WEBVTT - Why Home Insurance Markets in California and Florida Imploded

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<v Speaker 1>Bloomberg Audio Studios, Podcasts, Radio News.

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<v Speaker 2>Hello and welcome to another episode of the Odd Lots Podcast.

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<v Speaker 3>I'm Joe Wisenthal and I'm Tracy Alloway.

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<v Speaker 2>Tracy, it's funny that, like in all the coverage of

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<v Speaker 2>finance generally, you know, we talk about banking, we talk

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<v Speaker 2>about brokerage, we talk about deals, there's not a lot

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<v Speaker 2>of talk about insurance.

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<v Speaker 3>I know, it's so weird. I feel like it's kind

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<v Speaker 3>of a blind spot for financial journalism. And I'm sure

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<v Speaker 3>I'm gonna get a lot of tweets and emails from

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<v Speaker 3>dedicated insurance correspond yes, but there should be more of them. Yes,

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<v Speaker 3>that's basically what we're saying. It's a huge pool of capital,

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<v Speaker 3>and also it has real life consequences, right, I think

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<v Speaker 3>those aren't discussed enough. Like there's a sort of feedback

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<v Speaker 3>loop where insurers are often deciding what is economically acceptable

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<v Speaker 3>in terms of risk, and so their decisions have actual

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<v Speaker 3>impact on you know, people's lives and the way we

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<v Speaker 3>behave where we live. Things like that.

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<v Speaker 2>It's interesting to think about, like the similarities between insurance

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<v Speaker 2>and deposit banking, because both industries are basically, I give

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<v Speaker 2>an institution an amount of money, and I expect at

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<v Speaker 2>some point to get it all back, and in the

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<v Speaker 2>meantime that company that I gave it to gets to

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<v Speaker 2>lend it out or invest it or something like that.

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<v Speaker 2>The difference is with banking, you sort of like get

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<v Speaker 2>the money back whenever you want it. With insurance, on

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<v Speaker 2>the other.

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<v Speaker 3>Hand, when something bad happens.

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<v Speaker 2>It'll probably happen at some point in your life. You

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<v Speaker 2>just have no idea when it'll unfortunately almost always be

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<v Speaker 2>when a very bad incident that you want to ensure against.

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<v Speaker 2>But yeah, it really is interesting how there's this huge

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<v Speaker 2>thing and as you say, it touches every aspect of

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<v Speaker 2>life in many cases dictates even what people can and

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<v Speaker 2>can't do. But it's like we know so little about

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<v Speaker 2>like there's so little talk about it.

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<v Speaker 3>It's the lesser known supply shock, let's put it that way. Recently,

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<v Speaker 3>we did that episode on the Fed's Preferred measure of inflation,

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<v Speaker 3>and we were talking in that about the insurance component

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<v Speaker 3>and the impact that's been having on the headline number.

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<v Speaker 2>Right, So this is the one aspect of insurance that

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<v Speaker 2>has gotten a fair amount of coverage over the last

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<v Speaker 2>several years, which is that in certain states, particularly California

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<v Speaker 2>and Florida and maybe some others, there have been these

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<v Speaker 2>huge upward shocks to the cost of covering your home.

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<v Speaker 2>We actually talked about this with the Howard Hughes CEO

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<v Speaker 2>last autumn, where he was talking about their insurance surge.

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<v Speaker 2>But I have to say, like, in my head, like

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<v Speaker 2>I still don't totally understand what's driven these huge spikes

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<v Speaker 2>in premiums, particularly for homeowner's insurance.

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<v Speaker 3>So I think what's confusing about this whole discussion is

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<v Speaker 3>you see two very different headlines. So on the inflation side,

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<v Speaker 3>you see things like, oh, the cost of insurance is

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<v Speaker 3>surging in Florida and California, it's unaffordable to live in

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<v Speaker 3>those specific places or specific areas within those states. But

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<v Speaker 3>on the other hand, you also see headlines that say

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<v Speaker 3>things like insurers are sixty percent behind in terms of

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<v Speaker 3>pricing from where they need to be, and insurers say

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<v Speaker 3>the market is uneconomic, they can't make the numbers work,

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<v Speaker 3>And so you're left kind of head scratching, Well, is

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<v Speaker 3>this about insurers trying to cover extra costs? Is it

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<v Speaker 3>price gouging? Is it that there's something fundamentally too risky

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<v Speaker 3>about this particular line of business. Is it political posturing?

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<v Speaker 3>This is the other thing that happens here in California

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<v Speaker 3>and Florida. They have very particular regulatory systems around insurance.

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<v Speaker 3>It's really hard to disentangle it's actually going on completely.

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<v Speaker 2>And there's always this question anytime you see an insurer

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<v Speaker 2>like pull out of a state, like I never understand that, Like,

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<v Speaker 2>why not just price it higher where it's like, oh,

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<v Speaker 2>this is uninsurable. Yeah, no, certainly, like there's some risk

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<v Speaker 2>that someone will desire to be compensated for. But yet

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<v Speaker 2>you see this line uninsurable. I do think obviously, in

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<v Speaker 2>the case of Florida and California, we've seen disasters. Of course,

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<v Speaker 2>we've seen various wildfires over the last several years in California,

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<v Speaker 2>Florida hit by a number of hurricanes, so there's a

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<v Speaker 2>climate change element. But in my mind, I do not

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<v Speaker 2>feel like I understand the whole story of why. At

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<v Speaker 2>least in a handful of states, homeowner insurance premiums have

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<v Speaker 2>spiked at levels that like basically it feels like no

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<v Speaker 2>one has seen before in history.

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<v Speaker 3>Yeah, And at the same time, the insurers say they

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<v Speaker 3>can't make any money. I was just looking at a

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<v Speaker 3>little article from credit site saying that the majority of

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<v Speaker 3>the top twenty underwriters of Californian retail, home and auto

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<v Speaker 3>insurance at this point have either entirely withdrawn or significantly

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<v Speaker 3>curtailed their participation in the state given profitability challenges. So

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<v Speaker 3>there's clearly something going on. The pool of available insurers

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<v Speaker 3>seems to be dwindling. But the question is why.

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<v Speaker 2>Yes, I think we really need to dig into this

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<v Speaker 2>further and get a better handle on like how these markets,

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<v Speaker 2>these heavily regulated markets, but at these markets, how they

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<v Speaker 2>actually work, and how insurers think about managing risk, and

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<v Speaker 2>how prices are determined and how capacity ebbs and flows.

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<v Speaker 2>So time to give it the outlaws treatment.

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<v Speaker 3>Yeah, this is an episode we've been meaning to do

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<v Speaker 3>for a while, and to compensate for not doing it

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<v Speaker 3>for months, we actually have two guests, two perfect guests

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<v Speaker 3>for you.

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<v Speaker 2>So we are going to be speaking with first someone

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<v Speaker 2>who is on the business side of insurance, someone who's

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<v Speaker 2>actually involved in regular operations and can talk about how

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<v Speaker 2>prices are determined and how supply is determined. And then

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<v Speaker 2>we're going to be speaking with someone who has a

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<v Speaker 2>been a deeper understanding of the regulatory side. So we're

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<v Speaker 2>going to first be speaking with Amias Garrity. He is

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<v Speaker 2>a partner at QED Investors. It does a lot of

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<v Speaker 2>fintech investing, and he is on the board of Kin,

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<v Speaker 2>which is a direct household insurance company. So, Amias, thank

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<v Speaker 2>you so much for coming on.

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<v Speaker 4>Odd lots my pleasure.

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<v Speaker 2>Why do you tell us first, like, what do you do,

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<v Speaker 2>what's your background, and what do you do in this

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<v Speaker 2>space of home insurance.

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<v Speaker 4>So I'm on the board of a direct consumer home

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<v Speaker 4>insurance company called Kin, and Kin really focuses on exactly

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<v Speaker 4>this problem of what do we do in catastrophe affected areas?

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<v Speaker 4>What do we do with the incredible change that we're

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<v Speaker 4>dealing with in terms of hurricane and windstorms and ultimately fire.

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<v Speaker 3>What's a direct to consumer insurer? How does that differ

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<v Speaker 3>from a normal insurance model.

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<v Speaker 4>So one of the really important elements of the structure

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<v Speaker 4>of the insurance market is that almost everybody gets their

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<v Speaker 4>insurance through an agent, and it actually really impacts the

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<v Speaker 4>economics of the industry because agents are typically paid commissions

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<v Speaker 4>around fifteen percent, and also because of that, all of

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<v Speaker 4>the insurance company's access to information actually comes through agents.

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<v Speaker 4>So with the Kin model, one of the reasons why

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<v Speaker 4>we think this direct to consumer makes more sense is one,

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<v Speaker 4>you get actually more economics to play with, so you

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<v Speaker 4>can spend that money on data science, you can spend

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<v Speaker 4>that money on aerial photography. And then also because the

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<v Speaker 4>environment is changing so quickly and knowing what's going on

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<v Speaker 4>in a house is so much more knowable now that

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<v Speaker 4>you actually would prefer to get your information through data

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<v Speaker 4>science than through an independent agent, like looking at a

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<v Speaker 4>roof and saying, I don't know, roof looks pretty good.

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<v Speaker 2>So big picture, we've all seen these stories, but oh,

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<v Speaker 2>it's so hard to get insurance in a state like Florida,

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<v Speaker 2>or people seeing their premiums jump thirty five or fifty

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<v Speaker 2>or sixty percent. Just let's start a big picture, like

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<v Speaker 2>how would you describe the problem or just the market

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<v Speaker 2>environment of the last few years.

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<v Speaker 4>Yeah, so the problem is pretty straightforward, which is insurance

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<v Speaker 4>is there to protect people from losses that are gonna

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<v Speaker 4>happen pretty infrequently. But if you just think about the math, right,

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<v Speaker 4>so Hurricane Ian two years ago, right about twenty billion

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<v Speaker 4>dollars of losses, So twenty five thousand claims ish, and

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<v Speaker 4>you know, if that's gonna happen every twenty years, you're

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<v Speaker 4>gonna need to pay just for that one storm probability

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<v Speaker 4>twelve hundred.

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<v Speaker 2>Bucks, okay. And this is twelve hundred bucks a year.

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<v Speaker 2>Twelve hundred bucks a year, okay, Right.

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<v Speaker 4>And so what we're dealing with is a pretty and

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<v Speaker 4>we all know that climate change is real. So if

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<v Speaker 4>you go back in history, typically our last forty years

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<v Speaker 4>or so, they were about eight billion dollar events per year.

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<v Speaker 4>So where the insurance industry deals with a billion dollars

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<v Speaker 4>loss from one event, in the last five years the

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<v Speaker 4>average was sixteen. So the change is real, and the

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<v Speaker 4>cost of insurance is real. But at the same time,

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<v Speaker 4>you know, if you look across you know these markets,

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<v Speaker 4>the costs are going up, but we also have house

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<v Speaker 4>prices going up, we have inflation. So over the last

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<v Speaker 4>ten years, you know, the national data actually only goes

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<v Speaker 4>through twenty one, but the price increase has been a

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<v Speaker 4>little bit higher than inflation, but not a lot higher

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<v Speaker 4>than inflation. And I think this is partly what we're

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<v Speaker 4>all dealing with, is we're coming to grips with a

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<v Speaker 4>bunch of different forces coming and hitting homeowners in exactly

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<v Speaker 4>the same time in the same way.

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<v Speaker 3>Joe, did you know the most expensive hurricane of all

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<v Speaker 3>time was nineteen thirty eight in New England. I can't

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<v Speaker 3>remember if that's inflation adjusted or not. It must be, yeah,

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<v Speaker 3>it must be, and I always that's a good fact

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<v Speaker 3>for Yes, you're welcome. There's a really good book about

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<v Speaker 3>it called Sudden Sea, The Great Hurricane of nineteen thirty eight.

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<v Speaker 3>But okay, wait a second. So whenever we have these

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<v Speaker 3>conversations about insurers, a lot of the numbers here kind

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<v Speaker 3>of blow my mind, because, as Joe just mentioned, we

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<v Speaker 3>talk about insurance premiums going up by sometimes insane amounts.

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<v Speaker 3>I was reading a Bloomberg article that came out recently,

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<v Speaker 3>and it was the owner of a business I think

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<v Speaker 3>in Colorado who was paying forty thousand dollars and his

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<v Speaker 3>insurance premium jumped to four hundred thousand dollars a year,

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<v Speaker 3>and he thought it was a typo initially, and then

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<v Speaker 3>I read analysis from people like the strategists over at

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<v Speaker 3>credit sites, and they say that they think insurers maybe

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<v Speaker 3>sixty percent behind in terms of pricing where they actually

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<v Speaker 3>need to be. And then I look at the numbers

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<v Speaker 3>behind the amount of capital that's actually flowing into the

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<v Speaker 3>insurance industry, where you know, it's not just people paying premiums,

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<v Speaker 3>it's also stock, it's also bonds that are being issued.

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<v Speaker 3>These just seem like insane numbers don't seem to match

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<v Speaker 3>up what is happening here.

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<v Speaker 4>So two things. One is that always the question is

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<v Speaker 4>how do we get this price right? And so a

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<v Speaker 4>lot of times what people feel is I can't get insured,

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<v Speaker 4>But what's actually going economically is I can't get insured.

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<v Speaker 3>At that price right, the price you want right.

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<v Speaker 4>The price that you want. I think there's also some

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<v Speaker 4>dynamics where fire is scarier in a lot of ways

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<v Speaker 4>compared to hurricane and wind. Partly this is a dynamic,

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<v Speaker 4>which is the hurricane increase has been quite extreme but

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<v Speaker 4>also relatively linear, right, so there are more storms, they

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<v Speaker 4>tend to be a little bit more severe, but fire

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<v Speaker 4>has been a little bit more of a tipping point.

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<v Speaker 4>So if you were living in Colorado, you probably didn't

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<v Speaker 4>think about fire risk as like a really important part

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<v Speaker 4>of your home insurance until only last ten or fifteen years.

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<v Speaker 4>So there is a more of a tipping point dynamic

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<v Speaker 4>with fire as compared to hurricane where it's just culturally

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<v Speaker 4>understood that if you live in Florida, you're going to

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<v Speaker 4>deal with hurricanes. If you live in the Carolinas, you're

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<v Speaker 4>going to deal with hurricanes.

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<v Speaker 3>So, just on the pricing point, one thing I wonder

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<v Speaker 3>about all the time is what do the pricing models

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<v Speaker 3>actually look like? And again, that sixty percent estimate that

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<v Speaker 3>I mentioned is based on the actuarial models of insurers,

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<v Speaker 3>like this is what their model says they should be

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<v Speaker 3>charging currently based on I assume forward projections of what

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<v Speaker 3>the weather is going to be. But of course the

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<v Speaker 3>question always is if you're having forward projections, if you're

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<v Speaker 3>forecasting something, I mean insures our for profit enterprises, why

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<v Speaker 3>not say that the risk of catastrophic events is much

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<v Speaker 3>higher and therefore we need to charge this particular amount.

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<v Speaker 3>You're trying to discern the future. It's not like anyone

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<v Speaker 3>is going to be able to say, no, you're wrong.

