WEBVTT - An Interview With Paul Desmond: Masters in Business (Audio)

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<v Speaker 1>This is Masters in Business with Barry Ridholts on Bloomberg Radio.

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<v Speaker 1>This week on the podcast, I have a special guest.

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<v Speaker 1>His name is Paul Desmond. He is the president of

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<v Speaker 1>Lowry's Research and an extremely highly regarded market technician known

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<v Speaker 1>as a technicians technician. And quick funny story about Paul.

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<v Speaker 1>I know him, I don't know fifteen years fourteen years.

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<v Speaker 1>And Paul and I had a conversation a dozen years

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<v Speaker 1>ago that essentially was the forerunner of these podcasts. He

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<v Speaker 1>had just won the Charles Dow Market Technicians Award for

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<v Speaker 1>the most significant uh technical paper looking at bear markets

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<v Speaker 1>and and how bottoms are formed. And I started a

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<v Speaker 1>correspondence with him on email and he got back to

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<v Speaker 1>me and said, oh, that paper was really interesting, but

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<v Speaker 1>now I'm working on this new paper on how market

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<v Speaker 1>tops are formed, and it's really fascinating. We had to

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<v Speaker 1>go back and re create all this data from the

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<v Speaker 1>twenties that didn't exist, and he was just really enthusiastic,

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<v Speaker 1>and so we ended up um through a series of

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<v Speaker 1>phone calls that were recorded and transcribed, created these these

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<v Speaker 1>long conversations which became A Q and A with Paul

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<v Speaker 1>Desmond Part one and two. Originally it ran on the

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<v Speaker 1>On the Street dot com and and now it's a

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<v Speaker 1>little difficult to find there. I know it's buried somewhere

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<v Speaker 1>in there, but I reproduced it on my blog, The

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<v Speaker 1>Big Picture, which is results dot com. I'll put a

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<v Speaker 1>link in uh the page I I do on this

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<v Speaker 1>podcast to those original um Q and A s if

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<v Speaker 1>you want to uh, if you want to see them.

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<v Speaker 1>I actually just reread them the other day and they're

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<v Speaker 1>really really good. But at Conversation was really the first

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<v Speaker 1>time it popped into my head. Hey, I could find

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<v Speaker 1>these really smart guys with really really interesting experiences and

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<v Speaker 1>get them to speak about that, and maybe someone would

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<v Speaker 1>want to pay attention and and and listen to it

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<v Speaker 1>or read it. And um really, Paul Desmond was the

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<v Speaker 1>first Masters in Business we've ever done before we were

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<v Speaker 1>doing radio, by the way, he be. This is a

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<v Speaker 1>long podcast, but he tells some fascinating stories about how

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<v Speaker 1>he met Mr Lowry and and some anecdotes about Joe

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<v Speaker 1>Granville that I find to be hilarious if you know

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<v Speaker 1>who Joe Granville is. But um really an unusual and

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<v Speaker 1>interesting conversation with a lot of of details. If you're

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<v Speaker 1>a technician. If you're a chartist, this is the podcast

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<v Speaker 1>for you. So, without any further ado, here is my

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<v Speaker 1>conversation in with Lowry's Paul Desmond. This is Masters in

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<v Speaker 1>Business with Barry Ridholts on Bloomberg Radio. This week on

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<v Speaker 1>Masters in Business on Bloomberg Radio, my guest is Paul Desmond.

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<v Speaker 1>For those of you who may not know who Paul is. No,

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<v Speaker 1>he is not a member of Dave Brubeck's quartet. He

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<v Speaker 1>is president of Lowry's Research, which is the oldest advisory

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<v Speaker 1>firm in the United States. Paul joined Lowry's as Director

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<v Speaker 1>of Research in nine four, meaning you just had your

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<v Speaker 1>fiftieth anniversary last year. UM. The vast majority of Lowry's

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<v Speaker 1>subscribers or professional investors, including many of the largest hedge

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<v Speaker 1>funds in the world. Paul was the president of the

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<v Speaker 1>Market Technicians Association and the recipients of the Charles H.

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<v Speaker 1>Dow Award given for original and groundbreaking research. And the

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<v Speaker 1>piece that you won that award for was called Identify

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<v Speaker 1>bear market Bottoms and New bull Markets. We'll talk about

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<v Speaker 1>that a little while, um. Speaking of bear market bottoms.

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<v Speaker 1>In two thousand nine, you were honored by the Technical

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<v Speaker 1>and you were honored as Technical Analysts of the Year

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<v Speaker 1>by Technical Analysts magazine. Bull Desmond, Welcome to Bloomberg. Thank

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<v Speaker 1>you very much. I'm delighted to be here. So people

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<v Speaker 1>who um are not in the industry may not have

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<v Speaker 1>heard of you, but I found you a long time

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<v Speaker 1>ago when you had won that Dow Award for that paper,

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<v Speaker 1>and you and I actually had, I want to say,

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<v Speaker 1>it's about a dozen years ago, an extensive conversation about

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<v Speaker 1>how market bottoms are formed. And at the time a

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<v Speaker 1>paper you were working on which was called how Market

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<v Speaker 1>Tops Are Formed, and we I ended up writing that

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<v Speaker 1>up that got published. It's actually still on the block side.

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<v Speaker 1>If anyone wants to read this one from oh four

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<v Speaker 1>or five something like that, it's called uh it just

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<v Speaker 1>searched for Riholts and Desmond and that will come up.

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<v Speaker 1>And that's a really a fascinating conversation. Um, but let's

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<v Speaker 1>jump right into this. What did you do before you

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<v Speaker 1>were working at Lowry's. I was in the army, So

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<v Speaker 1>I went from college to the Army to Lowry just

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<v Speaker 1>like that. Yeah, I've got the shortest resume animals. There

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<v Speaker 1>you go one job years. That's that's a little unusual.

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<v Speaker 1>So that naturally leads to the next question, which is,

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<v Speaker 1>how did you become a technician right out of the army? Well,

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<v Speaker 1>I my my my father was an investor of some

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<v Speaker 1>size and UH and suffered a series of heart attacks

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<v Speaker 1>and and UH couldn't handle the portfolio anymore, and so

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<v Speaker 1>I took over for a short term, short time, and

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<v Speaker 1>and I knew nothing about what I was doing. So

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<v Speaker 1>I spent a great deal of time at the public

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<v Speaker 1>library trying to try to figure out what made sense

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<v Speaker 1>and would you learn? In the library, I saw a

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<v Speaker 1>lot of things that did not work, that I did

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<v Speaker 1>not enjoy or did not feel what it was the

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<v Speaker 1>right way to go. But but I did run into

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<v Speaker 1>I had. I had a major economics in college, and

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<v Speaker 1>so I was very familiar with the laws supply and demand,

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<v Speaker 1>and believed in the law supplying the man very much.

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<v Speaker 1>And I started looking for things that fit along with

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<v Speaker 1>the law supplying the man. Finally got down to the

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<v Speaker 1>point where I was doing some point in figure charting.

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<v Speaker 1>I was looking at value line and then all of

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<v Speaker 1>a sudden I ran across the lowry material. And I

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<v Speaker 1>was in the Miami Library at the time, and saw

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<v Speaker 1>that the Lowry's had a Miami address, and so so

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<v Speaker 1>I read a lot of their material and and felt

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<v Speaker 1>this was exactly what I was looking for because it

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<v Speaker 1>was based on the law of supplying demand. So how

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<v Speaker 1>do you go from research markets to manager Dad's portfolio

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<v Speaker 1>to applying for the job as had of research. I

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<v Speaker 1>really wasn't applying for the job. I was trying to

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<v Speaker 1>learn more about the stock market, and so with the

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<v Speaker 1>Miami address, I thought, well, this is a chance to

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<v Speaker 1>just go over there and maybe get a chance to

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<v Speaker 1>learn more. Serendipitous right there, Yes, I was, I was

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<v Speaker 1>put together. I went over to the address that was

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<v Speaker 1>on the reports, and instead of an office building, what

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<v Speaker 1>I found was I was. I was in the State

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<v Speaker 1>area of Miami and right along the Brickle Avenue estates

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<v Speaker 1>and I got to a gate. UH went through the

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<v Speaker 1>gate and at the at the end of the property

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<v Speaker 1>was three or four story brick colonial homes, incredibly unusual

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<v Speaker 1>in Miami, and Uh, I pulled over. They had a

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<v Speaker 1>separate garage and I guess mads quarters. And I pulled

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<v Speaker 1>in there and there was a there was a man

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<v Speaker 1>in the bushes tending to the flowers, and I said

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<v Speaker 1>I said to him, is there anybody around here from

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<v Speaker 1>the Lowry organization? This is actually on a Saturday. And

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<v Speaker 1>he came up out of the bushes with an old

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<v Speaker 1>head on, you know, dirt all over his fingernails, and said,

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<v Speaker 1>I think we can find somebody around here. And his

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<v Speaker 1>name was L. M. Lowry, the founder of Larry Research.

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<v Speaker 1>And so we we went into actually the major quarters

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<v Speaker 1>have been converted into his private office and so we

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<v Speaker 1>sat went in and sat down and I just said,

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<v Speaker 1>you know, I've seen your material in the library and

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<v Speaker 1>like to learn more about it. And we sat and

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<v Speaker 1>talked for oh, I think three hours. The first time

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<v Speaker 1>you're meeting him, just come on into my lair and

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<v Speaker 1>talk to me. Yeah. I always thought in college that

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<v Speaker 1>there must be some place in the world that you

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<v Speaker 1>could go to get a master's degree or PhD in

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<v Speaker 1>stock market analysis, and I think this is it. And

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<v Speaker 1>he said, well you can learn you know, I think

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<v Speaker 1>I think you can learn a few things here. And um,

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<v Speaker 1>did he offer you a job? Well, yeah, sort of

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<v Speaker 1>sort of a sort of a job at a phenominal

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<v Speaker 1>again as an intern it was almost almost an internship.

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<v Speaker 1>Is this is masters in business on Bloomberg Radio. I'm

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<v Speaker 1>Barry Ridholtz. My guest this week on Masters in Business

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<v Speaker 1>is technical analyst Paul Desmond of Lowry's. You've been called

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<v Speaker 1>the technicians technician, which is a term I I really like.

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<v Speaker 1>Before we start talking about market bottoms, I have to

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<v Speaker 1>ask one question, which is a quote of yours. You said,

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<v Speaker 1>if you're looking at fundamentals, you're already too late. Explain

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<v Speaker 1>what you meant by that, Well, the fundamentals are are delayed.

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<v Speaker 1>People buy and sell stocks not because of what they

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<v Speaker 1>know today, but what they think is going to happen

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<v Speaker 1>in the future. So they look at today's or rings

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<v Speaker 1>reports and they say, I can see the ear rings

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<v Speaker 1>are positive now, but I just don't think they're going

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<v Speaker 1>to be that positive six months from now, and therefore

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<v Speaker 1>the market starts to turn down because of that change

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<v Speaker 1>in psychology, and um the ear rings reports are still positive,

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<v Speaker 1>but the but the market turns out the same thing.

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<v Speaker 1>At market bottoms, the market traditionally turns up because investors

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<v Speaker 1>are saying, yeah, I can see how bad things are

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<v Speaker 1>right now, but I think in the next six months

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<v Speaker 1>things are going to get better. So so let's talk

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<v Speaker 1>a little bit about that. Let's talk about market bottoms.

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<v Speaker 1>This is the piece that you won the Charles Dowe

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<v Speaker 1>Award for um how how bare market bought ms are made.

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<v Speaker 1>Let's talk a little bit about the oh seven o

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<v Speaker 1>nine financial crisis and market bottom. How did that compare

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<v Speaker 1>to prior bear markets? Was that typical or was that

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<v Speaker 1>an a typical bottom? No, it was it was rather

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<v Speaker 1>rather typical bottom. We we we saw. The conditions that

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<v Speaker 1>are necessary for a bottom are twofold number number one.

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<v Speaker 1>You have to see the the selling exhausted. In other words,

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<v Speaker 1>people have to capitulate, dump stock and just give up exactly.

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<v Speaker 1>You have. It has to reach the point where people say,

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<v Speaker 1>just get me out of the stock market. I don't

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<v Speaker 1>ever want to see his stock again in my life.

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<v Speaker 1>And at that point there's no more sellers to drive

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<v Speaker 1>prices down. That's what you mean by exhausting, exhausted exactly. Now.

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<v Speaker 1>The second part of it which has to be there

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<v Speaker 1>is uh that the buyers who are sitting on the

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<v Speaker 1>sidelines have to look at the bargains that are available

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<v Speaker 1>at that point and say, boy, this is an opportunity

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<v Speaker 1>that I haven't seen in a dozen years, and they

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<v Speaker 1>come running back in with great enthusiasm to grab up

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<v Speaker 1>all these bargains. So it's a one two punch. You

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<v Speaker 1>have to exhaust the sellers and then you have to

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<v Speaker 1>bring the bring the buyers back in again. That's interesting

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<v Speaker 1>that simultaneously you have the psychology of some people I'm

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<v Speaker 1>going to describe it as reacting emotionally, Hey, just make

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<v Speaker 1>the pain stop, do whatever you have to do, versus

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<v Speaker 1>the more objective, value oriented people who say, well, it

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<v Speaker 1>may feel terrible, but look how reasonable these things are.

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<v Speaker 1>That's right. And what you find generally is that the

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<v Speaker 1>average investor is panicking right at the bottom. They're saying,

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<v Speaker 1>oh my goodness, I you know, I have to sell

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<v Speaker 1>now because I'm gonna lose. If I don't, I'm gonna

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<v Speaker 1>lose everything I've got. I remember, and we were at

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<v Speaker 1>Dow or so during the O nine bottom, and all

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<v Speaker 1>of a sudden, out of the woodworks, we were getting

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<v Speaker 1>forecast for Dow five thousand, Dow three thousand, Dow one thousand,

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<v Speaker 1>and that sort of background noise I think really scared

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<v Speaker 1>the living daylights out of people. Absolutely did. And and

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<v Speaker 1>that those are the conditions that typically invest occur at

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<v Speaker 1>a market bottom. So let's talk a little bit about

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<v Speaker 1>that bottom in your um white paper that won the

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<v Speaker 1>dowt Ward. You talk about down days and days. Describe

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<v Speaker 1>what that is and tell us what it means. Well,

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<v Speaker 1>we were looking for some way to to to to

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<v Speaker 1>indicate that we reached a market bottom, and a lot

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<v Speaker 1>of writers have talked about capitulation and uh and in

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<v Speaker 1>a in a very vague general sense, but nobody had

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<v Speaker 1>come up with a way to specifically identify the kind

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<v Speaker 1>capitulation that occurs at market bottoms. So we went back

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<v Speaker 1>and looked at the amount of volume that was traded

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<v Speaker 1>on the downside during periods of the market decline. And

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<v Speaker 1>there's the sellers volume, how much how much of the

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<v Speaker 1>volume was due to sellers and how much of it

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<v Speaker 1>was due to buyers? And what we found that when

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<v Speaker 1>you get into the point where investors are panicking, uh

0:14:24.840 --> 0:14:27.440
<v Speaker 1>or more of all of the volume traded on the

0:14:27.480 --> 0:14:30.880
<v Speaker 1>market that day is traded on the downside, meaning it's

0:14:30.920 --> 0:14:33.680
<v Speaker 1>at a price lower than the previous price. Exactly, because

0:14:33.760 --> 0:14:36.200
<v Speaker 1>whenever I've brought this up to people, one of the

0:14:36.200 --> 0:14:38.520
<v Speaker 1>comments I often hear is, well, what do you mean

0:14:38.600 --> 0:14:41.560
<v Speaker 1>more sellers and buyers? Every share that's sold someone's buying

0:14:41.560 --> 0:14:44.080
<v Speaker 1>it shouldn't there be an equal amount. But you're really

0:14:44.120 --> 0:14:48.640
<v Speaker 1>talking about are these shares sold um sold lower or

0:14:48.640 --> 0:14:51.360
<v Speaker 1>are they bought higher? Yeah? Yeah, which you have to

0:14:51.400 --> 0:14:54.120
<v Speaker 1>look at. The stock market is a double auction system

0:14:54.320 --> 0:14:58.040
<v Speaker 1>where the buyers can raise or lower their prices and

0:14:58.080 --> 0:15:02.040
<v Speaker 1>the sellers can lower or raise their prices. And so

0:15:02.160 --> 0:15:06.400
<v Speaker 1>what you're constantly watching for is to say, um is

0:15:06.440 --> 0:15:12.720
<v Speaker 1>the mood of investors towards selling more than towards buying. Uh.

0:15:12.880 --> 0:15:16.440
<v Speaker 1>So there's always a buyer, always a seller. But the

0:15:16.560 --> 0:15:19.200
<v Speaker 1>question is who is the most anxious to do business,

0:15:19.280 --> 0:15:23.680
<v Speaker 1>who's driving the actions. If the seller is anxious, then

0:15:23.720 --> 0:15:27.280
<v Speaker 1>the price will go down. If the buyer is anxious,

0:15:27.320 --> 0:15:29.120
<v Speaker 1>the only way he's going to get that stock away

0:15:29.160 --> 0:15:31.440
<v Speaker 1>from the seller is to raise the price. So it's

0:15:31.480 --> 0:15:34.640
<v Speaker 1>who's impatience and just wants either in or out at

0:15:34.640 --> 0:15:37.360
<v Speaker 1>that moment's right, and and at the at these at

0:15:37.560 --> 0:15:41.680
<v Speaker 1>near these major market bottoms, the impatience is all on

0:15:41.720 --> 0:15:43.880
<v Speaker 1>the downside. Just get me out of this place. I

0:15:43.920 --> 0:15:45.880
<v Speaker 1>don't I don't want to ever see a stock again.

0:15:46.160 --> 0:15:50.720
<v Speaker 1>So we talked about down days when the vast majority

0:15:50.760 --> 0:15:54.400
<v Speaker 1>of the trading volume is to the downside, but surprisingly

0:15:54.640 --> 0:15:58.000
<v Speaker 1>right around bottoms you also end up, as you've written,

0:15:58.440 --> 0:16:02.240
<v Speaker 1>with an update, explain what happens. You don't always and

0:16:02.280 --> 0:16:05.640
<v Speaker 1>that's the that's the important point is you can have

0:16:05.680 --> 0:16:09.320
<v Speaker 1>a series of these ninety percent downside days where investors

0:16:09.360 --> 0:16:12.440
<v Speaker 1>are are panicking, but the buyers are sitting on the

0:16:12.480 --> 0:16:16.520
<v Speaker 1>sidelines saying, you know, prices just don't look that good

0:16:16.520 --> 0:16:19.600
<v Speaker 1>to me. I really can't get too enthusiastic about buying here.

0:16:20.360 --> 0:16:24.920
<v Speaker 1>If that, if that's the way they view the bargain prices,

0:16:25.000 --> 0:16:28.280
<v Speaker 1>that there will be more sellers, there will be more

0:16:29.160 --> 0:16:33.160
<v Speaker 1>downside days, and so you don't you can't just view

0:16:33.240 --> 0:16:37.520
<v Speaker 1>the selling as being the key to the market bottom.

0:16:37.640 --> 0:16:39.920
<v Speaker 1>It's it's a one two punch of you need to

0:16:39.920 --> 0:16:43.080
<v Speaker 1>see the sellers panic and then you need to see

0:16:43.120 --> 0:16:45.440
<v Speaker 1>the buyers come rushing back in. If the buyers won't

0:16:45.480 --> 0:16:48.560
<v Speaker 1>rush back any and then the market decline will continue

0:16:49.080 --> 0:16:52.360
<v Speaker 1>until prices eventually reach the point where the buyers are

0:16:52.400 --> 0:16:55.240
<v Speaker 1>really enthusiastic about coming back into the mark. And that's

0:16:55.240 --> 0:16:59.320
<v Speaker 1>when we get that's what is upside day so and

0:16:59.400 --> 0:17:03.080
<v Speaker 1>others in nineties, in the nineteen seventy nine seventy four

0:17:03.120 --> 0:17:09.679
<v Speaker 1>market decline. We saw sixteen downside days without ever seeing

0:17:09.680 --> 0:17:12.440
<v Speaker 1>and until we finally saw a ninety percent ups a day.

0:17:12.440 --> 0:17:15.760
<v Speaker 1>And what year was that? When seventy three and nineteen

0:17:15.800 --> 0:17:19.520
<v Speaker 1>seventy four was two year two year bear market? Amazing.

0:17:19.680 --> 0:17:23.680
<v Speaker 1>This is Masters in Business on Bloomberg Radio. I'm Barry Ridalts.

0:17:23.960 --> 0:17:27.320
<v Speaker 1>Our guest this week on Masters in Business is Paul Desmond,

0:17:27.640 --> 0:17:31.560
<v Speaker 1>President of Lowry's and a gentleman known as a technicians

0:17:31.600 --> 0:17:36.520
<v Speaker 1>technician UH, an award winning analyst of stock market history.

0:17:36.680 --> 0:17:40.800
<v Speaker 1>Let's talk a little bit about a fairly interesting problem

0:17:40.880 --> 0:17:42.840
<v Speaker 1>which I think a lot of people are unaware of,

0:17:43.320 --> 0:17:48.640
<v Speaker 1>and that's what happens when we market cap weight various industries.

0:17:48.720 --> 0:17:51.760
<v Speaker 1>The SMP five hundred is cap weighted, many of the

0:17:51.760 --> 0:17:56.440
<v Speaker 1>other industries are also. Other indusicries are also cap weighted.

0:17:57.280 --> 0:17:59.840
<v Speaker 1>What you've been critical about this, what's the problem with

0:18:00.119 --> 0:18:03.920
<v Speaker 1>cap waiting market in disease, well, particularly in particularly in

0:18:04.080 --> 0:18:10.360
<v Speaker 1>old bull markets, the camp being late in the cycle,

0:18:10.560 --> 0:18:16.080
<v Speaker 1>not not not nineteenth century bull markets liked or something

0:18:16.119 --> 0:18:19.480
<v Speaker 1>along those lines, and where you're transitioning from from an

0:18:19.520 --> 0:18:24.320
<v Speaker 1>old bull market into a bearer market in that period,

0:18:24.840 --> 0:18:33.080
<v Speaker 1>the big cap price indexes are incredibly deceptive, and we're

0:18:33.080 --> 0:18:36.240
<v Speaker 1>in that kind of stage right now in two thousand

0:18:36.320 --> 0:18:39.400
<v Speaker 1>and fifteen. This is now an old six years old

0:18:39.400 --> 0:18:42.040
<v Speaker 1>bull market exactly. And what what you're seeing is that

0:18:42.840 --> 0:18:47.159
<v Speaker 1>is that the small camp segment of the market was

0:18:47.240 --> 0:18:51.160
<v Speaker 1>the first part to begin to turn down, most sensitive

0:18:51.200 --> 0:18:55.000
<v Speaker 1>to economic conditions, or just the first thing that sellers

0:18:55.040 --> 0:18:57.800
<v Speaker 1>started dump. Well, I think they're the most speculative stocks

0:18:57.840 --> 0:19:01.080
<v Speaker 1>that they tend to be overpriced more than more than

0:19:01.160 --> 0:19:07.600
<v Speaker 1>most stocks. They're they're the the most uh a liquid,

0:19:08.480 --> 0:19:12.680
<v Speaker 1>least amount of coverage, not much about there. They're kind

0:19:12.680 --> 0:19:15.760
<v Speaker 1>of one trick ponies. If if, if there, if their

0:19:15.760 --> 0:19:19.160
<v Speaker 1>companies don't if their company's product does not do well,

0:19:19.240 --> 0:19:22.479
<v Speaker 1>that you know they're pretty much gone. So anyway, what

0:19:22.520 --> 0:19:27.400
<v Speaker 1>we've seen is that the market does not always move

0:19:27.480 --> 0:19:31.640
<v Speaker 1>in tandem and knows it's not a single entity. It's

0:19:31.680 --> 0:19:36.800
<v Speaker 1>a series of of areas of strength and weakness. And

0:19:36.880 --> 0:19:40.679
<v Speaker 1>so the first stage of of a transition from a

0:19:40.720 --> 0:19:44.360
<v Speaker 1>bowl market to a bearer market is weakness in small caps.

