WEBVTT - The Trials and Tribulations of the 737 MAX

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<v Speaker 1>Welcome to tech Stuff, a production of I Heart Radios

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<v Speaker 1>How Stuff Works. Hey there, and welcome to tech Stuff.

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<v Speaker 1>I'm your host, Jonathan Strickland. I'm an executive producer with

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<v Speaker 1>I Heart Radio and I love all things tech. But again,

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<v Speaker 1>this is another one of those episodes where I have

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<v Speaker 1>to couch that so not that long ago, I did

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<v Speaker 1>a series of episodes about the company Bowing and its history,

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<v Speaker 1>which once again is in the news as I record

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<v Speaker 1>this episode. So the week I'm recording this, which is

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<v Speaker 1>the very end of October, actually technically today is November one.

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<v Speaker 1>The CEO of Boeing just appeared before Congress to answer

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<v Speaker 1>questions about the tragedies involving two seven thirty seven Max

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<v Speaker 1>aircraft crashes. Politicians asked some very pointed questions to find

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<v Speaker 1>out when people at Boeing became aware of problems with

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<v Speaker 1>the aircraft and how much they knew, as well as

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<v Speaker 1>other details. So in this episode, I want to explore

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<v Speaker 1>exactly what went wrong and why. And while you could

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<v Speaker 1>summarize the story by saying a sensor and some software malfunctioned,

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<v Speaker 1>that's not really a full understanding of exactly what went

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<v Speaker 1>wrong and why it went wrong. So let's start with

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<v Speaker 1>the seven thirty seven Max in general, and the seven

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<v Speaker 1>thirty seven Max is history really only dates back to

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<v Speaker 1>July two thousand eleven. That's when Boeing learned that it's competitor,

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<v Speaker 1>air Bus, had made a deal with American Airlines to

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<v Speaker 1>sell two hundred A three twenty neo aircraft and the

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<v Speaker 1>eight three twenty family of aircraft first debuted in nineteen

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<v Speaker 1>eight six. They're intended to serve as short to medium

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<v Speaker 1>range aircraft. They are narrow body aircraft, which means they

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<v Speaker 1>have a cabin that measures no more than thirteen ft

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<v Speaker 1>or four meters wide, and they have a single aisle

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<v Speaker 1>going down the length of the cabin with seats on

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<v Speaker 1>either side. In other words, these aircraft sir the same

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<v Speaker 1>function as something like the seven thirty seven does. So

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<v Speaker 1>it might be a good idea to do a quick

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<v Speaker 1>rundown on the different sizes of aircraft and what they're

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<v Speaker 1>intended functions are, and to understand why we even have

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<v Speaker 1>these different sizes of aircraft. It helps to understand the

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<v Speaker 1>history of the development of airports and airlines in general.

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<v Speaker 1>I find that it could be easy to forget that

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<v Speaker 1>the systems we have in place today evolved over time

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<v Speaker 1>out of necessity. But I also know that's not the

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<v Speaker 1>focus of our episodes, So we're gonna be super general.

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<v Speaker 1>I'm not going to spend an enormous amount of time

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<v Speaker 1>on this, So the Right Brothers, really, I'm not going

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<v Speaker 1>to spend a whole lot time on this. But they

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<v Speaker 1>developed the first real airplane in the United States in

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<v Speaker 1>the early twentieth century by n In the United States,

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<v Speaker 1>the government had passed the Air Mail Act that gave

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<v Speaker 1>the Postmaster General the authority to work with private airlines

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<v Speaker 1>flying between certain routes the ability to carry mail. This

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<v Speaker 1>was sort of laying the groundwork for the modern airline.

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<v Speaker 1>The government followed that up with the Air Commerce Act,

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<v Speaker 1>which gave powers to the Secretary of Commerce to create

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<v Speaker 1>the rules and regulations that would apply to commercial aircraft.

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<v Speaker 1>That included requirements to license pilots, to certify specific aircraft

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<v Speaker 1>as being safe for commercial operation, to establish air routes,

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<v Speaker 1>and to create rules for air traffic. Now, many airlines

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<v Speaker 1>in this time were regional. They were operating between a

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<v Speaker 1>handful of cities within a general area of the United States,

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<v Speaker 1>but they gradually were able to grow to provide service

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<v Speaker 1>to more airports further afield. This might require a certain

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<v Speaker 1>number of hops between cities, and it created an incentive

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<v Speaker 1>for aircraft and engine manufacturers to find ways to increase

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<v Speaker 1>the flying range of aircraft to allow for more direct

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<v Speaker 1>service options between distant cities. The US government wasn't done yet, though.

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<v Speaker 1>In ninety eight, Congress past the Civil Aeronautics Act, which

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<v Speaker 1>in turn created these Civil Aeronautics Board or c a B.

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<v Speaker 1>One of the board's responsibilities was to regulate airfare prices

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<v Speaker 1>for passengers. Another was that it could assign specific routes

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<v Speaker 1>to airlines, giving permission for them to operate flights between

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<v Speaker 1>specific cities. The price regulation meant that airlines couldn't really

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<v Speaker 1>compete against each other with battling with lower fares for

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<v Speaker 1>routes between the same cities. A ticket on one airline

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<v Speaker 1>for a trip between let's say New York and Chicago

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<v Speaker 1>would cost pretty much the same as a ticket on

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<v Speaker 1>another airline because of this regulation. So that meant that

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<v Speaker 1>these airlines had to differentiate themselves in service because price

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<v Speaker 1>was going to be the same no matter where you

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<v Speaker 1>were going. Right if you went on one air airline

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<v Speaker 1>versus another you're gonna be paying the same amount, So

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<v Speaker 1>why would you choose one over the other? Had to

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<v Speaker 1>be because of the service. Further, if the Board determined

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<v Speaker 1>then airline was providing sub standard service along a specific route,

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<v Speaker 1>then the board would allow other airlines to operate along

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<v Speaker 1>that same route in order to create the competition needed

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<v Speaker 1>to improve service. So if the Board were to look

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<v Speaker 1>at say t W A and say, your service between

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<v Speaker 1>this city and that city has been reported as being substandard,

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<v Speaker 1>We're now going to allow these three other airlines to

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<v Speaker 1>compete in that space, the idea was that things would improve.

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<v Speaker 1>In nineteen fifty eight, the US government established what we

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<v Speaker 1>now call the Federal Aviation Agency or f a A,

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<v Speaker 1>which oversees airline safety operations. Twenty years later, in nineteen

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<v Speaker 1>seventy eight, the economic climate had changed in the United States.

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<v Speaker 1>Foreign airlines offering service to the US were not bound

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<v Speaker 1>by the price regulations of the Civil Aeronautics Board. American

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<v Speaker 1>airline companies could not compete with the lower airfares posted

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<v Speaker 1>by these foreign companies, and there was a growing resistance

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<v Speaker 1>to regulations in general in the US, so Congress passed

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<v Speaker 1>a deregulation Act than the Civil Aeronautics Board disbanded, The

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<v Speaker 1>price regulations came to an end, and airlines in the

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<v Speaker 1>United States could charge whatever they felt the market could

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<v Speaker 1>bear for any of their airfares. This also allowed new

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<v Speaker 1>airlines to join the market, which had previously been dominated

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<v Speaker 1>by just a few major carriers. The influx of competition

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<v Speaker 1>was a boon to passengers as far as airfare price

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<v Speaker 1>is concerned, but less so when it came to in

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<v Speaker 1>flight experience. More on that in just a moment. But

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<v Speaker 1>it also meant that some of the larger airline carriers

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<v Speaker 1>were struggling to compete. They had grown very large, and

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<v Speaker 1>they depended on a certain amount of revenue that happened

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<v Speaker 1>to have been guaranteed by the regulated prices. So when

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<v Speaker 1>those regulations went away and smaller, more nimble companies began

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<v Speaker 1>operating routes previously commanded by these giant companies, while the

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<v Speaker 1>giants began to wobble a little bit. This was exacerbated

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<v Speaker 1>by an economic recession in the nineteen nineties that saw

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<v Speaker 1>a reduction in air travel, and some of the big

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<v Speaker 1>airlines outright collapsed into bankruptcy, like t w A and

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<v Speaker 1>Pan American. So another recession in two thousand one, and

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<v Speaker 1>then the terrorist attacks on nine eleven further hurt the

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<v Speaker 1>airline industry, which would remain unprofitable for five more years.

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<v Speaker 1>Now since then, you know, since two thousand six, airlines

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<v Speaker 1>have managed to turn things around for the most part. Now,

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<v Speaker 1>the reason all of that was important is that it

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<v Speaker 1>creates the foundation for us to understand why there are

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<v Speaker 1>so many different types of aircraft out there, and why

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<v Speaker 1>conditions and aircraft have changed over time, and this in

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<v Speaker 1>turn informs us as to why Boeing made specific decisions.

