1 00:00:04,240 --> 00:00:07,240 Speaker 1: Welcome to tech Stuff, a production of I Heart Radios 2 00:00:07,320 --> 00:00:13,960 Speaker 1: How Stuff Works. Hey there, and welcome to tech Stuff. 3 00:00:13,960 --> 00:00:16,520 Speaker 1: I'm your host, Jonathan Strickland. I'm an executive producer with 4 00:00:16,560 --> 00:00:19,880 Speaker 1: I Heart Radio and I love all things tech. But again, 5 00:00:20,200 --> 00:00:22,040 Speaker 1: this is another one of those episodes where I have 6 00:00:22,120 --> 00:00:25,160 Speaker 1: to couch that so not that long ago, I did 7 00:00:25,160 --> 00:00:28,640 Speaker 1: a series of episodes about the company Bowing and its history, 8 00:00:28,840 --> 00:00:31,600 Speaker 1: which once again is in the news as I record 9 00:00:31,840 --> 00:00:35,280 Speaker 1: this episode. So the week I'm recording this, which is 10 00:00:35,320 --> 00:00:38,720 Speaker 1: the very end of October, actually technically today is November one. 11 00:00:39,320 --> 00:00:42,839 Speaker 1: The CEO of Boeing just appeared before Congress to answer 12 00:00:42,960 --> 00:00:47,160 Speaker 1: questions about the tragedies involving two seven thirty seven Max 13 00:00:47,320 --> 00:00:52,560 Speaker 1: aircraft crashes. Politicians asked some very pointed questions to find 14 00:00:52,560 --> 00:00:55,560 Speaker 1: out when people at Boeing became aware of problems with 15 00:00:55,600 --> 00:00:58,520 Speaker 1: the aircraft and how much they knew, as well as 16 00:00:58,560 --> 00:01:01,360 Speaker 1: other details. So in this episode, I want to explore 17 00:01:01,480 --> 00:01:05,560 Speaker 1: exactly what went wrong and why. And while you could 18 00:01:05,760 --> 00:01:09,959 Speaker 1: summarize the story by saying a sensor and some software malfunctioned, 19 00:01:10,240 --> 00:01:13,920 Speaker 1: that's not really a full understanding of exactly what went 20 00:01:14,000 --> 00:01:17,959 Speaker 1: wrong and why it went wrong. So let's start with 21 00:01:18,240 --> 00:01:21,440 Speaker 1: the seven thirty seven Max in general, and the seven 22 00:01:21,520 --> 00:01:24,560 Speaker 1: thirty seven Max is history really only dates back to 23 00:01:24,680 --> 00:01:28,600 Speaker 1: July two thousand eleven. That's when Boeing learned that it's competitor, 24 00:01:28,760 --> 00:01:31,760 Speaker 1: air Bus, had made a deal with American Airlines to 25 00:01:31,800 --> 00:01:36,520 Speaker 1: sell two hundred A three twenty neo aircraft and the 26 00:01:36,560 --> 00:01:40,840 Speaker 1: eight three twenty family of aircraft first debuted in nineteen 27 00:01:40,959 --> 00:01:45,080 Speaker 1: eight six. They're intended to serve as short to medium 28 00:01:45,160 --> 00:01:48,960 Speaker 1: range aircraft. They are narrow body aircraft, which means they 29 00:01:49,160 --> 00:01:51,760 Speaker 1: have a cabin that measures no more than thirteen ft 30 00:01:51,880 --> 00:01:54,880 Speaker 1: or four meters wide, and they have a single aisle 31 00:01:54,920 --> 00:01:56,760 Speaker 1: going down the length of the cabin with seats on 32 00:01:56,840 --> 00:02:00,640 Speaker 1: either side. In other words, these aircraft sir the same 33 00:02:00,640 --> 00:02:04,400 Speaker 1: function as something like the seven thirty seven does. So 34 00:02:04,440 --> 00:02:06,240 Speaker 1: it might be a good idea to do a quick 35 00:02:06,360 --> 00:02:09,320 Speaker 1: rundown on the different sizes of aircraft and what they're 36 00:02:09,360 --> 00:02:12,880 Speaker 1: intended functions are, and to understand why we even have 37 00:02:13,400 --> 00:02:16,440 Speaker 1: these different sizes of aircraft. It helps to understand the 38 00:02:16,560 --> 00:02:19,760 Speaker 1: history of the development of airports and airlines in general. 39 00:02:20,400 --> 00:02:22,480 Speaker 1: I find that it could be easy to forget that 40 00:02:22,560 --> 00:02:26,080 Speaker 1: the systems we have in place today evolved over time 41 00:02:26,160 --> 00:02:28,880 Speaker 1: out of necessity. But I also know that's not the 42 00:02:28,880 --> 00:02:31,520 Speaker 1: focus of our episodes, So we're gonna be super general. 43 00:02:31,560 --> 00:02:34,040 Speaker 1: I'm not going to spend an enormous amount of time 44 00:02:34,080 --> 00:02:37,720 Speaker 1: on this, So the Right Brothers, really, I'm not going 45 00:02:37,800 --> 00:02:39,639 Speaker 1: to spend a whole lot time on this. But they 46 00:02:39,680 --> 00:02:41,880 Speaker 1: developed the first real airplane in the United States in 47 00:02:41,880 --> 00:02:45,880 Speaker 1: the early twentieth century by n In the United States, 48 00:02:46,040 --> 00:02:49,600 Speaker 1: the government had passed the Air Mail Act that gave 49 00:02:49,600 --> 00:02:52,880 Speaker 1: the Postmaster General the authority to work with private airlines 50 00:02:52,960 --> 00:02:56,960 Speaker 1: flying between certain routes the ability to carry mail. This 51 00:02:57,000 --> 00:02:59,959 Speaker 1: was sort of laying the groundwork for the modern airline. 52 00:03:00,440 --> 00:03:03,400 Speaker 1: The government followed that up with the Air Commerce Act, 53 00:03:03,560 --> 00:03:06,280 Speaker 1: which gave powers to the Secretary of Commerce to create 54 00:03:06,360 --> 00:03:09,880 Speaker 1: the rules and regulations that would apply to commercial aircraft. 55 00:03:10,320 --> 00:03:15,080 Speaker 1: That included requirements to license pilots, to certify specific aircraft 56 00:03:15,120 --> 00:03:19,320 Speaker 1: as being safe for commercial operation, to establish air routes, 57 00:03:19,400 --> 00:03:22,880 Speaker 1: and to create rules for air traffic. Now, many airlines 58 00:03:22,960 --> 00:03:25,960 Speaker 1: in this time were regional. They were operating between a 59 00:03:26,040 --> 00:03:30,240 Speaker 1: handful of cities within a general area of the United States, 60 00:03:30,280 --> 00:03:33,160 Speaker 1: but they gradually were able to grow to provide service 61 00:03:33,240 --> 00:03:37,360 Speaker 1: to more airports further afield. This might require a certain 62 00:03:37,440 --> 00:03:41,040 Speaker 1: number of hops between cities, and it created an incentive 63 00:03:41,160 --> 00:03:45,040 Speaker 1: for aircraft and engine manufacturers to find ways to increase 64 00:03:45,120 --> 00:03:48,040 Speaker 1: the flying range of aircraft to allow for more direct 65 00:03:48,160 --> 00:03:53,560 Speaker 1: service options between distant cities. The US government wasn't done yet, though. 66 00:03:53,760 --> 00:03:58,600 Speaker 1: In ninety eight, Congress past the Civil Aeronautics Act, which 67 00:03:58,640 --> 00:04:02,600 Speaker 1: in turn created these Civil Aeronautics Board or c a B. 68 00:04:03,280 --> 00:04:07,520 Speaker 1: One of the board's responsibilities was to regulate airfare prices 69 00:04:07,640 --> 00:04:11,720 Speaker 1: for passengers. Another was that it could assign specific routes 70 00:04:11,760 --> 00:04:15,440 Speaker 1: to airlines, giving permission for them to operate flights between 71 00:04:15,520 --> 00:04:20,359 Speaker 1: specific cities. The price regulation meant that airlines couldn't really 72 00:04:20,400 --> 00:04:24,159 Speaker 1: compete against each other with battling with lower fares for 73 00:04:24,279 --> 00:04:27,920 Speaker 1: routes between the same cities. A ticket on one airline 74 00:04:27,960 --> 00:04:30,760 Speaker 1: for a trip between let's say New York and Chicago 75 00:04:31,279 --> 00:04:33,680 Speaker 1: would cost pretty much the same as a ticket on 76 00:04:33,720 --> 00:04:36,680 Speaker 1: another airline because of this regulation. So that meant that 77 00:04:36,760 --> 00:04:41,600 Speaker 1: these airlines had to differentiate themselves in service because price 78 00:04:41,800 --> 00:04:44,440 Speaker 1: was going to be the same no matter where you 79 00:04:44,520 --> 00:04:47,920 Speaker 1: were going. Right if you went on one air airline 80 00:04:48,040 --> 00:04:50,440 Speaker 1: versus another you're gonna be paying the same amount, So 81 00:04:50,520 --> 00:04:52,640 Speaker 1: why would you choose one over the other? Had to 82 00:04:52,640 --> 00:04:56,640 Speaker 1: be because of the service. Further, if the Board determined 83 00:04:56,680 --> 00:05:01,320 Speaker 1: then airline was providing sub standard service along a specific route, 84 00:05:01,800 --> 00:05:04,960 Speaker 1: then the board would allow other airlines to operate along 85 00:05:04,960 --> 00:05:08,000 Speaker 1: that same route in order to create the competition needed 86 00:05:08,080 --> 00:05:11,640 Speaker 1: to improve service. So if the Board were to look 87 00:05:11,640 --> 00:05:15,280 Speaker 1: at say t W A and say, your service between 88 00:05:15,279 --> 00:05:19,440 Speaker 1: this city and that city has been reported as being substandard, 89 00:05:19,640 --> 00:05:22,359 Speaker 1: We're now going to allow these three other airlines to 90 00:05:22,400 --> 00:05:25,839 Speaker 1: compete in that space, the idea was that things would improve. 91 00:05:26,440 --> 00:05:29,359 Speaker 1: In nineteen fifty eight, the US government established what we 92 00:05:29,480 --> 00:05:32,800 Speaker 1: now call the Federal Aviation Agency or f a A, 93 00:05:33,240 --> 00:05:38,520 Speaker 1: which oversees airline safety operations. Twenty years later, in nineteen 94 00:05:38,600 --> 00:05:42,599 Speaker 1: seventy eight, the economic climate had changed in the United States. 