0:19:45.040 --> 0:19:48.320
<v Speaker 1>Then at the later point, maybe several months later, you

0:19:48.520 --> 0:19:51.600
<v Speaker 1>see the deteriorations start to occur in the mid cap stocks.

0:19:52.280 --> 0:19:55.200
<v Speaker 1>And then later than that it occurs in the big

0:19:55.240 --> 0:19:58.639
<v Speaker 1>cap stocks. So if you're watching the big cap indexes

0:19:58.720 --> 0:20:03.320
<v Speaker 1>like the SMP five index, you're missing out on all

0:20:03.440 --> 0:20:07.639
<v Speaker 1>the weakness that has already occurred in the um, in

0:20:07.680 --> 0:20:10.400
<v Speaker 1>the small cap, in the mid cap and Nicklas. Example,

0:20:11.040 --> 0:20:14.360
<v Speaker 1>at the top on the top day in two thousand,

0:20:14.520 --> 0:20:19.159
<v Speaker 1>which I think was January twelve, or this is the

0:20:19.320 --> 0:20:22.280
<v Speaker 1>this is the absolute top day of the of the

0:20:22.400 --> 0:20:26.879
<v Speaker 1>SMP five index. If you look to inter inside the market,

0:20:26.920 --> 0:20:29.960
<v Speaker 1>you'd see the fifty five percent of all of the

0:20:30.040 --> 0:20:32.920
<v Speaker 1>stocks listed on the New York Stock is Change were

0:20:33.000 --> 0:20:36.880
<v Speaker 1>already down by twenty or more from there from their high.

0:20:37.040 --> 0:20:39.159
<v Speaker 1>So more than more than half of the index is

0:20:39.200 --> 0:20:42.199
<v Speaker 1>already in a bullmarket. Yeah, but you can't tell that

0:20:42.240 --> 0:20:45.840
<v Speaker 1>because the leaders are still going higher. Absolutely, because the

0:20:45.840 --> 0:20:48.639
<v Speaker 1>big caps are the last thing to turn down, and

0:20:48.680 --> 0:20:51.960
<v Speaker 1>therefore they hide all of the weaknesses occurring in the

0:20:52.040 --> 0:20:54.959
<v Speaker 1>small cap and mid cap stop. So we saw that

0:20:55.040 --> 0:20:58.399
<v Speaker 1>in two thousand with what people called the Horsemen of

0:20:58.520 --> 0:21:02.760
<v Speaker 1>the Technology index. We saw that in the late sixties

0:21:02.840 --> 0:21:05.840
<v Speaker 1>or mid sixties, we had a twenty year bull market

0:21:06.040 --> 0:21:10.280
<v Speaker 1>after the World War two ended, and that narrowed to

0:21:10.359 --> 0:21:13.840
<v Speaker 1>the nifty fifty similar concept. Those were the best known

0:21:13.880 --> 0:21:16.840
<v Speaker 1>biggest gap stocks. Yeah, that wasn't That was in seventy,

0:21:17.280 --> 0:21:21.560
<v Speaker 1>seventy two and seventy three, so really forty years into uh,

0:21:21.720 --> 0:21:24.879
<v Speaker 1>twenty years into a huge post war rally. Yeah, and

0:21:25.359 --> 0:21:29.200
<v Speaker 1>you and you see other You see other situations in

0:21:29.240 --> 0:21:33.399
<v Speaker 1>which a part portion of the market is going in

0:21:33.480 --> 0:21:36.000
<v Speaker 1>one direction and a portion of the market is going

0:21:36.040 --> 0:21:40.240
<v Speaker 1>in another direction. For example, in seventy seven, the Dow

0:21:40.400 --> 0:21:44.080
<v Speaker 1>Jones Industrial Average was down almost all year long. They

0:21:44.200 --> 0:21:49.119
<v Speaker 1>was down from his highs. At the same time, the

0:21:49.200 --> 0:21:52.600
<v Speaker 1>small caps and mid caps were making new bull market highs.

0:21:53.320 --> 0:21:57.520
<v Speaker 1>You saw the same pattern in two thousand. Actually, what

0:21:57.680 --> 0:22:00.760
<v Speaker 1>was happening in two thousand was the technology stocks were

0:22:00.800 --> 0:22:05.880
<v Speaker 1>extremely weak. They were probably down. The big caps were

0:22:05.920 --> 0:22:10.080
<v Speaker 1>down maybe thirty five, and the mid caps and small

0:22:10.160 --> 0:22:15.439
<v Speaker 1>caps we're making new highs. The SMP mid cap and

0:22:15.480 --> 0:22:21.280
<v Speaker 1>the SMP small cap indexes made their highs in UM

0:22:21.359 --> 0:22:26.720
<v Speaker 1>April of two thousand two. Most people say, well, the

0:22:26.760 --> 0:22:30.000
<v Speaker 1>bear markets started in early two thousand and lasted until

0:22:30.119 --> 0:22:35.399
<v Speaker 1>March of two thousand three. UM. But first big for

0:22:35.520 --> 0:22:38.720
<v Speaker 1>mid caps and small caps, they were actually going in

0:22:38.760 --> 0:22:43.280
<v Speaker 1>the opposite direction from the big caps. Again, if an

0:22:43.280 --> 0:22:48.000
<v Speaker 1>investor can't couldn't see that that condition, they missed a

0:22:48.160 --> 0:22:52.600
<v Speaker 1>huge opportunity. This is Masters in Business on Bloomberg Radio.

0:22:52.800 --> 0:22:57.159
<v Speaker 1>I'm Barry Ridholtz. We're speaking with Paul Desmond, technical analysts

0:22:57.240 --> 0:23:02.040
<v Speaker 1>at Lowry's also president, and he has been either working

0:23:02.080 --> 0:23:07.240
<v Speaker 1>there or running the place since nineteen sixt you. Um,

0:23:07.400 --> 0:23:09.880
<v Speaker 1>last time we spoke, you were working on a paper

0:23:10.119 --> 0:23:14.080
<v Speaker 1>about how market tops were formed. What you subsequently put

0:23:14.080 --> 0:23:17.920
<v Speaker 1>out and has become a widely acclaimed piece of research.

0:23:18.800 --> 0:23:22.360
<v Speaker 1>Let's talk about a data point that I pulled from

0:23:22.400 --> 0:23:26.560
<v Speaker 1>your research that I find absolutely fascinating. Of the fourteen

0:23:26.680 --> 0:23:31.760
<v Speaker 1>major market tops from ninety nine to two thousand, the

0:23:31.840 --> 0:23:35.359
<v Speaker 1>average percentage of stocks making new highs for the day

0:23:36.160 --> 0:23:40.360
<v Speaker 1>was only six percent. Explain how that happens and and

0:23:40.400 --> 0:23:46.520
<v Speaker 1>what that means? Well, uh uh what? What? What occurs

0:23:46.640 --> 0:23:51.040
<v Speaker 1>is that in the past, people used to think of

0:23:51.080 --> 0:23:55.240
<v Speaker 1>the market as a single entity. The market goes up

0:23:55.400 --> 0:23:59.760
<v Speaker 1>and it goes down, all in unison, that that stocks

0:24:00.040 --> 0:24:05.000
<v Speaker 1>moved together. That's true at market bottoms, but it's far

0:24:05.160 --> 0:24:08.960
<v Speaker 1>from true at market tops. Market tops are very much

0:24:09.040 --> 0:24:13.080
<v Speaker 1>like the autumn season, which is what we are right

0:24:13.119 --> 0:24:17.800
<v Speaker 1>in the middle of now. And and in the autumn,

0:24:18.280 --> 0:24:21.760
<v Speaker 1>what's happening is the leaves are changing color, and everybody's saying, oh,

0:24:21.920 --> 0:24:24.879
<v Speaker 1>isn't that isn't that beautiful? But the if the leaves

0:24:24.920 --> 0:24:28.399
<v Speaker 1>could talk, they'd be screaming out to you saying, winner's coming,

0:24:28.480 --> 0:24:32.359
<v Speaker 1>winner's coming, winners coming. You better get prepared because winners coming.

0:24:33.000 --> 0:24:35.119
<v Speaker 1>And nobody's paying any sense to it, all say, oh,

0:24:35.160 --> 0:24:39.119
<v Speaker 1>are there the leaves? Pretty well, the same thing happens

0:24:39.160 --> 0:24:42.720
<v Speaker 1>in the stock market is that individual stocks drop out

0:24:42.760 --> 0:24:46.440
<v Speaker 1>of the bull market one by one by one, very

0:24:46.480 --> 0:24:49.800
<v Speaker 1>much like the leaves falling off the trees. That the

0:24:49.840 --> 0:24:54.520
<v Speaker 1>process starts with the small caps. Almost always starts with

0:24:54.600 --> 0:24:59.080
<v Speaker 1>the small caps. Then it moves to the mid caps. Uh.

0:24:59.119 --> 0:25:01.800
<v Speaker 1>In those are area is the few people are looking at.

0:25:02.320 --> 0:25:04.160
<v Speaker 1>You know, if you said, when was the last time

0:25:04.160 --> 0:25:07.400
<v Speaker 1>you saw open the paper or a magazine and saw

0:25:07.480 --> 0:25:12.080
<v Speaker 1>a picture of the chart of the small cap Price INDEXUS,

0:25:12.160 --> 0:25:14.480
<v Speaker 1>it's you never see it. You see the SMP five.

0:25:15.800 --> 0:25:21.240
<v Speaker 1>So so those are stocks that you don't even know exists. Um,

0:25:21.320 --> 0:25:24.080
<v Speaker 1>so they start to roll over. First, they're the first

0:25:24.160 --> 0:25:26.840
<v Speaker 1>leaves to fall off the trees. Then the mid caps

0:25:26.840 --> 0:25:29.720
<v Speaker 1>start to fall off the trees. And that process is

0:25:29.760 --> 0:25:32.399
<v Speaker 1>all taking place while the s m P five hundred

0:25:32.520 --> 0:25:36.679
<v Speaker 1>is still in a rising pattern, because the big caps

0:25:36.720 --> 0:25:40.000
<v Speaker 1>are the last thing to turn down. So the what

0:25:40.160 --> 0:25:45.400
<v Speaker 1>you typically find is the this This study started with

0:25:45.480 --> 0:25:47.720
<v Speaker 1>us going back and looking at at what was going

0:25:47.760 --> 0:25:52.280
<v Speaker 1>on in I've I've always been fascinated with the idea

0:25:52.359 --> 0:25:56.120
<v Speaker 1>that I've had a number of people who a number

0:25:56.119 --> 0:25:59.919
<v Speaker 1>of our clients who were actually at in the market

0:26:00.040 --> 0:26:03.639
<v Speaker 1>in nineteen say to me, you know, the market was

0:26:03.720 --> 0:26:06.800
<v Speaker 1>just going up in and then it just crashed. There

0:26:06.880 --> 0:26:10.280
<v Speaker 1>was no warnings, there was no nothing, And I thought,

0:26:10.320 --> 0:26:13.600
<v Speaker 1>that just doesn't make any sense to me. Nothing happens

0:26:14.480 --> 0:26:17.680
<v Speaker 1>without some warning signs around it. That you can't think

0:26:17.680 --> 0:26:23.080
<v Speaker 1>of anything in life that doesn't have warning signs. Lightning

0:26:23.320 --> 0:26:27.720
<v Speaker 1>can't occur without white clouds turning the dark clouds turning

0:26:27.800 --> 0:26:31.000
<v Speaker 1>to black clouds. At least in hindsight, you should be

0:26:31.000 --> 0:26:34.040
<v Speaker 1>able to say, oh, this was the warning sign we missed. Sure,

0:26:34.119 --> 0:26:37.040
<v Speaker 1>if you know what to look for, then it's pretty

0:26:37.080 --> 0:26:39.320
<v Speaker 1>simple to see. If you don't know what to look for,

0:26:40.080 --> 0:26:42.159
<v Speaker 1>then you're gonna miss it almost every time. So so

0:26:42.200 --> 0:26:44.960
<v Speaker 1>what did you find in ninety nine? We found that

0:26:45.080 --> 0:26:48.440
<v Speaker 1>when the when the Doal Jones Industrial Average reached its

0:26:48.480 --> 0:26:55.679
<v Speaker 1>peak in on September three, only two point three percent

0:26:55.840 --> 0:26:57.680
<v Speaker 1>of the stocks on the New York Stock and Change

0:26:57.680 --> 0:26:59.919
<v Speaker 1>we're making new highs that day. Now, that was supposed

0:26:59.960 --> 0:27:04.000
<v Speaker 1>to be the market high. How could only two point

0:27:04.040 --> 0:27:08.920
<v Speaker 1>three percent be making new highs? There be six making

0:27:08.960 --> 0:27:14.760
<v Speaker 1>new highs in actuality, thirty thirty or thirty five percent

0:27:15.000 --> 0:27:17.160
<v Speaker 1>of the stocks on the New York Stock Exchange, we're

0:27:17.200 --> 0:27:21.359
<v Speaker 1>already down by or more from their highs. So we

0:27:21.400 --> 0:27:24.280
<v Speaker 1>went back and we created an advanced decline line. That's

0:27:24.320 --> 0:27:26.479
<v Speaker 1>a simple way of just saying how many stocks are

0:27:26.920 --> 0:27:29.720
<v Speaker 1>participating in the up trend, how many stocks are not

0:27:29.920 --> 0:27:32.719
<v Speaker 1>participating in the up trind. And what we found was

0:27:32.760 --> 0:27:38.200
<v Speaker 1>the advanced decline line was in a steep decline from

0:27:38.240 --> 0:27:44.040
<v Speaker 1>September two years, two years prior to the to the top.

0:27:44.200 --> 0:27:47.440
<v Speaker 1>And each day, what that was saying was there are

0:27:47.480 --> 0:27:50.520
<v Speaker 1>more more and more leaves falling off the trees and

0:27:50.600 --> 0:27:54.360
<v Speaker 1>winters coming u So it was constantly warning you that

0:27:54.640 --> 0:27:57.280
<v Speaker 1>the market was becoming thinner. There were fewer and fewer

0:27:57.320 --> 0:28:01.280
<v Speaker 1>stocks that were producing profits for portfolio. It was it

0:28:01.359 --> 0:28:06.600
<v Speaker 1>was encouraging portfolio managers to get rid of all of

0:28:06.640 --> 0:28:09.160
<v Speaker 1>the dead wood that was in their portfolios and start

0:28:09.400 --> 0:28:12.480
<v Speaker 1>start calling out stocks that were no longer in the

0:28:12.520 --> 0:28:16.400
<v Speaker 1>bull market and therefore moving towards a more defensive position

0:28:17.080 --> 0:28:21.119
<v Speaker 1>for the coming winter. So let's stay with that full

0:28:21.200 --> 0:28:25.000
<v Speaker 1>foliage metaphor that that you use so well. If I

0:28:25.080 --> 0:28:30.040
<v Speaker 1>recall what you had said previously, at the average market peak,

0:28:30.359 --> 0:28:33.639
<v Speaker 1>at least of the stocks and the brought in the

0:28:33.760 --> 0:28:39.280
<v Speaker 1>seas are already down. Is that a rough number the

0:28:39.320 --> 0:28:43.880
<v Speaker 1>equivalent of at the peak of full foliage leaves have

0:28:43.920 --> 0:28:48.320
<v Speaker 1>already fallen off the trees, exactly. And those are the

0:28:48.400 --> 0:28:52.800
<v Speaker 1>stocks that have already dropped off are almost always initially

0:28:52.840 --> 0:28:56.680
<v Speaker 1>in the small cap segment and in the mid cap segment.

0:28:57.520 --> 0:29:01.680
<v Speaker 1>So again, very different called for the average investor to see,

0:29:01.720 --> 0:29:05.440
<v Speaker 1>and so you need the tools to say, I can

0:29:05.480 --> 0:29:08.200
<v Speaker 1>see that, I can see that stocks are falling off

0:29:08.240 --> 0:29:10.840
<v Speaker 1>the trees. I can see that I can see that

0:29:10.920 --> 0:29:13.480
<v Speaker 1>it's the small caps that are rolling first, and that's

0:29:13.720 --> 0:29:17.400
<v Speaker 1>a warning sign of a coming bearer market. Let's talk

0:29:17.400 --> 0:29:21.280
<v Speaker 1>a little bit about something related, which is uh something

0:29:21.320 --> 0:29:24.600
<v Speaker 1>you had written about the New York Stock Exchange, which

0:29:24.720 --> 0:29:27.640
<v Speaker 1>you had termed as really not much of a stock

0:29:27.720 --> 0:29:30.960
<v Speaker 1>exchange because more than half of the issues on it

0:29:31.320 --> 0:29:35.720
<v Speaker 1>are on stocks. UM. So, so describe what's actually on

0:29:35.760 --> 0:29:38.040
<v Speaker 1>the New York Stock Exchange, and then we'll talk a

0:29:38.080 --> 0:29:42.640
<v Speaker 1>little bit about your operating company only index. Well, if

0:29:42.680 --> 0:29:46.520
<v Speaker 1>you if you go back in time and and let's

0:29:46.520 --> 0:29:49.120
<v Speaker 1>say you went back to the forties or the even

0:29:49.120 --> 0:29:52.640
<v Speaker 1>the fifties and looked at what was registered on the

0:29:52.640 --> 0:29:55.160
<v Speaker 1>New York Stock Exchange. At the time, it was all

0:29:55.320 --> 0:29:59.440
<v Speaker 1>common stocks, and then it was preferred stocks that were

0:29:59.600 --> 0:30:07.200
<v Speaker 1>general convertible into common stocks UM also operating common stock

0:30:07.360 --> 0:30:14.040
<v Speaker 1>companies and preferred and and and and convertible preferred So

0:30:14.520 --> 0:30:18.160
<v Speaker 1>the convertible preferreds because they were tied to the common

0:30:18.200 --> 0:30:23.040
<v Speaker 1>stock through the through the conversion process, they moved like

0:30:23.280 --> 0:30:30.880
<v Speaker 1>common stocks. What happened in was there were products around,

0:30:31.360 --> 0:30:37.360
<v Speaker 1>particularly particularly from the developer called neuven Nouvene had developed

0:30:37.680 --> 0:30:41.080
<v Speaker 1>a number of products that were primarily for the retirement community,

0:30:41.240 --> 0:30:44.960
<v Speaker 1>mostly bonds and interest issuing. Yeah, they were. They were.

0:30:45.000 --> 0:30:50.720
<v Speaker 1>They were essentially portfolios of of individual bonds, all with

0:30:50.800 --> 0:30:57.479
<v Speaker 1>an approximately same maturity date. And UM they didn't have

0:30:57.600 --> 0:31:00.960
<v Speaker 1>an aftermarket. They had no way to sell if somebody

0:31:01.000 --> 0:31:04.560
<v Speaker 1>wanted to sell the shares for any reason in between

0:31:04.600 --> 0:31:08.960
<v Speaker 1>the maturity dates. There was no market. So Nouvene and

0:31:09.000 --> 0:31:10.960
<v Speaker 1>a number of products like that went to the New

0:31:11.040 --> 0:31:15.840
<v Speaker 1>York Stock Exchange and said, we need we need an

0:31:15.840 --> 0:31:19.720
<v Speaker 1>aftermarket and you need more volume on the on the exchange,

0:31:20.320 --> 0:31:24.840
<v Speaker 1>and so they made a deal, uh that that essentially

0:31:24.880 --> 0:31:29.080
<v Speaker 1>said the place should have been renamed the New York

0:31:29.200 --> 0:31:32.800
<v Speaker 1>Stock and Bond Market, but they didn't do it. That

0:31:33.000 --> 0:31:35.960
<v Speaker 1>was still called the New York Stock Market. But investors

0:31:36.040 --> 0:31:41.440
<v Speaker 1>were not aware of the distortions that were occurring because

0:31:41.440 --> 0:31:44.600
<v Speaker 1>of the fact that so many bonds were now listed

0:31:44.600 --> 0:31:46.880
<v Speaker 1>on the New York Stock Exchange. So so you mentioned

0:31:46.880 --> 0:31:50.080
<v Speaker 1>it's bonds, it's closed in funds, it's reads. But more

0:31:50.120 --> 0:31:52.800
<v Speaker 1>than half is that still true today? More than half

0:31:52.800 --> 0:31:57.760
<v Speaker 1>of the NYC is not operating company domestic common stock. Yeah,

0:31:57.760 --> 0:32:01.560
<v Speaker 1>it's actually about fift and and another part of it's

0:32:01.600 --> 0:32:05.040
<v Speaker 1>in there that is that instead of convertible preferred stocks,

0:32:05.480 --> 0:32:09.520
<v Speaker 1>we now just have preferred stocks, and those stocks trade

0:32:09.640 --> 0:32:12.840
<v Speaker 1>more like bonds than they do like stocks. So in

0:32:12.960 --> 0:32:17.760
<v Speaker 1>order to in order to eliminate all these potential distortions,

0:32:18.000 --> 0:32:21.360
<v Speaker 1>we simply said what what investors wanted to know is

0:32:21.680 --> 0:32:27.480
<v Speaker 1>how are common stocks domestic common stocks moving on the exchange.

0:32:27.760 --> 0:32:34.280
<v Speaker 1>And so we created a new universe called the operating

0:32:34.480 --> 0:32:38.320
<v Speaker 1>Companies only, and the only thing that's in that group

0:32:38.480 --> 0:32:43.200
<v Speaker 1>is is is domestic common stocks. So let's let's go

0:32:43.280 --> 0:32:46.600
<v Speaker 1>back to how market tops were formed. Then I want

0:32:46.600 --> 0:32:49.560
<v Speaker 1>to talk about specific market tops. So what do your

0:32:49.560 --> 0:32:52.400
<v Speaker 1>clients said? Nine? There was no warning, but you went

0:32:52.480 --> 0:32:55.680
<v Speaker 1>back and there was plenty of warnings warning what about

0:32:56.360 --> 0:32:59.080
<v Speaker 1>which a lot of people look at the black Monday

0:33:00.040 --> 0:33:03.000
<v Speaker 1>van as having no warning. It just came out of

0:33:03.040 --> 0:33:06.760
<v Speaker 1>no act. Now the same same thing again. You need

0:33:06.760 --> 0:33:08.880
<v Speaker 1>to know where to look and you need to have

0:33:09.000 --> 0:33:11.880
<v Speaker 1>the indicators to be able to see it. The advanced

0:33:11.880 --> 0:33:15.680
<v Speaker 1>decline line that we were talking about in nine in

0:33:15.720 --> 0:33:21.680
<v Speaker 1>the seven case topped out in March of Night seven

0:33:22.320 --> 0:33:25.600
<v Speaker 1>and was in a significant decline by the time that

0:33:25.680 --> 0:33:30.560
<v Speaker 1>the break occurred in October. We've been speaking with Paul Desmond.

0:33:30.880 --> 0:33:33.720
<v Speaker 1>He is the president and had to research at Lowry's

0:33:34.160 --> 0:33:36.560
<v Speaker 1>Market Research. You can you can hang around and continue

0:33:36.600 --> 0:33:40.120
<v Speaker 1>chatting for a while. So if you enjoy this conversation,

0:33:40.200 --> 0:33:42.480
<v Speaker 1>be sure and check out our podcast extras where we

0:33:42.560 --> 0:33:46.320
<v Speaker 1>keep the tape rolling and continue speaking. Be sure and

0:33:46.400 --> 0:33:48.960
<v Speaker 1>check out my daily column. You can see that at

0:33:49.000 --> 0:33:52.880
<v Speaker 1>Bloomberg View dot com. Follow me on Twitter at rid Halts.