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<v Speaker 1>So you may have seen images of air travel in

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<v Speaker 1>the nineteen fifties or nineteen sixties when it looked like

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<v Speaker 1>everyone was dressed in their Sunday best and they're enjoying

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<v Speaker 1>a big, comfy seat with plan D of leg room,

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<v Speaker 1>and they might even be chowing down on an impressive

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<v Speaker 1>looking meal. It's a pretty dramatic contrast to what you

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<v Speaker 1>find on a typical commercial jet today. So let's talk

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<v Speaker 1>about the different types of aircraft classes and what there

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<v Speaker 1>for and why things have changed. So you've got wide

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<v Speaker 1>body aircraft. These are the ones that are meant for

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<v Speaker 1>long range routes, usually such as transatlantic or trans Pacific routes.

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<v Speaker 1>They typically have two aisles running the length of the cabin,

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<v Speaker 1>and the width of the cabin tends to range from

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<v Speaker 1>sixteen to twenty feet or five to six meters. You

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<v Speaker 1>can have up to ten or maybe even eleven seats

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<v Speaker 1>arranged in a single row. In the economy class. They

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<v Speaker 1>really pack them in like sardines and some aircraft. That

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<v Speaker 1>means that with the size of some of these aircraft,

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<v Speaker 1>you can have configurations that can carry more than eight

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<v Speaker 1>hundred passengers, which is mind blowing to me. Most of

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<v Speaker 1>them are more like two fifty four passengers, but there

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<v Speaker 1>are some configurations that have significantly more than that. The

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<v Speaker 1>original wide body aircraft were something like luxury vehicles. They

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<v Speaker 1>were intended to provide a superior experience with more room

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<v Speaker 1>per passenger than you would find on other types of aircraft,

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<v Speaker 1>so they weren't all about packing as many people in

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<v Speaker 1>as possible. But then once the industry underwent deregulation, folks

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<v Speaker 1>that airlines began to figure out that there was another

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<v Speaker 1>tactic they could use. They could cram way more seats

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<v Speaker 1>on those aircraft, actually reducing the space for the average

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<v Speaker 1>traveler and maximizing the number of passengers that could fit

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<v Speaker 1>on a single flight. After all, the airlines were no

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<v Speaker 1>longer restricted to a regulated airfare price. They didn't have

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<v Speaker 1>to compete on the basis of service. They could compete

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<v Speaker 1>by offering lower airfares, and they can make up the

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<v Speaker 1>difference by putting more people on a single plane, so

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<v Speaker 1>they could actually make more money per trip even by

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<v Speaker 1>offering lower airfares per customer. By doing the old stand by,

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<v Speaker 1>you make it up in volume, and after balancing out

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<v Speaker 1>the pros and cons of delivering a superior experience to

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<v Speaker 1>the alternative of just going for the cold hard cash,

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<v Speaker 1>most airlines went the cold hard cash route, and thus

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<v Speaker 1>we started down the pathway of encountering aircraft with decreasing

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<v Speaker 1>amounts of leg room, narrower seats, and other features that

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<v Speaker 1>fuel stand up comedian routines. These huge aircraft are really expensive.

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<v Speaker 1>They also can't fit on all runways, and not every

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<v Speaker 1>airport can accommodate them. They were used for routes where

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<v Speaker 1>it made the most economic sense to use them, typically

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<v Speaker 1>on those transcontinental or trans oceanic flights. These tend to

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<v Speaker 1>be long range aircraft because they are more expensive to purchase, maintain,

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<v Speaker 1>and operate. Airlines typically have fewer of them in their fleets,

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<v Speaker 1>so they dedicate them to these long range routes. Enter

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<v Speaker 1>the narrow body aircraft. These became popular starting in the

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<v Speaker 1>nineteen sixties, but they really took off pun intended after deregulation.

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<v Speaker 1>They tend to be much less expensive to purchase, maintain,

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<v Speaker 1>and operate than their larger cousins. They can fit in

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<v Speaker 1>more airports and more runways, and they played into an

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<v Speaker 1>economic strategy that airlines used to compete against each other

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<v Speaker 1>because there was one other thing you could do to

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<v Speaker 1>use to your advantage besides the level of service or

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<v Speaker 1>the price of the airfare, and that was the frequency

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<v Speaker 1>of flights for specific routes. Now this really got going

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<v Speaker 1>with deregulation and the emergence of new airlines. Now passengers

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<v Speaker 1>could have a lot more options. When they were booking

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<v Speaker 1>a trip earlier, you might have a route that only

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<v Speaker 1>had two or maybe three flights per day between two cities,

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<v Speaker 1>so the passenger had to fit their schedule with the

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<v Speaker 1>airline schedule. But with more routes approved and more narrow

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<v Speaker 1>body aircraft in fleets, airlines had the chance to increase

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<v Speaker 1>the frequency between certain cities that had demand that warranted it,

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<v Speaker 1>and as you would imagine, most of the time, this

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<v Speaker 1>would involve cities that had regular traffic between them. You

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<v Speaker 1>weren't suddenly going to see an enormous increase in flights

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<v Speaker 1>to some city that was far out of the way

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<v Speaker 1>of everything else. Because there's no demand between two cities,

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<v Speaker 1>it makes no sense to operate hourly flights between them.

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<v Speaker 1>But for some routes that's exactly what did make sense.

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<v Speaker 1>So airlines began to compete by telling customers, hey, we

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<v Speaker 1>operate enough flights to your destination that you don't have

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<v Speaker 1>to worry about conforming to our schedule. We've got a

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<v Speaker 1>flight that fits your schedule. So this was the era

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<v Speaker 1>in which we saw the narrow body mid range aircraft

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<v Speaker 1>come into prominence, and that included the Boeing seven thirty seven.

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<v Speaker 1>The original seven thirty seven was introduced by Bowing in

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<v Speaker 1>nineteen sixty six. It was nicknamed a square airplane because

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<v Speaker 1>the length of the aircraft was the same as the

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<v Speaker 1>width of its wingspan. Both were approximately ninety three feet

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<v Speaker 1>or a little more than twenty eight meters. It's a

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<v Speaker 1>twin jet engine aircraft and the original seven thirty seven

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<v Speaker 1>had an engine mounted under each wing. This becomes an

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<v Speaker 1>important element when we get to the design of the

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<v Speaker 1>seven thirty seven Max. Now there are different versions of

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<v Speaker 1>the seven thirty seven that have different dimensions. The original

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<v Speaker 1>seven thirty seven one hundred innered service for the airline

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<v Speaker 1>luft Hanza, among others. United Airlines expressed interest in purchasing

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<v Speaker 1>some seven thirty seven's, but that airline wanted a slightly

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<v Speaker 1>longer version of the aircraft, so Boeing adjusted it and

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<v Speaker 1>then created a version of the seven thirty seven called

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<v Speaker 1>the seven thirty seven two hundred, and There are several others,

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<v Speaker 1>including the recent seven thirties even Max Okay so aircraft,

0:14:02.720 --> 0:14:05.240
<v Speaker 1>like the seven thirty seven from Boeing and the A

0:14:05.440 --> 0:14:09.320
<v Speaker 1>three twenty from air Bus, served similar purposes to act

0:14:09.360 --> 0:14:12.320
<v Speaker 1>as a short or mid range aircraft capable of carrying

0:14:12.320 --> 0:14:16.800
<v Speaker 1>around two passengers, which varies depending upon the aircraft's configuration.

0:14:17.320 --> 0:14:20.040
<v Speaker 1>By two thousand six, Boeing had been relying upon the

0:14:20.040 --> 0:14:23.520
<v Speaker 1>seven thirty seven design for forty years, when the company

0:14:23.560 --> 0:14:26.840
<v Speaker 1>began to consider the possibility of an entirely new design

0:14:27.120 --> 0:14:30.640
<v Speaker 1>to fill essentially the same function as the old, reliable

0:14:30.720 --> 0:14:34.000
<v Speaker 1>seven thirty seven. That decision was a huge one and

0:14:34.000 --> 0:14:37.320
<v Speaker 1>would require a lot of steps, So Bowing kicked the

0:14:37.360 --> 0:14:40.200
<v Speaker 1>idea down the road a few times, and then we

0:14:40.280 --> 0:14:44.200
<v Speaker 1>get to two thousand eleven and American Airlines ordering the

0:14:44.320 --> 0:14:47.880
<v Speaker 1>two hundred Airbus aircraft. It sent a signal to Boeing

0:14:48.240 --> 0:14:50.960
<v Speaker 1>that delays we're going to cost the company big time.

0:14:51.280 --> 0:14:55.000
<v Speaker 1>Now explain more in just a moment, But first, you know, guys,

0:14:55.840 --> 0:14:59.840
<v Speaker 1>I've talked a lot about privacy and security on this

0:15:00.200 --> 0:15:03.040
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0:15:03.080 --> 0:15:04.840
<v Speaker 1>there have been times that I haven't really taken it

0:15:04.920 --> 0:15:08.000
<v Speaker 1>that seriously as seriously as I should anyway. But we

0:15:08.080 --> 0:15:10.680
<v Speaker 1>all know that there are pitfalls out there, and it

0:15:10.720 --> 0:15:13.640
<v Speaker 1>doesn't make sense to just hope you avoid them by luck.