95 00:05:42,960 --> 00:05:46,760 Speaker 1: Foreign airlines offering service to the US were not bound 96 00:05:46,920 --> 00:05:50,760 Speaker 1: by the price regulations of the Civil Aeronautics Board. American 97 00:05:50,800 --> 00:05:55,000 Speaker 1: airline companies could not compete with the lower airfares posted 98 00:05:55,040 --> 00:05:58,120 Speaker 1: by these foreign companies, and there was a growing resistance 99 00:05:58,160 --> 00:06:02,320 Speaker 1: to regulations in general in the US, so Congress passed 100 00:06:02,360 --> 00:06:07,640 Speaker 1: a deregulation Act than the Civil Aeronautics Board disbanded, The 101 00:06:07,720 --> 00:06:10,440 Speaker 1: price regulations came to an end, and airlines in the 102 00:06:10,520 --> 00:06:13,039 Speaker 1: United States could charge whatever they felt the market could 103 00:06:13,120 --> 00:06:16,560 Speaker 1: bear for any of their airfares. This also allowed new 104 00:06:16,600 --> 00:06:19,839 Speaker 1: airlines to join the market, which had previously been dominated 105 00:06:19,839 --> 00:06:24,280 Speaker 1: by just a few major carriers. The influx of competition 106 00:06:24,880 --> 00:06:27,960 Speaker 1: was a boon to passengers as far as airfare price 107 00:06:28,040 --> 00:06:30,840 Speaker 1: is concerned, but less so when it came to in 108 00:06:30,960 --> 00:06:33,839 Speaker 1: flight experience. More on that in just a moment. But 109 00:06:33,920 --> 00:06:36,719 Speaker 1: it also meant that some of the larger airline carriers 110 00:06:37,040 --> 00:06:41,039 Speaker 1: were struggling to compete. They had grown very large, and 111 00:06:41,040 --> 00:06:44,040 Speaker 1: they depended on a certain amount of revenue that happened 112 00:06:44,040 --> 00:06:47,160 Speaker 1: to have been guaranteed by the regulated prices. So when 113 00:06:47,160 --> 00:06:51,120 Speaker 1: those regulations went away and smaller, more nimble companies began 114 00:06:51,200 --> 00:06:55,599 Speaker 1: operating routes previously commanded by these giant companies, while the 115 00:06:55,640 --> 00:06:59,360 Speaker 1: giants began to wobble a little bit. This was exacerbated 116 00:06:59,360 --> 00:07:02,360 Speaker 1: by an economic recession in the nineteen nineties that saw 117 00:07:02,400 --> 00:07:05,080 Speaker 1: a reduction in air travel, and some of the big 118 00:07:05,120 --> 00:07:09,440 Speaker 1: airlines outright collapsed into bankruptcy, like t w A and 119 00:07:09,480 --> 00:07:13,720 Speaker 1: Pan American. So another recession in two thousand one, and 120 00:07:13,760 --> 00:07:17,600 Speaker 1: then the terrorist attacks on nine eleven further hurt the 121 00:07:17,640 --> 00:07:22,440 Speaker 1: airline industry, which would remain unprofitable for five more years. 122 00:07:23,000 --> 00:07:26,360 Speaker 1: Now since then, you know, since two thousand six, airlines 123 00:07:26,400 --> 00:07:29,880 Speaker 1: have managed to turn things around for the most part. Now, 124 00:07:29,920 --> 00:07:33,320 Speaker 1: the reason all of that was important is that it 125 00:07:33,360 --> 00:07:37,080 Speaker 1: creates the foundation for us to understand why there are 126 00:07:37,120 --> 00:07:40,120 Speaker 1: so many different types of aircraft out there, and why 127 00:07:40,240 --> 00:07:43,680 Speaker 1: conditions and aircraft have changed over time, and this in 128 00:07:43,760 --> 00:07:48,720 Speaker 1: turn informs us as to why Boeing made specific decisions. 129 00:07:49,240 --> 00:07:51,760 Speaker 1: So you may have seen images of air travel in 130 00:07:51,760 --> 00:07:54,760 Speaker 1: the nineteen fifties or nineteen sixties when it looked like 131 00:07:54,800 --> 00:07:58,080 Speaker 1: everyone was dressed in their Sunday best and they're enjoying 132 00:07:58,120 --> 00:08:00,920 Speaker 1: a big, comfy seat with plan D of leg room, 133 00:08:01,000 --> 00:08:03,720 Speaker 1: and they might even be chowing down on an impressive 134 00:08:03,720 --> 00:08:07,120 Speaker 1: looking meal. It's a pretty dramatic contrast to what you 135 00:08:07,160 --> 00:08:11,000 Speaker 1: find on a typical commercial jet today. So let's talk 136 00:08:11,040 --> 00:08:13,840 Speaker 1: about the different types of aircraft classes and what there 137 00:08:13,840 --> 00:08:17,880 Speaker 1: for and why things have changed. So you've got wide 138 00:08:18,040 --> 00:08:20,560 Speaker 1: body aircraft. These are the ones that are meant for 139 00:08:20,840 --> 00:08:25,640 Speaker 1: long range routes, usually such as transatlantic or trans Pacific routes. 140 00:08:25,960 --> 00:08:29,960 Speaker 1: They typically have two aisles running the length of the cabin, 141 00:08:30,400 --> 00:08:32,800 Speaker 1: and the width of the cabin tends to range from 142 00:08:32,880 --> 00:08:36,600 Speaker 1: sixteen to twenty feet or five to six meters. You 143 00:08:36,640 --> 00:08:39,920 Speaker 1: can have up to ten or maybe even eleven seats 144 00:08:40,040 --> 00:08:44,280 Speaker 1: arranged in a single row. In the economy class. They 145 00:08:44,320 --> 00:08:47,559 Speaker 1: really pack them in like sardines and some aircraft. That 146 00:08:47,640 --> 00:08:50,040 Speaker 1: means that with the size of some of these aircraft, 147 00:08:50,120 --> 00:08:52,960 Speaker 1: you can have configurations that can carry more than eight 148 00:08:53,080 --> 00:08:57,400 Speaker 1: hundred passengers, which is mind blowing to me. Most of 149 00:08:57,440 --> 00:09:01,800 Speaker 1: them are more like two fifty four passengers, but there 150 00:09:01,800 --> 00:09:05,440 Speaker 1: are some configurations that have significantly more than that. The 151 00:09:05,480 --> 00:09:10,360 Speaker 1: original wide body aircraft were something like luxury vehicles. They 152 00:09:10,360 --> 00:09:14,120 Speaker 1: were intended to provide a superior experience with more room 153 00:09:14,160 --> 00:09:17,240 Speaker 1: per passenger than you would find on other types of aircraft, 154 00:09:17,320 --> 00:09:20,000 Speaker 1: so they weren't all about packing as many people in 155 00:09:20,120 --> 00:09:25,000 Speaker 1: as possible. But then once the industry underwent deregulation, folks 156 00:09:25,000 --> 00:09:27,160 Speaker 1: that airlines began to figure out that there was another 157 00:09:27,200 --> 00:09:31,720 Speaker 1: tactic they could use. They could cram way more seats 158 00:09:31,800 --> 00:09:36,280 Speaker 1: on those aircraft, actually reducing the space for the average 159 00:09:36,320 --> 00:09:40,079 Speaker 1: traveler and maximizing the number of passengers that could fit 160 00:09:40,160 --> 00:09:42,640 Speaker 1: on a single flight. After all, the airlines were no 161 00:09:42,679 --> 00:09:47,240 Speaker 1: longer restricted to a regulated airfare price. They didn't have 162 00:09:47,440 --> 00:09:50,840 Speaker 1: to compete on the basis of service. They could compete 163 00:09:50,880 --> 00:09:53,760 Speaker 1: by offering lower airfares, and they can make up the 164 00:09:53,800 --> 00:09:57,920 Speaker 1: difference by putting more people on a single plane, so 165 00:09:58,080 --> 00:10:00,920 Speaker 1: they could actually make more money per trip even by 166 00:10:00,960 --> 00:10:04,360 Speaker 1: offering lower airfares per customer. By doing the old stand by, 167 00:10:04,559 --> 00:10:07,640 Speaker 1: you make it up in volume, and after balancing out 168 00:10:07,760 --> 00:10:11,200 Speaker 1: the pros and cons of delivering a superior experience to 169 00:10:11,760 --> 00:10:16,280 Speaker 1: the alternative of just going for the cold hard cash, 170 00:10:16,480 --> 00:10:19,680 Speaker 1: most airlines went the cold hard cash route, and thus 171 00:10:19,720 --> 00:10:22,920 Speaker 1: we started down the pathway of encountering aircraft with decreasing 172 00:10:22,920 --> 00:10:27,160 Speaker 1: amounts of leg room, narrower seats, and other features that 173 00:10:27,240 --> 00:10:34,040 Speaker 1: fuel stand up comedian routines. These huge aircraft are really expensive. 174 00:10:34,480 --> 00:10:37,520 Speaker 1: They also can't fit on all runways, and not every 175 00:10:37,559 --> 00:10:41,240 Speaker 1: airport can accommodate them. They were used for routes where 176 00:10:41,240 --> 00:10:44,760 Speaker 1: it made the most economic sense to use them, typically 177 00:10:44,800 --> 00:10:49,440 Speaker 1: on those transcontinental or trans oceanic flights. These tend to 178 00:10:49,480 --> 00:10:54,040 Speaker 1: be long range aircraft because they are more expensive to purchase, maintain, 179 00:10:54,080 --> 00:10:58,040 Speaker 1: and operate. Airlines typically have fewer of them in their fleets, 180 00:10:58,160 --> 00:11:02,000 Speaker 1: so they dedicate them to these long range routes. Enter 181 00:11:02,080 --> 00:11:05,839 Speaker 1: the narrow body aircraft. These became popular starting in the 182 00:11:05,960 --> 00:11:11,720 Speaker 1: nineteen sixties, but they really took off pun intended after deregulation. 