1 00:00:03,160 --> 00:00:07,960 Speaker 1: This is Bloomberg Law with June Bresso from Bloomberg Radio. 2 00:00:09,119 --> 00:00:13,560 Speaker 1: The late Justice Antonin Scalia was a conservative icon and 3 00:00:13,640 --> 00:00:17,960 Speaker 1: the courts champion of originalism, the approach to constitutional law 4 00:00:18,040 --> 00:00:20,760 Speaker 1: that adheres tightly to the words of the founding fathers, 5 00:00:21,400 --> 00:00:25,520 Speaker 1: say what did these concepts mean when when they were adopted? Now, 6 00:00:25,560 --> 00:00:29,159 Speaker 1: as as for the difficulty of figuring that out, the 7 00:00:29,280 --> 00:00:33,159 Speaker 1: historical problem, yes there is this. I'm not pretending that 8 00:00:33,880 --> 00:00:37,000 Speaker 1: the doing it by text and the original leaning of 9 00:00:37,040 --> 00:00:41,120 Speaker 1: that text is perfect, that it's going to solve every problem, 10 00:00:41,120 --> 00:00:43,720 Speaker 1: but it solves an awful lot of problems, especially the 11 00:00:43,720 --> 00:00:47,480 Speaker 1: most controversial ones. While Justice Stephen Brier is an advocate 12 00:00:47,520 --> 00:00:51,159 Speaker 1: of the living Constitution, the belief that the Constitution is 13 00:00:51,200 --> 00:00:55,600 Speaker 1: an evolving document that changes over time. Brier and Scalia 14 00:00:55,720 --> 00:00:59,680 Speaker 1: debated the efficacy of the two approaches, and the Constitution, 15 00:00:59,800 --> 00:01:04,040 Speaker 1: in application of it, adapts to the circumstance in order 16 00:01:04,080 --> 00:01:07,760 Speaker 1: to keep the values the same. The issue is whether 17 00:01:08,120 --> 00:01:13,000 Speaker 1: a judge can say the living Constitution has morphed, and 18 00:01:13,080 --> 00:01:16,080 Speaker 1: so what used to be okay is now not bad? 19 00:01:16,880 --> 00:01:20,920 Speaker 1: Is now bad? That that's that's the living Constitution I'm 20 00:01:20,959 --> 00:01:23,360 Speaker 1: talking about, and it's it's the one that I wish 21 00:01:23,360 --> 00:01:28,200 Speaker 1: would die. Now, six years after Justice Scaliah's death, it 22 00:01:28,280 --> 00:01:32,440 Speaker 1: appears he's won the debate. Originalism is deeply ingrained in 23 00:01:32,480 --> 00:01:36,839 Speaker 1: the current Court's decisions, employed by a majority of the justices, 24 00:01:37,080 --> 00:01:41,120 Speaker 1: and even invoked by the liberal justices. But is originalism 25 00:01:41,160 --> 00:01:45,280 Speaker 1: fulfilling Scaliah's pledge that it would keep judges from injecting 26 00:01:45,319 --> 00:01:49,120 Speaker 1: their personal views into the law. My guest is Elizabeth Widra, 27 00:01:49,440 --> 00:01:54,200 Speaker 1: president of the Constitutional Accountability Center. People here both terms 28 00:01:54,200 --> 00:02:00,800 Speaker 1: originalism and textualism. What's the difference. The originalism is slightly 29 00:02:00,840 --> 00:02:05,040 Speaker 1: different from textualism, although it should start from the words 30 00:02:05,040 --> 00:02:08,840 Speaker 1: of the Constitution, and that it shares with textualism of course, 31 00:02:08,880 --> 00:02:11,880 Speaker 1: as textualism the name suggests, But originalism goes a little 32 00:02:11,919 --> 00:02:14,640 Speaker 1: bit more broadly, and when it's looking to what's the 33 00:02:14,800 --> 00:02:19,560 Speaker 1: word in the Constitution mean, it looks to what's termed 34 00:02:19,600 --> 00:02:22,360 Speaker 1: original public meaning, So that's you know, what was the 35 00:02:22,480 --> 00:02:25,720 Speaker 1: general understanding of the words that were written into the 36 00:02:25,760 --> 00:02:29,760 Speaker 1: Constitution at the time they were ratified. The late Justice 37 00:02:29,919 --> 00:02:35,320 Speaker 1: Antonin Scalia was the courts champion of originalism. I don't 38 00:02:35,360 --> 00:02:40,120 Speaker 1: remember hearing much about it before Scalia Scalia was definitely 39 00:02:40,200 --> 00:02:44,200 Speaker 1: the most prominent I think jurist who ascribes the originalist philosophy. 40 00:02:44,400 --> 00:02:47,000 Speaker 1: It definitely came to the four I think during the 41 00:02:47,040 --> 00:02:50,800 Speaker 1: Reagan years. There were several prominent members of the Reagan 42 00:02:51,120 --> 00:02:55,760 Speaker 1: legal administration, like for example Ed Nice, who used the 43 00:02:55,800 --> 00:03:00,560 Speaker 1: originalism philosophy, and then a lot of conservative academic would 44 00:03:00,600 --> 00:03:05,639 Speaker 1: also ascribe themselves to the originalist philosophy. But it has 45 00:03:05,880 --> 00:03:08,840 Speaker 1: gone through some changes over time. Sort of the way 46 00:03:08,960 --> 00:03:11,519 Speaker 1: was first used, and I think even before Reagan you 47 00:03:11,560 --> 00:03:14,040 Speaker 1: could trade it back to around the time of school 48 00:03:14,120 --> 00:03:19,040 Speaker 1: desegregation cases. It was originally used as this kind of 49 00:03:19,120 --> 00:03:21,960 Speaker 1: what would the founders have done? Kind of mind meld, 50 00:03:22,080 --> 00:03:25,720 Speaker 1: though the kind of academic term for that is original 51 00:03:25,800 --> 00:03:29,840 Speaker 1: expected application of the term, and that quickly went out 52 00:03:29,840 --> 00:03:32,880 Speaker 1: of fashion because it became very clear that that wasn't 53 00:03:32,919 --> 00:03:36,160 Speaker 1: any way to interpret a constitution in the modern world. 