Speaker 1: Pushkin from Pushkin Industries. This is Deep Background the show
Speaker 1: where we explored the stories behind the stories in the news.
Speaker 1: I'm Noah Feldman. Is Donald Trump leading US into war
Speaker 1: with Iran? One of the signature accomplishments, maybe the signature
Speaker 1: accomplishment of Barack Obama's administration in foreign policy, was a
Speaker 1: complex multi party deal between the United States and Iran
Speaker 1: that ultimately guaranteed that the United States would increasingly allow
Speaker 1: a normalization of international relations for Iran in exchange for
Speaker 1: Iran holding back on its nuclear ambitions. Donald Trump came
Speaker 1: into office having intensely criticized that plan, and since then
Speaker 1: he's adopted a systematic strategy intended to put the screws
Speaker 1: on Iran. But what options does that leave Iran? In
Speaker 1: response to discuss this extremely pressing and worrisome topic, I'm
Speaker 1: thrilled to have with me. Vali Nasser Vali is a
Speaker 1: Middle East scholar, a foreign policy advisor, and a commentator
Speaker 1: on international relations. From twenty and twelve until twenty nineteen,
Speaker 1: he was the dean of the John Hopkins School of
Speaker 1: Advanced International Studies in Washington, DC, and he was a
Speaker 1: special advisor before that in the Obama administration focusing on
Speaker 1: Afghanistan and Pakistan policy. There's nobody that I can think
Speaker 1: of better qualified to talk about these issues. VALI welcome,
Speaker 1: Thank you. So I want to start by asking you
Speaker 1: how bad do you think things are at this moment.
Speaker 1: I think they are. They are bad largely because the
Speaker 1: President's strategy with their on at one level looks like
Speaker 1: very it's very clear. At another level it actually is
Speaker 1: somewhat rather less so. President Trump walked away from the
Speaker 1: nuclear deal and very successfully put a tremendous amount of
Speaker 1: pressure on Europeans, Chinese, Indians, Russians to stop trading with
Speaker 1: Iran and to try to crush Iran's economy. It wasn't
Speaker 1: clear what the purpose is. He said, well, the purpose
Speaker 1: that the maximum pressure is to bring Iran to the
Speaker 1: table so that they would negotiate. His national security advisor
Speaker 1: and his Secretary of State seemed to be suggesting that
Speaker 1: the goal is something much bigger. You know, there words
Speaker 1: expelling Iran literally from Middle East, out of Iraq's area, Afhanistan,
Speaker 1: the Persian Gulf, Yemen, but even further, perhaps pushing for
Speaker 1: regime change in Iran. Trump seems to be essentially talking
Speaker 1: from the both side of his mouth, escalating pressure very
Speaker 1: dangerously narrowing the field for diplomacy, and yet saying that
Speaker 1: he doesn't want war and he wants to talk. But
Speaker 1: in the meantime, he hasn't created any way in which
Speaker 1: the two sides can literally climb down from the tree
Speaker 1: and engage. In fact, Secretary Pompeo and President Trump as rhetorics,
Speaker 1: continuously makes it almost impossible to engage in any kind
Speaker 1: of fruitful talks. So you mentioned, and I think you're
Speaker 1: completely right that the administration sounds like it has two
Speaker 1: different Iran policies. Trump says that he wants to do
Speaker 1: something very similar to the policy that he's tried to
Speaker 1: pursue with everybody else in the world, namely, up the
Speaker 1: pressure on them to get the renegotiation of some pre
Speaker 1: existing deal that he doesn't like. And you know, that's
Speaker 1: Trump talking about NAFTA, that's Trump talking about trade with China,
Speaker 1: that's Trump talking about North Korea. I mean, that's just
Speaker 1: his If he has a vision of how to do
Speaker 1: things in life, that's the vision. But that, of course,
Speaker 1: as you say, implies actual deal making at the end
Speaker 1: of the process. And then you have the Bolton Pompeo view, which,
Speaker 1: as you say, sometimes seems like it's even varying to
Speaker 1: the point of calling for regime change, where the punchline
Speaker 1: is not we talk to you. The punchline is the opposite,
Speaker 1: We want you to come, we want you to be
Speaker 1: to be brought down. Now, I want to ask whether
Speaker 1: that incoherence is seen in in your mind as genuine incoherence.