0:33:53.320 --> 0:33:56.440
<v Speaker 1>I'm Barry Ridults. You're listening to Masters in Business on

0:33:56.600 --> 0:34:00.600
<v Speaker 1>Bloomberg Radio. You're listening to the podcast portion. I don't

0:34:00.640 --> 0:34:02.080
<v Speaker 1>know why I do this with my arms. I do

0:34:02.200 --> 0:34:04.760
<v Speaker 1>that every uh every time. Paul, thank you so much

0:34:04.800 --> 0:34:08.280
<v Speaker 1>for for coming by today. I've been looking forward to

0:34:08.280 --> 0:34:13.400
<v Speaker 1>to revisiting this conversation. I still get emails about that

0:34:13.520 --> 0:34:17.520
<v Speaker 1>earlier conversation we had. I actually had someone at the

0:34:17.560 --> 0:34:21.920
<v Speaker 1>Street dot com transcribe it and we published it in

0:34:21.960 --> 0:34:25.160
<v Speaker 1>two parts the Street dot com. It's somewhere on the

0:34:25.200 --> 0:34:28.560
<v Speaker 1>side it's buried, but I I took the original text

0:34:28.760 --> 0:34:31.680
<v Speaker 1>and and reposted it on my blog it hilts dot

0:34:31.719 --> 0:34:36.160
<v Speaker 1>com years ago. I still get emails about that, and

0:34:36.200 --> 0:34:38.719
<v Speaker 1>people ask me about lowry Is. I'm like, hey, they're

0:34:38.800 --> 0:34:41.799
<v Speaker 1>an operating company. You have questions, contact them. I know

0:34:41.920 --> 0:34:45.320
<v Speaker 1>you could download all of your white papers at Lowriies

0:34:45.360 --> 0:34:48.680
<v Speaker 1>dot com and order reprints of all sorts of stuff.

0:34:49.560 --> 0:34:51.840
<v Speaker 1>So let's let's talk about some of the questions and

0:34:51.880 --> 0:34:55.120
<v Speaker 1>some of the things um we missed. Before I get

0:34:55.160 --> 0:34:59.239
<v Speaker 1>into some of my regular questions, and these are these

0:34:59.239 --> 0:35:04.040
<v Speaker 1>are actually real questions. I'm not just making this stuff up. Um,

0:35:04.080 --> 0:35:06.800
<v Speaker 1>So let's talk a little bit about technical analysis, which

0:35:07.239 --> 0:35:09.680
<v Speaker 1>some of my friends think of as voodoo, and I

0:35:09.920 --> 0:35:14.759
<v Speaker 1>always have looked at it as really, let's think of

0:35:14.800 --> 0:35:17.880
<v Speaker 1>this as a measure of psychology and as the battle

0:35:17.960 --> 0:35:21.280
<v Speaker 1>between supply and demand for market shares. And I found

0:35:21.320 --> 0:35:24.840
<v Speaker 1>that has always been a helpful way to to frame

0:35:25.000 --> 0:35:31.799
<v Speaker 1>technical analysis. What do most people misunderstand about about technicals? Oh,

0:35:32.200 --> 0:35:36.520
<v Speaker 1>you know, it's a broad, uh broad category, and there

0:35:36.560 --> 0:35:40.840
<v Speaker 1>are a lot of different approaches to the stock market

0:35:40.920 --> 0:35:44.080
<v Speaker 1>that all kind of fit within the in the category

0:35:44.160 --> 0:35:48.440
<v Speaker 1>of technical. Now, O, if it's not fundamental, then it

0:35:48.480 --> 0:35:51.640
<v Speaker 1>fits into the category of of of technical. So if

0:35:51.640 --> 0:35:54.040
<v Speaker 1>you're not looking at earnings and value and price, then

0:35:54.080 --> 0:35:58.279
<v Speaker 1>you're you're it's a big umbrella. And that's everything from

0:35:58.680 --> 0:36:04.040
<v Speaker 1>charts to momentum to fib cycles. It's it's the moon,

0:36:04.360 --> 0:36:07.200
<v Speaker 1>the tides of the moon. Well, we're trying to keep

0:36:07.280 --> 0:36:10.359
<v Speaker 1>it serious, like when I and I know there are

0:36:10.400 --> 0:36:13.439
<v Speaker 1>people who and I apologize to those of you who

0:36:13.480 --> 0:36:16.000
<v Speaker 1>follow astrology as a way to invest your money, and

0:36:16.040 --> 0:36:20.520
<v Speaker 1>I apologize for you essentially being broke. But um, but

0:36:21.560 --> 0:36:27.040
<v Speaker 1>within the realm of quasi, I don't even know the

0:36:27.120 --> 0:36:31.440
<v Speaker 1>right words. Let's hold tides and and astrology aside. But

0:36:32.560 --> 0:36:35.480
<v Speaker 1>when we look at things like Fibonacci and Elliott wave.

0:36:35.800 --> 0:36:38.000
<v Speaker 1>So I'm gonna ask you the same question in two

0:36:38.000 --> 0:36:41.160
<v Speaker 1>different ways. The first, let me ask you this, what

0:36:41.239 --> 0:36:45.640
<v Speaker 1>are your favorite indicators, favorite technico indicators that you use

0:36:46.239 --> 0:36:49.759
<v Speaker 1>to help form your view of the market. Well, let

0:36:49.239 --> 0:36:52.799
<v Speaker 1>me go back just the second. Nobody knows where the

0:36:52.840 --> 0:36:58.000
<v Speaker 1>word technical came from, right, other than it's different than fundamental. Yeah,

0:36:59.560 --> 0:37:02.520
<v Speaker 1>when I when I was president of the Market Technicians Association,

0:37:02.640 --> 0:37:05.879
<v Speaker 1>we made an effort to try to go back and

0:37:05.920 --> 0:37:09.719
<v Speaker 1>find out who first used the word technical. Couldn't figure

0:37:09.760 --> 0:37:13.920
<v Speaker 1>it out, and what you know, in my in my estimation,

0:37:15.080 --> 0:37:17.440
<v Speaker 1>we should not use the word technical. We should be

0:37:17.520 --> 0:37:20.200
<v Speaker 1>using the word supply and demand. Right, how do you

0:37:20.280 --> 0:37:22.080
<v Speaker 1>how would you call that it? So I'm not a

0:37:22.120 --> 0:37:26.880
<v Speaker 1>fundamental analyst, I'm a supply demand That's very interesting. You

0:37:26.920 --> 0:37:32.600
<v Speaker 1>think that more accurately describes what the so called technicians do. Yes,

0:37:32.680 --> 0:37:36.200
<v Speaker 1>it's it's the it's the foundation of everything that that

0:37:36.920 --> 0:37:40.919
<v Speaker 1>people in the general category of technical analys so when

0:37:40.920 --> 0:37:43.480
<v Speaker 1>when you're looking at a chart, what you're really seeing

0:37:43.800 --> 0:37:47.799
<v Speaker 1>is the daily battle of demand versus supply. Exactly as

0:37:47.840 --> 0:37:51.520
<v Speaker 1>prices rise is because the buyers were more anxious to

0:37:51.520 --> 0:37:54.720
<v Speaker 1>do business than the sellers. Or if prices are dropping,

0:37:54.880 --> 0:37:57.560
<v Speaker 1>is because the sellers are trying to get rid of

0:37:57.600 --> 0:37:59.800
<v Speaker 1>their stocks and they're lowering the price in order to

0:37:59.840 --> 0:38:03.560
<v Speaker 1>get rid of it. And the important point is that

0:38:03.600 --> 0:38:07.000
<v Speaker 1>if you if you go back to every economic textbook

0:38:07.719 --> 0:38:12.360
<v Speaker 1>that's probably that's ever been published, in turn to chapter one,

0:38:12.560 --> 0:38:16.960
<v Speaker 1>maybe chapter two, it's about the law supplying demand, and

0:38:17.000 --> 0:38:20.120
<v Speaker 1>it says the law supply demand is the foundation is

0:38:20.160 --> 0:38:27.120
<v Speaker 1>the starting point of all all economic analysis. MM. So

0:38:27.280 --> 0:38:31.920
<v Speaker 1>it makes sense that that we would look at that,

0:38:32.080 --> 0:38:35.520
<v Speaker 1>at those at that chapter and say, okay, now what

0:38:35.560 --> 0:38:37.880
<v Speaker 1>we need to be doing is because they're saying this

0:38:37.960 --> 0:38:41.480
<v Speaker 1>is the foundation, this is the starting point. We need

0:38:41.520 --> 0:38:45.080
<v Speaker 1>to be looking at supply and demand. But somehow the

0:38:45.120 --> 0:38:48.920
<v Speaker 1>Fundamental school says, well, we look at supply and demand

0:38:49.000 --> 0:38:51.560
<v Speaker 1>for loyal we look at it for real estate, we

0:38:51.600 --> 0:38:53.360
<v Speaker 1>look at it for gold, we look at it for

0:38:53.400 --> 0:38:56.440
<v Speaker 1>orange juice, we look at it for qualities, but not

0:38:56.600 --> 0:39:03.200
<v Speaker 1>the stock market. For some reason, some and they exclude uh,

0:39:03.360 --> 0:39:07.520
<v Speaker 1>the laws supplying demand from from the analysis of the

0:39:07.560 --> 0:39:11.360
<v Speaker 1>stock market. That's a fascinating thing. How the how the

0:39:11.360 --> 0:39:15.920
<v Speaker 1>stock market is all of a sudden excluded or supplying

0:39:16.000 --> 0:39:19.719
<v Speaker 1>demand is excluded from the stock market. It's almost you know,

0:39:19.760 --> 0:39:23.799
<v Speaker 1>it's almost the same as saying, um, we all recognize

0:39:23.840 --> 0:39:26.680
<v Speaker 1>that at night when they get start out, you tend

0:39:26.719 --> 0:39:29.920
<v Speaker 1>to come in the house, and when the sun is up,

0:39:30.000 --> 0:39:33.239
<v Speaker 1>it's it's tend to get outside and and and uh

0:39:33.600 --> 0:39:37.040
<v Speaker 1>go about your business. In the wintertime, we wear heavy

0:39:37.080 --> 0:39:40.440
<v Speaker 1>clothes and we turn on a heater. Uh. In the summertime,

0:39:40.560 --> 0:39:42.799
<v Speaker 1>we turn on an air condition here, and we're light clothes.

0:39:42.840 --> 0:39:48.520
<v Speaker 1>So we're constantly adapting. We're changing as conditions are around us. Change.

0:39:48.960 --> 0:39:52.280
<v Speaker 1>But then the fundamental school says, well, that all applies

0:39:52.360 --> 0:39:54.760
<v Speaker 1>to everything else in life, but not the stock market.

0:39:55.239 --> 0:39:58.520
<v Speaker 1>The stock market, we just stay fully invested. We always

0:39:58.520 --> 0:40:03.160
<v Speaker 1>stay invested. We wear this same clothes all year round. Uh,

0:40:03.320 --> 0:40:06.759
<v Speaker 1>we were if we're wearing bathing suits when winner comes,

0:40:06.840 --> 0:40:10.440
<v Speaker 1>we just keep wearing bathing suits. Makes no sense at all.

0:40:10.600 --> 0:40:13.680
<v Speaker 1>That's a fascinating way to look at it. Well. Supply

0:40:13.800 --> 0:40:18.680
<v Speaker 1>demand approach simply says the supply the changes in the

0:40:18.760 --> 0:40:23.680
<v Speaker 1>forces of supplying demand will warn you of the changes

0:40:23.880 --> 0:40:30.280
<v Speaker 1>in investor psychology, so that when uh summer in place,

0:40:30.360 --> 0:40:34.560
<v Speaker 1>or when we go back earlier, and when when springtime comes,

0:40:35.239 --> 0:40:38.360
<v Speaker 1>you're aware that this is a wonderful opportunity to plant

0:40:38.400 --> 0:40:41.760
<v Speaker 1>your money in in common stocks and and see it grow.

0:40:42.840 --> 0:40:46.680
<v Speaker 1>But it also shows you the erosion that takes place

0:40:47.560 --> 0:40:50.279
<v Speaker 1>in autumn, in the autumn of the stock market, and

0:40:50.400 --> 0:40:54.360
<v Speaker 1>allows you to to recognize that a lot of stocks

0:40:54.360 --> 0:40:57.200
<v Speaker 1>are not not not going up anymore. And if they're

0:40:57.200 --> 0:41:00.080
<v Speaker 1>not going up, then you then you are exposed to

0:41:00.120 --> 0:41:02.880
<v Speaker 1>the risk without any of the reward, and the better,

0:41:03.280 --> 0:41:07.120
<v Speaker 1>more logical thing to do is to to go to cash.

0:41:07.800 --> 0:41:12.399
<v Speaker 1>So let's talk a little bit about the psychology of this.

0:41:13.000 --> 0:41:17.080
<v Speaker 1>How much of what technicals are so called technicals, I

0:41:17.280 --> 0:41:20.080
<v Speaker 1>shouldn't really use that that tim around you. How much

0:41:20.080 --> 0:41:23.840
<v Speaker 1>of that is really just a measure of psychology. It's

0:41:23.920 --> 0:41:27.680
<v Speaker 1>it's it's it's exactly what you're doing. And then that's

0:41:27.719 --> 0:41:34.160
<v Speaker 1>exactly why the fundamental school doesn't like us technical analysis,

0:41:34.239 --> 0:41:37.759
<v Speaker 1>because they're saying psychology is is an art form, it's

0:41:37.800 --> 0:41:42.200
<v Speaker 1>not a it's not a science. And um, but but

0:41:42.560 --> 0:41:46.600
<v Speaker 1>prices go up and down because buyers are more anxious

0:41:46.600 --> 0:41:51.000
<v Speaker 1>to buy than sellers are to sell. And so what

0:41:51.080 --> 0:41:56.200
<v Speaker 1>you find is that the major turning points in the

0:41:56.239 --> 0:42:02.800
<v Speaker 1>stock market occur because of psychology, not because of evidence

0:42:02.920 --> 0:42:07.560
<v Speaker 1>provided by fund the fundamental school. In other words, at

0:42:07.480 --> 0:42:12.040
<v Speaker 1>a major market bottom when you should be buying, the

0:42:12.080 --> 0:42:17.200
<v Speaker 1>economic news is all bad. Earnings are horrible, corporations are

0:42:17.200 --> 0:42:21.480
<v Speaker 1>going bankrupts. Uh, you know, everything is bad. I think

0:42:21.600 --> 0:42:26.720
<v Speaker 1>think back to March o nine, earnings had plummeted almost

0:42:26.719 --> 0:42:30.840
<v Speaker 1>a hundred percent. That we're still doing four hundred thousand

0:42:31.320 --> 0:42:35.520
<v Speaker 1>job losses a month. GDP was still contracting. If if

0:42:35.560 --> 0:42:38.319
<v Speaker 1>you were looking at the economic fundamentals, the last thing

0:42:38.320 --> 0:42:40.960
<v Speaker 1>you would want to do is put money into stocks

0:42:41.000 --> 0:42:44.600
<v Speaker 1>in March o nine. And yet there's no better time

0:42:44.640 --> 0:42:46.680
<v Speaker 1>in the past decade to have put money into the

0:42:46.719 --> 0:42:51.120
<v Speaker 1>equity market, exactly. And so and so an intelligent investor

0:42:51.440 --> 0:42:55.799
<v Speaker 1>has to learn that they need to be a contrarian

0:42:55.880 --> 0:43:00.759
<v Speaker 1>investor and they need to view major mark at declines

0:43:01.239 --> 0:43:04.400
<v Speaker 1>as as an opportunity to make profit. Is that the

0:43:04.440 --> 0:43:09.640
<v Speaker 1>decline is producing the opportunity to buy it extremely low prices.

0:43:09.840 --> 0:43:13.920
<v Speaker 1>The bowl market as it goes higher and higher and

0:43:14.000 --> 0:43:17.920
<v Speaker 1>higher is creating an opportunity for people to be caught

0:43:18.000 --> 0:43:20.520
<v Speaker 1>in that in the in the in the coming bear

0:43:20.680 --> 0:43:25.520
<v Speaker 1>market and um and suffer those losses. So so you

0:43:25.560 --> 0:43:28.960
<v Speaker 1>need you need to be able to see whether buyers

0:43:29.320 --> 0:43:34.680
<v Speaker 1>and sellers are gaining control of the markets so that

0:43:34.760 --> 0:43:40.480
<v Speaker 1>you can change as market conditions change. So, so let's

0:43:40.520 --> 0:43:45.120
<v Speaker 1>stick with various technical indicators. Um, what are your favorite

0:43:45.120 --> 0:43:48.840
<v Speaker 1>things to look at? Obviously market breath one of the

0:43:48.840 --> 0:43:52.319
<v Speaker 1>most important things. Yeah, it's it's it's all subsets of

0:43:52.440 --> 0:43:55.840
<v Speaker 1>supply and demand. So its case to say, how, how

0:43:55.880 --> 0:43:58.200
<v Speaker 1>in what ways can you measure your supply and demand.

0:43:58.239 --> 0:44:00.759
<v Speaker 1>While you can measure it in terms of value, you

0:44:00.800 --> 0:44:05.000
<v Speaker 1>can measure it in terms of momentum. Do you find volume?

0:44:05.120 --> 0:44:10.439
<v Speaker 1>Is um worthwhile to to analyze or it's extremely important? Sure,

0:44:10.520 --> 0:44:16.560
<v Speaker 1>Let's let's say that. Let's say that you're there, Uh,

0:44:16.719 --> 0:44:19.239
<v Speaker 1>let's say that you're thinking about buying a piece of

0:44:19.280 --> 0:44:21.960
<v Speaker 1>real estate and you're you're saying, I'm looking for a

0:44:22.040 --> 0:44:24.280
<v Speaker 1>piece of real estates are going to appreciate in value.

0:44:25.000 --> 0:44:27.360
<v Speaker 1>So I'm going to go over to this new development

0:44:27.440 --> 0:44:32.560
<v Speaker 1>that's down down the street and I'm going to say, um, uh,

0:44:32.840 --> 0:44:35.000
<v Speaker 1>if I bought one of these houses, do you think

0:44:35.080 --> 0:44:38.600
<v Speaker 1>that would appreciate and value and the and the answer

0:44:38.640 --> 0:44:41.880
<v Speaker 1>to that is the case of saying, uh, well, here's

0:44:42.000 --> 0:44:45.680
<v Speaker 1>one development where where the buyers are lined up around

0:44:45.680 --> 0:44:49.240
<v Speaker 1>the block trying to get in, trying and have money

0:44:49.239 --> 0:44:52.919
<v Speaker 1>in their hand, trying to trying to buy these buy

0:44:52.960 --> 0:44:58.799
<v Speaker 1>these buildings. Here's another development mile away where there's two

0:44:58.880 --> 0:45:02.960
<v Speaker 1>or three people looking at the properties, which one do

0:45:03.000 --> 0:45:05.920
<v Speaker 1>you think is going to appreciate in value? So the

0:45:06.080 --> 0:45:11.840
<v Speaker 1>volume of transactions simply tells you the strength of buyers

0:45:11.960 --> 0:45:14.880
<v Speaker 1>or the strength of the lack of lack of strength.

0:45:15.600 --> 0:45:18.400
<v Speaker 1>And if if there's only a few people interested in

0:45:18.440 --> 0:45:21.480
<v Speaker 1>a particular piece of property, then the chances are the

0:45:22.280 --> 0:45:25.360
<v Speaker 1>value of those pieces of property are not going to

0:45:25.480 --> 0:45:29.600
<v Speaker 1>increase very much. Whereas where the line that around the block,

0:45:30.640 --> 0:45:32.880
<v Speaker 1>the prices are probably gonna go up is because people

0:45:32.920 --> 0:45:36.160
<v Speaker 1>want that that particular kind of house. So it's it's

0:45:36.200 --> 0:45:40.759
<v Speaker 1>Brooklyn versus Staten Island. Is really the housing market in

0:45:40.760 --> 0:45:44.520
<v Speaker 1>Brooklyn is on fire. Other borrows not not as much,

0:45:44.520 --> 0:45:46.640
<v Speaker 1>although I'm sure someone's gonna email me and say no,

0:45:46.800 --> 0:45:51.279
<v Speaker 1>everything's gone crazy. And Staten Island also starting to pick

0:45:51.400 --> 0:45:54.800
<v Speaker 1>up in Queens and the Bronx now is just really

0:45:55.400 --> 0:45:57.640
<v Speaker 1>there's not enough land and they're not building a whole

0:45:57.640 --> 0:46:01.080
<v Speaker 1>lot more and it's gone, it's going crazy. So when

0:46:01.160 --> 0:46:04.279
<v Speaker 1>you use the real estate metaphor, I'm just thinking the

0:46:04.320 --> 0:46:08.480
<v Speaker 1>prices of apartments in Brooklyn, you go to Park Slope

0:46:08.719 --> 0:46:12.399
<v Speaker 1>or Brooklyn Heights or cal Gun, they're just off the chart.

0:46:12.440 --> 0:46:15.240
<v Speaker 1>It's amazing, And well, let's in this process. Is supplying

0:46:15.280 --> 0:46:18.960
<v Speaker 1>demand works not only in real estate, not only on

0:46:20.440 --> 0:46:23.160
<v Speaker 1>For example, if everybody knows if you want to buy

0:46:23.160 --> 0:46:27.520
<v Speaker 1>a car, uh, you buy a car when there are

0:46:27.560 --> 0:46:31.360
<v Speaker 1>no buyers around, and there's a huge inventory of cars

0:46:31.400 --> 0:46:34.200
<v Speaker 1>on the on the dealer's lot, and end of the

0:46:34.239 --> 0:46:36.520
<v Speaker 1>month or end of the year, the last week between

0:46:36.600 --> 0:46:39.120
<v Speaker 1>Christmas and New Year's those are your best deals exactly.

0:46:39.120 --> 0:46:41.400
<v Speaker 1>And that that's simply a case of saying you're you're

0:46:41.440 --> 0:46:44.520
<v Speaker 1>you are going to buy when the forces of supplying

0:46:44.520 --> 0:46:46.640
<v Speaker 1>demand are at their worst for the for the dealer.

0:46:47.360 --> 0:46:48.640
<v Speaker 1>The same thing with if you want to buy an

0:46:48.640 --> 0:46:52.160
<v Speaker 1>air conditioner, you better buy it in the wintertime. They'll

0:46:52.200 --> 0:46:54.799
<v Speaker 1>buy it in July. That's a mistake where there are

0:46:54.800 --> 0:46:56.920
<v Speaker 1>no buyers lined up in the middle of winter to

0:46:57.040 --> 0:46:59.400
<v Speaker 1>buy air conditioning units, and so you get a you

0:46:59.440 --> 0:47:02.359
<v Speaker 1>get a drum antically better deal. That's using the law

0:47:02.440 --> 0:47:06.120
<v Speaker 1>supply and demand in in a smart fashion to to

0:47:06.200 --> 0:47:10.920
<v Speaker 1>take advantage of the changes in in the forces of

0:47:11.000 --> 0:47:13.719
<v Speaker 1>supplying demand. So, so we mentioned some of your your

0:47:13.760 --> 0:47:18.480
<v Speaker 1>favorite indicators. What sort of approaches the technico analysis do

0:47:18.600 --> 0:47:21.360
<v Speaker 1>you think the jury is still out on or or

0:47:21.440 --> 0:47:25.400
<v Speaker 1>you don't think really is provides a whole lot of insight.

0:47:26.200 --> 0:47:29.680
<v Speaker 1>Anything stand out that you don't understand why people deploy

0:47:29.760 --> 0:47:34.359
<v Speaker 1>that astrology aside? Yeah, what what's interesting is there? There

0:47:34.040 --> 0:47:41.000
<v Speaker 1>there too two areas of UH interest in technical analysis.