54 00:03:36,480 --> 00:03:39,880 Speaker 1: And so it has kind of more even in conservative 55 00:03:39,920 --> 00:03:43,400 Speaker 1: spheares to this quote unquote original public meaning, which looks 56 00:03:43,440 --> 00:03:46,240 Speaker 1: more to a broad understanding of you know what did 57 00:03:46,640 --> 00:03:50,600 Speaker 1: equal protection mean? You know what did freedom of speech mean? 58 00:03:51,160 --> 00:03:55,280 Speaker 1: That kind of understanding as opposed to expressly limiting ourselves 59 00:03:55,280 --> 00:03:58,360 Speaker 1: to what the drafters of that language would have thought 60 00:03:58,400 --> 00:03:59,920 Speaker 1: and applied to at the time. You know, there's a 61 00:04:00,000 --> 00:04:02,240 Speaker 1: allows us to take into account, for example, of changes 62 00:04:02,240 --> 00:04:05,840 Speaker 1: in technology or changes in society. Women can vote now, 63 00:04:05,960 --> 00:04:08,680 Speaker 1: so we're part of society. So it's that kind of 64 00:04:08,720 --> 00:04:12,280 Speaker 1: shift in the conservative originalist philosophy has taken place. I 65 00:04:12,360 --> 00:04:17,279 Speaker 1: remember events where Justice Scalia and Justice Brier would talk 66 00:04:17,320 --> 00:04:22,440 Speaker 1: about originalism versus the living Constitution, But it seems like 67 00:04:22,720 --> 00:04:26,560 Speaker 1: even the liberal justices are almost afraid to use that 68 00:04:26,640 --> 00:04:30,920 Speaker 1: phrase living constitution anymore. Yeah, I definitely think that in 69 00:04:31,000 --> 00:04:34,880 Speaker 1: some way conservatives have won the branding war in terms 70 00:04:34,880 --> 00:04:40,279 Speaker 1: of coming up with a narrative around why the conservative 71 00:04:40,680 --> 00:04:45,520 Speaker 1: at least claim of originalism is better. Their idea was that, look, 72 00:04:45,720 --> 00:04:49,839 Speaker 1: originalism is tied to the Constitution's text and histories, so 73 00:04:50,080 --> 00:04:54,640 Speaker 1: it restrained judges from injecting their personal views into things. 74 00:04:54,760 --> 00:04:58,520 Speaker 1: You know, it isn't just based on changing policy preferences. 75 00:04:58,560 --> 00:05:00,400 Speaker 1: But that's where I think concern of it is have 76 00:05:00,440 --> 00:05:03,200 Speaker 1: gotten into trouble now that they actually you know, it's 77 00:05:03,279 --> 00:05:05,960 Speaker 1: like the dog finally catching the car. I think they're 78 00:05:06,000 --> 00:05:08,680 Speaker 1: getting into trouble because what we're actually seeing when they 79 00:05:08,680 --> 00:05:12,039 Speaker 1: apply originalism is that a lot of those claims of 80 00:05:12,080 --> 00:05:15,600 Speaker 1: why originalism was better than any other method in terms 81 00:05:15,600 --> 00:05:18,720 Speaker 1: of restraining justices and keeping it tied to the Constitution 82 00:05:19,080 --> 00:05:21,120 Speaker 1: doesn't seem to be playing out in these big cases 83 00:05:21,120 --> 00:05:23,839 Speaker 1: we've seen in the Supreme Court. Yeah, Justice Scalia said 84 00:05:23,880 --> 00:05:28,240 Speaker 1: the originalism would keep judges from injecting their personal views 85 00:05:28,400 --> 00:05:31,400 Speaker 1: into the law. But then why do we have cases 86 00:05:31,680 --> 00:05:35,919 Speaker 1: where the originalists on the court differ, For example the 87 00:05:35,960 --> 00:05:40,160 Speaker 1: boss Stock case where Justice course it's joined with the liberals. 