Speaker 1: Is it the result of just Trump thinking something different
Speaker 1: from what is national security advisor and his secretary of
Speaker 1: State think, or is it more sophisticated than that. Is
Speaker 1: it a kind of two pronged approach where Trump knows
Speaker 1: that the hard line from Bolton and Pompeo strengthens his threat,
Speaker 1: makes him more credible as a threat, and hopes that
Speaker 1: he can then say to the Iranians, Look, you know,
Speaker 1: I have to deal with my Secretary of State of
Speaker 1: my national security advisor, so I have to stay tough
Speaker 1: with you, but look, I will intervene and do a
Speaker 1: deal with you. Do so, do you think the US
Speaker 1: side is incoherent or that Trump is crazy like a fox?
Speaker 1: I think increasingly over the past two years, people have
Speaker 1: come to let's say the Iranians have come to conclude
Speaker 1: that it's incoherence that ultimately Trump has one agenda, which
Speaker 1: is to have talks. He says he doesn't want war,
Speaker 1: and then he's employed people who essentially are pursuing a
Speaker 1: very different strategy. And then, you know, the Iranians compare
Speaker 1: notes with the North Koreans, and the North Korean assumptions
Speaker 1: is the same that you can go in a room
Speaker 1: and make any kind of an agreement with Trump, you
Speaker 1: come out and Pompeo and Bolton shredded to pieces. So
Speaker 1: the Iranians have come to see that, yes, Trump doesn't
Speaker 1: want war, but even if you met with Trump and
Speaker 1: you had an agreement, how does this go forward when
Speaker 1: the people who are in charge of actually carrying the
Speaker 1: ball forward after the principles as we call him, that
Speaker 1: the sort of heads of government's meet actually have no
Speaker 1: desire for this to work, and Trump doesn't seem to
Speaker 1: be able to rein him in. So now let's tack
Speaker 1: to the side of the Iranian perspective. So you're dealing
Speaker 1: imagine that you're, you know, advising the Iranian government, and
Speaker 1: the Iranian government is dealing with a government in the
Speaker 1: United States that has two different approaches that are in
Speaker 1: contradiction with each other, and it can't really expect that
Speaker 1: any true deal is going to come out. There won't be,
Speaker 1: as you say, shredded by Bolton and Pompeo. So what's
Speaker 1: the wisest strategy for Iran to pursuer? What can Iran
Speaker 1: do faced with that set of circumstances and added to
Speaker 1: that the part that is having a huge effect on them,
Speaker 1: namely the significant crackdown on their trading capacities. First, let
Speaker 1: me backtrack. So when Trump came out of the nuclear deal,
Speaker 1: the Iranians didn't really react in a big way. There
Speaker 1: was no uptick in anything in particular. They adopted something
Speaker 1: they call a strategic patients. So let's see, they's waited
Speaker 1: out and hopefully the Europeans, Chinese and the Russians will
Speaker 1: be able to create enough trade to just keep things
Speaker 1: going and you could kick the ball down the road.
Speaker 1: The Europeans didn't come through. Maximum pressure proved to be
Speaker 1: extremely effective, and the Iranians decided that that the statusco
Speaker 1: is generally not sustainable. I mean Trump is perfectly free
Speaker 1: to escalate pressure every five months six months, and the
Speaker 1: Europeans and Chinese, Russians, Indians make you growl, but they're
Speaker 1: just going to go along with the American pressure and
Speaker 1: eventually this can either break the regime or it's going
Speaker 1: to lead to war or something worse. So how do
Speaker 1: you break the impast And you can do it in
Speaker 1: two ways. You could basically show up for talks and
Speaker 1: you hope that that actually would create a wedge between
Speaker 1: Bolton Pompey on the one side and Trump on the other,
Speaker 1: or that you can actually escalate in kind, bring it
Speaker 1: to the brink of war, hoping that that also would
Speaker 1: create a wedge between national security advisors who are happy
Speaker 1: to go to war and Trump, who really doesn't want
Speaker 1: to go to war. The first scenario I think the
Speaker 1: Iranians decided was not for them because, unlike North Korea,
Speaker 1: they actually don't have a nuclear weapon, so they don't
Speaker 1: have much to bargain with the US right now. Whatever
Speaker 1: they had they cashed it in to get the deal
Speaker 1: with Obama. Secondly, they do have domestic politics, and Trump
Speaker 1: and Pompeio have left very little room for anybody in
Speaker 1: Iran to be able to come to the table given
Speaker 1: the rhetoric coming out of Washington and Thirdly, the irun
Speaker 1: Is also understand that, unlike North Korea, there is a
Speaker 1: very entrenched and powerful anti Iran and anti talking to
Speaker 1: Iran lobby in the United States, perhaps even led by
Speaker 1: Israel's Prime Minister Netanyahoo, who is very opposed to this idea,
Speaker 1: and that Trump, you know, they could end up meeting
Speaker 1: with Trump. Trump gets this photo opportunity, but there's not
Speaker 1: going to be much American appetite for actually doing something,
Speaker 1: so this is not really the time to talk. On
Speaker 1: the other hand, they decided that if you escalate, if
Speaker 1: you hit tankers, if you shot an down an American drone,
Speaker 1: if you also talked about war, you will force Trump
Speaker 1: to actually confront the consequences of his policy. And that
Speaker 1: would also force first of all, would put it on
Speaker 1: at a much higher level on his radar so that
Speaker 1: he would actually pay attention to what his minions are doing.