183 00:11:12,080 --> 00:11:15,840 Speaker 1: They tend to be much less expensive to purchase, maintain, 184 00:11:15,960 --> 00:11:19,440 Speaker 1: and operate than their larger cousins. They can fit in 185 00:11:19,480 --> 00:11:22,920 Speaker 1: more airports and more runways, and they played into an 186 00:11:22,920 --> 00:11:26,760 Speaker 1: economic strategy that airlines used to compete against each other 187 00:11:27,120 --> 00:11:29,680 Speaker 1: because there was one other thing you could do to 188 00:11:29,920 --> 00:11:34,120 Speaker 1: use to your advantage besides the level of service or 189 00:11:34,520 --> 00:11:38,160 Speaker 1: the price of the airfare, and that was the frequency 190 00:11:38,320 --> 00:11:42,200 Speaker 1: of flights for specific routes. Now this really got going 191 00:11:42,240 --> 00:11:46,319 Speaker 1: with deregulation and the emergence of new airlines. Now passengers 192 00:11:46,360 --> 00:11:48,840 Speaker 1: could have a lot more options. When they were booking 193 00:11:48,840 --> 00:11:52,000 Speaker 1: a trip earlier, you might have a route that only 194 00:11:52,040 --> 00:11:56,280 Speaker 1: had two or maybe three flights per day between two cities, 195 00:11:56,679 --> 00:12:00,040 Speaker 1: so the passenger had to fit their schedule with the 196 00:12:00,080 --> 00:12:04,080 Speaker 1: airline schedule. But with more routes approved and more narrow 197 00:12:04,120 --> 00:12:08,120 Speaker 1: body aircraft in fleets, airlines had the chance to increase 198 00:12:08,160 --> 00:12:12,760 Speaker 1: the frequency between certain cities that had demand that warranted it, 199 00:12:13,360 --> 00:12:16,080 Speaker 1: and as you would imagine, most of the time, this 200 00:12:16,120 --> 00:12:19,120 Speaker 1: would involve cities that had regular traffic between them. You 201 00:12:19,160 --> 00:12:23,240 Speaker 1: weren't suddenly going to see an enormous increase in flights 202 00:12:23,280 --> 00:12:25,240 Speaker 1: to some city that was far out of the way 203 00:12:25,240 --> 00:12:28,319 Speaker 1: of everything else. Because there's no demand between two cities, 204 00:12:28,360 --> 00:12:31,280 Speaker 1: it makes no sense to operate hourly flights between them. 205 00:12:31,480 --> 00:12:35,120 Speaker 1: But for some routes that's exactly what did make sense. 206 00:12:35,440 --> 00:12:38,360 Speaker 1: So airlines began to compete by telling customers, hey, we 207 00:12:38,440 --> 00:12:41,840 Speaker 1: operate enough flights to your destination that you don't have 208 00:12:41,920 --> 00:12:44,680 Speaker 1: to worry about conforming to our schedule. We've got a 209 00:12:44,720 --> 00:12:49,280 Speaker 1: flight that fits your schedule. So this was the era 210 00:12:49,400 --> 00:12:52,680 Speaker 1: in which we saw the narrow body mid range aircraft 211 00:12:52,720 --> 00:12:56,600 Speaker 1: come into prominence, and that included the Boeing seven thirty seven. 212 00:12:56,920 --> 00:13:00,240 Speaker 1: The original seven thirty seven was introduced by Bowing in 213 00:13:00,400 --> 00:13:05,760 Speaker 1: nineteen sixty six. It was nicknamed a square airplane because 214 00:13:05,800 --> 00:13:08,640 Speaker 1: the length of the aircraft was the same as the 215 00:13:08,760 --> 00:13:13,120 Speaker 1: width of its wingspan. Both were approximately ninety three feet 216 00:13:13,280 --> 00:13:15,960 Speaker 1: or a little more than twenty eight meters. It's a 217 00:13:16,040 --> 00:13:19,839 Speaker 1: twin jet engine aircraft and the original seven thirty seven 218 00:13:19,880 --> 00:13:23,920 Speaker 1: had an engine mounted under each wing. This becomes an 219 00:13:23,960 --> 00:13:26,760 Speaker 1: important element when we get to the design of the 220 00:13:26,840 --> 00:13:30,600 Speaker 1: seven thirty seven Max. Now there are different versions of 221 00:13:30,640 --> 00:13:34,720 Speaker 1: the seven thirty seven that have different dimensions. The original 222 00:13:34,760 --> 00:13:38,400 Speaker 1: seven thirty seven one hundred innered service for the airline 223 00:13:38,480 --> 00:13:43,800 Speaker 1: luft Hanza, among others. United Airlines expressed interest in purchasing 224 00:13:43,840 --> 00:13:47,640 Speaker 1: some seven thirty seven's, but that airline wanted a slightly 225 00:13:47,679 --> 00:13:51,280 Speaker 1: longer version of the aircraft, so Boeing adjusted it and 226 00:13:51,320 --> 00:13:53,840 Speaker 1: then created a version of the seven thirty seven called 227 00:13:53,920 --> 00:13:57,640 Speaker 1: the seven thirty seven two hundred, and There are several others, 228 00:13:58,040 --> 00:14:02,560 Speaker 1: including the recent seven thirties even Max Okay so aircraft, 229 00:14:02,720 --> 00:14:05,240 Speaker 1: like the seven thirty seven from Boeing and the A 230 00:14:05,440 --> 00:14:09,320 Speaker 1: three twenty from air Bus, served similar purposes to act 231 00:14:09,360 --> 00:14:12,320 Speaker 1: as a short or mid range aircraft capable of carrying 232 00:14:12,320 --> 00:14:16,800 Speaker 1: around two passengers, which varies depending upon the aircraft's configuration. 233 00:14:17,320 --> 00:14:20,040 Speaker 1: By two thousand six, Boeing had been relying upon the 234 00:14:20,040 --> 00:14:23,520 Speaker 1: seven thirty seven design for forty years, when the company 235 00:14:23,560 --> 00:14:26,840 Speaker 1: began to consider the possibility of an entirely new design 236 00:14:27,120 --> 00:14:30,640 Speaker 1: to fill essentially the same function as the old, reliable 237 00:14:30,720 --> 00:14:34,000 Speaker 1: seven thirty seven. That decision was a huge one and 238 00:14:34,000 --> 00:14:37,320 Speaker 1: would require a lot of steps, So Bowing kicked the 239 00:14:37,360 --> 00:14:40,200 Speaker 1: idea down the road a few times, and then we 240 00:14:40,280 --> 00:14:44,200 Speaker 1: get to two thousand eleven and American Airlines ordering the 241 00:14:44,320 --> 00:14:47,880 Speaker 1: two hundred Airbus aircraft. It sent a signal to Boeing 242 00:14:48,240 --> 00:14:50,960 Speaker 1: that delays we're going to cost the company big time. 243 00:14:51,280 --> 00:14:55,000 Speaker 1: Now explain more in just a moment, But first, you know, guys, 244 00:14:55,840 --> 00:14:59,840 Speaker 1: I've talked a lot about privacy and security on this 245 00:15:00,200 --> 00:15:03,040 Speaker 1: show in the past, and I have to admit that 246 00:15:03,080 --> 00:15:04,840 Speaker 1: there have been times that I haven't really taken it 247 00:15:04,920 --> 00:15:08,000 Speaker 1: that seriously as seriously as I should anyway. But we 248 00:15:08,080 --> 00:15:10,680 Speaker 1: all know that there are pitfalls out there, and it 249 00:15:10,720 --> 00:15:13,640 Speaker 1: doesn't make sense to just hope you avoid them by luck. 250 00:15:14,040 --> 00:15:17,080 Speaker 1: And heck, there's all that tracking that's going on by 251 00:15:17,120 --> 00:15:21,000 Speaker 1: everything from online stores to social media sites. Your data 252 00:15:21,160 --> 00:15:25,120 Speaker 1: is becoming their commodity. It's for these reasons that I 253 00:15:25,160 --> 00:15:29,920 Speaker 1: recommend using Express VPN. Express VPN has easy to use 254 00:15:29,960 --> 00:15:33,080 Speaker 1: apps that runs seamlessly in the background of my computer, 255 00:15:33,360 --> 00:15:37,320 Speaker 1: phone and tablet. Turning on Express VbN protection only takes 256 00:15:37,400 --> 00:15:41,520 Speaker 1: one click. 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And if you don't want to 265 00:16:08,200 --> 00:16:11,400 Speaker 1: hand over your online history to your internet provider or 266 00:16:11,600 --> 00:16:16,080 Speaker 1: data resellers, Express VPN is the answer. Protect your online 267 00:16:16,120 --> 00:16:18,920 Speaker 1: activity today and find out how you can get three 268 00:16:18,960 --> 00:16:23,080 Speaker 1: months free at express vpn dot com slash tech stuff. 269 00:16:23,480 --> 00:16:28,400 Speaker 1: That's e x p R e S S vpn dot 270 00:16:28,440 --> 00:16:32,280 Speaker 1: com slash tech stuff for three months free with a 271 00:16:32,280 --> 00:16:36,120 Speaker 1: one year package. Visit express vpn dot com slash tech 272 00:16:36,160 --> 00:16:39,800 Speaker 1: stuff to learn more. Now let's get back to the 273 00:16:39,840 --> 00:16:43,320 Speaker 1: seven thirty seven Max Alright. I left off saying that 274 00:16:43,400 --> 00:16:46,840 Speaker 1: Boeing concluded that developing an all new type of aircraft 275 00:16:46,960 --> 00:16:51,480 Speaker 1: wasn't going to pun intended fly. As Airbus began to 276 00:16:51,520 --> 00:16:55,600 Speaker 1: gain popularity among airlines and American airlines had as part 277 00:16:55,600 --> 00:16:59,600 Speaker 1: of its plan and order for a re engined seven 278 00:16:59,640 --> 00:17:03,520 Speaker 1: thirty seven aircraft. Boeing would need to focus on that effort, 279 00:17:03,680 --> 00:17:06,720 Speaker 1: and it abandoned the design of an entirely new aircraft. 280 00:17:06,800 --> 00:17:09,880 Speaker 1: It finally said, Okay, it doesn't make sense for us 281 00:17:09,920 --> 00:17:13,200 Speaker 1: to create a new aircraft from the ground up. Let's 282 00:17:13,240 --> 00:17:16,000 Speaker 1: go back to the seven thirty seven and make some adjustments. 283 00:17:16,520 --> 00:17:19,439 Speaker 1: This also brought with it a few other potential benefits. 284 00:17:19,680 --> 00:17:24,240 Speaker 1: Developing a new aircraft is time consuming and incredibly expensive. 285 00:17:24,640 --> 00:17:28,639 Speaker 1: Not only is the development process itself expensive, then there's 286 00:17:28,680 --> 00:17:32,480 Speaker 1: the certification phase, in which the aircraft must pass requirements 287 00:17:32,560 --> 00:17:35,919 Speaker 1: set by the various aviation authorities around the world in 288 00:17:36,000 --> 00:17:38,760 Speaker 1: order to be allowed to operate as a commercial aircraft. 