88 00:05:40,720 --> 00:05:44,600 Speaker 1: So Justice Scaliah himself would acknowledge that, you know, originalism 89 00:05:44,600 --> 00:05:47,559 Speaker 1: and constitutional interpretation were not, in his word, as easy 90 00:05:47,600 --> 00:05:50,800 Speaker 1: as pie. But a lot of it depends on the 91 00:05:50,880 --> 00:05:54,680 Speaker 1: question you ask. So if you look back to say, 92 00:05:54,800 --> 00:05:57,719 Speaker 1: you know, what does the word equal mean in the 93 00:05:57,720 --> 00:06:01,800 Speaker 1: fourteenth Amendment, what does the term liberty means? You can 94 00:06:01,839 --> 00:06:03,760 Speaker 1: take a broad lens to that or you can take 95 00:06:03,800 --> 00:06:06,080 Speaker 1: a narrow lens to that. So the whole idea that 96 00:06:06,160 --> 00:06:09,800 Speaker 1: somehow originalism is like putting a question into a computer 97 00:06:09,880 --> 00:06:12,520 Speaker 1: and it fits out an answer that's just wrong. And 98 00:06:12,640 --> 00:06:15,359 Speaker 1: we've seemed that with the way that, for example, just 99 00:06:15,480 --> 00:06:18,400 Speaker 1: as Alado takes the constitutional text and comes up the 100 00:06:18,560 --> 00:06:22,240 Speaker 1: very limited vision of liberty, and another person can take 101 00:06:22,360 --> 00:06:25,479 Speaker 1: that same text, that same original public meaning of the 102 00:06:25,520 --> 00:06:28,880 Speaker 1: fourteenth Amendment, for example, and have a much broader vision 103 00:06:28,920 --> 00:06:32,520 Speaker 1: of liberty following up on that. In some of the 104 00:06:32,560 --> 00:06:36,599 Speaker 1: most controversial decisions of the term, the case you mentioned 105 00:06:36,640 --> 00:06:39,719 Speaker 1: that took away the constitutional right to abortion and the 106 00:06:39,800 --> 00:06:43,600 Speaker 1: case that established a constitutional right to carry a handgun. 107 00:06:44,200 --> 00:06:48,320 Speaker 1: Rather than the words of the Constitution, the majority opinions 108 00:06:48,440 --> 00:06:52,520 Speaker 1: used historical analysis going back as far as twelfth century 109 00:06:52,640 --> 00:06:56,520 Speaker 1: England to justify the results. Is that the correct way 110 00:06:56,520 --> 00:07:01,440 Speaker 1: to apply originalism absolutely not. I think the first step 111 00:07:01,680 --> 00:07:05,200 Speaker 1: of an originalist constitutional interpretation would be to look at 112 00:07:05,240 --> 00:07:09,000 Speaker 1: the words of the Constitution and have them be their guide. 113 00:07:09,360 --> 00:07:11,840 Speaker 1: And what we saw in both of the cases, and 114 00:07:11,880 --> 00:07:15,880 Speaker 1: I think especially in the abortion case, was this conservative 115 00:07:15,920 --> 00:07:21,680 Speaker 1: majority on the court using dates, practices, and centuries old 116 00:07:21,800 --> 00:07:26,560 Speaker 1: history to subvert the actual words of the Constitution. Instead 117 00:07:26,600 --> 00:07:30,680 Speaker 1: of using history to enlighten the meaning of those words, 118 00:07:30,720 --> 00:07:33,760 Speaker 1: they were using history too, in many ways guts the 119 00:07:33,840 --> 00:07:36,400 Speaker 1: meaning of the words of the Constitution, And I think 120 00:07:36,480 --> 00:07:41,080 Speaker 1: that points out a very big flaw in conservative originalism, 121 00:07:41,080 --> 00:07:44,600 Speaker 1: which is that it focuses very much on the Constitution 122 00:07:44,600 --> 00:07:48,239 Speaker 1: as it stood in seventeen nine. But it really fails 123 00:07:48,280 --> 00:07:51,760 Speaker 1: to grapple with the radical changes to the Constitution made 124 00:07:51,800 --> 00:07:55,280 Speaker 1: after the Civil War, particularly in the Fourteenth Amendment, which 125 00:07:55,440 --> 00:07:59,960 Speaker 1: wrote into our constitution sweeping guarantees of equality and liberty. 126 00:08:00,320 --> 00:08:02,600 Speaker 1: And when you look at the original public meaning of 127 00:08:02,640 --> 00:08:05,680 Speaker 1: those words, which again is kind of the second step originalism, 128 00:08:05,680 --> 00:08:07,600 Speaker 1: after you look at the text, we see that the 129 00:08:07,760 --> 00:08:13,280 Speaker 1: concerns that motivated writing those words into Constitution were very 130 00:08:13,400 --> 00:08:18,400 Speaker 1: much about righting the wrongs of enslavement and the deep 131 00:08:18,480 --> 00:08:21,120 Speaker 1: deprivation of rights and oppression that took place under the 132 00:08:21,240 --> 00:08:23,600 Speaker 1: slave system. And so the Fourteenth Amendment, in the words 133 00:08:23,600 --> 00:08:27,640 Speaker 1: of its own drafters, was intended to be a constitutional revolution. 134 00:08:27,880 --> 00:08:30,160 Speaker 1: That's how one of the members of Congress at the 135 00:08:30,160 --> 00:08:33,280 Speaker 1: time described it. And conservative originalists, and we're seeing this 136 00:08:33,400 --> 00:08:35,560 Speaker 1: on the court. We thought, especially in the abortion case, 137 00:08:35,679 --> 00:08:39,760 Speaker 1: do not grapple with that constitutional revolution that wrote into 138 00:08:39,760 --> 00:08:44,960 Speaker 1: our constitution broad concepts of liberty. Justice. Alito's opinion called 139 00:08:45,080 --> 00:08:48,520 Speaker 1: the most important historical fact the state of the law 140 00:08:48,520 --> 00:08:52,040 Speaker 1: in eighteen sixty eight when the Fourteenth Amendment was adopted, 141 00:08:52,559 --> 00:08:55,800 Speaker 1: and then he pointed out that in eighteen sixty eight 142 00:08:56,120 --> 00:08:59,760 Speaker 1: three quarters of the states made abortion a crime, at 143 00:08:59,800 --> 00:09:03,040 Speaker 1: least in the early stages. So I think what is 144 00:09:03,080 --> 00:09:06,400 Speaker 1: really remarkable about that is that if you think about 145 00:09:06,440 --> 00:09:08,680 Speaker 1: the Fourteenth Amendment, you know, is drafted right after the 146 00:09:08,679 --> 00:09:11,880 Speaker 1: Civil War. Half the states where slave, half the states 147 00:09:11,880 --> 00:09:16,719 Speaker 1: were free. It was intended to disrupt discriminatory state practices. 