Speaker 1: And secondly, that he would create a wedge. And I
Speaker 1: think they running strategy has worked. So when they shut
Speaker 1: down the American drone, which was a very expensive drone
Speaker 1: flying at thirty five thousand feet, they showed that they
Speaker 1: both have the audacity essentially to push for what might
Speaker 1: end up in war. But also they have capability to
Speaker 1: inflict a lot of pain if the United States ended
Speaker 1: up in war with Iran. And also I think they
Speaker 1: signaled to Saudi Arabia, UAE, Bahrain, America's allies in the Gulf,
Speaker 1: that they will take the war to them as well,
Speaker 1: and therefore this can get really ugly. And I think
Speaker 1: they running conclusion was that this paid off. Trump came
Speaker 1: to the edge of making a decision to punish it
Speaker 1: on for shooting down the drone, and then decided to
Speaker 1: walk back, and that opened the wedge between him and
Speaker 1: his national security team, head of CIA, national Security Advisor,
Speaker 1: Secretary of State, all of whom had favored America flexing
Speaker 1: its muscles in response to the shooting down of the drone.
Speaker 1: So I think the Iranians see benefit in enforcing Trump
Speaker 1: to think seriously about something other than maximum pressure bringing
Speaker 1: Iran to the table, which is actually what Iran needs.
Speaker 1: If it is to countenance coming to the table, it
Speaker 1: needs the United States to give it some economic benefits,
Speaker 1: relief some of the economic pressure. So the Iranians could
Speaker 1: even tell their own population that talks is not surrender,
Speaker 1: but rather they're getting something in exchange. For showing up
Speaker 1: for talks, and also that Trump would probably have to
Speaker 1: change his the team that's going to talk to Iran,
Speaker 1: and we already saw that he toyed with the idea
Speaker 1: of Rand Paul playing the role of an envoy. Right.
Speaker 1: I am skeptical that Trump will do can do all
Speaker 1: of this in an election year, but the Iranians may
Speaker 1: have at least bought themselves time until after November twenty
Speaker 1: twenty to see where we go from there. I think
Speaker 1: that's right. And you know what I would like to
Speaker 1: do is try to break it into a simple part
Speaker 1: and a complicated part. The simple part seems to me
Speaker 1: that by shooting down the drone, the Iranians basically said
Speaker 1: to Trump, we're calling your bluff. Are you actually prepared
Speaker 1: to use force against us? And it worked because Trump
Speaker 1: whimped out, you know. I mean, one might think that
Speaker 1: was a good thing or a bad thing, but from
Speaker 1: their perspective, Trump did not retaliate in the end. That
Speaker 1: to me seems like the straightforward part. The complicated part,
Speaker 1: and it's almost mind bendingly complicated, is so now you're
Speaker 1: Iran and you know that although Trump's foreign policy advisors
Speaker 1: are going to keep telling him that he should use
Speaker 1: force against Iran, He's almost certainly not going to do it.
Speaker 1: He doesn't want actual violence, but he does want to
Speaker 1: stick with the weaking of Iran via economic sanctions, and
Speaker 1: maybe that arrangement is one that he's perfectly happy to continue,
Speaker 1: and maybe even his advisers are happy to continue it.
Speaker 1: And from Iran's perspective, there's not much obvious that you
Speaker 1: can do in response. And this is really the crux
Speaker 1: of what I'm trying to understand from the Iranian perspective.
Speaker 1: I mean, if they know that Trump is not likely
Speaker 1: to compromise with them on the trade sanctions that are
Speaker 1: hurting them so much, and they also know that he's
Speaker 1: probably not going to use violence, what benefit do they
Speaker 1: have in continuing to up the ante. They probably don't
Speaker 1: have that much benefit. That they probably need to just
Speaker 1: try to survive. Isn't that sort of the best strategy
Speaker 1: available to them in that moment. Well, in the short run,
Speaker 1: that's the case. But I don't think the Iranians can
Speaker 1: sustain this situation for four years if Trump gets reelected,
Speaker 1: So I think at some point in time they would
Speaker 1: have to take the idea of talking to Trump seriously.