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<v Speaker 4>Well, first of all, a lot of the price comes

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<v Speaker 4>from the reinsurers, and the reinsurance prices have been increasing,

0:12:59.840 --> 0:13:02.880
<v Speaker 4>but it's been a roller coaster ride. So if you

0:13:03.000 --> 0:13:06.720
<v Speaker 4>look at like a history of reinsurance prices since ninety four,

0:13:06.760 --> 0:13:09.200
<v Speaker 4>so think about Hurricane Andrew as kind of you know,

0:13:09.320 --> 0:13:11.440
<v Speaker 4>for those of us who are gen xers, like this

0:13:11.520 --> 0:13:13.319
<v Speaker 4>is the time in which we started to really think

0:13:13.320 --> 0:13:15.880
<v Speaker 4>about hurricane So you know, early teenage years for me,

0:13:16.920 --> 0:13:22.080
<v Speaker 4>the price shot up post Andrew, then it came down steadily,

0:13:22.679 --> 0:13:26.480
<v Speaker 4>shot up again in Katrina, came down steadily, and then

0:13:26.559 --> 0:13:28.600
<v Speaker 4>in the last five years is shot up again. So

0:13:29.080 --> 0:13:32.680
<v Speaker 4>even though the trend is up, it's very boom and

0:13:32.760 --> 0:13:36.000
<v Speaker 4>bust in terms of reinsurance prices. And that also you

0:13:36.040 --> 0:13:38.960
<v Speaker 4>see the same dynamic with home insurers. And this goes

0:13:39.000 --> 0:13:42.720
<v Speaker 4>back to your earlier question about having an independent agent.

0:13:43.040 --> 0:13:46.560
<v Speaker 4>So if you are an insurance carrier and you think

0:13:46.640 --> 0:13:49.520
<v Speaker 4>you need to raise prices, but one percent of your

0:13:49.559 --> 0:13:55.040
<v Speaker 4>clients are intermediated through an agent, if you're the first

0:13:55.120 --> 0:13:59.920
<v Speaker 4>carrier to raise prices, all of your customers will move.

0:14:00.600 --> 0:14:01.600
<v Speaker 3>Oh, there's a first mover.

0:14:02.000 --> 0:14:06.000
<v Speaker 4>There's a first mover disadvantage. So everybody needs to reprice,

0:14:06.480 --> 0:14:09.720
<v Speaker 4>but they're very afraid of repricing because of the insurance agents.

0:14:09.760 --> 0:14:11.760
<v Speaker 4>And then the last thing, and this is what you

0:14:11.840 --> 0:14:15.040
<v Speaker 4>see happening in the debate in California right now, is

0:14:15.080 --> 0:14:18.320
<v Speaker 4>that in California, until very recently, it was literally not

0:14:18.440 --> 0:14:23.200
<v Speaker 4>allowed to take into account future casts, and so there

0:14:23.240 --> 0:14:26.800
<v Speaker 4>are a bunch of different things going on that make

0:14:26.880 --> 0:14:44.800
<v Speaker 4>that repricing very messy.

0:14:44.920 --> 0:14:47.720
<v Speaker 2>You said, there's not really so much a shortage of

0:14:47.760 --> 0:14:50.560
<v Speaker 2>insurance so much as a shortage of insurance at the

0:14:50.560 --> 0:14:52.880
<v Speaker 2>price that people think they should pay. But we do

0:14:52.920 --> 0:14:55.480
<v Speaker 2>get these stories right of insurancing. We're just out of

0:14:55.520 --> 0:14:58.040
<v Speaker 2>this market, right, And I think we've seen it a

0:14:58.080 --> 0:15:00.840
<v Speaker 2>lot in California. I think Florida is.

0:15:00.960 --> 0:15:02.120
<v Speaker 4>You've seen it in Florida as well.

0:15:02.160 --> 0:15:04.800
<v Speaker 2>So what it goes into that decision where an insurers like,

0:15:04.840 --> 0:15:07.240
<v Speaker 2>we just we're not in this market. Yeah, so because

0:15:07.240 --> 0:15:08.040
<v Speaker 2>that is a real thing.

0:15:08.000 --> 0:15:13.160
<v Speaker 4>Right absolutely, And that too is kind of the fractal

0:15:13.200 --> 0:15:15.600
<v Speaker 4>geometry of the thing. Right. So, at the level of

0:15:15.640 --> 0:15:18.520
<v Speaker 4>your house, you're saying, like, I think this price is crazy.

0:15:18.560 --> 0:15:20.200
<v Speaker 4>I can't get anyone to ensure my house at a

0:15:20.240 --> 0:15:22.240
<v Speaker 4>price that makes sense. And then at the level of

0:15:22.280 --> 0:15:26.480
<v Speaker 4>the state, the insurers are going to the regulators and saying, well,

0:15:26.520 --> 0:15:28.960
<v Speaker 4>if you don't let me raise my prices by x,

0:15:29.240 --> 0:15:31.840
<v Speaker 4>I'm going to pull out entirely. And so what you

0:15:31.920 --> 0:15:35.320
<v Speaker 4>see in these kind of big crackups with large insurers

0:15:35.360 --> 0:15:39.360
<v Speaker 4>pulling out is usually a dialogue or you know, a

0:15:39.440 --> 0:15:42.960
<v Speaker 4>disagreement about the regulatory framework and how quickly they can

0:15:43.040 --> 0:15:43.680
<v Speaker 4>raise prices.

0:15:43.920 --> 0:15:46.120
<v Speaker 3>Oh yeah, there's always a discussion about whether or not

0:15:46.200 --> 0:15:49.640
<v Speaker 3>this is political posturing because they want the actual regulation

0:15:49.840 --> 0:15:55.000
<v Speaker 3>to be changed. But what happens when an area this

0:15:55.080 --> 0:15:58.560
<v Speaker 3>is an extreme statement, but if an area becomes unensurable,

0:15:58.680 --> 0:16:02.320
<v Speaker 3>So if the bulk of insurers decide to move out

0:16:02.360 --> 0:16:07.080
<v Speaker 3>of particular counties in California, things like that, what happens

0:16:07.240 --> 0:16:11.840
<v Speaker 3>to home owners, business owners, car owners totally.

0:16:12.120 --> 0:16:15.320
<v Speaker 4>So in both Florida and California, which are sort of

0:16:15.400 --> 0:16:18.960
<v Speaker 4>the furthest along vanguard states for this kind of catastrophe risk,

0:16:19.440 --> 0:16:22.840
<v Speaker 4>both of those states have public insurers of last resort

0:16:23.160 --> 0:16:27.240
<v Speaker 4>and so they will give you insurance at a price

0:16:27.280 --> 0:16:30.760
<v Speaker 4>that is underwritten by the state. Now, there's complicated rules

0:16:30.800 --> 0:16:33.080
<v Speaker 4>about what the state has to charge, but those get

0:16:33.160 --> 0:16:37.440
<v Speaker 4>very political. And in Florida, for example, this has followed

0:16:37.480 --> 0:16:39.440
<v Speaker 4>a little bit of that same boom and bus cycle

0:16:39.480 --> 0:16:43.640
<v Speaker 4>that we've seen with reinsurance rates. So currently citizens in

0:16:43.680 --> 0:16:46.520
<v Speaker 4>Florida has about one point two million policies. This is

0:16:46.800 --> 0:16:49.920
<v Speaker 4>the this is the state insurer, So the state sponsored

0:16:49.960 --> 0:16:53.280
<v Speaker 4>insurer today has one point two million policies in Florida.

0:16:53.360 --> 0:16:56.320
<v Speaker 4>That's about twenty five percent or more of the state.

0:16:57.200 --> 0:17:01.280
<v Speaker 4>That's actually significantly up from five years ago, almost three

0:17:01.480 --> 0:17:04.479
<v Speaker 4>x up, but it's down from when it's last peaked

0:17:04.560 --> 0:17:08.320
<v Speaker 4>in twenty eleven. So there is this dynamic of waxing

0:17:08.359 --> 0:17:12.560
<v Speaker 4>and waning. What we're seeing in California is just a

0:17:12.600 --> 0:17:15.800
<v Speaker 4>straight upward tick. Now there it's only about three percent

0:17:15.800 --> 0:17:20.040
<v Speaker 4>of the state, but in the counties that are worst off,

0:17:20.200 --> 0:17:21.240
<v Speaker 4>it's about twenty percent.

0:17:21.880 --> 0:17:25.560
<v Speaker 3>In Florida, didn't they start cracking down on the roof

0:17:25.800 --> 0:17:28.920
<v Speaker 3>scandals as well? Wasn't that part of it where these

0:17:29.040 --> 0:17:32.520
<v Speaker 3>roofing frauds were so prevalent that they were actually boosting

0:17:32.560 --> 0:17:34.359
<v Speaker 3>premiums for everyone in the state.

0:17:34.840 --> 0:17:37.280
<v Speaker 4>Yeah, that was a really significant issue. So this issue

0:17:37.320 --> 0:17:41.679
<v Speaker 4>Tracy is called assignment of benefits. Where you could come

0:17:42.000 --> 0:17:45.000
<v Speaker 4>as a roofer. You could come to Tracy's house post

0:17:45.080 --> 0:17:49.080
<v Speaker 4>hurricane and say, hey, I'll take care of this, and

0:17:49.119 --> 0:17:52.680
<v Speaker 4>then you assign your benefit to me, and now I'll

0:17:52.720 --> 0:17:56.240
<v Speaker 4>go deal with the insurance company on your behalf. Now,

0:17:56.280 --> 0:17:59.040
<v Speaker 4>the challenge of this is that there's a bunch of

0:17:59.040 --> 0:18:01.399
<v Speaker 4>different things going on, but one of things had to

0:18:01.440 --> 0:18:04.000
<v Speaker 4>do with what were the terms under which you could litigate,

0:18:04.280 --> 0:18:06.520
<v Speaker 4>what were the terms under which the insurance company had

0:18:06.520 --> 0:18:09.440
<v Speaker 4>to pay the lawyer's fees, and whether assignment of benefits

0:18:09.520 --> 0:18:11.800
<v Speaker 4>was possible. And Florida has done a series of reforms

0:18:11.840 --> 0:18:13.960
<v Speaker 4>to try and pull that in, you know, the other

0:18:14.040 --> 0:18:16.840
<v Speaker 4>piece going back to the direct consumer element here, this

0:18:17.000 --> 0:18:20.479
<v Speaker 4>is also a place where from where we sit, we

0:18:20.520 --> 0:18:23.320
<v Speaker 4>do think there's a ton of opportunity for technology and

0:18:23.359 --> 0:18:26.240
<v Speaker 4>for companies to do better because the reason why there

0:18:26.240 --> 0:18:30.119
<v Speaker 4>was assignment of benefits is because homeowners were frustrated. And

0:18:30.200 --> 0:18:33.399
<v Speaker 4>so like again, after a storm, every single policy holder

0:18:33.440 --> 0:18:35.840
<v Speaker 4>gets a text message and within a couple of days

0:18:35.840 --> 0:18:38.720
<v Speaker 4>we'll do aerial imagery and say, hey, look you might

0:18:38.720 --> 0:18:41.520
<v Speaker 4>have had to evacuate, but here's an aerial image of

0:18:41.560 --> 0:18:44.000
<v Speaker 4>your house. Would you like to start your claim. So

0:18:44.119 --> 0:18:45.679
<v Speaker 4>there's a bunch of things that you can do to

0:18:45.720 --> 0:18:48.160
<v Speaker 4>make the system better. But yeah, there was a pretty

0:18:48.160 --> 0:18:49.359
<v Speaker 4>significant reform effort.

0:18:49.359 --> 0:18:51.359
<v Speaker 2>And so what was the basics of the scam?

0:18:51.400 --> 0:18:54.119
<v Speaker 4>Okay, so the basics of the scam are your house

0:18:54.160 --> 0:18:58.760
<v Speaker 4>is damaged, I'm a roofer instead of you contracting with

0:18:58.880 --> 0:19:02.159
<v Speaker 4>me and then you following up with the insurance company.

0:19:03.040 --> 0:19:06.480
<v Speaker 4>You assign your benefits to me, I do the work.

0:19:06.920 --> 0:19:09.520
<v Speaker 4>You know, maybe the price is the right price, maybe

0:19:09.520 --> 0:19:12.520
<v Speaker 4>it's a much higher price, and then I, with your

0:19:12.640 --> 0:19:17.680
<v Speaker 4>legal rights, sue the insurance company. And in that context, right,

0:19:17.720 --> 0:19:20.520
<v Speaker 4>you've got big players on both sides. There was a

0:19:20.560 --> 0:19:23.439
<v Speaker 4>litigation finance dynamic here. There were hedge funds getting into

0:19:23.480 --> 0:19:28.240
<v Speaker 4>the market to finance lawyers because there were dynamics in

0:19:28.280 --> 0:19:32.440
<v Speaker 4>the Florida market where if there was any settlement at all,

0:19:32.960 --> 0:19:36.520
<v Speaker 4>the insurer had to pay the legal fees. Oh yeah,

0:19:36.600 --> 0:19:38.879
<v Speaker 4>So there was a bunch of incentives built into the

0:19:38.960 --> 0:19:43.720
<v Speaker 4>system that made it very advantageous to sue even if

0:19:44.040 --> 0:19:47.080
<v Speaker 4>you weren't being you know, truthful about the amount of

0:19:47.119 --> 0:19:49.480
<v Speaker 4>cost that it actually took to fix the house.

0:19:49.720 --> 0:19:52.480
<v Speaker 3>My impression was also that in addition to all these

0:19:52.720 --> 0:19:57.560
<v Speaker 3>legal peculiarities that you just described, it was just really common.

0:19:57.720 --> 0:19:59.639
<v Speaker 3>Like you would get a knock on your door and

0:19:59.680 --> 0:20:01.800
<v Speaker 3>it would your roof for going like, hey, do you

0:20:01.840 --> 0:20:04.480
<v Speaker 3>want a new roof? No worries, I'll take care of

0:20:04.520 --> 0:20:06.280
<v Speaker 3>it for you. All you have to do is sign

0:20:06.320 --> 0:20:09.240
<v Speaker 3>away you know the right to file a claim and

0:20:09.280 --> 0:20:10.400
<v Speaker 3>then suit your insurer.

0:20:11.040 --> 0:20:13.840
<v Speaker 4>Yeah, and this goes back to this idea of are

0:20:13.880 --> 0:20:16.080
<v Speaker 4>we using the best in modern technology or not?

0:20:16.320 --> 0:20:16.480
<v Speaker 5>Right.

0:20:16.680 --> 0:20:19.200
<v Speaker 4>If I have an aerial image of your house two

0:20:19.200 --> 0:20:23.119
<v Speaker 4>weeks before the storm and two days after, my ability

0:20:23.160 --> 0:20:25.840
<v Speaker 4>to know whether that's a roofing scam or a proper

0:20:25.880 --> 0:20:28.960
<v Speaker 4>claim goes way way up. If you know, the last

0:20:28.960 --> 0:20:31.119
<v Speaker 4>time I saw your house was an independent insurance agent

0:20:31.200 --> 0:20:33.560
<v Speaker 4>coming to sell you the policy five years ago, it's

0:20:33.600 --> 0:20:36.959
<v Speaker 4>a lot harder to defend against the exact same facts.

0:20:37.359 --> 0:20:40.040
<v Speaker 4>And so there's a lot of room in the insurance

0:20:40.080 --> 0:20:42.720
<v Speaker 4>market for things to get better, in addition to the

0:20:42.760 --> 0:20:45.000
<v Speaker 4>fact that we've got to find ways to get the

0:20:45.119 --> 0:20:47.760
<v Speaker 4>regulations right and ultimately model the climate correctly.