0:15:14.040 --> 0:15:17.080
<v Speaker 1>And heck, there's all that tracking that's going on by

0:15:17.120 --> 0:15:21.000
<v Speaker 1>everything from online stores to social media sites. Your data

0:15:21.160 --> 0:15:25.120
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0:15:25.160 --> 0:15:29.920
<v Speaker 1>recommend using Express VPN. Express VPN has easy to use

0:15:29.960 --> 0:15:33.080
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0:15:37.400 --> 0:15:41.520
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0:15:41.600 --> 0:15:45.239
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0:16:02.960 --> 0:16:06.000
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0:16:06.040 --> 0:16:08.120
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0:16:08.200 --> 0:16:11.400
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0:16:16.120 --> 0:16:18.920
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0:16:23.480 --> 0:16:28.400
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0:16:36.160 --> 0:16:39.800
<v Speaker 1>stuff to learn more. Now let's get back to the

0:16:39.840 --> 0:16:43.320
<v Speaker 1>seven thirty seven Max Alright. I left off saying that

0:16:43.400 --> 0:16:46.840
<v Speaker 1>Boeing concluded that developing an all new type of aircraft

0:16:46.960 --> 0:16:51.480
<v Speaker 1>wasn't going to pun intended fly. As Airbus began to

0:16:51.520 --> 0:16:55.600
<v Speaker 1>gain popularity among airlines and American airlines had as part

0:16:55.600 --> 0:16:59.600
<v Speaker 1>of its plan and order for a re engined seven

0:16:59.640 --> 0:17:03.520
<v Speaker 1>thirty seven aircraft. Boeing would need to focus on that effort,

0:17:03.680 --> 0:17:06.720
<v Speaker 1>and it abandoned the design of an entirely new aircraft.

0:17:06.800 --> 0:17:09.880
<v Speaker 1>It finally said, Okay, it doesn't make sense for us

0:17:09.920 --> 0:17:13.200
<v Speaker 1>to create a new aircraft from the ground up. Let's

0:17:13.240 --> 0:17:16.000
<v Speaker 1>go back to the seven thirty seven and make some adjustments.

0:17:16.520 --> 0:17:19.439
<v Speaker 1>This also brought with it a few other potential benefits.

0:17:19.680 --> 0:17:24.240
<v Speaker 1>Developing a new aircraft is time consuming and incredibly expensive.

0:17:24.640 --> 0:17:28.639
<v Speaker 1>Not only is the development process itself expensive, then there's

0:17:28.680 --> 0:17:32.480
<v Speaker 1>the certification phase, in which the aircraft must pass requirements

0:17:32.560 --> 0:17:35.919
<v Speaker 1>set by the various aviation authorities around the world in

0:17:36.000 --> 0:17:38.760
<v Speaker 1>order to be allowed to operate as a commercial aircraft.

0:17:39.000 --> 0:17:42.080
<v Speaker 1>And then there's the training phase. Pilots have to train

0:17:42.160 --> 0:17:44.320
<v Speaker 1>on the new aircraft to learn its systems and how

0:17:44.359 --> 0:17:47.560
<v Speaker 1>it flies. Not all aircraft behave the same up in

0:17:47.600 --> 0:17:50.080
<v Speaker 1>the air, and that means it's a really big deal

0:17:50.200 --> 0:17:53.720
<v Speaker 1>to invest in an all new type of aircraft. It's

0:17:53.800 --> 0:17:57.760
<v Speaker 1>asking for a lot of resources, both from the manufacturing

0:17:57.760 --> 0:18:01.800
<v Speaker 1>company and the various airlines out there. Updating and existing

0:18:01.840 --> 0:18:05.520
<v Speaker 1>design is far less daunting. The basic bones for the

0:18:05.560 --> 0:18:08.640
<v Speaker 1>aircraft are already there, and if the changes are within

0:18:08.680 --> 0:18:12.920
<v Speaker 1>certain parameters, you can get through regulations pretty easily. After all,

0:18:12.920 --> 0:18:15.800
<v Speaker 1>the base aircraft has already been through that process and

0:18:15.840 --> 0:18:20.400
<v Speaker 1>had been approved. Likewise, if the changes aren't dramatic, pilots

0:18:20.480 --> 0:18:23.639
<v Speaker 1>might be able to fly those planes without any real

0:18:23.680 --> 0:18:27.440
<v Speaker 1>additional training or having to go into any flight simulators,

0:18:27.480 --> 0:18:30.199
<v Speaker 1>because the aircraft, at least in theory, is going to

0:18:30.240 --> 0:18:33.800
<v Speaker 1>perform within the basic parameters of its predecessors. So there

0:18:33.800 --> 0:18:36.720
<v Speaker 1>are a lot of strong business cases for sticking with

0:18:36.760 --> 0:18:40.680
<v Speaker 1>a previously engineered design. Boeing's decision to stick with the

0:18:40.720 --> 0:18:44.480
<v Speaker 1>seven thirty seven was both more economical and, due to

0:18:44.520 --> 0:18:48.760
<v Speaker 1>the agreement it had reached with American Airlines, pretty much necessary.

0:18:49.280 --> 0:18:52.400
<v Speaker 1>One of the big goals Boeing had was to improve

0:18:52.520 --> 0:18:55.440
<v Speaker 1>fuel efficiency so that the seven thirty seven Max could

0:18:55.480 --> 0:18:58.800
<v Speaker 1>fly the same distance as older seven thirty seven's while

0:18:58.800 --> 0:19:01.760
<v Speaker 1>burning less fuel. That would also mean the seven thirty

0:19:01.800 --> 0:19:05.159
<v Speaker 1>seven Max could potentially have an increased range of flight

0:19:05.760 --> 0:19:09.280
<v Speaker 1>compared to earlier seven thirty seven's, and you could argue

0:19:09.359 --> 0:19:12.840
<v Speaker 1>that ultimately it was this push that would lead to

0:19:12.880 --> 0:19:16.160
<v Speaker 1>the tragedies of the two seven thirty seven Max crashes

0:19:16.600 --> 0:19:19.920
<v Speaker 1>that would ground the global fleet of seven thirty seven

0:19:19.920 --> 0:19:23.720
<v Speaker 1>Max aircraft. It's a sort of cascade effect where one decision,

0:19:24.320 --> 0:19:28.040
<v Speaker 1>that being to re engine the seven seven would lead

0:19:28.080 --> 0:19:31.840
<v Speaker 1>to other decisions that ultimately set the stage for catastrophe.

0:19:32.200 --> 0:19:34.080
<v Speaker 1>And by the way, this is all very easy for

0:19:34.119 --> 0:19:37.400
<v Speaker 1>me to say in hindsight, I'm not trying to suggest

0:19:37.400 --> 0:19:40.600
<v Speaker 1>that I would have spotted the potential for disaster before

0:19:40.640 --> 0:19:43.760
<v Speaker 1>it happened. It's only because it happened that we're able

0:19:43.800 --> 0:19:45.520
<v Speaker 1>to go back and analyze this and see where the

0:19:45.560 --> 0:19:48.760
<v Speaker 1>mistakes were made. But at the time it was not

0:19:48.800 --> 0:19:52.840
<v Speaker 1>necessarily that clear, at least not outside of Boeing. Boeing

0:19:52.960 --> 0:19:55.240
<v Speaker 1>chose for this new version of the seven thirty seven

0:19:55.560 --> 0:19:59.560
<v Speaker 1>some engines from a company called CFL. CFM is actually

0:19:59.600 --> 0:20:05.200
<v Speaker 1>a joint venture between g E Aviation and Saffron Aircraft Engines.

0:20:05.520 --> 0:20:08.520
<v Speaker 1>So in two thousand eight, CFM introduced a class of

0:20:08.560 --> 0:20:12.879
<v Speaker 1>engines they called the Leading Edge Aviation Propulsion Class or

0:20:13.160 --> 0:20:17.399
<v Speaker 1>LEAP l E a P. Boeing opted for the Leap

0:20:17.640 --> 0:20:21.160
<v Speaker 1>one B model of engines, which has a thrust range

0:20:21.200 --> 0:20:25.239
<v Speaker 1>between twenty three thousand and twenty eight thousand pounds of

0:20:25.280 --> 0:20:29.439
<v Speaker 1>thrust or between one hundred and one killing Newton's of

0:20:29.480 --> 0:20:32.080
<v Speaker 1>thrust and Newton is the amount of force required to

0:20:32.080 --> 0:20:35.000
<v Speaker 1>accelerate an object with a mass of one kilogram and

0:20:35.040 --> 0:20:39.840
<v Speaker 1>an acceleration of one second per second. CFM chose several

0:20:39.920 --> 0:20:43.960
<v Speaker 1>engineering advancements that contributed to better fuel efficiency and its

0:20:44.040 --> 0:20:48.280
<v Speaker 1>leap engines compared to older aircraft engines. That includes carbon

0:20:48.400 --> 0:20:53.399
<v Speaker 1>fiber composite components that are stronger than earlier materials at

0:20:53.440 --> 0:20:57.160
<v Speaker 1>a fraction of the weight, so while the engines are

