1 00:00:04,400 --> 00:00:07,800 Speaker 1: Welcome to tech Stuff, a production from I Heart Radio. 2 00:00:12,080 --> 00:00:14,960 Speaker 1: Hey there, and welcome to tech Stuff. I'm your host, 3 00:00:15,120 --> 00:00:17,959 Speaker 1: Jonathan Strickland. I am an executive producer with I Heart 4 00:00:18,040 --> 00:00:20,840 Speaker 1: Radio and a love of all things tech. And this 5 00:00:21,440 --> 00:00:27,520 Speaker 1: is the news episode for Tuesday, January nineteen one. And 6 00:00:27,800 --> 00:00:32,640 Speaker 1: let's just dive right into it. Parlor or Parley, the 7 00:00:32,760 --> 00:00:35,920 Speaker 1: social networking platform that aims to be a place where 8 00:00:36,360 --> 00:00:39,840 Speaker 1: free speeches held above all else, has a new home, 9 00:00:40,320 --> 00:00:43,120 Speaker 1: at least for its u r L. You might remember 10 00:00:43,400 --> 00:00:47,400 Speaker 1: that Parlor saw Apple, Google, and Amazon all close off 11 00:00:47,400 --> 00:00:51,120 Speaker 1: support for the service, removing apps from stores, and, in 12 00:00:51,159 --> 00:00:54,640 Speaker 1: the case of Amazon, shutting down the servers that actually 13 00:00:54,720 --> 00:00:57,920 Speaker 1: hosted the site. All of this was done due to 14 00:00:57,960 --> 00:01:01,760 Speaker 1: the content being posted to Parlor, much of it from 15 00:01:01,800 --> 00:01:07,280 Speaker 1: extremists advocating for violence. When the site proved either unwilling 16 00:01:07,480 --> 00:01:11,160 Speaker 1: or unable to rein in the user base and moderate 17 00:01:11,520 --> 00:01:15,440 Speaker 1: such things, the other companies started to pull the plug 18 00:01:15,680 --> 00:01:19,160 Speaker 1: on the service. The site now has a registered domain 19 00:01:19,280 --> 00:01:23,600 Speaker 1: on EPIC servers. That's e p i K founded in 20 00:01:23,680 --> 00:01:29,520 Speaker 1: two thousand nine. Epic says it quote offers cheap domain names, hosting, domaining, 21 00:01:29,640 --> 00:01:33,440 Speaker 1: and more end quote, but it might be better known 22 00:01:33,600 --> 00:01:36,280 Speaker 1: as the hosting service that is home to many far 23 00:01:36,440 --> 00:01:40,240 Speaker 1: right extremist sites and services. It's the home for the 24 00:01:40,319 --> 00:01:44,840 Speaker 1: social network gab, which is associated with far right extremist groups, 25 00:01:44,959 --> 00:01:51,320 Speaker 1: neo Nazis, and white supremacists. So yikes, Parlor is not 26 00:01:51,760 --> 00:01:55,240 Speaker 1: really back, at least not yet. It has its domain, 27 00:01:55,680 --> 00:01:58,440 Speaker 1: but the homepage is just a landing page with a 28 00:01:58,520 --> 00:02:01,880 Speaker 1: message on it. It will take time to transfer Parlor's 29 00:02:01,920 --> 00:02:05,040 Speaker 1: data to new servers, and it isn't clear how much 30 00:02:05,280 --> 00:02:08,280 Speaker 1: needs to be actually rebuilt from the ground up. There 31 00:02:08,320 --> 00:02:12,200 Speaker 1: are conflicting messages on that front. Some of those messages 32 00:02:12,240 --> 00:02:16,040 Speaker 1: suggest that the code used for Parlor wasn't dependent upon 33 00:02:16,160 --> 00:02:20,280 Speaker 1: Amazon's proprietary tools, which would make it easier to port 34 00:02:20,360 --> 00:02:22,680 Speaker 1: over to a new home, but there are other messages 35 00:02:22,720 --> 00:02:26,080 Speaker 1: that indicate that much of Parlor did depend on Amazon's tools, 36 00:02:26,520 --> 00:02:29,320 Speaker 1: and since those tools won't be present at Epic, it 37 00:02:29,360 --> 00:02:33,880 Speaker 1: will require rebuilding Moreover, the process of moving a service 38 00:02:34,040 --> 00:02:38,120 Speaker 1: from one hosting company to another is time consuming and expensive. 39 00:02:38,360 --> 00:02:41,080 Speaker 1: It can take years, even if you are planning it 40 00:02:41,160 --> 00:02:45,440 Speaker 1: in advance, to migrate to different servers, and, as The 41 00:02:45,480 --> 00:02:49,000 Speaker 1: Atlantic pointed out in a recent piece titled what comes 42 00:02:49,040 --> 00:02:52,440 Speaker 1: after Parlor. A lot of companies that offer tools to 43 00:02:52,560 --> 00:02:56,639 Speaker 1: help with migration are refusing to work with Parlor because 44 00:02:56,720 --> 00:03:00,639 Speaker 1: the association with that platform is pretty darn and toxic, 45 00:03:00,720 --> 00:03:03,760 Speaker 1: to say the least. Parlor has also been in the 46 00:03:03,760 --> 00:03:08,440 Speaker 1: news for having truly atrocious privacy and security measures in place, 47 00:03:08,960 --> 00:03:12,440 Speaker 1: which means the service effectively exposed users to a great 48 00:03:12,480 --> 00:03:17,000 Speaker 1: deal of scrutiny. That's something that can benefit organizations like 49 00:03:17,080 --> 00:03:21,720 Speaker 1: the FBI, as agents are conducting investigations regarding the siege 50 00:03:21,800 --> 00:03:26,160 Speaker 1: at the Capitol on January six, but it's not necessarily 51 00:03:26,240 --> 00:03:30,440 Speaker 1: a selling point for users. Here's my ultimate take on 52 00:03:30,520 --> 00:03:34,360 Speaker 1: the subject. I understand the call for free speech. It 53 00:03:34,520 --> 00:03:38,440 Speaker 1: is incredibly important. I mean, that's why it is the 54 00:03:38,520 --> 00:03:43,800 Speaker 1: first Amendment to the United States Constitution. But Parlor wasn't 55 00:03:43,920 --> 00:03:47,520 Speaker 1: some sort of equal platform for all speech, as much 56 00:03:47,560 --> 00:03:50,400 Speaker 1: as it was touting itself to be. It was funded 57 00:03:50,440 --> 00:03:54,120 Speaker 1: by people who had previously funded Cambridge Analytica, and it 58 00:03:54,200 --> 00:03:56,480 Speaker 1: was used by people who were employing the type of 59 00:03:56,560 --> 00:04:00,920 Speaker 1: language that's used in white supremacist rhetoric. It's all designed 60 00:04:00,920 --> 00:04:05,160 Speaker 1: to recruit new members. It wasn't a town square, it 61 00:04:05,280 --> 00:04:09,560 Speaker 1: was a radicalization engine. Now, this is a complex problem, 62 00:04:09,840 --> 00:04:13,920 Speaker 1: one that holds up conflicting and foundational values, and it 63 00:04:14,000 --> 00:04:17,960 Speaker 1: shows us that life is complicated. There are times when 64 00:04:18,000 --> 00:04:21,000 Speaker 1: we as a society have to make a call whether 65 00:04:21,120 --> 00:04:24,320 Speaker 1: to lean more on protecting free speech or more on 66 00:04:24,480 --> 00:04:29,080 Speaker 1: protecting the underpinnings of democracy itself. As for Parlor's return, 67 00:04:29,440 --> 00:04:32,839 Speaker 1: there's still no published timeline for that as of this recording. 