0:20:48.000 --> 0:20:51.040
<v Speaker 2>So something I'm interested in is, you know, Florida in

0:20:51.560 --> 0:20:53.959
<v Speaker 2>many parts of California, I mean actually the whole country,

0:20:54.000 --> 0:20:57.480
<v Speaker 2>but there's two states that have just seen these incredible

0:20:57.600 --> 0:21:00.400
<v Speaker 2>like real estate booms, and Florida's always in a real

0:21:00.480 --> 0:21:03.720
<v Speaker 2>estate boom, but the incredible price, especially over the last

0:21:03.760 --> 0:21:06.640
<v Speaker 2>five years in the post COVID environment. And so you're

0:21:06.680 --> 0:21:10.000
<v Speaker 2>in a situation which maybe like so someone you know

0:21:10.040 --> 0:21:12.359
<v Speaker 2>bought their house in nineteen ninety five, or I don't know,

0:21:12.359 --> 0:21:15.240
<v Speaker 2>two hundred thousand dollars and now it's worth two million

0:21:15.320 --> 0:21:18.320
<v Speaker 2>dollars or something like that. And so the homeowner is

0:21:18.600 --> 0:21:21.760
<v Speaker 2>paying insurance on a two million dollar house even if

0:21:21.880 --> 0:21:24.600
<v Speaker 2>that's right, if it's much bigger, Yeah, that's exactly right.

0:21:24.640 --> 0:21:27.000
<v Speaker 4>And if you think about how much Florida home insurance

0:21:27.000 --> 0:21:29.640
<v Speaker 4>has gone up, yeah, right, if you're a homeowner, what

0:21:29.680 --> 0:21:32.520
<v Speaker 4>you feel is, oh my gosh, Florida home insurance over

0:21:32.520 --> 0:21:34.480
<v Speaker 4>the last three years has gone up nine percent a year.

0:21:35.280 --> 0:21:38.040
<v Speaker 4>But what you don't recognize because you're the homeowner is

0:21:38.200 --> 0:21:40.760
<v Speaker 4>Tampa real estate has gone up ten percent a year.

0:21:41.440 --> 0:21:44.600
<v Speaker 2>Just on this sort of similar point, particularly in the

0:21:44.680 --> 0:21:48.439
<v Speaker 2>sort of inflation that we've seen. I mean, I imagine just

0:21:48.720 --> 0:21:53.320
<v Speaker 2>the cost of repairs, even on a given structure, given

0:21:53.400 --> 0:21:57.000
<v Speaker 2>we know labor shortages and cost shortages, et cetera. Just

0:21:57.080 --> 0:22:00.000
<v Speaker 2>the actual process of putting a roof back on whatever

0:22:00.119 --> 0:22:01.720
<v Speaker 2>must be much more expensive than it used to be.

0:22:01.960 --> 0:22:05.119
<v Speaker 4>Yeah, that's right, and this is part of what disrupts

0:22:05.200 --> 0:22:09.200
<v Speaker 4>the industry. But that should come out in the WAH. Right,

0:22:09.240 --> 0:22:11.560
<v Speaker 4>we see that in the inflation data. We see the

0:22:11.600 --> 0:22:14.840
<v Speaker 4>premiums going up about the same rate of inflation. In fact,

0:22:15.040 --> 0:22:17.440
<v Speaker 4>Over the ten years from twenty eleven to twenty twenty one,

0:22:17.840 --> 0:22:20.640
<v Speaker 4>Florida home insurance went up less than inflation. But since

0:22:20.680 --> 0:22:22.159
<v Speaker 4>it's gone up a little bit faster.

0:22:22.520 --> 0:22:25.320
<v Speaker 3>I realized we probably should have asked you this earlier.

0:22:25.400 --> 0:22:30.720
<v Speaker 3>But what's the pitch to investors in insurance companies now,

0:22:30.760 --> 0:22:34.639
<v Speaker 3>whether it's through buying equity or you know, buying something

0:22:34.720 --> 0:22:38.560
<v Speaker 3>like a cap bond something like that. It used to

0:22:38.640 --> 0:22:44.040
<v Speaker 3>be that you have these uncorrelated returns. Natural disasters don't

0:22:44.080 --> 0:22:47.000
<v Speaker 3>really have anything to do with the market. But if

0:22:47.119 --> 0:22:50.719
<v Speaker 3>natural disasters are happening on a more frequent basis, then

0:22:50.760 --> 0:22:54.520
<v Speaker 3>it seems like some of that correlation argument sort of

0:22:54.680 --> 0:22:55.840
<v Speaker 3>falls by the wayside.

0:22:56.200 --> 0:22:58.760
<v Speaker 4>Yeah, I mean, there is a sense in which reinsurance

0:22:58.800 --> 0:23:03.480
<v Speaker 4>costs are, like almost everything else we see, affected by

0:23:03.480 --> 0:23:06.399
<v Speaker 4>interest rates because there is capital scarcity in the world

0:23:06.400 --> 0:23:08.919
<v Speaker 4>when the risk free rate is five and a half percent.

0:23:09.400 --> 0:23:13.360
<v Speaker 4>And also, the reinsurance markets happen on an annual basis,

0:23:13.400 --> 0:23:16.120
<v Speaker 4>just like the home insurance markets happen on an annual basis,

0:23:16.240 --> 0:23:19.159
<v Speaker 4>So there's a lot of friction and slow movingness that

0:23:19.520 --> 0:23:22.320
<v Speaker 4>is built into the system. So the average home insurer

0:23:22.680 --> 0:23:26.000
<v Speaker 4>in Florida will place their reinsurance, you know, somewhere between

0:23:26.040 --> 0:23:28.280
<v Speaker 4>March and June. If you think about that from a

0:23:28.320 --> 0:23:32.080
<v Speaker 4>capital allocation perspective, you're a reinsurer. You're making that decision. Okay,

0:23:32.080 --> 0:23:35.119
<v Speaker 4>what are we going to bid on? What capacity do

0:23:35.160 --> 0:23:37.560
<v Speaker 4>we want to give to this market. You're making that

0:23:37.640 --> 0:23:42.159
<v Speaker 4>decision as a bureaucratic matter, not like naturally fluctuating with

0:23:42.240 --> 0:23:45.880
<v Speaker 4>the prices. So you definitely have this idea that And

0:23:46.000 --> 0:23:48.280
<v Speaker 4>by the way, what's on the reinsurance balance sheets?

0:23:48.640 --> 0:23:51.639
<v Speaker 3>A bunch of bonds, right, those are making more money?

0:23:52.000 --> 0:23:55.280
<v Speaker 4>No? But those no, because those bonds repriced down when

0:23:55.359 --> 0:23:58.280
<v Speaker 4>rates go right. So, Tracy, to your point, your intuition

0:23:58.400 --> 0:24:02.560
<v Speaker 4>exactly right. That you have both kind of climate shock

0:24:02.960 --> 0:24:05.800
<v Speaker 4>over the last couple of years and you had a

0:24:05.800 --> 0:24:08.159
<v Speaker 4>capital supply shock over the last couple of years as

0:24:08.240 --> 0:24:11.680
<v Speaker 4>bonds repriced on insurance balance That's great.

0:24:11.720 --> 0:24:15.280
<v Speaker 2>Talk to us more about that capital supply aspect. So, oh,

0:24:15.440 --> 0:24:17.399
<v Speaker 2>so they take a hit on their balante because their

0:24:17.440 --> 0:24:20.840
<v Speaker 2>bond portfolio is down. So does that mean just the

0:24:20.880 --> 0:24:23.720
<v Speaker 2>sheer amount of dollars that they can then lend out?

0:24:23.960 --> 0:24:26.200
<v Speaker 2>Talk to us about that. I guess, like supply chain

0:24:26.240 --> 0:24:29.040
<v Speaker 2>of dollars and how it feeds down to the end homeowner.

0:24:29.160 --> 0:24:31.439
<v Speaker 4>Yeah, so the supply chain of dollars is you know,

0:24:31.760 --> 0:24:34.720
<v Speaker 4>like everything is kind of simple. Right, You've got large

0:24:34.720 --> 0:24:38.640
<v Speaker 4>pools of capital looking for return. In reinsurance, those are

0:24:39.240 --> 0:24:44.360
<v Speaker 4>an increasingly diverse mixed insurance link securities, cap bonds, captive reinsurers.

0:24:44.400 --> 0:24:46.880
<v Speaker 4>You know, hedge funds can go into it directly, you can,

0:24:47.160 --> 0:24:48.920
<v Speaker 4>you know, there's a bunch of different things you can do,

0:24:49.160 --> 0:24:51.960
<v Speaker 4>but they all come back to this idea that I'm

0:24:52.000 --> 0:24:53.800
<v Speaker 4>sitting on a pool of capital. I'm trying to figure

0:24:53.840 --> 0:24:55.840
<v Speaker 4>out what's the best way to get returned for that capital.

0:24:56.119 --> 0:25:00.520
<v Speaker 4>And that return is in a world of low interest rates, right,

0:25:00.600 --> 0:25:04.680
<v Speaker 4>this climate risk is extremely attractive because it's uncorrelated and

0:25:04.720 --> 0:25:08.760
<v Speaker 4>it provides a rate of return that is sort of

0:25:09.119 --> 0:25:13.359
<v Speaker 4>set by the actuarial tables, not set by you know,

0:25:13.440 --> 0:25:17.000
<v Speaker 4>global macro. In a world where rates go way up,

0:25:17.400 --> 0:25:21.720
<v Speaker 4>now that implied hurdle rate, right, the actuarial return is

0:25:21.760 --> 0:25:25.360
<v Speaker 4>going to be still the same. Right, It's basically set

0:25:25.560 --> 0:25:28.159
<v Speaker 4>by what's the risk of a storm and what's the

0:25:28.240 --> 0:25:30.440
<v Speaker 4>right way to price that. But then as the risk

0:25:30.520 --> 0:25:32.800
<v Speaker 4>view rate goes way up, you know what else should

0:25:32.800 --> 0:25:34.479
<v Speaker 4>I do with the dollars. Should I just buy treasury,

0:25:34.520 --> 0:25:37.359
<v Speaker 4>should I buy corporates? Whatever it is that sort of

0:25:37.480 --> 0:25:40.520
<v Speaker 4>gets a little bit more competitive. And then the last thing,

0:25:40.560 --> 0:25:44.480
<v Speaker 4>of course, is that reinsurance markets do have this unfortunate

0:25:44.560 --> 0:25:45.640
<v Speaker 4>boom bust dynamic.

0:25:46.040 --> 0:25:46.240
<v Speaker 6>Right.

0:25:46.359 --> 0:25:50.320
<v Speaker 4>So one of the great stories about you know, Berkshire

0:25:50.359 --> 0:25:57.120
<v Speaker 4>Hathaway is that they wrote reinsurance after Hurricane Andrew. Right,

0:25:57.200 --> 0:26:00.119
<v Speaker 4>so they took basically no losses in Hurricane Andrew. When

0:26:00.119 --> 0:26:03.320
<v Speaker 4>they came into the market, there was very little reinsurance capacity,

0:26:03.640 --> 0:26:05.640
<v Speaker 4>and so they wrote reinsurance into Florida in the wake

0:26:05.640 --> 0:26:08.560
<v Speaker 4>of Hurricane Andrew. So these stories are relatively common, and

0:26:08.600 --> 0:26:11.480
<v Speaker 4>you see this. Actually there was a sequence of three

0:26:11.560 --> 0:26:15.160
<v Speaker 4>years where reinsurance got super expensive in Florida, and over

0:26:15.200 --> 0:26:17.399
<v Speaker 4>the last year it's actually come down and flattened a

0:26:17.400 --> 0:26:20.720
<v Speaker 4>little bit because make people make money. Oh, then the

0:26:21.040 --> 0:26:21.919
<v Speaker 4>capital piles in.

0:26:23.359 --> 0:26:27.280
<v Speaker 3>So you mentioned investments, So you have this pool of

0:26:27.440 --> 0:26:29.720
<v Speaker 3>money and obviously you can invest it in different things,

0:26:29.720 --> 0:26:32.760
<v Speaker 3>whether it's corporate debt or treasuries. You also mentioned technology

0:26:32.880 --> 0:26:38.199
<v Speaker 3>earlier on what levers do insurers have to pull in

0:26:38.280 --> 0:26:42.439
<v Speaker 3>a situation where risks are going up, expenses are going

0:26:42.520 --> 0:26:45.480
<v Speaker 3>up in some areas of the country. They're still limited

0:26:45.520 --> 0:26:47.800
<v Speaker 3>in terms of how much of a premium increase they

0:26:47.800 --> 0:26:50.800
<v Speaker 3>can pass on. How do they go about reducing costs.

0:26:51.600 --> 0:26:54.920
<v Speaker 4>So the first thing is insurance is all about getting

0:26:55.040 --> 0:26:59.680
<v Speaker 4>the price right. And while it is hard to model,

0:26:59.840 --> 0:27:03.640
<v Speaker 4>it's not impossible to model right. So, as you said earlier, right,

0:27:04.000 --> 0:27:06.760
<v Speaker 4>we're all capitalists here, we can sort of figure out, Okay, well,

0:27:06.920 --> 0:27:09.040
<v Speaker 4>next year, we think the chance of a hurricane is

0:27:09.080 --> 0:27:10.800
<v Speaker 4>a little bit higher than it was ten years ago,

0:27:10.880 --> 0:27:13.199
<v Speaker 4>so we can adjust the price for that. So the

0:27:13.240 --> 0:27:15.919
<v Speaker 4>first thing is getting the price right, and we have

0:27:16.160 --> 0:27:21.960
<v Speaker 4>seen a lot of innovation around just understanding that climate

0:27:22.000 --> 0:27:26.040
<v Speaker 4>science and building that into the system. The second thing is.

0:27:25.960 --> 0:27:28.800
<v Speaker 3>Wait, can can you expand on that a little bit more?

0:27:28.840 --> 0:27:31.760
<v Speaker 3>Because as someone who spends a certain amount of time

0:27:31.800 --> 0:27:34.879
<v Speaker 3>in New England nowadays, I feel like the weather forecast

0:27:35.000 --> 0:27:37.160
<v Speaker 3>still leaves something to be desired.

0:27:37.480 --> 0:27:43.520
<v Speaker 5>Yes, so the weather is hard to predict, but climate

0:27:43.560 --> 0:27:47.760
<v Speaker 5>is the climate, you know, moves in ways that are

0:27:48.080 --> 0:27:51.320
<v Speaker 5>you don't care whether the hurricane comes on Tuesday or Thursday.

0:27:51.359 --> 0:27:54.960
<v Speaker 4>You care about what's the probability of a hurricane this year. Now,

0:27:55.040 --> 0:27:58.440
<v Speaker 4>even within that right, we had hurricane in and then

0:27:58.520 --> 0:28:01.360
<v Speaker 4>last year was a more mild here. So it's not

0:28:01.480 --> 0:28:04.160
<v Speaker 4>that they're so good at predicting the where and the when,

0:28:04.640 --> 0:28:07.800
<v Speaker 4>but we can see the trends, and so you start

0:28:07.800 --> 0:28:09.840
<v Speaker 4>with that. The second thing you start with is just

0:28:10.040 --> 0:28:14.760
<v Speaker 4>actually getting much more sophisticated about the interactions between the

0:28:14.760 --> 0:28:18.480
<v Speaker 4>house and the weather. Right, so houses can be hardened,

0:28:18.840 --> 0:28:23.600
<v Speaker 4>building codes, roofs. Think about California fire breaks, right like,

0:28:23.800 --> 0:28:26.600
<v Speaker 4>do you have a bunch of shrubbery in your lawn

0:28:26.720 --> 0:28:28.840
<v Speaker 4>or do you have a bunch of pebbles? Like these

0:28:28.880 --> 0:28:32.680
<v Speaker 4>actually make a real difference to your risk of catastrophe,

0:28:32.960 --> 0:28:35.600
<v Speaker 4>you know, And so at least at Kin, what we

0:28:35.680 --> 0:28:38.840
<v Speaker 4>see is that it really matters which house on the

0:28:38.840 --> 0:28:41.080
<v Speaker 4>block you underwrite, because some of the houses are just

0:28:41.160 --> 0:28:44.840
<v Speaker 4>naturally harder, or they're shaped a little bit differently relative

0:28:44.840 --> 0:28:47.120
<v Speaker 4>to where the water might come.

