.960
<v Speaker 1>the regulator of a bank such as do? So? It

0:14:39.000 --> 0:14:42.400
<v Speaker 1>would be primarily the office of the controller of the currency,

0:14:42.480 --> 0:14:46.560
<v Speaker 1>because that it would issue a National Trust Bank Charter.

0:14:47.120 --> 0:14:49.840
<v Speaker 1>But you would also need the cooperation of the Fed

0:14:50.480 --> 0:14:54.400
<v Speaker 1>and the FDI C to really make this work. Ideally,

0:14:54.640 --> 0:14:57.160
<v Speaker 1>you know, you need the SEC and the CFTC to

0:14:57.240 --> 0:14:59.160
<v Speaker 1>go along to just to not do things that are

0:14:59.160 --> 0:15:02.120
<v Speaker 1>inconsistent with what you're trying to do under the bank

0:15:02.240 --> 0:15:07.080
<v Speaker 1>loans Um. But you know, we created the Financial Stability

0:15:07.120 --> 0:15:10.320
<v Speaker 1>Oversight Council to bring the regulators together. We've suggested well,

0:15:10.320 --> 0:15:13.720
<v Speaker 1>it could, it could help coordinate this as well. Is

0:15:13.760 --> 0:15:18.680
<v Speaker 1>there anything about this proposal that would impinge on the

0:15:18.720 --> 0:15:21.440
<v Speaker 1>current business model of major stable coin issuers? Because I

0:15:21.440 --> 0:15:23.680
<v Speaker 1>think if you all talk to them, if we had

0:15:23.880 --> 0:15:26.360
<v Speaker 1>Jeremy a layer of circle back on, you say yeah,

0:15:26.440 --> 0:15:30.200
<v Speaker 1>more clarity, more regulation, totally fine, etcetera. Is there anything?

0:15:30.320 --> 0:15:32.880
<v Speaker 1>Is there a Trojan horse that I'm missing that he

0:15:32.920 --> 0:15:35.480
<v Speaker 1>would say no, this is not gonna work. There are

0:15:35.520 --> 0:15:39.160
<v Speaker 1>things that they might not like. Um, the way we've

0:15:39.160 --> 0:15:42.600
<v Speaker 1>proposed it, because we've said this could be done administratively

0:15:42.680 --> 0:15:45.400
<v Speaker 1>and because we wanted to be very conservative and suggest

0:15:45.480 --> 0:15:48.720
<v Speaker 1>something that the bank regulators could say, Oh yes, this

0:15:49.040 --> 0:15:52.320
<v Speaker 1>uses building blocks we've that are tried and tested in

0:15:52.400 --> 0:15:55.880
<v Speaker 1>our regulatory framework. We can do this. Is We have said,

0:15:55.920 --> 0:15:58.560
<v Speaker 1>this trust bank would need to be a subsidiary of

0:15:58.600 --> 0:16:01.920
<v Speaker 1>an insured depository stitution. It still wouldn't have insurance, but

0:16:02.000 --> 0:16:05.360
<v Speaker 1>it would be chartered that way, which brings in banking

0:16:05.440 --> 0:16:08.440
<v Speaker 1>regulation overall. So what stable coin issuers will say is

0:16:08.480 --> 0:16:12.720
<v Speaker 1>twofold one. They'll say our business model is narrowed, we

0:16:12.800 --> 0:16:15.560
<v Speaker 1>don't need to be subject to lots and lots of

0:16:15.600 --> 0:16:19.320
<v Speaker 1>bank regulations, and I'm sympathetic to that. Um, I would

0:16:19.360 --> 0:16:22.440
<v Speaker 1>be willing to go down a path of saying, yeah,

0:16:22.600 --> 0:16:26.200
<v Speaker 1>let's customize the rules a little bit for these guys.

0:16:26.240 --> 0:16:29.800
<v Speaker 1>They don't need all of these things. Our proposal already

0:16:29.840 --> 0:16:32.800
<v Speaker 1>does that in terms of capital requirements and so forth,

0:16:32.920 --> 0:16:37.440
<v Speaker 1>because the trust itself would be off balance sheet. The

0:16:37.520 --> 0:16:41.160
<v Speaker 1>second thing they will say is, you know, if you're

0:16:41.240 --> 0:16:45.920
<v Speaker 1>going to make this a subsidiary of a bank, that

0:16:46.320 --> 0:16:49.800
<v Speaker 1>limits potential competition. The whole point of stable coins is

0:16:49.840 --> 0:16:52.480
<v Speaker 1>we want to be competing with banks. I'm sympathetic to

0:16:52.520 --> 0:16:56.440
<v Speaker 1>that too, because I do regard stable coins is potentially

0:16:56.440 --> 0:16:59.560
<v Speaker 1>helping US bring more competition to payments. I think both

0:16:59.560 --> 0:17:01.560
<v Speaker 1>those things this can be dealt with in the process.

0:17:01.600 --> 0:17:05.439
<v Speaker 1>It really depends on how much flexibility regulators want to

0:17:05.480 --> 0:17:07.520
<v Speaker 1>build in the system. But those, I think, would be

0:17:07.560 --> 0:17:09.920
<v Speaker 1>the terrain objections they would have, and this was going

0:17:09.960 --> 0:17:11.959
<v Speaker 1>to be my question actually, which is what's in it

0:17:12.040 --> 0:17:15.439
<v Speaker 1>for a bank to allow a stable coin issuer to

0:17:15.800 --> 0:17:19.879
<v Speaker 1>be a subsidiary? Yeah, well, you know, I think a

0:17:19.880 --> 0:17:22.240
<v Speaker 1>lot of banks are looking at stable coins and sort

0:17:22.280 --> 0:17:24.800
<v Speaker 1>of thinking about, do we enter this space? Do we

0:17:24.880 --> 0:17:28.879
<v Speaker 1>not enter this space? Um, I think with with interest

0:17:28.960 --> 0:17:33.320
<v Speaker 1>rates moving up, Um, it becomes interesting also, how does

0:17:33.359 --> 0:17:36.800
<v Speaker 1>that affect the stable coin issuers business model? Right, because

0:17:36.840 --> 0:17:38.320
<v Speaker 1>some of them now are going to be making a

0:17:38.320 --> 0:17:41.359
<v Speaker 1>lot of money. On the of course, their deposits are still,

0:17:41.520 --> 0:17:45.000
<v Speaker 1>you know, very, very, very small fraction of the total

0:17:45.359 --> 0:17:49.399
<v Speaker 1>deposits in the banking system. Hundred fifty billion and stable

0:17:49.400 --> 0:17:53.359
<v Speaker 1>coins versus nineteen trillion and bank deposits. But, you know,

0:17:53.440 --> 0:17:56.199
<v Speaker 1>I think banks are really thinking about how do we

0:17:56.320 --> 0:18:00.160
<v Speaker 1>maintain our competitive edge in UH in payments? I mean

0:18:00.680 --> 0:18:03.320
<v Speaker 1>all of this also goes to a broader issue, right,

0:18:03.400 --> 0:18:07.400
<v Speaker 1>of how do we think about banking? Banking has traditionally

0:18:07.520 --> 0:18:13.080
<v Speaker 1>bundled credit creation, creation of money. Really Right, because most

0:18:13.080 --> 0:18:17.200
<v Speaker 1>of the money we use is really represents private eye, I. O. U. S.

