1 00:00:04,480 --> 00:00:12,399 Speaker 1: Welcome to tech Stuff, a production from iHeartRadio. Hey there, 2 00:00:12,440 --> 00:00:16,000 Speaker 1: and welcome to tech Stuff. I'm your host, Jonathan Strickland. 3 00:00:16,040 --> 00:00:19,159 Speaker 1: I'm an executive producer with iHeart Podcasts, and how the 4 00:00:19,239 --> 00:00:23,320 Speaker 1: tech are you? You know, there's this classic scene in 5 00:00:23,400 --> 00:00:27,640 Speaker 1: Mel Brooks's documentary film space Balls, in which a radar 6 00:00:27,760 --> 00:00:32,000 Speaker 1: operator aboard the bad Guy's spaceship announces that he has 7 00:00:32,080 --> 00:00:36,400 Speaker 1: lost the bleeps, the sweeps, and the creeps. Why because 8 00:00:36,440 --> 00:00:40,919 Speaker 1: the radar has been jammed Raspberry jam to be specific, 9 00:00:40,920 --> 00:00:43,520 Speaker 1: and there's only one man who would Dare give Darth 10 00:00:43,600 --> 00:00:46,800 Speaker 1: Helmet the Raspberry. But I'm ARII getting sidetracked. I thought 11 00:00:46,840 --> 00:00:50,239 Speaker 1: I would do a short episode about signal jamming and 12 00:00:50,280 --> 00:00:54,520 Speaker 1: signal intrusion and broadly how it works, maybe a few 13 00:00:54,560 --> 00:00:57,800 Speaker 1: interesting examples. So let's get the bare basics out of 14 00:00:57,840 --> 00:01:01,600 Speaker 1: the way, because it's actually really simple. Signal jamming occurs 15 00:01:01,600 --> 00:01:04,920 Speaker 1: when someone uses a transmitter to send out signals over 16 00:01:05,120 --> 00:01:09,680 Speaker 1: certain radio frequencies at a strength powerful enough to interfere 17 00:01:09,800 --> 00:01:13,560 Speaker 1: or overwhelm communications equipment in the area. We can use 18 00:01:13,600 --> 00:01:16,160 Speaker 1: an analogy here. It's kind of like trying to have 19 00:01:16,200 --> 00:01:20,240 Speaker 1: a conversation with someone in a really loud environment. Like 20 00:01:20,480 --> 00:01:23,080 Speaker 1: let's say it's a really loud party and you're just 21 00:01:23,120 --> 00:01:26,320 Speaker 1: trying to chat with somebody, and every time you or 22 00:01:26,360 --> 00:01:29,000 Speaker 1: your friend talks, the noise in the space just gets 23 00:01:29,120 --> 00:01:32,240 Speaker 1: louder and you can't hear one another. There's too much 24 00:01:32,480 --> 00:01:35,720 Speaker 1: noise not enough signal. That's essentially what's going on with 25 00:01:35,840 --> 00:01:41,160 Speaker 1: signal jamming, except we're talking about electromagnetic or specifically radio signals. 26 00:01:41,280 --> 00:01:45,600 Speaker 1: No raspberries are involved, sadly. Now, let's really get stuck 27 00:01:45,640 --> 00:01:49,400 Speaker 1: in by talking quickly about the origins of radio, simply 28 00:01:49,440 --> 00:01:51,400 Speaker 1: so that we can kind of have a working understanding 29 00:01:51,520 --> 00:01:53,920 Speaker 1: what's going on here. So the full story of the 30 00:01:54,000 --> 00:01:57,160 Speaker 1: history of radio is a really long, complicated one, with 31 00:01:57,200 --> 00:02:01,600 Speaker 1: lots of important scientists and engineers who made discoveries that 32 00:02:01,680 --> 00:02:05,200 Speaker 1: led up to our ability to make radio transmitters and 33 00:02:05,240 --> 00:02:07,800 Speaker 1: receivers and that kind of stuff. I'm not going to 34 00:02:07,880 --> 00:02:11,519 Speaker 1: do the full rundown. I've done it before in other episodes, 35 00:02:11,680 --> 00:02:14,760 Speaker 1: but here's just sort of like the highlights. So James 36 00:02:14,760 --> 00:02:18,400 Speaker 1: Clerk Maxwell's first stop in the mid nineteenth century. Like 37 00:02:18,440 --> 00:02:22,680 Speaker 1: the eighteen sixties, Maxwell proposed a hypothesis that later developed 38 00:02:22,680 --> 00:02:26,440 Speaker 1: into the theory of electromagnetism. He believed that with an 39 00:02:26,440 --> 00:02:30,920 Speaker 1: oscillating electric or magnetic field, one could generate electromagnetic waves 40 00:02:30,960 --> 00:02:34,480 Speaker 1: that are capable of traveling outward from the source through space. 41 00:02:34,880 --> 00:02:37,760 Speaker 1: You didn't need wires or any other kind of connection. 42 00:02:38,520 --> 00:02:42,160 Speaker 1: You could just beam this energy, which was a pretty 43 00:02:42,240 --> 00:02:44,359 Speaker 1: radical idea at the time, but it was a radical 44 00:02:44,400 --> 00:02:47,320 Speaker 1: idea that would turn out to be correct. So about 45 00:02:47,360 --> 00:02:53,520 Speaker 1: twenty years after Maxwell had published his mathematical equations explaining electromagnetism, 46 00:02:53,720 --> 00:02:56,800 Speaker 1: there was a German scientist named Heinrich Hertz, and he 47 00:02:56,880 --> 00:03:00,639 Speaker 1: created an interesting setup to test the idea of these 48 00:03:00,680 --> 00:03:04,520 Speaker 1: electromagnetic waves. Hertz created what ended up being a very 49 00:03:04,520 --> 00:03:09,519 Speaker 1: simple radio transmitter. So he had a pair of metal 50 00:03:09,560 --> 00:03:13,000 Speaker 1: plates that had these little metal balls extending from them, 51 00:03:13,200 --> 00:03:15,000 Speaker 1: and he put the two metal balls so that they 52 00:03:15,040 --> 00:03:17,680 Speaker 1: were close to each other, but not actually in contact 53 00:03:17,800 --> 00:03:20,359 Speaker 1: with each other, so there was a gap between the 54 00:03:20,400 --> 00:03:24,959 Speaker 1: two balls, and they connected to an oscillating power source, 55 00:03:25,000 --> 00:03:27,840 Speaker 1: so alternating current. In other words, the current would go 56 00:03:28,080 --> 00:03:31,240 Speaker 1: in one direction, then reverse and go the other direction, 57 00:03:31,480 --> 00:03:34,360 Speaker 1: and would do this many times per second. So the 58 00:03:34,400 --> 00:03:37,720 Speaker 1: power source meant since it was alternating, it meant that 59 00:03:37,760 --> 00:03:41,560 Speaker 1: the polarity of the two balls was alternating too, and 60 00:03:41,960 --> 00:03:44,520 Speaker 1: if you had a great enough difference in voltage between 61 00:03:44,560 --> 00:03:47,160 Speaker 1: these two balls, it would induce a spark to jump 62 00:03:47,200 --> 00:03:49,160 Speaker 1: from one ball to the other. It had to be 63 00:03:49,240 --> 00:03:52,119 Speaker 1: a great voltage to do that. If it's too low voltage, 64 00:03:52,280 --> 00:03:54,840 Speaker 1: then you get a charge build up, but it's not 65 00:03:55,040 --> 00:03:58,360 Speaker 1: enough for the charge to discharge. Right now, the fact 66 00:03:58,360 --> 00:04:01,040 Speaker 1: that it was an oscillating current that was going back 67 00:04:01,040 --> 00:04:04,520 Speaker 1: and forth and reversing this polarity, in the words of 68 00:04:04,520 --> 00:04:07,680 Speaker 1: star Trek, meant that the spark would actually oscillate too. 69 00:04:07,960 --> 00:04:09,960 Speaker 1: They would go like from left to right and then 70 00:04:10,040 --> 00:04:11,960 Speaker 1: right to left, and left right and right to left, 71 00:04:12,160 --> 00:04:15,640 Speaker 1: so it was zapping back and forth. Next, Hertz set 72 00:04:15,720 --> 00:04:19,080 Speaker 1: up a length of wire and at the end of 73 00:04:19,760 --> 00:04:22,040 Speaker 1: each end of this length of wire he put another 74 00:04:22,320 --> 00:04:25,480 Speaker 1: metal ball, and he bent the wire into a loop. 75 00:04:25,720 --> 00:04:28,240 Speaker 1: And the two metal balls were close to each other, 76 00:04:28,279 --> 00:04:30,599 Speaker 1: but still having a gap between them, but you know, 77 00:04:30,640 --> 00:04:33,040 Speaker 1: they were on either end of this loop. He put 78 00:04:33,040 --> 00:04:37,440 Speaker 1: this loop close to the oscillating power source where the 79 00:04:37,800 --> 00:04:41,520 