0:28:47.760 --> 0:28:51.000
<v Speaker 3>I learned that word today, Joe hardened, like the idea

0:28:51.200 --> 0:28:54.239
<v Speaker 3>of protecting houses in this way. And now I have

0:28:54.320 --> 0:28:57.080
<v Speaker 3>this idea in my head of like these hard houses

0:28:57.200 --> 0:28:59.880
<v Speaker 3>walking around going on, I'm so hard you can't get me.

0:29:00.640 --> 0:29:02.960
<v Speaker 2>You reaised that, like, you know, sometimes when people are

0:29:02.960 --> 0:29:05.960
<v Speaker 2>talking about health insurance, like oh, the health insurance should

0:29:05.960 --> 0:29:08.320
<v Speaker 2>give you incentives like go to the gym or whatever.

0:29:08.600 --> 0:29:11.440
<v Speaker 2>And my understanding is that that stuff doesn't really work

0:29:11.480 --> 0:29:15.040
<v Speaker 2>that much. But I guess, like with technology in theory,

0:29:15.120 --> 0:29:17.880
<v Speaker 2>are you able to say, like a homeowner comes to

0:29:17.960 --> 0:29:21.239
<v Speaker 2>you and you say, okay, it'd be this price, but

0:29:21.360 --> 0:29:23.840
<v Speaker 2>if you do X to your property, it could be

0:29:23.880 --> 0:29:24.360
<v Speaker 2>this price.

0:29:24.800 --> 0:29:25.160
<v Speaker 6>Yeah.

0:29:25.200 --> 0:29:28.040
<v Speaker 4>So it's probably not quite that much of a negotiation, okay,

0:29:28.080 --> 0:29:31.360
<v Speaker 4>but implicitly it is. Right, how old is your roof, Okay,

0:29:31.440 --> 0:29:34.160
<v Speaker 4>what are your singles? Do you have tile or tar?

0:29:34.880 --> 0:29:37.480
<v Speaker 4>And so these kinds of things are directly impacted in

0:29:37.520 --> 0:29:40.000
<v Speaker 4>the price. And then sometimes I mean, we're not investors

0:29:40.000 --> 0:29:42.000
<v Speaker 4>in any of these companies, but we have seen home

0:29:42.040 --> 0:29:46.240
<v Speaker 4>insurers in California say like, literally, you come to us,

0:29:46.400 --> 0:29:49.040
<v Speaker 4>we underwrite your house, and then we're gonna tell you

0:29:49.080 --> 0:29:51.719
<v Speaker 4>what to do with your backyard. Oh and then some

0:29:51.760 --> 0:29:53.320
<v Speaker 4>are trying to do this, some are trying.

0:29:53.160 --> 0:29:53.480
<v Speaker 5>To do that.

0:30:08.720 --> 0:30:11.360
<v Speaker 2>You mentioned fire, So as you said, like this sort

0:30:11.360 --> 0:30:14.080
<v Speaker 2>of like hurricane risk over time has been sort of

0:30:14.120 --> 0:30:17.840
<v Speaker 2>linearly going up, fire has been sort of less predictable.

0:30:18.160 --> 0:30:20.320
<v Speaker 2>There have been a little bit more of a tipping

0:30:20.360 --> 0:30:23.520
<v Speaker 2>point issue, I would call it. Does the industry feel

0:30:23.560 --> 0:30:26.160
<v Speaker 2>like it has a good way of modeling fire at

0:30:26.240 --> 0:30:28.560
<v Speaker 2>risk or at this point because it's sort of hitting

0:30:28.560 --> 0:30:31.920
<v Speaker 2>this tipping point, do the insurers or the reinsurers like

0:30:32.160 --> 0:30:34.760
<v Speaker 2>need a margin, a bigger margin of era, a bigger

0:30:34.800 --> 0:30:37.720
<v Speaker 2>cushion due to the sort of the tipping point or

0:30:37.720 --> 0:30:38.760
<v Speaker 2>the novelty of the risk.

0:30:38.920 --> 0:30:41.280
<v Speaker 4>So there's two issues that make this question a little

0:30:41.320 --> 0:30:44.600
<v Speaker 4>bit hard to answer. Okay, The first is that California

0:30:45.280 --> 0:30:48.400
<v Speaker 4>is historically underpriced, as we talked about earlier. So the

0:30:48.480 --> 0:30:53.160
<v Speaker 4>average home insurance cost premium in California is only about

0:30:53.480 --> 0:30:57.400
<v Speaker 4>thirty dollars more than the national average. So and again

0:30:57.400 --> 0:30:59.680
<v Speaker 4>this is twenty twenty one data, so it's probably moved

0:30:59.680 --> 0:31:02.719
<v Speaker 4>a bit, but that is kind of interesting. It demonstrates

0:31:02.760 --> 0:31:06.640
<v Speaker 4>to Tracy's point earlier that California is more behind, whereas

0:31:06.920 --> 0:31:09.560
<v Speaker 4>in Florida is more like twenty four hundred dollars. So

0:31:09.600 --> 0:31:13.840
<v Speaker 4>the first thing is the gap between what California is

0:31:13.920 --> 0:31:16.800
<v Speaker 4>charging and where insurers want to be is so vast

0:31:17.200 --> 0:31:19.480
<v Speaker 4>that it's a little bit of a little bit harder thing.

0:31:19.560 --> 0:31:21.640
<v Speaker 4>On top of that, I do think fire is harder

0:31:21.680 --> 0:31:24.240
<v Speaker 4>to model. A lot of the work modeling it is

0:31:24.280 --> 0:31:27.960
<v Speaker 4>around these topographical models, right, so where are you relative

0:31:28.040 --> 0:31:30.040
<v Speaker 4>to the wind? Where are you relative to the hills?

0:31:30.040 --> 0:31:32.560
<v Speaker 4>Where are you relative? And I think there's definitely a

0:31:32.560 --> 0:31:35.280
<v Speaker 4>lot of work still to be done there, But right

0:31:35.320 --> 0:31:37.520
<v Speaker 4>now it's a little bit hard to tell how much

0:31:37.720 --> 0:31:39.880
<v Speaker 4>whether the margin really is on just getting the price

0:31:39.960 --> 0:31:43.360
<v Speaker 4>right or the margin is on better modeling. But either way,

0:31:43.600 --> 0:31:45.800
<v Speaker 4>you come back to Tracy's word of hardening the house.

0:31:46.160 --> 0:31:47.840
<v Speaker 4>Hardening the house is going to make a big difference.

0:31:48.680 --> 0:31:51.080
<v Speaker 3>Oh, I would have thought for California, maybe it's drought

0:31:51.160 --> 0:31:54.840
<v Speaker 3>conditions or something like that, where I guess twenty twenty

0:31:54.880 --> 0:31:58.360
<v Speaker 3>three was a historic drought in that state, and then

0:31:58.640 --> 0:32:01.240
<v Speaker 3>flipping into twenty twenty four, I think we've seen a

0:32:01.400 --> 0:32:03.920
<v Speaker 3>historic amount of rain. So maybe the hope was that

0:32:04.320 --> 0:32:07.320
<v Speaker 3>fire premiums would start to come down. But I guess

0:32:07.320 --> 0:32:09.800
<v Speaker 3>that's not the case. That's never the case. Price never

0:32:10.240 --> 0:32:10.680
<v Speaker 3>it could be.

0:32:10.720 --> 0:32:13.920
<v Speaker 4>I mean, we've seen this again in Florida. You see

0:32:13.920 --> 0:32:16.600
<v Speaker 4>this like premiums went way up, right ten years ago

0:32:16.760 --> 0:32:20.080
<v Speaker 4>or thirteen years ago, we hit a peak of people

0:32:20.120 --> 0:32:23.280
<v Speaker 4>moving into the public option came down, come back up.

0:32:23.440 --> 0:32:26.280
<v Speaker 4>I think with California it's a little too early to know.

0:32:27.320 --> 0:32:31.720
<v Speaker 3>You mentioned people going into the public option. Do insurers

0:32:31.960 --> 0:32:36.440
<v Speaker 3>in places like Florida see that public option as a

0:32:36.480 --> 0:32:38.200
<v Speaker 3>competitor to their business?

0:32:38.920 --> 0:32:42.280
<v Speaker 4>Yes, But most of the time the states set these

0:32:42.400 --> 0:32:46.040
<v Speaker 4>up so that you have to prove that you couldn't

0:32:46.080 --> 0:32:49.719
<v Speaker 4>get insurance, and that's obviously ends up being a price

0:32:49.920 --> 0:32:53.960
<v Speaker 4>question as well. And so, for instance, I believe in Florida,

0:32:54.320 --> 0:32:57.960
<v Speaker 4>the rule is if a Florida carrier is willing to

0:32:58.040 --> 0:33:02.120
<v Speaker 4>quote you within twenty percent of the Citizens price, the

0:33:02.160 --> 0:33:05.880
<v Speaker 4>public price, then you no longer become eligible. So that's

0:33:05.880 --> 0:33:09.240
<v Speaker 4>how they manage it. So the states generally don't want

0:33:09.240 --> 0:33:12.720
<v Speaker 4>to be in this business, and so they try to

0:33:12.840 --> 0:33:17.760
<v Speaker 4>set up situations where Citizens is or the Fair Plan

0:33:17.800 --> 0:33:21.880
<v Speaker 4>in California is an insurer last resort rather than a competitor, just.

0:33:21.840 --> 0:33:24.800
<v Speaker 2>Out of curiosity from the perspective of like a startup

0:33:25.320 --> 0:33:29.600
<v Speaker 2>tech forward insurer, how do people believe you that you'll

0:33:29.640 --> 0:33:32.720
<v Speaker 2>pay out? I mean, you know, it's like companies have

0:33:32.760 --> 0:33:35.240
<v Speaker 2>heard of All State or AIG or whatever. It's like, yeah,

0:33:35.240 --> 0:33:38.200
<v Speaker 2>they probably have the money, and it's good. Kin comes

0:33:38.240 --> 0:33:40.360
<v Speaker 2>along and I don't know what it is and maybe

0:33:40.360 --> 0:33:43.160
<v Speaker 2>it looks like an app or something like that. Like,

0:33:43.280 --> 0:33:46.640
<v Speaker 2>is there an FDIC equivalent of insurance where it's like, Okay,

0:33:46.640 --> 0:33:49.480
<v Speaker 2>they have that FDIC stamp, so I feel comfortable that

0:33:49.520 --> 0:33:51.640
<v Speaker 2>they'll like hold my money, Like, how do you How

0:33:51.720 --> 0:33:52.280
<v Speaker 2>is that a step?

0:33:52.440 --> 0:33:55.560
<v Speaker 4>Yeah, so there's not an FDIC, but it is. It

0:33:55.600 --> 0:33:58.840
<v Speaker 4>is highly regulated, right, and it's it's a combination of

0:33:58.880 --> 0:34:02.160
<v Speaker 4>insurance regulation and then rating agencies, and so there's insurance

0:34:02.200 --> 0:34:05.640
<v Speaker 4>specific rating agencies, and so that's why if you actually

0:34:05.640 --> 0:34:10.000
<v Speaker 4>pay attention to the insurance ads that you'll get, they'll say,

0:34:10.040 --> 0:34:12.919
<v Speaker 4>you know, rated by am Best or rated by Demo Tech,

0:34:12.960 --> 0:34:16.120
<v Speaker 4>which is the sort of predominant Florida specific rating agency.

0:34:16.600 --> 0:34:19.120
<v Speaker 3>But going back to the first part of Joe's question,

0:34:19.200 --> 0:34:22.080
<v Speaker 3>how do you convince customers that you're going to pay out?

0:34:22.160 --> 0:34:25.200
<v Speaker 3>Because this seems to be the focus of nearly every

0:34:25.480 --> 0:34:28.920
<v Speaker 3>insurance commercial in existence, and insurance is also still one

0:34:28.960 --> 0:34:31.799
<v Speaker 3>of the industries where word of mouth actually matters. So

0:34:31.960 --> 0:34:34.480
<v Speaker 3>people will say, I had a good experience with this

0:34:34.600 --> 0:34:37.439
<v Speaker 3>insurer when I was filing my claim, you should go

0:34:37.640 --> 0:34:39.960
<v Speaker 3>with it too. How do you go about having that

0:34:40.120 --> 0:34:44.440
<v Speaker 3>discussion with people for an industry where the incentives are

0:34:44.440 --> 0:34:47.839
<v Speaker 3>not necessarily aligned the insurer wants to make money, and

0:34:48.040 --> 0:34:50.759
<v Speaker 3>the customer wants to get as much as they can

0:34:51.120 --> 0:34:53.960
<v Speaker 3>out of putting their money into premiums.

0:34:54.080 --> 0:34:56.840
<v Speaker 4>Yeah, so I think you hit the nail exactly on

0:34:56.880 --> 0:34:59.319
<v Speaker 4>the head, which is the dynamic is actually less about

0:34:59.320 --> 0:35:03.000
<v Speaker 4>the financial strength and more about the customer experience. And

0:35:03.040 --> 0:35:05.640
<v Speaker 4>that's where you know, for us, we put a lot

0:35:05.640 --> 0:35:09.040
<v Speaker 4>of effort into this idea of how do I give

0:35:09.160 --> 0:35:12.520
<v Speaker 4>people the customer experience that when they come to us

0:35:12.560 --> 0:35:17.160
<v Speaker 4>with a claim they actually feel satisfied. Now, naturally, customer

0:35:17.200 --> 0:35:21.720
<v Speaker 4>satisfaction post claim always drops. That's just like a rule

0:35:21.800 --> 0:35:24.160
<v Speaker 4>of life, but by how much? And so I talked

0:35:24.200 --> 0:35:26.760
<v Speaker 4>about like this thing about people left their homes after

0:35:26.800 --> 0:35:30.480
<v Speaker 4>Ian and we sent them text messages that said, here's

0:35:30.520 --> 0:35:33.520
<v Speaker 4>an aerial image of your house. We're sorry to tell

0:35:33.560 --> 0:35:35.759
<v Speaker 4>you that your roof is destroyed. Would you like to

0:35:35.800 --> 0:35:39.520
<v Speaker 4>start your claim? Now, that's an incredibly positive experience for someone.

0:35:39.640 --> 0:35:43.120
<v Speaker 4>Usually the other dynamic here is just you know, within Kin,

0:35:43.200 --> 0:35:46.040
<v Speaker 4>we actually did it as a capital structure issue as well.

0:35:46.080 --> 0:35:49.480
<v Speaker 4>So Kin uses what's called a reciprocal So the carrier

0:35:49.520 --> 0:35:54.680
<v Speaker 4>itself is a nonprofit owned by the policyholders, and then

0:35:54.840 --> 0:35:58.560
<v Speaker 4>the technology company is what's called an attorney in fact,

0:35:58.840 --> 0:36:02.000
<v Speaker 4>so that technology company managing the pricing, the underwriting, the

0:36:02.000 --> 0:36:06.000
<v Speaker 4>consumer response, but the carrier itself, the risk is all

0:36:06.080 --> 0:36:08.319
<v Speaker 4>born as if it were a mutual. So we have

0:36:08.400 --> 0:36:11.120
<v Speaker 4>done some interesting things and that's why people like mutuals

0:36:11.440 --> 0:36:12.560
<v Speaker 4>in the insurance industry.