0:18:17.320 --> 0:18:19.800
<v Speaker 1>it's only paper money that represents a liability of the

0:18:19.840 --> 0:18:24.800
<v Speaker 1>government and payments. Right, banks have bundled all those functions.

0:18:25.200 --> 0:18:29.399
<v Speaker 1>They've been entitled to certain regulatory advantages in order to

0:18:29.480 --> 0:18:33.199
<v Speaker 1>do that, such as deposit insurance, such as access to

0:18:33.280 --> 0:18:38.560
<v Speaker 1>fed master accounts and really stable coins and other innovations

0:18:38.560 --> 0:18:41.640
<v Speaker 1>and payments are really raising the question of should we

0:18:41.840 --> 0:18:46.240
<v Speaker 1>unbundle this a bit and let non banking entities come

0:18:46.280 --> 0:18:48.520
<v Speaker 1>in and do payments? And this, by the way, there's

0:18:48.560 --> 0:18:51.439
<v Speaker 1>a report that's going to be put out by the

0:18:51.480 --> 0:18:54.800
<v Speaker 1>Treasury Department called the future of money and payments, which

0:18:54.840 --> 0:18:59.000
<v Speaker 1>is a report required by the executive order, which presumably

0:18:59.000 --> 0:19:01.280
<v Speaker 1>will talk about this and you know, we'll see if

0:19:01.320 --> 0:19:05.440
<v Speaker 1>it takes a firm stance. I mean the scope of

0:19:05.480 --> 0:19:08.199
<v Speaker 1>that report is very, very broad if you look at

0:19:08.240 --> 0:19:11.000
<v Speaker 1>the executive orders. Supposed to talk about future payments and

0:19:11.119 --> 0:19:16.160
<v Speaker 1>cbdcs and how can they affect competition and financial inclusion

0:19:16.280 --> 0:19:20.880
<v Speaker 1>and so forth. And truthfully, you know, I'm I'm very

0:19:20.920 --> 0:19:23.879
<v Speaker 1>interested in what the report will say, but you know,

0:19:24.040 --> 0:19:27.720
<v Speaker 1>it may well be a committee product that doesn't take

0:19:27.720 --> 0:19:30.399
<v Speaker 1>a firm view on some things but just covers a

0:19:30.440 --> 0:19:34.520
<v Speaker 1>lot of territory. We'll see. Interesting just on the banks

0:19:34.640 --> 0:19:37.480
<v Speaker 1>versus stable coins point this, this is something that came

0:19:37.560 --> 0:19:41.679
<v Speaker 1>up in our episode with the Circle CEO, with Jeremy Ahlaire.

0:19:42.760 --> 0:19:46.080
<v Speaker 1>There is a sense that, okay, maybe sending money via

0:19:46.119 --> 0:19:49.240
<v Speaker 1>stable coins is more efficient than sending it through a

0:19:49.280 --> 0:19:51.600
<v Speaker 1>bank which, you know, it takes days and maybe they

0:19:51.680 --> 0:19:54.320
<v Speaker 1>charge you fees or they charge you a bad exchange

0:19:54.400 --> 0:19:57.320
<v Speaker 1>rate or something like that. But the question always is

0:19:57.720 --> 0:20:03.400
<v Speaker 1>how much of stable coins advantage is genuinely genuine technology

0:20:03.480 --> 0:20:07.640
<v Speaker 1>innovation versus regulatory arbitrage, and I'd be curious to get

0:20:07.640 --> 0:20:10.640
<v Speaker 1>your thoughts on that. Well, I think that's a great question.

0:20:10.760 --> 0:20:13.960
<v Speaker 1>I mean, look, for most of us the payment system

0:20:14.040 --> 0:20:18.520
<v Speaker 1>works perfectly fine, right. I mean we have our credit cards,

0:20:18.600 --> 0:20:21.160
<v Speaker 1>we have mobile banking and you know, I can deposit

0:20:21.160 --> 0:20:24.040
<v Speaker 1>a check at three in the morning, uh, and I

0:20:24.119 --> 0:20:26.080
<v Speaker 1>get an instant you know, I get an email right

0:20:26.119 --> 0:20:28.320
<v Speaker 1>back and said, Oh, yes, we've got your check. Now.

0:20:28.400 --> 0:20:31.639
<v Speaker 1>In reality, of course, if I'm a low income person,

0:20:32.359 --> 0:20:34.639
<v Speaker 1>I may not even have that access and if I

0:20:34.680 --> 0:20:38.040
<v Speaker 1>deposit that check, it might be five days before it clears, right,

0:20:38.160 --> 0:20:43.520
<v Speaker 1>and that's why our payment system is actually relatively slow

0:20:43.800 --> 0:20:47.800
<v Speaker 1>and inefficient compared to what it could be and what

0:20:48.320 --> 0:20:51.280
<v Speaker 1>at least some countries have advanced in terms of having

0:20:51.320 --> 0:20:54.640
<v Speaker 1>more of a real time system. That doesn't hurt most

0:20:54.680 --> 0:20:57.000
<v Speaker 1>of us, again, because we have all these options. We

0:20:57.040 --> 0:21:00.199
<v Speaker 1>have credit cards that give us, you know, free revolving it,

0:21:00.960 --> 0:21:03.680
<v Speaker 1>but it really does hurt low income people. They're actually

0:21:03.960 --> 0:21:07.199
<v Speaker 1>subsidizing our credit cards right because they pay all the

0:21:07.240 --> 0:21:10.040
<v Speaker 1>same price as we pay, but they don't have those

0:21:10.040 --> 0:21:12.680
<v Speaker 1>credit cards. So when you look at it from a

0:21:12.720 --> 0:21:17.040
<v Speaker 1>societal standpoint, we do need to modernize the payment system.

0:21:17.119 --> 0:21:20.919
<v Speaker 1>And while, yes, the advantages today to most of us

0:21:21.000 --> 0:21:23.840
<v Speaker 1>of a stable coin payment versus, you know, a bank

0:21:24.400 --> 0:21:27.040
<v Speaker 1>may not matter that much unless maybe we're doing a

0:21:27.080 --> 0:21:30.640
<v Speaker 1>cross border payment where the fees can be high. Um,

0:21:30.680 --> 0:21:33.240
<v Speaker 1>you know, I think long term this could be significant.