148 00:09:17,040 --> 00:09:19,920 Speaker 1: The idea that you would use the Fourteenth Amendment to 149 00:09:20,240 --> 00:09:26,320 Speaker 1: enshrine into amber discriminatory and unjust state practices goes against 150 00:09:26,400 --> 00:09:30,560 Speaker 1: the very concept of the Fourteenth Amendment, much less the 151 00:09:30,679 --> 00:09:35,200 Speaker 1: language contained within it. So using those state practices at 152 00:09:35,240 --> 00:09:38,640 Speaker 1: the time of the Fourteenth Amendment, and you know, historians 153 00:09:38,720 --> 00:09:42,120 Speaker 1: also disagree with the way that Alito describes that. I'll 154 00:09:42,200 --> 00:09:44,920 Speaker 1: leave that to them, but it doesn't matter of constitutional law. 155 00:09:45,000 --> 00:09:47,760 Speaker 1: The idea that you would take a constitutional amendment like 156 00:09:47,840 --> 00:09:52,040 Speaker 1: the Fourteenth Amendment that was intended to disrupt discriminatory state 157 00:09:52,120 --> 00:09:57,640 Speaker 1: practices and instead use it to enshrine those discriminatory state 158 00:09:57,679 --> 00:10:03,199 Speaker 1: practices demonstrates the real, frankly misunderstanding of the Fourteenth Amendment. 159 00:10:03,760 --> 00:10:06,200 Speaker 1: And you know, in the E. P A case this term, 160 00:10:06,600 --> 00:10:10,360 Speaker 1: Chief Justice Roberts wrote the majority opinion, all of a sudden, 161 00:10:10,400 --> 00:10:13,760 Speaker 1: they came out with this major questions doctrine. I mean, 162 00:10:13,800 --> 00:10:16,160 Speaker 1: where did that come from? And how is that part 163 00:10:16,200 --> 00:10:20,199 Speaker 1: of their philosophy of originalism. Yes, that is an extremely 164 00:10:20,240 --> 00:10:25,680 Speaker 1: good point because the flaws in what conservative originalism has 165 00:10:25,800 --> 00:10:28,760 Speaker 1: wrought on the Supreme Court. You know that the problems 166 00:10:28,760 --> 00:10:31,360 Speaker 1: of conservative originalism on this court are not just limited 167 00:10:31,400 --> 00:10:35,200 Speaker 1: to individual fundamental rights. There's also this view of the 168 00:10:35,280 --> 00:10:39,800 Speaker 1: federal government that is truly untethered from constitutional text and history. 169 00:10:40,080 --> 00:10:43,160 Speaker 1: And that case is a perfect example. If you claim 170 00:10:43,240 --> 00:10:46,440 Speaker 1: to be a jurist who is limited to constitutional text, 171 00:10:46,559 --> 00:10:51,440 Speaker 1: coming up with a major doctrine that limits the ability 172 00:10:51,440 --> 00:10:54,560 Speaker 1: of the federal government to act in times of national crises. 173 00:10:54,840 --> 00:10:58,000 Speaker 1: That is quite a departure from you know, this restrained 174 00:10:58,040 --> 00:11:01,800 Speaker 1: method of suristprudence that con servative originalists have promised. And 175 00:11:02,040 --> 00:11:04,560 Speaker 1: what we're seeing, I think with this court on questions 176 00:11:04,640 --> 00:11:08,000 Speaker 1: ranging from the structure of the government, rule of law, 177 00:11:08,280 --> 00:11:11,640 Speaker 1: all the way to individual fundamental rights, we're seeing a 178 00:11:11,800 --> 00:11:17,280 Speaker 1: very aggressively conservative court not being restrained at all by 179 00:11:17,320 --> 00:11:21,880 Speaker 1: any labels of conservative originalism or anything else. Justice Kagan, 180 00:11:22,000 --> 00:11:26,679 Speaker 1: at her confirmation hearings in said we're all originalists, and 181 00:11:26,880 --> 00:11:31,800 Speaker 1: Justice Katangi Brown Jackson said originalism had become the established 182 00:11:31,840 --> 00:11:36,240 Speaker 1: method of constitutional analysis in your analysis? Is that true? 183 00:11:36,520 --> 00:11:38,120 Speaker 1: You know, I think it is true in a very 184 00:11:38,160 --> 00:11:40,800 Speaker 1: basic sense. Look, if you are a judge and you 185 00:11:40,840 --> 00:11:44,680 Speaker 1: have a constitutional question presented to you, you're going to 186 00:11:44,880 --> 00:11:48,480 Speaker 1: first look at the words of the relevant constitutional provision 187 00:11:48,840 --> 00:11:50,840 Speaker 1: and then you're going to think about what those words means. 