Speaker 1: But what if he just doesn't want to talk. What
Speaker 1: if he actually wants to say about talk about talking,
Speaker 1: but Trump actually doesn't want to talk. I mean, one
Speaker 1: thing that you have to keep in mind about Trump,
Speaker 1: I think, and I'm sure the Iranians do think about this,
Speaker 1: is he doesn't do foreign policy the way you and
Speaker 1: I were brought up to think about foreign policy, where
Speaker 1: you know, we were taught and we teach our students
Speaker 1: choose your objective and then find the rational strategy to
Speaker 1: pursue your objective. But Trump doesn't always do it that way.
Speaker 1: Sometimes he just wants a perception to be created out there, say,
Speaker 1: a perception of toughness aimed primarily to domestic audience. And
Speaker 1: you know, his only constraint is he doesn't want to
Speaker 1: be in a war. Then he does want to look tough,
Speaker 1: and so in that sense, he's not very clearly pursuing
Speaker 1: an objective. You know, you might give him a low
Speaker 1: grade if he were teaching him in foreign policy, but
Speaker 1: it doesn't matter. He's the president of United States and
Speaker 1: this is the policy that he's pursuing. Well, that's exactly
Speaker 1: why this becomes very dangerous because ultimately you have to say, Okay,
Speaker 1: what are Iran's options if Trump doesn't want to talk
Speaker 1: to them and he just wants to apply pressure. So
Speaker 1: either they have to say voluntarily we're going to dismantle
Speaker 1: the regime, which is not likely to happen, right, or
Speaker 1: that they actually, you know, go down the path of
Speaker 1: trying to force Trump to choose between war and diplomacy,
Speaker 1: so they get it to a point that even hanging
Speaker 1: tough would mean that he has to go to war
Speaker 1: with Iran or that he has to talk to them.
Speaker 1: So in a way, you could say, the tables get turned.
Speaker 1: So it's Trump that was originally putting maximum pressure to
Speaker 1: get them to the table, and it could become Iran
Speaker 1: that's putting maximum pressure on Trump to come to the table.
Speaker 1: And I think that's exactly why the way in which
Speaker 1: Trump does foreign policy is so dangerous, because you know,
Speaker 1: he plays with fire without actually wanting to use force
Speaker 1: when it comes to it. I think the point that
Speaker 1: you're making, Valley is is hugely significant, and I think
Speaker 1: I don't think it's been made clearly enough in the
Speaker 1: minds at least of most Americans, even those who followed
Speaker 1: foreign policy pretty closely. So let me say it. Say
Speaker 1: it back to you and see if you tell me
Speaker 1: if I'm getting it right. What I hear you saying
Speaker 1: is that by pursuing this policy, Trump hasn't really taken
Speaker 1: into account that he may push Iron to the point
Speaker 1: where it feels it has to provoke a war, it
Speaker 1: has to come very very close to provoking a war,
Speaker 1: maybe actually provoke a war, just in order to get
Speaker 1: Trump to negotiate and there by to put the power
Speaker 1: in there on their side. And I guess the question
Speaker 1: I have for you there is is that plausible from
Speaker 1: me Iron's perspective? I mean, wouldn't a war? Of course
Speaker 1: they could inflict damage on American allies, They could inflict
Speaker 1: damage on the United States, They could inflict damage on
Speaker 1: Israel and on Saudi Arabia and on the UAE. But
Speaker 1: could they survive a genuine war? And if they couldn't,
Speaker 1: then how much are they going to be willing to
Speaker 1: risk going down that path? Well, you know, the dilemma
Speaker 1: that Trump has created is that if you give Iran
Speaker 1: only bad choices, they're going to pick one of the
Speaker 1: bad choices. I mean, you know, I don't see this
Speaker 1: region voluntarily dismantling. And now it's sort of a body
Speaker 1: into the idea that you could force Trump to blink,
Speaker 1: so they can go down that path of trying to
Speaker 1: have him blink again and again, and they may make
Speaker 1: a mistake or go one step too far and actually
Speaker 1: end up getting a war. I think, you know, the
Speaker 1: irony here is that neither the United States, or at
Speaker 1: least neither Trump nor Iran want war right but there
Speaker 1: is no room right now for anything else. You know,
Speaker 1: as the Trump says the pathway to talks are there,
Speaker 1: but that's not really the case. And therefore, you know,
Speaker 1: the sort of the Iranians have very few options left
Speaker 1: before them other than basically sitting and watching their country
Speaker 1: come apart. And there are those within Iran's hardliners who
Speaker 1: argued that, look, if we're going to end up in
Speaker 1: a war with the United States, it's better we do
Speaker 1: it now when we're still strong, than do it twenty
Speaker 1: years from now. Has happened with Saddam, where nothing is
Speaker 1: left of our institutions. And I think, you know, if
Speaker 1: Trump gets reelected, the Iranians have to look at four
Speaker 1: more years of the same policy, and then they have
Speaker 1: to sort of calculate can they survive four more years
Speaker 1: of the same thing, where every six months Trump keeps escalating,
Speaker 1: or are they going to really force, you know, try
Speaker 1: to force their way out of this situation. Either by
Speaker 1: there are two ways of doing it. They audaciously give
Speaker 1: him an offer of talks that that he can't refuse
Speaker 1: and I don't see that happening under this supreme leader.