68 00:04:33,279 --> 00:04:36,280 Speaker 1: There are other tools out there that extremists have been 69 00:04:36,400 --> 00:04:40,839 Speaker 1: using for communication and organizing, some that predated Parlor, but 70 00:04:40,920 --> 00:04:43,279 Speaker 1: most of them don't have the same amount of visibility 71 00:04:43,279 --> 00:04:47,240 Speaker 1: that Parlor did, and so right now they're not necessarily 72 00:04:47,279 --> 00:04:50,640 Speaker 1: as heavily trafficked. We'll have to wait to see if 73 00:04:50,680 --> 00:04:57,599 Speaker 1: anything happens on inauguration day, that being January, and even 74 00:04:57,640 --> 00:05:01,080 Speaker 1: more sobering is the thought that moving for Word will 75 00:05:01,160 --> 00:05:04,880 Speaker 1: have to be vigilant in an effort to counteract the radicalization. 76 00:05:05,400 --> 00:05:08,839 Speaker 1: Otherwise we're going to see more acts of violence and terrorism, 77 00:05:08,880 --> 00:05:11,960 Speaker 1: and we'll likely see reactions to that grow more extreme 78 00:05:12,000 --> 00:05:16,880 Speaker 1: as well, from surveillance to enforcement. In other words, right 79 00:05:16,920 --> 00:05:20,359 Speaker 1: now we are on the precipice of things getting a 80 00:05:20,480 --> 00:05:24,280 Speaker 1: whole lot worse if we don't make very good decisions 81 00:05:24,320 --> 00:05:29,680 Speaker 1: moving forward, and in the meantime, their entire vulnerable populations 82 00:05:29,680 --> 00:05:33,800 Speaker 1: that are depending on the rest of us making those decisions. 83 00:05:33,800 --> 00:05:36,480 Speaker 1: So it creates even more responsibility for all of us 84 00:05:37,080 --> 00:05:41,840 Speaker 1: to employ those two things I constantly call for compassion 85 00:05:42,000 --> 00:05:45,520 Speaker 1: and critical thinking. We've got to make use of those 86 00:05:45,760 --> 00:05:49,160 Speaker 1: to make sure that we forge a good path forward 87 00:05:49,600 --> 00:05:52,799 Speaker 1: and we don't just sweep things under the rug where 88 00:05:52,880 --> 00:05:55,960 Speaker 1: it can fester and grow worse and the status quo 89 00:05:56,080 --> 00:05:59,280 Speaker 1: is maintained. Because the status quo is not it's not 90 00:05:59,360 --> 00:06:02,880 Speaker 1: good enough eyes And getting back to Parlor and security, 91 00:06:03,000 --> 00:06:05,599 Speaker 1: that security was so poor that in the hours leading 92 00:06:05,640 --> 00:06:10,520 Speaker 1: up to Amazon giving Parlor the boot, numerous hackers scraped 93 00:06:10,600 --> 00:06:13,760 Speaker 1: the service to archive as much information as possible. And 94 00:06:13,800 --> 00:06:16,760 Speaker 1: when I say hackers, it could be anyone. It could 95 00:06:16,760 --> 00:06:20,320 Speaker 1: be Independence, it could be people working on behalf of 96 00:06:20,320 --> 00:06:22,800 Speaker 1: the United States government. It could be people working on 97 00:06:22,839 --> 00:06:26,640 Speaker 1: behalf of other governments. The list goes on, and the 98 00:06:26,720 --> 00:06:30,120 Speaker 1: content included not just the stuff that was posted publicly 99 00:06:30,160 --> 00:06:34,000 Speaker 1: to Parlor, but also the locations and sometimes the identities 100 00:06:34,040 --> 00:06:37,000 Speaker 1: of thousands of people on the service, and by linking 101 00:06:37,080 --> 00:06:40,680 Speaker 1: locations to posts, people have found potential links to the 102 00:06:40,800 --> 00:06:44,520 Speaker 1: riots and d C showing how participating on parlor could 103 00:06:44,520 --> 00:06:47,800 Speaker 1: create a digital trail that agencies like the FBI could 104 00:06:47,800 --> 00:06:52,480 Speaker 1: find particularly interesting, and it's a reminder that security and 105 00:06:52,600 --> 00:06:56,960 Speaker 1: privacy are really important. While I think it is also 106 00:06:57,040 --> 00:07:00,160 Speaker 1: important for people who are subverting the democratic process US 107 00:07:00,160 --> 00:07:03,880 Speaker 1: to be held accountable, I kind of find it disturbing 108 00:07:03,920 --> 00:07:08,400 Speaker 1: to think about how a total failure in privacy for 109 00:07:08,440 --> 00:07:13,680 Speaker 1: a social network like this leads to abuse anyway. One 110 00:07:13,720 --> 00:07:16,440 Speaker 1: group that archived a lot of information, and it did 111 00:07:16,480 --> 00:07:20,520 Speaker 1: so without needing to hack anything was Pro Publica, the 112 00:07:20,600 --> 00:07:26,120 Speaker 1: nonprofit news organization. Pro Publica employees copied videos that were 113 00:07:26,160 --> 00:07:29,720 Speaker 1: publicly uploaded to parlors, so they weren't, you know, scraping 114 00:07:29,800 --> 00:07:32,680 Speaker 1: data or anything. They were literally grabbing the stuff that 115 00:07:32,800 --> 00:07:36,000 Speaker 1: was available for anyone to look at, and collectively, Pro 116 00:07:36,080 --> 00:07:39,720 Speaker 1: Publica preserved more than five hundred videos that the news 117 00:07:39,800 --> 00:07:43,600 Speaker 1: organization determined had been taken during the riots on January six, 118 00:07:44,320 --> 00:07:49,200 Speaker 1: creating a thorough record of how those events unfolded. I 119 00:07:49,280 --> 00:07:54,880 Speaker 1: don't recommend watching them if you are easily affected by 120 00:07:55,560 --> 00:08:00,200 Speaker 1: scenes of violence and violent rhetoric. It is hard stuff 121 00:08:00,200 --> 00:08:04,160 Speaker 1: to watch, but it's also incredibly important to maintain that 122 00:08:04,800 --> 00:08:08,880 Speaker 1: as a record of what happened, and to remind people 123 00:08:09,640 --> 00:08:12,080 Speaker 1: of again what happens if we sweep things under the 124 00:08:12,160 --> 00:08:14,960 Speaker 1: rug and we try to pretend like nothing is wrong, 125 00:08:15,400 --> 00:08:19,160 Speaker 1: this stuff just gets worse. And sticking with the riots 126 00:08:19,320 --> 00:08:23,400 Speaker 1: for a bit longer, the FBI filed an affidavit against 127 00:08:23,480 --> 00:08:28,120 Speaker 1: a woman named Riley June Williams of Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, who 128 00:08:28,160 --> 00:08:30,840 Speaker 1: participated in the riots at the US Capital. There are 129 00:08:30,880 --> 00:08:34,560 Speaker 1: images of her up online, so she was there on 130 00:08:34,640 --> 00:08:39,400 Speaker 1: January six, and according to the affidavit, Williams had planned 131 00:08:39,520 --> 00:08:44,280 Speaker 1: to steal the House of Representatives Speaker Nancy Pelosi's laptop, 132 00:08:44,679 --> 00:08:47,200 Speaker 1: so the Speaker of the House her laptop, and the 133 00:08:47,280 --> 00:08:51,520 Speaker 1: goal was to ultimately sell this laptop to a