0:20:57.280 --> 0:21:01.520
<v Speaker 1>big larger than previous seventh D seven engines, they don't

0:21:01.520 --> 0:21:05.400
<v Speaker 1>necessarily weigh as much as those older engines do. CFM

0:21:05.520 --> 0:21:10.000
<v Speaker 1>also used additive manufacturing, more commonly called three D printing

0:21:10.320 --> 0:21:14.840
<v Speaker 1>to produce those components. The leap engines also pre mix

0:21:15.040 --> 0:21:19.000
<v Speaker 1>fuel and air together before the mixture hits the nozzles

0:21:19.080 --> 0:21:22.800
<v Speaker 1>that enter the fuel into the combustion chamber, So older

0:21:22.840 --> 0:21:27.440
<v Speaker 1>engines would inject essentially amissed a fuel into the combustion

0:21:27.520 --> 0:21:30.280
<v Speaker 1>chamber and the mixing of the fuel and the air

0:21:30.359 --> 0:21:33.600
<v Speaker 1>happened inside the chamber itself. But according to CFM, that

0:21:33.680 --> 0:21:37.200
<v Speaker 1>meant lower fuel efficiency and greater emissions, So they say

0:21:37.280 --> 0:21:40.879
<v Speaker 1>that this new method cuts down on emissions and you

0:21:40.960 --> 0:21:44.000
<v Speaker 1>burn more of the fuel. The engines would give Boeing

0:21:44.200 --> 0:21:47.960
<v Speaker 1>the boost and efficiency needed to meet American airlines requirements.

0:21:48.520 --> 0:21:52.359
<v Speaker 1>In August two thousand eleven, Bowing officially announced the development

0:21:52.520 --> 0:21:55.119
<v Speaker 1>of this new version of the seven thirty seven, and

0:21:55.119 --> 0:21:58.600
<v Speaker 1>the company began to market the aircraft to various airlines.

0:21:59.119 --> 0:22:02.359
<v Speaker 1>By December two thousand eleven, Boeing found a customer in

0:22:02.400 --> 0:22:05.800
<v Speaker 1>the form of Southwest Airlines, which put in an order

0:22:06.000 --> 0:22:09.600
<v Speaker 1>for one fifty of the aircraft. Aircraft that were in

0:22:09.600 --> 0:22:12.919
<v Speaker 1>the earliest stages of development, mind you. From two thousand

0:22:13.000 --> 0:22:16.480
<v Speaker 1>eleven to two thousand fifteen, Boeing worked on the design

0:22:16.600 --> 0:22:20.160
<v Speaker 1>and production of the seven thirty seven Max. And here's

0:22:20.200 --> 0:22:23.520
<v Speaker 1>where we see some other decisions that would ultimately contribute

0:22:23.560 --> 0:22:26.879
<v Speaker 1>to the problems we saw when it entered service. The

0:22:26.960 --> 0:22:30.560
<v Speaker 1>new engines were larger than the previous seven thirty seven engines,

0:22:30.600 --> 0:22:34.119
<v Speaker 1>as I mentioned earlier, and traditionally those earlier seven thirty

0:22:34.119 --> 0:22:37.800
<v Speaker 1>seven engines would be mounted under the seven thirty seven's wings,

0:22:38.400 --> 0:22:40.560
<v Speaker 1>but these new engines were too big to do that

0:22:40.840 --> 0:22:44.479
<v Speaker 1>and still allow for adequate ground clearance between the bottom

0:22:44.520 --> 0:22:47.600
<v Speaker 1>of the engine and the ground itself, So that meant

0:22:47.640 --> 0:22:50.200
<v Speaker 1>the engineers had to figure out where to put these

0:22:50.200 --> 0:22:52.600
<v Speaker 1>engines on the body of a seven thirty seven, and

0:22:52.680 --> 0:22:56.240
<v Speaker 1>ultimately they decided to move the engines forward along the body,

0:22:56.400 --> 0:22:59.280
<v Speaker 1>ahead of the wings, and their position in such a

0:22:59.320 --> 0:23:01.959
<v Speaker 1>way so that the exhaust of the engines is directed

0:23:02.040 --> 0:23:04.960
<v Speaker 1>underneath the wings, which makes sense. You wouldn't want it

0:23:05.000 --> 0:23:07.280
<v Speaker 1>to go right up against the wings you melt your

0:23:07.280 --> 0:23:10.640
<v Speaker 1>own wings off. And also the way that their position

0:23:10.680 --> 0:23:12.880
<v Speaker 1>now means that the bottom of the engine has sufficient

0:23:12.920 --> 0:23:17.680
<v Speaker 1>ground clearance. But moving the engines forward had another consequence.

0:23:17.880 --> 0:23:21.080
<v Speaker 1>It changed how the aircraft moved in flight. Moving the

0:23:21.119 --> 0:23:24.320
<v Speaker 1>engines forward meant that in flight, the seven thirty seven

0:23:24.359 --> 0:23:28.479
<v Speaker 1>Max has a slight tendency to tilt its pitch upward,

0:23:28.520 --> 0:23:31.639
<v Speaker 1>in other words, to tilt its nose up towards the

0:23:31.680 --> 0:23:34.840
<v Speaker 1>sky in a climb. That can be a problem for

0:23:34.920 --> 0:23:37.760
<v Speaker 1>lots of reasons, but a big one is on takeoff.

0:23:37.760 --> 0:23:41.639
<v Speaker 1>I mean, obviously you're climbing in takeoff, and in that phase,

0:23:41.720 --> 0:23:44.919
<v Speaker 1>pilot's guide a plane into a climb to reach cruising altitude.

0:23:45.080 --> 0:23:47.919
<v Speaker 1>So you don't want a plane to overcompensate and tilt

0:23:48.119 --> 0:23:51.720
<v Speaker 1>further back than the plan to climb for lots of reasons,

0:23:51.960 --> 0:23:54.199
<v Speaker 1>but a big one is that it can cause the

0:23:54.240 --> 0:23:57.920
<v Speaker 1>engines to stall out. So for a jet engine to work,

0:23:58.560 --> 0:24:01.600
<v Speaker 1>you have to have air flow going through that jet

0:24:01.600 --> 0:24:05.720
<v Speaker 1>engine in sufficient quantities, so it has to be moving

0:24:05.720 --> 0:24:09.879
<v Speaker 1>there in a sufficient speed. Essentially, I covered this in

0:24:09.960 --> 0:24:12.640
<v Speaker 1>recent episodes, so I'm just going to do a quick overview.

0:24:12.880 --> 0:24:16.520
<v Speaker 1>In a jet engine, incoming air hits fan blades that

0:24:16.600 --> 0:24:21.080
<v Speaker 1>compress that incoming air, which then either flows in or

0:24:21.119 --> 0:24:26.680
<v Speaker 1>around a combustion chamber where the engine ignites fuel. The

0:24:26.840 --> 0:24:31.280
<v Speaker 1>resulting hot gases in the combustion chamber expand and then

0:24:31.400 --> 0:24:34.080
<v Speaker 1>force their way out of the chamber through an exhaust

0:24:34.200 --> 0:24:36.840
<v Speaker 1>nozzle in the back of the chamber, and as they

0:24:37.040 --> 0:24:41.440
<v Speaker 1>escape they hit rotors on the rear side of the engine,

0:24:42.000 --> 0:24:45.760
<v Speaker 1>and the rotors connect through a shaft to the fan

0:24:45.840 --> 0:24:48.720
<v Speaker 1>blades that are in the front of the engine. So

0:24:48.960 --> 0:24:51.240
<v Speaker 1>as that exhaust is coming out the back of the engine,

0:24:51.359 --> 0:24:54.040
<v Speaker 1>it hits the rotors, and the rotors turn because of

0:24:54.080 --> 0:24:58.000
<v Speaker 1>that rapidly escaping gas, and because that's connected by a

0:24:58.000 --> 0:25:01.320
<v Speaker 1>shaft to the blades in the front, it turns. The

0:25:01.359 --> 0:25:03.439
<v Speaker 1>fan blades in the front of the engine, and the

0:25:03.520 --> 0:25:08.360
<v Speaker 1>whole thing perpetuates itself because of this continuous burn inside

0:25:08.400 --> 0:25:11.080
<v Speaker 1>the combustion chamber. But for this to work, you have

0:25:11.160 --> 0:25:13.600
<v Speaker 1>to have a sufficient amount of air flowing into the

0:25:13.640 --> 0:25:16.080
<v Speaker 1>engine in the first place. This is also why it's

0:25:16.119 --> 0:25:19.520
<v Speaker 1>necessary to jump start a jet engine on the ground.

0:25:19.960 --> 0:25:23.320
<v Speaker 1>They forced compressed air through the jet engine in order

0:25:23.359 --> 0:25:26.560
<v Speaker 1>to get it going, because you cannot get it started

0:25:26.600 --> 0:25:29.720
<v Speaker 1>any other way. Now, if the plane were to tilt

0:25:29.800 --> 0:25:33.160
<v Speaker 1>too far in an incline when it's climbing up into

0:25:33.200 --> 0:25:36.840
<v Speaker 1>the sky, the angle of the engine compared to the

0:25:36.880 --> 0:25:39.920
<v Speaker 1>airflow would be such that you wouldn't get enough air

0:25:40.000 --> 0:25:42.680
<v Speaker 1>to go through the engine for it to maintain operation,

0:25:42.840 --> 0:25:45.080
<v Speaker 1>and that's why it would stall out. You would have

0:25:45.119 --> 0:25:48.399
<v Speaker 1>a lack of air to keep that whole process going.