Speaker 1: balls were sparking, so again not in contact, but close 80 00:04:41,560 --> 00:04:45,240 Speaker 1: to those first pair of balls, and this loop with 81 00:04:45,360 --> 00:04:47,520 Speaker 1: the second pair of balls Once it got close enough, 82 00:04:47,839 --> 00:04:51,760 Speaker 1: sparks started to go between those two balls too, so 83 00:04:52,320 --> 00:04:54,400 Speaker 1: the balls which were not in contact with the power 84 00:04:54,440 --> 00:04:59,080 Speaker 1: source were also sparking, and what Hurts had created was 85 00:04:59,200 --> 00:05:04,320 Speaker 1: a simple spark gap transmitter. Hertz's experiment was the first 86 00:05:04,440 --> 00:05:08,159 Speaker 1: radio transmission in history. Now, this kind of radio transmission 87 00:05:08,480 --> 00:05:12,520 Speaker 1: covers a broad span of radio frequencies, right, This isn't 88 00:05:12,520 --> 00:05:16,000 Speaker 1: something that was tuned to a particular band. It was 89 00:05:16,040 --> 00:05:19,600 Speaker 1: just kind of blasting out a raw signal of noise 90 00:05:19,720 --> 00:05:24,839 Speaker 1: across effectively the entire radio spectrum. Other folks like Marconi 91 00:05:25,080 --> 00:05:28,680 Speaker 1: and Tesla would make improvements in Hurtz's basic design and 92 00:05:28,720 --> 00:05:32,279 Speaker 1: allow for wireless signaling. But the early days of wireless 93 00:05:32,279 --> 00:05:36,640 Speaker 1: communications were really primitive. You were broadcasting a very simple 94 00:05:36,760 --> 00:05:39,760 Speaker 1: series of signals. Essentially, you were either blasting out noise 95 00:05:40,240 --> 00:05:43,120 Speaker 1: or you weren't blasting out noise. So you can blast 96 00:05:43,120 --> 00:05:46,280 Speaker 1: out noise in tight patterns, such as in Morse code, 97 00:05:46,520 --> 00:05:49,800 Speaker 1: and then you could send meaningful communications. But that was 98 00:05:49,839 --> 00:05:53,320 Speaker 1: about it. These broadcasts were also public, right, anyone who 99 00:05:53,400 --> 00:05:55,360 Speaker 1: had a radio receiver would be able to pick up 100 00:05:55,400 --> 00:05:58,800 Speaker 1: those transmissions. So wireless in the early days was not 101 00:05:58,880 --> 00:06:02,000 Speaker 1: suitable for any sort of communication of a sensitive nature, 102 00:06:02,120 --> 00:06:06,479 Speaker 1: because anyone with a radio receiver who was within transmission 103 00:06:06,600 --> 00:06:09,240 Speaker 1: range would be able to hear the message. One smarty 104 00:06:09,320 --> 00:06:12,720 Speaker 1: pants who worked on this problem was Sir Oliver Lodge. 105 00:06:12,800 --> 00:06:15,400 Speaker 1: Now I should probably do a full episode about him 106 00:06:15,400 --> 00:06:18,440 Speaker 1: at some point because he was a really quirky dude. 107 00:06:18,800 --> 00:06:21,240 Speaker 1: So on the one hand, he was pushing back the 108 00:06:21,240 --> 00:06:25,840 Speaker 1: boundaries of ignorance, right he was exploring radio and a 109 00:06:25,920 --> 00:06:28,880 Speaker 1: time when we were just starting to get a handle 110 00:06:28,920 --> 00:06:31,200 Speaker 1: on it. But on the other hand, he was also 111 00:06:31,279 --> 00:06:34,400 Speaker 1: a believer in the paranormal. He was a spiritualist. So 112 00:06:34,680 --> 00:06:38,159 Speaker 1: I think it's an interesting dichotomy there, right, Like you've 113 00:06:38,160 --> 00:06:42,839 Speaker 1: got a person who is fundamentally adding to our scientific 114 00:06:43,080 --> 00:06:47,440 Speaker 1: understanding of a new technology, and on the other hand 115 00:06:47,640 --> 00:06:51,080 Speaker 1: he believes in ghosts. Anyway, in the late eighteen hundreds, 116 00:06:51,200 --> 00:06:55,520 Speaker 1: Sir Oliver presented a paper on using special radio transmitters 117 00:06:55,520 --> 00:06:59,200 Speaker 1: and receivers that would be tuned to work in specific 118 00:06:59,279 --> 00:07:02,440 Speaker 1: bands of radio frequencies, so instead of blasting out a 119 00:07:02,480 --> 00:07:07,440 Speaker 1: signal across essentially all radio frequencies, these devices would only 120 00:07:07,480 --> 00:07:11,440 Speaker 1: work within this relatively narrow band. Now, Marconi had developed 121 00:07:11,480 --> 00:07:14,080 Speaker 1: a similar technology and the two of them got into 122 00:07:14,160 --> 00:07:17,240 Speaker 1: kind of a patent dispute over the matter, with Marconi 123 00:07:17,360 --> 00:07:21,680 Speaker 1: wanting to put his tuning technology to use, but it 124 00:07:21,800 --> 00:07:27,200 Speaker 1: was infringing essentially on Sir Oliver's patent. So ultimately they 125 00:07:27,200 --> 00:07:31,040 Speaker 1: were able to settle their dispute, and Marconi bought Sir 126 00:07:31,080 --> 00:07:34,480 Speaker 1: Oliver's patent and gave a good old alie and honorary 127 00:07:34,560 --> 00:07:36,800 Speaker 1: title with the Marconi Company, though as far as I know, 128 00:07:37,080 --> 00:07:40,440 Speaker 1: Oliver never actually did a day's work over at Marconi. 129 00:07:40,800 --> 00:07:43,920 Speaker 1: Tuning would mean you could send a radio signal across 130 00:07:43,960 --> 00:07:47,840 Speaker 1: a specific frequency, and radios tuned just to that frequency 131 00:07:47,840 --> 00:07:50,040 Speaker 1: would be able to pick it up. But this also 132 00:07:50,080 --> 00:07:53,960 Speaker 1: meant you could send signals across lots of different frequencies simultaneously, 133 00:07:54,080 --> 00:07:57,520 Speaker 1: and those transmissions wouldn't interfere with one another, because if 134 00:07:57,520 --> 00:08:00,160 Speaker 1: you had a radio that you could similarly tune, it 135 00:08:00,200 --> 00:08:03,200 Speaker 1: would pay attention to a specific set of frequencies and 136 00:08:03,280 --> 00:08:06,480 Speaker 1: ignore everything else. Right, So if I needed to receive 137 00:08:06,520 --> 00:08:09,800 Speaker 1: a message on one frequency band and you needed to 138 00:08:09,920 --> 00:08:12,480 Speaker 1: receive one in another frequency band, and we happen to 139 00:08:12,520 --> 00:08:14,679 Speaker 1: like live next to each other, we could each tune 140 00:08:14,680 --> 00:08:18,800 Speaker 1: our respective radios into our respective radio frequencies and receive 141 00:08:18,840 --> 00:08:22,480 Speaker 1: those messages without worrying about them getting mixed up. Now, 142 00:08:22,800 --> 00:08:26,720 Speaker 1: I'm going to skip over eight ton of radio history 143 00:08:26,720 --> 00:08:29,040 Speaker 1: at this point because we don't really need to have 144 00:08:29,080 --> 00:08:31,640 Speaker 1: a deep understanding of how radio signals work to get 145 00:08:31,720 --> 00:08:34,120 Speaker 1: to the jammy bits. And besides, like I said, I've 146 00:08:34,160 --> 00:08:36,800 Speaker 1: done several episodes about the history and evolution of radio 147 00:08:36,880 --> 00:08:39,880 Speaker 1: in the past, so no need to go over all 148 00:08:39,920 --> 00:08:44,800 Speaker 1: of that material. It's the same like people have traveled 149 00:08:44,840 --> 00:08:47,240 Speaker 1: back into the past and changed the history of radio, 150 00:08:47,360 --> 00:08:49,959 Speaker 1: so no need to go through it. If they did, 151 00:08:49,960 --> 00:08:52,520 Speaker 1: I'm sure that the Tesla fans would have made sure 152 00:08:52,600 --> 00:08:56,440 Speaker 1: Tesla got his due. Anyway. The radio tuning thing, along 153 00:08:56,520 --> 00:09:01,360 Speaker 1: with signal modulation like amplitude modulation and then frequency modulation, 154 00:09:01,640 --> 00:09:05,520 Speaker 1: these would become important components for transmitting broadcasts with sound, 155 00:09:05,679 --> 00:09:10,240 Speaker 1: as would be manipulating an oscillating signal. Right, a standard 156 00:09:10,280 --> 00:09:15,880 Speaker 