0:21:33.560 --> 0:21:37.480
<v Speaker 1>I think obviously digital forms of payment have the potential.

0:21:37.560 --> 0:21:41.159
<v Speaker 1>Also blockchain forms of payment have the potential to be programmable.

0:21:41.720 --> 0:21:44.080
<v Speaker 1>But I guess at the end of the day I

0:21:44.080 --> 0:21:46.679
<v Speaker 1>would say, as a former regulator, I don't really know

0:21:46.760 --> 0:21:49.680
<v Speaker 1>the answer to the question ultimately, and I don't think

0:21:49.720 --> 0:21:52.280
<v Speaker 1>government is smart enough to figure it out. I think

0:21:52.280 --> 0:21:55.320
<v Speaker 1>the market has to figure out do these things really

0:21:55.400 --> 0:21:58.359
<v Speaker 1>have long term utility? I'm skeptical of a lot of

0:21:58.400 --> 0:22:01.280
<v Speaker 1>things that go on in it though, as to their

0:22:01.320 --> 0:22:05.080
<v Speaker 1>long term utility. But I don't think that's the government's

0:22:05.160 --> 0:22:07.920
<v Speaker 1>job to decide. I think that's the market will figure

0:22:07.920 --> 0:22:11.280
<v Speaker 1>it out. The government's job is to create a framework where,

0:22:11.680 --> 0:22:16.240
<v Speaker 1>you know, innovation can can take place, but that we ensure,

0:22:16.840 --> 0:22:21.640
<v Speaker 1>you know, financial stability and consumer protection and transparency and integrity.

0:22:21.680 --> 0:22:23.879
<v Speaker 1>And we're not doing that today. We're not doing it

0:22:23.920 --> 0:22:26.439
<v Speaker 1>with stable points, we're not doing it with Crypto more broadly,

0:22:26.480 --> 0:22:28.800
<v Speaker 1>and we can. You know, you asked about better. Happy

0:22:28.840 --> 0:22:32.320
<v Speaker 1>to turn to that. So you mentioned that what really

0:22:32.359 --> 0:22:35.240
<v Speaker 1>got crypto and stable coins in particular on the map

0:22:35.280 --> 0:22:38.600
<v Speaker 1>of regulators, obviously, was the failed libra attempt, and you

0:22:38.680 --> 0:22:42.120
<v Speaker 1>also through in their earlier in the conversation. It's like, well,

0:22:42.119 --> 0:22:44.480
<v Speaker 1>what if like Amazon wanted to do a stable coin?

0:22:44.960 --> 0:22:47.679
<v Speaker 1>And I don't know much about this, but there is

0:22:47.760 --> 0:22:50.439
<v Speaker 1>something like that prevents or makes it hard for like

0:22:50.480 --> 0:22:53.560
<v Speaker 1>a retailer or a non bank company to become a bank.

0:22:53.600 --> 0:22:55.560
<v Speaker 1>And Walmart, ever once in a while, I think, makes

0:22:55.600 --> 0:22:57.960
<v Speaker 1>noises about wanting to become a bank and like set

0:22:58.040 --> 0:23:00.880
<v Speaker 1>up something in Utah and never really seems to go anywhere.

0:23:00.880 --> 0:23:05.679
<v Speaker 1>From what I understand. Would your proposal essentially foreclose the

0:23:05.680 --> 0:23:10.200
<v Speaker 1>possibility of an Amazon stable coin at something? Yes, it would. Today.

0:23:10.320 --> 0:23:13.560
<v Speaker 1>That's an excellent question. We do have a separation between

0:23:13.960 --> 0:23:17.520
<v Speaker 1>banking and commerce. That's primarily through the bank holding company

0:23:17.520 --> 0:23:23.520
<v Speaker 1>APP and our proposal would uh have that apply. Now

0:23:23.880 --> 0:23:27.240
<v Speaker 1>you could revisit that as well and you know some

0:23:27.320 --> 0:23:29.960
<v Speaker 1>of the proposals in Congress have suggested. Well, maybe the

0:23:29.960 --> 0:23:32.560
<v Speaker 1>bank holding company Actiondn't apply, but we should still have

0:23:32.680 --> 0:23:37.240
<v Speaker 1>some limitation on commercial affiliations. I think that is important.

0:23:37.720 --> 0:23:41.120
<v Speaker 1>It's a difficult question as to exactly where you draw

0:23:41.200 --> 0:23:44.600
<v Speaker 1>the line, but I do think that we need to

0:23:44.640 --> 0:23:49.800
<v Speaker 1>be concerned about the concentration of power that could result from,

0:23:49.840 --> 0:23:53.040
<v Speaker 1>you know, a major commercial firm like an Amazon, which

0:23:53.080 --> 0:23:57.520
<v Speaker 1>has lots and lots of information from its customers Um

0:23:58.040 --> 0:24:02.800
<v Speaker 1>also then engaging in, you know, financial services and payments

0:24:02.840 --> 0:24:05.960
<v Speaker 1>types type of services. Well, let me ask you the

0:24:06.040 --> 0:24:09.560
<v Speaker 1>kind of a follow up question which is in your mind.

0:24:10.080 --> 0:24:13.919
<v Speaker 1>How do you actually distinguish the difference between, say, a

0:24:13.960 --> 0:24:18.640
<v Speaker 1>stable coin versus, say, a Venmo or a paypal, which

0:24:18.640 --> 0:24:20.960
<v Speaker 1>are not you know, you could sort of abstract them away.

0:24:20.960 --> 0:24:23.400
<v Speaker 1>They're pretty similar. You have a dollar and a paypal account.

0:24:23.600 --> 0:24:25.480
<v Speaker 1>It's supposed to be backed by a dollar, it's and

0:24:25.600 --> 0:24:28.600
<v Speaker 1>it's a liability of paypal, etcetera like. What do you

0:24:28.640 --> 0:24:31.439
<v Speaker 1>see as like the bright line difference for them? And

0:24:31.480 --> 0:24:33.359
<v Speaker 1>it seems important if we're going to be deciding who

0:24:33.440 --> 0:24:37.800
<v Speaker 1>gets to even issue these. Absolutely, because from a regulatory standpoint,

0:24:38.440 --> 0:24:43.679
<v Speaker 1>you're basically right that the same framework I talked about

0:24:43.720 --> 0:24:47.800
<v Speaker 1>that applies to stable coins is essentially what applies to

0:24:47.880 --> 0:24:53.080
<v Speaker 1>those other types of payment providers, um. From a business

0:24:53.119 --> 0:24:58.160
<v Speaker 1>model standpoint, they're different, of course, because paypal Venmo are

0:24:58.280 --> 0:25:01.920
<v Speaker 1>then connected to the banking system. They are running through

0:25:02.000 --> 0:25:06.879
<v Speaker 1>the banking system, whereas a stable coin is not, Um,