188 00:11:51,120 --> 00:11:53,360 Speaker 1: And so to the extent that originalists have kind of 189 00:11:53,400 --> 00:11:57,319 Speaker 1: co opted that common sense constitutional interpretation, again, I think 190 00:11:57,320 --> 00:12:00,280 Speaker 1: it's probably a great feat of branding, you know, the Yes, 191 00:12:00,320 --> 00:12:04,640 Speaker 1: that's true, and progressives as well as conservative should claim 192 00:12:04,720 --> 00:12:08,040 Speaker 1: the Constitution should argue based on its text in history, 193 00:12:08,160 --> 00:12:11,400 Speaker 1: and you know, there are many strong progressive arguments in 194 00:12:11,400 --> 00:12:13,240 Speaker 1: that text in history. And I think that's what we're 195 00:12:13,240 --> 00:12:17,880 Speaker 1: seeing reflected in more progressive juris like Justice brown Jackson 196 00:12:18,040 --> 00:12:21,040 Speaker 1: and Justice Kagan noting that, yeah, we do that too. 197 00:12:21,600 --> 00:12:24,280 Speaker 1: It seems astonishing to me. It's it's only been six 198 00:12:24,360 --> 00:12:29,520 Speaker 1: years since the passing of Justice Scalia and the rise 199 00:12:29,920 --> 00:12:34,440 Speaker 1: of originalism is sort of astonishing to me. Yes, well, 200 00:12:34,440 --> 00:12:38,920 Speaker 1: you know Justice Scalia, after he passed, he created the opportunity, 201 00:12:39,360 --> 00:12:42,320 Speaker 1: you know, through Mitch McConnell blocking Garland getting on the 202 00:12:42,360 --> 00:12:45,439 Speaker 1: court after he was nominated by President Obama and then 203 00:12:45,480 --> 00:12:48,800 Speaker 1: allowing for President Trump to build those feats. They allowed 204 00:12:49,120 --> 00:12:53,280 Speaker 1: for a really radical shift to the Supreme Court, which 205 00:12:53,320 --> 00:12:56,760 Speaker 1: was already a conservative court under Chief Justice John Roberts. 206 00:12:56,800 --> 00:12:58,600 Speaker 1: It wasn't as if it was this great liberal court 207 00:12:58,640 --> 00:13:00,760 Speaker 1: and then President Trump, but people in the bention it 208 00:13:00,800 --> 00:13:04,280 Speaker 1: became suddenly conservative. Was already very conservative. But what happened 209 00:13:04,400 --> 00:13:08,800 Speaker 1: was after Justice Lee is passing, we saw a substantial 210 00:13:08,880 --> 00:13:14,040 Speaker 1: number of justices added that ascribes to an originalist philosophy, 211 00:13:14,080 --> 00:13:17,800 Speaker 1: which is really the predominant conservative method of looking at 212 00:13:17,840 --> 00:13:20,480 Speaker 1: the Constitution. But again, in some ways it is just 213 00:13:20,640 --> 00:13:24,640 Speaker 1: basic constitutional interpretation, but with a label that kind of 214 00:13:24,720 --> 00:13:28,840 Speaker 1: makes it seem like it's more objective and not tied 215 00:13:28,880 --> 00:13:32,240 Speaker 1: to any sort of ideological agenda. Question whether or not 216 00:13:32,320 --> 00:13:33,760 Speaker 1: that is true, and I think a lot of people 217 00:13:33,800 --> 00:13:38,120 Speaker 1: are seeing these cases from this last term as showing 218 00:13:38,440 --> 00:13:43,959 Speaker 1: the hollowness of the conservative originalist label and instead, you know, really, 219 00:13:44,320 --> 00:13:47,000 Speaker 1: I think people who have been critics of conservative originalism 220 00:13:47,040 --> 00:13:48,640 Speaker 1: are saying, look, this is what we've been saying. It 221 00:13:48,720 --> 00:13:52,320 Speaker 1: is all along, just a label that covers up, you know, 222 00:13:52,400 --> 00:13:59,360 Speaker 1: a regressive and very conservative ideological agenda. Thanks for coming 223 00:13:59,360 --> 00:14:03,400 Speaker 1: on the Showizabeth. That's Elizabeth Widra, president of the Constitutional 224 00:14:03,400 --> 00:14:11,720 Speaker 1: Accountability Center. Hold the way he just got paid, Bacon 225 00:14:12,559 --> 00:14:22,160 Speaker 1: Energys andropay the crowd. Beyonce's track Energy on her new 226 00:14:22,240 --> 00:14:26,080 Speaker 1: album Renaissance is missing something. The portion of the two 227 00:14:26,080 --> 00:14:29,360 Speaker 1: thousand three R and B dance hit Milkshake that was 228 00:14:29,400 --> 00:14:33,400 Speaker 1: in the song originally. After musician Callise complained that she 229 00:14:33,600 --> 00:14:36,960 Speaker 1: was not properly credited as a songwriter on the album, 230 00:14:37,320 --> 00:14:41,360 Speaker 1: Beyonce removed that portion of the song. This situation is 231 00:14:41,400 --> 00:14:44,680 Speaker 1: a warning to emerging artists who could find themselves locked 232 00:14:44,680 --> 00:14:48,160 Speaker 1: out of lucrative royalties if they don't secure the credit 233 00:14:48,240 --> 00:14:52,440 Speaker 1: for their contributions upfront. My guest is Robert Clarida, who 234 00:14:52,480 --> 00:14:56,680 Speaker 1: had the intellectual property practice at Reitler, Callis and Rosenblatt. 