0:47:41.080 --> 0:47:46.360
<v Speaker 1>One one is the UH psychology side of it. The

0:47:46.440 --> 0:47:52.240
<v Speaker 1>other side of it is are things like fibonacci um

0:47:52.360 --> 0:47:57.040
<v Speaker 1>on my list and UH game and some of some

0:47:57.080 --> 0:48:04.320
<v Speaker 1>of these UH And what's fascinating is that a number

0:48:04.320 --> 0:48:09.200
<v Speaker 1>of these approaches are based upon the physical world. In

0:48:09.239 --> 0:48:13.120
<v Speaker 1>other words, we've all seen that picture of that Leonardo

0:48:13.239 --> 0:48:17.399
<v Speaker 1>da Vinci creative, a man standing with his arms spread out,

0:48:18.200 --> 0:48:23.160
<v Speaker 1>And what that's demonstrating is what is called the golden measurement,

0:48:23.360 --> 0:48:26.960
<v Speaker 1>golden ratio, golden ratio, that the length of your arm

0:48:27.040 --> 0:48:30.200
<v Speaker 1>is the same as the length of your leg. Or whatever.

0:48:31.120 --> 0:48:33.520
<v Speaker 1>And and it's a is a physical thing that says,

0:48:33.600 --> 0:48:35.960
<v Speaker 1>no matter who you are, no matter when you're born,

0:48:36.120 --> 0:48:38.560
<v Speaker 1>where where, where you are in the world, that measurement

0:48:38.600 --> 0:48:43.120
<v Speaker 1>is always the same. Uh. Fibonacci is much the same

0:48:43.200 --> 0:48:47.600
<v Speaker 1>as as simply says that there there's a there's a

0:48:47.719 --> 0:48:51.960
<v Speaker 1>natural ratio that exists in nature. They've seen that the

0:48:52.040 --> 0:48:56.640
<v Speaker 1>nut shell with the declining spiral, And the problem with

0:48:56.680 --> 0:49:00.600
<v Speaker 1>that is there from the physical world. And what controls

0:49:00.680 --> 0:49:03.600
<v Speaker 1>the stock market is not the physical world. It's the

0:49:03.640 --> 0:49:07.800
<v Speaker 1>emotional world. It's a buyers versus sellers. So I'm always

0:49:07.840 --> 0:49:11.360
<v Speaker 1>skeptical of those things that come from the natural world

0:49:11.920 --> 0:49:17.400
<v Speaker 1>that say there's only so far that that stock can move. Uh.

0:49:18.000 --> 0:49:21.760
<v Speaker 1>You know, if you if you think of the range

0:49:21.960 --> 0:49:27.359
<v Speaker 1>of human emotion has almost no limit to it. And

0:49:27.400 --> 0:49:30.279
<v Speaker 1>so to say that, you know, that's a certain things

0:49:30.320 --> 0:49:34.200
<v Speaker 1>you can only go so far is a naive So

0:49:34.280 --> 0:49:38.879
<v Speaker 1>I know Elliott wave is the three count five count three,

0:49:38.960 --> 0:49:42.000
<v Speaker 1>and for some reason that's supposed to be magic. Feminacci

0:49:42.200 --> 0:49:46.000
<v Speaker 1>is the retracement on the golden ratio. I'm trying to

0:49:46.000 --> 0:49:49.040
<v Speaker 1>remember again, was gaining something with nine. It was a

0:49:49.080 --> 0:49:52.440
<v Speaker 1>box that people would draw dots on. And that's another

0:49:52.440 --> 0:49:54.400
<v Speaker 1>one that I just never was able to wrap my

0:49:54.440 --> 0:49:57.719
<v Speaker 1>head around. No, nobody fully understands game. Well, that makes

0:49:57.719 --> 0:50:01.120
<v Speaker 1>it easier to sell sell a newsletter if nobody understands it.

0:50:01.160 --> 0:50:03.960
<v Speaker 1>But you have the magic uh, we have the magic secret.

0:50:04.040 --> 0:50:07.960
<v Speaker 1>Here send us four nine your first years uh subscription.

0:50:08.000 --> 0:50:12.279
<v Speaker 1>So it's interesting you you said that, UM, tell me

0:50:12.320 --> 0:50:16.880
<v Speaker 1>about some of the technicians that you've um followed in

0:50:16.920 --> 0:50:20.000
<v Speaker 1>the past. Who who's always stood out to you as Wow,

0:50:20.040 --> 0:50:24.240
<v Speaker 1>that guy really understands charts and supplying the man and

0:50:25.160 --> 0:50:28.759
<v Speaker 1>is value added. Well, uh, you know, I have to

0:50:28.800 --> 0:50:32.600
<v Speaker 1>start with L. M. Lowery. Sure he was. He was

0:50:32.640 --> 0:50:37.520
<v Speaker 1>a genius. I've I really felt very privileged to spend

0:50:37.600 --> 0:50:40.319
<v Speaker 1>time with him. He was he was not only a

0:50:40.320 --> 0:50:44.320
<v Speaker 1>good analyst, but he was a good philosopher. He understood

0:50:44.360 --> 0:50:48.520
<v Speaker 1>he understood human nature, and having a having an understanding

0:50:48.560 --> 0:50:53.160
<v Speaker 1>of psychology and human nature is a very valuable tool

0:50:53.280 --> 0:50:55.759
<v Speaker 1>when you're trying to deal with the changes in the

0:50:55.800 --> 0:50:58.960
<v Speaker 1>trends of the start market. So so I'm gonna interrupt

0:50:59.000 --> 0:51:01.360
<v Speaker 1>you there before we talk about and I'm writing down

0:51:01.440 --> 0:51:04.839
<v Speaker 1>this down so I don't forget about it. I never

0:51:04.880 --> 0:51:09.360
<v Speaker 1>heard that story you told earlier, which sounds fascinating than

0:51:09.440 --> 0:51:15.080
<v Speaker 1>in en four. You're researching in the library in Miami

0:51:15.120 --> 0:51:18.600
<v Speaker 1>to try and get a handle on your dad's portfolio

0:51:18.719 --> 0:51:22.160
<v Speaker 1>after he has a heart attack. You find Lowry's and

0:51:22.719 --> 0:51:26.720
<v Speaker 1>just on a lark some Saturday, you drive to the address.

0:51:26.840 --> 0:51:29.919
<v Speaker 1>What were you expecting, like an office park, and you're

0:51:29.920 --> 0:51:32.759
<v Speaker 1>gonna pull in and and let me go see what

0:51:32.920 --> 0:51:36.279
<v Speaker 1>this brokerage like firm is gonna have. What what was

0:51:36.320 --> 0:51:40.920
<v Speaker 1>your thinking to say, let's go visit Lowry's. Uh, you know,

0:51:41.000 --> 0:51:47.960
<v Speaker 1>the Mimi Library um is four or five miles away

0:51:48.000 --> 0:51:51.759
<v Speaker 1>from the address that was on the on the on

0:51:51.840 --> 0:51:56.120
<v Speaker 1>these reports. So that's that's just so coincidental. And see

0:51:56.160 --> 0:52:00.160
<v Speaker 1>what's going on? How how serendipitous is that that you're

0:52:00.200 --> 0:52:04.600
<v Speaker 1>in Miami you look at this and it's five miles away. Yeah. Well,

0:52:04.640 --> 0:52:06.560
<v Speaker 1>a lot of life, a lot of good things in

0:52:06.600 --> 0:52:11.040
<v Speaker 1>life occur because of serendipitous theme on this show. I

0:52:11.080 --> 0:52:13.439
<v Speaker 1>can't tell you how many people have said that over

0:52:13.440 --> 0:52:16.120
<v Speaker 1>and over again. Hey, you gotta get lucky. So well,

0:52:16.160 --> 0:52:18.799
<v Speaker 1>you know, this whole study in nineteen nine was the

0:52:18.920 --> 0:52:21.760
<v Speaker 1>same kind of a thing. We were doing this study

0:52:21.800 --> 0:52:24.400
<v Speaker 1>in nineteen twenty nine. We were collecting this data and

0:52:24.520 --> 0:52:30.160
<v Speaker 1>a very boring process, and it occurred to me, you know,

0:52:30.239 --> 0:52:33.920
<v Speaker 1>I wonder what was going on in people's minds in

0:52:34.000 --> 0:52:37.160
<v Speaker 1>September of ninety nine. What what do you suppose the

0:52:37.200 --> 0:52:40.160
<v Speaker 1>news stories were that were in the journal? And what

0:52:40.680 --> 0:52:43.640
<v Speaker 1>what was the thinking of the day and so on

0:52:43.640 --> 0:52:46.960
<v Speaker 1>and so forth. So I got out the micro film

0:52:47.120 --> 0:52:49.960
<v Speaker 1>for September third nine, put it up on the machine,

0:52:50.760 --> 0:52:53.640
<v Speaker 1>and there wasn't much commentary in the Wall Street Journal

0:52:53.640 --> 0:52:56.400
<v Speaker 1>in those days, and so I quickly ended up on

0:52:56.440 --> 0:53:02.440
<v Speaker 1>the trading page. And I I started looking down the

0:53:02.520 --> 0:53:04.879
<v Speaker 1>trading page, and what obviously is over on the left

0:53:04.920 --> 0:53:10.400
<v Speaker 1>hand side is always the same thing today. The high

0:53:10.800 --> 0:53:13.520
<v Speaker 1>for for each stock was over on the left hand column,

0:53:14.160 --> 0:53:17.920
<v Speaker 1>and then over on the right side was the clothes

0:53:18.360 --> 0:53:23.840
<v Speaker 1>for for for that day. And the first stock on

0:53:23.880 --> 0:53:28.400
<v Speaker 1>the list was not a New Highs. And the second

0:53:28.440 --> 0:53:30.719
<v Speaker 1>stock on the list was not a New Highs. And

0:53:30.760 --> 0:53:33.080
<v Speaker 1>the third stock on the list was down about twenty

0:53:35.239 --> 0:53:38.400
<v Speaker 1>And I thought, something's wrong here, because this is supposed

0:53:38.440 --> 0:53:41.960
<v Speaker 1>to be the high for the market. And that was

0:53:42.080 --> 0:53:49.520
<v Speaker 1>part of the the recognition that the market is doesn't

0:53:49.560 --> 0:53:54.320
<v Speaker 1>exist at major market tops. It's all about individual stocks,

0:53:55.160 --> 0:53:59.000
<v Speaker 1>and so what we what we found from from just

0:53:59.120 --> 0:54:02.919
<v Speaker 1>that serendiper us, the question is, you don't wonder what

0:54:02.960 --> 0:54:06.080
<v Speaker 1>was going on in the day we we we found

0:54:06.080 --> 0:54:08.640
<v Speaker 1>out that two point three percent of all the stocks

0:54:08.640 --> 0:54:10.720
<v Speaker 1>on the New York Stock Exchange were at new highs

0:54:10.760 --> 0:54:13.799
<v Speaker 1>that day, meaning nine seven point seven percent of all

0:54:13.840 --> 0:54:17.040
<v Speaker 1>stocks were not at recognized when the market is at

0:54:17.040 --> 0:54:21.840
<v Speaker 1>a record exactly and and at the same time, thirty

0:54:21.960 --> 0:54:25.120
<v Speaker 1>around thirty five of all the stocks on the New

0:54:25.200 --> 0:54:29.239
<v Speaker 1>York Stock Exchange we're already down by or more from

0:54:29.239 --> 0:54:32.080
<v Speaker 1>their highs. So so so on the top day of

0:54:32.120 --> 0:54:36.800
<v Speaker 1>the doal Jones Industrial lanverage of the stocks were already

0:54:36.840 --> 0:54:40.520
<v Speaker 1>in bear markets. And what was was interesting about it

0:54:40.560 --> 0:54:43.719
<v Speaker 1>is what we now know is that it was it

0:54:43.840 --> 0:54:47.919
<v Speaker 1>was the small caps and the mid caps that had

0:54:47.960 --> 0:54:52.120
<v Speaker 1>been rolling over for some time that caused that particular situation.

0:54:52.760 --> 0:54:55.000
<v Speaker 1>But if you were simply looking at the doal Jones

0:54:55.000 --> 0:54:58.439
<v Speaker 1>Industrial Average, which is a big cap index, you could

0:54:58.440 --> 0:55:00.440
<v Speaker 1>never see the weakness that was a ring in the

0:55:00.480 --> 0:55:03.919
<v Speaker 1>small caps or the manicamps. So the big caps camouflage

0:55:03.960 --> 0:55:07.839
<v Speaker 1>what's happening. They completely completely hit it. And the doal

0:55:07.960 --> 0:55:12.399
<v Speaker 1>Jones Nostra language was actually deceptive in holding people into

0:55:12.440 --> 0:55:14.279
<v Speaker 1>the market when they should have been looking at the

0:55:14.320 --> 0:55:16.960
<v Speaker 1>individual stocks. Although who knew back then? Who had the

0:55:17.000 --> 0:55:19.919
<v Speaker 1>faintest idea, Hey, the mids small caps are rolling over,

0:55:19.960 --> 0:55:23.759
<v Speaker 1>I better sell in September twenty nine. Let me bring

0:55:23.800 --> 0:55:28.200
<v Speaker 1>you back to that day, that Saturday when you decide

0:55:28.239 --> 0:55:32.000
<v Speaker 1>to leave the Miami Library and drive over. So was

0:55:32.040 --> 0:55:36.840
<v Speaker 1>that Mr Lowry's home, the big man right on It

0:55:36.960 --> 0:55:42.000
<v Speaker 1>was right on Biscayne Bay. So he obviously was very successful.

0:55:42.120 --> 0:55:44.520
<v Speaker 1>Was that as an investor? Or? Was that? As How

0:55:44.560 --> 0:55:48.840
<v Speaker 1>did he become so successful and sitting with such a

0:55:48.960 --> 0:55:53.560
<v Speaker 1>huge homestead. He had a strong understanding of supplying the man,

0:55:53.760 --> 0:55:55.480
<v Speaker 1>So you can make money with that in the market,

0:55:55.600 --> 0:55:59.160
<v Speaker 1>in real estate, in in buying and selling cars, and

0:55:59.160 --> 0:56:03.959
<v Speaker 1>in iron is selling oil. He made his He made

0:56:04.040 --> 0:56:08.439
<v Speaker 1>a variety of fortunes in a number of areas really well,

0:56:08.640 --> 0:56:11.400
<v Speaker 1>by recognizing the changes that we're going on in the

0:56:11.440 --> 0:56:14.280
<v Speaker 1>economy and saying now is a good time to invest

0:56:14.320 --> 0:56:17.240
<v Speaker 1>in oil. Now is not a good time to invest

0:56:17.239 --> 0:56:19.000
<v Speaker 1>in oil, but it is a good time to invest

0:56:19.080 --> 0:56:22.400
<v Speaker 1>in real estate. Uh, it's not good to invest in

0:56:22.600 --> 0:56:24.799
<v Speaker 1>real estate in one area of the country, but it

0:56:24.920 --> 0:56:27.080
<v Speaker 1>is good to do it in another So you you

0:56:27.160 --> 0:56:30.640
<v Speaker 1>pull up, you're you're on Biscayne Bay. Is this like

0:56:30.680 --> 0:56:33.360
<v Speaker 1>a big gated property. I'm trying to ualize, you know.

0:56:33.440 --> 0:56:37.080
<v Speaker 1>I started to drive in, and I was I was

0:56:37.800 --> 0:56:41.520
<v Speaker 1>in my late twenties, and I had, you know, I

0:56:41.719 --> 0:56:44.800
<v Speaker 1>had what were you driving? Oh? So this is sixty

0:56:44.840 --> 0:56:50.840
<v Speaker 1>three sixty four a little sports car. Um not a

0:56:51.840 --> 0:56:53.759
<v Speaker 1>didn't belong in that area of the city, you know.

0:56:54.719 --> 0:56:57.440
<v Speaker 1>And I actually I drove in the gate and there

0:56:57.960 --> 0:57:01.600
<v Speaker 1>was a line of royal palms going down the driveway

0:57:01.680 --> 0:57:05.440
<v Speaker 1>to leading to the house. And my first thought was

0:57:06.080 --> 0:57:09.520
<v Speaker 1>I'm going to get arrested. He really And I turned

0:57:09.520 --> 0:57:13.400
<v Speaker 1>around and left, No kidding, yeah, because I thought, you know,

0:57:13.800 --> 0:57:16.000
<v Speaker 1>I don't belong in this. I don't belong in this area.

0:57:16.080 --> 0:57:20.240
<v Speaker 1>This this was the prime pieces of real estate in

0:57:20.360 --> 0:57:24.560
<v Speaker 1>all of South Florida, And um, what made you turn

0:57:24.600 --> 0:57:28.400
<v Speaker 1>around and go back? I thought, what are they gonna

0:57:28.440 --> 0:57:31.520
<v Speaker 1>arrest me for? I'm not doing anything wrong? You have

0:57:31.560 --> 0:57:33.560
<v Speaker 1>the I'm here, I'm looking for this. The people who

0:57:33.600 --> 0:57:36.439
<v Speaker 1>put this out. You gotta take some risks in life,

0:57:36.440 --> 0:57:38.920
<v Speaker 1>you know. So I just thought, you know, what are

0:57:38.960 --> 0:57:41.240
<v Speaker 1>they gonna do to me? So you turned around you

0:57:41.280 --> 0:57:46.520
<v Speaker 1>went back down down this driveway with centuries of royal

0:57:46.520 --> 0:57:49.200
<v Speaker 1>palms on either side. Yeah, and then and and there

0:57:49.320 --> 0:57:54.320
<v Speaker 1>was there was this elderly man in the bushes, picking flower,

0:57:54.480 --> 0:57:57.560
<v Speaker 1>tending to a bunch of flowers. Did you assume this

0:57:57.640 --> 0:58:02.600
<v Speaker 1>was the gardener? Oh? Sure, you had no idea straw

0:58:02.720 --> 0:58:07.320
<v Speaker 1>hat overalls, absolutely governed in soil and who knows what

0:58:08.040 --> 0:58:11.680
<v Speaker 1>notn on his knees. That's that's some some picture, some

0:58:11.960 --> 0:58:16.760
<v Speaker 1>picture you're painting. So so this is the the garage

0:58:16.960 --> 0:58:21.800
<v Speaker 1>slash maid's quarters away from the main It was a

0:58:21.880 --> 0:58:25.000
<v Speaker 1>house I think there were four or five uh for

0:58:25.360 --> 0:58:29.600
<v Speaker 1>you know, area for four or five cars, and then

0:58:29.720 --> 0:58:32.480
<v Speaker 1>and then a two story building attached to that that

0:58:32.680 --> 0:58:37.760
<v Speaker 1>was I think originally it was maid's quarters, smaller obviously

0:58:37.800 --> 0:58:41.840
<v Speaker 1>than the main the main house, dramatically small y. Yeah,

0:58:42.000 --> 0:58:45.320
<v Speaker 1>and uh he converted it into his office and so,

0:58:45.800 --> 0:58:49.760
<v Speaker 1>uh it fits very nicely for these roles will be

0:58:49.800 --> 0:58:52.760
<v Speaker 1>small operation that he was running at that point. So

0:58:53.960 --> 0:58:56.520
<v Speaker 1>you see the gardener on his knees, playing in the dirt.

0:58:57.640 --> 0:58:59.520
<v Speaker 1>How do you what do you say to him? Said?

0:58:59.600 --> 0:59:02.320
<v Speaker 1>Is there in anybody around here from the lowry organization?

0:59:03.240 --> 0:59:05.280
<v Speaker 1>And he said, yeah, I think we could find somebody.

0:59:05.400 --> 0:59:07.280
<v Speaker 1>And he got up, he got up all of his knees,

0:59:07.320 --> 0:59:10.840
<v Speaker 1>and he took me into the into the office, and

0:59:10.840 --> 0:59:14.160
<v Speaker 1>and I thought he was just leading me, you know,

0:59:14.280 --> 0:59:17.280
<v Speaker 1>somewhere where there'd be somebody to talk to. And uh,

0:59:17.400 --> 0:59:22.880
<v Speaker 1>and all of a sudden we were in in an office. Um,

0:59:23.000 --> 0:59:26.480
<v Speaker 1>and he was sitting in a big chair. And how

0:59:26.480 --> 0:59:30.000
<v Speaker 1>did that conversation progress? That sounds like that's just one

0:59:30.000 --> 0:59:33.280
<v Speaker 1>of those stories, uh, that you couldn't make up if

0:59:33.320 --> 0:59:36.280
<v Speaker 1>you tried. Yeah, it was simply case to saying, you know,

0:59:36.320 --> 0:59:39.160
<v Speaker 1>I was at the public library. I saw little Harry material.

0:59:39.320 --> 0:59:44.720
<v Speaker 1>I was really enthused and attracted to it. I went

0:59:44.720 --> 0:59:47.800
<v Speaker 1>through a lot of it and and UH found it,

0:59:49.160 --> 0:59:52.480
<v Speaker 1>uh that I was drawn to it, that it had

0:59:52.480 --> 0:59:56.080
<v Speaker 1>a natural, natural draw to it. It was based on

0:59:56.120 --> 0:59:58.320
<v Speaker 1>a little law supplying to me, and I've never seen

0:59:58.360 --> 1:00:01.600
<v Speaker 1>anything else that it was really focused on supplying demand.

1:00:02.040 --> 1:00:06.000
<v Speaker 1>How long had he been running Lowry's research at that

1:00:06.040 --> 1:00:08.800
<v Speaker 1>point in time. Oh, he started the company in nineteen

1:00:10.640 --> 1:00:15.040
<v Speaker 1>and he he created a five year history going back

1:00:15.120 --> 1:00:19.720
<v Speaker 1>to ninety three. So our history had always been from

1:00:19.800 --> 1:00:23.640
<v Speaker 1>nineteen thirty three to the present time. And it wasn't

1:00:23.720 --> 1:00:29.800
<v Speaker 1>until uh, nineteen, we finished a study that that we

1:00:29.840 --> 1:00:34.240
<v Speaker 1>started in the mid seventies that covered the period from

1:00:34.320 --> 1:00:37.560
<v Speaker 1>nineteen twenty five to nineteen thirty two. So now our

1:00:37.600 --> 1:00:41.560
<v Speaker 1>history goes from to the present time, eighty eight years.

1:00:41.640 --> 1:00:44.840
<v Speaker 1>Where did you find the data for five to thirty two?

1:00:45.240 --> 1:00:48.280
<v Speaker 1>The Wall Street Journal on microfilm? So you're looking at

1:00:48.400 --> 1:00:51.520
<v Speaker 1>daily stock prices in order to figure out what was

1:00:51.560 --> 1:00:56.280
<v Speaker 1>going on. Yeah, and it's a horrendously difficult job. I

1:00:56.360 --> 1:00:59.640
<v Speaker 1>can image so, because you have to not only pull

1:00:59.680 --> 1:01:01.760
<v Speaker 1>that ada, but then you have to verify it and

1:01:02.000 --> 1:01:05.400
<v Speaker 1>second check it in. But I'm still entranced by the

1:01:05.440 --> 1:01:10.000
<v Speaker 1>story of you in Mr Lowry's office. So you start

1:01:10.040 --> 1:01:16.240
<v Speaker 1>speaking with the gardener slash owner of the place. Give

1:01:16.280 --> 1:01:18.960
<v Speaker 1>me a little color on on that conversation. How did

1:01:18.960 --> 1:01:22.240
<v Speaker 1>that progress? Well, I just told him I think I

1:01:22.280 --> 1:01:26.480
<v Speaker 1>think he was impressed that there was a young man

1:01:26.640 --> 1:01:29.400
<v Speaker 1>sitting there that that had an interest in the same

1:01:29.440 --> 1:01:31.600
<v Speaker 1>things that he had an interest in. Who were his

1:01:31.680 --> 1:01:35.600
<v Speaker 1>clients at the time they were The clientele has always

1:01:35.680 --> 1:01:41.960
<v Speaker 1>been primarily professional investors institutions. That's where we've always aimed

1:01:41.960 --> 1:01:45.680
<v Speaker 1>at work. We don't really make any attempt to go

1:01:45.720 --> 1:01:49.320
<v Speaker 1>after the general public. Our stuff is a little too

1:01:49.480 --> 1:01:53.920
<v Speaker 1>esoter for most of most investors, so he's surprised that

1:01:54.080 --> 1:01:56.480
<v Speaker 1>some twenty year old kid pulls up in a sports

1:01:56.520 --> 1:01:59.760
<v Speaker 1>car wants to talk about his work, not the you

1:02:00.200 --> 1:02:05.120
<v Speaker 1>conversation he has. You said, you spoke for three hours. Yeah.