1: consistent oscillating signal. Amplitude modulation you you, obviously you manipulate 157 00:09:15,920 --> 00:09:20,040 Speaker 1: the amplitude of that wave frequency. You modify the frequency 158 00:09:20,080 --> 00:09:23,200 Speaker 1: within certain parameters. You can't modify the frequency, you know, 159 00:09:24,000 --> 00:09:27,360 Speaker 1: all higlidy piglidy. You have to do it within the 160 00:09:27,400 --> 00:09:30,600 Speaker 1: bandwidth of that frequency band. But this meant you didn't 161 00:09:30,720 --> 00:09:33,280 Speaker 1: have to blast out as signal and just use Morse 162 00:09:33,360 --> 00:09:36,320 Speaker 1: code or something similar to get your point across. You 163 00:09:36,320 --> 00:09:38,800 Speaker 1: could actually speak or I don't know, you could. You 164 00:09:38,800 --> 00:09:42,440 Speaker 1: can blast out Abbas' greatest hits if you wanted to. Okay, 165 00:09:42,880 --> 00:09:45,520 Speaker 1: we're gonna come back in just a minute to talk 166 00:09:45,559 --> 00:09:48,880 Speaker 1: about jamming, but first let's jam out to these messages 167 00:09:49,080 --> 00:10:01,680 Speaker 1: from our sponsors. Okay, we a quick down and dirty 168 00:10:01,720 --> 00:10:04,280 Speaker 1: overview of how radio works. But what if someone else 169 00:10:04,360 --> 00:10:06,960 Speaker 1: wanted to send a signal on the same frequency that 170 00:10:07,080 --> 00:10:09,680 Speaker 1: you were already using. And maybe you're using it to 171 00:10:09,800 --> 00:10:12,560 Speaker 1: just listen to music, maybe you're using it to communicate, 172 00:10:12,640 --> 00:10:17,040 Speaker 1: maybe you're using it as an infrastructure for wireless communication 173 00:10:17,120 --> 00:10:20,360 Speaker 1: between lots of different devices in your home. Well, if 174 00:10:20,360 --> 00:10:24,320 Speaker 1: someone wanted to use that same frequency band, that same channel, 175 00:10:24,360 --> 00:10:26,839 Speaker 1: if you will, and they happen to be really close 176 00:10:26,880 --> 00:10:29,200 Speaker 1: to you, that could be a problem. It'd kind of 177 00:10:29,240 --> 00:10:31,720 Speaker 1: be like putting a bunch of people who are all 178 00:10:32,080 --> 00:10:35,320 Speaker 1: picking up telephones on old landline systems and talking. Or 179 00:10:35,360 --> 00:10:37,160 Speaker 1: we go back to an analogy where you're trying to 180 00:10:37,160 --> 00:10:39,959 Speaker 1: hold a one on one conversation with somebody, but you 181 00:10:40,320 --> 00:10:42,280 Speaker 1: happen to be sitting at a table with six other 182 00:10:42,320 --> 00:10:45,000 Speaker 1: people and there's lots of cross talk going on. It 183 00:10:45,000 --> 00:10:49,000 Speaker 1: gets confusing. With radio. It could mean that whatever signal 184 00:10:49,160 --> 00:10:52,640 Speaker 1: is strongest wins. You might have been in this experience 185 00:10:52,679 --> 00:10:55,360 Speaker 1: where let's say you're on a road trip and you've 186 00:10:55,400 --> 00:10:58,320 Speaker 1: tuned to a radio station and you're starting to get 187 00:10:58,360 --> 00:11:02,719 Speaker 1: to that point where the radio station signal is weakening 188 00:11:02,840 --> 00:11:05,920 Speaker 1: and it's not as consistent or strong as it has 189 00:11:06,040 --> 00:11:08,880 Speaker 1: been and you're starting to lose it. Meanwhile, you might 190 00:11:08,880 --> 00:11:12,840 Speaker 1: be coming into the range of a competing radio signal, 191 00:11:13,240 --> 00:11:17,439 Speaker 1: and so for a while, your car radio sounds like 192 00:11:17,480 --> 00:11:20,079 Speaker 1: it's tuning to two different stations at the same time. Right, 193 00:11:20,120 --> 00:11:22,880 Speaker 1: you might hear little bits of one song versus chatter 194 00:11:22,960 --> 00:11:25,880 Speaker 1: on another station or whatever it may be, until eventually 195 00:11:26,280 --> 00:11:29,559 Speaker 1: it turns over to the other, the secondary radio station, 196 00:11:29,880 --> 00:11:33,440 Speaker 1: because that's the signal that is strongest and is speeding 197 00:11:33,480 --> 00:11:37,640 Speaker 1: through to your entertainment system. Well, if you're you know 198 00:11:37,720 --> 00:11:40,640 Speaker 1: that's unintentional. That's just two different radio stations that are 199 00:11:40,679 --> 00:11:44,119 Speaker 1: in the same broadcast range, that are on the same frequency. 200 00:11:44,480 --> 00:11:46,560 Speaker 1: But you could also do this on purpose, right, You 201 00:11:46,559 --> 00:11:50,600 Speaker 1: could blast out a radio signal, and you can use 202 00:11:50,640 --> 00:11:53,320 Speaker 1: one that is already in use for something else and 203 00:11:53,360 --> 00:11:56,640 Speaker 1: try to overwhelm it, and the devices in that area 204 00:11:56,679 --> 00:11:58,560 Speaker 1: that pick up radio are going to listen to whichever 205 00:11:58,600 --> 00:12:02,240 Speaker 1: signal is strongest. Countries around the world have over time 206 00:12:02,360 --> 00:12:05,800 Speaker 1: designated bands of frequencies in the radio spectrum for very 207 00:12:05,800 --> 00:12:08,840 Speaker 1: specific purposes, and you're not supposed to use them for 208 00:12:09,000 --> 00:12:13,160 Speaker 1: anything else. So this is intended to avoid interference as 209 00:12:13,200 --> 00:12:16,160 Speaker 1: well as clogging up the airwaves with competing signals. So, 210 00:12:16,360 --> 00:12:20,040 Speaker 1: for example, here in the United States, AM radio frequencies 211 00:12:20,080 --> 00:12:23,960 Speaker 1: amplitude modulated radio frequencies. They range from five hundred thirty 212 00:12:24,040 --> 00:12:27,480 Speaker 1: killer hurts, which is actually reserved for travelers information stations. 213 00:12:27,520 --> 00:12:30,199 Speaker 1: I don't think any AM radio stations are allowed to 214 00:12:30,720 --> 00:12:34,120 Speaker 1: broadcast at five thirty, but it goes up to seventeen 215 00:12:34,320 --> 00:12:37,640 Speaker 1: hundred killer hurts. So five thirty to seventeen hundred that's 216 00:12:37,679 --> 00:12:42,320 Speaker 1: the AM broadcast range. Each station has a bandwidth of 217 00:12:42,480 --> 00:12:45,480 Speaker 1: ten killer herts, so it's ten killer hurts wide, and 218 00:12:45,520 --> 00:12:48,839 Speaker 1: that goes five killer hurts above the signal and five 219 00:12:48,920 --> 00:12:51,520 Speaker 1: killer hurts below the signal. So technically you could say 220 00:12:51,559 --> 00:12:54,400 Speaker 1: five hundred and thirty that's really around five twenty five 221 00:12:54,480 --> 00:12:56,959 Speaker 1: killer hurts up to five thirty five killer hurts if 222 00:12:56,960 --> 00:13:00,000 Speaker 1: you were talking about you know the basic rules here. Meanwhile, 223 00:13:00,240 --> 00:13:03,040 Speaker 1: FM stations here in the United States range from eighty 224 00:13:03,040 --> 00:13:06,920 Speaker 1: eight point zero megahertz to one hundred and eight megahertz. 