0:25:48.880 --> 0:25:53.199
<v Speaker 1>Installed engines would clearly be a disaster. Once Boeing engineers

0:25:53.240 --> 0:25:56.720
<v Speaker 1>recognize the tendency for the seven thirty seven Max designed

0:25:56.720 --> 0:26:00.600
<v Speaker 1>to go into this unprompted tilt, they had to how

0:26:00.640 --> 0:26:04.639
<v Speaker 1>to address that problem, and their solution was a combination

0:26:04.680 --> 0:26:08.479
<v Speaker 1>of hardware and software. On the hardware side, they relied

0:26:08.560 --> 0:26:12.280
<v Speaker 1>upon sensors that would automatically analyze the difference between the

0:26:12.320 --> 0:26:16.480
<v Speaker 1>airplane's attitude in the air and the angle of attack.

0:26:17.080 --> 0:26:19.320
<v Speaker 1>So the angle of attack describes the angle of a

0:26:19.359 --> 0:26:23.320
<v Speaker 1>plane's wing with respect to airflow. Angle of attack is

0:26:23.359 --> 0:26:26.280
<v Speaker 1>a big component of lift, that's the force that keeps

0:26:26.400 --> 0:26:30.280
<v Speaker 1>aircraft in the air. The other major hardware component is

0:26:30.320 --> 0:26:34.960
<v Speaker 1>the aircraft's horizontal tail, which can tilt to change the

0:26:35.040 --> 0:26:40.040
<v Speaker 1>plane's pitch. By altering the orientation of this horizontal tail,

0:26:40.760 --> 0:26:42.960
<v Speaker 1>it could act as kind of like a rudder, except

0:26:42.960 --> 0:26:46.240
<v Speaker 1>a rudder for the horizontal access, not the vertical, and

0:26:46.280 --> 0:26:48.720
<v Speaker 1>the effect is that it could force the nose of

0:26:48.760 --> 0:26:52.239
<v Speaker 1>the plane back downward in one of these climbs, so,

0:26:52.280 --> 0:26:54.720
<v Speaker 1>in other words, it could affect the pitch of the airplane.

0:26:55.040 --> 0:26:58.880
<v Speaker 1>The software overseeing the whole operation of this, which would

0:26:58.920 --> 0:27:01.880
<v Speaker 1>monitor the data coming in from the sensors and then

0:27:01.920 --> 0:27:05.800
<v Speaker 1>send appropriate commands to the tail, is called the Maneuvering

0:27:05.960 --> 0:27:10.520
<v Speaker 1>Characteristics Augmentation System or m CASTS. So if you've been

0:27:10.560 --> 0:27:12.920
<v Speaker 1>following the story of the seven thirty seven Max, you've

0:27:12.960 --> 0:27:17.280
<v Speaker 1>likely heard the term m CAST thrown around now. In theory,

0:27:17.640 --> 0:27:20.480
<v Speaker 1>m casts would operate in the background and make the

0:27:20.520 --> 0:27:23.439
<v Speaker 1>seven thirty seven Max perform as if it were any

0:27:23.560 --> 0:27:27.159
<v Speaker 1>other type of seven thirty seven aircraft, so it was

0:27:27.200 --> 0:27:30.840
<v Speaker 1>designed to override pilot controls. But this also meant that

0:27:30.920 --> 0:27:34.200
<v Speaker 1>if the system were to erroneously detect that the aircraft

0:27:34.200 --> 0:27:37.000
<v Speaker 1>were in too steep a climb, the tail flap or

0:27:37.040 --> 0:27:40.159
<v Speaker 1>the horizontal tail rather could force the plane into a

0:27:40.240 --> 0:27:43.440
<v Speaker 1>dive and the pilots would be struggling to pull out

0:27:43.480 --> 0:27:45.760
<v Speaker 1>of it, and they'd have to figure out how to

0:27:45.800 --> 0:27:48.520
<v Speaker 1>do that, and that would also mean knowing how to

0:27:48.600 --> 0:27:52.879
<v Speaker 1>disarm the system. Okay, so Boeing was pushing hard to

0:27:52.920 --> 0:27:55.439
<v Speaker 1>get the seven thirty seven Max ready to compete with

0:27:55.480 --> 0:27:59.560
<v Speaker 1>the Airbus A three twenty neo aircraft. The f a

0:27:59.560 --> 0:28:03.439
<v Speaker 1>A helped expedite things. In two thousand fifteen, according to

0:28:03.480 --> 0:28:07.000
<v Speaker 1>the Seattle Times, the f a A managers put pressure

0:28:07.000 --> 0:28:10.439
<v Speaker 1>on the agency's safety engineers, telling them to delegate the

0:28:10.480 --> 0:28:14.399
<v Speaker 1>assessment process to Boeing's own staff. This, by the way,

0:28:14.440 --> 0:28:17.640
<v Speaker 1>it doesn't seem like it's completely unusual, but it did

0:28:17.680 --> 0:28:19.840
<v Speaker 1>come as something of a surprise to me. I did

0:28:19.880 --> 0:28:22.960
<v Speaker 1>not know that's how things worked, because, in other words,

0:28:22.960 --> 0:28:25.920
<v Speaker 1>what that means is the agency and charge of overseeing

0:28:26.040 --> 0:28:31.120
<v Speaker 1>safety passed that job along to a company that produced

0:28:31.119 --> 0:28:34.639
<v Speaker 1>the very thing the FAA was meant to oversee. And

0:28:34.680 --> 0:28:37.880
<v Speaker 1>that might sound like it might not be the best idea.

0:28:38.440 --> 0:28:42.280
<v Speaker 1>I happen to think it was a pretty bad idea now, granted,

0:28:42.560 --> 0:28:44.680
<v Speaker 1>as we are now seeing, a failure on the part

0:28:44.760 --> 0:28:47.880
<v Speaker 1>of a company to be completely honest and rigorous with

0:28:47.920 --> 0:28:51.880
<v Speaker 1>its safety assessment process can result in terrible tragedies for

0:28:51.960 --> 0:28:55.800
<v Speaker 1>passengers as well as real hardships for the company itself.

0:28:55.960 --> 0:28:58.840
<v Speaker 1>So companies like Boeing have a very strong incentive to

0:28:58.920 --> 0:29:02.440
<v Speaker 1>police themselves care late. However, it sounds like that's maybe

0:29:02.480 --> 0:29:06.560
<v Speaker 1>not what happened with Boeing's self assessment. Again. According to

0:29:06.600 --> 0:29:11.000
<v Speaker 1>the Seattle Times, the safety analysis understated how far the

0:29:11.080 --> 0:29:14.800
<v Speaker 1>im cast software could force the horizontal tail to move

0:29:15.320 --> 0:29:18.920
<v Speaker 1>in an effort to stabilize the planes pitch. The Times

0:29:18.920 --> 0:29:21.680
<v Speaker 1>reported that in reality, the software was able to make

0:29:21.680 --> 0:29:25.320
<v Speaker 1>the tail move more than four times further than what

0:29:25.400 --> 0:29:28.840
<v Speaker 1>the report indicated, meaning a much more dramatic change in

0:29:28.960 --> 0:29:32.320
<v Speaker 1>pitch than what Boeing was claiming in the report. And

0:29:32.360 --> 0:29:36.080
<v Speaker 1>Boeing's response to this was that initially Imcast would be

0:29:36.120 --> 0:29:39.440
<v Speaker 1>able to move the horizontal tail at an angle of

0:29:39.840 --> 0:29:42.640
<v Speaker 1>point six degrees. It turned out it was more like

0:29:42.840 --> 0:29:46.280
<v Speaker 1>two point five degrees, and Boeing said, well, it was

0:29:46.320 --> 0:29:50.000
<v Speaker 1>only upon further study that we realized in order to

0:29:50.040 --> 0:29:54.080
<v Speaker 1>pull out of a disastrous climb, you would need a

0:29:54.240 --> 0:29:59.160
<v Speaker 1>greater movement than just point six degrees, which is why

0:29:59.200 --> 0:30:01.640
<v Speaker 1>we increased it. But at that point we had already

0:30:01.640 --> 0:30:04.160
<v Speaker 1>written the report. Seems to me like there might have

0:30:04.200 --> 0:30:06.240
<v Speaker 1>been an addendum that needed to be added there, but

0:30:06.360 --> 0:30:09.720
<v Speaker 1>what am I to say? So the report did not

0:30:10.000 --> 0:30:14.600
<v Speaker 1>address how mcasts would reset after a pilot's response and

0:30:14.600 --> 0:30:18.640
<v Speaker 1>would go into another dive despite repeated manual attempts to recover. So,

0:30:18.680 --> 0:30:22.959
<v Speaker 1>in other words, if a pilot were to respond to

0:30:23.040 --> 0:30:26.280
<v Speaker 1>this unplanned dive and pull back, you know, activate the

0:30:26.320 --> 0:30:30.240
<v Speaker 1>control and pull back on it, then it would stop

0:30:30.320 --> 0:30:33.720
<v Speaker 1>the system temporarily, but it would just reset and start

0:30:33.800 --> 0:30:37.120
<v Speaker 1>the cycle over again, and it might get more dramatic

0:30:37.200 --> 0:30:41.640
<v Speaker 1>each time. The the amount of of of tilt that

0:30:41.720 --> 0:30:44.959
<v Speaker 1>the horizontal tail would take, and thus the amount of

0:30:45.560 --> 0:30:49.000
<v Speaker 1>dive the plane would go into, would get greater each time.