1:02:05.240 --> 1:02:07.840
<v Speaker 1>Finally his wife called him on the phone and said,

1:02:07.920 --> 1:02:10.440
<v Speaker 1>we're in a world, are you? Said, I was afraid that,

1:02:10.520 --> 1:02:12.600
<v Speaker 1>you know, you got bit by a snake or something,

1:02:13.240 --> 1:02:16.760
<v Speaker 1>and she she said, you know, I can't imagine what

1:02:16.840 --> 1:02:19.560
<v Speaker 1>was taking you so long? And he said, oh, having,

1:02:19.720 --> 1:02:22.680
<v Speaker 1>we're having a good time here. And uh so I

1:02:22.680 --> 1:02:24.760
<v Speaker 1>think we went on for maybe another half an hour

1:02:24.880 --> 1:02:28.400
<v Speaker 1>or so, and finally she, I think she called again

1:02:28.440 --> 1:02:31.760
<v Speaker 1>and said the dinners ready, you know, get up here. So, so,

1:02:31.800 --> 1:02:33.880
<v Speaker 1>when did he offer you a job? There? Was it

1:02:33.960 --> 1:02:39.960
<v Speaker 1>that conversation or subsequence of it? Um? Uh? I said

1:02:39.960 --> 1:02:44.400
<v Speaker 1>to him. I said to him, uh, you know, all

1:02:44.440 --> 1:02:47.680
<v Speaker 1>the time that I was in college, I was interested.

1:02:48.400 --> 1:02:52.960
<v Speaker 1>My interest was not in banking and economics. My interest

1:02:53.160 --> 1:02:55.360
<v Speaker 1>was how do you make money in the stock market?

1:02:56.400 --> 1:02:59.120
<v Speaker 1>And I never had a course in that, and I

1:02:59.160 --> 1:03:01.960
<v Speaker 1>didn't teach that, and I kept thinking there must be

1:03:02.040 --> 1:03:04.520
<v Speaker 1>some place in the world you can go and take

1:03:04.560 --> 1:03:07.360
<v Speaker 1>a course and how to make money in the stock market.

1:03:08.240 --> 1:03:10.720
<v Speaker 1>And I told him, I said, you know, I'm sitting

1:03:10.760 --> 1:03:15.560
<v Speaker 1>here talking to you. This is the place to come

1:03:15.800 --> 1:03:19.320
<v Speaker 1>to get a PhD and how to make money in

1:03:19.360 --> 1:03:21.760
<v Speaker 1>the stock market. And I want to I want to

1:03:21.800 --> 1:03:25.840
<v Speaker 1>be around here. I'm willing to work for nothing. I

1:03:25.920 --> 1:03:28.200
<v Speaker 1>just and he said, well, we can work that out,

1:03:30.200 --> 1:03:33.800
<v Speaker 1>and we almost did. Um. So when did you start

1:03:33.840 --> 1:03:38.400
<v Speaker 1>working for them? That's less than ten days later, And

1:03:38.680 --> 1:03:42.440
<v Speaker 1>that was so you essentially asked for a job. The

1:03:42.520 --> 1:03:45.000
<v Speaker 1>job was created for you looking for a job, you know,

1:03:45.080 --> 1:03:49.720
<v Speaker 1>I was. I was looking for education. That's an amazing thing.

1:03:49.800 --> 1:03:53.200
<v Speaker 1>How many people were actually working for him at the time, Oh,

1:03:53.280 --> 1:03:56.440
<v Speaker 1>I think four or five? So it was a small

1:03:56.480 --> 1:04:00.280
<v Speaker 1>research shop and institutional client base. Was he sending a

1:04:00.280 --> 1:04:04.520
<v Speaker 1>written newsletter or how was he? Well? Everything everything? Pretty much?

1:04:04.520 --> 1:04:06.400
<v Speaker 1>When I got there, everything that we did was on

1:04:06.440 --> 1:04:11.200
<v Speaker 1>a weekly basis um. Because there wasn't no internet, no computers,

1:04:11.360 --> 1:04:15.600
<v Speaker 1>no technology like the telephones were all long distance calls

1:04:15.680 --> 1:04:18.440
<v Speaker 1>and nobody nobody made long distance calls that they could

1:04:18.440 --> 1:04:22.160
<v Speaker 1>avoid it, um. And so everything that we did was

1:04:22.280 --> 1:04:27.360
<v Speaker 1>mailed out on Fridays and we did it. We did

1:04:27.360 --> 1:04:30.360
<v Speaker 1>an analysis of the general market as a as a

1:04:30.400 --> 1:04:34.000
<v Speaker 1>separate product, and then we had a an analysis of

1:04:34.040 --> 1:04:38.920
<v Speaker 1>about oh maybe four or five individual stocks that we

1:04:38.960 --> 1:04:42.040
<v Speaker 1>put out in uh and uh you know, we had

1:04:42.040 --> 1:04:45.200
<v Speaker 1>a printing press and used a backup of a memeorgraph.

1:04:45.360 --> 1:04:49.160
<v Speaker 1>So that's how rough, how rough things were in those days.

1:04:49.160 --> 1:04:51.200
<v Speaker 1>And so that would get stuffed in an envelope and

1:04:51.240 --> 1:04:53.680
<v Speaker 1>sent out the clients. Yeah, we have that. We had

1:04:53.880 --> 1:04:55.560
<v Speaker 1>we had to beg all that stuff up and take

1:04:55.600 --> 1:04:59.280
<v Speaker 1>it to the post office and in the get a processed.

1:04:59.800 --> 1:05:01.840
<v Speaker 1>We take it to the Miami Airport just to try

1:05:01.880 --> 1:05:03.800
<v Speaker 1>and speed up the process and get it to him,

1:05:03.960 --> 1:05:06.680
<v Speaker 1>get it to much as soon as we could. So

1:05:06.720 --> 1:05:08.720
<v Speaker 1>you mail that on a Friday afternoon. When does that

1:05:08.760 --> 1:05:12.520
<v Speaker 1>show up in investors homes or offices? Well, you know,

1:05:12.600 --> 1:05:17.480
<v Speaker 1>in those days, uh, even even in Los Angeles, you'd

1:05:17.480 --> 1:05:21.040
<v Speaker 1>pretty much have it on Monday morning. Oh yeah, post office.

1:05:21.320 --> 1:05:24.000
<v Speaker 1>Post office was a you know, a different entity than

1:05:24.040 --> 1:05:27.200
<v Speaker 1>it is today. Just to say the least. Um. So

1:05:27.480 --> 1:05:31.440
<v Speaker 1>you had mentioned obviously Lowry, I don't know it does

1:05:31.680 --> 1:05:33.400
<v Speaker 1>what did he always go by initials or is there

1:05:33.400 --> 1:05:36.920
<v Speaker 1>a first name there? Uh? He he always he always

1:05:36.920 --> 1:05:39.800
<v Speaker 1>went by initials, that there was a there was a

1:05:39.840 --> 1:05:46.640
<v Speaker 1>tendency in those days to be more formal and uh.

1:05:46.920 --> 1:05:52.640
<v Speaker 1>For example, uh uh, the founder of Fidelity phones, Mr Johnson,

1:05:54.720 --> 1:05:58.760
<v Speaker 1>no one, no one would dare to call him by

1:05:58.800 --> 1:06:04.600
<v Speaker 1>his first name. It's always Mr Johnson and uh. And

1:06:04.680 --> 1:06:09.000
<v Speaker 1>so Mr lur felt very much and he was in

1:06:09.440 --> 1:06:12.840
<v Speaker 1>he was in that same era and you just you

1:06:13.000 --> 1:06:18.080
<v Speaker 1>just didn't use first names until until you were engaged. Quick,

1:06:18.520 --> 1:06:24.000
<v Speaker 1>quick digression. I know there's a formal protocol around Bloomberg,

1:06:24.600 --> 1:06:28.479
<v Speaker 1>what you say and do around Mr Bloomberg, But I'm

1:06:28.520 --> 1:06:31.160
<v Speaker 1>a high functioning idiot and I don't know these things,

1:06:31.240 --> 1:06:33.840
<v Speaker 1>and I have, Um who was it? Oh? Is Professor

1:06:33.880 --> 1:06:38.480
<v Speaker 1>Taylor from Chicago? And sometimes your mouth operates before your

1:06:38.520 --> 1:06:42.560
<v Speaker 1>brain has an opportunity to to engage. We walk out

1:06:42.560 --> 1:06:46.080
<v Speaker 1>of the studio and literally as we're walking out, Michael

1:06:46.080 --> 1:06:49.160
<v Speaker 1>Bloomberg is walking by, and like in the idiot that

1:06:49.240 --> 1:06:52.360
<v Speaker 1>I am, I just blurred out, Hey, Mike, do you

1:06:52.560 --> 1:06:55.800
<v Speaker 1>do you know Professor Taylor? And the second it comes

1:06:55.800 --> 1:06:58.320
<v Speaker 1>out of my mouth, I'm thinking, well, this was a

1:06:58.320 --> 1:07:02.520
<v Speaker 1>good run, thanks for coming by. You're done, and um,

1:07:02.560 --> 1:07:06.080
<v Speaker 1>he turns around Andy Chicago, Right, He's got an amazing

1:07:06.120 --> 1:07:08.920
<v Speaker 1>memory's great with names and faces. And he turns around

1:07:08.920 --> 1:07:10.440
<v Speaker 1>it and so the two of them start having a

1:07:10.480 --> 1:07:13.800
<v Speaker 1>conversation and I'm like, wow, that I dodged a bullet there.

1:07:13.840 --> 1:07:18.080
<v Speaker 1>And every time I've interacted with him, it's always been

1:07:18.120 --> 1:07:21.200
<v Speaker 1>me speaking before the brain has a chance to get

1:07:21.240 --> 1:07:22.840
<v Speaker 1>in the way, and it's always hey, Mike, And I

1:07:23.280 --> 1:07:27.160
<v Speaker 1>know that's the wrong, wrong thing to say, but well

1:07:27.160 --> 1:07:29.280
<v Speaker 1>he seems to be very good natured about it. You know.

1:07:29.520 --> 1:07:33.760
<v Speaker 1>I think everybody goes a little bit of that. Uh.

1:07:33.840 --> 1:07:40.040
<v Speaker 1>One of one of our employees introduced me to somebody

1:07:40.320 --> 1:07:44.040
<v Speaker 1>last week is this is my boss. And I took

1:07:44.080 --> 1:07:46.760
<v Speaker 1>him aside afterwards and I said, you know, I just

1:07:46.800 --> 1:07:49.840
<v Speaker 1>don't like that term. I don't like to be called that.

1:07:50.040 --> 1:07:54.600
<v Speaker 1>It has a negative implication. It feels weird. It's it's

1:07:54.880 --> 1:07:57.600
<v Speaker 1>not negative, but it feels like saying this is the man,

1:07:57.880 --> 1:08:01.320
<v Speaker 1>this is the man who can who can ruined my life,

1:08:01.360 --> 1:08:03.360
<v Speaker 1>throw me out on the street any time that he

1:08:03.880 --> 1:08:07.520
<v Speaker 1>chooses to. You know. So, so you mentioned Lowry's and

1:08:07.560 --> 1:08:10.600
<v Speaker 1>then in some of your writings you've mentioned gould Is

1:08:10.640 --> 1:08:15.320
<v Speaker 1>that I'm getting the name rights. It's in Goold was

1:08:15.360 --> 1:08:21.960
<v Speaker 1>an early, early technician, Um, who did fabulously well. Right,

1:08:22.000 --> 1:08:27.160
<v Speaker 1>he was incredibly successful if if memory serves, yes, he did.

1:08:27.240 --> 1:08:29.599
<v Speaker 1>He did do quite well. He was an interesting character

1:08:29.800 --> 1:08:33.720
<v Speaker 1>and I think he I think he drew a lot

1:08:33.760 --> 1:08:36.920
<v Speaker 1>of people to him because he because he was he

1:08:37.040 --> 1:08:40.519
<v Speaker 1>was a fabulous character as well as a as a

1:08:40.560 --> 1:08:46.280
<v Speaker 1>good analyst. But but uh, one of the areas that

1:08:46.439 --> 1:08:49.360
<v Speaker 1>Edson Coold did a lot of work in talking about

1:08:50.120 --> 1:08:56.200
<v Speaker 1>the nature of market bottoms. But it was all vague,

1:08:57.000 --> 1:09:01.400
<v Speaker 1>you know, as he'd say, there's there's there's dramatic Uh,

1:09:01.720 --> 1:09:09.479
<v Speaker 1>there's dramatic panic and volume tends to expand And you'd say, well,

1:09:09.479 --> 1:09:11.840
<v Speaker 1>it tends to expand. What what does that mean? What

1:09:11.920 --> 1:09:16.880
<v Speaker 1>does tend to expand mean? And um? When you when

1:09:16.920 --> 1:09:22.360
<v Speaker 1>you'd go back and and and try to figure out

1:09:22.400 --> 1:09:25.519
<v Speaker 1>exactly what he was talking about, what you realized was

1:09:26.320 --> 1:09:30.320
<v Speaker 1>that these early technicians were working in an area where

1:09:30.360 --> 1:09:34.200
<v Speaker 1>the the amount of information available to them was very,

1:09:34.320 --> 1:09:37.960
<v Speaker 1>very small. We're so spoiled. We have access to infinite

1:09:37.960 --> 1:09:40.600
<v Speaker 1>amounts of you can slice and dice the market a

1:09:40.640 --> 1:09:45.519
<v Speaker 1>million ways today. They I when I took the technical

1:09:46.040 --> 1:09:51.840
<v Speaker 1>analysis course way back when with Ralph Akimpora, the generation

1:09:51.920 --> 1:09:56.679
<v Speaker 1>that was just behind me, told stories about they would

1:09:56.720 --> 1:10:00.479
<v Speaker 1>do their charts by hands every day. I did charge

1:10:00.520 --> 1:10:03.040
<v Speaker 1>my hand for how long did you do that? Well?

1:10:03.240 --> 1:10:06.160
<v Speaker 1>This study on ninety percent days that we were talking

1:10:06.200 --> 1:10:08.760
<v Speaker 1>about earlier, that was all done with a slide rule.

1:10:08.960 --> 1:10:12.599
<v Speaker 1>A slide rule. Wow, yeah, I know I still got

1:10:12.600 --> 1:10:17.000
<v Speaker 1>it today. I wonder how much we lose by all

1:10:17.080 --> 1:10:21.040
<v Speaker 1>the computer power if you're not in the thick of it,

1:10:21.200 --> 1:10:24.160
<v Speaker 1>seeing it from that angle, you could crunch a lot

1:10:24.200 --> 1:10:27.840
<v Speaker 1>more numbers, but you might miss a little something. You

1:10:27.880 --> 1:10:31.360
<v Speaker 1>know what's happening if you if you look at the

1:10:31.400 --> 1:10:36.200
<v Speaker 1>medical profession and you go back a couple of hundred years,

1:10:36.560 --> 1:10:39.679
<v Speaker 1>you say, in the late seventeen hundreds, early eighteen hundreds,

1:10:40.840 --> 1:10:45.720
<v Speaker 1>the the place that medicine was at was that the

1:10:45.800 --> 1:10:50.000
<v Speaker 1>body was a single entity, and if it got sick,

1:10:50.680 --> 1:10:53.680
<v Speaker 1>if it was showing signs of sickness, you'd bleed it.

1:10:54.000 --> 1:10:57.799
<v Speaker 1>You cut a vein open and let's let some blood

1:10:57.800 --> 1:11:00.800
<v Speaker 1>out and get the bad blood out of the out

1:11:00.840 --> 1:11:03.920
<v Speaker 1>of the body. That was what you do for cancer,

1:11:04.120 --> 1:11:06.080
<v Speaker 1>what you do for a headache, for a cold, for

1:11:07.320 --> 1:11:15.200
<v Speaker 1>a broken foot, You bleed um. And then the medical

1:11:15.240 --> 1:11:20.320
<v Speaker 1>profession started saying, well, you know, it's it's not that simple.

1:11:21.240 --> 1:11:23.960
<v Speaker 1>There's a thing called a kidney that, or there's a

1:11:24.040 --> 1:11:29.280
<v Speaker 1>thing called a heart, or there's anything called uh, you

1:11:29.320 --> 1:11:33.639
<v Speaker 1>know whatever, pancreas, whatever else, and there's still there's these

1:11:33.680 --> 1:11:37.280
<v Speaker 1>individual organs. Well, then the next step was to say,

1:11:37.680 --> 1:11:40.520
<v Speaker 1>it isn't really the organs, it's the it's the excels

1:11:40.640 --> 1:11:44.800
<v Speaker 1>that make up the ris. Uh. And so now we're

1:11:44.840 --> 1:11:47.600
<v Speaker 1>at the point where we're saying if you if you

1:11:47.680 --> 1:11:49.800
<v Speaker 1>try to go back to a case of saying that

1:11:49.840 --> 1:11:52.519
<v Speaker 1>the body is a single entity, they laugh you out

1:11:52.520 --> 1:11:56.360
<v Speaker 1>of the room. It's it's a case the same. Getting

1:11:56.400 --> 1:12:00.679
<v Speaker 1>down to the cellular part of the body opened up

1:12:00.720 --> 1:12:04.439
<v Speaker 1>all kinds of things allowed us to see all kinds

1:12:04.479 --> 1:12:07.680
<v Speaker 1>of things that we never could have seen before. The

1:12:07.760 --> 1:12:12.040
<v Speaker 1>stock market is exactly the same thing. In the early days,

1:12:12.479 --> 1:12:15.640
<v Speaker 1>everyone considered the market to be a single entity, that

1:12:15.760 --> 1:12:20.519
<v Speaker 1>all stocks moved together. Uh. That that that all stocks

1:12:20.800 --> 1:12:23.760
<v Speaker 1>made a high at the same time, they made it

1:12:23.880 --> 1:12:25.920
<v Speaker 1>low at the same time, so on and so forth.

1:12:26.439 --> 1:12:29.320
<v Speaker 1>That big camp made camp and small capital all moved

1:12:29.520 --> 1:12:32.400
<v Speaker 1>in unison with each other. And now we know all

1:12:32.640 --> 1:12:37.080
<v Speaker 1>that's wrong. And what we've done in order to learn

1:12:37.120 --> 1:12:40.280
<v Speaker 1>that is that we're breaking down the market from a

1:12:40.439 --> 1:12:44.880
<v Speaker 1>single entity approach to almost a cellular approach where we

1:12:44.880 --> 1:12:50.080
<v Speaker 1>can see each an individual stock, and with that individual stock,

1:12:50.160 --> 1:12:53.880
<v Speaker 1>we can see upside volume, downside volume points, gain points,

1:12:53.920 --> 1:12:59.040
<v Speaker 1>loss advances, and declines for each individual stock. And in

1:12:59.160 --> 1:13:01.400
<v Speaker 1>addition to that, we see momentum, and we see a

1:13:01.400 --> 1:13:06.120
<v Speaker 1>whole bunch of other side issues. And so, uh, we're

1:13:06.280 --> 1:13:08.920
<v Speaker 1>learning new things about the stock market that we've never

1:13:08.960 --> 1:13:11.920
<v Speaker 1>seen before, and that is we're doing that right now.

1:13:12.320 --> 1:13:19.480
<v Speaker 1>This this study of that we completed in is precisely

1:13:19.600 --> 1:13:24.360
<v Speaker 1>that that people thought that the stock market in n

1:13:25.880 --> 1:13:29.320
<v Speaker 1>was was a single entity, and that couldn't been further

1:13:29.360 --> 1:13:35.439
<v Speaker 1>from the truth. So our knowledge of market trends and

1:13:35.479 --> 1:13:39.520
<v Speaker 1>how to deal with the stock market is is expanding

1:13:39.560 --> 1:13:42.720
<v Speaker 1>at a tremendous rate. And we are now in a

1:13:42.800 --> 1:13:50.880
<v Speaker 1>position where where I strongly believe um that it is

1:13:51.520 --> 1:13:59.639
<v Speaker 1>entirely possible likely that using the proper tools, bearer markets

1:14:00.000 --> 1:14:03.519
<v Speaker 1>are a thing of the past, that that they exist,

1:14:03.600 --> 1:14:07.720
<v Speaker 1>but our ability to sidestep those bear markets is a

1:14:07.960 --> 1:14:13.479
<v Speaker 1>very uh valid concept and and in fact we we

1:14:13.479 --> 1:14:15.879
<v Speaker 1>we have recently set up a new money management operation

1:14:15.960 --> 1:14:19.160
<v Speaker 1>to prove it. We're taking a position of saying we're

1:14:19.160 --> 1:14:25.280
<v Speaker 1>gonna put you and and you're gonna actually manage money

1:14:25.479 --> 1:14:30.320
<v Speaker 1>using your methodology to participate in markets to the upside,

1:14:30.360 --> 1:14:32.479
<v Speaker 1>get out of the way of the top, let the

1:14:32.520 --> 1:14:35.360
<v Speaker 1>bear market play out, and get back in near the bottom.

1:14:35.400 --> 1:14:37.680
<v Speaker 1>Is that the So what is what is the name

1:14:37.720 --> 1:14:43.120
<v Speaker 1>of this money management entity going to be called called capital? Um?

1:14:44.000 --> 1:14:47.880
<v Speaker 1>But the big thing is that the biggest problem that

1:14:48.040 --> 1:14:52.799
<v Speaker 1>all investors have had, the very biggest problem, has always

1:14:52.840 --> 1:14:56.840
<v Speaker 1>been bear markets. And what we wanted to do is

1:14:56.880 --> 1:15:04.759
<v Speaker 1>demonstrate that that that uncertainty, that lack of knowledge about

1:15:04.800 --> 1:15:08.720
<v Speaker 1>bearer markets has been overcome and we are in a

1:15:08.800 --> 1:15:14.840
<v Speaker 1>position to sidestep versa of the entire bearer market. So so,

1:15:14.880 --> 1:15:18.479
<v Speaker 1>who are the consistently, who are the investors in Lowry's

1:15:18.520 --> 1:15:21.040
<v Speaker 1>capital going to be? Are these going to be institutions? Well,

1:15:21.080 --> 1:15:25.200
<v Speaker 1>I'm the first one, so literally putting your money with

1:15:25.439 --> 1:15:29.439
<v Speaker 1>putting my mouth money more mouth is And uh, I

1:15:29.479 --> 1:15:31.960
<v Speaker 1>believe in this. You know I've spent you know, I've

1:15:31.960 --> 1:15:36.320
<v Speaker 1>spent a good literally fifty years yeah, well plastically studying

1:15:36.360 --> 1:15:39.599
<v Speaker 1>major market tops. I've probably put twenty years into it.

1:15:39.760 --> 1:15:46.120
<v Speaker 1>And um, so we've we've we've attacked the major problem

1:15:46.160 --> 1:15:50.200
<v Speaker 1>that all investors are facing, and we've we've conquered that

1:15:50.360 --> 1:15:55.519
<v Speaker 1>issue and so everything else is small, small problems. Now,

1:15:55.760 --> 1:15:58.000
<v Speaker 1>so let's let's talk about that a little bit and

1:15:58.040 --> 1:16:02.080
<v Speaker 1>then we'll come back to any other analysts or mentors

1:16:02.080 --> 1:16:06.280
<v Speaker 1>you've had. So we really just hinted at this earlier.

1:16:06.960 --> 1:16:10.439
<v Speaker 1>So your studies that say we know how markets top,

1:16:10.520 --> 1:16:13.320
<v Speaker 1>it's small caps, it's main caps, it's big caps, we

1:16:13.400 --> 1:16:17.760
<v Speaker 1>actually run a tactical model that does something similar, and

1:16:17.800 --> 1:16:21.480
<v Speaker 1>in August it moved to an all bond position from

1:16:21.680 --> 1:16:26.520
<v Speaker 1>three different size caps. Positionings are in it and it generated.