289 00:17:39,000 --> 00:17:42,080 Speaker 1: And then there's the training phase. Pilots have to train 290 00:17:42,160 --> 00:17:44,320 Speaker 1: on the new aircraft to learn its systems and how 291 00:17:44,359 --> 00:17:47,560 Speaker 1: it flies. Not all aircraft behave the same up in 292 00:17:47,600 --> 00:17:50,080 Speaker 1: the air, and that means it's a really big deal 293 00:17:50,200 --> 00:17:53,720 Speaker 1: to invest in an all new type of aircraft. It's 294 00:17:53,800 --> 00:17:57,760 Speaker 1: asking for a lot of resources, both from the manufacturing 295 00:17:57,760 --> 00:18:01,800 Speaker 1: company and the various airlines out there. Updating and existing 296 00:18:01,840 --> 00:18:05,520 Speaker 1: design is far less daunting. The basic bones for the 297 00:18:05,560 --> 00:18:08,640 Speaker 1: aircraft are already there, and if the changes are within 298 00:18:08,680 --> 00:18:12,920 Speaker 1: certain parameters, you can get through regulations pretty easily. After all, 299 00:18:12,920 --> 00:18:15,800 Speaker 1: the base aircraft has already been through that process and 300 00:18:15,840 --> 00:18:20,400 Speaker 1: had been approved. Likewise, if the changes aren't dramatic, pilots 301 00:18:20,480 --> 00:18:23,639 Speaker 1: might be able to fly those planes without any real 302 00:18:23,680 --> 00:18:27,440 Speaker 1: additional training or having to go into any flight simulators, 303 00:18:27,480 --> 00:18:30,199 Speaker 1: because the aircraft, at least in theory, is going to 304 00:18:30,240 --> 00:18:33,800 Speaker 1: perform within the basic parameters of its predecessors. So there 305 00:18:33,800 --> 00:18:36,720 Speaker 1: are a lot of strong business cases for sticking with 306 00:18:36,760 --> 00:18:40,680 Speaker 1: a previously engineered design. Boeing's decision to stick with the 307 00:18:40,720 --> 00:18:44,480 Speaker 1: seven thirty seven was both more economical and, due to 308 00:18:44,520 --> 00:18:48,760 Speaker 1: the agreement it had reached with American Airlines, pretty much necessary. 309 00:18:49,280 --> 00:18:52,400 Speaker 1: One of the big goals Boeing had was to improve 310 00:18:52,520 --> 00:18:55,440 Speaker 1: fuel efficiency so that the seven thirty seven Max could 311 00:18:55,480 --> 00:18:58,800 Speaker 1: fly the same distance as older seven thirty seven's while 312 00:18:58,800 --> 00:19:01,760 Speaker 1: burning less fuel. That would also mean the seven thirty 313 00:19:01,800 --> 00:19:05,159 Speaker 1: seven Max could potentially have an increased range of flight 314 00:19:05,760 --> 00:19:09,280 Speaker 1: compared to earlier seven thirty seven's, and you could argue 315 00:19:09,359 --> 00:19:12,840 Speaker 1: that ultimately it was this push that would lead to 316 00:19:12,880 --> 00:19:16,160 Speaker 1: the tragedies of the two seven thirty seven Max crashes 317 00:19:16,600 --> 00:19:19,920 Speaker 1: that would ground the global fleet of seven thirty seven 318 00:19:19,920 --> 00:19:23,720 Speaker 1: Max aircraft. It's a sort of cascade effect where one decision, 319 00:19:24,320 --> 00:19:28,040 Speaker 1: that being to re engine the seven seven would lead 320 00:19:28,080 --> 00:19:31,840 Speaker 1: to other decisions that ultimately set the stage for catastrophe. 321 00:19:32,200 --> 00:19:34,080 Speaker 1: And by the way, this is all very easy for 322 00:19:34,119 --> 00:19:37,400 Speaker 1: me to say in hindsight, I'm not trying to suggest 323 00:19:37,400 --> 00:19:40,600 Speaker 1: that I would have spotted the potential for disaster before 324 00:19:40,640 --> 00:19:43,760 Speaker 1: it happened. It's only because it happened that we're able 325 00:19:43,800 --> 00:19:45,520 Speaker 1: to go back and analyze this and see where the 326 00:19:45,560 --> 00:19:48,760 Speaker 1: mistakes were made. But at the time it was not 327 00:19:48,800 --> 00:19:52,840 Speaker 1: necessarily that clear, at least not outside of Boeing. Boeing 328 00:19:52,960 --> 00:19:55,240 Speaker 1: chose for this new version of the seven thirty seven 329 00:19:55,560 --> 00:19:59,560 Speaker 1: some engines from a company called CFL. CFM is actually 330 00:19:59,600 --> 00:20:05,200 Speaker 1: a joint venture between g E Aviation and Saffron Aircraft Engines. 331 00:20:05,520 --> 00:20:08,520 Speaker 1: So in two thousand eight, CFM introduced a class of 332 00:20:08,560 --> 00:20:12,879 Speaker 1: engines they called the Leading Edge Aviation Propulsion Class or 333 00:20:13,160 --> 00:20:17,399 Speaker 1: LEAP l E a P. Boeing opted for the Leap 334 00:20:17,640 --> 00:20:21,160 Speaker 1: one B model of engines, which has a thrust range 335 00:20:21,200 --> 00:20:25,239 Speaker 1: between twenty three thousand and twenty eight thousand pounds of 336 00:20:25,280 --> 00:20:29,439 Speaker 1: thrust or between one hundred and one killing Newton's of 337 00:20:29,480 --> 00:20:32,080 Speaker 1: thrust and Newton is the amount of force required to 338 00:20:32,080 --> 00:20:35,000 Speaker 1: accelerate an object with a mass of one kilogram and 339 00:20:35,040 --> 00:20:39,840 Speaker 1: an acceleration of one second per second. CFM chose several 340 00:20:39,920 --> 00:20:43,960 Speaker 1: engineering advancements that contributed to better fuel efficiency and its 341 00:20:44,040 --> 00:20:48,280 Speaker 1: leap engines compared to older aircraft engines. That includes carbon 342 00:20:48,400 --> 00:20:53,399 Speaker 1: fiber composite components that are stronger than earlier materials at 343 00:20:53,440 --> 00:20:57,160 Speaker 1: a fraction of the weight, so while the engines are 344 00:20:57,280 --> 00:21:01,520 Speaker 1: big larger than previous seventh D seven engines, they don't 345 00:21:01,520 --> 00:21:05,400 Speaker 1: necessarily weigh as much as those older engines do. CFM 346 00:21:05,520 --> 00:21:10,000 Speaker 1: also used additive manufacturing, more commonly called three D printing 347 00:21:10,320 --> 00:21:14,840 Speaker 1: to produce those components. The leap engines also pre mix 348 00:21:15,040 --> 00:21:19,000 Speaker 1: fuel and air together before the mixture hits the nozzles 349 00:21:19,080 --> 00:21:22,800 Speaker 1: that enter the fuel into the combustion chamber, So older 350 00:21:22,840 --> 00:21:27,440 Speaker 1: engines would inject essentially amissed a fuel into the combustion 351 00:21:27,520 --> 00:21:30,280 Speaker 1: chamber and the mixing of the fuel and the air 352 00:21:30,359 --> 00:21:33,600 Speaker 1: happened inside the chamber itself. But according to CFM, that 353 00:21:33,680 --> 00:21:37,200 Speaker 1: meant lower fuel efficiency and greater emissions, So they say 354 00:21:37,280 --> 00:21:40,879 Speaker 1: that this new method cuts down on emissions and you 355 00:21:40,960 --> 00:21:44,000 Speaker 1: burn more of the fuel. The engines would give Boeing 356 00:21:44,200 --> 00:21:47,960 Speaker 1: the boost and efficiency needed to meet American airlines requirements. 357 00:21:48,520 --> 00:21:52,359 Speaker 1: In August two thousand eleven, Bowing officially announced the development 358 00:21:52,520 --> 00:21:55,119 Speaker 1: of this new version of the seven thirty seven, and 359 00:21:55,119 --> 00:21:58,600 Speaker 1: the company began to market the aircraft to various airlines. 360 00:21:59,119 --> 00:22:02,359 Speaker 1: By December two thousand eleven, Boeing found a customer in 361 00:22:02,400 --> 00:22:05,800 Speaker 1: the form of Southwest Airlines, which put in an order 362 00:22:06,000 --> 00:22:09,600 Speaker 1: for one fifty of the aircraft. Aircraft that were in 363 00:22:09,600 --> 00:22:12,919 Speaker 1: the earliest stages of development, mind you. From two thousand 364 00:22:13,000 --> 00:22:16,480 Speaker 1: eleven to two thousand fifteen, Boeing worked on the design 365 00:22:16,600 --> 00:22:20,160 Speaker 1: and production of the seven thirty seven Max. And here's 366 00:22:20,200 --> 00:22:23,520 Speaker 1: where we see some other decisions that would ultimately contribute 367 00:22:23,560 --> 00:22:26,879 Speaker 1: to the problems we saw when it entered service. The 368 00:22:26,960 --> 00:22:30,560 Speaker 1: new engines were larger than the previous seven thirty seven engines, 369 00:22:30,600 --> 00:22:34,119 Speaker 1: as I mentioned earlier, and traditionally those earlier seven thirty 370 00:22:34,119 --> 00:22:37,800 Speaker 1: seven engines would be mounted under the seven thirty seven's wings, 371 00:22:38,400 --> 00:22:40,560 Speaker 1: but these new engines were too big to do that 372 00:22:40,840 --> 00:22:44,479 Speaker 1: and still allow for adequate ground clearance between the bottom 373 00:22:44,520 --> 00:22:47,600 Speaker 1: of the engine and the ground itself, So that meant 374 00:22:47,640 --> 00:22:50,200 Speaker 1: the engineers had to figure out where to put these 375 00:22:50,200 --> 00:22:52,600 Speaker 1: engines on the body of a seven thirty seven, and 376 00:22:52,680 --> 00:22:56,240 Speaker 1: ultimately they decided to move the engines forward along the body, 377 00:22:56,400 --> 00:22:59,280 Speaker 1: ahead of the wings, and their position in such a 378 00:22:59,320 --> 00:23:01,959 Speaker 1: way so that the exhaust of the engines is directed 379 00:23:02,040 --> 00:23:04,960 Speaker 1: underneath the wings, which makes sense. You wouldn't want it 380 00:23:05,000 --> 00:23:07,280 Speaker 1: to go right up against the wings you melt your 381 00:23:07,280 --> 00:23:10,640 Speaker 1: own wings off. And also the way that their position 382 00:23:10,680 --> 00:23:12,880 Speaker 1: now means that the bottom of the engine has sufficient 383 00:23:12,920 --> 00:23:17,680 Speaker 1: ground clearance. But moving the engines forward had another consequence. 