0:25:06.920 --> 0:25:10.960
<v Speaker 1>you know, in terms of what we've seen today. So, uh,

0:25:11.000 --> 0:25:13.399
<v Speaker 1>you're right that we do need to think about those

0:25:13.520 --> 0:25:33.080
<v Speaker 1>issues together when we think about how to regulates. I

0:25:33.119 --> 0:25:35.760
<v Speaker 1>have a devil's advocate question, which is you've mentioned a

0:25:35.840 --> 0:25:38.800
<v Speaker 1>number of times Um that under your proposal there wouldn't

0:25:38.800 --> 0:25:43.760
<v Speaker 1>be deposit insurance first. Stable winds. Right. Why not? Because

0:25:43.800 --> 0:25:46.800
<v Speaker 1>I mean the trade off between banks and getting deposit

0:25:47.080 --> 0:25:49.520
<v Speaker 1>insurance from the FT I C is. Well, you know,

0:25:49.760 --> 0:25:53.520
<v Speaker 1>we agreed to restrictions on what we can and can't do.

0:25:53.680 --> 0:25:56.000
<v Speaker 1>We agree to hold a certain amount of capital, to

0:25:56.080 --> 0:25:58.840
<v Speaker 1>be regulated, to be under scrutiny, and in return we

0:25:58.880 --> 0:26:01.560
<v Speaker 1>get this government back stop. So, if you're going to

0:26:01.720 --> 0:26:04.919
<v Speaker 1>make requests of stable coin providers and say that they

0:26:04.920 --> 0:26:08.320
<v Speaker 1>are going to be portfolio constraints or more disclosures, then

0:26:08.359 --> 0:26:12.280
<v Speaker 1>why not give like a carrot to reward reward them

0:26:12.280 --> 0:26:16.480
<v Speaker 1>for doing that? Yeah, good questions. So keep in mind

0:26:16.520 --> 0:26:23.000
<v Speaker 1>deposit insurance enables banks to basically create money, create credit, right,

0:26:23.119 --> 0:26:26.520
<v Speaker 1>because they can take in my deposit and then lend

0:26:26.560 --> 0:26:30.560
<v Speaker 1>it out and that's creating money. And that happens over

0:26:30.600 --> 0:26:34.119
<v Speaker 1>and over and over again, subject to minimal reserve requirements

0:26:34.200 --> 0:26:37.520
<v Speaker 1>or whatever. But as the depositor, I don't worry because

0:26:37.880 --> 0:26:40.960
<v Speaker 1>you know, I know, if the bank fails, my money

0:26:41.040 --> 0:26:42.680
<v Speaker 1>is going to be insured. So it's not going to

0:26:42.760 --> 0:26:46.720
<v Speaker 1>be like, you know, Jimmy Stewart, and it's a wonderful life.

0:26:47.000 --> 0:26:48.640
<v Speaker 1>You know, where's my money? Where's my money? Oh, it's

0:26:48.640 --> 0:26:55.639
<v Speaker 1>invested in selling those mortgage so that was a happy

0:26:55.760 --> 0:27:02.159
<v Speaker 1>ending in that. Sorry, when I take my classes and

0:27:02.280 --> 0:27:04.600
<v Speaker 1>I use a slide show, I actually have a little

0:27:04.640 --> 0:27:07.080
<v Speaker 1>slide of Jimmy Stewart in the bank facing all those

0:27:07.119 --> 0:27:09.800
<v Speaker 1>people with a little balloon coming out, you know, cartoon

0:27:09.880 --> 0:27:13.359
<v Speaker 1>things saying with him thinking they'd go away if I had,

0:27:13.440 --> 0:27:18.000
<v Speaker 1>if I told them we had blockchain. But Um, the

0:27:18.119 --> 0:27:20.880
<v Speaker 1>point is that first of all we don't want we're

0:27:20.880 --> 0:27:24.120
<v Speaker 1>saying stable coin issuers should not be creating credit. Okay,

0:27:24.200 --> 0:27:28.040
<v Speaker 1>so again we're separating the payment function from the other

0:27:28.119 --> 0:27:32.280
<v Speaker 1>things banks do. Stable coin issuers would not be creating credit.

0:27:32.320 --> 0:27:35.879
<v Speaker 1>They're not intermediating in the sense of bringing borrowers and

0:27:35.960 --> 0:27:40.879
<v Speaker 1>sabers together. They're a payment vehicle. So That, plus the

0:27:40.920 --> 0:27:45.120
<v Speaker 1>fact that we can um ensure that you know your

0:27:45.960 --> 0:27:50.840
<v Speaker 1>your money is safe, if you will, by the investment restrictions,

0:27:51.240 --> 0:27:54.240
<v Speaker 1>means we don't need deposit insurance. And the final reason is,

0:27:54.280 --> 0:27:56.800
<v Speaker 1>of course, that I don't want to subject the Deposit

0:27:56.840 --> 0:28:01.560
<v Speaker 1>Insurance Fund to the risk of these things. Um because

0:28:01.720 --> 0:28:03.879
<v Speaker 1>it is a new area. We don't know exactly how

0:28:03.960 --> 0:28:06.840
<v Speaker 1>we'll develop and I recognize that some of the concern

0:28:06.920 --> 0:28:09.239
<v Speaker 1>of the bank regulators and you know, and they've kind

0:28:09.240 --> 0:28:11.119
<v Speaker 1>of acted in a way of like Gee, you know,

0:28:11.200 --> 0:28:12.840
<v Speaker 1>we're not so sure about all this stuff. We don't

0:28:12.880 --> 0:28:16.640
<v Speaker 1>really want to legitimize it or authorize it. Um. So

0:28:16.680 --> 0:28:19.560
<v Speaker 1>that those are the reasons. Why? What kind of investment

0:28:19.720 --> 0:28:23.119
<v Speaker 1>or portfolio restrictions would you be envisioning? Because I know

0:28:23.160 --> 0:28:25.600
<v Speaker 1>we were kind of joking earlier about to some extent

0:28:25.680 --> 0:28:29.080
<v Speaker 1>this is the easy part, but still there are big

0:28:29.160 --> 0:28:33.240
<v Speaker 1>questions over what a stable coin like tether is actually

0:28:33.240 --> 0:28:37.439
<v Speaker 1>holding right, there are. So it would be some version

0:28:37.640 --> 0:28:42.080
<v Speaker 1>of cash and high quality liquid assets. Okay, whether it's

0:28:42.120 --> 0:28:45.280
<v Speaker 1>exactly like to a seven for money market funds or

0:28:45.280 --> 0:28:47.640
<v Speaker 1>whether it's more restrictive, you know, you can debate that.