Speaker 1: Or they have to force Trump to really think about
Speaker 1: the fact that the danger of war is imminent and
Speaker 1: he needs to find a way out. So I want
Speaker 1: to ask about what this means for moderates in Iran.
Speaker 1: I mean, you describe the position that the hardliners take, namely,
Speaker 1: betterify the war now when we have real leverage, then
Speaker 1: at some later time. If you're an Iranian moderate and
Speaker 1: you supported the deal with Obama and you thought that
Speaker 1: Rohanni had done a good job by brokering that deal,
Speaker 1: now do you have a leg to stand on. I mean,
Speaker 1: I have moderates in Iran just been completely discredited by
Speaker 1: the rise of the Trump policy. Yes, I think that's
Speaker 1: one of the that's one of the tragedies of Trump's
Speaker 1: policy towards Iran. So all the moderates have either been
Speaker 1: marginalized or have been radicalized. Even the moderates are trying
Speaker 1: to distance themselves from the nuclear deal, and in fact,
Speaker 1: even in the past year, there was hope that still
Speaker 1: the Moderates could sustain themselves if Europe actually had stood
Speaker 1: up to Trump and tried to protect doing business with
Speaker 1: Iran even at the risk of sanctions. And Europe folded completely.
Speaker 1: There was no appetite in Europe in any way to
Speaker 1: do something through central banks or governments and actually do
Speaker 1: business with Iran in a way that would keep the
Speaker 1: nuclear deal genuinely alive, so that the moderates really don't
Speaker 1: have anything to offer. And I think some presidential elections,
Speaker 1: parliamentary elections, they're going to be completely sidelines. And in
Speaker 1: a way, in an ironic way, Trump has achieved regime
Speaker 1: change in Iran, except the wrong regime change. He's handed
Speaker 1: Iran to militaristic hardliners who would be now very difficult
Speaker 1: to dislodge going forward. I wanted to ask about the
Speaker 1: Europeans and why they did fold so immediately and completely.
Speaker 1: You know, when when the obaministration was putting the finishing
Speaker 1: touches on the Iran Deal, one of the structures that
Speaker 1: seemed to be actually desirable was that even if the
Speaker 1: United Dates were to back out of the deal in
Speaker 1: a future administration, it was still nominally up to Europe
Speaker 1: to continue to make its own judgment about whether Iran
Speaker 1: had renected on the deal and therefore to continue trade.
Speaker 1: And the theory at the time many people believe this,
Speaker 1: I certainly thought it at the time was that this
Speaker 1: was a good failsafe measure in the deal that even
Speaker 1: if the United States backed out, it wouldn't really matter
Speaker 1: the United States had backed out because Iran could still
Speaker 1: do business with Europeans. But as you noted, the Trump
Speaker 1: administration applied some pressure and the Europeans completely backed down.
Speaker 1: Why is that just because they have so many of
Speaker 1: their own worries about Trump that they don't want to
Speaker 1: annoy him about Iran or is it based on any
Speaker 1: actual attitude towards Iran. I think they may hide behind
Speaker 1: attitude towards Iran, like you know, because Iran has missiles
Speaker 1: or his bola, this makes it difficult for us to
Speaker 1: abide by the nuclear deal. But but the reality of
Speaker 1: it is that Trump showed with Europe that the emperor
Speaker 1: has no clothes, you know, as the Europeans have no
Speaker 1: will of their own and there are not really independent
Speaker 1: international actors. That Europe, for all practical purposes, is a
Speaker 1: vestige of American foreign policy, even though Trump looks down
Speaker 1: on Europe and likes to weaken Europe, but in reality
Speaker 1: has also shown that Europeans really are not independent of
Speaker 1: US foreign policy. Now, this has much broader implications. It's
Speaker 1: not about Iran. If you're China, if you're Russia, if
Speaker 1: you're any other country around the world sitting and watching this,
Speaker 1: you basically come to the same conclusion that you know,
Speaker 1: if there is an international deal that the Europeans step
Speaker 1: in and say, well, you're we're the brokers, as a
Speaker 1: big unit in international affairs, as protectors of rule of law, multilateralism.