0:36:12.840 --> 0:36:16.040
<v Speaker 3>And so the carrier pays a fee presumably to the

0:36:16.080 --> 0:36:17.399
<v Speaker 3>technology company.

0:36:17.360 --> 0:36:21.120
<v Speaker 2>Exactly as you mentioned, what was the peak year for

0:36:21.320 --> 0:36:23.200
<v Speaker 2>citizens twenty eleven.

0:36:23.320 --> 0:36:23.880
<v Speaker 4>Twenty eleven.

0:36:23.920 --> 0:36:27.520
<v Speaker 2>So it sounds like, even though there's a ton of

0:36:27.560 --> 0:36:30.399
<v Speaker 2>focus on what's going on in Florida right now, what's

0:36:30.440 --> 0:36:34.720
<v Speaker 2>going on in California, et cetera, that it's not necessarily

0:36:34.760 --> 0:36:38.560
<v Speaker 2>a death spiral dynamic. That we have these crazy moves,

0:36:38.719 --> 0:36:42.000
<v Speaker 2>but it doesn't mean they happen in perpetuity and that

0:36:42.320 --> 0:36:45.640
<v Speaker 2>the nature of the business is such that you could

0:36:45.680 --> 0:36:47.480
<v Speaker 2>just have years where they thinks swing wildly.

0:36:48.080 --> 0:36:51.680
<v Speaker 4>Yeah, that's right. I mean, unfortunately, insurance does have a

0:36:51.719 --> 0:36:56.880
<v Speaker 4>little bit of this boom and bust dynamic. And that's why,

0:36:57.040 --> 0:36:59.319
<v Speaker 4>you know, when we think about it, you know, when

0:36:59.320 --> 0:37:02.000
<v Speaker 4>we're sitting in the boardroom, we're talking about strategy. From

0:37:02.040 --> 0:37:04.719
<v Speaker 4>the perspective insurance, it's all about getting the price right.

0:37:05.480 --> 0:37:08.760
<v Speaker 3>So you've been talking a lot about that boom bust cycle,

0:37:08.880 --> 0:37:10.640
<v Speaker 3>and in some respects that makes a lot of sense

0:37:10.680 --> 0:37:14.680
<v Speaker 3>because you're dealing with nature and extreme events within the

0:37:14.680 --> 0:37:16.759
<v Speaker 3>weather or the climate, and so you could see how

0:37:16.800 --> 0:37:18.839
<v Speaker 3>one year will be terrible and then the next year

0:37:18.880 --> 0:37:21.520
<v Speaker 3>will be bad, and the insurance industry is kind of

0:37:21.520 --> 0:37:24.759
<v Speaker 3>trying to catch up or react to those events all

0:37:24.800 --> 0:37:27.879
<v Speaker 3>the time. But is there stuff that could be done

0:37:28.040 --> 0:37:31.080
<v Speaker 3>to try to smooth that boom bust cycle.

0:37:31.680 --> 0:37:35.239
<v Speaker 4>So from the perspective of the actual insurance carriers that

0:37:35.239 --> 0:37:39.040
<v Speaker 4>are dealing with homeowners, that's actually their core mission, right,

0:37:39.200 --> 0:37:41.719
<v Speaker 4>is that there's gonna be a little bit of a

0:37:41.719 --> 0:37:44.640
<v Speaker 4>boom and bust cycle when you think about what's capital

0:37:44.680 --> 0:37:49.360
<v Speaker 4>market's appetite to buy climate risk. And similarly, there's gonna

0:37:49.400 --> 0:37:52.239
<v Speaker 4>be bad years and good years when it comes to

0:37:52.239 --> 0:37:53.839
<v Speaker 4>the question of what's the weather going to be like,

0:37:53.840 --> 0:37:56.680
<v Speaker 4>what's the hurricane? And the whole point of insurance is

0:37:56.719 --> 0:37:59.080
<v Speaker 4>to act as the buffer between those things. And so

0:37:59.400 --> 0:38:01.239
<v Speaker 4>even though I talk about this boom and bicycle, that's

0:38:01.280 --> 0:38:04.600
<v Speaker 4>really more about access to capital and pricing, and it

0:38:04.680 --> 0:38:07.640
<v Speaker 4>is the role of both insurance regulators and insurance companies

0:38:07.920 --> 0:38:12.040
<v Speaker 4>to keep that customer interface smooth. So that's why you

0:38:12.120 --> 0:38:15.080
<v Speaker 4>see a lot of pressure on both sides. But it

0:38:15.120 --> 0:38:18.120
<v Speaker 4>comes out in price, right, it comes out in how

0:38:18.160 --> 0:38:22.240
<v Speaker 4>do we serve our customers and then increase the prices

0:38:22.320 --> 0:38:25.760
<v Speaker 4>as necessary to make it actually really sound and that

0:38:25.760 --> 0:38:28.919
<v Speaker 4>that's really the whole mission of insurance. But it puts

0:38:28.960 --> 0:38:30.240
<v Speaker 4>a lot of pressure on both sides.

0:38:31.160 --> 0:38:33.759
<v Speaker 2>Mayas Garrity, thank you so much for coming on od lots.

0:38:33.760 --> 0:38:35.160
<v Speaker 2>That was fascinating, my pleasure.

0:38:35.480 --> 0:38:40.399
<v Speaker 3>That was our conversation with Amayas Garrity, partner at QED Investors.

0:38:40.560 --> 0:38:43.200
<v Speaker 3>And now we are on to our second guest. We're

0:38:43.200 --> 0:38:45.480
<v Speaker 3>going to be speaking with r J. Lehman. He's the

0:38:45.680 --> 0:38:50.239
<v Speaker 3>editor and chief for the International Center for Law and Economics. RJ,

0:38:50.360 --> 0:38:52.080
<v Speaker 3>thank you so much for coming on ad lots.

0:38:52.480 --> 0:38:53.279
<v Speaker 6>Thank you for having me.

0:38:53.840 --> 0:38:55.840
<v Speaker 2>Uh, why don't you tell us a little bit? I

0:38:55.840 --> 0:38:58.920
<v Speaker 2>guess why are we telling you? What is your background

0:38:59.040 --> 0:39:02.359
<v Speaker 2>and sort of like your work and understanding the sort

0:39:02.400 --> 0:39:04.680
<v Speaker 2>of regulatory environment for home insurance.

0:39:05.000 --> 0:39:07.640
<v Speaker 6>Sure thing my background is I was journalists. I was

0:39:07.680 --> 0:39:12.280
<v Speaker 6>business journalists. Like y'all, there's hope for us, there's hope.

0:39:12.480 --> 0:39:16.000
<v Speaker 6>Insurance was my beat and I recommend it to anyone

0:39:16.400 --> 0:39:20.600
<v Speaker 6>who is considering going into financial journalism, insurance is the

0:39:20.640 --> 0:39:25.279
<v Speaker 6>best beat. It touches everything, and although there are parts

0:39:25.320 --> 0:39:28.480
<v Speaker 6>of it that are dry, you have the greatest panoply

0:39:28.600 --> 0:39:32.719
<v Speaker 6>of potential subjects to expound upon. So I was a journalist.

0:39:32.920 --> 0:39:37.360
<v Speaker 6>I entered think tank lend back in twenty twelve. I

0:39:37.440 --> 0:39:39.680
<v Speaker 6>co founded a group called the R. Street Institute with

0:39:39.719 --> 0:39:44.719
<v Speaker 6>Eli Laher. Initially, Our Street was overwhelmingly insurance focused. It

0:39:44.840 --> 0:39:49.120
<v Speaker 6>is diversified over the years. I led their insurance program

0:39:49.440 --> 0:39:51.719
<v Speaker 6>as long as I was there, which was until late

0:39:51.800 --> 0:39:56.400
<v Speaker 6>twenty twenty. Most notably, I produced for them an annual

0:39:56.480 --> 0:40:00.319
<v Speaker 6>report card of the fifty states with respect to their

0:40:00.440 --> 0:40:05.080
<v Speaker 6>insurance regulatory environments, ranking who was doing a good job,

0:40:05.120 --> 0:40:10.000
<v Speaker 6>who was in need of improvement. California in particular, was

0:40:10.040 --> 0:40:13.839
<v Speaker 6>always near the bottom because of the system in California

0:40:14.360 --> 0:40:17.440
<v Speaker 6>Florida over the years had been by the time I

0:40:17.600 --> 0:40:20.160
<v Speaker 6>left Our Street and stopped doing that report card, had

0:40:20.200 --> 0:40:24.360
<v Speaker 6>been creeping up from the very bottom to towards the top.

0:40:25.000 --> 0:40:28.520
<v Speaker 6>But they've certainly had some challenges in the past few years.

0:40:28.840 --> 0:40:31.200
<v Speaker 3>So one thing I always wonder when we have these

0:40:31.440 --> 0:40:35.160
<v Speaker 3>insurance discussions, I think there's a tendency to look at

0:40:35.400 --> 0:40:39.080
<v Speaker 3>the current system and feel like it was inevitable. And

0:40:39.400 --> 0:40:42.399
<v Speaker 3>this isn't just regarding insurance, but a lot of things

0:40:42.400 --> 0:40:44.880
<v Speaker 3>in the financial system. But how is it that we

0:40:45.120 --> 0:40:51.239
<v Speaker 3>ended up in a place where insurance premiums are regulated,

0:40:51.800 --> 0:40:55.360
<v Speaker 3>especially in places like California and Florida, And we have

0:40:55.480 --> 0:41:00.440
<v Speaker 3>this mix of private insurance companies but also again in

0:41:00.480 --> 0:41:02.960
<v Speaker 3>places like Florida, a public backstop.

0:41:03.520 --> 0:41:07.920
<v Speaker 6>So why are they regulated? Goes back to basically anti

0:41:07.960 --> 0:41:10.759
<v Speaker 6>trust law. Just after World War Two, there was a

0:41:10.800 --> 0:41:16.280
<v Speaker 6>famous Supreme Court case that determined that insurance was interstate commerce.

0:41:17.200 --> 0:41:20.760
<v Speaker 6>The Congress responded by passing a law called the mccaren

0:41:20.760 --> 0:41:23.840
<v Speaker 6>Ferguson Act that acknowledged that case and acknowledged that it

0:41:23.880 --> 0:41:27.000
<v Speaker 6>was interstate commerce, but nonetheless left it to the states

0:41:27.440 --> 0:41:31.920
<v Speaker 6>to handle regulation of the business of insurance. And insurers,

0:41:31.960 --> 0:41:36.480
<v Speaker 6>particularly back then, used to file rates collectively. The reason

0:41:36.520 --> 0:41:38.839
<v Speaker 6>this was an anti trust concern was because they used

0:41:38.920 --> 0:41:42.880
<v Speaker 6>underwriting bureaus where they shared data because no one insurer

0:41:43.000 --> 0:41:46.399
<v Speaker 6>was large enough to know what the correct rate should be,

0:41:46.920 --> 0:41:50.520
<v Speaker 6>and that was collusion, and so the states initially just

0:41:50.760 --> 0:41:55.120
<v Speaker 6>accepted or rejected rates from the industry as a whole

0:41:55.560 --> 0:41:59.320
<v Speaker 6>and individual insurers only differed in how much they charged

0:41:59.360 --> 0:42:02.520
<v Speaker 6>for market expenses and things like that for their agent force.

0:42:03.160 --> 0:42:05.960
<v Speaker 6>That system kind of broke apart by the late seventies

0:42:06.480 --> 0:42:11.760
<v Speaker 6>when insurers started, especially the larger ones in the personal lines,

0:42:11.800 --> 0:42:15.280
<v Speaker 6>which is home in auto, basically started having enough data

0:42:15.280 --> 0:42:18.479
<v Speaker 6>on their own to make credible actuarial projections without using

0:42:18.719 --> 0:42:21.279
<v Speaker 6>a rating bureau. And that's when you started to have

0:42:21.719 --> 0:42:26.600
<v Speaker 6>actually more complicated regulatory systems, because rather than just accept

0:42:26.640 --> 0:42:28.960
<v Speaker 6>or reject a rate for the whole industry, you had

0:42:29.000 --> 0:42:32.840
<v Speaker 6>to look at each individual company's filing. And so initially

0:42:33.160 --> 0:42:35.880
<v Speaker 6>what most states did was leave it to the market

0:42:36.200 --> 0:42:39.160
<v Speaker 6>in most cases to determine what the best rate would be.

0:42:40.040 --> 0:42:43.319
<v Speaker 6>But some states in the eighties started having issues with

0:42:43.600 --> 0:42:47.160
<v Speaker 6>rates climbing up. There was concern about especially in auto

0:42:47.360 --> 0:42:51.280
<v Speaker 6>more than homeowners. There was concern about profiteering and gouging,

0:42:51.760 --> 0:42:55.759
<v Speaker 6>and so some states responded by having a more intense

0:42:56.120 --> 0:43:00.239
<v Speaker 6>what's called prior approval regulatory system. California did this ineteen

0:43:00.280 --> 0:43:03.560
<v Speaker 6>eighty eight by a ballot initiative called Prop One O three.

0:43:03.880 --> 0:43:08.080
<v Speaker 6>Florida does not have the same prior approval system as California,

0:43:08.080 --> 0:43:11.000
<v Speaker 6>but what Florida was challenged with was after Hurricane Andrew,

0:43:11.640 --> 0:43:15.240
<v Speaker 6>a number of companies simply had not been charging enough

0:43:15.600 --> 0:43:19.600
<v Speaker 6>and were rendered and solvent, especially regional and domestic companies.

0:43:20.080 --> 0:43:22.759
<v Speaker 6>Some of the larger companies want to get out of

0:43:22.800 --> 0:43:27.319
<v Speaker 6>the state altogether. Florida responded by creating these entities what

0:43:27.360 --> 0:43:31.799
<v Speaker 6>are called residual markets, insurers of last resort. Florida's kind

0:43:31.840 --> 0:43:35.480
<v Speaker 6>of unique in two respects. One is, most states do

0:43:35.640 --> 0:43:39.320
<v Speaker 6>have some kind of residual market for auto and for home,

0:43:39.480 --> 0:43:41.920
<v Speaker 6>but it's usually like an assigned risk pool life. You

0:43:41.920 --> 0:43:46.080
<v Speaker 6>can't get coverage, then you will be assigned to an insurer,

0:43:46.160 --> 0:43:49.800
<v Speaker 6>and those assignments will be made based on insurers overall

0:43:49.920 --> 0:43:54.560
<v Speaker 6>market share. In Florida, you have two entities, the Florida

0:43:54.600 --> 0:44:00.800
<v Speaker 6>Citizens Property Insurance Corporation, which is a freestanding owners insurer

0:44:01.040 --> 0:44:04.080
<v Speaker 6>capitalized by the state. Back by the state, it competes

0:44:04.120 --> 0:44:08.040
<v Speaker 6>in the market, and the Florida Hurricane Catastrophe Funds, which

0:44:08.080 --> 0:44:11.520
<v Speaker 6>is a state backed reinsurer. There's no other state that

0:44:11.560 --> 0:44:15.640
<v Speaker 6>has anything quite like that, So the reinsurer. Every insurance

0:44:15.640 --> 0:44:18.400
<v Speaker 6>company doing business in Florida has to buy their first

0:44:18.440 --> 0:44:22.960
<v Speaker 6>layer of reinsurance from the state itself. And that was

0:44:23.640 --> 0:44:29.160
<v Speaker 6>both because there was concern that reinsurers were taking excess

0:44:29.200 --> 0:44:34.560
<v Speaker 6>profit but also because reinsurance rates can fluctuate wildly, and

0:44:34.600 --> 0:44:37.320
<v Speaker 6>so the idea was to try to make it a

0:44:37.360 --> 0:44:38.320
<v Speaker 6>little bit more stable.