384 00:23:17,880 --> 00:23:21,080 Speaker 1: It changed how the aircraft moved in flight. Moving the 385 00:23:21,119 --> 00:23:24,320 Speaker 1: engines forward meant that in flight, the seven thirty seven 386 00:23:24,359 --> 00:23:28,479 Speaker 1: Max has a slight tendency to tilt its pitch upward, 387 00:23:28,520 --> 00:23:31,639 Speaker 1: in other words, to tilt its nose up towards the 388 00:23:31,680 --> 00:23:34,840 Speaker 1: sky in a climb. That can be a problem for 389 00:23:34,920 --> 00:23:37,760 Speaker 1: lots of reasons, but a big one is on takeoff. 390 00:23:37,760 --> 00:23:41,639 Speaker 1: I mean, obviously you're climbing in takeoff, and in that phase, 391 00:23:41,720 --> 00:23:44,919 Speaker 1: pilot's guide a plane into a climb to reach cruising altitude. 392 00:23:45,080 --> 00:23:47,919 Speaker 1: So you don't want a plane to overcompensate and tilt 393 00:23:48,119 --> 00:23:51,720 Speaker 1: further back than the plan to climb for lots of reasons, 394 00:23:51,960 --> 00:23:54,199 Speaker 1: but a big one is that it can cause the 395 00:23:54,240 --> 00:23:57,920 Speaker 1: engines to stall out. So for a jet engine to work, 396 00:23:58,560 --> 00:24:01,600 Speaker 1: you have to have air flow going through that jet 397 00:24:01,600 --> 00:24:05,720 Speaker 1: engine in sufficient quantities, so it has to be moving 398 00:24:05,720 --> 00:24:09,879 Speaker 1: there in a sufficient speed. Essentially, I covered this in 399 00:24:09,960 --> 00:24:12,640 Speaker 1: recent episodes, so I'm just going to do a quick overview. 400 00:24:12,880 --> 00:24:16,520 Speaker 1: In a jet engine, incoming air hits fan blades that 401 00:24:16,600 --> 00:24:21,080 Speaker 1: compress that incoming air, which then either flows in or 402 00:24:21,119 --> 00:24:26,680 Speaker 1: around a combustion chamber where the engine ignites fuel. The 403 00:24:26,840 --> 00:24:31,280 Speaker 1: resulting hot gases in the combustion chamber expand and then 404 00:24:31,400 --> 00:24:34,080 Speaker 1: force their way out of the chamber through an exhaust 405 00:24:34,200 --> 00:24:36,840 Speaker 1: nozzle in the back of the chamber, and as they 406 00:24:37,040 --> 00:24:41,440 Speaker 1: escape they hit rotors on the rear side of the engine, 407 00:24:42,000 --> 00:24:45,760 Speaker 1: and the rotors connect through a shaft to the fan 408 00:24:45,840 --> 00:24:48,720 Speaker 1: blades that are in the front of the engine. So 409 00:24:48,960 --> 00:24:51,240 Speaker 1: as that exhaust is coming out the back of the engine, 410 00:24:51,359 --> 00:24:54,040 Speaker 1: it hits the rotors, and the rotors turn because of 411 00:24:54,080 --> 00:24:58,000 Speaker 1: that rapidly escaping gas, and because that's connected by a 412 00:24:58,000 --> 00:25:01,320 Speaker 1: shaft to the blades in the front, it turns. The 413 00:25:01,359 --> 00:25:03,439 Speaker 1: fan blades in the front of the engine, and the 414 00:25:03,520 --> 00:25:08,360 Speaker 1: whole thing perpetuates itself because of this continuous burn inside 415 00:25:08,400 --> 00:25:11,080 Speaker 1: the combustion chamber. But for this to work, you have 416 00:25:11,160 --> 00:25:13,600 Speaker 1: to have a sufficient amount of air flowing into the 417 00:25:13,640 --> 00:25:16,080 Speaker 1: engine in the first place. This is also why it's 418 00:25:16,119 --> 00:25:19,520 Speaker 1: necessary to jump start a jet engine on the ground. 419 00:25:19,960 --> 00:25:23,320 Speaker 1: They forced compressed air through the jet engine in order 420 00:25:23,359 --> 00:25:26,560 Speaker 1: to get it going, because you cannot get it started 421 00:25:26,600 --> 00:25:29,720 Speaker 1: any other way. Now, if the plane were to tilt 422 00:25:29,800 --> 00:25:33,160 Speaker 1: too far in an incline when it's climbing up into 423 00:25:33,200 --> 00:25:36,840 Speaker 1: the sky, the angle of the engine compared to the 424 00:25:36,880 --> 00:25:39,920 Speaker 1: airflow would be such that you wouldn't get enough air 425 00:25:40,000 --> 00:25:42,680 Speaker 1: to go through the engine for it to maintain operation, 426 00:25:42,840 --> 00:25:45,080 Speaker 1: and that's why it would stall out. You would have 427 00:25:45,119 --> 00:25:48,399 Speaker 1: a lack of air to keep that whole process going. 428 00:25:48,880 --> 00:25:53,199 Speaker 1: Installed engines would clearly be a disaster. Once Boeing engineers 429 00:25:53,240 --> 00:25:56,720 Speaker 1: recognize the tendency for the seven thirty seven Max designed 430 00:25:56,720 --> 00:26:00,600 Speaker 1: to go into this unprompted tilt, they had to how 431 00:26:00,640 --> 00:26:04,639 Speaker 1: to address that problem, and their solution was a combination 432 00:26:04,680 --> 00:26:08,479 Speaker 1: of hardware and software. On the hardware side, they relied 433 00:26:08,560 --> 00:26:12,280 Speaker 1: upon sensors that would automatically analyze the difference between the 434 00:26:12,320 --> 00:26:16,480 Speaker 1: airplane's attitude in the air and the angle of attack. 435 00:26:17,080 --> 00:26:19,320 Speaker 1: So the angle of attack describes the angle of a 436 00:26:19,359 --> 00:26:23,320 Speaker 1: plane's wing with respect to airflow. Angle of attack is 437 00:26:23,359 --> 00:26:26,280 Speaker 1: a big component of lift, that's the force that keeps 438 00:26:26,400 --> 00:26:30,280 Speaker 1: aircraft in the air. The other major hardware component is 439 00:26:30,320 --> 00:26:34,960 Speaker 1: the aircraft's horizontal tail, which can tilt to change the 440 00:26:35,040 --> 00:26:40,040 Speaker 1: plane's pitch. By altering the orientation of this horizontal tail, 441 00:26:40,760 --> 00:26:42,960 Speaker 1: it could act as kind of like a rudder, except 442 00:26:42,960 --> 00:26:46,240 Speaker 1: a rudder for the horizontal access, not the vertical, and 443 00:26:46,280 --> 00:26:48,720 Speaker 1: the effect is that it could force the nose of 444 00:26:48,760 --> 00:26:52,239 Speaker 1: the plane back downward in one of these climbs, so, 445 00:26:52,280 --> 00:26:54,720 Speaker 1: in other words, it could affect the pitch of the airplane. 446 00:26:55,040 --> 00:26:58,880 Speaker 1: The software overseeing the whole operation of this, which would 447 00:26:58,920 --> 00:27:01,880 Speaker 1: monitor the data coming in from the sensors and then 448 00:27:01,920 --> 00:27:05,800 Speaker 1: send appropriate commands to the tail, is called the Maneuvering 449 00:27:05,960 --> 00:27:10,520 Speaker 1: Characteristics Augmentation System or m CASTS. So if you've been 450 00:27:10,560 --> 00:27:12,920 Speaker 1: following the story of the seven thirty seven Max, you've 451 00:27:12,960 --> 00:27:17,280 Speaker 1: likely heard the term m CAST thrown around now. In theory, 452 00:27:17,640 --> 00:27:20,480 Speaker 1: m casts would operate in the background and make the 453 00:27:20,520 --> 00:27:23,439 Speaker 1: seven thirty seven Max perform as if it were any 454 00:27:23,560 --> 00:27:27,159 Speaker 1: other type of seven thirty seven aircraft, so it was 455 00:27:27,200 --> 00:27:30,840 Speaker 1: designed to override pilot controls. But this also meant that 456 00:27:30,920 --> 00:27:34,200 Speaker 1: if the system were to erroneously detect that the aircraft 457 00:27:34,200 --> 00:27:37,000 Speaker 1: were in too steep a climb, the tail flap or 458 00:27:37,040 --> 00:27:40,159 Speaker 1: the horizontal tail rather could force the plane into a 459 00:27:40,240 --> 00:27:43,440 Speaker 1: dive and the pilots would be struggling to pull out 460 00:27:43,480 --> 00:27:45,760 Speaker 1: of it, and they'd have to figure out how to 461 00:27:45,800 --> 00:27:48,520 Speaker 1: do that, and that would also mean knowing how to 462 00:27:48,600 --> 00:27:52,879 Speaker 1: disarm the system. Okay, so Boeing was pushing hard to 463 00:27:52,920 --> 00:27:55,439 Speaker 1: get the seven thirty seven Max ready to compete with 464 00:27:55,480 --> 00:27:59,560 Speaker 1: the Airbus A three twenty neo aircraft. The f a 465 00:27:59,560 --> 00:28:03,439 Speaker 1: A helped expedite things. In two thousand fifteen, according to 466 00:28:03,480 --> 00:28:07,000 Speaker 1: the Seattle Times, the f a A managers put pressure 467 00:28:07,000 --> 00:28:10,439 Speaker 1: on the agency's safety engineers, telling them to delegate the 468 00:28:10,480 --> 00:28:14,399 Speaker 1: assessment process to Boeing's own staff. This, by the way, 469 00:28:14,440 --> 00:28:17,640 Speaker 1: it doesn't seem like it's completely unusual, but it did 470 00:28:17,680 --> 00:28:19,840 Speaker 1: come as something of a surprise to me. I did 471 00:28:19,880 --> 00:28:22,960 Speaker 1: not know that's how things worked, because, in other words, 472 00:28:22,960 --> 00:28:25,920 Speaker 1: what that means is the agency and charge of overseeing 473 00:28:26,040 --> 00:28:31,120 Speaker 1: safety passed that job along to a company that produced 474 00:28:31,119 --> 00:28:34,639 Speaker 1: the very thing the FAA was meant to oversee. And 475 00:28:34,680 --> 00:28:37,880 Speaker 1: that might sound like it might not be the best idea. 476 00:28:38,440 --> 00:28:42,280 Speaker 1: I happen to think it was a pretty bad idea now, granted, 477 00:28:42,560 --> 00:28:44,680 Speaker 1: as we are now seeing, a failure on the part 478 00:28:44,760 --> 00:28:47,880 Speaker 1: of a company to be completely honest and rigorous with 479 00:28:47,920 --> 00:28:51,880 Speaker 1: its safety assessment process can result in terrible tragedies for 480 00:28:51,960 --> 00:28:55,800 Speaker 1: passengers as well as real hardships for the company itself. 