contact 134 00:08:51,559 --> 00:08:55,040 Speaker 1: in Russia. And the plan from there, presumably was to 135 00:08:55,120 --> 00:08:59,920 Speaker 1: then sell the laptop to the Russian government, to an 136 00:09:00,040 --> 00:09:03,320 Speaker 1: intelligence agency in Russia. So this was to be a 137 00:09:03,320 --> 00:09:07,520 Speaker 1: monetary transaction, so effectively, she would be selling out the 138 00:09:07,640 --> 00:09:11,559 Speaker 1: United States to Russia. Now, as I'm recording this, Williams 139 00:09:11,600 --> 00:09:14,000 Speaker 1: remains at large. I do not know if by the 140 00:09:14,040 --> 00:09:16,079 Speaker 1: time you hear this, if that will have changed, but 141 00:09:16,280 --> 00:09:19,520 Speaker 1: as I'm recording that is the case, she has deleted 142 00:09:19,559 --> 00:09:24,560 Speaker 1: her accounts with various social media platforms. She discontinued her 143 00:09:24,559 --> 00:09:27,480 Speaker 1: phone number as well. I imagine the FBI is using 144 00:09:27,520 --> 00:09:30,200 Speaker 1: a lot of different resources to track her down. I'm 145 00:09:30,200 --> 00:09:33,160 Speaker 1: sure they have a lot of questions for her. I 146 00:09:33,200 --> 00:09:35,839 Speaker 1: have a quick update on this story. It turns out 147 00:09:35,960 --> 00:09:41,199 Speaker 1: that Williams turned herself into local police Monday evening after 148 00:09:41,280 --> 00:09:44,760 Speaker 1: I had already finished recording that episode, but wanted to 149 00:09:45,000 --> 00:09:48,600 Speaker 1: update it with the most recent news I had. Moving on, 150 00:09:49,160 --> 00:09:51,880 Speaker 1: and my last story for this section is that on 151 00:09:52,080 --> 00:09:57,239 Speaker 1: January eighth, twenty twenty one, get hub fired an employee. 152 00:09:57,400 --> 00:09:59,920 Speaker 1: And obviously there's more to the story than just that 153 00:10:00,240 --> 00:10:03,160 Speaker 1: companies fire employees all the time. But get hub is 154 00:10:03,200 --> 00:10:06,719 Speaker 1: in the business of offering a software development environment with 155 00:10:06,920 --> 00:10:09,480 Speaker 1: version control features. In case you're not familiar with what 156 00:10:09,520 --> 00:10:13,480 Speaker 1: they do, they sort of help other companies do the 157 00:10:13,559 --> 00:10:16,000 Speaker 1: things they need to do in order to develop the 158 00:10:16,080 --> 00:10:20,040 Speaker 1: software they either depend upon internally or that they incorporate 159 00:10:20,080 --> 00:10:24,080 Speaker 1: into external products. The get hub employee, who is Jewish, 160 00:10:24,280 --> 00:10:28,160 Speaker 1: had posted an internal message on January six two colleagues 161 00:10:28,200 --> 00:10:32,000 Speaker 1: located in Washington, d C. And said that they need 162 00:10:32,040 --> 00:10:36,360 Speaker 1: to stay safe from Nazis. Now, the term Nazi is 163 00:10:36,400 --> 00:10:40,040 Speaker 1: definitely a loaded one that is obvious, it really goes 164 00:10:40,080 --> 00:10:44,560 Speaker 1: without saying, but it also happened to be appropriate, as 165 00:10:44,600 --> 00:10:46,880 Speaker 1: a number of people at the riots and d C 166 00:10:47,679 --> 00:10:52,560 Speaker 1: belonged to neo Nazi organizations. However, a fellow get hub 167 00:10:52,559 --> 00:10:56,760 Speaker 1: employee complained to HR about the use of the term Nazi, 168 00:10:56,800 --> 00:11:01,120 Speaker 1: finding it objectionable, and HR first rep remanded, but then 169 00:11:01,280 --> 00:11:05,880 Speaker 1: later fired the employee two days later. Following this action, 170 00:11:06,080 --> 00:11:09,360 Speaker 1: around two d gethub employees demanded to know the reasons 171 00:11:09,520 --> 00:11:12,440 Speaker 1: for the firing, and they also began to use the 172 00:11:12,480 --> 00:11:16,199 Speaker 1: word Nazi to describe rioters in these various slack channels 173 00:11:16,200 --> 00:11:19,400 Speaker 1: at get hub. So essentially they said, if this is 174 00:11:19,440 --> 00:11:21,560 Speaker 1: why you let that person go, we're all going to 175 00:11:21,760 --> 00:11:25,840 Speaker 1: end up doing the same sort of thing, because it's 176 00:11:25,880 --> 00:11:29,960 Speaker 1: calling something by its name. And this escalated, and on 177 00:11:30,080 --> 00:11:33,720 Speaker 1: January six, the CEO of get hub, Nat Friedman, sent 178 00:11:33,800 --> 00:11:36,520 Speaker 1: an internal message saying the company acted in the wrong 179 00:11:37,160 --> 00:11:39,480 Speaker 1: and that he would extend a public apology to the 180 00:11:39,520 --> 00:11:43,080 Speaker 1: fired employee and that that person's job would be offered 181 00:11:43,120 --> 00:11:46,720 Speaker 1: back to him should he want to return. Freedman also 182 00:11:46,840 --> 00:11:51,400 Speaker 1: committed to keeping internal communications open allowing for a discussion 183 00:11:51,440 --> 00:11:54,240 Speaker 1: of sensitive topics, provided that they are done in a 184 00:11:54,240 --> 00:11:57,840 Speaker 1: professional manner. So in other words, you're not trying to 185 00:11:58,240 --> 00:12:01,360 Speaker 1: use this freedom in a way to site, intimidate, or 186 00:12:01,440 --> 00:12:06,280 Speaker 1: harass other people. Assuming you're not doing that, then they 187 00:12:06,320 --> 00:12:10,719 Speaker 1: are allowing for the discussion of these sensitive topics, particularly 188 00:12:10,880 --> 00:12:17,040 Speaker 1: with regard of making maintaining a safe environment for their employees. Well, 189 00:12:17,280 --> 00:12:20,400 Speaker 1: that is all of the news I have that relates 190 00:12:20,480 --> 00:12:25,800 Speaker 1: to parlor and to the riots on January six. I 191 00:12:25,880 --> 00:12:29,160 Speaker 1: certainly hope that on Thursday I won't have to talk 192 00:12:29,200 --> 00:12:33,000 Speaker 1: about riots that relate to the inauguration, and when we 193 00:12:33,080 --> 00:12:36,800 Speaker 1: come back, we will cover totally different stories. Have nothing 194 00:12:36,800 --> 00:12:39,040 Speaker 1: to do with the rest of that, I promise. But first, 195 00:12:39,120 --> 00:12:49,440 Speaker 1: let's take a quick break. Our first story after the 196 00:12:49,480 --> 00:12:55,000 Speaker 1: break is about Samsung and problems with corruption and leadership. 