0:44:39.000 --> 0:44:41.960
<v Speaker 2>Two things. A. I like that you mentioned that everyone

0:44:42.000 --> 0:44:44.799
<v Speaker 2>should cover insurance because I think Tracy and I have

0:44:44.840 --> 0:44:47.479
<v Speaker 2>talked about there's like people forgot banks all the time,

0:44:47.640 --> 0:44:50.239
<v Speaker 2>Wall Street banks, et cetera, and like, it is sort

0:44:50.280 --> 0:44:55.000
<v Speaker 2>of remarkable generally how little coverage there is of insurers

0:44:55.040 --> 0:44:55.920
<v Speaker 2>and what they're doing.

0:44:56.040 --> 0:45:00.279
<v Speaker 3>It's also that essence of finance, right, like estimating and

0:45:00.320 --> 0:45:01.120
<v Speaker 3>pricing risk.

0:45:01.680 --> 0:45:03.400
<v Speaker 2>And then the other thing I think that's really important

0:45:03.400 --> 0:45:05.640
<v Speaker 2>that you mentioned here is it's funny that like there's

0:45:05.719 --> 0:45:07.239
<v Speaker 2>I don't know it's funny, but you know, a lot

0:45:07.239 --> 0:45:09.439
<v Speaker 2>of the concern right now is about pricing too high

0:45:09.520 --> 0:45:12.960
<v Speaker 2>and price gouging and promitteering. But pricing too low is

0:45:13.000 --> 0:45:16.120
<v Speaker 2>also very, as you say, problematic, because you don't want

0:45:16.120 --> 0:45:18.879
<v Speaker 2>someone an entity coming in and taking tons of market

0:45:18.920 --> 0:45:21.480
<v Speaker 2>share and then not having the capacity to pay out

0:45:21.520 --> 0:45:24.480
<v Speaker 2>when the hurricane hit. So you know, you mentioned that

0:45:24.560 --> 0:45:27.359
<v Speaker 2>as part of your former job, you would create these

0:45:27.640 --> 0:45:31.200
<v Speaker 2>rankings of each of the state's insurance. What goes into

0:45:31.239 --> 0:45:34.000
<v Speaker 2>that ranking, What makes for a good or a bad

0:45:34.120 --> 0:45:36.279
<v Speaker 2>in your view? And I think maybe you know, our

0:45:36.360 --> 0:45:39.560
<v Speaker 2>Street is sort of a you know, free market bent organization.

0:45:39.640 --> 0:45:42.200
<v Speaker 2>But from your view or when you were creating these rankings,

0:45:42.400 --> 0:45:45.120
<v Speaker 2>what constitutes a good or a bad insurance regime.

0:45:45.840 --> 0:45:49.359
<v Speaker 6>So my perspective was that there were certain tests that

0:45:49.400 --> 0:45:54.279
<v Speaker 6>it was important for a department to perform. It wasn't

0:45:54.280 --> 0:45:57.600
<v Speaker 6>seeking no regulation the most The two most important were solvency,

0:45:58.200 --> 0:46:02.799
<v Speaker 6>doing solvency review and the other's consumer protection. I mean,

0:46:03.280 --> 0:46:07.239
<v Speaker 6>it is certainly true that in the marketplace some consumers

0:46:07.360 --> 0:46:10.960
<v Speaker 6>are abused, some insurers might give you the run arounds

0:46:11.000 --> 0:46:15.480
<v Speaker 6>and not pay claims timely and appropriately, and there's a

0:46:15.560 --> 0:46:18.960
<v Speaker 6>role for a regulator to examine those cases. So we

0:46:19.040 --> 0:46:23.480
<v Speaker 6>try to emphasize in our rankings those states that we

0:46:23.480 --> 0:46:26.240
<v Speaker 6>thought were doing those two tasks in particular very well.

0:46:26.680 --> 0:46:31.600
<v Speaker 6>And we would gain states for mostly price regulation, because

0:46:31.920 --> 0:46:35.400
<v Speaker 6>soligncy regulation is kind of separate regime. Then price regulation.

0:46:36.000 --> 0:46:40.000
<v Speaker 6>If there is a competitive market, then I do think

0:46:40.080 --> 0:46:43.920
<v Speaker 6>the market is the best price regulator and insurance historically,

0:46:44.080 --> 0:46:49.520
<v Speaker 6>In fact, there has long been greater problems of companies

0:46:49.560 --> 0:46:53.200
<v Speaker 6>seeking market share and so underpricing their product. It's a

0:46:53.239 --> 0:46:56.560
<v Speaker 6>gain market share maybe to sell you other products, you know,

0:46:56.800 --> 0:47:00.640
<v Speaker 6>maybe you sell auto and then you also tie in

0:47:00.960 --> 0:47:05.120
<v Speaker 6>homeowners and life and possibly some banking services, and that

0:47:05.239 --> 0:47:08.240
<v Speaker 6>in the long run, you may not be pricing appropriately

0:47:08.320 --> 0:47:26.280
<v Speaker 6>or you may not be taking reserves appropriately to maintain solvency.

0:47:28.080 --> 0:47:31.480
<v Speaker 3>First of all, what information are they working from when

0:47:31.520 --> 0:47:35.920
<v Speaker 3>it comes to figuring out what's a reasonable or acceptable

0:47:36.560 --> 0:47:41.440
<v Speaker 3>price for insurers to actually charge? And then secondly, like

0:47:41.520 --> 0:47:44.359
<v Speaker 3>how do they come to that judgment? Like where does

0:47:44.360 --> 0:47:46.839
<v Speaker 3>the information come from? And then what strikes them as

0:47:46.960 --> 0:47:49.280
<v Speaker 3>a reasonable premium increase?

0:47:49.920 --> 0:47:55.040
<v Speaker 6>It is overwhelmingly past loss data in all states. That's true.

0:47:55.360 --> 0:47:59.600
<v Speaker 6>The states do differ in what factors they will allow

0:47:59.640 --> 0:48:03.160
<v Speaker 6>a com need to consider and in the mix of

0:48:03.239 --> 0:48:06.359
<v Speaker 6>factors how much weight you can place on any single one.

0:48:06.920 --> 0:48:09.640
<v Speaker 6>I mean to give you an example. Race is not

0:48:09.760 --> 0:48:13.040
<v Speaker 6>permitted to be used anywhere. That wasn't always true. There

0:48:13.120 --> 0:48:15.080
<v Speaker 6>was a time when it was an actual factor that

0:48:15.120 --> 0:48:18.160
<v Speaker 6>insurance companies in various kinds of insurance used. You cannot

0:48:18.239 --> 0:48:21.640
<v Speaker 6>use race anywhere. It doesn't matter if it's actually credible

0:48:21.760 --> 0:48:26.160
<v Speaker 6>or not. Certainly, loss costs. Things like the rising costs

0:48:26.200 --> 0:48:31.080
<v Speaker 6>of both labor and replacement parts for auto or materials

0:48:31.080 --> 0:48:34.520
<v Speaker 6>for homes are things that you can reflect in your

0:48:34.640 --> 0:48:39.440
<v Speaker 6>rates and in homeowners in particular. Over the last twenty

0:48:39.480 --> 0:48:43.759
<v Speaker 6>five years or so, many companies have started using off

0:48:43.800 --> 0:48:48.840
<v Speaker 6>the shelf catastrophe models. So a catastrophe model takes information

0:48:48.880 --> 0:48:55.040
<v Speaker 6>about climate and residential patterns and projects forward what the

0:48:55.080 --> 0:48:59.400
<v Speaker 6>maximum probable loss might be. That's different than a pure

0:48:59.440 --> 0:49:02.239
<v Speaker 6>loss cost approach, where you just look at what you

0:49:02.239 --> 0:49:06.520
<v Speaker 6>paid in the past. So in California that's particularly relevant

0:49:06.560 --> 0:49:09.360
<v Speaker 6>because prop One OZH three does not allow you to

0:49:09.400 --> 0:49:12.840
<v Speaker 6>project forward. You can only use what is your average

0:49:13.160 --> 0:49:16.160
<v Speaker 6>that you've paid out over the past twenty years in

0:49:16.239 --> 0:49:20.160
<v Speaker 6>determining what your rates should be. Well, in twenty seventeen

0:49:20.400 --> 0:49:25.040
<v Speaker 6>and twenty eighteen, California had these massive wildfires. So the

0:49:25.160 --> 0:49:28.680
<v Speaker 6>industry from nineteen ninety one to twenty sixteen in the

0:49:28.680 --> 0:49:32.800
<v Speaker 6>state of California had made ten billion dollars total in

0:49:33.040 --> 0:49:37.120
<v Speaker 6>underrating profits over that twenty five year period. In twenty

0:49:37.120 --> 0:49:40.920
<v Speaker 6>seventeen and twenty eighteen, they lost twenty billion dollars, so

0:49:40.960 --> 0:49:43.359
<v Speaker 6>they more than doubled all the money they had made

0:49:43.760 --> 0:49:47.240
<v Speaker 6>in the prior twenty five years. So if the future

0:49:47.239 --> 0:49:50.200
<v Speaker 6>doesn't look like the past, and you know, climate change

0:49:50.200 --> 0:49:53.359
<v Speaker 6>and residential patterns are both reasons that the future might

0:49:53.360 --> 0:49:56.240
<v Speaker 6>not look like the past, not being able to project

0:49:56.280 --> 0:49:58.280
<v Speaker 6>forward is a real problem.

0:49:59.080 --> 0:50:02.000
<v Speaker 2>Is California the ow only state that doesn't allow for

0:50:02.160 --> 0:50:05.840
<v Speaker 2>these sort of more forward looking projections of how damages

0:50:05.920 --> 0:50:06.480
<v Speaker 2>might change.

0:50:06.560 --> 0:50:09.200
<v Speaker 6>California is the only state that bars the use of

0:50:09.239 --> 0:50:13.560
<v Speaker 6>catastrophe models altogether. Other states do have controls on how

0:50:13.640 --> 0:50:16.480
<v Speaker 6>much weight you can place on cat models and crafting

0:50:16.520 --> 0:50:20.680
<v Speaker 6>your underwriting and rate setting. Florida is kind of unique

0:50:20.680 --> 0:50:24.520
<v Speaker 6>in that it actually the state created its own cat model.

0:50:24.600 --> 0:50:28.080
<v Speaker 6>So not only does it have state backed homeowners insure

0:50:28.120 --> 0:50:30.080
<v Speaker 6>and the state back reinsure, it also has a state

0:50:30.120 --> 0:50:32.799
<v Speaker 6>back cat model, and it uses its cat model to

0:50:32.920 --> 0:50:35.560
<v Speaker 6>judge the results of private cat models.

0:50:35.680 --> 0:50:37.840
<v Speaker 2>So did you say that California is the fiftieth or

0:50:37.920 --> 0:50:38.400
<v Speaker 2>was the worst?

0:50:38.680 --> 0:50:41.400
<v Speaker 6>It not always depended on the year, but it was

0:50:41.440 --> 0:50:42.439
<v Speaker 6>sometimes the world.

0:50:42.480 --> 0:50:45.919
<v Speaker 2>So what else? So we have seen these stories over

0:50:45.960 --> 0:50:49.239
<v Speaker 2>the last couple of years about various name brand insurance

0:50:49.280 --> 0:50:53.239
<v Speaker 2>companies saying we're leaving the state. So what is it?

0:50:53.320 --> 0:50:55.840
<v Speaker 2>I mean, is it just talk to us generally, Is

0:50:55.840 --> 0:50:59.160
<v Speaker 2>it just about their inability to sort of use these

0:50:59.200 --> 0:51:02.000
<v Speaker 2>cat models? Like, what is the environment or the situation

0:51:02.200 --> 0:51:04.920
<v Speaker 2>that caused I guess your rankings were legit. If they

0:51:05.080 --> 0:51:07.839
<v Speaker 2>like now they're running out of it, sure, I guess

0:51:07.840 --> 0:51:11.400
<v Speaker 2>you're vindicated. Well overall, what is the situation that caused

0:51:11.440 --> 0:51:14.239
<v Speaker 2>them to be ranked so low in your models or

0:51:14.280 --> 0:51:16.880
<v Speaker 2>in your ranking and that now we see insureds playing

0:51:16.880 --> 0:51:17.200
<v Speaker 2>the stame.

0:51:18.040 --> 0:51:20.799
<v Speaker 6>The reason California is different it does have a prior

0:51:20.840 --> 0:51:23.040
<v Speaker 6>approval system. It's not the only state that has that.

0:51:23.640 --> 0:51:27.080
<v Speaker 6>It doesn't allow catastrophe models to be used. It doesn't

0:51:27.080 --> 0:51:31.319
<v Speaker 6>allow anything to be used that was not specifically enumerated

0:51:31.880 --> 0:51:34.440
<v Speaker 6>in this ballot initiative Prop one ZHO three that was

0:51:34.440 --> 0:51:37.880
<v Speaker 6>past nineteen eighty eight. They're basically were no catastrophe models

0:51:37.960 --> 0:51:40.880
<v Speaker 6>in nineteen eighty eight. They were in their infancy in

0:51:40.960 --> 0:51:44.040
<v Speaker 6>auto people weren't really using credit yet, which is now

0:51:44.040 --> 0:51:46.680
<v Speaker 6>a common thing to use in auto insurance, and so

0:51:46.760 --> 0:51:50.080
<v Speaker 6>you can't use it in California. Also, Prop one oh

0:51:50.120 --> 0:51:54.200
<v Speaker 6>three created this system called the Intervener system, where private

0:51:54.320 --> 0:51:58.759
<v Speaker 6>parties consumer advocates every time an insurer files a rate,

0:51:59.280 --> 0:52:03.000
<v Speaker 6>whether it's an increase or not is actually only somewhat relevant.

0:52:03.080 --> 0:52:05.520
<v Speaker 6>But anytime and ensure files a rate files a form,

0:52:06.200 --> 0:52:10.160
<v Speaker 6>these private parties get to object and you have to

0:52:10.200 --> 0:52:14.359
<v Speaker 6>go through a hearing process to get that rate, which

0:52:14.400 --> 0:52:16.640
<v Speaker 6>even if it's ultimately approved, that can take up to

0:52:16.680 --> 0:52:21.279
<v Speaker 6>two years. So it is very inflexible system, and insurers

0:52:21.360 --> 0:52:25.560
<v Speaker 6>have may do with it because California is one fifth

0:52:25.600 --> 0:52:28.320
<v Speaker 6>of the country, and so you don't want to exit

0:52:28.360 --> 0:52:31.960
<v Speaker 6>the California market unless you know the circumstances are really bad.