225 00:13:07,040 --> 00:13:10,760 Speaker 1: These channels have two hundred killohertz of bandwidth. Other nations 226 00:13:10,760 --> 00:13:13,960 Speaker 1: have slightly different parameters. You know, it's not universal. And 227 00:13:14,480 --> 00:13:17,560 Speaker 1: these radio signals are used for all sorts of things 228 00:13:17,600 --> 00:13:21,960 Speaker 1: besides just radio broadcasts. Right. Some are used for navigational purposes, 229 00:13:22,120 --> 00:13:26,520 Speaker 1: some are for mobile communications, some are for fixed communications, 230 00:13:26,559 --> 00:13:30,240 Speaker 1: some are for television broadcasts, some are for amateur radio, 231 00:13:30,480 --> 00:13:33,040 Speaker 1: et cetera. And it took a lot of time to 232 00:13:33,080 --> 00:13:36,520 Speaker 1: sort out which frequencies would be used for specific types 233 00:13:36,559 --> 00:13:40,240 Speaker 1: of communications and thus would be off limits to anything else. 234 00:13:40,520 --> 00:13:43,920 Speaker 1: And as I said, different countries have slightly different standards 235 00:13:43,920 --> 00:13:46,440 Speaker 1: for the sort of thing. But back to jamming. So, 236 00:13:46,640 --> 00:13:49,959 Speaker 1: during World War One, radio was still a very young 237 00:13:50,080 --> 00:13:53,439 Speaker 1: science and as such, while it served a purpose during 238 00:13:53,480 --> 00:13:57,160 Speaker 1: the war, it was limited as far as its utility 239 00:13:57,280 --> 00:14:01,080 Speaker 1: was concerned. Transmissions were typically very short range and nature, 240 00:14:01,160 --> 00:14:04,000 Speaker 1: and they could be affected by atmospheric conditions, like if 241 00:14:04,000 --> 00:14:06,480 Speaker 1: you had a storm or something that could really affect 242 00:14:06,720 --> 00:14:09,200 Speaker 1: whether or not you could pick anything up, Like just 243 00:14:09,240 --> 00:14:13,559 Speaker 1: the things like lightning would really mess up your radio communications. 244 00:14:13,760 --> 00:14:17,439 Speaker 1: According to the Digital Public Library of America, and aircraft 245 00:14:17,559 --> 00:14:21,000 Speaker 1: outfitted with a radio during World War One typically had 246 00:14:21,000 --> 00:14:25,320 Speaker 1: a maximum transmission range of two thousand yards, so that's 247 00:14:25,840 --> 00:14:29,600 Speaker 1: not much further than a single mile, and you can 248 00:14:29,680 --> 00:14:33,320 Speaker 1: imagine that in most wartime situations the radio would not 249 00:14:33,400 --> 00:14:36,280 Speaker 1: be instrumental to the success or failure of emission just 250 00:14:36,280 --> 00:14:40,120 Speaker 1: because of that limited transmission distance. Right, you wouldn't be 251 00:14:40,360 --> 00:14:44,480 Speaker 1: in contact with anyone for very long unless you were 252 00:14:44,520 --> 00:14:48,280 Speaker 1: just flying very tight circles in a very small region. 253 00:14:48,720 --> 00:14:52,520 Speaker 1: But by World War Two things had evolved considerably. Radio 254 00:14:52,640 --> 00:14:57,520 Speaker 1: technology was much more sophisticated than capable, and radio transmissions 255 00:14:57,520 --> 00:15:01,080 Speaker 1: would become integral to the war effort on both sides 256 00:15:01,120 --> 00:15:05,520 Speaker 1: of the conflict, and as such, interfering with radio transmissions 257 00:15:05,680 --> 00:15:10,960 Speaker 1: would become part of warfare. Interrupting enemy communication channels obviously 258 00:15:11,200 --> 00:15:16,120 Speaker 1: a high priority whenever you're talking about wartime conflicts. On 259 00:15:16,200 --> 00:15:19,080 Speaker 1: the ally side, there were outfits like the thirty sixth 260 00:15:19,200 --> 00:15:22,520 Speaker 1: Bombardment Squadron the thirty six BS. It was part of 261 00:15:22,520 --> 00:15:26,400 Speaker 1: the Mighty eighth Air Force, and the thirty six BS 262 00:15:26,440 --> 00:15:29,800 Speaker 1: would fly missions over enemy territory and attempt to jam 263 00:15:30,120 --> 00:15:35,280 Speaker 1: or spoof radio axis communications, and sometimes that also meant 264 00:15:35,360 --> 00:15:39,600 Speaker 1: jamming radar stations, just as our little silly example at 265 00:15:39,640 --> 00:15:42,200 Speaker 1: the top of this episode was. Now in this case 266 00:15:42,240 --> 00:15:46,600 Speaker 1: it didn't involve dropping raspberry jam on anybody. They would 267 00:15:46,640 --> 00:15:49,240 Speaker 1: release what was called well, they were called windows, but 268 00:15:49,440 --> 00:15:52,480 Speaker 1: you might know it better as chaff. These are thin 269 00:15:52,520 --> 00:15:55,560 Speaker 1: strips of metal, and it's a way to fool radar 270 00:15:55,600 --> 00:15:59,080 Speaker 1: stations that are on the ground that there are enemy 271 00:15:59,120 --> 00:16:02,280 Speaker 1: fighters overhead, right, because the strips of metal will actually 272 00:16:02,320 --> 00:16:05,560 Speaker 1: interact with the radio waves the radar is sending out, 273 00:16:05,800 --> 00:16:09,280 Speaker 1: and the radar will mistakenly believe that there are enemy 274 00:16:09,320 --> 00:16:13,480 Speaker 1: fighters overhead, when in fact it's just this chaff that's 275 00:16:13,560 --> 00:16:17,560 Speaker 1: falling from bombers that are dropping it. And this becomes 276 00:16:17,560 --> 00:16:21,400 Speaker 1: a distraction for radar stations. And if you're doing this 277 00:16:21,520 --> 00:16:24,480 Speaker 1: as part of an effort of an actual attack, it 278 00:16:24,520 --> 00:16:26,560 Speaker 1: can mean that eyes are on the wrong part of 279 00:16:26,600 --> 00:16:29,640 Speaker 1: the sky, or that anti aircraft weaponry are trained on 280 00:16:29,680 --> 00:16:31,240 Speaker 1: the wrong part of the sky, which is the most 281 00:16:31,240 --> 00:16:33,760 Speaker 1: important bit right, and then you can carry out your 282 00:16:33,800 --> 00:16:38,360 Speaker 1: attack with less resistance from the enemy. But with radio 283 00:16:38,480 --> 00:16:42,240 Speaker 1: often the strategy was to use powerful transmitters to commandeer 284 00:16:42,360 --> 00:16:47,880 Speaker 1: enemy communications and send incorrect information. So this was a 285 00:16:48,000 --> 00:16:52,120 Speaker 1: spoofing attack. You may be familiar with that term spoofing. 286 00:16:52,240 --> 00:16:55,760 Speaker 1: It means that the attacker is pretending to be someone 287 00:16:55,880 --> 00:17:00,360 Speaker 1: or something else and is trying to trick you into 288 00:17:00,400 --> 00:17:04,879 Speaker 1: thinking that a communication is from this particular source, but 289 00:17:04,960 --> 00:17:08,679 Speaker 1: in fact it's a hacker or attacker posing as that source. 290 00:17:08,800 --> 00:17:12,800 Speaker 1: So in this case, the attackers would pose as the 291 00:17:12,960 --> 00:17:18,040 Speaker 1: enemy and would give bad intel or false orders in 292 00:17:18,080 --> 00:17:21,200 Speaker 1: an effort to gain an advantage. So the Royal Air 293 00:17:21,240 --> 00:17:24,480 Speaker 1: Force of the UK had a project called Operation Corona 294 00:17:24,760 --> 00:17:28,359 Speaker 1: that was dedicated to this effort. The RAF found native 295 00:17:28,400 --> 00:17:33,760 Speaker 1: German speakers to pose as flight controllers to confound German pilots. Eventually, 296 00:17:34,080 --> 00:17:38,239 Speaker 1: the German Luftwaffe caught onto this and their response was 297 00:17:38,440 --> 00:17:42,320 Speaker 1: to replace all their flight controllers with women, so that 298 00:17:42,680 --> 00:17:46,399 Speaker 1: if a pilot heard a male voice speaking in German 299 00:17:46,520 --> 00:17:50,560 Speaker 1: giving them new orders, they would know, oh, that's one 300 00:17:50,600 --> 00:17:55,240 Speaker 1: of the allies posing as a flight controller. Disregard those orders. 301 00:17:55,520 --> 00:17:59,320 Speaker 1: Of course, the UK they figured this out too, and 302 00:17:59,359 --> 00:18:03,879 Speaker 1: they began to employ women to serve as these spoofed 303 00:18:04,080 --> 00:18:07,080 Speaker 1: German flight controllers. So it went back and forth in 304 00:18:07,160 --> 00:18:11,240 Speaker 1: an old seesaw. Now, obviously, signal jamming in warfare has 305 00:18:11,320 --> 00:18:15,359 Speaker 1: continued since World War Two. Russia has been doing it 306 00:18:15,440 --> 00:18:20,159 Speaker 1: like crazy to Ukraine, for example. Some methods allow the 307 00:18:20,920 --> 00:18:25,960 Speaker 1: one attacker to suppress radio communications by effectively broadcasting silence. 