235 00:14:57,000 --> 00:15:00,200 Speaker 1: So Beyonce did credit Calise, who was twenty four the 236 00:15:00,240 --> 00:15:04,440 Speaker 1: song debuted nearly two decades ago, as the performer and 237 00:15:04,560 --> 00:15:08,520 Speaker 1: Farrell Williams and Chat Hugo as the songwriters. What does 238 00:15:08,560 --> 00:15:11,480 Speaker 1: an artist who wants to use someone else's work in 239 00:15:11,560 --> 00:15:14,360 Speaker 1: their song have to do? What kind of permissions do 240 00:15:14,400 --> 00:15:16,440 Speaker 1: they have? To get what kind of royalties do they 241 00:15:16,480 --> 00:15:19,520 Speaker 1: have to pay. Typically, the way that works is, and 242 00:15:19,560 --> 00:15:22,680 Speaker 1: you know, there's really two different kinds of copyrights involved. Here. 243 00:15:22,720 --> 00:15:25,080 Speaker 1: There's the copyright in the song and then there's the 244 00:15:25,120 --> 00:15:27,320 Speaker 1: copyright in the recording of the song, and those are 245 00:15:27,360 --> 00:15:29,840 Speaker 1: two different things. Sometimes they are owned by the same person, 246 00:15:29,960 --> 00:15:33,240 Speaker 1: sometimes they're not. Frequently they're not. The record label will 247 00:15:33,280 --> 00:15:35,960 Speaker 1: often own the copyright and the sound recording, and the 248 00:15:36,000 --> 00:15:39,200 Speaker 1: songwriter will own the copyright in the song. My understanding 249 00:15:39,240 --> 00:15:42,040 Speaker 1: in the case of the Energy track is that it 250 00:15:42,120 --> 00:15:44,160 Speaker 1: was not a sample of the sound recording. It was 251 00:15:44,240 --> 00:15:47,360 Speaker 1: Beyonce actually singing the melody. It wasn't a recording of 252 00:15:47,400 --> 00:15:50,720 Speaker 1: Callis's voice singing it. So if that's the case, then 253 00:15:50,720 --> 00:15:53,200 Speaker 1: it would only be the songwriter that would have to 254 00:15:53,240 --> 00:15:56,800 Speaker 1: be approached about that. And typically in a situation like that, 255 00:15:57,160 --> 00:15:59,480 Speaker 1: where a small piece of a song is used to 256 00:15:59,720 --> 00:16:02,520 Speaker 1: call and interpolation is the term that's often used in 257 00:16:02,560 --> 00:16:04,520 Speaker 1: the industry, now there will be some kind of a 258 00:16:04,520 --> 00:16:08,120 Speaker 1: fractional percentage paid from the revenues of that song. You know, 259 00:16:08,200 --> 00:16:11,160 Speaker 1: the person who owns the piece that was interpolated, we'll 260 00:16:11,200 --> 00:16:14,479 Speaker 1: get some small percentage of the of the royalties generated 261 00:16:14,480 --> 00:16:17,200 Speaker 1: by the song. But it's a negotiated thing. There's not like, 262 00:16:17,320 --> 00:16:19,880 Speaker 1: you know, standard price. It's all you know, how popular 263 00:16:20,000 --> 00:16:22,400 Speaker 1: was the first record, how big is the second record? 264 00:16:22,560 --> 00:16:24,920 Speaker 1: You know, what kind of bargaining power does everybody have. 265 00:16:25,440 --> 00:16:28,400 Speaker 1: It doesn't seem like Beyonce did anything wrong here. I mean, 266 00:16:28,440 --> 00:16:31,920 Speaker 1: I can certainly imagine that if the song on the 267 00:16:32,000 --> 00:16:35,880 Speaker 1: Plice record was credited to for All Williams and Chad 268 00:16:35,960 --> 00:16:39,720 Speaker 1: Hugo and they say to Beyonce, sure you can use it. 269 00:16:40,040 --> 00:16:42,680 Speaker 1: If I were on Beyonce's team, I would say, okay, 270 00:16:42,720 --> 00:16:45,440 Speaker 1: we've got the writer's permission here, We're fine, and they 271 00:16:45,440 --> 00:16:48,320 Speaker 1: would put the credit on the record accordingly. I mean, 272 00:16:48,440 --> 00:16:51,520 Speaker 1: if there is some kind of backstory that the credits 273 00:16:51,600 --> 00:16:54,840 Speaker 1: on the Police track we're not accurate, how is Beyonce 274 00:16:55,000 --> 00:16:56,920 Speaker 1: going to know that? I mean, you know, for All 275 00:16:56,960 --> 00:16:59,680 Speaker 1: Williams and Chad Hugo presumably would know that if that 276 00:16:59,760 --> 00:17:03,400 Speaker 1: were case, but Beyonce wouldn't know that necessarily. So I'm 277 00:17:03,400 --> 00:17:05,879 Speaker 1: not sure that Beyonce did anything wrong here other than 278 00:17:05,920 --> 00:17:08,560 Speaker 1: taking somebody's word for something, to the extent that someone 279 00:17:08,600 --> 00:17:10,840 Speaker 1: on her team had looked up the credits on the 280 00:17:10,920 --> 00:17:13,800 Speaker 1: Callise record, they would have seen those two names on it, 281 00:17:14,080 --> 00:17:16,320 Speaker 1: and they would have had no reason to think there 282 00:17:16,359 --> 00:17:19,119 Speaker 1: was a red flag there about