0:30:49.520 --> 0:30:53.200
<v Speaker 1>The criticism is that the safety measure had no self

0:30:53.280 --> 0:30:59.080
<v Speaker 1>correcting process that would discontinue the diving efforts after manual intervention.

0:30:59.360 --> 0:31:01.480
<v Speaker 1>It would just keep going into a dive. So the

0:31:01.600 --> 0:31:04.560
<v Speaker 1>argument is that there should have been a system in

0:31:04.600 --> 0:31:10.200
<v Speaker 1>place where if a pilot intervenes, it deactivates this process

0:31:10.320 --> 0:31:13.680
<v Speaker 1>that was not in place. The Times criticized that the

0:31:13.720 --> 0:31:17.120
<v Speaker 1>assessment stated that if the system were to fail, it

0:31:17.160 --> 0:31:22.120
<v Speaker 1>would merit a hazardous danger rather than a catastrophic one.

0:31:22.200 --> 0:31:27.120
<v Speaker 1>These have real meanings in safety assessments. Hazardous means that

0:31:27.400 --> 0:31:30.920
<v Speaker 1>the outcome could result in injury or death to a

0:31:31.000 --> 0:31:35.720
<v Speaker 1>small number of passengers in a plane. Catastrophic is essentially

0:31:36.240 --> 0:31:39.920
<v Speaker 1>a designation stating that such a failure would result in

0:31:39.960 --> 0:31:42.760
<v Speaker 1>the complete loss of the plane and everyone on board.

0:31:43.280 --> 0:31:46.920
<v Speaker 1>So Boeing was saying that a failure of the system

0:31:47.200 --> 0:31:51.280
<v Speaker 1>would merit the hazardous level, not the catastrophic level. So,

0:31:51.320 --> 0:31:54.480
<v Speaker 1>in other words, the criticism is that the report was

0:31:54.560 --> 0:31:58.760
<v Speaker 1>downplaying the actual outcome of a system failure. One other

0:31:58.840 --> 0:32:03.040
<v Speaker 1>major problem is that Boeing neglected to include information about

0:32:03.240 --> 0:32:06.400
<v Speaker 1>m casts in its operation manuals for the seven thirty

0:32:06.440 --> 0:32:10.360
<v Speaker 1>seven Max. Pilots didn't know about it, airlines didn't know

0:32:10.480 --> 0:32:14.600
<v Speaker 1>about it. It wasn't until after the first tragedy that

0:32:14.720 --> 0:32:17.440
<v Speaker 1>this would be amended. When we come back, I'll talk

0:32:17.480 --> 0:32:20.440
<v Speaker 1>about that accident and the following events. But first, let's

0:32:20.480 --> 0:32:31.680
<v Speaker 1>take another quick break. Perhaps because the f a A

0:32:31.960 --> 0:32:36.640
<v Speaker 1>delegated the safety assessment duties to Boeing, Perhaps because the

0:32:36.760 --> 0:32:39.960
<v Speaker 1>seven thirty seven Max was a variant on a tried

0:32:40.080 --> 0:32:43.000
<v Speaker 1>and true aircraft design that had been an operation for

0:32:43.200 --> 0:32:48.440
<v Speaker 1>at that point fifty years. Perhaps because simulations failed to

0:32:48.480 --> 0:32:51.600
<v Speaker 1>create the sort of scenarios that we would unfortunately see

0:32:51.760 --> 0:32:54.960
<v Speaker 1>unfold in the actual operation of the aircraft. The seven

0:32:55.040 --> 0:33:00.080
<v Speaker 1>thirty seven Max past certification without much hullabaloo. Then, to

0:33:00.120 --> 0:33:04.280
<v Speaker 1>be fair, it seems in more investigations that some of

0:33:04.320 --> 0:33:08.000
<v Speaker 1>those simulations actually did show some problems, but Boeing didn't

0:33:08.040 --> 0:33:12.280
<v Speaker 1>really address that at the time. There was also no

0:33:12.360 --> 0:33:15.120
<v Speaker 1>need to train flight crews on how to operate the

0:33:15.120 --> 0:33:18.520
<v Speaker 1>seven thirty seven Max, because in theory it behaves so

0:33:18.640 --> 0:33:22.600
<v Speaker 1>much like other seven thirty seven's, particularly the seven thirty

0:33:22.680 --> 0:33:26.560
<v Speaker 1>seven in G, which was the immediate predecessor of the Max.

0:33:27.280 --> 0:33:30.680
<v Speaker 1>Pilots reported that they essentially had to complete a one

0:33:30.800 --> 0:33:34.680
<v Speaker 1>hour course on a tablet and not even spend any

0:33:34.680 --> 0:33:37.680
<v Speaker 1>time in a simulator before they would be certified to

0:33:37.760 --> 0:33:40.760
<v Speaker 1>fly a seven thirty seven Max. However, you want to

0:33:40.840 --> 0:33:43.000
<v Speaker 1>lay it out. The end of the matter is that

0:33:43.080 --> 0:33:46.680
<v Speaker 1>the seven thirty seven Max received its certification and Boeing

0:33:46.760 --> 0:33:50.600
<v Speaker 1>began to deliver the aircraft to customers. One of those

0:33:50.640 --> 0:33:54.560
<v Speaker 1>customers was Melindo Air, a carrier based out of Malaysia

0:33:54.800 --> 0:33:58.360
<v Speaker 1>and a subsidiary of a larger airline called Lion Air.

0:33:59.080 --> 0:34:03.120
<v Speaker 1>On October twenty ninth, two thousand eighteen, Lion Air flight

0:34:03.400 --> 0:34:06.600
<v Speaker 1>j T six ten, which was a seven thirty seven

0:34:06.760 --> 0:34:12.239
<v Speaker 1>Max eight, crashed just thirteen minutes after takeoff from Indonesia.

0:34:12.600 --> 0:34:16.080
<v Speaker 1>The plane crashed into the sea off Jakarta. All one

0:34:16.600 --> 0:34:19.520
<v Speaker 1>eighty nine people on board died as a result of

0:34:19.560 --> 0:34:24.520
<v Speaker 1>that crash. Among them were twenty Indonesian government officials. The

0:34:24.560 --> 0:34:28.040
<v Speaker 1>plane had been in use for about two months. A

0:34:28.160 --> 0:34:31.520
<v Speaker 1>pilot had reported a problem with the aircraft right away,

0:34:31.840 --> 0:34:35.960
<v Speaker 1>requesting a return to the airport before they lost control

0:34:36.040 --> 0:34:38.960
<v Speaker 1>of the aircraft. The CEO of Lion Air at the

0:34:39.000 --> 0:34:42.440
<v Speaker 1>time reported that a different pilot had reported the same

0:34:42.480 --> 0:34:46.759
<v Speaker 1>plane for a quote technical issue end quote earlier on

0:34:46.880 --> 0:34:49.680
<v Speaker 1>that week, but that the aircraft had been cleared to

0:34:49.719 --> 0:34:54.560
<v Speaker 1>fly the following day. An investigation following the crash indicated

0:34:54.600 --> 0:34:58.480
<v Speaker 1>that one of the angle of attack sensors had malfunctioned

0:34:58.560 --> 0:35:02.360
<v Speaker 1>on the Lion Air flight, and it had mistakenly indicated

0:35:02.440 --> 0:35:06.560
<v Speaker 1>a dangerous change in pitch and an oncoming engine stall,

0:35:07.000 --> 0:35:10.000
<v Speaker 1>and none of those conditions were actually existing at the time.

0:35:10.560 --> 0:35:13.840
<v Speaker 1>But the im CAST software and system went into action,

0:35:14.040 --> 0:35:17.880
<v Speaker 1>forcing the horizontal tail to move the the the nose

0:35:18.080 --> 0:35:20.440
<v Speaker 1>of the plane downward and put it into a dive.