481 00:28:55,960 --> 00:28:58,840 Speaker 1: So companies like Boeing have a very strong incentive to 482 00:28:58,920 --> 00:29:02,440 Speaker 1: police themselves care late. However, it sounds like that's maybe 483 00:29:02,480 --> 00:29:06,560 Speaker 1: not what happened with Boeing's self assessment. Again. According to 484 00:29:06,600 --> 00:29:11,000 Speaker 1: the Seattle Times, the safety analysis understated how far the 485 00:29:11,080 --> 00:29:14,800 Speaker 1: im cast software could force the horizontal tail to move 486 00:29:15,320 --> 00:29:18,920 Speaker 1: in an effort to stabilize the planes pitch. The Times 487 00:29:18,920 --> 00:29:21,680 Speaker 1: reported that in reality, the software was able to make 488 00:29:21,680 --> 00:29:25,320 Speaker 1: the tail move more than four times further than what 489 00:29:25,400 --> 00:29:28,840 Speaker 1: the report indicated, meaning a much more dramatic change in 490 00:29:28,960 --> 00:29:32,320 Speaker 1: pitch than what Boeing was claiming in the report. And 491 00:29:32,360 --> 00:29:36,080 Speaker 1: Boeing's response to this was that initially Imcast would be 492 00:29:36,120 --> 00:29:39,440 Speaker 1: able to move the horizontal tail at an angle of 493 00:29:39,840 --> 00:29:42,640 Speaker 1: point six degrees. It turned out it was more like 494 00:29:42,840 --> 00:29:46,280 Speaker 1: two point five degrees, and Boeing said, well, it was 495 00:29:46,320 --> 00:29:50,000 Speaker 1: only upon further study that we realized in order to 496 00:29:50,040 --> 00:29:54,080 Speaker 1: pull out of a disastrous climb, you would need a 497 00:29:54,240 --> 00:29:59,160 Speaker 1: greater movement than just point six degrees, which is why 498 00:29:59,200 --> 00:30:01,640 Speaker 1: we increased it. But at that point we had already 499 00:30:01,640 --> 00:30:04,160 Speaker 1: written the report. Seems to me like there might have 500 00:30:04,200 --> 00:30:06,240 Speaker 1: been an addendum that needed to be added there, but 501 00:30:06,360 --> 00:30:09,720 Speaker 1: what am I to say? So the report did not 502 00:30:10,000 --> 00:30:14,600 Speaker 1: address how mcasts would reset after a pilot's response and 503 00:30:14,600 --> 00:30:18,640 Speaker 1: would go into another dive despite repeated manual attempts to recover. So, 504 00:30:18,680 --> 00:30:22,959 Speaker 1: in other words, if a pilot were to respond to 505 00:30:23,040 --> 00:30:26,280 Speaker 1: this unplanned dive and pull back, you know, activate the 506 00:30:26,320 --> 00:30:30,240 Speaker 1: control and pull back on it, then it would stop 507 00:30:30,320 --> 00:30:33,720 Speaker 1: the system temporarily, but it would just reset and start 508 00:30:33,800 --> 00:30:37,120 Speaker 1: the cycle over again, and it might get more dramatic 509 00:30:37,200 --> 00:30:41,640 Speaker 1: each time. The the amount of of of tilt that 510 00:30:41,720 --> 00:30:44,959 Speaker 1: the horizontal tail would take, and thus the amount of 511 00:30:45,560 --> 00:30:49,000 Speaker 1: dive the plane would go into, would get greater each time. 512 00:30:49,520 --> 00:30:53,200 Speaker 1: The criticism is that the safety measure had no self 513 00:30:53,280 --> 00:30:59,080 Speaker 1: correcting process that would discontinue the diving efforts after manual intervention. 514 00:30:59,360 --> 00:31:01,480 Speaker 1: It would just keep going into a dive. So the 515 00:31:01,600 --> 00:31:04,560 Speaker 1: argument is that there should have been a system in 516 00:31:04,600 --> 00:31:10,200 Speaker 1: place where if a pilot intervenes, it deactivates this process 517 00:31:10,320 --> 00:31:13,680 Speaker 1: that was not in place. The Times criticized that the 518 00:31:13,720 --> 00:31:17,120 Speaker 1: assessment stated that if the system were to fail, it 519 00:31:17,160 --> 00:31:22,120 Speaker 1: would merit a hazardous danger rather than a catastrophic one. 520 00:31:22,200 --> 00:31:27,120 Speaker 1: These have real meanings in safety assessments. Hazardous means that 521 00:31:27,400 --> 00:31:30,920 Speaker 1: the outcome could result in injury or death to a 522 00:31:31,000 --> 00:31:35,720 Speaker 1: small number of passengers in a plane. Catastrophic is essentially 523 00:31:36,240 --> 00:31:39,920 Speaker 1: a designation stating that such a failure would result in 524 00:31:39,960 --> 00:31:42,760 Speaker 1: the complete loss of the plane and everyone on board. 525 00:31:43,280 --> 00:31:46,920 Speaker 1: So Boeing was saying that a failure of the system 526 00:31:47,200 --> 00:31:51,280 Speaker 1: would merit the hazardous level, not the catastrophic level. So, 527 00:31:51,320 --> 00:31:54,480 Speaker 1: in other words, the criticism is that the report was 528 00:31:54,560 --> 00:31:58,760 Speaker 1: downplaying the actual outcome of a system failure. One other 529 00:31:58,840 --> 00:32:03,040 Speaker 1: major problem is that Boeing neglected to include information about 530 00:32:03,240 --> 00:32:06,400 Speaker 1: m casts in its operation manuals for the seven thirty 531 00:32:06,440 --> 00:32:10,360 Speaker 1: seven Max. Pilots didn't know about it, airlines didn't know 532 00:32:10,480 --> 00:32:14,600 Speaker 1: about it. It wasn't until after the first tragedy that 533 00:32:14,720 --> 00:32:17,440 Speaker 1: this would be amended. When we come back, I'll talk 534 00:32:17,480 --> 00:32:20,440 Speaker 1: about that accident and the following events. But first, let's 535 00:32:20,480 --> 00:32:31,680 Speaker 1: take another quick break. Perhaps because the f a A 536 00:32:31,960 --> 00:32:36,640 Speaker 1: delegated the safety assessment duties to Boeing, Perhaps because the 537 00:32:36,760 --> 00:32:39,960 Speaker 1: seven thirty seven Max was a variant on a tried 538 00:32:40,080 --> 00:32:43,000 Speaker 1: and true aircraft design that had been an operation for 539 00:32:43,200 --> 00:32:48,440 Speaker 1: at that point fifty years. Perhaps because simulations failed to 540 00:32:48,480 --> 00:32:51,600 Speaker 1: create the sort of scenarios that we would unfortunately see 541 00:32:51,760 --> 00:32:54,960 Speaker 1: unfold in the actual operation of the aircraft. The seven 542 00:32:55,040 --> 00:33:00,080 Speaker 1: thirty seven Max past certification without much hullabaloo. Then, to 543 00:33:00,120 --> 00:33:04,280 Speaker 1: be fair, it seems in more investigations that some of 544 00:33:04,320 --> 00:33:08,000 Speaker 1: those simulations actually did show some problems, but Boeing didn't 545 00:33:08,040 --> 00:33:12,280 Speaker 1: really address that at the time. There was also no 546 00:33:12,360 --> 00:33:15,120 Speaker 1: need to train flight crews on how to operate the 547 00:33:15,120 --> 00:33:18,520 Speaker 1: seven thirty seven Max, because in theory it behaves so 548 00:33:18,640 --> 00:33:22,600 Speaker 1: much like other seven thirty seven's, particularly the seven thirty 549 00:33:22,680 --> 00:33:26,560 Speaker 1: seven in G, which was the immediate predecessor of the Max. 550 00:33:27,280 --> 00:33:30,680 Speaker 1: Pilots reported that they essentially had to complete a one 551 00:33:30,800 --> 00:33:34,680 Speaker 1: hour course on a tablet and not even spend any 552 00:33:34,680 --> 00:33:37,680 Speaker 1: time in a simulator before they would be certified to 553 00:33:37,760 --> 00:33:40,760 Speaker 1: fly a seven thirty seven Max. However, you want to 554 00:33:40,840 --> 00:33:43,000 Speaker 1: lay it out. The end of the matter is that 555 00:33:43,080 --> 00:33:46,680 Speaker 1: the seven thirty seven Max received its certification and Boeing 556 00:33:46,760 --> 00:33:50,600 Speaker 1: began to deliver the aircraft to customers. One of those 557 00:33:50,640 --> 00:33:54,560 Speaker 1: customers was Melindo Air, a carrier based out of Malaysia 558 00:33:54,800 --> 00:33:58,360 Speaker 1: and a subsidiary of a larger airline called Lion Air. 559 00:33:59,080 --> 00:34:03,120 Speaker 1: On October twenty ninth, two thousand eighteen, Lion Air flight 560 00:34:03,400 --> 00:34:06,600 Speaker 1: j T six ten, which was a seven thirty seven 561 00:34:06,760 --> 00:34:12,239 Speaker 1: Max eight, crashed just thirteen minutes after takeoff from Indonesia. 