0:52:32.440 --> 0:52:37.080
<v Speaker 6>But it is terribly brittle. You cannot change these rules

0:52:37.280 --> 0:52:41.240
<v Speaker 6>without either a new proposition to be passed by the voters,

0:52:41.520 --> 0:52:43.480
<v Speaker 6>and the voters are not going to pass something that

0:52:43.560 --> 0:52:48.719
<v Speaker 6>raises their insurance rates, or the legislature by super majorities

0:52:48.719 --> 0:52:52.319
<v Speaker 6>in both chambers can make adjustments to Prop One O three,

0:52:52.360 --> 0:52:54.760
<v Speaker 6>but only if they, in the view of the Court,

0:52:55.360 --> 0:52:58.480
<v Speaker 6>forward the purpose of Prop One O three. So you

0:52:58.520 --> 0:53:02.080
<v Speaker 6>can't undo anything that's in the statute, but you can

0:53:02.640 --> 0:53:06.440
<v Speaker 6>make tweaks. So there's been some effort in California over

0:53:06.440 --> 0:53:10.160
<v Speaker 6>the last year. The Insurance Commissioner, recognizing that there's a problem,

0:53:10.800 --> 0:53:15.520
<v Speaker 6>a serious problem of not having insurance available, has taken

0:53:15.560 --> 0:53:21.520
<v Speaker 6>some emergency regulatory actions that would permit, in some limited circumstances,

0:53:21.560 --> 0:53:24.160
<v Speaker 6>things like being able to use cat models, being able

0:53:24.200 --> 0:53:26.560
<v Speaker 6>to reflect the cost of reinsurance, which is another thing

0:53:26.600 --> 0:53:29.920
<v Speaker 6>that prop One Zho three doesn't specifically allow. But it's

0:53:29.960 --> 0:53:32.680
<v Speaker 6>going to take the legislature taking action for any of

0:53:32.680 --> 0:53:33.760
<v Speaker 6>those things to be permanent.

0:53:35.040 --> 0:53:37.359
<v Speaker 3>So one of the things I always think about when

0:53:37.360 --> 0:53:42.680
<v Speaker 3>we talk about insurance premiums going up and the regulatory

0:53:42.880 --> 0:53:46.600
<v Speaker 3>regime that sort of limits them in places like California,

0:53:46.719 --> 0:53:51.080
<v Speaker 3>or limits those increases. So the idea of having expensive

0:53:51.360 --> 0:53:55.680
<v Speaker 3>insurance is partly it's supposed to deter you from doing

0:53:56.120 --> 0:53:59.480
<v Speaker 3>stupid things, right, It's supposed to shape your behavior to

0:53:59.480 --> 0:54:02.840
<v Speaker 3>some extent. So when it comes to things like climate change,

0:54:03.080 --> 0:54:08.640
<v Speaker 3>you're disincentivized from building a house in a place that's

0:54:08.640 --> 0:54:11.160
<v Speaker 3>prone to floods or in a place that is now

0:54:11.200 --> 0:54:16.680
<v Speaker 3>prone to wildfires. How do regulators balance that aspect of

0:54:16.719 --> 0:54:17.680
<v Speaker 3>this entire question?

0:54:18.239 --> 0:54:24.520
<v Speaker 6>Awkwardly is the short answer. Regulators are chosen in different

0:54:24.520 --> 0:54:27.359
<v Speaker 6>ways in different states. So as you might imagine, ones

0:54:27.360 --> 0:54:30.160
<v Speaker 6>that are directly elected, and there's about eleven of those,

0:54:30.800 --> 0:54:35.920
<v Speaker 6>are probably most attuned to public sentiments as opposed to

0:54:36.760 --> 0:54:40.839
<v Speaker 6>the nuts and bolts of stay solvency, and so those

0:54:40.840 --> 0:54:45.480
<v Speaker 6>who are appointed will vary. Some are appointed in kind

0:54:45.520 --> 0:54:48.080
<v Speaker 6>of unusual ways. In the state of Florida, we have

0:54:48.160 --> 0:54:51.560
<v Speaker 6>this weird system called the cabinet where the four directly

0:54:51.600 --> 0:54:55.799
<v Speaker 6>elected executive officers have to vote together on who to

0:54:55.880 --> 0:54:59.360
<v Speaker 6>appoint and also who to remove. So the Florida Insurance

0:54:59.400 --> 0:55:03.880
<v Speaker 6>Commissioners actually unusually insulated if he has the vote of

0:55:03.920 --> 0:55:09.680
<v Speaker 6>either the CFO or the governor, basically cannot be removed.

0:55:10.200 --> 0:55:15.400
<v Speaker 6>Flood which isn't actually underwritten very much by private parties,

0:55:15.440 --> 0:55:19.640
<v Speaker 6>it's mostly underwritten by the federal government. There is a

0:55:20.560 --> 0:55:25.480
<v Speaker 6>direct relationship between where and how you build and the

0:55:25.480 --> 0:55:29.479
<v Speaker 6>flood risks that are being generated. Wildfire is a little

0:55:29.480 --> 0:55:33.640
<v Speaker 6>bit stranger because there are various tipping points, like if

0:55:33.680 --> 0:55:36.279
<v Speaker 6>I build more densely in a floodplain, I'm going to

0:55:36.360 --> 0:55:38.719
<v Speaker 6>have more flood risk because there's more people there, there's

0:55:38.719 --> 0:55:42.200
<v Speaker 6>more structures there, You're covering the ground. If you build

0:55:42.239 --> 0:55:46.439
<v Speaker 6>more densely in an area of wildfire, initially you may

0:55:46.440 --> 0:55:50.040
<v Speaker 6>be having more properties exposed to the risk, but after

0:55:50.080 --> 0:55:53.520
<v Speaker 6>a certain point you actually are reducing the risk because

0:55:53.560 --> 0:56:00.960
<v Speaker 6>wildfire is generated in less dense. In essence, it sounds silly,

0:56:01.000 --> 0:56:03.040
<v Speaker 6>but you can choose to get rid of the trees.

0:56:03.200 --> 0:56:07.120
<v Speaker 3>Yeah, if we pave over all of California.

0:56:07.440 --> 0:56:10.279
<v Speaker 2>If everyone moves to a wildfire risky area, then the

0:56:10.320 --> 0:56:11.480
<v Speaker 2>wildfire risky.

0:56:11.200 --> 0:56:16.360
<v Speaker 6>Base it disappears. Yeah, so it's not correlated linearly in

0:56:16.400 --> 0:56:18.400
<v Speaker 6>the same way with that risk as it is with

0:56:18.520 --> 0:56:22.040
<v Speaker 6>flood But obviously there are things that you can do

0:56:22.280 --> 0:56:25.680
<v Speaker 6>in terms of creating defensible space around a property, making

0:56:25.680 --> 0:56:29.440
<v Speaker 6>sure that you don't have wood decks and wood roofs,

0:56:30.000 --> 0:56:33.839
<v Speaker 6>and you know, fire retarded materials, sprinklers, etc. These can

0:56:33.880 --> 0:56:37.799
<v Speaker 6>all contribute, but it's not as simple as saying, you know,

0:56:37.920 --> 0:56:43.120
<v Speaker 6>charging more yields the more environmentally responsible solution. Not necessarily.

0:56:43.160 --> 0:56:44.360
<v Speaker 6>It depends on the particulars.

0:56:44.920 --> 0:56:48.239
<v Speaker 2>That's extremely interesting. So Florida you mentioned that it had

0:56:48.320 --> 0:56:51.760
<v Speaker 2>over the years climbed up the rankings. That being said,

0:56:52.440 --> 0:56:54.839
<v Speaker 2>you know, we've all seen these headlines over the last

0:56:54.840 --> 0:56:58.800
<v Speaker 2>couple of years just about these like eye popping insurance

0:56:58.840 --> 0:57:01.719
<v Speaker 2>premium increases four homeowners in the state of Florida, and

0:57:01.800 --> 0:57:06.239
<v Speaker 2>increased dependence on citizens the public option backstop. Why do

0:57:06.320 --> 0:57:09.240
<v Speaker 2>you explain that? So, what did Florida do to prove

0:57:09.880 --> 0:57:13.239
<v Speaker 2>its rankings, and yet you know, still it feels like

0:57:13.520 --> 0:57:15.880
<v Speaker 2>just intuitively and maybe the market justifies it, but it

0:57:15.920 --> 0:57:17.640
<v Speaker 2>feels like there's a problem still.

0:57:18.480 --> 0:57:21.960
<v Speaker 6>Take you back to two thousand and six. Florida had

0:57:22.120 --> 0:57:26.520
<v Speaker 6>just had in two thousand and four four major hurricanes,

0:57:26.880 --> 0:57:30.680
<v Speaker 6>two category threes, two category fours make landfall in one year.

0:57:31.000 --> 0:57:34.200
<v Speaker 6>In two thousand and five, they had Hurricane Wilma. That

0:57:34.280 --> 0:57:37.200
<v Speaker 6>was also the year of Hurricane Katrina, which did massive

0:57:37.320 --> 0:57:42.040
<v Speaker 6>damage and kind of took the reinsurance markets for loop.

0:57:42.440 --> 0:57:45.760
<v Speaker 6>Florida was a basket case back then, and essentially any

0:57:45.960 --> 0:57:49.800
<v Speaker 6>remaining major national homeowners insurers that we're doing business in

0:57:49.800 --> 0:57:53.440
<v Speaker 6>Florida left. Citizens became the largest, not only the largest

0:57:53.440 --> 0:57:55.960
<v Speaker 6>insurer in Florida, but one of the top ten in

0:57:56.000 --> 0:58:00.760
<v Speaker 6>the country. So Charlie crist was elected in two thousand

0:58:00.760 --> 0:58:04.640
<v Speaker 6>and six than a Republican on an insurance reform platform.

0:58:04.760 --> 0:58:08.240
<v Speaker 6>The state legislature in early two thousand and seven passed

0:58:08.240 --> 0:58:11.680
<v Speaker 6>this platform, which included rolling back rates, making it much

0:58:11.680 --> 0:58:15.800
<v Speaker 6>easier to join Citizens, doubling the size of the hurricane

0:58:15.800 --> 0:58:20.000
<v Speaker 6>catastrophe fund. And this was basically a bet that in Florida,

0:58:20.200 --> 0:58:24.080
<v Speaker 6>no realistic assessment of what Florida did in two thousand

0:58:24.080 --> 0:58:25.919
<v Speaker 6>and seven would say that the state, if it got

0:58:25.920 --> 0:58:30.320
<v Speaker 6>a major hurricane, could finance those costs because it put

0:58:31.000 --> 0:58:35.280
<v Speaker 6>enormous costs on potential costs on the state. But Charlie

0:58:35.360 --> 0:58:38.960
<v Speaker 6>Christ and he said this in congressional testimony, made the

0:58:39.000 --> 0:58:42.800
<v Speaker 6>bet that the federal government would pass a national Catastrophe

0:58:42.800 --> 0:58:46.440
<v Speaker 6>fund that would bail out Florida if need be. So

0:58:46.520 --> 0:58:48.600
<v Speaker 6>what Florida did in the intervening years and why they

0:58:48.640 --> 0:58:54.040
<v Speaker 6>were improving, was they did allow rates to rise, They

0:58:54.720 --> 0:59:00.680
<v Speaker 6>shrank the size of citizens significantly. The cat fund was

0:59:00.840 --> 0:59:03.840
<v Speaker 6>put on better financial footing. But what allowed this to

0:59:03.880 --> 0:59:07.440
<v Speaker 6>happen was a very lucky streak, which is that between

0:59:07.480 --> 0:59:11.920
<v Speaker 6>Wilma in two thousand and five and Hurricane Irma in

0:59:11.960 --> 0:59:16.000
<v Speaker 6>twenty seventeen, Florida had no major hurricanes and the historic

0:59:16.080 --> 0:59:20.000
<v Speaker 6>record doesn't show that ever happening before. So the markets

0:59:20.000 --> 0:59:23.600
<v Speaker 6>got much more solid just based on good luck. More

0:59:23.720 --> 0:59:28.360
<v Speaker 6>or less, there were still problems, notably, the litigation environment

0:59:28.400 --> 0:59:32.880
<v Speaker 6>in Florida deteriorated significantly. It was a very attractive place

0:59:32.880 --> 0:59:35.280
<v Speaker 6>for the trial bar as you can see if you

0:59:35.360 --> 0:59:40.560
<v Speaker 6>drive our hideways and see many billboards advertising the services

0:59:40.600 --> 0:59:43.440
<v Speaker 6>of our local trial attorneys, and I have no objection

0:59:44.080 --> 0:59:48.479
<v Speaker 6>to them. But in the last decade and half, nine

0:59:48.560 --> 0:59:51.520
<v Speaker 6>percent of all homeowners insurance claims originated in the state

0:59:51.560 --> 0:59:54.920
<v Speaker 6>of Florida. But eighty percent of all homeowners insurance lawsuits.

0:59:55.160 --> 0:59:57.400
<v Speaker 3>Oh that's funny in Florida. You know what I quoted

0:59:57.440 --> 1:00:02.960
<v Speaker 3>that exact statistic, Oh, yesterday after we recorded our conversation.

1:00:03.200 --> 1:00:05.520
<v Speaker 3>But yeah, that is a stunning statistic.

1:00:06.120 --> 1:00:09.280
<v Speaker 6>It is. It is so we weren't quite as healthy

1:00:09.440 --> 1:00:12.240
<v Speaker 6>as probably we should have been, given our good luck,

1:00:12.760 --> 1:00:17.600
<v Speaker 6>But that lucky streak did allow capital to accumulate and

1:00:17.920 --> 1:00:22.240
<v Speaker 6>for a more robust market to evolve. That market still

1:00:22.280 --> 1:00:26.720
<v Speaker 6>always had problems because it was reliant heavily on companies

1:00:26.720 --> 1:00:29.440
<v Speaker 6>that only do business in Florida and only wrote homeowners,

1:00:29.960 --> 1:00:32.840
<v Speaker 6>so not diversified at all, and they are relatively small,

1:00:32.960 --> 1:00:37.480
<v Speaker 6>relatively thinly capitalized. Then Irma came in twenty seventeen, We

1:00:37.520 --> 1:00:40.160
<v Speaker 6>had Michael in twenty eighteen, we had Ian in twenty

1:00:40.160 --> 1:00:42.960
<v Speaker 6>twenty two, we had a Dalia last year, and those

1:00:42.960 --> 1:00:46.240
<v Speaker 6>were just the knockout blow for like what was for

1:00:46.320 --> 1:00:49.040
<v Speaker 6>these thinly We've had a dozen that have gone insolvent

1:00:49.200 --> 1:00:51.560
<v Speaker 6>in the last couple of years. There are many more

1:00:51.600 --> 1:00:55.960
<v Speaker 6>that are teetering. There needed to be a significant adjustment,

1:00:56.120 --> 1:00:59.720
<v Speaker 6>and that's what you've seen is rates have risen significantly. Now.

1:00:59.840 --> 1:01:02.920
<v Speaker 6>The the average homeowners rate in Florida's asked me to

1:01:03.000 --> 1:01:06.360
<v Speaker 6>be about six thousand dollars a year, which is probably

1:01:06.440 --> 1:01:09.320
<v Speaker 6>double the next state. And I'm not even certain what

1:01:09.320 --> 1:01:11.960
<v Speaker 6>that next date would be. It's been wrenching. I do

1:01:12.080 --> 1:01:15.800
<v Speaker 6>think we're to a better place, at least in terms

1:01:15.800 --> 1:01:20.600
<v Speaker 6>of availability that right now. Ensure looking at the Florida

1:01:20.600 --> 1:01:22.960
<v Speaker 6>market would say those rates are attractive, and if I

1:01:23.000 --> 1:01:25.840
<v Speaker 6>have a clean balance sheet, maybe I'll start writing business there,

1:01:25.920 --> 1:01:28.440
<v Speaker 6>even if I haven't in many years. But it's going

1:01:28.520 --> 1:01:30.280
<v Speaker 6>to be a painful adjustment for sure.