0:35:21.120 --> 0:35:24.600
<v Speaker 1>The pilot was unable to counteract that, and the plane

0:35:24.600 --> 0:35:27.759
<v Speaker 1>crashed as a result. Making matters worse was the fact

0:35:27.800 --> 0:35:30.640
<v Speaker 1>that Boeing had not indicated the im cast was even

0:35:30.640 --> 0:35:33.279
<v Speaker 1>a thing. The pilots had no way of knowing what

0:35:33.400 --> 0:35:36.120
<v Speaker 1>it was that was causing the plane's nose to dive

0:35:36.880 --> 0:35:41.000
<v Speaker 1>or how they were supposed to stop it. On November six,

0:35:41.200 --> 0:35:45.160
<v Speaker 1>two thousand eighteen, Boeing issued a report revealing im CAST

0:35:45.239 --> 0:35:48.760
<v Speaker 1>to pilots and airlines for the first time. The report

0:35:48.800 --> 0:35:51.800
<v Speaker 1>also gave instructions to pilots on how to override in

0:35:52.000 --> 0:35:54.920
<v Speaker 1>cast in the event of a failure. Not At this point,

0:35:55.239 --> 0:35:58.280
<v Speaker 1>it wasn't yet certain that im casts was at fault,

0:35:58.400 --> 0:36:01.160
<v Speaker 1>but the signs were starting to point that way. In

0:36:01.200 --> 0:36:04.080
<v Speaker 1>the meantime, Boeing continued to receive orders for the seven

0:36:04.120 --> 0:36:07.520
<v Speaker 1>thirties seven Max from various airlines and was still in

0:36:07.840 --> 0:36:12.120
<v Speaker 1>full manufacturing mode. One thing Bowing did that later drew

0:36:12.160 --> 0:36:16.360
<v Speaker 1>an enormous amount of criticism was to place some responsibility

0:36:16.600 --> 0:36:19.880
<v Speaker 1>on the pilots themselves, stating that they should have known

0:36:19.920 --> 0:36:23.600
<v Speaker 1>to cut off the switches to the planes stabilizers. But

0:36:23.680 --> 0:36:26.719
<v Speaker 1>analysts who looked at the recovered flight data for the

0:36:26.760 --> 0:36:30.560
<v Speaker 1>Lion Air disaster said that what the pilots had experienced

0:36:30.680 --> 0:36:34.560
<v Speaker 1>didn't look like a stabilizer runaway scenario in which an

0:36:34.560 --> 0:36:38.320
<v Speaker 1>element like the seven thirty seven Max's horizontal tail would

0:36:38.320 --> 0:36:43.520
<v Speaker 1>make a continuous, uncommanded movement. The Lion Air flight data

0:36:43.840 --> 0:36:47.080
<v Speaker 1>showed that the tail movement was not a continuous motion,

0:36:47.440 --> 0:36:49.719
<v Speaker 1>and then the pilots were able to use the controls

0:36:49.760 --> 0:36:53.200
<v Speaker 1>to pull up several times before the plane became uncontrollable.

0:36:53.600 --> 0:36:57.560
<v Speaker 1>The analysts contradicted Boeing, saying that it wouldn't have seemed

0:36:57.600 --> 0:37:00.440
<v Speaker 1>obvious to cut off the stabilizer controls based on what

0:37:00.520 --> 0:37:04.759
<v Speaker 1>was happening then. On March tenth, two thousand, nineteen, and

0:37:04.920 --> 0:37:09.080
<v Speaker 1>Ethiopian Airlines flight from Addis Ababa to Nairobi crashed not

0:37:09.280 --> 0:37:12.719
<v Speaker 1>long after takeoff. Air traffic control lost contact with the

0:37:12.719 --> 0:37:16.399
<v Speaker 1>plane just six minutes after it left the runway. All

0:37:16.480 --> 0:37:20.240
<v Speaker 1>one fifty seven people aboard that plane died from the crash.

0:37:20.719 --> 0:37:24.000
<v Speaker 1>Early analysis suggested that once again, this was a failure

0:37:24.120 --> 0:37:27.600
<v Speaker 1>of m CAST. Further investigation showed that the crew attempted

0:37:27.640 --> 0:37:31.319
<v Speaker 1>to follow Boeing's instructions to correct for the failure, to

0:37:31.440 --> 0:37:35.880
<v Speaker 1>no effect. One day after the crash in Ethiopia, China,

0:37:35.960 --> 0:37:39.680
<v Speaker 1>and Indonesia, authorities issued orders that all seven thirty seven

0:37:39.719 --> 0:37:44.040
<v Speaker 1>Max aircraft operating in those countries were to be grounded. Now,

0:37:44.080 --> 0:37:46.239
<v Speaker 1>at that point, it was not yet known that m

0:37:46.320 --> 0:37:50.360
<v Speaker 1>CAST was definitely at fault for that second crash. The

0:37:50.480 --> 0:37:54.160
<v Speaker 1>day after that, on March twelve, two thousand nineteen, Canada,

0:37:54.440 --> 0:37:57.840
<v Speaker 1>the EU, and India also ordered all seven thirty seven

0:37:57.880 --> 0:38:01.000
<v Speaker 1>Max aircraft grounded. The f a A in the United

0:38:01.040 --> 0:38:04.240
<v Speaker 1>States would follow suit one day later, on March thirteenth,

0:38:04.320 --> 0:38:07.920
<v Speaker 1>two thousand nineteen. At that point, investigators were seeing signs

0:38:07.960 --> 0:38:11.480
<v Speaker 1>that IMCAST did play a part in the second crash.

0:38:11.840 --> 0:38:14.919
<v Speaker 1>The U s Department of Justice began a sweeping investigation

0:38:15.000 --> 0:38:18.440
<v Speaker 1>into the matter, and particularly into the process of the

0:38:18.520 --> 0:38:22.840
<v Speaker 1>jets certification. How could it pass certification if it had

0:38:22.880 --> 0:38:28.200
<v Speaker 1>this incredible flaw. That investigation has uncovered other concerning details

0:38:28.280 --> 0:38:31.560
<v Speaker 1>about the issue, including the revelation that a Boeing pilot

0:38:31.800 --> 0:38:35.080
<v Speaker 1>had brought concerns about the flight system of the seven

0:38:35.120 --> 0:38:38.319
<v Speaker 1>thirty seven Max to the attention of Boeing officials back

0:38:38.320 --> 0:38:42.880
<v Speaker 1>in two six. Previously, Boeing management had maintained that they

0:38:42.920 --> 0:38:45.640
<v Speaker 1>had no idea that the flight control system could cause

0:38:45.640 --> 0:38:49.480
<v Speaker 1>a catastrophe, but pilot Mark Fortner said that while flying

0:38:49.520 --> 0:38:53.640
<v Speaker 1>simulations that incorporated m CAST, he had encountered cases where

0:38:53.680 --> 0:38:57.920
<v Speaker 1>the flight management system was, in his words, quote running

0:38:58.040 --> 0:39:02.520
<v Speaker 1>rampant end quote. The revelation of this pilot's warnings came

0:39:02.560 --> 0:39:05.960
<v Speaker 1>a little more than a week before Boeing CEO Dennis

0:39:06.040 --> 0:39:10.360
<v Speaker 1>Muhlenberg and John Hamilton's Boeing's lead engineer, were to appear

0:39:10.440 --> 0:39:13.520
<v Speaker 1>before the United States Senate and the United States House

0:39:13.560 --> 0:39:18.000
<v Speaker 1>of Representatives and back to back hearings. During those hearings,

0:39:18.160 --> 0:39:23.319
<v Speaker 1>officials accused Boeing of purposefully downplaying safety issues and concealing

0:39:23.360 --> 0:39:27.040
<v Speaker 1>potential problems in an effort to achieve certification as quickly

0:39:27.080 --> 0:39:31.680
<v Speaker 1>as possible and thus start selling planes as quickly as possible.

0:39:32.000 --> 0:39:34.880
<v Speaker 1>Those officials are also concerned about the f a a's

0:39:34.920 --> 0:39:38.359
<v Speaker 1>practice to deputize the very companies it is supposed to

0:39:38.400 --> 0:39:42.840
<v Speaker 1>certify in the safety assessment process. Now that's not to

0:39:42.920 --> 0:39:46.239
<v Speaker 1>say that the US government is now advocating for sweeping

0:39:46.440 --> 0:39:50.319
<v Speaker 1>changes in certification or or even going to come down

0:39:50.360 --> 0:39:53.319
<v Speaker 1>hard on Boeing, because it's not as simple as that.

0:39:53.880 --> 0:39:56.920
<v Speaker 1>At issue isn't just the fate of Boeing, which is

0:39:57.080 --> 0:40:00.959
<v Speaker 1>an enormous employer in the United States. That also means

0:40:00.960 --> 0:40:03.480
<v Speaker 1>that there's a whole lot of folks who are potentially

0:40:03.760 --> 0:40:07.080
<v Speaker 1>voters who could be affected by any massive problems that

0:40:07.160 --> 0:40:11.880
<v Speaker 1>Boeing faces, and politicians are a little squeamish about doing

0:40:11.920 --> 0:40:15.920
<v Speaker 1>things that could potentially upset voters. There are airlines that

0:40:16.000 --> 0:40:19.360
<v Speaker 1>have aircraft they can't use. They're dealing with this problem

0:40:19.400 --> 0:40:22.319
<v Speaker 1>to they're looking at lost revenue. And there are all

0:40:22.400 --> 0:40:26.200
<v Speaker 1>these companies that supply bowing with components like GE, you know,

0:40:26.280 --> 0:40:28.680
<v Speaker 1>one of the companies responsible for the seven thirty seven

0:40:28.680 --> 0:40:33.080
<v Speaker 1>max engines. GE has had its own share of problems recently.