Speaker 1: We're going to put our name to this deal. It's meaningless.
Speaker 1: And one of the outcomes of this entire thing is
Speaker 1: that Trump has basically shredded European legitimacy and shown Europe
Speaker 1: to be vassals of the United States. And that has
Speaker 1: broad implications if you would, for the great power rivalry
Speaker 1: that is likely to unfold going forward between Russia, China,
Speaker 1: and the United States. And again, I think a folly
Speaker 1: of Trump's foreign policy is that if that's really the case,
Speaker 1: if it's really the big game of big power is
Speaker 1: between you and China and Russia, it always would have
Speaker 1: benefited the United States to have Europe as a foil,
Speaker 1: as a fourth partner there that looks like, you know,
Speaker 1: is an independent actor, and then you know, would benefit
Speaker 1: the United States interests. By completely shredding Europe's credibility, Trump
Speaker 1: has ended up i think, weekend in America's hand internationally
Speaker 1: because the Europeans won't matter to the great power rivalry anymore. Well,
Speaker 1: I wanted to also ask you about a really interesting
Speaker 1: piece that you wrote where you argued in The Atlantic
Speaker 1: that Trump's Iran policy is a gift to China. That's
Speaker 1: not intuitive at all, and you make a pretty complex
Speaker 1: and interesting argument. So I wonder if you would just
Speaker 1: describe that argument. Well, you know, we we often when
Speaker 1: we think about China and rivalry with China, we only
Speaker 1: think about East Asia in the vestige of America's old
Speaker 1: thinking that we think of China as a pacific power.
Speaker 1: China is increasingly a continental power. Its interests are moving westwards.
Speaker 1: It's even population and industries are moving westwards. And the
Speaker 1: entire idea of the new sale crowd that Shishimping has
Speaker 1: put on the table, or the Belt and Road as
Speaker 1: it's more popularly known, is the one that would connect
Speaker 1: Asia to Africa and then to Europe. I mean, the
Speaker 1: Chinese have a conception of Eurasia, which is essentially from
Speaker 1: eastern China all the way to Ireland, as being a
Speaker 1: zone of influence, economic influence for the Chinese, and the
Speaker 1: Middle East and Iran are big pieces in the middle
Speaker 1: of this, and the Chinese have been pushing into the
Speaker 1: Middle East, into Saudi Arabia, into UAE, into Pakistan, into Afghanistan,
Speaker 1: and into Iran in a big way. And the United
Speaker 1: States sort of conducts policy with Iran and the Middle
Speaker 1: East as if we are still in the Bush era?
Speaker 1: What is the United States is the only outside actor
Speaker 1: that matters, and increasingly when it comes to diplomacy, nowadays,
Speaker 1: Russians are the ones that matter. And when it comes
Speaker 1: to economics, it's the Chinese that matter. And ultimately, if
Speaker 1: the United States going to contain China, it would have
Speaker 1: to contain it globally, not just with trade or in
Speaker 1: the eastern part of China in the Pacific. It has
Speaker 1: to think about how do you contain China's influenced in
Speaker 1: the Middle East, and how do you make sure that
Speaker 1: the Chinese don't become or the Iranians don't become essentially
Speaker 1: an extension of China's foreign policy and China's economic policy,
Speaker 1: and isolation of Iran from the West essentially eventually turn
Speaker 1: irund in the direction of China. The Chinese will end
Speaker 1: up developing Iran's gas fields one now that total left,
Speaker 1: they will end up developing Iran's infrastructure, Iran's oil fields.
Speaker 1: And even now, the Chinese are perhaps the only ones
Speaker 1: that are continuing to buy Irani aoid. You know, you're
Speaker 1: making decisions about Iran without thinking about the broader ramifications
Speaker 1: of what this means for the bigger fight against China.