0:28:47.800 --> 0:28:53.040
<v Speaker 1>But basically cash and treasuries, you know, is what is

0:28:53.080 --> 0:28:55.640
<v Speaker 1>what I would say. It wouldn't include commercial paper, it

0:28:55.640 --> 0:28:58.840
<v Speaker 1>wouldn't include other things. And you're right. Tether, you know,

0:28:59.280 --> 0:29:02.960
<v Speaker 1>has had to other investments. It had investments in cryptocurrencies.

0:29:03.080 --> 0:29:07.800
<v Speaker 1>It's only recently that that circle limited its investments to

0:29:08.040 --> 0:29:11.600
<v Speaker 1>basically cash and short term treasuries. And, by the way,

0:29:11.680 --> 0:29:13.760
<v Speaker 1>for a stable coin issue, to say, Oh, we've put

0:29:13.760 --> 0:29:16.800
<v Speaker 1>our money in FDI c ensured bank. So, you know,

0:29:17.200 --> 0:29:20.440
<v Speaker 1>that's why we don't need to be regulated. I mean, yeah,

0:29:20.600 --> 0:29:23.440
<v Speaker 1>that's safer than, you know, putting it in a mattress,

0:29:23.480 --> 0:29:26.600
<v Speaker 1>but it doesn't help people again, in the bankruptcy situation.

0:29:26.880 --> 0:29:29.160
<v Speaker 1>The F that that money is in an FDI and

0:29:29.520 --> 0:29:31.920
<v Speaker 1>C insured bank isn't going to help me as a

0:29:31.920 --> 0:29:35.200
<v Speaker 1>holder get it isn't gonna put me better off relative

0:29:35.280 --> 0:29:39.640
<v Speaker 1>to unsecure creditors of that stable coin issue. Yeah, I

0:29:39.640 --> 0:29:41.240
<v Speaker 1>think that's one of the things we're seeing like the

0:29:41.320 --> 0:29:44.280
<v Speaker 1>voyager bankruptcy, not a stable coin per saver. It's like,

0:29:44.280 --> 0:29:45.880
<v Speaker 1>Oh yeah, the fact that they held their money in

0:29:45.960 --> 0:29:48.040
<v Speaker 1>an FD. I see. In Short, bank is not really

0:29:48.600 --> 0:29:52.400
<v Speaker 1>helping many people. You know, you joked about could a

0:29:52.440 --> 0:29:56.600
<v Speaker 1>blockchain have saved George Bailey? But you you, but you

0:29:56.680 --> 0:29:58.320
<v Speaker 1>briefly brought up but I actually do want to talk

0:29:58.360 --> 0:30:01.440
<v Speaker 1>about this aspect, which is the operational risk of public

0:30:01.520 --> 0:30:04.480
<v Speaker 1>block change, which is another way that clearly stable points

0:30:04.520 --> 0:30:07.920
<v Speaker 1>differ from, say, Venmo or Paypal, which are, you know,

0:30:08.120 --> 0:30:11.520
<v Speaker 1>we know those rails. Um. What in your how? How

0:30:11.560 --> 0:30:14.120
<v Speaker 1>should you know? They're always launching new change. There's ethereum

0:30:14.160 --> 0:30:16.480
<v Speaker 1>in Salana, but there's like, I think there's like thousands,

0:30:16.520 --> 0:30:19.240
<v Speaker 1>and the big stable point issuers are all on multiple

0:30:19.440 --> 0:30:24.080
<v Speaker 1>chains at this point. From a regulatory standpoint, how should

0:30:24.520 --> 0:30:28.560
<v Speaker 1>regulators be thinking about what chains, uh, they're issued on

0:30:28.600 --> 0:30:31.760
<v Speaker 1>and the risks that posted? Yeah, yeah, great question, and

0:30:31.840 --> 0:30:33.680
<v Speaker 1>let me, by the way, before I answer that, just note,

0:30:33.720 --> 0:30:37.600
<v Speaker 1>since you've mentioned paypalates. YEA, do some advisory work to

0:30:37.600 --> 0:30:42.120
<v Speaker 1>pay OK. Thank you. We appreciate that. Um. So I

0:30:42.160 --> 0:30:44.560
<v Speaker 1>think that's a huge issue and you know, and I've

0:30:44.600 --> 0:30:46.440
<v Speaker 1>talked with senator to me about this because I said,

0:30:46.440 --> 0:30:48.000
<v Speaker 1>you know, your bill is very good, it has a

0:30:48.000 --> 0:30:50.320
<v Speaker 1>lot of things, but you haven't said anything about the

0:30:50.360 --> 0:30:52.560
<v Speaker 1>operational risk of these block chains. And he said, yeah,

0:30:52.560 --> 0:30:54.719
<v Speaker 1>I know, I'm not quite sure you know what to do.

0:30:55.920 --> 0:30:58.600
<v Speaker 1>and Um, I think regulators aren't quite sure what to

0:30:58.600 --> 0:31:01.480
<v Speaker 1>do about that. We need so we do need standards.

0:31:01.520 --> 0:31:04.840
<v Speaker 1>We need standards that would impose some obligation on the

0:31:04.880 --> 0:31:10.280
<v Speaker 1>stable coin issuer as to what blockchains it supports. Right,

0:31:10.320 --> 0:31:14.400
<v Speaker 1>because if you read circle's disclosure, you know it will say, well,

0:31:14.440 --> 0:31:20.640
<v Speaker 1>we support the trading of USDC on eight blockchain. So

0:31:20.720 --> 0:31:23.280
<v Speaker 1>there would have to be some sort of due diligent

0:31:23.400 --> 0:31:26.240
<v Speaker 1>standards and so forth. And then I think what you

0:31:26.280 --> 0:31:30.080
<v Speaker 1>would want is, you know, some requirements that a stable

0:31:30.080 --> 0:31:34.440
<v Speaker 1>coin issuer might have to freeze its tokens if certain

0:31:34.480 --> 0:31:38.160
<v Speaker 1>things happen. So freeze the tokens on that blockchain and

0:31:38.640 --> 0:31:42.760
<v Speaker 1>of course, could even be used if what happens is,

0:31:42.880 --> 0:31:46.400
<v Speaker 1>even if a blockchain isn't supported by a stable coin issuer,

0:31:47.040 --> 0:31:51.720
<v Speaker 1>someone wraps the stable coin and trades it on that blockchain,

0:31:52.640 --> 0:31:54.880
<v Speaker 1>which case the stable coin issuer could say, Hey, I

0:31:54.920 --> 0:31:57.840
<v Speaker 1>didn't authorize this but it's still happening. So, you know,

0:31:57.880 --> 0:32:00.280
<v Speaker 1>I think you'd have to have some stand or just

0:32:00.360 --> 0:32:03.120
<v Speaker 1>say look, if this happens h then you might have

0:32:03.160 --> 0:32:05.560
<v Speaker 1>to freeze, freeze the stable coins. Now, of course, the