1:16:26.600 --> 1:16:30.360
<v Speaker 1>It's all quantitative, there's no chin stroking, but it's some

1:16:30.520 --> 1:16:34.000
<v Speaker 1>of it is uses some of the theories and and

1:16:34.080 --> 1:16:37.400
<v Speaker 1>research that you've put together. And this went to cash

1:16:37.640 --> 1:16:42.400
<v Speaker 1>or bonds um in August, and we watched the market

1:16:42.800 --> 1:16:45.920
<v Speaker 1>in September, you know, have a rough first half and

1:16:46.840 --> 1:16:49.960
<v Speaker 1>started to recover in October. Where do you think we

1:16:50.040 --> 1:16:56.240
<v Speaker 1>are in the topping process um of the bullmarket that

1:16:56.320 --> 1:17:00.120
<v Speaker 1>began in March two thousand nine. Well, there's a P

1:17:00.360 --> 1:17:05.120
<v Speaker 1>five for all practical purposes made high in in in

1:17:05.280 --> 1:17:10.120
<v Speaker 1>like the late July, it was it was a little

1:17:10.120 --> 1:17:13.200
<v Speaker 1>bit of the previous high, but by by by nickels

1:17:13.240 --> 1:17:15.559
<v Speaker 1>and dimes, and previous high of a month or two

1:17:15.600 --> 1:17:21.920
<v Speaker 1>of previous down about a couple of percent. Yeah and yeah,

1:17:21.960 --> 1:17:25.400
<v Speaker 1>but what we're seeing in this small caps are dramatically

1:17:25.680 --> 1:17:29.840
<v Speaker 1>off their much us on. So I think we're probably

1:17:30.080 --> 1:17:34.160
<v Speaker 1>still in the relatively early stages. We're still at the

1:17:34.240 --> 1:17:37.960
<v Speaker 1>point where where most of the investors that I talked

1:17:38.000 --> 1:17:42.080
<v Speaker 1>to about bear markets are saying, oh, you know, there's

1:17:42.080 --> 1:17:46.559
<v Speaker 1>no bear market. They don't see any bear market. Um.

1:17:46.640 --> 1:17:49.240
<v Speaker 1>And part of that is because they're they're not looking.

1:17:50.520 --> 1:17:54.120
<v Speaker 1>They're they're concentrating on corporate earnings, and corporate earnings will

1:17:54.200 --> 1:17:58.040
<v Speaker 1>never never warn you of a bear market. Uh. That's

1:17:58.120 --> 1:18:03.599
<v Speaker 1>simply what the history of the of corporate earning shows. Um.

1:18:03.920 --> 1:18:07.639
<v Speaker 1>But to some extent, it's that investors are saying, well,

1:18:07.840 --> 1:18:12.040
<v Speaker 1>the the SMP, it's worse than here, has been off

1:18:12.080 --> 1:18:14.559
<v Speaker 1>twelve and a half percent from it's high. That's a

1:18:15.040 --> 1:18:19.000
<v Speaker 1>that's a short term correction. Uh, and and it's gonna

1:18:19.040 --> 1:18:22.240
<v Speaker 1>go back. I'm going to go back to new highs Now. Well,

1:18:23.439 --> 1:18:27.960
<v Speaker 1>my answer to that is, um, Uh, with all the

1:18:28.000 --> 1:18:31.800
<v Speaker 1>deterioration that has occurred behind the scenes, now there's if

1:18:31.800 --> 1:18:35.479
<v Speaker 1>you say small cap, who cares about small caps? Small

1:18:35.520 --> 1:18:39.080
<v Speaker 1>caps are about of all of the shares traded on

1:18:39.200 --> 1:18:42.720
<v Speaker 1>the New York Stock They're really the canary in the

1:18:42.760 --> 1:18:45.680
<v Speaker 1>coal mine. Yeah, that's right, and mid caps are in

1:18:45.760 --> 1:18:50.120
<v Speaker 1>the same general range. Big caps are are something between

1:18:50.120 --> 1:18:53.760
<v Speaker 1>twelve and so you really need to pay attention to

1:18:53.800 --> 1:18:55.760
<v Speaker 1>what the what the small caps are doing in the

1:18:55.800 --> 1:18:58.439
<v Speaker 1>mid caps are doing because they are the majority of

1:18:58.479 --> 1:19:02.559
<v Speaker 1>stocks traded on the New York's Doctor. Actually, the SMP

1:19:02.720 --> 1:19:07.639
<v Speaker 1>five hundred index is made up sixty five of mid

1:19:07.680 --> 1:19:13.400
<v Speaker 1>cap stocks. Uh, and so so what you're really looking

1:19:13.439 --> 1:19:15.880
<v Speaker 1>at when you look at the SMP is that is

1:19:15.960 --> 1:19:20.599
<v Speaker 1>maybe twenty five or thirty or forty stocks there that

1:19:20.600 --> 1:19:24.840
<v Speaker 1>that are capitalized the air heavy capitalis, but the bulk

1:19:24.880 --> 1:19:28.559
<v Speaker 1>of by by numbers or mid cap capitals. So you're

1:19:28.600 --> 1:19:30.600
<v Speaker 1>not looking at the full five hundred you're looking at

1:19:30.800 --> 1:19:35.479
<v Speaker 1>you're looking at or less. And then what's driving the

1:19:35.520 --> 1:19:38.200
<v Speaker 1>price of the index? Yeah, in at the top of

1:19:38.200 --> 1:19:41.439
<v Speaker 1>the seven excuse me, in the top in two thousand

1:19:41.479 --> 1:19:44.840
<v Speaker 1>and eight, two thousand and seven, they're in October of

1:19:44.840 --> 1:19:48.759
<v Speaker 1>two thousand seven, there were eighteen stocks of the SMP

1:19:48.840 --> 1:19:53.080
<v Speaker 1>five hundred making new highs that day? What's typical? What

1:19:53.080 --> 1:19:57.240
<v Speaker 1>do you usually see? So, in other words, that's three

1:19:57.320 --> 1:19:59.600
<v Speaker 1>and a half percent, is that right? Oh? Yeah? And

1:20:00.080 --> 1:20:05.160
<v Speaker 1>and in early stage of renewable market, uh stocks making

1:20:05.200 --> 1:20:08.479
<v Speaker 1>new highs on any single day would be in the range.

1:20:08.560 --> 1:20:12.920
<v Speaker 1>Really wow, that's a huge that's a huge number. Um.

1:20:13.000 --> 1:20:17.400
<v Speaker 1>So we mentioned Gould, we mentioned Lowry's. Any other um

1:20:17.520 --> 1:20:21.439
<v Speaker 1>analysts or technicians that were influential to your thinking? Oh boy,

1:20:21.760 --> 1:20:28.719
<v Speaker 1>um uh, you know there there there were other people

1:20:28.720 --> 1:20:31.280
<v Speaker 1>that were contemporaries in mine and I thought, I thought,

1:20:31.640 --> 1:20:35.759
<v Speaker 1>added to the edit to my knowledge, and well, Bob

1:20:35.800 --> 1:20:39.680
<v Speaker 1>Farrell of Merrill Lynch would be number one, And a

1:20:39.720 --> 1:20:43.280
<v Speaker 1>lot of people mentioned him. Dave Rosenberg of formerly of

1:20:43.320 --> 1:20:45.760
<v Speaker 1>Meryl has has brought his name up. Other people that

1:20:45.840 --> 1:20:49.559
<v Speaker 1>brought his name up repeatedly. He was a master and

1:20:49.800 --> 1:20:52.840
<v Speaker 1>he's still He was a master at He was a

1:20:52.840 --> 1:20:57.639
<v Speaker 1>master at training other people. He didn't keep it to himself.

1:20:57.680 --> 1:21:02.719
<v Speaker 1>And what you find is dozens and dozens of people

1:21:03.360 --> 1:21:07.120
<v Speaker 1>say I learned technical analysis at the at the knee

1:21:07.120 --> 1:21:11.240
<v Speaker 1>of Bob Ferrell. Yes, he is still around. He's still

1:21:11.240 --> 1:21:16.960
<v Speaker 1>serving a small group of of of institutional investors and

1:21:17.640 --> 1:21:21.280
<v Speaker 1>very active, very very active in the market. Um. Anyone

1:21:21.320 --> 1:21:24.960
<v Speaker 1>else Worth mentioned Allen Shaw, I knew you're gonna go there.

1:21:25.200 --> 1:21:31.200
<v Speaker 1>Um well, Allen Allen was in charge of technical analysis

1:21:31.360 --> 1:21:38.800
<v Speaker 1>for Smith Barney and um a legend amongst technicians. Yeah.

1:21:36.960 --> 1:21:41.920
<v Speaker 1>He added to the He added a lot to the field,

1:21:42.160 --> 1:21:47.640
<v Speaker 1>and he trained a lot of people. Luigia Mata is

1:21:47.680 --> 1:21:53.719
<v Speaker 1>still active. Louise worked with with Allen for oh, probably

1:21:53.720 --> 1:21:58.320
<v Speaker 1>twenty years or so. Um. You know those those are

1:21:58.360 --> 1:22:00.920
<v Speaker 1>kind of people that really added to the added to

1:22:01.000 --> 1:22:05.080
<v Speaker 1>the overall knowledge of technical analysis and and brought the

1:22:05.760 --> 1:22:10.920
<v Speaker 1>brought the industry forward and brought some professionalism into it.

1:22:11.960 --> 1:22:15.240
<v Speaker 1>But quite fasting. Anyone else, uh sticks out? Or is

1:22:15.240 --> 1:22:17.439
<v Speaker 1>that is that a good enough list to Uh? Oh?

1:22:17.640 --> 1:22:19.679
<v Speaker 1>Those are those are the people that you know, I think,

1:22:20.160 --> 1:22:26.800
<v Speaker 1>I think I'm really important to my learning process. Um

1:22:26.840 --> 1:22:31.360
<v Speaker 1>anyone you you you mentioned Luis Humana, anybody else who

1:22:31.439 --> 1:22:36.719
<v Speaker 1>who is from the current generation of technicians stands out? Um?

1:22:36.880 --> 1:22:40.360
<v Speaker 1>Well have you felt Phil Roth used to be with

1:22:40.360 --> 1:22:46.840
<v Speaker 1>Morgan Stanley Fell. Roth is an incredible analyst. He is

1:22:46.880 --> 1:22:54.679
<v Speaker 1>a is an incredible uh uh knowledge of the investor

1:22:54.760 --> 1:23:01.240
<v Speaker 1>psychology and the application of that information. Um. You know

1:23:01.320 --> 1:23:04.880
<v Speaker 1>there's there's a there's a dozen people that would be

1:23:04.920 --> 1:23:07.599
<v Speaker 1>on the list that we have. We haven't got that much.

1:23:07.600 --> 1:23:10.160
<v Speaker 1>So let's let's hold off with the list right there,

1:23:10.320 --> 1:23:13.439
<v Speaker 1>and let me keep plowing through some of um, some

1:23:13.600 --> 1:23:15.880
<v Speaker 1>of my favorite questions. I don't want to forget any

1:23:15.880 --> 1:23:18.320
<v Speaker 1>of these. So we already talked about what you did

1:23:18.360 --> 1:23:20.639
<v Speaker 1>before you worked on Wall Street, you were in the army,

1:23:20.840 --> 1:23:25.440
<v Speaker 1>and we discussed your early mentors. Any other investors influence

1:23:25.560 --> 1:23:28.680
<v Speaker 1>your your approach, anybody who was running a fund or

1:23:28.840 --> 1:23:31.720
<v Speaker 1>managing money, or anyone along those lines. What are you

1:23:31.760 --> 1:23:36.960
<v Speaker 1>really looking at the research and analysis side, For the

1:23:37.080 --> 1:23:40.760
<v Speaker 1>most part, our relationships with our clients tends to be

1:23:40.840 --> 1:23:44.920
<v Speaker 1>kind of one sided. UM. So it was that we

1:23:44.960 --> 1:23:48.320
<v Speaker 1>don't we don't see we don't see the clients side

1:23:48.320 --> 1:23:52.240
<v Speaker 1>of it very much. UM. In fact, many of our

1:23:52.240 --> 1:23:56.440
<v Speaker 1>clients do not like anyone to know that they subscribe

1:23:56.479 --> 1:24:00.800
<v Speaker 1>to lowry analysis. That's interesting. There's a very famous there's

1:24:00.800 --> 1:24:04.599
<v Speaker 1>a very famous author who lives in New York. He's

1:24:04.720 --> 1:24:06.760
<v Speaker 1>I don't know how many books he's written, but a

1:24:06.800 --> 1:24:11.679
<v Speaker 1>lot of books, very well recognized, and he in every

1:24:11.720 --> 1:24:14.120
<v Speaker 1>book that he writes, he has a chapter in there

1:24:14.240 --> 1:24:19.800
<v Speaker 1>that says, whatever you do, do not ever use technical analysis.

1:24:20.960 --> 1:24:24.080
<v Speaker 1>And I was sitting with him several years ago and

1:24:24.160 --> 1:24:28.320
<v Speaker 1>I said to him, you know, I don't understand this. Uh.

1:24:28.920 --> 1:24:32.000
<v Speaker 1>You in every one of your books you say, don't ever,

1:24:32.240 --> 1:24:36.160
<v Speaker 1>don't ever use technical analysis. But he's a subscriber. He's

1:24:36.200 --> 1:24:39.400
<v Speaker 1>been a subscriber to ours for before I got to Lowries,

1:24:39.439 --> 1:24:46.920
<v Speaker 1>he was a subscriber. And I said, you know, why

1:24:47.439 --> 1:24:50.400
<v Speaker 1>why you take this position when when you use our

1:24:50.479 --> 1:24:54.400
<v Speaker 1>work regularly? He said, you don't do technical I mean

1:24:54.400 --> 1:24:57.520
<v Speaker 1>you do. You don't do technical analysis. That's not technical analysis.

1:24:57.520 --> 1:24:59.800
<v Speaker 1>You you know, you know that's what I'm talking about.

1:25:00.920 --> 1:25:07.959
<v Speaker 1>So then he in his books he names three technicians. Uh,

1:25:08.000 --> 1:25:13.599
<v Speaker 1>and uh, I can tell you now because uh one

1:25:13.600 --> 1:25:20.439
<v Speaker 1>of the it's recently gone Joe Granville, of course. And

1:25:20.479 --> 1:25:25.200
<v Speaker 1>what he's what he what he said was told the

1:25:25.240 --> 1:25:28.920
<v Speaker 1>story about some of the mistakes that Joe Granville has

1:25:29.000 --> 1:25:32.599
<v Speaker 1>made in calling market turns. So for people who don't

1:25:32.640 --> 1:25:35.160
<v Speaker 1>know Joe Brandville, he was a guy who in the

1:25:35.320 --> 1:25:40.439
<v Speaker 1>seventies was essentially about as good a market time or

1:25:40.479 --> 1:25:45.120
<v Speaker 1>as there was. He caught every seemingly caught every twist

1:25:45.120 --> 1:25:48.320
<v Speaker 1>and turn of that market that had huge moves up

1:25:48.400 --> 1:25:51.600
<v Speaker 1>and huge moved down. And then in nineteen it was

1:25:51.640 --> 1:25:54.759
<v Speaker 1>either eighty or eighty two the market made its final turn,

1:25:55.479 --> 1:25:58.280
<v Speaker 1>and he never made that turn, and he could never

1:25:58.400 --> 1:26:01.680
<v Speaker 1>get on the right side of the market after that. Yeah,

1:26:01.760 --> 1:26:04.960
<v Speaker 1>and then there were there were at least two other

1:26:05.920 --> 1:26:10.240
<v Speaker 1>technicians that are still still with us that i'll i'll,

1:26:10.960 --> 1:26:16.360
<v Speaker 1>I'll not name, but he in those three cases, he

1:26:16.400 --> 1:26:19.479
<v Speaker 1>went through a litany of all the mistakes that they

1:26:19.680 --> 1:26:22.760
<v Speaker 1>that these three guys had made, and how you just

1:26:22.800 --> 1:26:25.439
<v Speaker 1>don't want ever, you know, want ever give them a

1:26:25.600 --> 1:26:30.600
<v Speaker 1>chance to to take your money away from you. And um,

1:26:30.720 --> 1:26:34.240
<v Speaker 1>I said, do you know those three people? He said, no,

1:26:34.360 --> 1:26:37.160
<v Speaker 1>I've never met any of them. And I said, well,

1:26:37.200 --> 1:26:41.120
<v Speaker 1>I know all three of them, and they are the

1:26:41.160 --> 1:26:45.040
<v Speaker 1>most egotistical human beings I've ever met in my life.

1:26:45.240 --> 1:26:50.599
<v Speaker 1>Really well, Brandville used to be just larger than life

1:26:50.600 --> 1:26:54.320
<v Speaker 1>guy who's supposed to be you know, moved markets and

1:26:54.439 --> 1:26:56.479
<v Speaker 1>was proud of the fact that he moved mark when

1:26:56.479 --> 1:26:59.080
<v Speaker 1>he would say sell and the market went down, and

1:26:59.240 --> 1:27:03.280
<v Speaker 1>the Wall Street General would call he proud as a peacock. Right. Yeah, Well,

1:27:03.439 --> 1:27:07.559
<v Speaker 1>when he was a child, there was an evangelist that

1:27:07.640 --> 1:27:13.559
<v Speaker 1>traveled around the Midwest and um, every once in a

1:27:13.560 --> 1:27:17.720
<v Speaker 1>while at the gatherings he is this evangelists would draw

1:27:17.840 --> 1:27:21.599
<v Speaker 1>huge crowds, and every once in a while, I think

1:27:21.640 --> 1:27:24.920
<v Speaker 1>maybe twelve or fourteen times during his career he would

1:27:25.600 --> 1:27:28.680
<v Speaker 1>see a face in the in the crowd and he

1:27:28.720 --> 1:27:31.000
<v Speaker 1>would call them up and he would put his hand

1:27:31.080 --> 1:27:34.960
<v Speaker 1>on their head and he would say, this is a

1:27:35.200 --> 1:27:40.320
<v Speaker 1>special person. This person is going to do incredible things

1:27:40.400 --> 1:27:45.160
<v Speaker 1>in the World's going to have an incredible impact on life,

1:27:45.240 --> 1:27:48.679
<v Speaker 1>as as it isn't. Joe Granville was one of those people.

1:27:49.400 --> 1:27:51.599
<v Speaker 1>But meanwhile, this guy is doing this in every town

1:27:51.640 --> 1:27:54.200
<v Speaker 1>he goes and every year, well, wow, the world is

1:27:54.280 --> 1:27:59.320
<v Speaker 1>filled with special people. Well, actually, some somebody kept track

1:27:59.479 --> 1:28:03.439
<v Speaker 1>of theirs. There several books ought about this evangelist call

1:28:03.520 --> 1:28:06.400
<v Speaker 1>his name, no, I don't at the moment, but then

1:28:06.920 --> 1:28:09.519
<v Speaker 1>a list of all the people he had put his

1:28:09.760 --> 1:28:13.360
<v Speaker 1>put his hand on. He was also curing sickness and

1:28:13.400 --> 1:28:18.559
<v Speaker 1>all that had those folks. Joe always felt as though

1:28:18.640 --> 1:28:24.200
<v Speaker 1>he was this very special human being that had a

1:28:24.400 --> 1:28:26.800
<v Speaker 1>special purpose on being on the face of the earth.

1:28:27.560 --> 1:28:32.200
<v Speaker 1>So his ego, uh was, was at a completely different

1:28:32.240 --> 1:28:34.519
<v Speaker 1>level than the rest of us. You know, that's the

1:28:34.520 --> 1:28:37.479
<v Speaker 1>problem with getting a couple of big calls right, if

1:28:37.520 --> 1:28:42.720
<v Speaker 1>you don't realize how rare and occasionally lucky those calls are.

1:28:42.800 --> 1:28:47.160
<v Speaker 1>And by luck I mean somewhat random, even if if

1:28:47.240 --> 1:28:50.640
<v Speaker 1>you have a methodology behind it, that could go to

1:28:50.680 --> 1:28:55.320
<v Speaker 1>your head very easily and suddenly you're you think I

1:28:55.360 --> 1:28:58.240
<v Speaker 1>love the line. Was a Peter Drucker who used to say,

1:28:58.720 --> 1:29:01.600
<v Speaker 1>we use the word guru because the word Charlottean is

1:29:01.640 --> 1:29:05.800
<v Speaker 1>too long to fit in the headline. Is Was it

1:29:05.960 --> 1:29:08.960
<v Speaker 1>that sort of thing? I don't know if Granville was

1:29:09.000 --> 1:29:13.120
<v Speaker 1>a Charlottean, because for a decade at least, going by

1:29:13.160 --> 1:29:16.439
<v Speaker 1>the histories that I've read, he was I don't want

1:29:16.439 --> 1:29:20.400
<v Speaker 1>to say infallible, but a whole lot more right than wrong. Well, Charlottan.

1:29:21.080 --> 1:29:25.000
<v Speaker 1>The word Charlottan to me says, I know I'm a crook.

1:29:26.800 --> 1:29:30.639
<v Speaker 1>So he ate his own cooking. He believed in himself.

1:29:31.560 --> 1:29:34.600
<v Speaker 1>Uh I was in at a conference I think it was.

1:29:35.880 --> 1:29:39.040
<v Speaker 1>It was in Miami Beach, and there used to be

1:29:39.120 --> 1:29:44.120
<v Speaker 1>conferences back in this seventies and eighties. Uh I used

1:29:44.120 --> 1:29:46.120
<v Speaker 1>to refer to him as a thousand experts from out

1:29:46.160 --> 1:29:51.720
<v Speaker 1>of town, and and so the the people that were

1:29:51.800 --> 1:29:55.600
<v Speaker 1>running this conference had a cocktail party for all the speakers,

1:29:56.600 --> 1:30:01.000
<v Speaker 1>and so I made I I was sitting in the

1:30:01.280 --> 1:30:06.439
<v Speaker 1>in the in the cocktail area, and this young man,

1:30:06.640 --> 1:30:09.280
<v Speaker 1>this is just an example of the ego. Young man,

1:30:09.840 --> 1:30:12.679
<v Speaker 1>all dressed up in a very nice suit, came over

1:30:12.760 --> 1:30:15.599
<v Speaker 1>to my table where I was sitting and he said,

1:30:16.520 --> 1:30:23.679
<v Speaker 1>excuse me, Mr Joseph P. Grenville, would like to join

1:30:23.960 --> 1:30:29.800
<v Speaker 1>your grouping. Who would that be acceptable to you? And

1:30:29.880 --> 1:30:32.000
<v Speaker 1>I turned around him and I said, if Joe wants

1:30:32.000 --> 1:30:33.640
<v Speaker 1>to come and sit out over here, tell him to

1:30:33.720 --> 1:30:37.519
<v Speaker 1>come on over. And then he walked out from behind

1:30:37.880 --> 1:30:42.080
<v Speaker 1>a curtain like a grand entrance and grand entrance, and

1:30:42.200 --> 1:30:46.040
<v Speaker 1>he was dressed in a white linen suit with a

1:30:46.240 --> 1:30:53.040
<v Speaker 1>red um silk shirt and a red tie and the

1:30:53.560 --> 1:30:57.519
<v Speaker 1>excuse me, a red kerchief in in his pocket and

1:30:58.640 --> 1:31:07.000
<v Speaker 1>bright red shiny shoes and um, you know, just I mean, really, really,

1:31:07.800 --> 1:31:10.080
<v Speaker 1>really an outfit. And he came over to the table

1:31:10.120 --> 1:31:15.240
<v Speaker 1>and he sat down and I said to him, you

1:31:15.240 --> 1:31:19.800
<v Speaker 1>you did a fantastic job up there on the podium today,

1:31:20.040 --> 1:31:25.000
<v Speaker 1>and he well, of course, he said, well you realize,

1:31:25.000 --> 1:31:29.840
<v Speaker 1>of course that last year I received the award in

1:31:29.960 --> 1:31:35.559
<v Speaker 1>Las Vegas for the greatest entertainer of the year, and

1:31:35.760 --> 1:31:39.000
<v Speaker 1>that that was the way he was. So a crowd

1:31:39.040 --> 1:31:42.479
<v Speaker 1>gathered around the table while I was sitting there, no

1:31:42.640 --> 1:31:45.400
<v Speaker 1>crowd move when Joe came. All of a sudden, it

1:31:45.400 --> 1:31:49.439
<v Speaker 1>was a big crowd. What what year is This has

1:31:49.479 --> 1:31:51.640
<v Speaker 1>to be pre eight too, right, yeah, I think it was.