197 00:12:55,880 --> 00:13:00,440 Speaker 1: Lee J Young, otherwise known as j y Lee, is 198 00:13:00,440 --> 00:13:05,200 Speaker 1: facing a thirty month prison sentence in South Korea. Lee 199 00:13:05,480 --> 00:13:09,920 Speaker 1: is a vice chairman of the mega corporation Samsung. Again 200 00:13:09,960 --> 00:13:13,400 Speaker 1: out of South Korea. Lee has already served some of 201 00:13:13,440 --> 00:13:15,920 Speaker 1: that time for a previous day in prison. This is 202 00:13:15,960 --> 00:13:19,880 Speaker 1: actually an order for him to return to prison, not 203 00:13:20,040 --> 00:13:22,000 Speaker 1: just go to prison, and at the heart of all 204 00:13:22,000 --> 00:13:25,840 Speaker 1: this are charges that Lee was bribing a close friend 205 00:13:26,000 --> 00:13:30,120 Speaker 1: of the then president of South Korea, Park Gunner. The 206 00:13:30,200 --> 00:13:33,520 Speaker 1: reason for the bribe Well j Y Lee was trying 207 00:13:33,520 --> 00:13:36,440 Speaker 1: to grease the wheels to get government support for his 208 00:13:36,559 --> 00:13:41,520 Speaker 1: ascension to the head of Samsung. Park herself was ousted 209 00:13:41,640 --> 00:13:45,840 Speaker 1: as president and found guilty on charges of grafting, so 210 00:13:46,000 --> 00:13:49,200 Speaker 1: all this tracks. She is currently serving a sentence in 211 00:13:49,240 --> 00:13:52,840 Speaker 1: the same prison where Lee is headed. Lee, for his part, 212 00:13:53,360 --> 00:13:56,200 Speaker 1: served about a year a little less than a year 213 00:13:56,240 --> 00:13:59,720 Speaker 1: of a five year long sentence at that prison previously 214 00:13:59,800 --> 00:14:03,840 Speaker 1: from two thousand seventeen into two thousand eighteen UH but 215 00:14:04,440 --> 00:14:09,679 Speaker 1: then an appeals court overturned part of those charges and 216 00:14:09,679 --> 00:14:14,000 Speaker 1: suspended his sentence. But then the Korean Supreme Court reinstated 217 00:14:14,080 --> 00:14:17,240 Speaker 1: that sentence and as demanding that Lee returned to prison 218 00:14:17,280 --> 00:14:19,880 Speaker 1: to serve out those two and a half years. He 219 00:14:19,960 --> 00:14:23,400 Speaker 1: also faces a separate trial relating to charges that he 220 00:14:23,520 --> 00:14:28,280 Speaker 1: engaged in stock manipulation and other illegal activities while overseeing 221 00:14:28,360 --> 00:14:32,480 Speaker 1: a merger in two thousand and fifteen. His father, Lee Kunhi, 222 00:14:33,040 --> 00:14:36,200 Speaker 1: had been chairman of Samsung, but he passed away in 223 00:14:36,240 --> 00:14:40,720 Speaker 1: twenty twenty. J y Lee had in effect been leading 224 00:14:40,760 --> 00:14:44,960 Speaker 1: the company since, but you know, not officially, and there's 225 00:14:45,000 --> 00:14:49,200 Speaker 1: been no formal restructuring at Samsung yet. The company has 226 00:14:49,240 --> 00:14:53,440 Speaker 1: had other high level legal issues in the board chairman 227 00:14:53,640 --> 00:14:58,600 Speaker 1: Lee Sang Hun resigned after being convicted for violating labor 228 00:14:58,720 --> 00:15:03,200 Speaker 1: laws and under my a labor unions. Samsung is a 229 00:15:03,240 --> 00:15:07,240 Speaker 1: conglomerate under the control of the Lee family, and in Korea, 230 00:15:07,960 --> 00:15:13,520 Speaker 1: these families likely wield enormous influence in business and politics. 231 00:15:14,000 --> 00:15:17,080 Speaker 1: Uh the the all of it is wrapped up together 232 00:15:17,280 --> 00:15:20,320 Speaker 1: and has been a big concern for people who are 233 00:15:20,320 --> 00:15:25,120 Speaker 1: on the lookout for corruption. Last week, I talked about 234 00:15:25,200 --> 00:15:29,160 Speaker 1: how WhatsApp users were abandoning the platform for other messaging 235 00:15:29,200 --> 00:15:34,080 Speaker 1: services after Facebook updated the terms of service for WhatsApp, 236 00:15:34,440 --> 00:15:37,160 Speaker 1: and in case you missed it, the big change is 237 00:15:37,200 --> 00:15:40,640 Speaker 1: that Facebook will be mining WhatsApp for data to share 238 00:15:40,640 --> 00:15:44,480 Speaker 1: it with Facebook proper. Now. Facebook has since said that 239 00:15:44,560 --> 00:15:47,240 Speaker 1: it would not be reading the content of messages. It 240 00:15:47,320 --> 00:15:50,040 Speaker 1: said it can't there's no way for WhatsApp to know 241 00:15:50,400 --> 00:15:56,040 Speaker 1: what is inside the messages sent between users. According to Facebook, Instead, 242 00:15:56,200 --> 00:15:59,360 Speaker 1: the data would be more meta in nature rather than 243 00:15:59,520 --> 00:16:02,840 Speaker 1: the content of the messages themselves, more like, who is 244 00:16:02,840 --> 00:16:05,600 Speaker 1: it that you're messaging at? What time of day? And 245 00:16:05,640 --> 00:16:08,600 Speaker 1: where did the two of you happen to be? Still 246 00:16:08,760 --> 00:16:12,040 Speaker 1: kind of on the creepy side, And anyway, Facebook's messaging 247 00:16:12,120 --> 00:16:14,680 Speaker 1: was too little, too late, and a lot of folks 248 00:16:14,680 --> 00:16:18,800 Speaker 1: found the news upsetting enough to jump ship. One ship 249 00:16:18,840 --> 00:16:23,280 Speaker 1: to which they jumped was the messaging service Signal. Signals 250 00:16:23,320 --> 00:16:26,840 Speaker 1: saw such a huge boost in numbers that the service 251 00:16:26,920 --> 00:16:30,520 Speaker 1: couldn't handle the jump. For more than a day, Signal 252 00:16:30,680 --> 00:16:34,600 Speaker 1: was offline, having collapsed under the weight of new users. 253 00:16:35,080 --> 00:16:38,240 Speaker 1: This is almost a good problem to have because it 254 00:16:38,280 --> 00:16:41,280 Speaker 1: shows a real enthusiasm for a product, but it's also 255 00:16:41,320 --> 00:16:44,640 Speaker 1: a serious problem because people would be frustrated with the 256 00:16:44,720 --> 00:16:47,440 Speaker 1: lack of service, and then they might migrate to a 257 00:16:47,560 --> 00:16:51,800 Speaker 1: competing messaging service instead. So this is a classic example 258 00:16:52,080 --> 00:16:55,720 Speaker 1: of the challenges of scale. Creating a service that works 259 00:16:55,720 --> 00:16:58,360 Speaker 1: for a relatively modest number of users is one thing, 260 00:16:58,800 --> 00:17:01,560 Speaker 1: but building it out so that it can handle millions 261 00:17:01,600 --> 00:17:06,639 Speaker 1: of new users that is entirely different. That being said. 262 00:17:06,680 --> 00:17:09,760 Speaker 1: Signal has recovered it is back online as I am 263 00:17:09,840 --> 00:17:13,720 Speaker 1: recording this, and the company says it has expanded its capacity, 264 00:17:13,840 --> 00:17:17,080 Speaker 1: which typically means adding more servers to run the service, 265 00:17:17,160 --> 00:17:20,560 Speaker 1: but the company wasn't really specific, so it should be 266 00:17:20,600 --> 00:17:23,920 Speaker 1: back up and running now. But the question is did 267 00:17:23,960 --> 00:17:27,240 Speaker 1: this harm signals momentum? We're gonna have to wait a 268 00:17:27,280 --> 