anything. Colice said she 283 00:17:19,200 --> 00:17:21,080 Speaker 1: took part in the writing it was supposed to be 284 00:17:21,119 --> 00:17:24,399 Speaker 1: thirty three thirty three thirty three? Do young artists have 285 00:17:24,520 --> 00:17:27,520 Speaker 1: to get a lawyer to make sure their rights are 286 00:17:27,600 --> 00:17:31,960 Speaker 1: protected when they're involved in projects like this. They need 287 00:17:32,000 --> 00:17:34,879 Speaker 1: to have someone with some industry experience, whether it's a 288 00:17:34,920 --> 00:17:38,040 Speaker 1: manager or a lawyer. You know, the actual title doesn't 289 00:17:38,119 --> 00:17:40,439 Speaker 1: much matter, but it has to be somebody with some 290 00:17:40,520 --> 00:17:44,560 Speaker 1: industry experience who can know sort of what the pitfalls are, 291 00:17:44,800 --> 00:17:48,040 Speaker 1: and that's often not the case, particularly when artists are 292 00:17:48,040 --> 00:17:50,639 Speaker 1: first starting out. I'm not familiar with Callie's career. I 293 00:17:50,640 --> 00:17:53,359 Speaker 1: don't know how many records she had made previously. Maybe 294 00:17:53,400 --> 00:17:55,439 Speaker 1: she had a lot of experience in the industry, But 295 00:17:55,640 --> 00:17:58,480 Speaker 1: it seems in that case that if she did participate 296 00:17:58,520 --> 00:18:00,920 Speaker 1: in the writing of the song, and it was her 297 00:18:01,000 --> 00:18:04,400 Speaker 1: understanding that it would be one third splits all around, 298 00:18:04,640 --> 00:18:06,800 Speaker 1: there should have been a piece of paper somewhere, and 299 00:18:06,880 --> 00:18:09,520 Speaker 1: someone representing her should have made sure that there was 300 00:18:09,560 --> 00:18:12,040 Speaker 1: a piece of paper somewhere that set that out. That 301 00:18:12,040 --> 00:18:15,280 Speaker 1: that's what the splits would be. Oftentimes that's handled in 302 00:18:15,320 --> 00:18:17,440 Speaker 1: a very kind of, you know, quick and dirty way, 303 00:18:17,480 --> 00:18:19,920 Speaker 1: with what they call a split sheet. At the recording session, 304 00:18:19,960 --> 00:18:23,000 Speaker 1: somebody will just memorialize what the splits are for a 305 00:18:23,040 --> 00:18:26,280 Speaker 1: particular song, and maybe that was done, maybe it wasn't done. 306 00:18:26,680 --> 00:18:29,119 Speaker 1: But there should be a piece of paper that's actually 307 00:18:29,160 --> 00:18:33,080 Speaker 1: got signatures on it and has some legal enforceability in 308 00:18:33,160 --> 00:18:36,080 Speaker 1: order to prevent this sort of thing happening. For Rell 309 00:18:36,200 --> 00:18:41,800 Speaker 1: and Hugo could renegotiate her credit on Milkshake, But would 310 00:18:41,800 --> 00:18:44,879 Speaker 1: that open them up to needing to make an accounting. 311 00:18:45,440 --> 00:18:48,320 Speaker 1: That's really a question that goes to, uh, what kind 312 00:18:48,320 --> 00:18:51,760 Speaker 1: of a claim could Plice have against them. It's a 313 00:18:51,760 --> 00:18:54,600 Speaker 1: difficult in a situation like that because if there was 314 00:18:54,680 --> 00:18:57,479 Speaker 1: some piece of paper that she signed off on about 315 00:18:57,520 --> 00:19:00,160 Speaker 1: what the songwriting credits were and what the splits were, 316 00:19:00,560 --> 00:19:02,679 Speaker 1: that would be very hard for her to undo that. 317 00:19:03,040 --> 00:19:05,080 Speaker 1: You know, there are certain things you can say about 318 00:19:05,080 --> 00:19:08,480 Speaker 1: a contract. You know that you were fraudulently induced into 319 00:19:08,480 --> 00:19:11,280 Speaker 1: signing it because somebody told you something that you relied 320 00:19:11,320 --> 00:19:14,439 Speaker 1: on that wasn't true or whatever. There are arguments like 321 00:19:14,480 --> 00:19:16,800 Speaker 1: that that theoretically somebody could make. I don't know if 322 00:19:16,800 --> 00:19:19,080 Speaker 1: the facts here would support any of that, but I 323 00:19:19,119 --> 00:19:21,800 Speaker 1: would put it this way, nothing in this situation would 324 00:19:21,840 --> 00:19:24,840 Speaker 1: happen unilaterally. I don't think if there were to be 325 00:19:25,080 --> 00:19:28,320 Speaker 1: a revision in the credit of the of the Milkshake track, 326 00:19:28,720 --> 00:19:31,520 Speaker 1: it would be something that Calise would sign off on, 327 00:19:32,080 --> 00:19:35,320 Speaker 1: and then it would be negotiated, you know, among the parties, 328 00:19:35,960 --> 00:19:38,520 Speaker 1: and it would be some a way of forestalling any 329 00:19:38,520 --> 00:19:42,520 Speaker 1: other legal action. Police signed a contract that she says 330 00:19:42,560 --> 00:19:45,920 Speaker 1: she didn't understand. That's a hard argument to win. I mean, 331 00:19:46,000 --> 00:19:49,159 