308 00:18:26,400 --> 00:18:28,520 Speaker 1: You know, in the old days, it was that you 309 00:18:28,560 --> 00:18:31,600 Speaker 1: were using it to intrude upon their signal and send 310 00:18:31,680 --> 00:18:37,560 Speaker 1: something else. Now you can actually just suppress the communications entirely, 311 00:18:37,680 --> 00:18:40,800 Speaker 1: not just you know, intruding on the signal. If your 312 00:18:41,280 --> 00:18:44,320 Speaker 1: targets are unaware that they're being jammed, they might not 313 00:18:44,400 --> 00:18:47,560 Speaker 1: even realize for a bit that no communications are going 314 00:18:47,600 --> 00:18:50,320 Speaker 1: through like other people might be desperately trying to get 315 00:18:50,359 --> 00:18:52,800 Speaker 1: in touch with them, but none of the signals reached 316 00:18:52,880 --> 00:18:56,359 Speaker 1: their destination. And that could be really handy if you 317 00:18:56,400 --> 00:18:59,640 Speaker 1: know you are an enemy of this target and your 318 00:18:59,680 --> 00:19:03,320 Speaker 1: plan an assault of some sort. But outside of warfare, 319 00:19:03,640 --> 00:19:07,280 Speaker 1: there are other uses for signal jamming and signal intrusion, 320 00:19:07,800 --> 00:19:11,679 Speaker 1: though we are largely talking about the murky world of 321 00:19:11,880 --> 00:19:16,720 Speaker 1: illegal activity. In most cases. Keep in mind, the use 322 00:19:16,760 --> 00:19:21,359 Speaker 1: of specific frequencies is a highly regulated affair in most countries, 323 00:19:21,600 --> 00:19:26,200 Speaker 1: and folks founded to have intruded upon those uses typically 324 00:19:26,240 --> 00:19:30,680 Speaker 1: face some stiff penalties when they're caught. We'll talk more 325 00:19:30,880 --> 00:19:35,359 Speaker 1: about these nefarious uses of signal jamming and some famous 326 00:19:35,440 --> 00:19:39,639 Speaker 1: examples after we take this quick break to thank our sponsors. 327 00:19:48,960 --> 00:19:53,280 Speaker 1: We're back, all right. Let's say that you are an 328 00:19:53,440 --> 00:19:58,199 Speaker 1: enterprising young person, maybe Christian Slater, and you want to 329 00:19:58,200 --> 00:20:01,720 Speaker 1: build your own pirate race station so that you can 330 00:20:01,840 --> 00:20:06,760 Speaker 1: broadcast without first securing a broadcast license. So you could 331 00:20:06,800 --> 00:20:09,400 Speaker 1: get in real hot water because you don't actually have 332 00:20:09,600 --> 00:20:13,080 Speaker 1: permission to use the radio frequencies, even if the frequency 333 00:20:13,119 --> 00:20:17,439 Speaker 1: is unused in your area, right like, no one is 334 00:20:17,520 --> 00:20:20,760 Speaker 1: broadcasting on this particular frequency. If you don't have a 335 00:20:20,800 --> 00:20:24,480 Speaker 1: license to broadcast in that range, assuming you're not like 336 00:20:24,560 --> 00:20:28,440 Speaker 1: just broadcasting across amateur radio, well you're going to get 337 00:20:28,600 --> 00:20:31,240 Speaker 1: some trouble. Although a lot of people have gone ahead 338 00:20:31,240 --> 00:20:33,960 Speaker 1: and done it anyway, because I mean tracking down who's 339 00:20:34,000 --> 00:20:36,280 Speaker 1: doing it, that's a different matter. It actually is pretty 340 00:20:36,320 --> 00:20:40,399 Speaker 1: tricky to zone in on the specific location of where 341 00:20:40,440 --> 00:20:43,280 Speaker 1: someone is doing this. If you're transmitting over a really 342 00:20:43,400 --> 00:20:46,240 Speaker 1: large area, it narrows things down because you do have 343 00:20:46,280 --> 00:20:50,359 Speaker 1: to have an antenna to push a transmission out. So 344 00:20:50,640 --> 00:20:54,159 Speaker 1: if you're doing so with a high power transmitter, chances 345 00:20:54,200 --> 00:20:56,880 Speaker 1: are people by'd say, oh, maybe it's the house that 346 00:20:56,920 --> 00:21:00,639 Speaker 1: has the fifty foot broadcast tower behind it. But assuming 347 00:21:00,680 --> 00:21:04,680 Speaker 1: you're not doing a massive area, it could be a 348 00:21:04,760 --> 00:21:08,399 Speaker 1: lot trickier to track the location down. Now a lot 349 00:21:08,480 --> 00:21:11,320 Speaker 1: of this ends up being kind of moot anyway, because 350 00:21:11,359 --> 00:21:14,960 Speaker 1: the Internet and streaming platforms have really made pirate radio 351 00:21:15,160 --> 00:21:20,160 Speaker 1: kind of a quaint and arguably obsolete form of punkish disobedience. 352 00:21:20,440 --> 00:21:23,200 Speaker 1: You still might have to deal with consequences if you're 353 00:21:23,280 --> 00:21:27,080 Speaker 1: choosing to stream and you're including a lot of licensed 354 00:21:27,119 --> 00:21:31,760 Speaker 1: material that you don't you know, actually license, But that's different, right, 355 00:21:31,960 --> 00:21:35,280 Speaker 1: you might get banned from the streaming platform because you 356 00:21:35,880 --> 00:21:41,680 Speaker 1: know you're violating policies by playing ip covered music without 357 00:21:41,720 --> 00:21:43,800 Speaker 1: actually having the license to do so. So I guess 358 00:21:43,840 --> 00:21:46,320 Speaker 1: I'll have to wait on launching my internet radio station 359 00:21:46,440 --> 00:21:49,280 Speaker 1: dedicated to glam punk and new wave hits. But you 360 00:21:49,359 --> 00:21:52,720 Speaker 1: know my time will come now. Some folks have used 361 00:21:52,720 --> 00:21:57,879 Speaker 1: transmitters to overwhelm the airwaves and transmit absolute nonsense and mischief. 362 00:21:58,119 --> 00:22:01,200 Speaker 1: Sometimes they actually do so in an effort to push 363 00:22:01,200 --> 00:22:05,480 Speaker 1: out a public message that in itself isn't necessarily nonsense, 364 00:22:05,840 --> 00:22:08,879 Speaker 1: but the framing of it tends to be a little weird. So, 365 00:22:08,960 --> 00:22:13,240 Speaker 1: for example, in nineteen fifty nine, on April first, one 366 00:22:13,480 --> 00:22:19,320 Speaker 1: or more jokesters used broadcast intrusion. They overpowered the audio 367 00:22:19,480 --> 00:22:22,199 Speaker 1: part of a television signal that was coming from the 368 00:22:22,240 --> 00:22:27,439 Speaker 1: TV station KATV in Arkansas, and if you were tuned 369 00:22:27,480 --> 00:22:31,840 Speaker 1: in to watch the news on KATV on this day, 370 00:22:31,880 --> 00:22:35,359 Speaker 1: April first, nineteen fifty nine, audio would suddenly drop out 371 00:22:35,560 --> 00:22:37,919 Speaker 1: and then you would hear a voice claiming to belong 372 00:22:38,000 --> 00:22:41,240 Speaker 1: to Powell Clayton. Powell Clayton was a general for the 373 00:22:41,359 --> 00:22:43,880 Speaker 1: Union during the US Civil War. He was very much 374 00:22:44,000 --> 00:22:46,919 Speaker 1: dead by nineteen fifty nine. He had also served as 375 00:22:46,960 --> 00:22:49,680 Speaker 1: the governor of Arkansas at one point, and this voice 376 00:22:49,760 --> 00:22:54,439 Speaker 1: was telling KATV viewers that they needed to quote share 377 00:22:54,640 --> 00:22:58,400 Speaker 1: in the Great Awakening end quote. So by that, presumably 378 00:22:58,520 --> 00:23:02,120 Speaker 1: the late general meant that Arkansas citizens were to embrace 379 00:23:02,320 --> 00:23:05,679 Speaker 1: racial integration in the state, which is a serious and 380 00:23:05,840 --> 00:23:11,240 Speaker 1: applaudable message, right integration, Great, that's a great message. It is. However, 381 00:23:11,280 --> 00:23:15,680 Speaker 1: a questionable means of delivering that message. So an investigation followed. 