00:17:29,640 Speaker 1: little bit longer to find out the answer to that. 269 00:17:30,320 --> 00:17:33,800 Speaker 1: The Wall Street Journal reported that Amazon is the target 270 00:17:33,880 --> 00:17:36,920 Speaker 1: of a new lawsuit that claims the company was colluding 271 00:17:37,000 --> 00:17:40,560 Speaker 1: with five major book publishers in the US to fix 272 00:17:40,640 --> 00:17:44,800 Speaker 1: prices on e books. The lawsuit alleges that Amazon and 273 00:17:44,800 --> 00:17:48,240 Speaker 1: the publishers have worked out a deal in which Amazon 274 00:17:48,359 --> 00:17:51,800 Speaker 1: charges a high commission to carry the publishers books, and 275 00:17:51,840 --> 00:17:54,800 Speaker 1: that in turn determines the price of the e books 276 00:17:54,880 --> 00:17:58,520 Speaker 1: in the Amazon Store, so the prices are higher than 277 00:17:58,560 --> 00:18:01,640 Speaker 1: they might otherwise be because that commission price, and then 278 00:18:01,680 --> 00:18:06,359 Speaker 1: the publishers charge other retail organizations the Amazon price, which 279 00:18:06,400 --> 00:18:09,919 Speaker 1: means those retailers can't offer the titles at a lower 280 00:18:09,960 --> 00:18:12,520 Speaker 1: price point than Amazon does, or they would be doing 281 00:18:12,520 --> 00:18:15,760 Speaker 1: so at a loss. And since those five publishers are 282 00:18:15,800 --> 00:18:19,120 Speaker 1: the major publishing companies in the United States, they account 283 00:18:19,160 --> 00:18:23,000 Speaker 1: for more than of all the books published in the country. 284 00:18:23,359 --> 00:18:26,240 Speaker 1: Considering that Amazon is one of the big companies under 285 00:18:26,280 --> 00:18:31,960 Speaker 1: investigation for anti competitive and monopolistic practices. Along with Google, Facebook, 286 00:18:31,960 --> 00:18:35,400 Speaker 1: and Apple, this is probably going to be a bit 287 00:18:35,520 --> 00:18:39,360 Speaker 1: rough for the company. Apple faced a similar lawsuit back 288 00:18:39,359 --> 00:18:43,639 Speaker 1: in and they ultimately decided to settle out of court. 289 00:18:43,960 --> 00:18:46,960 Speaker 1: They weren't given much choice in that. Actually, it was 290 00:18:47,000 --> 00:18:49,840 Speaker 1: a pretty big settlement too. It remains to be seen 291 00:18:50,040 --> 00:18:54,679 Speaker 1: what Amazon will do across the pond. The constabulary have 292 00:18:54,800 --> 00:18:57,919 Speaker 1: a big blunder to answer for. The UK Home Office 293 00:18:58,080 --> 00:19:02,440 Speaker 1: recently revealed that n dreds of thousands of lease records, 294 00:19:02,760 --> 00:19:06,800 Speaker 1: including stuff like DNA records, are gone records that could 295 00:19:06,800 --> 00:19:10,840 Speaker 1: be instrumental in linking suspects with crime scenes. So we're 296 00:19:10,840 --> 00:19:15,399 Speaker 1: talking active files here, not just archives. Stuff puff vanished, 297 00:19:15,760 --> 00:19:19,400 Speaker 1: maybe as many as four hundred thousand as of this recording, 298 00:19:19,600 --> 00:19:21,720 Speaker 1: that number might be higher by the time you hear this. 299 00:19:22,200 --> 00:19:28,000 Speaker 1: And that includes two offense records, one thousand arrest records 300 00:19:28,000 --> 00:19:31,600 Speaker 1: and fifteen thousand person records. Some of the data links 301 00:19:31,640 --> 00:19:35,360 Speaker 1: to serious offenses and was too intended to indicate individuals 302 00:19:35,600 --> 00:19:38,600 Speaker 1: who had perpetrated some pretty nasty crimes in the past, 303 00:19:39,080 --> 00:19:42,200 Speaker 1: and a lot of that is gone now. And how 304 00:19:42,200 --> 00:19:45,359 Speaker 1: how is that possible? What what actually happened? Was it 305 00:19:45,440 --> 00:19:50,200 Speaker 1: a hack. Was it some sort of massive equipment failure, Well, 306 00:19:50,200 --> 00:19:53,879 Speaker 1: it seems as though human error caused it as and 307 00:19:54,040 --> 00:19:58,560 Speaker 1: someone accidentally deleted all that stuff during what the Home 308 00:19:58,560 --> 00:20:03,359 Speaker 1: Office calls quote unquote housekeeping. The Home Office Digital Data 309 00:20:03,400 --> 00:20:05,800 Speaker 1: and Technology division is working to see if it can 310 00:20:05,840 --> 00:20:09,639 Speaker 1: restore any or maybe all of those files. It's a 311 00:20:09,720 --> 00:20:12,160 Speaker 1: little difficult for me to get a handle on exactly 312 00:20:12,200 --> 00:20:16,399 Speaker 1: how serious this is, apart from, you know, extremely serious. 313 00:20:16,840 --> 00:20:19,119 Speaker 1: It's also amazing to me that there was apparently no 314 00:20:19,200 --> 00:20:22,800 Speaker 1: secure backup system in place, and that these files were 315 00:20:22,840 --> 00:20:26,320 Speaker 1: all on the type of centralized storage and not siloed out. 316 00:20:26,840 --> 00:20:29,679 Speaker 1: That so many files could be wiped out through error 317 00:20:29,800 --> 00:20:34,200 Speaker 1: is staggering. Hopefully the engineers at Home Office will figure 318 00:20:34,200 --> 00:20:36,760 Speaker 1: out how to restore the data, but in the meantime 319 00:20:36,920 --> 00:20:42,200 Speaker 1: it will almost certainly have a negative effect on ongoing cases. Meanwhile, 320 00:20:42,520 --> 00:20:47,239 Speaker 1: the Scottish Environmental Protection Agency or SIPA, has been the 321 00:20:47,240 --> 00:20:51,800 Speaker 1: target of a ransomware attack, something that SIPA revealed right 322 00:20:51,840 --> 00:20:56,359 Speaker 1: around Christmas time last year. According to reports, the attackers 323 00:20:56,359 --> 00:20:59,640 Speaker 1: were able to steal around one point to gigabytes of data, 324 00:21:00,119 --> 00:21:05,320 Speaker 1: which SIPA says included quote limited sensitive information end quote 325 00:21:05,640 --> 00:21:08,360 Speaker 1: meaning most of the information was a lot of publicly 326 00:21:08,400 --> 00:21:11,280 Speaker 1: available stuff. There wasn't a whole lot of you know, 327 00:21:11,480 --> 00:21:14,960 Speaker 1: really important data. They're important in the sense of secret 328 00:21:15,040 --> 00:21:17,919 Speaker 1: or anything like that. It's all important, it's just a 329 00:21:17,960 --> 00:21:20,720 Speaker 1: lot of it was also, you know, public stuff, not 330 00:21:20,880 --> 00:21:26,120 Speaker 1: particularly precious data. The organization is working to recover its capabilities. 331 00:21:26,400 --> 00:21:29,439 Speaker 1: Some of its systems were still inaccessible as of the 332 00:21:29,480 --> 00:21:33,840 Speaker 1: time of my recording due to that ransomware attack. Investigators 333 00:21:33,880 --> 00:21:36,879 Speaker 1: are also looking into the matter, although you know, figuring 334 00:21:36,920 --> 00:21:40,560 Speaker 1: out who did this doesn't necessarily make much of a difference. 