562 00:34:12,600 --> 00:34:16,080 Speaker 1: The plane crashed into the sea off Jakarta. All one 563 00:34:16,600 --> 00:34:19,520 Speaker 1: eighty nine people on board died as a result of 564 00:34:19,560 --> 00:34:24,520 Speaker 1: that crash. Among them were twenty Indonesian government officials. The 565 00:34:24,560 --> 00:34:28,040 Speaker 1: plane had been in use for about two months. A 566 00:34:28,160 --> 00:34:31,520 Speaker 1: pilot had reported a problem with the aircraft right away, 567 00:34:31,840 --> 00:34:35,960 Speaker 1: requesting a return to the airport before they lost control 568 00:34:36,040 --> 00:34:38,960 Speaker 1: of the aircraft. The CEO of Lion Air at the 569 00:34:39,000 --> 00:34:42,440 Speaker 1: time reported that a different pilot had reported the same 570 00:34:42,480 --> 00:34:46,759 Speaker 1: plane for a quote technical issue end quote earlier on 571 00:34:46,880 --> 00:34:49,680 Speaker 1: that week, but that the aircraft had been cleared to 572 00:34:49,719 --> 00:34:54,560 Speaker 1: fly the following day. An investigation following the crash indicated 573 00:34:54,600 --> 00:34:58,480 Speaker 1: that one of the angle of attack sensors had malfunctioned 574 00:34:58,560 --> 00:35:02,360 Speaker 1: on the Lion Air flight, and it had mistakenly indicated 575 00:35:02,440 --> 00:35:06,560 Speaker 1: a dangerous change in pitch and an oncoming engine stall, 576 00:35:07,000 --> 00:35:10,000 Speaker 1: and none of those conditions were actually existing at the time. 577 00:35:10,560 --> 00:35:13,840 Speaker 1: But the im CAST software and system went into action, 578 00:35:14,040 --> 00:35:17,880 Speaker 1: forcing the horizontal tail to move the the the nose 579 00:35:18,080 --> 00:35:20,440 Speaker 1: of the plane downward and put it into a dive. 580 00:35:21,120 --> 00:35:24,600 Speaker 1: The pilot was unable to counteract that, and the plane 581 00:35:24,600 --> 00:35:27,759 Speaker 1: crashed as a result. Making matters worse was the fact 582 00:35:27,800 --> 00:35:30,640 Speaker 1: that Boeing had not indicated the im cast was even 583 00:35:30,640 --> 00:35:33,279 Speaker 1: a thing. The pilots had no way of knowing what 584 00:35:33,400 --> 00:35:36,120 Speaker 1: it was that was causing the plane's nose to dive 585 00:35:36,880 --> 00:35:41,000 Speaker 1: or how they were supposed to stop it. On November six, 586 00:35:41,200 --> 00:35:45,160 Speaker 1: two thousand eighteen, Boeing issued a report revealing im CAST 587 00:35:45,239 --> 00:35:48,760 Speaker 1: to pilots and airlines for the first time. The report 588 00:35:48,800 --> 00:35:51,800 Speaker 1: also gave instructions to pilots on how to override in 589 00:35:52,000 --> 00:35:54,920 Speaker 1: cast in the event of a failure. Not At this point, 590 00:35:55,239 --> 00:35:58,280 Speaker 1: it wasn't yet certain that im casts was at fault, 591 00:35:58,400 --> 00:36:01,160 Speaker 1: but the signs were starting to point that way. In 592 00:36:01,200 --> 00:36:04,080 Speaker 1: the meantime, Boeing continued to receive orders for the seven 593 00:36:04,120 --> 00:36:07,520 Speaker 1: thirties seven Max from various airlines and was still in 594 00:36:07,840 --> 00:36:12,120 Speaker 1: full manufacturing mode. One thing Bowing did that later drew 595 00:36:12,160 --> 00:36:16,360 Speaker 1: an enormous amount of criticism was to place some responsibility 596 00:36:16,600 --> 00:36:19,880 Speaker 1: on the pilots themselves, stating that they should have known 597 00:36:19,920 --> 00:36:23,600 Speaker 1: to cut off the switches to the planes stabilizers. But 598 00:36:23,680 --> 00:36:26,719 Speaker 1: analysts who looked at the recovered flight data for the 599 00:36:26,760 --> 00:36:30,560 Speaker 1: Lion Air disaster said that what the pilots had experienced 600 00:36:30,680 --> 00:36:34,560 Speaker 1: didn't look like a stabilizer runaway scenario in which an 601 00:36:34,560 --> 00:36:38,320 Speaker 1: element like the seven thirty seven Max's horizontal tail would 602 00:36:38,320 --> 00:36:43,520 Speaker 1: make a continuous, uncommanded movement. The Lion Air flight data 603 00:36:43,840 --> 00:36:47,080 Speaker 1: showed that the tail movement was not a continuous motion, 604 00:36:47,440 --> 00:36:49,719 Speaker 1: and then the pilots were able to use the controls 605 00:36:49,760 --> 00:36:53,200 Speaker 1: to pull up several times before the plane became uncontrollable. 606 00:36:53,600 --> 00:36:57,560 Speaker 1: The analysts contradicted Boeing, saying that it wouldn't have seemed 607 00:36:57,600 --> 00:37:00,440 Speaker 1: obvious to cut off the stabilizer controls based on what 608 00:37:00,520 --> 00:37:04,759 Speaker 1: was happening then. On March tenth, two thousand, nineteen, and 609 00:37:04,920 --> 00:37:09,080 Speaker 1: Ethiopian Airlines flight from Addis Ababa to Nairobi crashed not 610 00:37:09,280 --> 00:37:12,719 Speaker 1: long after takeoff. Air traffic control lost contact with the 611 00:37:12,719 --> 00:37:16,399 Speaker 1: plane just six minutes after it left the runway. All 612 00:37:16,480 --> 00:37:20,240 Speaker 1: one fifty seven people aboard that plane died from the crash. 613 00:37:20,719 --> 00:37:24,000 Speaker 1: Early analysis suggested that once again, this was a failure 614 00:37:24,120 --> 00:37:27,600 Speaker 1: of m CAST. Further investigation showed that the crew attempted 615 00:37:27,640 --> 00:37:31,319 Speaker 1: to follow Boeing's instructions to correct for the failure, to 616 00:37:31,440 --> 00:37:35,880 Speaker 1: no effect. One day after the crash in Ethiopia, China, 617 00:37:35,960 --> 00:37:39,680 Speaker 1: and Indonesia, authorities issued orders that all seven thirty seven 618 00:37:39,719 --> 00:37:44,040 Speaker 1: Max aircraft operating in those countries were to be grounded. Now, 619 00:37:44,080 --> 00:37:46,239 Speaker 1: at that point, it was not yet known that m 620 00:37:46,320 --> 00:37:50,360 Speaker 1: CAST was definitely at fault for that second crash. The 621 00:37:50,480 --> 00:37:54,160 Speaker 1: day after that, on March twelve, two thousand nineteen, Canada, 622 00:37:54,440 --> 00:37:57,840 Speaker 1: the EU, and India also ordered all seven thirty seven 623 00:37:57,880 --> 00:38:01,000 Speaker 1: Max aircraft grounded. The f a A in the United 624 00:38:01,040 --> 00:38:04,240 Speaker 1: States would follow suit one day later, on March thirteenth, 625 00:38:04,320 --> 00:38:07,920 Speaker 1: two thousand nineteen. At that point, investigators were seeing signs 626 00:38:07,960 --> 00:38:11,480 Speaker 1: that IMCAST did play a part in the second crash. 627 00:38:11,840 --> 00:38:14,919 Speaker 1: The U s Department of Justice began a sweeping investigation 628 00:38:15,000 --> 00:38:18,440 Speaker 1: into the matter, and particularly into the process of the 629 00:38:18,520 --> 00:38:22,840 Speaker 1: jets certification. How could it pass certification if it had 630 00:38:22,880 --> 00:38:28,200 Speaker 1: this incredible flaw. That investigation has uncovered other concerning details 631 00:38:28,280 --> 00:38:31,560 Speaker 1: about the issue, including the revelation that a Boeing pilot 632 00:38:31,800 --> 00:38:35,080 Speaker 1: had brought concerns about the flight system of the seven 633 00:38:35,120 --> 00:38:38,319 Speaker 1: thirty seven Max to the attention of Boeing officials back 634 00:38:38,320 --> 00:38:42,880 Speaker 1: in two six. Previously, Boeing management had maintained that they 635 00:38:42,920 --> 00:38:45,640 Speaker 1: had no idea that the flight control system could cause 636 00:38:45,640 --> 00:38:49,480 Speaker 1: a catastrophe, but pilot Mark Fortner said that while flying 637 00:38:49,520 --> 00:38:53,640 Speaker 1: simulations that incorporated m CAST, he had encountered cases where 638 00:38:53,680 --> 00:38:57,920 Speaker 1: the flight management system was, in his words, quote running 639 00:38:58,040 --> 00:39:02,520 Speaker 1: rampant end quote. The revelation of this pilot's warnings came 640 00:39:02,560 --> 00:39:05,960 Speaker 1: a little more than a week before Boeing CEO Dennis 641 00:39:06,040 --> 00:39:10,360 Speaker 1: Muhlenberg and John Hamilton's Boeing's lead engineer, were to appear 642 00:39:10,440 --> 00:39:13,520 Speaker 1: before the United States Senate and the United States House 643 00:39:13,560 --> 00:39:18,000 Speaker 1: of Representatives and back to back hearings. During those hearings, 644 00:39:18,160 --> 00:39:23,319 Speaker 1: officials accused Boeing of purposefully downplaying safety issues and concealing 645 00:39:23,360 --> 00:39:27,040 Speaker 1: potential problems in an effort to achieve certification as quickly 646 00:39:27,080 --> 00:39:31,680 Speaker 1: as possible and thus start selling planes as quickly as possible. 647 00:39:32,000 --> 00:39:34,880 Speaker 1: Those officials are also concerned about the f a a's 648 00:39:34,920 --> 00:39:38,359 Speaker 1: practice to deputize the very companies it is supposed to 649 00:39:38,400 --> 00:39:42,840 Speaker 1: certify in the safety assessment process. Now that's not to 650 00:39:42,920 --> 00:39:46,239 Speaker 1: say that the US government is now advocating for sweeping 651 00:39:46,440 --> 00:39:50,319 Speaker 1: changes in certification or or even going to come down 652 00:39:50,360 --> 00:39:53,319 Speaker 1: hard on Boeing, because it's not as simple as that. 653 00:39:53,880 --> 00:39:56,920 Speaker 1: At issue isn't just the fate of Boeing, which is 654 00:39:57,080 --> 00:40:00,959 Speaker 1: an enormous employer in the United States. That also means 655 00:40:00,960 --> 00:40:03,480 Speaker 1: that there's a whole lot of folks who are potentially 656 00:40:03,760 --> 00:40:07,080 Speaker 1: voters who could be affected by any massive problems that 657 00:40:07,160 --> 00:40:11,880 Speaker 1: Boeing faces, and politicians are a little squeamish about doing 658 00:40:11,920 --> 00:40:15,920 Speaker 1: things that could potentially upset voters. There are airlines that 659 00:40:16,000 --> 00:40:19,360 Speaker 1: have aircraft they can't use. They're dealing with this problem 660 00:40:19,400 --> 00:40:22,319 Speaker 1: to they're looking at lost revenue. And there are all 661 00:40:22,400 --> 00:40:26,200 Speaker 1: these companies that supply bowing with components like GE, you know, 662 00:40:26,280 --> 00:40:28,680 Speaker 1: one of the companies responsible for the seven thirty seven 663 00:40:28,680 --> 00:40:33,080 Speaker 1: max engines. GE has had its own share of problems recently. 