Speaker 1: there was a really awful case involving Frankie Lyman and 332 00:19:49,160 --> 00:19:52,040 Speaker 1: the teenagers who had some big hits in the fifties 333 00:19:52,080 --> 00:19:55,200 Speaker 1: like do Up Records, and they signed to a really, 334 00:19:55,240 --> 00:19:58,720 Speaker 1: really awful contract with this sort of a notoriously shady 335 00:19:58,960 --> 00:20:01,520 Speaker 1: record producer who sort of took all the credit and 336 00:20:01,560 --> 00:20:05,440 Speaker 1: all the money. And Frankie Lyman was fifteen years old 337 00:20:05,440 --> 00:20:07,119 Speaker 1: at the time or whatever, and he said, hey, I 338 00:20:07,200 --> 00:20:09,880 Speaker 1: was fifteen, what did I know? But he didn't come 339 00:20:09,920 --> 00:20:13,280 Speaker 1: forward until much later, many years had gone by, and 340 00:20:13,440 --> 00:20:15,119 Speaker 1: he sort of said, Okay, now I'm going to make 341 00:20:15,160 --> 00:20:17,040 Speaker 1: an issue out of this, and it was too late. 342 00:20:17,320 --> 00:20:19,680 Speaker 1: You know, you can't sleep on your rights that long 343 00:20:20,040 --> 00:20:22,440 Speaker 1: and then later come out of the woodwork and say, hey, well, 344 00:20:22,440 --> 00:20:25,919 Speaker 1: now that this song is valuable and I'm an adult 345 00:20:25,920 --> 00:20:29,320 Speaker 1: and I understand what happened. You know, it's just unfortunate 346 00:20:29,359 --> 00:20:32,159 Speaker 1: that the legal system draws a line and says, nope, sorry, 347 00:20:32,200 --> 00:20:35,800 Speaker 1: you can't do that. And you know, obviously, in some situations, 348 00:20:35,840 --> 00:20:38,680 Speaker 1: like outside of the copyright world, you know, the statute 349 00:20:38,680 --> 00:20:42,320 Speaker 1: of limitations can be told for certain reasons, but something 350 00:20:42,359 --> 00:20:44,880 Speaker 1: like that would be really, really hard to come back 351 00:20:44,920 --> 00:20:47,399 Speaker 1: after the fact. There's typically a three year statute of 352 00:20:47,440 --> 00:20:52,240 Speaker 1: limitations for copyright infringement. So if you're a young artist 353 00:20:52,560 --> 00:20:56,000 Speaker 1: and you're working with some established artists, do you risk 354 00:20:56,080 --> 00:20:59,520 Speaker 1: the established artists telling you, you know, forget about it. 355 00:20:59,640 --> 00:21:02,719 Speaker 1: You're contribution isn't worth it, It isn't worth the trouble, 356 00:21:02,800 --> 00:21:06,679 Speaker 1: isn't worth the money. Oh sure, absolutely, And you know 357 00:21:06,760 --> 00:21:09,199 Speaker 1: it's really a matter of bargaining power. I mean, you 358 00:21:09,200 --> 00:21:12,400 Speaker 1: can stand on principle and say, well, you can't use 359 00:21:12,440 --> 00:21:14,760 Speaker 1: my contribution if you're not going to credit me as 360 00:21:14,800 --> 00:21:18,960 Speaker 1: a writer. But that's probably not just gonna result in 361 00:21:19,160 --> 00:21:22,920 Speaker 1: that particular record not happening, But that may have further 362 00:21:22,960 --> 00:21:26,119 Speaker 1: consequences down the road. It turns developer of reputation for 363 00:21:26,160 --> 00:21:29,960 Speaker 1: being difficult to work with. Whatever you ruin whatever relationship 364 00:21:30,040 --> 00:21:32,800 Speaker 1: you thought you were trying to build with this established artist. 365 00:21:33,160 --> 00:21:34,800 Speaker 1: You know there can be all kinds of other sort 366 00:21:34,840 --> 00:21:38,800 Speaker 1: of reputational consequences and so on. So yes, you are 367 00:21:38,840 --> 00:21:41,640 Speaker 1: faced with that dilemma. But you know in every business, 368 00:21:42,119 --> 00:21:44,399 Speaker 1: you know there are dilemmas like that that people face. 369 00:21:44,960 --> 00:21:47,720 Speaker 1: You know what trade offs do I make now to 370 00:21:47,840 --> 00:21:51,359 Speaker 1: sort of go along and get ahead versus standing on 371 00:21:51,400 --> 00:21:55,120 Speaker 1: principle every time? Thanks for joining us, Bob. That's Robert Clarida, 372 00:21:55,520 --> 00:21:58,560 Speaker 1: a writler Callis and Rosenblatt, And that's it for this 373 00:21:58,720 --> 00:22:01,600 Speaker 1: edition of the Bloomberg Lash. Remember you can always get 374 00:22:01,640 --> 00:22:04,760 Speaker 1: the latest legal news on our Bloomberg Law podcast. You 375 00:22:04,800 --> 00:22:08,960 Speaker 1: can find them on Apple Podcasts, Spotify, and at www 376 00:22:09,040 --> 00:22:13,320 Speaker 1: dot Bloomberg dot com, slash podcast Slash Law, And remember 377 00:22:13,320 --> 00:22:16,040 Speaker 1: to tune into The Bloomberg Law Show every week night 378 00:22:16,119 --> 00:22:19,600 Speaker 1: at ten pm Wall Street Time. I'm June Grosso and 379 00:22:19,640 --> 00:22:21,119 Speaker 1: you're listening to Bloomberg