382 00:23:15,880 --> 00:23:18,520 Speaker 1: But while the assumption was whomever pulled off the stunt 383 00:23:18,560 --> 00:23:21,840 Speaker 1: had a good working knowledge of radio, no one was 384 00:23:21,880 --> 00:23:25,480 Speaker 1: actually identified like it was assumed, Okay, this person knows 385 00:23:25,520 --> 00:23:28,760 Speaker 1: their way around radio transmissions or else they wouldn't have 386 00:23:28,800 --> 00:23:32,760 Speaker 1: been able to pull this off. So that eliminates a 387 00:23:32,880 --> 00:23:36,160 Speaker 1: huge number of the folks in the region, right, it's 388 00:23:36,200 --> 00:23:39,480 Speaker 1: just the people who know radio. But it's entirely possible 389 00:23:39,520 --> 00:23:41,600 Speaker 1: it was like a college student who maybe had some 390 00:23:41,720 --> 00:23:44,760 Speaker 1: experience working at the college radio station. There were plenty 391 00:23:44,880 --> 00:23:47,840 Speaker 1: of those in Arkansas in nineteen fifty nine. So while 392 00:23:47,880 --> 00:23:50,640 Speaker 1: it narrowed it down, it didn't eliminate like nearly all 393 00:23:50,640 --> 00:23:53,280 Speaker 1: the suspects. There's still plenty of people it could have been. 394 00:23:53,640 --> 00:23:55,480 Speaker 1: And maybe it wasn't a college student at all, or 395 00:23:55,480 --> 00:23:58,760 Speaker 1: maybe it was someone who had learned in college but 396 00:23:58,920 --> 00:24:02,679 Speaker 1: had long since grad We'll likely never know. But that 397 00:24:02,720 --> 00:24:06,800 Speaker 1: didn't stop some people from proposing outlandish theories about who 398 00:24:06,880 --> 00:24:09,840 Speaker 1: was behind this, and they ranged from everything from a 399 00:24:09,960 --> 00:24:13,200 Speaker 1: communist takeover, because keep in mind, nineteen fifty nine, that's 400 00:24:13,280 --> 00:24:17,240 Speaker 1: like height of the Cold War. To quote an inevitable 401 00:24:17,480 --> 00:24:21,840 Speaker 1: Yankee reinvasion of America. End quote. Now this was a 402 00:24:21,920 --> 00:24:25,399 Speaker 1: quote from a member of the Sons of Confederate Veterans, 403 00:24:25,840 --> 00:24:28,760 Speaker 1: so you can imagine this person had a particular point 404 00:24:28,760 --> 00:24:32,119 Speaker 1: of view. But I'm not sure if anyone ever told 405 00:24:32,160 --> 00:24:36,479 Speaker 1: this person that the Union won the Civil War, so 406 00:24:37,080 --> 00:24:41,600 Speaker 1: there was no need for Yankees to reinvade anything, because 407 00:24:41,960 --> 00:24:45,320 Speaker 1: it's not an invasion. The Arkansas was part of the 408 00:24:45,480 --> 00:24:49,119 Speaker 1: Union and remained part of the Union. So yeah, it 409 00:24:49,160 --> 00:24:53,199 Speaker 1: was a pretty ludicrous act to send a message in 410 00:24:53,240 --> 00:24:56,240 Speaker 1: this way, but it really just revealed more lunacy in 411 00:24:56,240 --> 00:24:59,479 Speaker 1: the state of Arkansas. In nineteen seventy seven, on November 412 00:24:59,520 --> 00:25:03,000 Speaker 1: twenty six, someone in the UK was able to take 413 00:25:03,040 --> 00:25:07,679 Speaker 1: over a broadcast signal from Southern Television. They did so 414 00:25:08,000 --> 00:25:11,679 Speaker 1: in order to send an audio only message. So again, 415 00:25:11,960 --> 00:25:16,000 Speaker 1: the audio of the television broadcast drops out and this 416 00:25:16,160 --> 00:25:19,560 Speaker 1: audio goes in its place, and the audio was a 417 00:25:19,560 --> 00:25:24,960 Speaker 1: person who claimed to be an alien named vrillin Vlo 418 00:25:25,240 --> 00:25:28,199 Speaker 1: n I am told and that this alien wished to 419 00:25:28,320 --> 00:25:30,720 Speaker 1: warn earthlings that they really needed to shape up or 420 00:25:30,760 --> 00:25:33,320 Speaker 1: get the heck out of Dodge. And in this case, 421 00:25:33,359 --> 00:25:36,040 Speaker 1: by Dodge, I mean the galaxy. I am sad to 422 00:25:36,119 --> 00:25:40,000 Speaker 1: report that, despite it being nearly fifty years later, we 423 00:25:40,119 --> 00:25:43,159 Speaker 1: humans still don't have our act together. So I expect 424 00:25:43,240 --> 00:25:45,480 Speaker 1: Villain will be back any day now to chide us 425 00:25:45,560 --> 00:25:48,520 Speaker 1: for falling short. Or you know, it was just some 426 00:25:48,840 --> 00:25:51,879 Speaker 1: random person having a laugh by hijacking a TV signal 427 00:25:52,040 --> 00:25:57,680 Speaker 1: by pushing out a competing broadcast signal of greater strength. Now, 428 00:25:57,720 --> 00:26:01,479 Speaker 1: perhaps the most famous broadcast intrusion event, at least here 429 00:26:01,520 --> 00:26:04,800 Speaker 1: in the United States, happened on November twenty second, nineteen 430 00:26:04,840 --> 00:26:10,119 Speaker 1: eighty seven. That was the infamous Max Headroom incident, in 431 00:26:10,160 --> 00:26:14,600 Speaker 1: which a person wearing a Max Headroom mask interrupted television 432 00:26:14,640 --> 00:26:18,840 Speaker 1: broadcasts on two separate TV stations in Chicago, Illinois. So, 433 00:26:18,960 --> 00:26:21,000 Speaker 1: for those of y'all who don't have any idea who 434 00:26:21,040 --> 00:26:24,320 Speaker 1: Max Headroom is, he's a fictional character. He was originally 435 00:26:24,320 --> 00:26:27,760 Speaker 1: created to serve as a television host for a program 436 00:26:27,760 --> 00:26:30,760 Speaker 1: that would show music videos on British TV, and he 437 00:26:30,880 --> 00:26:34,720 Speaker 1: was presented as being a computer generated AI character like 438 00:26:34,760 --> 00:26:38,119 Speaker 1: he was supposed to be like a computer animated figure 439 00:26:38,160 --> 00:26:41,520 Speaker 1: and AI controlled. Now, in fact, an actual human being 440 00:26:41,640 --> 00:26:44,920 Speaker 1: was portraying Max Headroom. That human being being Matt Frewer, 441 00:26:45,119 --> 00:26:47,480 Speaker 1: who did a great job. By the way, I love 442 00:26:47,960 --> 00:26:52,680 Speaker 1: old Max Headroom videos. They are weird, like really strange. 443 00:26:52,760 --> 00:26:55,000 Speaker 1: I would like to think that Space Ghost Coast to 444 00:26:55,080 --> 00:26:59,760 Speaker 1: Coast copied a lot from the Max Headroom days. Anyway, 445 00:27:00,240 --> 00:27:03,280 Speaker 1: Max Headroom would go on to become an advertising spokesman, 446 00:27:03,480 --> 00:27:06,959 Speaker 1: a talk show host, and a TV show character like 447 00:27:07,720 --> 00:27:12,160 Speaker 1: in his own sci fi television series. A very unlikely 448 00:27:12,200 --> 00:27:15,680 Speaker 1: thing to have happened, but it did happen. So this 449 00:27:15,840 --> 00:27:20,080 Speaker 1: signal hijacker was wearing a Max Headroom mask and the 450 00:27:20,080 --> 00:27:26,000 Speaker 1: first thing that he did was he interrupted Chicago's WGN 451 00:27:26,240 --> 00:27:29,440 Speaker 1: TV signal. This was like at nine o'clock or so, 452 00:27:29,640 --> 00:27:32,840 Speaker 1: and this incident lasted less than half a minute, so 453 00:27:33,359 --> 00:27:36,720 Speaker 1: not long enough for things to really get crazy, but 454 00:27:36,800 --> 00:27:39,240 Speaker 1: it was very odd and I'm sure unsettling for people 455 00:27:39,280 --> 00:27:42,680 Speaker 1: who are watching television at nine o'clock. And a couple 456 00:27:42,720 --> 00:27:46,440 Speaker 1: of hours later that night, the same person interrupted a 457 00:27:46,640 --> 00:27:51,399 Speaker 1: signal from WTTW, which is a PBS affiliate station in 458 00:27:51,440 --> 00:27:53,720 Speaker 1: the Chicago area, or at least was at the time, 459 00:27:54,080 --> 00:27:58,520 Speaker 1: and this interruption included the man in the Max Headroom 460 00:27:58,600 --> 00:28:02,080 Speaker 1: mask speaking the so it's was very hard to make 461 00:28:02,080 --> 00:28:03,760 Speaker 1: out what he was actually saying. There was a lot 462 00:28:03,800 --> 00:28:06,480 Speaker 1: of distortion in the audio, and plus the mask made 463 00:28:06,520 --> 00:28:09,199 Speaker 1: it difficult to hear. But there was also a second person, 464 00:28:09,240 --> 00:28:12,320 Speaker 1: a female presenting person dressed in a French made outfit, 465 00:28:12,560 --> 00:28:17,080 Speaker 1: who was spanking the Max Hedgerroom masked dude with a 466 00:28:17,119 --> 00:28:20,800 Speaker 1: fly swatter to really really high brow stuff. The weird 467 00:28:20,840 --> 00:28:24,840 Speaker 1: signal intrusion which lasted, you know, just just a relatively 468 00:28:24,880 --> 00:28:28,119 Speaker 1: short amount of time. It made national headlines. It was 469 00:28:28,240 --> 00:28:30,200 Speaker 1: got a lot of media coverage because it was such 470 00:28:30,240 --> 00:28:33,639 Speaker 1: a weird thing to have happened. But to this day 471 00:28:33,920 --> 00:28:37,520 Speaker 1: it's unknown who actually pulled it off. Well unknown to 472 00:28:37,560 --> 00:28:40,840 Speaker 1: most of us, anyway. Some folks surely know about it 473 00:28:40,880 --> 00:28:43,800 Speaker 1: because they did it. But once upon a time, Chuck 474 00:28:43,880 --> 00:28:46,960 Speaker 1: Bryant of stuff you should know, joined to be on 475 00:28:47,080 --> 00:28:50,040 Speaker 1: tech Stuff to talk about this specific incident. You can 476 00:28:50,040 --> 00:28:52,640 Speaker 1: actually find that episode in the tech Stuff archives. It 477 00:28:52,680 --> 00:28:57,800 Speaker 1: originally published on November third, twenty fourteen, ten years ago. 478 00:28:58,040 --> 00:29:00,920 Speaker 1: Holy cow, I've been doing this a long time now. 479 00:29:00,920 --> 00:29:04,200 Speaker 1: Those are not the only incidents of signal intrusion, of course. 480 00:29:04,240 --> 00:29:07,600 Speaker 1: There are others, including cases in which the identity of 481 00:29:07,640 --> 00:29:10,760 Speaker 1: the person responsible is ultimately discovered and that person was 482 00:29:10,840 --> 00:29:14,920 Speaker 1: later punished. But apart from mischief, there are other reasons 483 00:29:14,960 --> 00:29:19,160 Speaker 1: why some folks are interested in signal jamming, like using 484 00:29:19,200 --> 00:29:22,720 Speaker 1: signal jamming as part of an effort to rob someone blind. 485 00:29:23,240 --> 00:29:26,280 Speaker 1: So obviously a lot of homes these days are protected 486 00:29:26,320 --> 00:29:31,959 Speaker 1: by systems that rely on local network connections, often wireless connections. 487 00:29:32,320 --> 00:29:36,400 Speaker 1: So let's say that you're a burglar. You a dirty, dirty, 488 00:29:36,760 --> 00:29:40,440 Speaker 1: dirty person. So you're casing a joint and you notice 489 00:29:40,480 --> 00:29:44,520 Speaker 1: that this particular target has security cameras, and obviously you 490 00:29:44,520 --> 00:29:47,000 Speaker 1: don't want your mug showing up on the five o'clock news, 491 00:29:47,320 --> 00:29:51,120 Speaker 1: not when you got I don't know, see TV and 492 00:29:51,240 --> 00:29:53,720 Speaker 1: maybe some funko pops to sell. I might just be 493 00:29:53,800 --> 00:29:56,000 Speaker 1: looking around the stuff that I have in my house. 494 00:29:56,400 --> 00:29:59,440 Speaker 1: I do not own expensive stuff. I just want that 495 00:29:59,480 --> 00:30:01,640 Speaker 1: to get out there to any potential thieves. The stuff 496 00:30:01,680 --> 00:30:07,400 Speaker 1: I own is largely junk and only has sentimental value. Anyway, 497 00:30:07,440 --> 00:30:10,400 Speaker 1: this is not just a hypothetical problem of thieves using 498 00:30:10,480 --> 00:30:14,200 Speaker 1: signal jammers in order to rob a house and to 499 00:30:14,760 --> 00:30:19,160 Speaker 1: dismantle the security systems, or at least to temporarily block them. 500 00:30:19,440 --> 00:30:23,000 Speaker 1: On July twentieth, twenty twenty four, Mark Tyson of Tom's 501 00:30:23,080 --> 00:30:27,760 Speaker 1: Hardware published an article titled lapd Warren's Residents after spike 502 00:30:27,880 --> 00:30:31,480 Speaker 1: and burglaries using Wi Fi jammers that disable security cameras, 503 00:30:31,720 --> 00:30:35,880 Speaker 1: smart door bells. So Wi Fi of course works over 504 00:30:36,320 --> 00:30:39,840 Speaker 1: radio waves, right like Wi Fi is just a different 505 00:30:40,120 --> 00:30:43,040 Speaker 1: brand of radio. It's a different set of frequencies at 506 00:30:43,080 --> 00:30:46,120 Speaker 1: two point four gigaherts and five point zero gigaherts. Like 507 00:30:46,200 --> 00:30:49,480 Speaker 1: other radio signals, Wi Fi can also be overwhelmed. So 508 00:30:49,560 --> 00:30:53,480 Speaker 1: Wi Fi jammers are a thing now. They are not 509 00:30:53,720 --> 00:30:57,080 Speaker 1: legal in the United States, at least they're not legal 510 00:30:57,160 --> 00:31:00,360 Speaker 1: to use here in the US, but they're there's still 511 00:31:00,400 --> 00:31:03,120 Speaker 1: something that you can find online, Like you can buy 512 00:31:03,120 --> 00:31:06,080 Speaker 1: these things online. They're not even particularly that expensive. They're 513 00:31:06,120 --> 00:31:08,400 Speaker 1: typically less than one hundred dollars or even less than 514 00:31:08,480 --> 00:31:11,160 Speaker 1: fifty dollars. So if you had one of these things, 515 00:31:11,600 --> 00:31:14,400 Speaker 1: you could turn it on and use it to disable 516 00:31:14,680 --> 00:31:18,760 Speaker 1: Wi Fi in an area, and in the process you 517 00:31:18,800 --> 00:31:22,080 Speaker 1: could knock out cameras that are Wi Fi connected and 518 00:31:22,280 --> 00:31:26,240 Speaker 1: they wouldn't be able to transmit or record you sneaking 519 00:31:26,360 --> 00:31:30,760 Speaker 1: up because that connection gets jammed. Same thing with alarm 520 00:31:30,840 --> 00:31:34,920 Speaker 1: systems right that are Wi Fi enabled, And that's important 521 00:31:34,920 --> 00:31:36,960 Speaker 1: to note it is Wi Fi enabled once. If you 522 00:31:37,000 --> 00:31:40,160 Speaker 1: have things that are hardwired, that's different. Right, They're not 523 00:31:40,280 --> 00:31:45,320 Speaker 1: relying on radio signals for their operation. They're transmitting over 524 00:31:45,480 --> 00:31:48,560 Speaker 1: wired connections, so those are not going to be affected 525 00:31:48,600 --> 00:31:51,320 Speaker 1: by these Wi Fi jammers. I mean, you could get 526 00:31:51,400 --> 00:31:55,600 Speaker 1: to a point where you have actual interference through the cables, 527 00:31:55,680 --> 00:31:59,440 Speaker 1: but typically cables are shielded well enough so that such 528 00:31:59,480 --> 00:32:02,880 Speaker 1: interference doesn't actually affect them. They have to be because 529 00:32:03,200 --> 00:32:05,520 Speaker 1: you don't know what kind of environment these systems are 530 00:32:05,520 --> 00:32:07,360 Speaker 1: going to be, and presumably it's going to be in 531 00:32:07,400 --> 00:32:10,440 Speaker 1: one that does have exposure to other radio waves, so 532 00:32:10,480 --> 00:32:13,640 Speaker 1: you have to shield the cables or else, you know, 533 00:32:13,720 --> 00:32:17,360 Speaker 1: you would just get interference from everything. So wired systems 534 00:32:17,440 --> 00:32:20,840 Speaker 1: not as effected. But if it's a Wi Fi based system, yeah, 535 00:32:21,000 --> 00:32:23,360 Speaker 1: that's going to be an issue. And obviously a Wi 536 00:32:23,360 --> 00:32:25,200 Speaker 1: Fi jammer is not just going to knock out the 537 00:32:25,240 --> 00:32:28,080 Speaker 1: security system, it's going to knock out your connection to 538 00:32:28,120 --> 00:32:31,080 Speaker 1: the Internet. Potentially, it could mean that you don't have 539 00:32:31,080 --> 00:32:34,120 Speaker 1: any connectivity to emergency services, so it could be a 540 00:32:34,160 --> 00:32:38,600 Speaker 1: real dangerous situation. So that's the reason why they're illegal 541 00:32:38,640 --> 00:32:41,080 Speaker 1: here in the United States. They're also illegal in several 542 00:32:41,080 --> 00:32:44,600 Speaker 1: other countries. The US is not alone in