664 00:40:33,120 --> 00:40:35,920 Speaker 1: You can listen to my episodes about General Electric that 665 00:40:36,000 --> 00:40:38,920 Speaker 1: published not too long ago to learn more about those. 666 00:40:39,600 --> 00:40:43,560 Speaker 1: Because the seven thirty seven max is effectively on hold. 667 00:40:44,000 --> 00:40:47,960 Speaker 1: It could potentially cost companies like Ge and others billions 668 00:40:48,000 --> 00:40:52,719 Speaker 1: of dollars. Boeing, for its part, has made major changes 669 00:40:52,800 --> 00:40:56,320 Speaker 1: to m CAST. A big one was that moving forward 670 00:40:56,360 --> 00:40:59,480 Speaker 1: in CAST will take into account both angle of attacks 671 00:40:59,520 --> 00:41:03,799 Speaker 1: sensor before changing the horizontal tails orientation. It would no 672 00:41:03,880 --> 00:41:07,000 Speaker 1: longer accept just one stream of data as being enough 673 00:41:07,120 --> 00:41:10,000 Speaker 1: to change the plane's pitch. One of the other major 674 00:41:10,040 --> 00:41:13,080 Speaker 1: criticisms directed at Boeing from a design level is that 675 00:41:13,160 --> 00:41:16,080 Speaker 1: the MCAST sensor was a single point of failure with 676 00:41:16,160 --> 00:41:20,200 Speaker 1: no redundancy, and when coupled with Boeing's self assessment that 677 00:41:20,280 --> 00:41:23,719 Speaker 1: a failure just represented a hazardous outcome but not a 678 00:41:23,760 --> 00:41:28,040 Speaker 1: catastrophic one, create a false sense of security. Another big 679 00:41:28,160 --> 00:41:31,600 Speaker 1: change is limiting how much the tail will move like 680 00:41:31,640 --> 00:41:33,919 Speaker 1: I said. The original safety assessment said the tail would 681 00:41:33,960 --> 00:41:36,279 Speaker 1: only move point six degrees, but in practice it was 682 00:41:36,320 --> 00:41:39,520 Speaker 1: more like two point five degrees at maximum. Boeing has 683 00:41:39,560 --> 00:41:42,080 Speaker 1: also stated that it is going to limit the system 684 00:41:42,120 --> 00:41:45,360 Speaker 1: to activating for a single cycle, as opposed to the 685 00:41:45,560 --> 00:41:49,120 Speaker 1: reset repeat process that was seen in both Lion Air 686 00:41:49,239 --> 00:41:53,640 Speaker 1: and the Ethiopian Airline crashes. Then there's the long tail 687 00:41:53,800 --> 00:41:56,200 Speaker 1: stuff that Boeing is going to have to deal with, 688 00:41:56,560 --> 00:42:01,000 Speaker 1: stuff like trust and perception. While Bowing has made efforts 689 00:42:01,040 --> 00:42:04,600 Speaker 1: to address the problems in its seven thirty seven Max 690 00:42:04,680 --> 00:42:08,520 Speaker 1: flight systems, the company's credibility has taken a hit, as 691 00:42:08,560 --> 00:42:11,759 Speaker 1: has the perception of the f a A. There's still 692 00:42:11,840 --> 00:42:14,279 Speaker 1: lawsuits against Boeing that are making their way through the 693 00:42:14,360 --> 00:42:17,080 Speaker 1: legal system that are a direct result of the seven 694 00:42:17,120 --> 00:42:21,120 Speaker 1: thirty seven Max disasters, and Boeing still has hopes that 695 00:42:21,280 --> 00:42:24,560 Speaker 1: the aviation agencies around the world will lift the grounding 696 00:42:24,640 --> 00:42:27,839 Speaker 1: of the seven thirty seven Max aircraft before the end 697 00:42:27,880 --> 00:42:32,080 Speaker 1: of twenty nineteen or in early twenty twenty. Meanwhile, the 698 00:42:32,160 --> 00:42:35,400 Speaker 1: company has another headache to deal with. In October two 699 00:42:35,440 --> 00:42:39,120 Speaker 1: thousand nineteen, reports came out that aircraft operators had discovered 700 00:42:39,200 --> 00:42:43,200 Speaker 1: cracks on the seven thirty seven in G aircraft, or 701 00:42:43,239 --> 00:42:45,880 Speaker 1: at least some of them now. As I mentioned earlier, 702 00:42:45,920 --> 00:42:49,160 Speaker 1: the seven thirty seven in G is a predecessor to 703 00:42:49,239 --> 00:42:51,480 Speaker 1: the seven thirty seven Max. It's been in service for 704 00:42:51,560 --> 00:42:55,360 Speaker 1: several years. It doesn't have the m CAST software or 705 00:42:55,400 --> 00:42:58,520 Speaker 1: the engine placement of the Max, and it remained in 706 00:42:58,600 --> 00:43:02,200 Speaker 1: operation with any problems. But in early October two thousand, nineteen, 707 00:43:02,560 --> 00:43:06,040 Speaker 1: U S officials ordered an inspection of seven thirty seven 708 00:43:06,040 --> 00:43:10,120 Speaker 1: in G planes that had completed more than thirty thousand cycles, 709 00:43:10,160 --> 00:43:13,719 Speaker 1: that is, more than thirty thousand takeoffs and landings. And 710 00:43:13,840 --> 00:43:16,560 Speaker 1: the whole point was to look at the section of 711 00:43:16,600 --> 00:43:19,040 Speaker 1: the plane where the wing attaches to the body of 712 00:43:19,080 --> 00:43:20,800 Speaker 1: the plane. It's a part of the plane that is 713 00:43:20,840 --> 00:43:24,359 Speaker 1: called and I swear I'm not making this up the 714 00:43:24,400 --> 00:43:29,080 Speaker 1: pickle fork. Several airlines outside of the United States also 715 00:43:29,320 --> 00:43:32,200 Speaker 1: began to inspect their seven thirty seven in G s, 716 00:43:32,520 --> 00:43:36,120 Speaker 1: even those that had not yet completed thirty thousand cycles, 717 00:43:36,320 --> 00:43:39,760 Speaker 1: and reportedly some of those aircraft have had cracks appearing 718 00:43:39,760 --> 00:43:42,799 Speaker 1: in the pickle fork as well. Boeing stated that out 719 00:43:42,800 --> 00:43:45,520 Speaker 1: of the one thousand, seven thirty seven in G s 720 00:43:45,840 --> 00:43:49,200 Speaker 1: that had been inspected so far, inspectors that only indicated 721 00:43:49,239 --> 00:43:53,040 Speaker 1: that five percent of them have had cracks. Still, it's 722 00:43:53,080 --> 00:43:56,440 Speaker 1: another indicator that things are not going so great for 723 00:43:56,520 --> 00:44:00,359 Speaker 1: Boeing right now. We'll have to wait and see how 724 00:44:00,400 --> 00:44:02,760 Speaker 1: this all plays out, whether or not the seven thirty 725 00:44:02,800 --> 00:44:05,880 Speaker 1: seven Max will return to service, whether or not people 726 00:44:05,880 --> 00:44:08,880 Speaker 1: will trust it. You've had a lot of us politicians 727 00:44:08,880 --> 00:44:12,120 Speaker 1: already saying that they would not get on a seven 728 00:44:12,160 --> 00:44:15,239 Speaker 1: thirty seven max to take a trip based on what 729 00:44:15,280 --> 00:44:19,000 Speaker 1: they've seen. So there may be an inherent trust that 730 00:44:19,280 --> 00:44:22,240 Speaker 1: ends up being an enormous barrier to the seven thirty 731 00:44:22,280 --> 00:44:25,520 Speaker 1: seven max, even if the technology is proven to be safe. 732 00:44:26,280 --> 00:44:29,879 Speaker 1: So that's a huge issue. Once you've eroded trust, it's 733 00:44:30,040 --> 00:44:33,879 Speaker 1: very hard to rebuild. So we'll have to wait see 734 00:44:33,880 --> 00:44:36,919 Speaker 1: how that turns out. I am very curious to see 735 00:44:36,920 --> 00:44:40,640 Speaker 1: it myself. I've definitely been interested in this subject. I 736 00:44:40,719 --> 00:44:44,600 Speaker 1: fly fairly frequently, and knowing about this is something that 737 00:44:44,680 --> 00:44:47,960 Speaker 1: I think is important. Um, it's also something that fills 738 00:44:48,000 --> 00:44:51,440 Speaker 1: me with anxiety if I'm being perfectly honest, but I'd 739 00:44:51,560 --> 00:44:54,880 Speaker 1: rather know than not know. Anyway, that wraps up this 740 00:44:54,960 --> 00:44:57,719 Speaker 1: episode of tech Stuff. If you guys have suggestions for 741 00:44:57,840 --> 00:45:00,560 Speaker 1: future episodes, send me an email. The edge says tech 742 00:45:00,600 --> 00:45:03,839 Speaker 1: stuff at how stuff works dot com, or you can 743 00:45:03,880 --> 00:45:06,319 Speaker 1: tell me on Facebook or Twitter. The handle for both 744 00:45:06,320 --> 00:45:10,040 Speaker 1: of those is text stuff h s W or pop 745 00:45:10,040 --> 00:45:13,359 Speaker 1: on over to our website that's tech stuff podcast dot com, 746 00:45:13,440 --> 00:45:16,799 Speaker 1: where we have an archive of every episode we've ever recorded. 747 00:45:17,080 --> 00:45:19,359 Speaker 1: We also have a link to our online store where 748 00:45:19,400 --> 00:45:22,360 Speaker 1: you can buy tech Stuff merch and every purchase you 749 00:45:22,440 --> 00:45:24,839 Speaker 1: make goes to help the show, and we greatly appreciate it, 750 00:45:25,200 --> 00:45:32,640 Speaker 1: and I will talk to you again really soon. Tex 751 00:45:32,719 --> 00:45:35,400 Speaker 1: Stuff is a production of I Heart Radio's How Stuff Works. 752 00:45:35,560 --> 00:45:38,360 Speaker 1: For more podcasts from I heart Radio, visit the I 753 00:45:38,480 --> 00:45:41,719 Speaker 1: heart Radio app, Apple Podcasts, or wherever you listen to 754 00:45:41,760 --> 00:45:42,680 Speaker 1: your favorite shows.