Speaker 1: And I think another thing that we're not paying attention
Speaker 1: to is that as we're isolating Iran, the Russians are
Speaker 1: deepening their strategic partnership with Iran. Yeah, and that means
Speaker 1: that Iran and Russia in Syria have built a deep
Speaker 1: state to deep state relationship, intelligence, security, military relationship. They
Speaker 1: have successfully prosecuted a war jointly. We may think, oh,
Speaker 1: they don't like each other, they don't agree their interests
Speaker 1: are different. That is, looking at the glass as half
Speaker 1: empty half full. Sight of it it is now you
Speaker 1: have close to a decade of very successful military intelligence
Speaker 1: cooperation that extends to now increasingly meetings between Revolutionary Guard
Speaker 1: commanders and Russian FSB and military commanders, coordination of policy
Speaker 1: on Afghanistan, for instance, between Iran and Russia, coordination of
Speaker 1: policy on Syria. And Iran, because it no longer has
Speaker 1: absolutely any relationship with the United States, it's kind of
Speaker 1: a potential future base for Russia. I mean, you could
Speaker 1: see the Russians may think that ten years from now
Speaker 1: they may be selling Iran advanced military aircraft s, four
Speaker 1: hundred missiles of the kind that's just sold Turkey. They
Speaker 1: may get basis in Iran. And the United States is
Speaker 1: not only handing over Iran to China economically and weakening
Speaker 1: China's competitors in Asia by cutting them out of Iran,
Speaker 1: but it's actually ending Iran over to Russia as well.
Speaker 1: And so the Russians don't want war, but the Russians
Speaker 1: are very happy to see Iran alienated from the West
Speaker 1: because in the future the only place Iran will have
Speaker 1: to go will be to Russia. Well, I think that's
Speaker 1: a good summary really of your analysis, Valley. I mean
Speaker 1: Trump's approached generally by isolating and alienating Iran first, gives
Speaker 1: Iranians an incentive to up the ante and look to war,
Speaker 1: and that might involve a situation where we actually get
Speaker 1: into a war with Iran. As a fallback to that,
Speaker 1: we're pushing Iran into China's arms economically and into Russia's
Speaker 1: arms militarily. If there's a more thoroughgoing condemnation of a
Speaker 1: foreign policy than that, I can't really imagine it. So
Speaker 1: I'm very grateful to you for that very penetrating and
Speaker 1: thoughtful analysis. I think it's a wake up call to
Speaker 1: think about how this relationship is developing. And if Trump
Speaker 1: is reelected, it seems as though there's a high problem
Speaker 1: that that's the direction which which things will go. I
Speaker 1: think it's hard to see a likely mid course correction
Speaker 1: from Trump on those things. So here, again, as on
Speaker 1: many other issues, so much depends on what happens in
Speaker 1: our next election exactly. Let's hope for the best. Let's
Speaker 1: hope for the best. Thank you so much for I
Speaker 1: really appreciate your time and your insight. Thank you as
Speaker 1: good being with you since I talked to Valinasser. John
Speaker 1: Bolton has actually left his post as National Security Advisor,
Speaker 1: which leads me to our Sound of the Week. Bolton
Speaker 1: was on the guidance to be here, so we're YouTube
Speaker 1: blindsided by what occurred today that he's no longer with
Speaker 1: the administration. Was it news to you today because last
Speaker 1: night you were. I'm never surprised that Secretary of State
Speaker 1: Mike Pompeo not a close friend of the outgoing National
Speaker 1: Security Advisor, answering questions from reporters at a press conference
Speaker 1: he held with Treasury Secretary Stephen Mnuchen on Tuesday, right
Speaker 1: after John Bulton's departure was made public. Now it is
Speaker 1: unclear whether Bolton resigned or was fired. It depends on
Speaker 1: who you believe. Trump tweeted that he had fired Bolton.
Speaker 1: Bolton tweeted that he had offered his resignation voluntarily either way,
Speaker 1: and honestly, who really cares. Here are my thoughts on
Speaker 1: what the departure means for US foreign policy at large.
Speaker 1: The hiring of John Bolton was, from the beginning a
Speaker 1: very strange thing for Donald Trump to have done. Donald
Speaker 1: Trump did not run as a neo conservative, the kind
Speaker 1: of politician who thinks the United States should promote global
Speaker 1: interests in democracy and human rights by force if necessary. Instead,
Speaker 1: he ran as a kind of isolationist and as someone
Speaker 1: who said that he liked to do deals economically, not
Speaker 1: to fight wars. Indeed, since becoming president, Donald Trump has
Speaker 1: been notably cautious about using force in almost any place
Speaker 1: around the globe, including under circumstances when most prior presidents,
Speaker 1: Republican and Democratic alike, probably would have at least fired
Speaker 1: off some missiles. So it was very, very surprising when
Speaker 1: he hired in John Bolton, a national security advisor who
Speaker 1: was well known within the George W. Bush administration, not
Speaker 1: to mention the earlier administrations he worked for as being
Speaker 1: the most pro intervention, the most shoot him up, the
Speaker 1: most aggressive guy in the entire administration. Sure, Trump had
Speaker 1: heard Bolton talking tough on Fox News, but the kind
Speaker 1: of tough talking that Bolton was doing was not an
Speaker 1: obvious fit for the policies that Trump was trying to adopt.