this. Some governments, 543 00:32:44,640 --> 00:32:48,840 Speaker 1: typically those on the more authoritarian side of the political landscape, 544 00:32:48,880 --> 00:32:51,840 Speaker 1: have been known to employ signal jammers to silence those 545 00:32:51,840 --> 00:32:55,840 Speaker 1: who would question the government. So the Chinese government, for example, 546 00:32:55,880 --> 00:32:59,320 Speaker 1: has a history of jamming incoming signals from Radio Free 547 00:32:59,360 --> 00:33:03,400 Speaker 1: Asia and at times other stations like BBC World Service 548 00:33:03,440 --> 00:33:07,480 Speaker 1: among others. So jamming is often used in conjunction with 549 00:33:07,560 --> 00:33:12,120 Speaker 1: other methods in order to impose censorship on citizens. So 550 00:33:12,600 --> 00:33:15,560 Speaker 1: that's kind of the overview of jamming. The question is 551 00:33:15,560 --> 00:33:17,680 Speaker 1: what can you do about it? Like, what if you 552 00:33:17,920 --> 00:33:22,280 Speaker 1: are the subject of signal jamming, either you're targeted in 553 00:33:22,400 --> 00:33:26,520 Speaker 1: particular or you're affected in a region that is being 554 00:33:26,640 --> 00:33:29,600 Speaker 1: hit by some form of signal jamming, Well, you can't 555 00:33:29,600 --> 00:33:32,560 Speaker 1: do much about it other than move out of the 556 00:33:32,680 --> 00:33:37,360 Speaker 1: range and perhaps get you know, signal again by leaving 557 00:33:37,400 --> 00:33:42,240 Speaker 1: the area that's affected. You could shut down the device 558 00:33:42,280 --> 00:33:44,760 Speaker 1: that's jamming the signal if you can find it, but 559 00:33:45,080 --> 00:33:48,640 Speaker 1: you know, discovering the actual location of a signal jammer 560 00:33:48,760 --> 00:33:52,480 Speaker 1: isn't easy these devices, particularly for the stuff that doesn't 561 00:33:52,480 --> 00:33:55,400 Speaker 1: affect huge ranges, things that are for the more immediate 562 00:33:55,440 --> 00:33:58,760 Speaker 1: area they don't have to be very large, so they 563 00:33:58,760 --> 00:34:01,360 Speaker 1: could easily be hidden somewhere and you'd have to be 564 00:34:01,400 --> 00:34:03,760 Speaker 1: searching around everything in order to find them. Or they 565 00:34:03,840 --> 00:34:06,560 Speaker 1: might even just be like in someone's backpack or something 566 00:34:06,600 --> 00:34:10,040 Speaker 1: as they're walking by. That would be very difficult for 567 00:34:10,080 --> 00:34:12,839 Speaker 1: you to track down. And you wouldn't be able to 568 00:34:12,840 --> 00:34:14,960 Speaker 1: just walk up to some random person and say, hey, 569 00:34:15,280 --> 00:34:17,560 Speaker 1: let me see what's in your backpack. That's it's not 570 00:34:17,600 --> 00:34:21,040 Speaker 1: how that works. So you know, if you're talking about 571 00:34:21,040 --> 00:34:23,920 Speaker 1: these small devices, if you've got signal interference as a 572 00:34:23,960 --> 00:34:28,320 Speaker 1: result of jamming, the culprit is likely nearby, like within 573 00:34:28,400 --> 00:34:31,520 Speaker 1: fifteen meters of your location, because these things don't have 574 00:34:31,560 --> 00:34:34,439 Speaker 1: a very long transmission range. Finding the device and turning 575 00:34:34,480 --> 00:34:36,160 Speaker 1: it off is all that you need to do to 576 00:34:36,200 --> 00:34:39,080 Speaker 1: restore service. But you know that is tricky if someone's 577 00:34:39,120 --> 00:34:43,440 Speaker 1: high to get effectively wired communications, obviously, that's a big difference. 578 00:34:43,520 --> 00:34:46,360 Speaker 1: Right if you're using hardwired connections with most of your stuff, 579 00:34:46,560 --> 00:34:48,600 Speaker 1: jammers are not likely to have much of an effect 580 00:34:48,600 --> 00:34:53,480 Speaker 1: on you. Like if you have a router and everything 581 00:34:53,520 --> 00:34:57,200 Speaker 1: you've got is connected by Ethernet cable and that's it. 582 00:34:57,320 --> 00:35:00,440 Speaker 1: You don't have wireless connectivity, then you don't I need 583 00:35:00,480 --> 00:35:02,200 Speaker 1: to worry so much. But I don't know anyone who 584 00:35:02,400 --> 00:35:05,239 Speaker 1: is just strictly hardwired. I mean pretty much everyone I 585 00:35:05,280 --> 00:35:08,879 Speaker 1: know who uses Internet connected devices is relying at least 586 00:35:08,880 --> 00:35:11,960 Speaker 1: in part on wireless ones, so those would obviously be 587 00:35:12,000 --> 00:35:16,000 Speaker 1: impacted by a Wi Fi signal jammer. And again, unless 588 00:35:16,040 --> 00:35:18,040 Speaker 1: you're able to find the source of the jam, it 589 00:35:18,160 --> 00:35:22,920 Speaker 1: kind of stuck until that person or thing has moved on. 590 00:35:23,400 --> 00:35:25,680 Speaker 1: So yeah, that's the bad news. The good news is 591 00:35:25,800 --> 00:35:29,359 Speaker 1: I don't think it's that revalent. Apparently it's prevalent enough 592 00:35:29,400 --> 00:35:34,480 Speaker 1: in certain areas of Los Angeles for it to become newsworthy, 593 00:35:34,880 --> 00:35:36,719 Speaker 1: So that is an issue if you live in an 594 00:35:36,760 --> 00:35:39,840 Speaker 1: area like that. Being aware of it is very important 595 00:35:40,200 --> 00:35:45,840 Speaker 1: because you might recognize certain signals to use a pun 596 00:35:46,320 --> 00:35:50,360 Speaker 1: that you're being jammed, and being aware of that is 597 00:35:50,480 --> 00:35:53,920 Speaker 1: very important. Being on the lookout for suspicious activity is 598 00:35:53,960 --> 00:35:57,759 Speaker 1: really important. But apart from that, you're not likely to 599 00:35:57,880 --> 00:36:00,680 Speaker 1: encounter it. There might be occasional case is where someone 600 00:36:00,800 --> 00:36:04,440 Speaker 1: is being disruptive on purpose, Like I could easily imagine 601 00:36:04,440 --> 00:36:08,520 Speaker 1: someone sneaking a signal jammer into say a tech conference, 602 00:36:08,800 --> 00:36:14,200 Speaker 1: in order to wreak havoc as part of a haha, 603 00:36:14,239 --> 00:36:17,000 Speaker 1: I prank to you kind of thing. We saw something 604 00:36:17,000 --> 00:36:19,759 Speaker 1: similar with that a few years ago, several years ago 605 00:36:19,800 --> 00:36:24,280 Speaker 1: now at ces when someone was essentially using the equivalent 606 00:36:24,320 --> 00:36:28,120 Speaker 1: of a universal remote to shut down televisions that were 607 00:36:28,120 --> 00:36:33,920 Speaker 1: on display during a tech presentation, a pr presentation at CEES, 608 00:36:34,200 --> 00:36:36,920 Speaker 1: which was a low class, dirty down thing to do. 609 00:36:37,120 --> 00:36:39,200 Speaker 1: But yeah, I could see someone trying to do something 610 00:36:39,239 --> 00:36:42,920 Speaker 1: like that just to cause disruption. But apart from that, 611 00:36:43,120 --> 00:36:47,040 Speaker 1: I don't know that you're ever going to encounter it, unless, again, 612 00:36:47,080 --> 00:36:49,440 Speaker 1: you happen to live in a place where robberies are 613 00:36:49,480 --> 00:36:53,640 Speaker 1: starting to make use of these technologies in an effort 614 00:36:53,680 --> 00:36:57,360 Speaker 1: to cover up people's identities. Well they target a house. 615 00:36:58,040 --> 00:37:01,280 Speaker 1: That's a serious issue. Anyway. Hey, that is our episode 616 00:37:01,320 --> 00:37:05,000 Speaker 1: on Signal Jamming. I hope you are all well and 617 00:37:05,040 --> 00:37:14,720 Speaker 1: I will talk to you again really soon. Tech Stuff 618 00:37:14,800 --> 00:37:19,319 Speaker 1: is an iHeartRadio production. For more podcasts from iHeartRadio, visit 619 00:37:19,360 --> 00:37:22,920 Speaker 1: the iHeartRadio app, Apple Podcasts, or wherever you listen to 620 00:37:22,960 --> 00:37:27,279 Speaker 1: your favorite shows.