0:32:05.680 --> 0:32:10.280
<v Speaker 1>risk is still, you know, lack of resilience, lack of reliability,

0:32:10.480 --> 0:32:12.640
<v Speaker 1>a hack or so forth, and that's why, you know,

0:32:12.680 --> 0:32:14.959
<v Speaker 1>this area is so new. I do think we have

0:32:15.000 --> 0:32:20.280
<v Speaker 1>to move cautiously, UM, because it's not clear that some

0:32:20.400 --> 0:32:24.120
<v Speaker 1>of these blockchains are resilient enough and people don't, you know,

0:32:24.600 --> 0:32:28.680
<v Speaker 1>always appreciate that. So one thing on stable coins is

0:32:28.720 --> 0:32:31.080
<v Speaker 1>it does seem like there is this sort of regulatory

0:32:31.200 --> 0:32:34.040
<v Speaker 1>dagger hanging over the industry at the moment, and you

0:32:34.080 --> 0:32:36.280
<v Speaker 1>started off by noting that this is a very fast

0:32:36.320 --> 0:32:40.719
<v Speaker 1>growing market segment. How do you think stable coin issuers

0:32:40.960 --> 0:32:44.719
<v Speaker 1>feel about regulation on the whole? Because, again, one thing

0:32:44.760 --> 0:32:47.640
<v Speaker 1>we hear is that the industry wants clarity, they want

0:32:47.720 --> 0:32:49.840
<v Speaker 1>rules to come out so they know how to go forward.

0:32:50.400 --> 0:32:52.680
<v Speaker 1>How much pent up demand do you see in the

0:32:52.760 --> 0:32:55.520
<v Speaker 1>wings from stable coin issuers? You know, if a rule

0:32:55.600 --> 0:33:00.400
<v Speaker 1>came out tomorrow, would we suddenly see fifty or injured

0:33:00.480 --> 0:33:03.920
<v Speaker 1>new stable point issuers out there? Yeah, I'm not sure

0:33:03.920 --> 0:33:07.240
<v Speaker 1>that we would. Um, Um. You know, I think people

0:33:07.280 --> 0:33:09.560
<v Speaker 1>are still trying to sort of figure out you know,

0:33:09.600 --> 0:33:11.720
<v Speaker 1>other financial institutions are still trying to figure out the

0:33:11.720 --> 0:33:13.240
<v Speaker 1>space and of course it would depend on what the

0:33:13.320 --> 0:33:17.280
<v Speaker 1>rule is, but certainly some players are eyeing this very

0:33:17.320 --> 0:33:20.120
<v Speaker 1>closely and thinking about it. So you know, it would

0:33:20.160 --> 0:33:23.200
<v Speaker 1>really depend on the on the content of the rule

0:33:23.520 --> 0:33:26.200
<v Speaker 1>and you know how burdensome it is and so forth.

0:33:26.720 --> 0:33:29.560
<v Speaker 1>One thing we have to keep in mind though, Um,

0:33:29.600 --> 0:33:31.880
<v Speaker 1>you know, maybe make two points. On the one hand,

0:33:31.880 --> 0:33:34.640
<v Speaker 1>you know, I think bank regulators sometimes kind of lull

0:33:34.720 --> 0:33:37.360
<v Speaker 1>themselves into maybe feeling like they don't have to act

0:33:37.400 --> 0:33:41.160
<v Speaker 1>that quickly because they say, well, it's still not very big, right.

0:33:41.200 --> 0:33:44.920
<v Speaker 1>I mean circle claims it did three point six billion

0:33:45.000 --> 0:33:49.320
<v Speaker 1>in payments since the beginning of well, you know, the

0:33:49.360 --> 0:33:52.200
<v Speaker 1>Fed wire system does like a hundred times that amount

0:33:52.240 --> 0:33:55.880
<v Speaker 1>every day or something. So they're small, but nevertheless they

0:33:55.880 --> 0:33:59.800
<v Speaker 1>are growing. And also there's nothing that prevents really a

0:34:00.120 --> 0:34:03.960
<v Speaker 1>stable coin issuer from incorporating abroad and then still issuing

0:34:03.960 --> 0:34:07.760
<v Speaker 1>a dollar based stable coins. So, you know, jurisdictions are

0:34:07.920 --> 0:34:10.680
<v Speaker 1>moving faster. I mean you can sort of think about this,

0:34:11.520 --> 0:34:14.960
<v Speaker 1>Um uh, in parallel to you know, the growth of

0:34:14.960 --> 0:34:17.920
<v Speaker 1>the Eurodollar market. I was talking with my friend Josh Younger,

0:34:17.960 --> 0:34:20.480
<v Speaker 1>who I know has been on your show numerous times,

0:34:20.560 --> 0:34:24.000
<v Speaker 1>about this idea of how this has kind of got

0:34:24.040 --> 0:34:28.279
<v Speaker 1>similar parallels in some ways. Um. So, you know, I

0:34:28.320 --> 0:34:32.680
<v Speaker 1>think we do need to act. Um. It is, you know,

0:34:32.880 --> 0:34:36.040
<v Speaker 1>it's it's maybe not a financial stability risk, but it's

0:34:36.040 --> 0:34:40.520
<v Speaker 1>growing quickly and we need to move forward. So one

0:34:40.520 --> 0:34:42.560
<v Speaker 1>of the thoughts that I took away from our recent

0:34:42.600 --> 0:34:46.000
<v Speaker 1>conversation with centator to me, and Tracy and I were

0:34:46.080 --> 0:34:49.240
<v Speaker 1>just talking about this, is it feels like stable coin regulation.

0:34:49.280 --> 0:34:52.120
<v Speaker 1>It's kind of low hanging fruit. It doesn't it your

0:34:52.360 --> 0:34:54.759
<v Speaker 1>it doesn't seem that hard to do. Maybe it's a

0:34:54.760 --> 0:34:57.759
<v Speaker 1>lot harder, but whether it's your proposal or something legislative,

0:34:57.800 --> 0:35:00.359
<v Speaker 1>it's like, okay, come up with a banking framework and

0:35:00.800 --> 0:35:03.320
<v Speaker 1>a way to make sure that they have the money there.

0:35:03.760 --> 0:35:06.120
<v Speaker 1>It seems like as soon as you go past that

0:35:06.160 --> 0:35:08.880
<v Speaker 1>with crypto regulation it strikes me in my mind as

0:35:08.960 --> 0:35:12.120
<v Speaker 1>orders of magnitude more complex, because how do you prevent

0:35:12.200 --> 0:35:14.399
<v Speaker 1>someone you know, or how do you think even begin

0:35:14.520 --> 0:35:18.960
<v Speaker 1>to think about regulating someone launches a joke? What's the

0:35:19.000 --> 0:35:23.279
<v Speaker 1>responsibility of that India or Estonia somewhere outside, and it

0:35:23.320 --> 0:35:26.640
<v Speaker 1>gets traded on a defi exchange and it gets marketed

0:35:26.680 --> 0:35:31.439
<v Speaker 1>towards us, uh, you know, American investors or consumers like

0:35:31.719 --> 0:35:34.080
<v Speaker 1>just conceptually, and we just have a couple of minutes left,

0:35:34.120 --> 0:35:36.719
<v Speaker 1>but how should we begin thinking about like that, which

0:35:36.760 --> 0:35:40.480
<v Speaker 1>just seems just so much harder it is. It is harder.