1:31:52.160 --> 1:31:54.000
<v Speaker 1>I think it was in the I think it was

1:31:54.040 --> 1:31:56.720
<v Speaker 1>in the late seventies. And he has to have a

1:31:56.760 --> 1:32:01.920
<v Speaker 1>couple of years on you, oh quite sure years. So yeah.

1:32:02.040 --> 1:32:09.360
<v Speaker 1>So anyway, uh, somebody, somebody, somebody that was in the

1:32:09.400 --> 1:32:13.920
<v Speaker 1>crowd said to him, Joe, you've missed every major market

1:32:13.960 --> 1:32:18.880
<v Speaker 1>top in the last twenty years. And Joe started telling

1:32:18.920 --> 1:32:23.479
<v Speaker 1>the story. He said, well, yeah, I there's no reason

1:32:23.560 --> 1:32:30.680
<v Speaker 1>for that. In fifty seven, Um, I got involved in

1:32:31.040 --> 1:32:36.120
<v Speaker 1>playing bridge, and I became one of the greatest bridge

1:32:36.160 --> 1:32:39.479
<v Speaker 1>players in the history of the world. And the kings

1:32:39.520 --> 1:32:42.840
<v Speaker 1>and queens around the world were inviting me to come

1:32:42.920 --> 1:32:47.559
<v Speaker 1>to their countries to play bridge with them, and so

1:32:48.120 --> 1:32:52.000
<v Speaker 1>I was. I was completely involved in meeting with all

1:32:52.040 --> 1:32:56.479
<v Speaker 1>of these heads of state around the world, and I

1:32:56.560 --> 1:33:00.080
<v Speaker 1>wasn't paying any attention to my numbers. And that's my

1:33:00.800 --> 1:33:04.360
<v Speaker 1>fifty seven decline. Missed the fifty seven decline. In sixty two,

1:33:06.280 --> 1:33:12.439
<v Speaker 1>I got involved in um sailing lightning sailboats, and he

1:33:12.840 --> 1:33:17.040
<v Speaker 1>I quickly became one of the greatest lightning sailboat captains

1:33:17.120 --> 1:33:22.519
<v Speaker 1>in history. And people were inviting me to come to

1:33:22.560 --> 1:33:27.200
<v Speaker 1>participate in regatta's all across the world to sail my

1:33:27.439 --> 1:33:32.719
<v Speaker 1>lightning boats. And he said, in sixty two, I wasn't

1:33:32.720 --> 1:33:35.320
<v Speaker 1>paying attention to my numbers because I was I was

1:33:35.479 --> 1:33:39.719
<v Speaker 1>winning sailboat races. And so I missed the sixty two decline.

1:33:40.280 --> 1:33:42.920
<v Speaker 1>And he went on and on like this, every top

1:33:42.960 --> 1:33:47.400
<v Speaker 1>and decline. It was he had become the greatest expert

1:33:47.439 --> 1:33:53.720
<v Speaker 1>in the world and gemology or whatever it was. And

1:33:53.720 --> 1:33:56.040
<v Speaker 1>and somebody in the crowd said, oh my god, I'm

1:33:56.080 --> 1:33:57.960
<v Speaker 1>gonna sell all the time. I gotta get to a

1:33:57.960 --> 1:33:59.920
<v Speaker 1>phone right now. I've got to sell all my stock

1:34:00.720 --> 1:34:03.120
<v Speaker 1>and he and he said, why why would you do that?

1:34:03.200 --> 1:34:06.080
<v Speaker 1>And he said, because Joe Granville just married a twenty

1:34:06.120 --> 1:34:09.800
<v Speaker 1>two year old woman. He's gonna be He's going to

1:34:09.880 --> 1:34:16.880
<v Speaker 1>be involved. Otherwise, I'm surprised. No one said, imagine, if

1:34:17.000 --> 1:34:20.200
<v Speaker 1>you the greatest expert in all these things, only applied

1:34:20.320 --> 1:34:22.720
<v Speaker 1>that to the stock market, how much money you can

1:34:22.840 --> 1:34:26.120
<v Speaker 1>make for you and your subscribers. Yeah, that's uh so

1:34:26.360 --> 1:34:28.400
<v Speaker 1>if that was the case, if he missed all these

1:34:28.479 --> 1:34:32.920
<v Speaker 1>great tops, how did he have that reputation in the

1:34:33.040 --> 1:34:37.280
<v Speaker 1>seventies for beings he fled? He developed a concept called

1:34:37.320 --> 1:34:40.679
<v Speaker 1>on Bailan's volume. Sure, of course that still exists today. Yeah.

1:34:40.720 --> 1:34:43.800
<v Speaker 1>And and as he says, O b V, if you'd

1:34:43.840 --> 1:34:47.080
<v Speaker 1>paid attention to on Bailance volume, you would have caught

1:34:47.080 --> 1:34:51.920
<v Speaker 1>those tops. Is that true? Sort of kinda not really?

1:34:52.439 --> 1:34:55.400
<v Speaker 1>More often than not? Yes, Okay, it's a good tool.

1:34:55.680 --> 1:34:58.720
<v Speaker 1>So then why did he miss the turn when the

1:34:58.720 --> 1:35:03.400
<v Speaker 1>bullmarket of eighty two to two thousand began? You know,

1:35:04.240 --> 1:35:10.120
<v Speaker 1>two year old life? Yeah, that's that's hilarious. Um, let's

1:35:10.120 --> 1:35:12.840
<v Speaker 1>talk a little bit about books. I only have you

1:35:12.880 --> 1:35:16.240
<v Speaker 1>for another twenty minutes or so, but any any books,

1:35:16.320 --> 1:35:22.520
<v Speaker 1>fiction or nonfiction stand out as as significant or informative

1:35:22.640 --> 1:35:29.320
<v Speaker 1>or worthwhile to you. Um there's a book that I

1:35:29.400 --> 1:35:32.880
<v Speaker 1>recommend every everybody. Anybody ever asked me about what's a

1:35:33.040 --> 1:35:35.920
<v Speaker 1>what's a good book to read? There's a book called

1:35:35.920 --> 1:35:38.479
<v Speaker 1>The Richest Man in Babel. Oh. Sure, I've read that

1:35:38.680 --> 1:35:44.040
<v Speaker 1>years ago. It was fabulous. It's a true story. Is

1:35:44.080 --> 1:35:47.160
<v Speaker 1>that the case. I always thought of it as a parable. No,

1:35:47.800 --> 1:35:50.360
<v Speaker 1>that's a real true story. It's a by the way

1:35:50.400 --> 1:35:54.960
<v Speaker 1>for people listening. It's a very thin, short book. You

1:35:55.000 --> 1:35:56.840
<v Speaker 1>could sit down and bang it out in an out

1:35:57.000 --> 1:36:01.719
<v Speaker 1>in an afternoon anyway. And I reminded me of another book.

1:36:02.680 --> 1:36:05.679
<v Speaker 1>There's a similar book to it, that same sort of concept,

1:36:05.760 --> 1:36:10.639
<v Speaker 1>but a true story dating back to the thousands. Yeah,

1:36:11.439 --> 1:36:15.120
<v Speaker 1>there's a there's a small little I think it's probably

1:36:15.200 --> 1:36:18.519
<v Speaker 1>maybe a one page explanation at the back of the book.

1:36:19.200 --> 1:36:23.040
<v Speaker 1>The book itself is about a number of people who

1:36:23.080 --> 1:36:27.280
<v Speaker 1>grew up together and one of them becomes extremely rich

1:36:27.400 --> 1:36:32.200
<v Speaker 1>and powerful. Yeah, and the rest of them are camel

1:36:32.320 --> 1:36:35.720
<v Speaker 1>drivers and things of that sort. And he he he

1:36:36.240 --> 1:36:40.960
<v Speaker 1>brings his old friends in and they asked him how

1:36:41.000 --> 1:36:44.400
<v Speaker 1>in the world did you get so rich and so successful?

1:36:44.800 --> 1:36:50.519
<v Speaker 1>And he reveals to them the secrets of how he became,

1:36:51.280 --> 1:36:56.920
<v Speaker 1>the secrets of how anybody can become successful. In the

1:36:56.920 --> 1:36:59.120
<v Speaker 1>back of the book, there's this a very short thing

1:36:59.160 --> 1:37:04.519
<v Speaker 1>that says, uh, the story of this man was, uh

1:37:04.960 --> 1:37:08.479
<v Speaker 1>was he was identified on clay tablets that were found

1:37:08.479 --> 1:37:11.680
<v Speaker 1>at the site of the original Babylon. And so it's

1:37:11.720 --> 1:37:16.160
<v Speaker 1>a it's an actual true story. Uh, and that that

1:37:16.439 --> 1:37:19.920
<v Speaker 1>simply adds to the whole thing to say, this isn't

1:37:19.960 --> 1:37:23.040
<v Speaker 1>just something that some writer sat down and dreamed up.

1:37:23.920 --> 1:37:29.599
<v Speaker 1>This is this is true concepts. Uh. Along those same lines, well,

1:37:30.040 --> 1:37:33.000
<v Speaker 1>you know it was as far as influences, there used

1:37:33.040 --> 1:37:38.000
<v Speaker 1>to be a fellow on the radio named Earl Nightingale. Okay,

1:37:38.840 --> 1:37:42.479
<v Speaker 1>and this goes back into this into probably the fifties

1:37:42.520 --> 1:37:44.640
<v Speaker 1>and sixties and seventies. I think he died in the

1:37:44.680 --> 1:37:48.800
<v Speaker 1>mid eighties, but he would he had a radio show

1:37:49.320 --> 1:37:52.120
<v Speaker 1>every day, and he kind of dwell on how to

1:37:52.160 --> 1:37:54.720
<v Speaker 1>get ahead in the world. And I thought, how to

1:37:54.920 --> 1:37:57.840
<v Speaker 1>how to conduct yourself in life and and everything else.

1:37:58.680 --> 1:38:00.680
<v Speaker 1>And he told us he told us story one night

1:38:00.720 --> 1:38:04.400
<v Speaker 1>that had a huge impact on me. Uh, he said,

1:38:04.680 --> 1:38:06.479
<v Speaker 1>he said, you know, when I was preparing for the

1:38:06.479 --> 1:38:08.679
<v Speaker 1>show today, a young man called me on the phone

1:38:09.880 --> 1:38:14.519
<v Speaker 1>and said to me, Mr Knightonale. Um, I've I'm just

1:38:14.560 --> 1:38:17.479
<v Speaker 1>a few years out of college. I've I've been trying

1:38:17.520 --> 1:38:21.320
<v Speaker 1>a career and uh, it's not working out for me.

1:38:21.680 --> 1:38:25.320
<v Speaker 1>And um, I was wondering if you could tell me

1:38:25.439 --> 1:38:31.479
<v Speaker 1>some some area of enterprise that I could that I'd

1:38:31.479 --> 1:38:35.480
<v Speaker 1>have a better chance to success. And so Mr Nightingale

1:38:35.479 --> 1:38:40.040
<v Speaker 1>said to him, uh uh, well, what what area are

1:38:40.040 --> 1:38:43.280
<v Speaker 1>you in And the Fellows said, well, I'm in life insurance.

1:38:45.080 --> 1:38:48.519
<v Speaker 1>And Mr Nightingale said, well, I've always believed that there's

1:38:48.600 --> 1:38:56.080
<v Speaker 1>one answer to success. It all comes down to the

1:38:56.200 --> 1:38:59.439
<v Speaker 1>same thing, no matter no matter how it plays out,

1:38:59.479 --> 1:39:02.559
<v Speaker 1>and always them back to the same thing. If you

1:39:02.600 --> 1:39:07.680
<v Speaker 1>want to be successful, look around the world and identify

1:39:07.720 --> 1:39:13.000
<v Speaker 1>a big problem something, That something is a lot of people,

1:39:13.680 --> 1:39:18.400
<v Speaker 1>a large number of people are are trying to deal

1:39:18.479 --> 1:39:23.760
<v Speaker 1>with and can't deal with. Then find a solution to

1:39:23.840 --> 1:39:27.040
<v Speaker 1>that problem. So just solve the world's biggest problems and

1:39:27.280 --> 1:39:31.519
<v Speaker 1>solve a problem a problem. It doesn't have to really

1:39:31.560 --> 1:39:35.439
<v Speaker 1>be the world shaking problem, but it could be a

1:39:35.479 --> 1:39:39.599
<v Speaker 1>case they're saying, you know, kids have kids have always

1:39:39.640 --> 1:39:42.960
<v Speaker 1>had trouble time shoes. So if you can make a

1:39:43.000 --> 1:39:46.920
<v Speaker 1>velcrow strap that goes across that solves a problem you

1:39:46.960 --> 1:39:51.080
<v Speaker 1>can make, you can be successful. So, so you identify

1:39:51.160 --> 1:39:53.920
<v Speaker 1>a problem, come up with a solution, and then go

1:39:54.000 --> 1:39:55.800
<v Speaker 1>to the people who have the problem and tell them

1:39:55.800 --> 1:39:59.040
<v Speaker 1>you've got a solution. And he said, you know, I

1:39:59.080 --> 1:40:02.439
<v Speaker 1>can't imagine a big your problem existing anywhere else in life,

1:40:02.479 --> 1:40:07.160
<v Speaker 1>but death, that death is a big problem. So he said,

1:40:07.200 --> 1:40:10.360
<v Speaker 1>you're already in an area that has is dealing with

1:40:10.400 --> 1:40:13.400
<v Speaker 1>a huge problem and you have a solution. You have

1:40:13.439 --> 1:40:15.840
<v Speaker 1>a solution. But he said, you're you're the way you're

1:40:15.840 --> 1:40:18.360
<v Speaker 1>going about it is all wrong. He said, you're calling

1:40:18.479 --> 1:40:21.120
<v Speaker 1>your people up, and what you should be saying to

1:40:21.200 --> 1:40:24.800
<v Speaker 1>him is, Mr Jones, death is a real problem for you,

1:40:24.880 --> 1:40:28.200
<v Speaker 1>and I've got a solution. No, you're not doing it

1:40:28.240 --> 1:40:30.920
<v Speaker 1>that way. You're calling Mr Jones up. You say, Mr Jones,

1:40:31.160 --> 1:40:33.959
<v Speaker 1>I got a problem. I need to feed my family,

1:40:34.560 --> 1:40:36.439
<v Speaker 1>I need to buy a car, I want to have

1:40:36.479 --> 1:40:39.000
<v Speaker 1>a new nice house, and I don't have enough money.

1:40:39.200 --> 1:40:43.799
<v Speaker 1>So I've picked you out as a solution to my problem.

1:40:43.880 --> 1:40:48.519
<v Speaker 1>He said, you're going about it all wrong. Well, uh,

1:40:48.680 --> 1:40:52.679
<v Speaker 1>as far as the stock market goes, that same story

1:40:53.520 --> 1:40:56.120
<v Speaker 1>is coming back to me again and again and again

1:40:56.120 --> 1:41:01.599
<v Speaker 1>and say, the biggest problem that all investors have, cancer

1:41:01.720 --> 1:41:05.439
<v Speaker 1>is something else. And you know, but in the stock market,

1:41:06.000 --> 1:41:11.080
<v Speaker 1>the biggest problem that every investors faced with is bear markets.

1:41:11.960 --> 1:41:14.519
<v Speaker 1>Bear markets seem to sneak up on people, don't. They

1:41:14.520 --> 1:41:18.640
<v Speaker 1>don't seem coming, they don't seem to be able to emotionally,

1:41:18.720 --> 1:41:20.680
<v Speaker 1>they don't seem to be able to do what is

1:41:20.760 --> 1:41:25.519
<v Speaker 1>necessary to do to avoid them, and um, and they

1:41:25.600 --> 1:41:29.320
<v Speaker 1>usually end up uh selling near the low of they.

1:41:29.400 --> 1:41:33.720
<v Speaker 1>I mean, that's a real problem for investors. And so

1:41:33.840 --> 1:41:40.080
<v Speaker 1>I've spent probably oh at least twenty five years fixated

1:41:40.240 --> 1:41:45.120
<v Speaker 1>on looking at major market tops, how bear markets develop,

1:41:45.320 --> 1:41:49.400
<v Speaker 1>how they occur, and what you can do to avoid them.

1:41:49.560 --> 1:41:54.520
<v Speaker 1>And so that was a huge influence on my life. Nightingale,

1:41:54.680 --> 1:41:58.400
<v Speaker 1>the gentleman's name is is Nightingale? Night and Gale? Any

1:41:58.439 --> 1:42:00.439
<v Speaker 1>other books you want to mention besides it's just man

1:42:00.479 --> 1:42:04.599
<v Speaker 1>in Babylon before we move on to the next question

1:42:04.640 --> 1:42:08.400
<v Speaker 1>in our last few minutes, No, I think that's that's

1:42:08.400 --> 1:42:10.840
<v Speaker 1>a that's a good one. That's a good place to stop.

1:42:10.960 --> 1:42:14.400
<v Speaker 1>And I read that so long ago. I have to go.

1:42:14.479 --> 1:42:16.080
<v Speaker 1>I know I have a copy of it somewhere. I'm

1:42:16.080 --> 1:42:20.080
<v Speaker 1>gonna have to pull that and reread it. Um. So

1:42:20.160 --> 1:42:26.400
<v Speaker 1>the last four questions are should go back to one

1:42:26.479 --> 1:42:31.200
<v Speaker 1>more one more book Reminiscences of a Stock market Trader,

1:42:31.840 --> 1:42:39.960
<v Speaker 1>uh talking about um the boy Plunger, right, which, UM,

1:42:40.600 --> 1:42:43.320
<v Speaker 1>I don't know anybody who hasn't read that. That's that's

1:42:43.360 --> 1:42:48.480
<v Speaker 1>a standards it's a standard book, but it's timeless, tells

1:42:48.560 --> 1:42:51.919
<v Speaker 1>you everything. It tells you a lot of the lessons

1:42:51.920 --> 1:42:54.400
<v Speaker 1>you need to learn in order to be a successful investor.

1:42:54.600 --> 1:42:58.240
<v Speaker 1>There there are things in that book that if you

1:42:58.400 --> 1:43:01.960
<v Speaker 1>just changed the name of the stock, you wouldn't know.

1:43:02.120 --> 1:43:07.080
<v Speaker 1>It wasn't written a week ago. It's the same thing. Um, okay,

1:43:07.120 --> 1:43:11.200
<v Speaker 1>so you joined Lowry's over fifty years ago. What are

1:43:11.240 --> 1:43:15.120
<v Speaker 1>the most significant things that you've seen change in the market,

1:43:15.640 --> 1:43:18.360
<v Speaker 1>Perhaps that people don't really pay attention. What do you

1:43:18.400 --> 1:43:22.280
<v Speaker 1>think is the most important changes we've seen since you've

1:43:22.400 --> 1:43:27.479
<v Speaker 1>entered this field? Well, uh gee, something's uh would would

1:43:27.520 --> 1:43:30.920
<v Speaker 1>be the creation of ETFs. It's so funny you said

1:43:30.960 --> 1:43:35.360
<v Speaker 1>that because Jeremy Siegel said the exact same thing a

1:43:35.400 --> 1:43:39.120
<v Speaker 1>few days ago, same exact answer. What why why are

1:43:39.120 --> 1:43:41.559
<v Speaker 1>e t F so important? Sorry I don't disagree with you,

1:43:42.000 --> 1:43:45.120
<v Speaker 1>but but why why do you think it's so important? Well,

1:43:46.439 --> 1:43:52.160
<v Speaker 1>it's it's it's been fascinating that the the mutual fund industry,

1:43:53.640 --> 1:43:58.080
<v Speaker 1>uh has persisted this for as long as it has

1:43:58.479 --> 1:44:02.599
<v Speaker 1>more mutual funds than actual stocks. Well, and yeah, that's right.

1:44:02.680 --> 1:44:07.280
<v Speaker 1>And and what what we have is saying you know,

1:44:07.800 --> 1:44:13.760
<v Speaker 1>when mutual funds were originally created, people were recording all

1:44:13.800 --> 1:44:17.240
<v Speaker 1>of the information about prices and who owns it and

1:44:17.280 --> 1:44:22.360
<v Speaker 1>everything else with a pencil and paper. Uh. And so

1:44:22.760 --> 1:44:27.479
<v Speaker 1>to get out of a mutual fund, you had to

1:44:27.520 --> 1:44:30.640
<v Speaker 1>sell on one day and get your money on the

1:44:30.680 --> 1:44:33.040
<v Speaker 1>next day. We would sell after the close because they

1:44:33.080 --> 1:44:35.320
<v Speaker 1>had a wait for closing prices. Even if you called

1:44:35.400 --> 1:44:39.000
<v Speaker 1>during the day, they wouldn't sell. Yeah. Sorry, And in

1:44:39.439 --> 1:44:41.600
<v Speaker 1>most cases you had to call before two o'clock in

1:44:41.600 --> 1:44:45.679
<v Speaker 1>the afternoon in order to get that day's price. Um

1:44:45.960 --> 1:44:49.479
<v Speaker 1>in some cases they wanted to even earlier, and it

1:44:49.560 --> 1:44:51.880
<v Speaker 1>was simply a case of saying they didn't have the

1:44:52.040 --> 1:44:56.559
<v Speaker 1>mechanical equipment necessary to be able to arrive at a

1:44:56.600 --> 1:45:00.960
<v Speaker 1>price in a short period of time. But the eighties,

1:45:01.400 --> 1:45:04.240
<v Speaker 1>you know, computerization has coming now and now we can

1:45:04.280 --> 1:45:09.559
<v Speaker 1>solve anything in a millisecond, and the mutual fund industry

1:45:09.600 --> 1:45:11.720
<v Speaker 1>is still sitting there saying, well, you gotta put in

1:45:11.760 --> 1:45:14.519
<v Speaker 1>your trade before four o'clock or or you don't get

1:45:14.560 --> 1:45:17.560
<v Speaker 1>today's trade. How is that possible? Is that just inertia

1:45:17.760 --> 1:45:20.439
<v Speaker 1>that these guys have managed, because if you look at

1:45:20.479 --> 1:45:23.960
<v Speaker 1>the long term charts, it's clear that ETFs are rising,

1:45:24.479 --> 1:45:27.240
<v Speaker 1>attracting more and more assets, and many of the mutual

1:45:27.240 --> 1:45:33.120
<v Speaker 1>fund companies are running into increasing their plateaued at best

1:45:33.200 --> 1:45:36.760
<v Speaker 1>only a handful of Vanguard is an exception, continues to

1:45:36.800 --> 1:45:41.080
<v Speaker 1>gain assets. You look at Fidelity not not as much. Well.

1:45:41.120 --> 1:45:44.519
<v Speaker 1>I think part of this because Vangard Vanguard picked up

1:45:44.560 --> 1:45:50.439
<v Speaker 1>the idea of a fixed portfolio of the index in

1:45:50.439 --> 1:45:55.040
<v Speaker 1>the s and UH there are two for their two

1:45:55.080 --> 1:46:01.360
<v Speaker 1>thirds um indexes and one third active manner um. And

1:46:01.400 --> 1:46:03.880
<v Speaker 1>I think the reason has persisted that way is because

1:46:03.920 --> 1:46:09.080
<v Speaker 1>it's it's convenient for the owners of of the mutual

1:46:09.120 --> 1:46:12.200
<v Speaker 1>funds to say, well, you can't get out of our

1:46:12.240 --> 1:46:18.639
<v Speaker 1>funds fast, so you have a chance to rethink, rethink

1:46:18.680 --> 1:46:21.400
<v Speaker 1>your your idea of trying to sell our mutual funds.