335 00:21:40,800 --> 00:21:44,280 Speaker 1: Frequently we're talking about organizations that get targeted from outside 336 00:21:44,320 --> 00:21:48,600 Speaker 1: the country, so jurisdiction becomes really tricky. And SIPA has 337 00:21:48,640 --> 00:21:53,359 Speaker 1: reassured UK citizens stating that the organization is not going 338 00:21:53,400 --> 00:21:56,680 Speaker 1: to be using any public funds to pay off the ransom, 339 00:21:56,920 --> 00:22:01,600 Speaker 1: and that is for the best because as paying off 340 00:22:01,640 --> 00:22:05,760 Speaker 1: a ransom sends a message to those who would carry 341 00:22:05,760 --> 00:22:09,960 Speaker 1: out ransomware attacks. For the record, that messages, hey, y'all, 342 00:22:10,000 --> 00:22:13,320 Speaker 1: this totally works, so you don't you don't want to 343 00:22:13,359 --> 00:22:15,720 Speaker 1: do that, you know, not paying the ransom is the 344 00:22:15,800 --> 00:22:18,720 Speaker 1: right move because that sends the message that the attackers 345 00:22:18,960 --> 00:22:21,919 Speaker 1: are going through the effort of compromising a system, but 346 00:22:22,040 --> 00:22:24,960 Speaker 1: are not going to receive any sort of ransom in return. 347 00:22:25,480 --> 00:22:28,840 Speaker 1: Now that doesn't necessarily mean that all ransomware attacks are 348 00:22:28,840 --> 00:22:32,280 Speaker 1: going to stop. I mean you can steal data, as 349 00:22:32,359 --> 00:22:35,320 Speaker 1: is the case with this particular instance, and then try 350 00:22:35,400 --> 00:22:39,320 Speaker 1: to sell that information, perhaps on the black market, but 351 00:22:39,800 --> 00:22:44,040 Speaker 1: typically the information doesn't command a very high price. Like 352 00:22:44,280 --> 00:22:47,280 Speaker 1: in in aggregate, you can get a lot of money 353 00:22:47,320 --> 00:22:51,760 Speaker 1: for it, but data actually is is fairly cheap on 354 00:22:51,800 --> 00:22:55,199 Speaker 1: the individual level, so there's not a huge return of 355 00:22:55,280 --> 00:22:59,560 Speaker 1: investment for time and effort if you're not getting that ransom. 356 00:22:59,600 --> 00:23:03,000 Speaker 1: So long story short, if you are hit with ransomware, 357 00:23:03,440 --> 00:23:06,600 Speaker 1: don't pay the ransom. In fact, there's no guarantee that 358 00:23:06,680 --> 00:23:10,840 Speaker 1: the attackers will return any stolen data, or not keep 359 00:23:10,880 --> 00:23:13,199 Speaker 1: a copy of it if they do return it, or 360 00:23:13,240 --> 00:23:16,040 Speaker 1: that they will actually decrypt your hard drive if that's 361 00:23:16,080 --> 00:23:19,719 Speaker 1: what they've done, or anything like that, So don't pay it. 362 00:23:20,359 --> 00:23:23,840 Speaker 1: All it does is encourage further attacks, and it doesn't 363 00:23:23,840 --> 00:23:26,360 Speaker 1: guarantee that any damage that was done to you will 364 00:23:26,359 --> 00:23:30,760 Speaker 1: be reversed. So bad idea. All right, well, that wraps 365 00:23:30,880 --> 00:23:33,639 Speaker 1: up this segment. When we come back After this break, 366 00:23:33,880 --> 00:23:37,199 Speaker 1: we'll have a few odds and ends to cover, but 367 00:23:37,320 --> 00:23:47,919 Speaker 1: first let's take that quick break. Our first story in 368 00:23:47,960 --> 00:23:52,680 Speaker 1: this segment is about an app and the more security breaches. 369 00:23:53,160 --> 00:23:56,760 Speaker 1: So Amazon's Ring Team revealed that there was a security 370 00:23:56,800 --> 00:24:00,879 Speaker 1: bug in the Ring Neighbor's app. The Neighbors app is 371 00:24:00,920 --> 00:24:04,439 Speaker 1: a neighborhood watch tool allowing users to post about public 372 00:24:04,480 --> 00:24:08,440 Speaker 1: safety concerns or neighborhood crime. That reminds me a lot 373 00:24:08,560 --> 00:24:13,119 Speaker 1: of what next door tends to become, although in my 374 00:24:13,160 --> 00:24:17,399 Speaker 1: neighborhood it gets way worse than that. But that's of 375 00:24:17,640 --> 00:24:20,560 Speaker 1: soapbox I can get on on some other podcast. The 376 00:24:20,640 --> 00:24:23,280 Speaker 1: security bug in this case revealed that the app was 377 00:24:23,320 --> 00:24:29,080 Speaker 1: pulling personal data off of neighbors, so it was revealing 378 00:24:29,080 --> 00:24:33,320 Speaker 1: stuff like the home addresses of users, which really it 379 00:24:33,359 --> 00:24:36,119 Speaker 1: shouldn't have been able to do. The Ring team changed 380 00:24:36,160 --> 00:24:38,760 Speaker 1: the app so that it will only pull the city, state, 381 00:24:38,840 --> 00:24:42,240 Speaker 1: and ZIP code of users, but not their actual street address. 382 00:24:42,760 --> 00:24:46,280 Speaker 1: As far as security failures go, this one appears to 383 00:24:46,280 --> 00:24:49,680 Speaker 1: be fairly mild. The Ring Team claims that there are 384 00:24:49,720 --> 00:24:52,800 Speaker 1: no signs that anyone was misusing the data or that 385 00:24:52,920 --> 00:24:55,720 Speaker 1: any other party had access to it. It's more of 386 00:24:55,760 --> 00:24:57,879 Speaker 1: a case of an app pulling more information than it 387 00:24:57,960 --> 00:25:00,760 Speaker 1: needs to in order to operate, then that has now 388 00:25:00,800 --> 00:25:05,000 Speaker 1: been resolved. If you have been following app news for 389 00:25:05,040 --> 00:25:08,640 Speaker 1: a long time, you know that this was something that 390 00:25:08,880 --> 00:25:12,920 Speaker 1: companies used to do on purpose. They would actually request 391 00:25:13,040 --> 00:25:16,760 Speaker 1: more information than the app required in order to operate, 392 00:25:17,480 --> 00:25:20,400 Speaker 1: and often users were unaware of that. In fact, that 393 00:25:20,560 --> 00:25:26,920 Speaker 1: was at its heart the working principle behind Cambridge Analytica. Uh. 394 00:25:26,960 --> 00:25:29,520 Speaker 1: The app that was used was pulling a lot more 395 00:25:29,560 --> 00:25:33,600 Speaker 1: information than people were aware of. And it wasn't until 396 00:25:33,640 --> 00:25:38,520 Speaker 1: Facebook went and made major changes to its approach that 397 00:25:39,160 --> 00:25:44,360 Speaker 1: things like that were harder to do and ideally impossible 398 00:25:44,359 --> 00:25:48,040 Speaker 1: to do. But as we see, sometimes it happens. Anyway, 399 00:25:48,119 --> 00:25:52,280 Speaker 1: let's talk about food, because it's almost lunchtime for me. 400 00:25:52,640 --> 00:25:55,639 Speaker 1: So a group of researchers with the Florida Institute