0:35:40.760 --> 0:35:42.680
<v Speaker 1>And you know, for one thing, we do have a

0:35:42.719 --> 0:35:47.400
<v Speaker 1>gap in the law. Right there's no federal regulator of

0:35:48.360 --> 0:35:54.200
<v Speaker 1>the trading and distribution of crypto tokens, which aren't securities

0:35:54.400 --> 0:35:58.719
<v Speaker 1>right now. The CFTC doesn't have that power. I you know,

0:35:58.719 --> 0:36:01.200
<v Speaker 1>when I was chairman we did quite bitcoined a commodity,

0:36:01.239 --> 0:36:04.160
<v Speaker 1>but that simply gave us essentially jurisdiction over swaps and

0:36:04.239 --> 0:36:07.279
<v Speaker 1>futures based on that's problem number one. Problem number two,

0:36:07.320 --> 0:36:10.120
<v Speaker 1>of course, is this. Is it a security? Is it

0:36:10.160 --> 0:36:12.840
<v Speaker 1>a commodity? And we're kind of stuck in the mud

0:36:12.880 --> 0:36:16.000
<v Speaker 1>on that because, you know, I'm very sympathetic to chairman

0:36:16.080 --> 0:36:20.080
<v Speaker 1>gainstler's view, Um, that a lot of these things probably

0:36:20.120 --> 0:36:22.440
<v Speaker 1>are securities, but I'm also sympathetic to the view that,

0:36:22.520 --> 0:36:25.919
<v Speaker 1>you know, the rules maybe aren't perfect. I mean there

0:36:25.920 --> 0:36:29.279
<v Speaker 1>are some issues where you'd like to customize them. But

0:36:30.040 --> 0:36:33.600
<v Speaker 1>my proposal that I'm working up with how Jackson at

0:36:33.600 --> 0:36:36.160
<v Speaker 1>Harvard Law School is we say, look, we're stuck in

0:36:36.200 --> 0:36:38.280
<v Speaker 1>the mud on that issue. Let's take a different approach.

0:36:38.440 --> 0:36:43.840
<v Speaker 1>Let's have the SEC and the CFTC create a joint

0:36:44.239 --> 0:36:49.160
<v Speaker 1>self regulatory organization trying to set the standards for the

0:36:49.200 --> 0:36:53.040
<v Speaker 1>trading of all crypto assets. We don't care whether their

0:36:53.080 --> 0:36:57.520
<v Speaker 1>securities can come out. We're gonna basically prod or browbeat

0:36:57.640 --> 0:37:00.960
<v Speaker 1>or jaw bone, whatever word you want to use, industry

0:37:01.000 --> 0:37:04.799
<v Speaker 1>participants to join this S R O. WE'RE gonna type.

0:37:04.800 --> 0:37:07.960
<v Speaker 1>We're gonna have the agencies tightly oversee it, tightly watch it.

0:37:07.960 --> 0:37:09.719
<v Speaker 1>It's not just going to go off on its own.

0:37:10.280 --> 0:37:13.360
<v Speaker 1>The agencies, the regulatory agencies, are going to appoint the members,

0:37:13.400 --> 0:37:15.360
<v Speaker 1>they're going to prove the rules. You know, and S

0:37:15.520 --> 0:37:18.080
<v Speaker 1>R O s have been very, very important in our

0:37:18.600 --> 0:37:23.280
<v Speaker 1>regulation of the Securities and derivatives markets since that regulation began.

0:37:23.600 --> 0:37:27.880
<v Speaker 1>And William O Douglas, former Supreme Court justice, who was

0:37:27.960 --> 0:37:30.319
<v Speaker 1>the chairman of the SEC, I guess he was like

0:37:30.400 --> 0:37:34.040
<v Speaker 1>the second or third chairman, basically was the guy who

0:37:34.120 --> 0:37:39.680
<v Speaker 1>who initiated the Self Regulatory Organization Movement and he basically said, look,

0:37:39.680 --> 0:37:43.200
<v Speaker 1>it only works if government has what he called a

0:37:43.280 --> 0:37:49.200
<v Speaker 1>Well Oiled Gun, you know, and standing by Um. In

0:37:49.239 --> 0:37:52.239
<v Speaker 1>other words, agencies really have to oversee this. But we

0:37:52.360 --> 0:37:55.000
<v Speaker 1>think it could set some standards because, you know, when

0:37:55.000 --> 0:37:58.879
<v Speaker 1>you look at the trading and distribution of Crypto, oh,

0:37:58.960 --> 0:38:02.000
<v Speaker 1>it's it just it's awful. I mean the lack of standards.

0:38:02.280 --> 0:38:05.160
<v Speaker 1>You know, you have exchanges that Um, have their own

0:38:05.200 --> 0:38:11.640
<v Speaker 1>proprietary trading operations that Um don't prohibit Um uh wash trading,

0:38:11.760 --> 0:38:14.600
<v Speaker 1>you know, where someone can basically inflate the price or

0:38:14.640 --> 0:38:17.720
<v Speaker 1>the volume of the security. You have other conflicts of interest.

0:38:17.800 --> 0:38:21.320
<v Speaker 1>You have exchanges that have interests in the CRYPTO tokens

0:38:21.360 --> 0:38:25.279
<v Speaker 1>their listing. You have, you know, no sort of order

0:38:25.360 --> 0:38:30.000
<v Speaker 1>execution rules, you have no requirements on pre impost transparency,

0:38:30.560 --> 0:38:35.000
<v Speaker 1>and crypto has created, you know, despite its claim, despite

0:38:35.040 --> 0:38:36.719
<v Speaker 1>the claim of the original White Paper, they said we're

0:38:36.719 --> 0:38:38.959
<v Speaker 1>going to eliminate intermediaries, we're not gonna have to rely

0:38:39.040 --> 0:38:41.839
<v Speaker 1>on these large intermediaries anymore. It created a whole new

0:38:41.880 --> 0:38:45.720
<v Speaker 1>class of Intermedias, right these changes and other and other actors,

0:38:45.800 --> 0:38:48.400
<v Speaker 1>and so we need standards. There and what we're proposing

0:38:48.480 --> 0:38:53.160
<v Speaker 1>is look required basically push them to become members of

0:38:53.200 --> 0:38:56.600
<v Speaker 1>this and then they'll also want these rules to apply

0:38:56.680 --> 0:38:59.640
<v Speaker 1>to the defied platforms, and the needs to figure out

0:38:59.680 --> 0:39:02.279
<v Speaker 1>a way to do that because they don't want to be,

0:39:02.400 --> 0:39:05.759
<v Speaker 1>you know, at a competitive disadvantage. So you know, it's

0:39:05.800 --> 0:39:08.239
<v Speaker 1>not a perfect solution, but compared to where we are,

0:39:08.640 --> 0:39:12.799
<v Speaker 1>we could go much, much further, we think, faster if

0:39:12.840 --> 0:39:15.000
<v Speaker 1>we were to do this. That's really interesting. I was

0:39:15.000 --> 0:39:18.719
<v Speaker 1>sort of wondering when someone would make that that suggestion.