1:01:31.080 --> 1:01:34.840
<v Speaker 3>Recent steps in Florida aside, and I realize I'm talking

1:01:35.120 --> 1:01:39.120
<v Speaker 3>very generally about insurance in the US, and it varies

1:01:39.160 --> 1:01:41.400
<v Speaker 3>state to state, as you point it out. But if

1:01:41.440 --> 1:01:44.760
<v Speaker 3>we have a situation where insurers are pulling out of

1:01:44.840 --> 1:01:48.360
<v Speaker 3>markets because they say they can't raise premiums because of

1:01:48.400 --> 1:01:53.320
<v Speaker 3>these regulatory limits, and meanwhile the risk of catastrophic events

1:01:53.800 --> 1:01:57.040
<v Speaker 3>is increasing, and then what ends up happening is people

1:01:57.240 --> 1:02:01.240
<v Speaker 3>lean on either you know, state or federal insurance, whatever

1:02:01.320 --> 1:02:04.840
<v Speaker 3>backstop might be in place there. Why not cut out

1:02:04.920 --> 1:02:08.400
<v Speaker 3>the middleman and just have a public insurance entity.

1:02:08.840 --> 1:02:12.880
<v Speaker 6>Well, as we were sort of alluding to earlier, if

1:02:12.920 --> 1:02:15.080
<v Speaker 6>you underprice the risk, and that that would be the

1:02:15.080 --> 1:02:18.200
<v Speaker 6>assumption here, right, is that the reason that private companies

1:02:18.240 --> 1:02:21.840
<v Speaker 6>would not write this business but the government entity would

1:02:22.280 --> 1:02:25.880
<v Speaker 6>is because they are underpricing the risk. Then that is

1:02:26.320 --> 1:02:29.560
<v Speaker 6>just shifting the problem to the taxpayer. And you can

1:02:29.600 --> 1:02:33.280
<v Speaker 6>make that decision, sure, I mean, that's a policy decision

1:02:33.320 --> 1:02:36.560
<v Speaker 6>that has been made in many contexts. It's certainly the

1:02:36.560 --> 1:02:39.840
<v Speaker 6>way the crop insurance program works is that it's a subsidy.

1:02:39.840 --> 1:02:43.920
<v Speaker 6>It's an explicit subsidy for our farmers. Whether this should

1:02:43.960 --> 1:02:47.720
<v Speaker 6>be something subsidized, whether building beach homes is something that

1:02:47.760 --> 1:02:51.160
<v Speaker 6>we want as a matter of public policy to subsidize,

1:02:51.360 --> 1:02:54.720
<v Speaker 6>I don't, but you know someone can make that case.

1:02:54.760 --> 1:02:59.520
<v Speaker 6>It's a democracy. There's someone believes that, and so you

1:02:59.560 --> 1:03:00.680
<v Speaker 6>know that that's where we are.

1:03:01.840 --> 1:03:06.040
<v Speaker 2>Is the Florida's stayed back reinsure? Is that re reinsured

1:03:06.080 --> 1:03:06.360
<v Speaker 2>at all?

1:03:07.560 --> 1:03:09.320
<v Speaker 3>It's all the way down.

1:03:09.520 --> 1:03:13.040
<v Speaker 2>Reinsurance does exist, right, yes.

1:03:13.080 --> 1:03:17.560
<v Speaker 6>And a bit is the answer there's largely through catastrophe

1:03:17.560 --> 1:03:21.160
<v Speaker 6>bonds that the CAT funds issued, and those are a

1:03:21.200 --> 1:03:26.160
<v Speaker 6>form of reinsurance. There isn't much facultative or treaty, and

1:03:26.200 --> 1:03:28.919
<v Speaker 6>I'm not aware of any currently with the farther CAT Fund,

1:03:28.920 --> 1:03:30.560
<v Speaker 6>but I will admit that I haven't looked at their

1:03:30.560 --> 1:03:32.160
<v Speaker 6>balance sheet in a couple of years.

1:03:32.280 --> 1:03:35.360
<v Speaker 2>What is your prescription for both states? It would be

1:03:35.360 --> 1:03:38.160
<v Speaker 2>it sounds like California has to do much more, but

1:03:38.200 --> 1:03:40.400
<v Speaker 2>it does seem like Florida has issues with the fact

1:03:40.440 --> 1:03:42.640
<v Speaker 2>that it has to be a solely you know, these

1:03:42.680 --> 1:03:46.720
<v Speaker 2>sort of undiversified companies. Definitely seems like an issue like

1:03:46.960 --> 1:03:49.400
<v Speaker 2>what would be the ideal reforms we're looking at.

1:03:49.480 --> 1:03:52.040
<v Speaker 6>In both cases. I think the ideal reform is to

1:03:52.080 --> 1:03:56.680
<v Speaker 6>bring down the level of risk, which means shifting investment

1:03:57.320 --> 1:04:00.760
<v Speaker 6>to the front end to mitigation, and both states do

1:04:00.840 --> 1:04:04.520
<v Speaker 6>that to some extent. Florida could do much more in

1:04:04.840 --> 1:04:08.480
<v Speaker 6>helping to raise properties and places where they're at risk

1:04:08.520 --> 1:04:13.720
<v Speaker 6>of flood, ensure that the building codes are appropriately measured

1:04:13.760 --> 1:04:19.360
<v Speaker 6>to the size of the risk. California's regulatory environment ultimately

1:04:19.520 --> 1:04:21.600
<v Speaker 6>will have to be a thing that the people of

1:04:21.600 --> 1:04:27.360
<v Speaker 6>California are leveled with about what is realistic and possible

1:04:27.440 --> 1:04:31.600
<v Speaker 6>over the long term. And that's a democracy challenge because

1:04:32.400 --> 1:04:35.960
<v Speaker 6>no one wants to pay more to be fair. In California,

1:04:36.000 --> 1:04:40.160
<v Speaker 6>they do actually pay less, although they in Hawaii are

1:04:40.160 --> 1:04:43.400
<v Speaker 6>the most expensive states, certainly for the cost of housing,

1:04:43.440 --> 1:04:47.320
<v Speaker 6>they pay less than one would predict. And that is

1:04:47.440 --> 1:04:50.720
<v Speaker 6>a function of the regulatory environment. In Florida, that's not true.

1:04:51.000 --> 1:04:54.360
<v Speaker 6>In fact, if anything, it may be current rates there

1:04:54.560 --> 1:04:58.960
<v Speaker 6>were probably peeking out at a level that will naturally

1:04:59.000 --> 1:05:01.520
<v Speaker 6>come down with more compat but we'll have to wait

1:05:01.560 --> 1:05:02.280
<v Speaker 6>and see on that.

1:05:03.200 --> 1:05:03.400
<v Speaker 5>R J.

1:05:03.560 --> 1:05:06.040
<v Speaker 2>Lehman, thank you so much for coming on odd Laws.

1:05:06.080 --> 1:05:08.240
<v Speaker 2>That was great and clarified a bunch of things for us.

1:05:08.240 --> 1:05:23.840
<v Speaker 2>So really appreciate you taking the time. Absolutely, thank you, Tracy.

1:05:23.960 --> 1:05:26.400
<v Speaker 2>Those conversations cleared up a lot of things for me.

1:05:26.480 --> 1:05:27.320
<v Speaker 2>Let's just start there.

1:05:27.880 --> 1:05:30.440
<v Speaker 3>Yes, I have been wanting to dig a little bit

1:05:30.520 --> 1:05:35.040
<v Speaker 3>more into the Florida fraudulent roof replacement schemes for a while.

1:05:35.200 --> 1:05:36.040
<v Speaker 3>That was really fun.

1:05:36.280 --> 1:05:38.680
<v Speaker 2>That was really fun. There were so many interesting things.

1:05:38.800 --> 1:05:41.120
<v Speaker 2>First of all, like I think one thing that helps

1:05:41.200 --> 1:05:45.840
<v Speaker 2>crystallize for me, the huge surgeon insurance premiums is a

1:05:46.320 --> 1:05:49.800
<v Speaker 2>not only the increase in climate risk, but be just

1:05:49.880 --> 1:05:53.760
<v Speaker 2>the surge in home values themselves, because it doesn't matter,

1:05:53.800 --> 1:05:55.480
<v Speaker 2>as we talked about, like you might have bought your

1:05:55.480 --> 1:05:57.520
<v Speaker 2>home in the nineteen eighties, but to replace it, you

1:05:57.560 --> 1:06:01.080
<v Speaker 2>have to replace it at twenty twenty four dollars. And

1:06:01.120 --> 1:06:03.320
<v Speaker 2>so if you are in a boom state, which many

1:06:03.360 --> 1:06:06.160
<v Speaker 2>people have been, whether particularly if you've been in Florida

1:06:06.200 --> 1:06:09.000
<v Speaker 2>or California over the last several years, or home prices

1:06:09.000 --> 1:06:11.560
<v Speaker 2>have gone nuts, it just makes sense, just sort of

1:06:11.600 --> 1:06:14.480
<v Speaker 2>mathematically right there, that your premiums are going to go up.

1:06:14.560 --> 1:06:18.120
<v Speaker 3>Absolutely. I also thought the differentiation in the way some

1:06:18.160 --> 1:06:21.520
<v Speaker 3>of these disasters happen is also interesting. So the idea

1:06:21.560 --> 1:06:24.360
<v Speaker 3>that forest fires are maybe a little bit different in

1:06:24.520 --> 1:06:28.080
<v Speaker 3>nature to something like a hurricane. They wipe out a

1:06:28.120 --> 1:06:31.640
<v Speaker 3>lot more, they can occur sort of unexpectedly. I mean,

1:06:31.680 --> 1:06:35.320
<v Speaker 3>obviously you can determine how dry the weather is, what

1:06:35.480 --> 1:06:39.000
<v Speaker 3>the fire risk conditions are at any one time, but

1:06:39.280 --> 1:06:41.720
<v Speaker 3>you don't necessarily have a good handle on whether a

1:06:41.840 --> 1:06:44.360
<v Speaker 3>single power line is going to come down or whether

1:06:44.440 --> 1:06:46.840
<v Speaker 3>I don't know, a crazy person starts a fire on

1:06:46.920 --> 1:06:51.400
<v Speaker 3>purpose or a camper starts accidentally burning brush that I.

1:06:51.360 --> 1:06:55.080
<v Speaker 2>Guess factoid about like fire risk, where it's like, if

1:06:55.120 --> 1:06:58.400
<v Speaker 2>you build in an area in which there's fire risk, like, okay,

1:06:58.440 --> 1:07:01.680
<v Speaker 2>maybe your insurance premiums go up. But if everyone builds

1:07:01.840 --> 1:07:03.840
<v Speaker 2>in an area where there's fire risk and you just

1:07:03.920 --> 1:07:07.640
<v Speaker 2>clear cut all of the trees, then the risk goes down,

1:07:07.720 --> 1:07:10.120
<v Speaker 2>which is sort of I guess it's funny in some way,

1:07:10.200 --> 1:07:14.000
<v Speaker 2>not necessarily funny, haha, but funny perverse. I think also,

1:07:14.240 --> 1:07:16.960
<v Speaker 2>just in you know, talking with RJ, the sort of

1:07:17.280 --> 1:07:20.920
<v Speaker 2>the diversity of state models and so the fact that

1:07:20.960 --> 1:07:24.040
<v Speaker 2>we really do have, you know, every state has an

1:07:24.040 --> 1:07:28.000
<v Speaker 2>insurance commissioner and every state has its own rules about

1:07:28.000 --> 1:07:32.800
<v Speaker 2>how pricing works, I think contributes to the difficulty understanding

1:07:32.880 --> 1:07:34.120
<v Speaker 2>this market absolutely.

1:07:34.160 --> 1:07:36.840
<v Speaker 3>And also just the cyclical nature, the sort of boom

1:07:36.880 --> 1:07:40.240
<v Speaker 3>bust cycle of insurance it feels like, and the degree

1:07:40.280 --> 1:07:42.640
<v Speaker 3>to which some of the capital behind the insurers, so

1:07:42.720 --> 1:07:46.240
<v Speaker 3>the reinsures is kind of cyclical. There's so many moving

1:07:46.320 --> 1:07:46.800
<v Speaker 3>parts here.

1:07:47.000 --> 1:07:49.520
<v Speaker 2>I'm really glad that you brought up the reinsurer's part

1:07:49.640 --> 1:07:51.600
<v Speaker 2>because you know, one of the things and we talked

1:07:51.600 --> 1:07:54.560
<v Speaker 2>about it a little bit on our recent inflation episode

1:07:54.640 --> 1:07:58.520
<v Speaker 2>with Omayor and Skanda, is these sort of back door

1:07:58.560 --> 1:08:02.680
<v Speaker 2>ways in which higher FED rates can contribute to higher inflation,

1:08:03.080 --> 1:08:06.480
<v Speaker 2>and so hear this sort of amyas as he explained it,

1:08:06.480 --> 1:08:10.720
<v Speaker 2>it's like the FED hikes rates, the reinsureds take losses

1:08:10.840 --> 1:08:14.600
<v Speaker 2>on their bond portfolio. The reinsurer then has less money,

1:08:14.880 --> 1:08:18.400
<v Speaker 2>less capacity to back home insurance, and so then they

1:08:18.600 --> 1:08:20.840
<v Speaker 2>hike up their rates, and the home insurers hike up

1:08:20.840 --> 1:08:24.240
<v Speaker 2>their rates, and so this sort of very backdoor way

1:08:24.439 --> 1:08:28.240
<v Speaker 2>in which higher rates almost linearly flow through right to

1:08:28.320 --> 1:08:29.479
<v Speaker 2>higher consumer prices.

1:08:29.800 --> 1:08:31.920
<v Speaker 3>Yeah, and no one ever really talks about it except

1:08:32.040 --> 1:08:34.800
<v Speaker 3>up all right, and the INSURAN and the and the

1:08:34.840 --> 1:08:37.240
<v Speaker 3>reinsurance dedicated.

1:08:36.720 --> 1:08:39.280
<v Speaker 2>Insurance reporters of Priye talked about this, but don't get

1:08:39.360 --> 1:08:39.920
<v Speaker 2>enough attention.

1:08:40.240 --> 1:08:42.600
<v Speaker 3>Yes, that is very good point. All right, shall we

1:08:42.640 --> 1:08:43.040
<v Speaker 3>leave it there.

1:08:43.120 --> 1:08:43.840
<v Speaker 2>Let's leave it there.

1:08:43.920 --> 1:08:46.479
<v Speaker 3>This has been another episode of the All Thoughts podcast.

1:08:46.560 --> 1:08:49.920
<v Speaker 3>I'm Tracy Alloway. You can follow me at Tracy Alloway.

1:08:49.520 --> 1:08:52.479
<v Speaker 2>And I'm Joe Wisenthal. You can follow me at the Stalwart.

1:08:52.720 --> 1:08:57.080
<v Speaker 2>Follow our guests Amias Garrity He's at Amias MG and RJ.

1:08:57.320 --> 1:09:01.720
<v Speaker 2>Leman He's at Ray Leman. Follow our producers Kerman Rodriguez

1:09:01.800 --> 1:09:05.240
<v Speaker 2>at Kerman Armann dash O Bennett at Dashbot and Kilbrooks

1:09:05.360 --> 1:09:08.360
<v Speaker 2>at Kilbrooks. And thank you to our producer Moses ONEm

1:09:08.560 --> 1:09:11.240
<v Speaker 2>and from our Oddlots content, go to Bloomberg dot com

1:09:11.240 --> 1:09:13.840
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1:09:22.640 --> 1:09:25.640
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1:09:25.760 --> 1:09:29.160
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