of 401 00:25:55,680 --> 00:25:59,600 Speaker 1: Technology road a paper for the International Journal of Society 402 00:25:59,640 --> 00:26:04,679 Speaker 1: System Science, which I guess is called I just and 403 00:26:04,720 --> 00:26:07,400 Speaker 1: I found it really interesting. The paper is about how 404 00:26:07,440 --> 00:26:10,720 Speaker 1: there is a growing need for advanced technologies dedicated to 405 00:26:10,760 --> 00:26:15,480 Speaker 1: supporting sustainable agricultural processes around the world as the global 406 00:26:15,480 --> 00:26:21,360 Speaker 1: population continues to rise. Among those advanced technologies is artificial intelligence, 407 00:26:21,800 --> 00:26:25,280 Speaker 1: which presumably would be used to help farmers manage farms 408 00:26:25,320 --> 00:26:29,280 Speaker 1: efficiently and effectively. The paper is more of a call 409 00:26:29,359 --> 00:26:32,240 Speaker 1: to action, with the researchers pointing out that there needs 410 00:26:32,240 --> 00:26:35,639 Speaker 1: to be a new generation of engineers and scientists working 411 00:26:35,680 --> 00:26:40,240 Speaker 1: on technologies that are specifically applicable to agriculture. The challenges 412 00:26:40,280 --> 00:26:43,639 Speaker 1: will be considerable, particularly with regard to finding ways to 413 00:26:43,720 --> 00:26:49,399 Speaker 1: maximize agricultural effectiveness in a way that's environmentally responsible. In 414 00:26:49,400 --> 00:26:51,480 Speaker 1: other words, you don't want to try and solve one 415 00:26:51,520 --> 00:26:55,879 Speaker 1: problem while making a different problem even worse. The title 416 00:26:55,960 --> 00:27:00,280 Speaker 1: of the piece is exploring technological management innovations that include 417 00:27:00,359 --> 00:27:05,800 Speaker 1: artificial intelligence and other innovations in global food production Snappy. 418 00:27:06,760 --> 00:27:10,480 Speaker 1: Virgin Orbit, part of the Virgin group of companies, is 419 00:27:10,520 --> 00:27:14,320 Speaker 1: all about putting small satellites into orbit, as opposed to 420 00:27:14,400 --> 00:27:17,200 Speaker 1: Virgin Galactic, which is a company that's all about creating 421 00:27:17,200 --> 00:27:20,199 Speaker 1: a way for very rich people to go to outer space. 422 00:27:21,119 --> 00:27:24,439 Speaker 1: Over the weekend, Virgin Orbit held a test flight in 423 00:27:24,480 --> 00:27:28,879 Speaker 1: which it's modified seven forty seven airliner carried a rocket 424 00:27:29,040 --> 00:27:33,320 Speaker 1: up to cruising altitude. Once they're the rocket detached from 425 00:27:33,320 --> 00:27:36,680 Speaker 1: the seven seven and then ignited to push a payload 426 00:27:36,800 --> 00:27:40,760 Speaker 1: out into orbit. The successful test flight demonstrated that the 427 00:27:40,800 --> 00:27:44,440 Speaker 1: process works. The goal was to reduce the overall cost 428 00:27:44,520 --> 00:27:48,200 Speaker 1: of launching smaller payloads into space. Launching from the ground 429 00:27:48,320 --> 00:27:51,320 Speaker 1: costs a lot of money, with the seven forty seven 430 00:27:51,400 --> 00:27:55,119 Speaker 1: already several thousand feet up. The overall costs mostly with 431 00:27:55,160 --> 00:27:57,600 Speaker 1: regard to how much fuel is needed in thus how 432 00:27:57,680 --> 00:28:02,160 Speaker 1: larger rocket you need those get deuced. Virgin Orbit isn't 433 00:28:02,200 --> 00:28:04,960 Speaker 1: really seen as an alternative to the approach of companies 434 00:28:05,000 --> 00:28:09,440 Speaker 1: like SpaceX, but rather as a complementary business for different clients. 435 00:28:10,280 --> 00:28:12,800 Speaker 1: If you've got a larger payload, you're gonna need to 436 00:28:12,840 --> 00:28:15,320 Speaker 1: go with a company like SpaceX to get it up 437 00:28:15,320 --> 00:28:19,119 Speaker 1: into space. But if it's a smaller satellite, Virgin Orbit 438 00:28:19,280 --> 00:28:21,439 Speaker 1: might be the way to go. Now, this was the 439 00:28:21,480 --> 00:28:24,560 Speaker 1: first time a Virgin Orbit flight launched a rocket into 440 00:28:24,640 --> 00:28:29,159 Speaker 1: orbit successfully. Back in May, the company had attempted a 441 00:28:29,200 --> 00:28:32,760 Speaker 1: similar test, but in that case, the rockets failsafe system 442 00:28:32,840 --> 00:28:36,880 Speaker 1: initiated an automatic shutdown not long after it detached from 443 00:28:36,920 --> 00:28:41,320 Speaker 1: the seven. Now, as failures go, that one was disappointing, 444 00:28:41,440 --> 00:28:45,520 Speaker 1: but it wasn't catastrophic, and Virgin Orbit reps say that 445 00:28:45,600 --> 00:28:47,840 Speaker 1: the failure taught their teams a lot, and the things 446 00:28:47,840 --> 00:28:50,840 Speaker 1: they learned helped them achieve success the second time around. 447 00:28:51,440 --> 00:28:55,680 Speaker 1: You know, people find different ways to pass the time. 448 00:28:56,080 --> 00:29:01,200 Speaker 1: For example, I practice playing guitar poorly, but some people, 449 00:29:01,320 --> 00:29:05,080 Speaker 1: you know, they take up carpentry, like Justin McElroy, and 450 00:29:05,280 --> 00:29:09,480 Speaker 1: some I suppose look over recent patent applications to find 451 00:29:09,640 --> 00:29:12,719 Speaker 1: neat stuff that appears to be what happened when a 452 00:29:12,720 --> 00:29:16,680 Speaker 1: Reddit user with the handle torrential snow posted a link 453 00:29:16,720 --> 00:29:20,840 Speaker 1: to a patent application filed by Take two Interactive. Take 454 00:29:20,840 --> 00:29:23,200 Speaker 1: two is better known as the parent company for rock 455 00:29:23,240 --> 00:29:26,400 Speaker 1: Star Games and two K, both of which are video 456 00:29:26,480 --> 00:29:30,280 Speaker 1: game publishing companies, and the patent is all about NPC 457 00:29:30,400 --> 00:29:34,760 Speaker 1: behaviors and games. The patent name is system and Method 458 00:29:34,880 --> 00:29:38,280 Speaker 1: for the virtual navigation in a gaming environment, and it 459 00:29:38,320 --> 00:29:42,000 Speaker 1: explains the challenges of creating non player characters that behave 460 00:29:42,080 --> 00:29:44,920 Speaker 1: in a natural and believable way when it comes to 461 00:29:44,960 --> 00:29:49,200 Speaker 1: traversing a virtual world. For example, and NPC, left to 462 00:29:49,240 --> 00:29:54,400 Speaker 1: its own, devices might travel to a seemingly random location, turnaround, 463 00:29:54,560 --> 00:29:57,840 Speaker 1: and then retrace its steps over and over, or it 464 00:29:57,920 --> 00:30:00,800 Speaker 1: might just do endless loops of a specific route in 465 00:30:00,840 --> 00:30:04,000 Speaker 1: the game. The patent describes a system that aims to 466 00:30:04,040 --> 00:30:08,200 Speaker 1: make NPC behaviors make more sense, particularly with regard to 467 00:30:08,240 --> 00:30:11,880 Speaker 1: a game that has a multiplayer element to it. Ideally, 468 00:30:12,120 --> 00:30:15,000 Speaker 1: you would want NPC behaviors to be natural enough that 469 00:30:15,080 --> 00:30:18,440 Speaker 1: another player wouldn't immediately be able to tell the difference 470 00:30:18,480 --> 00:30:22,920 Speaker 1: between a human player and an NPC just by watching 471 00:30:22,920 --> 00:30:25,640 Speaker 1: how they move, unless the other players are, you know, 472 00:30:25,760 --> 00:30:29,320 Speaker 1: behaving in really erratic ways on purpose, which, hey, that's 473 00:30:29,360 --> 00:30:32,320 Speaker 1: actually a pretty safe bet for most of these games. 