0:39:18.840 --> 0:39:21.080
<v Speaker 1>Rather than just have this bun fight between the CFTC

0:39:21.239 --> 0:39:24.440
<v Speaker 1>and sec going back from the stain government. Right, right,

0:39:25.160 --> 0:39:28.200
<v Speaker 1>let's just band together and create a new agency. Um

0:39:28.239 --> 0:39:30.480
<v Speaker 1>Tim I'm so sorry. We could talk to you for

0:39:30.680 --> 0:39:33.000
<v Speaker 1>another hour, but we are going to have to leave

0:39:33.000 --> 0:39:37.080
<v Speaker 1>it there due to Um time constraints. But fascinating discussion.

0:39:37.120 --> 0:39:38.960
<v Speaker 1>Thank you so much for coming on all thoughts than

0:39:39.000 --> 0:39:52.600
<v Speaker 1>thank you for having me. It's been a pleasure. I

0:39:52.640 --> 0:39:55.480
<v Speaker 1>thought that was really, really interesting and he kind of

0:39:55.520 --> 0:39:58.880
<v Speaker 1>answered a long running question that I've had about stable

0:39:58.920 --> 0:40:01.759
<v Speaker 1>coins in general, which is this came up with with

0:40:01.840 --> 0:40:05.600
<v Speaker 1>the circle CEO, which is, it feels, kind of redundant

0:40:05.760 --> 0:40:08.080
<v Speaker 1>if you have this new technology but in order to

0:40:08.080 --> 0:40:10.160
<v Speaker 1>make it work you have to team up with a

0:40:10.239 --> 0:40:13.080
<v Speaker 1>bank and get, you know, a bank license and all

0:40:13.120 --> 0:40:16.000
<v Speaker 1>of that. But the way Tim described the sort of

0:40:16.200 --> 0:40:21.680
<v Speaker 1>unbundling of credit creation versus payment services, that makes some

0:40:21.760 --> 0:40:25.279
<v Speaker 1>sense to me. Can I just say, like, I'm just

0:40:25.280 --> 0:40:29.200
<v Speaker 1>gonna full disclosure here. This is people are are you

0:40:29.200 --> 0:40:31.240
<v Speaker 1>going to leave all lots to join the new CRYPTO

0:40:31.400 --> 0:40:37.120
<v Speaker 1>Inter Agency Organization? Full disclosure here. It's not always the

0:40:37.200 --> 0:40:41.040
<v Speaker 1>case that I get really excited by Finnreg conversations like

0:40:41.239 --> 0:40:44.560
<v Speaker 1>macro and commodities and markets and stuff like. Yeah, that

0:40:44.600 --> 0:40:48.799
<v Speaker 1>gets me going. Tim Got me going Finn Regg and like,

0:40:48.880 --> 0:40:52.000
<v Speaker 1>even if we weren't talking about stable coins, he's I

0:40:52.120 --> 0:40:54.680
<v Speaker 1>really just enjoyed hearing him like talk about the essentially

0:40:54.719 --> 0:40:58.719
<v Speaker 1>like theory of Finnregg or financial regulations, in a very

0:40:58.719 --> 0:41:02.560
<v Speaker 1>engaging way. Yes, absolutely, also a little bit about facebook

0:41:02.600 --> 0:41:06.200
<v Speaker 1>and Libra Galvin and political interest and very interesting that

0:41:06.280 --> 0:41:08.960
<v Speaker 1>from the perspective of the Chinese that was seen as

0:41:09.000 --> 0:41:11.279
<v Speaker 1>a way to further reach the dollar, which I think

0:41:11.320 --> 0:41:14.080
<v Speaker 1>it's really interesting think about. If you're in any other country,

0:41:14.560 --> 0:41:18.640
<v Speaker 1>how do you hold dollar assets? Is Not a trivial question. Right.

0:41:18.640 --> 0:41:22.000
<v Speaker 1>You hold a dollar denominated assets safely and there is

0:41:22.040 --> 0:41:24.640
<v Speaker 1>this clear potential. People are talking about it of like

0:41:24.880 --> 0:41:29.120
<v Speaker 1>stable coins actually really deepening and cementing the dollars global reach.

0:41:29.360 --> 0:41:31.120
<v Speaker 1>So it's really interesting that that was like sort of

0:41:31.120 --> 0:41:34.200
<v Speaker 1>the aspect of libre that they totally but this is

0:41:34.200 --> 0:41:36.239
<v Speaker 1>also why people were making jokes about like the east

0:41:36.280 --> 0:41:39.560
<v Speaker 1>India Company and stuff when when facebook announced list but

0:41:39.640 --> 0:41:42.919
<v Speaker 1>absolutely fascinating conversation. I think we're going to have more

0:41:43.080 --> 0:41:46.000
<v Speaker 1>on stable coin and CRYPTIO regulation more broadly to come,

0:41:46.040 --> 0:41:47.920
<v Speaker 1>but for now shall we leave it there? Let's leave

0:41:47.920 --> 0:41:50.680
<v Speaker 1>it there. Okay, this has been another episode of the

0:41:50.719 --> 0:41:53.200
<v Speaker 1>all thoughts podcast. I'm Tracy alloway. You can follow me

0:41:53.520 --> 0:41:56.560
<v Speaker 1>on twitter at Tracy Alloway, and I'm Joe Wisn't all.

0:41:56.640 --> 0:41:59.640
<v Speaker 1>You can follow me on twitter at the stalwork. Follow

0:41:59.680 --> 0:42:02.880
<v Speaker 1>our guest Timothy Massad. He's on twitter at Tim Massad.

0:42:03.239 --> 0:42:07.359
<v Speaker 1>Follow our producer, Carmen Rodriguez, at Carmen Armand and check

0:42:07.360 --> 0:42:10.120
<v Speaker 1>out all of our podcasts at Bloomberg under the handle

0:42:10.320 --> 0:42:12.000
<v Speaker 1>at podcasts. Thanks for listening.