Speaker 1: The consequence of having a national security advisor whose policy
Speaker 1: approach was so different from the presidents was not what
Speaker 1: you might imagine for meeting dars Kern's Goodwin's team of rivals.
Speaker 1: This was not Donald Trump as Abraham Lincoln, trying to
Speaker 1: balance the impulses that he himself might have against different
Speaker 1: impulses of thoughtful members of his advisory group, so that
Speaker 1: they would balance each other. Hear different opinions and read
Speaker 1: some moderate middle To the contrary, Trump just continued to
Speaker 1: run foreign policy his own way, while Bolton made every
Speaker 1: effort to rein him in. The President would meet with
Speaker 1: the president of North Korea, and John Bolton would try
Speaker 1: to undercut the meeting. At one moment. In order for
Speaker 1: Trump to actually cross into North Korea, Bolton had to
Speaker 1: be sent off on a mission to Mongolia. I mean,
Speaker 1: you can't make this stuff up. The effect of this,
Speaker 1: and you heard this in my conversation with Bali, is
Speaker 1: that countries around the world are trying to figure out
Speaker 1: what is the policy of the United States under circumstances
Speaker 1: when the President and the National Security Advisor are aiming
Speaker 1: in what appeared to be almost exactly opposite directions. A
Speaker 1: president who no longer is burdened by a national secure
Speaker 1: advisor who is contradicting him would ordinarily be a good thing.
Speaker 1: It would ordinarily mean that the president would not have
Speaker 1: to spend his time arguing with his chief foreign policy adviser.
Speaker 1: It would also ordinarily mean that other countries trying to
Speaker 1: suss out what US policy is would not have to
Speaker 1: spend their time on the palace intrigue of conflict and contradiction.
Speaker 1: The question is, when the president is Donald Trump, does
Speaker 1: greater clarity of his foreign policy make us think the
Speaker 1: United States will be better off than it was otherwise.
Speaker 1: To be sure, I am not saying that it would
Speaker 1: have been better if John Bolton had gotten his way.
Speaker 1: His aggressive policies have a reasonable probability of getting the
Speaker 1: United States into violent confrontations that it frankly does not need,
Speaker 1: at least not in my view. So it's not really
Speaker 1: a question of whether Bolton's policies would have been better
Speaker 1: than Trump's in every instance. Rather, it's a question of
Speaker 1: whether Trump is a better president and I use those
Speaker 1: words in scare quotes when he's being constrained and limited
Speaker 1: by anyone who disagrees with him, then he is. When
Speaker 1: he's following his own impulses, whatever those may be. My
Speaker 1: own view is that despite the enormous costs of having
Speaker 1: a national security advisor and a president whose views were
Speaker 1: so fundamentally opposed, there was an accidental side benefit. And
Speaker 1: the accidental side benefit was that a president whose national
Speaker 1: security advisor disagree with him couldn't do much of anything.
Speaker 1: And when it comes to Donald Trump and foreign policy,
Speaker 1: the best outcome with the world can hope for, the
Speaker 1: best outcome the United States can hope for is that
Speaker 1: we do no harm. The less the president can do,
Speaker 1: the fewer agreements he can reach, the fewer wars he
Speaker 1: can enter. The less the president can do, the safer
Speaker 1: we all are. And I don't mean just we Americans,
Speaker 1: I mean we people who live in the world. So
Speaker 1: when I say that it's a bit of a sad
Speaker 1: thing that John Bolton is no longer the National Security Advisor,
Speaker 1: believe me, I'm not saying a single good thing about
Speaker 1: John Bolton. What I'm saying is that if Trump were
Speaker 1: to manage his own foreign policy unconstrained and unlimited, the
Speaker 1: random walk of his impulses and approaches could potentially endanger everybody.
Speaker 1: Departure of John Bolton is not the kind of event
Speaker 1: that makes you weep or cry for the man who's
Speaker 1: left his job. On the other hand, it does make
Speaker 1: me just a little bit more nervous for what's going
Speaker 1: on with foreign policy in the United States. Deep Background
Speaker 1: is brought to you by Pushkin Industries. Our producer is
Speaker 1: Lydia Geancott, with engineering by Jason Gambrell and Jason Rostkowski.
Speaker 1: Our showrunner is Sophie mckibbon. Our theme music is composed
Speaker 1: by Luis GERA special thanks to the Pushkin Brass, Malcolm Gladwell,
Speaker 1: Jacob Weisberg, and Mia Loebell. I'm Noah Feldman. You can
Speaker 1: follow me on Twitter at Noah R. Feldman. This is
Speaker 1: Deep Background.