474 00:30:32,320 --> 00:30:35,120 Speaker 1: But the whole patent is interesting, and because it's a 475 00:30:35,120 --> 00:30:37,920 Speaker 1: public resource, it's free to read if you want to. 476 00:30:38,640 --> 00:30:41,000 Speaker 1: But the thing that has most people excited is the 477 00:30:41,040 --> 00:30:44,760 Speaker 1: idea that this patent could be related to an upcoming 478 00:30:44,840 --> 00:30:48,160 Speaker 1: take to release, and the speculation seems to be centered 479 00:30:48,200 --> 00:30:51,080 Speaker 1: on the next entry in the Grand Theft Auto franchise. 480 00:30:51,640 --> 00:30:54,320 Speaker 1: That might be the case, or perhaps this has more 481 00:30:54,360 --> 00:30:56,760 Speaker 1: to do with the online world of Grand Theft Auto five. 482 00:30:57,320 --> 00:31:01,160 Speaker 1: It remains to be seen, but it is interesting. And finally, 483 00:31:01,640 --> 00:31:05,200 Speaker 1: Mica Price gets my award for smart Alec of the Week. 484 00:31:05,840 --> 00:31:09,640 Speaker 1: Price created a bot for Reddit. Has a very specific 485 00:31:09,720 --> 00:31:14,320 Speaker 1: set of directions pull text from arguments on Reddit and 486 00:31:14,360 --> 00:31:17,320 Speaker 1: then turn those into captions on top of a scene 487 00:31:17,400 --> 00:31:21,880 Speaker 1: from a video game called Ace Attorney. It's a it's 488 00:31:21,880 --> 00:31:25,160 Speaker 1: an attorney game. It's pretty fun. And you find a 489 00:31:25,200 --> 00:31:28,400 Speaker 1: suitable argument in Reddit when you find something that you 490 00:31:28,400 --> 00:31:30,520 Speaker 1: would think, oh, this thread is really blowing up and 491 00:31:30,560 --> 00:31:34,440 Speaker 1: it's ridiculous, this is perfect. Preferably it's one where the 492 00:31:34,520 --> 00:31:38,000 Speaker 1: argument has got really low stakes and it's overblown. And 493 00:31:38,000 --> 00:31:42,920 Speaker 1: then you use the command exclamation point objection bot and 494 00:31:42,960 --> 00:31:45,680 Speaker 1: the system will pull the text from the two most 495 00:31:45,720 --> 00:31:50,040 Speaker 1: prolific posters in the thread to create the scene. One 496 00:31:50,040 --> 00:31:52,320 Speaker 1: of the two gets assigned the role of Phoenix right, 497 00:31:52,880 --> 00:31:56,480 Speaker 1: the other one becomes Miles Edgeworth. Other people can become 498 00:31:56,600 --> 00:31:59,440 Speaker 1: supporting characters within the scene. According to Price, it took 499 00:31:59,480 --> 00:32:02,360 Speaker 1: him three old days to make the bot. The code, 500 00:32:02,360 --> 00:32:04,440 Speaker 1: by the way, is open source, so other people can 501 00:32:04,480 --> 00:32:07,440 Speaker 1: see prices work and improve upon it or alter it 502 00:32:07,520 --> 00:32:10,040 Speaker 1: and use it to make their own version of this 503 00:32:10,120 --> 00:32:12,719 Speaker 1: kind of stuff. He also mentioned that the bot doesn't 504 00:32:12,760 --> 00:32:16,320 Speaker 1: work on all Subreddit's, only a subset of them, and 505 00:32:16,360 --> 00:32:18,280 Speaker 1: I expect we'll see a lot of creative approaches to 506 00:32:18,320 --> 00:32:21,560 Speaker 1: framing out Reddit arguments. I also expect we're gonna see 507 00:32:21,560 --> 00:32:24,000 Speaker 1: a lot more Reddit arguments, not that we didn't see 508 00:32:24,080 --> 00:32:26,880 Speaker 1: enough already, but now if you know that this argument 509 00:32:26,920 --> 00:32:31,640 Speaker 1: couldn't turn into like a meme, it's off to the races. 510 00:32:31,840 --> 00:32:35,840 Speaker 1: So yeah, all you people who love Reddit, get ready 511 00:32:35,880 --> 00:32:39,440 Speaker 1: to read lots of ridiculous arguments specifically for the purpose 512 00:32:39,440 --> 00:32:42,880 Speaker 1: of getting it turned into an ace attorney meme, and 513 00:32:42,920 --> 00:32:46,840 Speaker 1: then get ready for all the moderators throwing down new 514 00:32:46,920 --> 00:32:50,280 Speaker 1: rules to ban that kind of stuff so that the 515 00:32:50,440 --> 00:32:54,800 Speaker 1: threads don't just turn into nonsense all the time, fun times. 516 00:32:55,400 --> 00:32:57,360 Speaker 1: Why can't we have nice things, is what I'm saying. 517 00:32:57,400 --> 00:32:59,680 Speaker 1: I like the idea of a bot that makes things 518 00:32:59,680 --> 00:33:02,360 Speaker 1: were aculous. I don't like the idea of people being 519 00:33:02,440 --> 00:33:06,040 Speaker 1: ridiculous just for the sake of a bot doing stuff 520 00:33:06,120 --> 00:33:11,360 Speaker 1: with it. Anyway, that wraps up the news items for Tuesday, 521 00:33:11,680 --> 00:33:15,680 Speaker 1: January one. I'm sure we'll have a lot to talk 522 00:33:15,720 --> 00:33:20,280 Speaker 1: about on Thursday. Wednesday promises to be an eventful day. Uh. 523 00:33:20,320 --> 00:33:22,960 Speaker 1: In the meantime, you will get a regular episode of 524 00:33:22,960 --> 00:33:27,680 Speaker 1: tech Stuff on Wednesday. And that's all for me. If 525 00:33:27,720 --> 00:33:30,280 Speaker 1: you guys have anything you want me to cover in 526 00:33:30,320 --> 00:33:33,280 Speaker 1: future episodes of tech Stuff. The regular episodes where I 527 00:33:33,280 --> 00:33:36,560 Speaker 1: talk about technology or tech companies or anything like that. 528 00:33:37,080 --> 00:33:39,120 Speaker 1: Let me know. The best way to reach out is 529 00:33:39,120 --> 00:33:43,200 Speaker 1: on Twitter. The handle is tech stuff hs W and 530 00:33:43,280 --> 00:33:51,160 Speaker 1: I'll talk to you again really soon. Tech Stuff is 531 00:33:51,200 --> 00:33:54,320 Speaker 1: an I Heart Radio production. For more podcasts from my 532 00:33:54,440 --> 00:33:58,080 Speaker 1: Heart Radio, visit the i Heart Radio app, Apple Podcasts, 533 00:33:58,160 --> 00:33:59,960 Speaker 1: or wherever you listen to your favorite show.