0:40:33.120 --> 0:40:35.920
<v Speaker 1>You can listen to my episodes about General Electric that

0:40:36.000 --> 0:40:38.920
<v Speaker 1>published not too long ago to learn more about those.

0:40:39.600 --> 0:40:43.560
<v Speaker 1>Because the seven thirty seven max is effectively on hold.

0:40:44.000 --> 0:40:47.960
<v Speaker 1>It could potentially cost companies like Ge and others billions

0:40:48.000 --> 0:40:52.719
<v Speaker 1>of dollars. Boeing, for its part, has made major changes

0:40:52.800 --> 0:40:56.320
<v Speaker 1>to m CAST. A big one was that moving forward

0:40:56.360 --> 0:40:59.480
<v Speaker 1>in CAST will take into account both angle of attacks

0:40:59.520 --> 0:41:03.799
<v Speaker 1>sensor before changing the horizontal tails orientation. It would no

0:41:03.880 --> 0:41:07.000
<v Speaker 1>longer accept just one stream of data as being enough

0:41:07.120 --> 0:41:10.000
<v Speaker 1>to change the plane's pitch. One of the other major

0:41:10.040 --> 0:41:13.080
<v Speaker 1>criticisms directed at Boeing from a design level is that

0:41:13.160 --> 0:41:16.080
<v Speaker 1>the MCAST sensor was a single point of failure with

0:41:16.160 --> 0:41:20.200
<v Speaker 1>no redundancy, and when coupled with Boeing's self assessment that

0:41:20.280 --> 0:41:23.719
<v Speaker 1>a failure just represented a hazardous outcome but not a

0:41:23.760 --> 0:41:28.040
<v Speaker 1>catastrophic one, create a false sense of security. Another big

0:41:28.160 --> 0:41:31.600
<v Speaker 1>change is limiting how much the tail will move like

0:41:31.640 --> 0:41:33.919
<v Speaker 1>I said. The original safety assessment said the tail would

0:41:33.960 --> 0:41:36.279
<v Speaker 1>only move point six degrees, but in practice it was

0:41:36.320 --> 0:41:39.520
<v Speaker 1>more like two point five degrees at maximum. Boeing has

0:41:39.560 --> 0:41:42.080
<v Speaker 1>also stated that it is going to limit the system

0:41:42.120 --> 0:41:45.360
<v Speaker 1>to activating for a single cycle, as opposed to the

0:41:45.560 --> 0:41:49.120
<v Speaker 1>reset repeat process that was seen in both Lion Air

0:41:49.239 --> 0:41:53.640
<v Speaker 1>and the Ethiopian Airline crashes. Then there's the long tail

0:41:53.800 --> 0:41:56.200
<v Speaker 1>stuff that Boeing is going to have to deal with,

0:41:56.560 --> 0:42:01.000
<v Speaker 1>stuff like trust and perception. While Bowing has made efforts

0:42:01.040 --> 0:42:04.600
<v Speaker 1>to address the problems in its seven thirty seven Max

0:42:04.680 --> 0:42:08.520
<v Speaker 1>flight systems, the company's credibility has taken a hit, as

0:42:08.560 --> 0:42:11.759
<v Speaker 1>has the perception of the f a A. There's still

0:42:11.840 --> 0:42:14.279
<v Speaker 1>lawsuits against Boeing that are making their way through the

0:42:14.360 --> 0:42:17.080
<v Speaker 1>legal system that are a direct result of the seven

0:42:17.120 --> 0:42:21.120
<v Speaker 1>thirty seven Max disasters, and Boeing still has hopes that

0:42:21.280 --> 0:42:24.560
<v Speaker 1>the aviation agencies around the world will lift the grounding

0:42:24.640 --> 0:42:27.839
<v Speaker 1>of the seven thirty seven Max aircraft before the end

0:42:27.880 --> 0:42:32.080
<v Speaker 1>of twenty nineteen or in early twenty twenty. Meanwhile, the

0:42:32.160 --> 0:42:35.400
<v Speaker 1>company has another headache to deal with. In October two

0:42:35.440 --> 0:42:39.120
<v Speaker 1>thousand nineteen, reports came out that aircraft operators had discovered

0:42:39.200 --> 0:42:43.200
<v Speaker 1>cracks on the seven thirty seven in G aircraft, or

0:42:43.239 --> 0:42:45.880
<v Speaker 1>at least some of them now. As I mentioned earlier,

0:42:45.920 --> 0:42:49.160
<v Speaker 1>the seven thirty seven in G is a predecessor to

0:42:49.239 --> 0:42:51.480
<v Speaker 1>the seven thirty seven Max. It's been in service for

0:42:51.560 --> 0:42:55.360
<v Speaker 1>several years. It doesn't have the m CAST software or

0:42:55.400 --> 0:42:58.520
<v Speaker 1>the engine placement of the Max, and it remained in

0:42:58.600 --> 0:43:02.200
<v Speaker 1>operation with any problems. But in early October two thousand, nineteen,

0:43:02.560 --> 0:43:06.040
<v Speaker 1>U S officials ordered an inspection of seven thirty seven

0:43:06.040 --> 0:43:10.120
<v Speaker 1>in G planes that had completed more than thirty thousand cycles,

0:43:10.160 --> 0:43:13.719
<v Speaker 1>that is, more than thirty thousand takeoffs and landings. And

0:43:13.840 --> 0:43:16.560
<v Speaker 1>the whole point was to look at the section of

0:43:16.600 --> 0:43:19.040
<v Speaker 1>the plane where the wing attaches to the body of

0:43:19.080 --> 0:43:20.800
<v Speaker 1>the plane. It's a part of the plane that is

0:43:20.840 --> 0:43:24.359
<v Speaker 1>called and I swear I'm not making this up the

0:43:24.400 --> 0:43:29.080
<v Speaker 1>pickle fork. Several airlines outside of the United States also

0:43:29.320 --> 0:43:32.200
<v Speaker 1>began to inspect their seven thirty seven in G s,

0:43:32.520 --> 0:43:36.120
<v Speaker 1>even those that had not yet completed thirty thousand cycles,

0:43:36.320 --> 0:43:39.760
<v Speaker 1>and reportedly some of those aircraft have had cracks appearing

0:43:39.760 --> 0:43:42.799
<v Speaker 1>in the pickle fork as well. Boeing stated that out

0:43:42.800 --> 0:43:45.520
<v Speaker 1>of the one thousand, seven thirty seven in G s

0:43:45.840 --> 0:43:49.200
<v Speaker 1>that had been inspected so far, inspectors that only indicated

0:43:49.239 --> 0:43:53.040
<v Speaker 1>that five percent of them have had cracks. Still, it's

0:43:53.080 --> 0:43:56.440
<v Speaker 1>another indicator that things are not going so great for

0:43:56.520 --> 0:44:00.359
<v Speaker 1>Boeing right now. We'll have to wait and see how

0:44:00.400 --> 0:44:02.760
<v Speaker 1>this all plays out, whether or not the seven thirty

0:44:02.800 --> 0:44:05.880
<v Speaker 1>seven Max will return to service, whether or not people

0:44:05.880 --> 0:44:08.880
<v Speaker 1>will trust it. You've had a lot of us politicians

0:44:08.880 --> 0:44:12.120
<v Speaker 1>already saying that they would not get on a seven

0:44:12.160 --> 0:44:15.239
<v Speaker 1>thirty seven max to take a trip based on what

0:44:15.280 --> 0:44:19.000
<v Speaker 1>they've seen. So there may be an inherent trust that

0:44:19.280 --> 0:44:22.240
<v Speaker 1>ends up being an enormous barrier to the seven thirty

0:44:22.280 --> 0:44:25.520
<v Speaker 1>seven max, even if the technology is proven to be safe.

0:44:26.280 --> 0:44:29.879
<v Speaker 1>So that's a huge issue. Once you've eroded trust, it's

0:44:30.040 --> 0:44:33.879
<v Speaker 1>very hard to rebuild. So we'll have to wait see

0:44:33.880 --> 0:44:36.919
<v Speaker 1>how that turns out. I am very curious to see

0:44:36.920 --> 0:44:40.640
<v Speaker 1>it myself. I've definitely been interested in this subject. I

0:44:40.719 --> 0:44:44.600
<v Speaker 1>fly fairly frequently, and knowing about this is something that

0:44:44.680 --> 0:44:47.960
<v Speaker 1>I think is important. Um, it's also something that fills

0:44:48.000 --> 0:44:51.440
<v Speaker 1>me with anxiety if I'm being perfectly honest, but I'd

0:44:51.560 --> 0:44:54.880
<v Speaker 1>rather know than not know. Anyway, that wraps up this

0:44:54.960 --> 0:44:57.719
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0:44:57.840 --> 0:45:00.560
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