1:46:21.400 --> 1:46:24.840
<v Speaker 1>And Vanguard has been a leader in that approach of

1:46:24.920 --> 1:46:29.439
<v Speaker 1>saying they essentially say, listen, give us your money, we'll

1:46:30.479 --> 1:46:32.800
<v Speaker 1>go away and we'll see you in forty years. It's

1:46:32.880 --> 1:46:35.640
<v Speaker 1>it's worth that for them, and and to a large

1:46:35.680 --> 1:46:40.000
<v Speaker 1>degree it's worked out for their clients. But the Vanguard

1:46:40.000 --> 1:46:42.880
<v Speaker 1>client is a different client. They tend not to be

1:46:43.520 --> 1:46:46.080
<v Speaker 1>They're a set and forget and we'll see in thirty

1:46:46.120 --> 1:46:50.240
<v Speaker 1>years sort of client. The average investor is very different

1:46:50.240 --> 1:46:53.679
<v Speaker 1>than the average vanguard investor. They're looking at the news,

1:46:53.720 --> 1:46:56.880
<v Speaker 1>they're getting there, but they're panicking at the bottom. It's

1:46:56.880 --> 1:47:01.000
<v Speaker 1>a very different philosophy than we see with UH with

1:47:01.120 --> 1:47:06.400
<v Speaker 1>Van Guard so so E t fs a real big innovation. Well,

1:47:06.479 --> 1:47:08.479
<v Speaker 1>E t F have simply come along and said said,

1:47:08.520 --> 1:47:11.719
<v Speaker 1>we're moving into the modern world. Instead of being priced

1:47:11.760 --> 1:47:14.720
<v Speaker 1>once a day, we're going to be priced day long,

1:47:14.760 --> 1:47:17.640
<v Speaker 1>TI tick all day long, and that that makes it

1:47:17.720 --> 1:47:22.000
<v Speaker 1>a very very acceptable tool, not only the small investors,

1:47:22.000 --> 1:47:26.880
<v Speaker 1>but also the institutions. We've seen a huge growth on

1:47:26.920 --> 1:47:30.000
<v Speaker 1>the institutional side. At the same time it's growing for

1:47:30.120 --> 1:47:35.200
<v Speaker 1>small individual investors. So lowry capital not gonna issue an

1:47:35.200 --> 1:47:39.640
<v Speaker 1>E t F on your Yeah, we're we're going to

1:47:39.760 --> 1:47:43.479
<v Speaker 1>be creating interest in very near future. Because I think

1:47:44.080 --> 1:47:46.719
<v Speaker 1>in a lot of ways it's the perfect investment for

1:47:46.840 --> 1:47:51.240
<v Speaker 1>all types of investors. It works, works for small investors,

1:47:51.280 --> 1:47:55.000
<v Speaker 1>work for big investors. Sufficient, it's it's inexpensive, it's easy

1:47:55.080 --> 1:47:58.280
<v Speaker 1>to it's easy, it's it's hard to find a downside.

1:47:58.360 --> 1:48:00.639
<v Speaker 1>John Bogel not a big fan out of him because

1:48:00.640 --> 1:48:04.600
<v Speaker 1>he says it encourages over trading. But your sort of

1:48:04.640 --> 1:48:08.960
<v Speaker 1>et F is not designed to be actively traded. I'm

1:48:09.000 --> 1:48:12.880
<v Speaker 1>assuming that internally you guys are handling the trading or

1:48:12.920 --> 1:48:18.040
<v Speaker 1>any value slash timing related decisions. Yeah. We we think

1:48:18.080 --> 1:48:20.720
<v Speaker 1>that we think that our ETF will eventions will will

1:48:20.800 --> 1:48:25.680
<v Speaker 1>essentially be buy and hold, buy and whole type of investments. Um,

1:48:25.760 --> 1:48:30.920
<v Speaker 1>that we take care of the changing the portfolio internally.

1:48:31.040 --> 1:48:34.320
<v Speaker 1>We we moved from bowl market to bear market and

1:48:34.360 --> 1:48:36.599
<v Speaker 1>make make all the changes that need to be made

1:48:36.640 --> 1:48:41.680
<v Speaker 1>for an investor. That that's fascinating This next question. So

1:48:41.720 --> 1:48:43.280
<v Speaker 1>I was gonna ask you what did you see as

1:48:43.280 --> 1:48:49.000
<v Speaker 1>the next major shifts? Um. Well, uh, you know, there's

1:48:49.000 --> 1:48:53.360
<v Speaker 1>bring some One of the things that affected us a

1:48:53.400 --> 1:48:56.639
<v Speaker 1>great deal was was the change in the uptick rule.

1:48:56.880 --> 1:49:01.000
<v Speaker 1>Took place in two thousands around June two thousand seven.

1:49:01.680 --> 1:49:03.439
<v Speaker 1>There used to be a rule that you could not

1:49:04.439 --> 1:49:08.200
<v Speaker 1>sell short until there was an uptick in the in

1:49:08.240 --> 1:49:13.280
<v Speaker 1>the price. And for reasons that are just absolutely beyond me,

1:49:14.280 --> 1:49:19.639
<v Speaker 1>they the SEC chose to remove that remove that control.

1:49:19.840 --> 1:49:24.080
<v Speaker 1>Good timing to it was put into place. Yeah, it

1:49:24.240 --> 1:49:29.200
<v Speaker 1>was put into place as a result of the crash.

1:49:29.320 --> 1:49:32.240
<v Speaker 1>Another word, JUNO one sellers piling on and it's one

1:49:32.240 --> 1:49:33.840
<v Speaker 1>thing if you own a stock and you want to

1:49:33.840 --> 1:49:36.880
<v Speaker 1>sell it, but we don't want people short selling and

1:49:37.000 --> 1:49:39.280
<v Speaker 1>driving it lower. You at least need a little bit

1:49:39.320 --> 1:49:42.800
<v Speaker 1>of up trading in order to get a short loss, right.

1:49:43.000 --> 1:49:45.960
<v Speaker 1>And that makes sense, doesn't Yeah, And so why they

1:49:46.120 --> 1:49:49.479
<v Speaker 1>why they removed the rule that was that was created

1:49:49.560 --> 1:49:55.280
<v Speaker 1>to avoid another ninety nine and they they made the

1:49:55.320 --> 1:49:58.799
<v Speaker 1>change just in time for the for the two thousand

1:49:58.840 --> 1:50:01.320
<v Speaker 1>seven two thousand nine market. And then they went the

1:50:01.360 --> 1:50:03.560
<v Speaker 1>other way and said, Okay, nobody can short bank or

1:50:03.640 --> 1:50:07.439
<v Speaker 1>related stocks. So they messed up one direction, and then

1:50:07.439 --> 1:50:11.320
<v Speaker 1>they went too far in the other direction. Uh. The

1:50:11.320 --> 1:50:18.240
<v Speaker 1>the the biggest thing in my mind that's occurred in

1:50:18.240 --> 1:50:21.000
<v Speaker 1>in in my career is that the New York Stock

1:50:21.040 --> 1:50:26.040
<v Speaker 1>Exchange used to be an institution and it went from

1:50:26.040 --> 1:50:29.960
<v Speaker 1>being an institution to being a profit making corporation. That's

1:50:29.960 --> 1:50:36.280
<v Speaker 1>a huge, huge change, which with major, major ramifications. Yeah,

1:50:36.400 --> 1:50:39.400
<v Speaker 1>and I think that was absolutely wrong. That that's what

1:50:39.479 --> 1:50:42.120
<v Speaker 1>led us to the world of high frequency trading and

1:50:42.120 --> 1:50:45.320
<v Speaker 1>and all these other things that are h the loss

1:50:45.320 --> 1:50:48.280
<v Speaker 1>of the specialist, and and now we end up with

1:50:49.360 --> 1:50:52.760
<v Speaker 1>a bunch of computers standing making markets, which isn't the

1:50:52.800 --> 1:50:56.639
<v Speaker 1>same as having a person responsible for creating an orderly market,

1:50:57.080 --> 1:51:01.799
<v Speaker 1>and and and some rules that have been in place

1:51:01.880 --> 1:51:08.880
<v Speaker 1>for decades um the ability to the ability to jump

1:51:10.120 --> 1:51:13.360
<v Speaker 1>jump in front of another investor by by and so

1:51:14.680 --> 1:51:19.600
<v Speaker 1>uh right, front running. Front running used to be a

1:51:19.720 --> 1:51:24.200
<v Speaker 1>thing that was a really serious problem, and now it's

1:51:24.439 --> 1:51:28.040
<v Speaker 1>just ignored. Well, it's not even ignored. It's that the

1:51:28.120 --> 1:51:34.040
<v Speaker 1>exchanges sell co location servers and data feeds and they

1:51:34.120 --> 1:51:37.720
<v Speaker 1>let the h f T sniff out incoming orders and

1:51:37.800 --> 1:51:40.559
<v Speaker 1>let them run ahead. And you know that that's an

1:51:40.560 --> 1:51:44.880
<v Speaker 1>issue because that basically the profits of the h f

1:51:44.920 --> 1:51:47.439
<v Speaker 1>T s are coming out of someone somewhere. It's a

1:51:47.560 --> 1:51:50.800
<v Speaker 1>zero sum game. And if they're sliced, the pie is

1:51:50.840 --> 1:51:54.320
<v Speaker 1>getting bigger. That means the investors the pie is getting smaller.

1:51:54.479 --> 1:51:58.639
<v Speaker 1>That said, a number of big shops, including Vanguard, has

1:51:58.680 --> 1:52:02.000
<v Speaker 1>said it adds liquidly, it allows us to execute orders

1:52:02.520 --> 1:52:06.400
<v Speaker 1>more more easily. I'm not fully convinced. Uh well, I

1:52:06.400 --> 1:52:09.639
<v Speaker 1>think it's an interesting thing that people are saying that

1:52:09.680 --> 1:52:14.080
<v Speaker 1>because of what they're saying is we're allowing people to

1:52:14.280 --> 1:52:19.880
<v Speaker 1>front run because it's to our particular advantage to have

1:52:20.040 --> 1:52:23.840
<v Speaker 1>them able to front run. And the new York Stcuchans

1:52:23.920 --> 1:52:29.840
<v Speaker 1>used to be about ethics. Ethics was paramount paramount. Yeah,

1:52:30.040 --> 1:52:34.240
<v Speaker 1>I couldn't agree today we say, well profit mode at

1:52:34.240 --> 1:52:38.120
<v Speaker 1>this paramount. They should have stayed as a utility, as

1:52:38.160 --> 1:52:41.040
<v Speaker 1>a public they should have been in square and not

1:52:41.400 --> 1:52:45.600
<v Speaker 1>a for profit construct and people that people that represented

1:52:45.640 --> 1:52:50.360
<v Speaker 1>the New York Stocuchian should have been appointed by a

1:52:50.439 --> 1:52:55.000
<v Speaker 1>committee and too important in should it should have been

1:52:55.080 --> 1:52:57.800
<v Speaker 1>conducted on the most ethical levels that could possibly be

1:52:57.880 --> 1:53:02.519
<v Speaker 1>done on. So last two questions you your story of

1:53:02.560 --> 1:53:06.360
<v Speaker 1>how you started a Lowry is Lowry's is certainly unique.

1:53:07.160 --> 1:53:09.880
<v Speaker 1>What sort of advice would you give to a millennial

1:53:10.040 --> 1:53:13.920
<v Speaker 1>or someone just graduating college today starting out in a

1:53:13.960 --> 1:53:19.920
<v Speaker 1>career in finance study the law supply demand number one

1:53:21.080 --> 1:53:26.640
<v Speaker 1>um UH and I think I think I would have

1:53:26.720 --> 1:53:34.680
<v Speaker 1>to say, search out a mentor. I know I know

1:53:34.800 --> 1:53:41.920
<v Speaker 1>of a lot of extremely capable UH supply demand type

1:53:43.080 --> 1:53:47.160
<v Speaker 1>UH analysts that that have that they have taken great

1:53:47.240 --> 1:53:51.240
<v Speaker 1>pride in serving as a mentor to other people. You

1:53:51.360 --> 1:53:56.519
<v Speaker 1>mentioned Alan Shaw, you mentioned Bob Farrell that that sort

1:53:56.520 --> 1:53:59.840
<v Speaker 1>of thing of of teeing up the next generation of

1:54:00.640 --> 1:54:03.559
<v Speaker 1>and and there are a lot of people that enjoy it.

1:54:03.640 --> 1:54:05.600
<v Speaker 1>I mean it's not it's not as though you have

1:54:05.640 --> 1:54:08.160
<v Speaker 1>to go to them and and cajole them in the

1:54:08.280 --> 1:54:14.320
<v Speaker 1>in the giving you a job. It's a case of saying, uh.

1:54:14.600 --> 1:54:17.719
<v Speaker 1>In any company that's trying to grow, you're looking for

1:54:17.800 --> 1:54:23.439
<v Speaker 1>those those exceptional people who are really willing to to

1:54:24.160 --> 1:54:29.639
<v Speaker 1>have another education. And and that means that you've got

1:54:29.680 --> 1:54:32.520
<v Speaker 1>to be willing to work along hours. You've got to

1:54:32.560 --> 1:54:37.080
<v Speaker 1>be willing to sit and listen to uh somebody like

1:54:37.200 --> 1:54:41.240
<v Speaker 1>me pontificate uh and and tell you the information. And

1:54:41.280 --> 1:54:42.920
<v Speaker 1>then you've got to be and you've got to go

1:54:42.920 --> 1:54:44.800
<v Speaker 1>and apply it. And you've gotta there's a lot of

1:54:44.800 --> 1:54:49.320
<v Speaker 1>hard work that you need to do to to take information,

1:54:49.400 --> 1:54:55.160
<v Speaker 1>to take advice, and then and then create actual experience

1:54:55.440 --> 1:55:01.040
<v Speaker 1>of seeing that advice payoff. And um, I think finding

1:55:01.040 --> 1:55:05.320
<v Speaker 1>a mentor is is we'll put you, We'll put you

1:55:05.440 --> 1:55:09.400
<v Speaker 1>miles and miles ahead of the competition. So people pulling

1:55:09.480 --> 1:55:12.200
<v Speaker 1>up on a Saturday afternoon while you're in the dirt

1:55:12.680 --> 1:55:14.800
<v Speaker 1>playing in the garden, is that is that how people

1:55:15.080 --> 1:55:18.400
<v Speaker 1>find you? Yeah, the same location, You're still in the

1:55:18.440 --> 1:55:21.080
<v Speaker 1>same building. Have we have we have we have several

1:55:21.080 --> 1:55:25.400
<v Speaker 1>people in our office that came to us, came to

1:55:25.480 --> 1:55:28.480
<v Speaker 1>us and pretty much set the same fashion. Really, one

1:55:28.520 --> 1:55:31.560
<v Speaker 1>of the people's been with me for twenty five years now,

1:55:32.360 --> 1:55:36.000
<v Speaker 1>fascinating And our last question, and I suspect I know

1:55:36.120 --> 1:55:38.680
<v Speaker 1>the answer to this one. What do you know about

1:55:38.720 --> 1:55:42.840
<v Speaker 1>investing today that you wish you knew when you started

1:55:42.960 --> 1:55:52.600
<v Speaker 1>fifty years ago? Oh? Um? Well, uh, some of this

1:55:52.720 --> 1:55:57.120
<v Speaker 1>recent work that we've done is is uh has been

1:55:57.800 --> 1:56:01.120
<v Speaker 1>about tops and bottom incredibly revealed. Yeah, it would have

1:56:02.520 --> 1:56:08.080
<v Speaker 1>absolutely fifty years ago people You know, people were dramatically

1:56:08.160 --> 1:56:14.280
<v Speaker 1>suffering with with bear markets. Um um. They had no

1:56:14.440 --> 1:56:19.760
<v Speaker 1>idea as to as to how to how to avoid them.

1:56:19.800 --> 1:56:22.160
<v Speaker 1>They didn't know what was going on the market was

1:56:22.200 --> 1:56:24.680
<v Speaker 1>a single entity. They didn't have they didn't have any

1:56:24.680 --> 1:56:29.080
<v Speaker 1>way of looking inside. I often I often use the

1:56:29.120 --> 1:56:32.120
<v Speaker 1>example of saying if you went to a doctor, uh,

1:56:32.160 --> 1:56:34.880
<v Speaker 1>and you said, doctor, you know, hurting all over. I

1:56:35.200 --> 1:56:38.880
<v Speaker 1>don't know what it is, I just hurt all over.

1:56:39.640 --> 1:56:43.400
<v Speaker 1>And the doctor says, I'm looking at your face. Your

1:56:43.440 --> 1:56:46.920
<v Speaker 1>face looks good, your skin good color, and your skin,

1:56:47.040 --> 1:56:50.000
<v Speaker 1>your eyes are bright. I think you're healthy. Here's here's

1:56:50.040 --> 1:56:53.840
<v Speaker 1>my bill for two hundred dollars. And you'd say, you'd

1:56:53.840 --> 1:56:55.960
<v Speaker 1>say to him. Doctor, there's no way to do an

1:56:56.000 --> 1:56:58.760
<v Speaker 1>analysis of a patient. I want you to take me

1:56:58.760 --> 1:57:00.800
<v Speaker 1>in the laboratory and the okay, I want you to

1:57:00.840 --> 1:57:03.960
<v Speaker 1>put me through sixteen different kinds of machines and see

1:57:04.000 --> 1:57:07.880
<v Speaker 1>what's going on inside. It's not the outside, it's the

1:57:08.000 --> 1:57:12.880
<v Speaker 1>inside that's really important. In stock market analysis, the same thing.

1:57:13.000 --> 1:57:15.879
<v Speaker 1>The outside is the S and P five hundred INDEXS,

1:57:15.960 --> 1:57:19.760
<v Speaker 1>the Dow Jones Industrial Average, all of that stuff. The

1:57:19.840 --> 1:57:25.240
<v Speaker 1>inside is supplying demand. It's the forces of buyers and sellers.

1:57:25.240 --> 1:57:29.760
<v Speaker 1>It's the volume and the price changes and momentum and

1:57:30.000 --> 1:57:33.680
<v Speaker 1>breath and all of these other factors that determine whether

1:57:33.800 --> 1:57:36.600
<v Speaker 1>the market is in an uptrend or in the entrant.

1:57:37.680 --> 1:57:43.760
<v Speaker 1>And um uh you know, now, all of a sudden,

1:57:44.520 --> 1:57:47.280
<v Speaker 1>we know these things, and I should I should say

1:57:47.480 --> 1:57:52.800
<v Speaker 1>these are not commonly known situations. For example, we're doing

1:57:52.800 --> 1:57:57.760
<v Speaker 1>the segmentation of of of the market. Uh, segmentation of

1:57:57.920 --> 1:58:01.320
<v Speaker 1>not only the advanced declines, but upside and downside volume

1:58:01.400 --> 1:58:04.680
<v Speaker 1>and points gaining points, austin all kinds of other factors.

1:58:05.320 --> 1:58:08.000
<v Speaker 1>I don't think that anybody else in the industry. I

1:58:08.040 --> 1:58:10.400
<v Speaker 1>don't know of anybody else in the industry that's doing

1:58:10.440 --> 1:58:12.840
<v Speaker 1>that kind of work and what you've learned over these

1:58:12.920 --> 1:58:17.360
<v Speaker 1>years would have been really helpful back in Oh. You

1:58:17.400 --> 1:58:21.160
<v Speaker 1>know what you have to think about is this if

1:58:21.280 --> 1:58:28.080
<v Speaker 1>it right now? Right now? Of all the money managers

1:58:28.080 --> 1:58:33.640
<v Speaker 1>in the world have a have a philosophy that you

1:58:33.760 --> 1:58:37.320
<v Speaker 1>cannot see a bearer market coming. There are no warning

1:58:37.400 --> 1:58:41.080
<v Speaker 1>signs of a bearer market. They just appear out of nowhere,

1:58:42.000 --> 1:58:45.440
<v Speaker 1>and the only thing you can do is endure them.

1:58:45.480 --> 1:58:48.160
<v Speaker 1>There's anything that you try to do to avoid a

1:58:48.200 --> 1:58:51.440
<v Speaker 1>bearer market, you'll just you'll just follow it up and

1:58:51.720 --> 1:58:58.960
<v Speaker 1>it will make things even worse. Um. So, of all

1:58:59.000 --> 1:59:03.360
<v Speaker 1>the money managers leave that, what we've done is we've

1:59:03.400 --> 1:59:09.280
<v Speaker 1>found in the last few years that they're absolutely wrong.

1:59:09.800 --> 1:59:13.040
<v Speaker 1>Number One, there are warning signs. There are There are

1:59:13.160 --> 1:59:18.680
<v Speaker 1>numerous warning signs that occur over a long period of time,

1:59:19.440 --> 1:59:23.320
<v Speaker 1>and that an investor can easily use those warning signs

1:59:23.400 --> 1:59:28.200
<v Speaker 1>to to move to the sidelines in advance of the

1:59:28.320 --> 1:59:32.480
<v Speaker 1>dramatical losses. What do you think is going to happen

1:59:32.840 --> 1:59:37.880
<v Speaker 1>to a money manager who has that information available to

1:59:38.000 --> 1:59:42.880
<v Speaker 1>them compared to a money manager that doesn't. That's a

1:59:42.960 --> 1:59:46.880
<v Speaker 1>huge advantage to say the least ss are going to

1:59:47.000 --> 1:59:50.680
<v Speaker 1>move around I'm looking forward to seeing what happens with

1:59:50.720 --> 1:59:54.280
<v Speaker 1>this new ETF that you're going to be putting out. UM,

1:59:54.360 --> 1:59:56.920
<v Speaker 1>and thank you so much for being so generous with

1:59:56.960 --> 1:59:59.680
<v Speaker 1>your time and spending UH all these hours with us.

1:59:59.680 --> 2:00:03.200
<v Speaker 1>We really appreciated. I've been chasing you to do this

2:00:03.360 --> 2:00:06.640
<v Speaker 1>for hours. I actually asked you at a conference not

2:00:06.720 --> 2:00:09.040
<v Speaker 1>too long ago in New York. Hey, let's let's let's

2:00:09.080 --> 2:00:11.640
<v Speaker 1>do this, and I'm glad you took me up on

2:00:11.720 --> 2:00:15.400
<v Speaker 1>my offer. We've been speaking with Paul Desmond. He is

2:00:15.440 --> 2:00:20.640
<v Speaker 1>the president of Lowry's Research Service, the oldest continuously operated

2:00:20.920 --> 2:00:25.839
<v Speaker 1>UH technical and analytical service UH in the United States,

2:00:26.000 --> 2:00:29.520
<v Speaker 1>if not in the world. If you enjoy these conversations,

2:00:29.600 --> 2:00:32.840
<v Speaker 1>be sure and check out all of our other chats UM.

2:00:32.960 --> 2:00:34.960
<v Speaker 1>You can find them on iTunes. Just look up an

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<v Speaker 1>inch or down an inch and you'll see the whole run.

2:00:37.440 --> 2:00:40.920
<v Speaker 1>Check out my daily column on Bloomberg View dot com.

2:00:41.160 --> 2:00:45.960
<v Speaker 1>Follow me on Twitter at rid halts Um. I want

2:00:45.960 --> 2:00:49.480
<v Speaker 1>to thank my recording engineered today has been Genie. Charlie

2:00:49.560 --> 2:00:52.360
<v Speaker 1>Volmer is our producer, and my head of research is

2:00:52.400 --> 2:00:55.600
<v Speaker 1>Michael bat Nick. I'm Barry Ridhults. You've been listening to

2:00:55.720 --> 2:00:58.040
<v Speaker 1>masters in Business on Bloomberg Radio