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Speaker 1: I'm t T and I'm Zakiyah and this is Dope Labs.

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Speaker 1: Welcome to Dope Labs, a weekly podcast that mixes hardcore

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Speaker 1: science with pop culture and a healthy dose of friendship.

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Speaker 1: I don't think I've ever asked you this, zee. Do

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Speaker 1: you like traveling? I mean, I travel a lot, and

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Speaker 1: I think usually I do. But it's just the little

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Speaker 1: in between time before I get to my gate and

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Speaker 1: board the plane, Like everything leading up to that, like

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Speaker 1: from when I wake up that morning to that point,

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Speaker 1: is stressful. It really gets on my nerves. And I

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Speaker 1: you know, I always pack at the last minute. Yeah,

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Speaker 1: of course, of course. And then I have to figure out,

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Speaker 1: am I taking an uber which is gonna be a

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Speaker 1: trillion dollars to the airport? Am I driving myself to

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Speaker 1: the airport? Which I used to like doing? But then

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Speaker 1: I get there, none of the information is corrected. The

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Speaker 1: Atlanta Airport sometimes they're like, oh, this parking lot is full.

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Speaker 1: It's like I just passed a digital sign that you

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Speaker 1: could easily update remotely that says this airport lot is available.

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Speaker 1: I wouldn't even come this way. And then I think

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Speaker 1: the gotcha, gotcha, guess who's coming to dinner. Part is

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Speaker 1: what your experience at TSA is gonna be, Like, it's

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Speaker 1: gonna be seven minutes or seventy you know, Oh my gosh, TSA.

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Speaker 1: It feels like everyone has an attitude. Folks are yelling,

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Speaker 1: people have their shoes off, people are struggling with the bens.

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Speaker 1: It is a nightmare. Yes, and so by the time

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Speaker 1: you get through there, it's like, I don't even want

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Speaker 1: to go. Actually, I'm going home. My shoes, I'm going home.

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Speaker 1: This sounds like a great topic to dive into today

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Speaker 1: because summer is near, and that means we are hitting

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Speaker 1: the friendli skuys. People are going on vacations, they flying out,

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Speaker 1: they flying folks out. I don't know what your business is.

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Speaker 1: I think you're right. So let's jump into the recitation

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Speaker 1: to figure out what we know and what we want

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Speaker 1: to know about TSA. Well, we know that the TSA

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Speaker 1: is meant to keep us safe and that there is

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Speaker 1: an attitude needed to serve in that role, a very

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Speaker 1: particular attitude. Yes, okay. So we know that the TSA

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Speaker 1: stands for the Transportation Security Administration and it's a part

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Speaker 1: of the Department of Homeland Security, and it's in charge

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Speaker 1: of keeping the nation's transportation systems safe. So that's airports, rails, highways, pipelines,

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Speaker 1: you name it. I have never seen the TSA at

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Speaker 1: a train station now, but I'm not going not too

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Speaker 1: much on it, but I just want to say that.

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Speaker 1: And we know that the rules for travel are constantly changing,

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Speaker 1: sometimes from my being to the next person's being, and

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Speaker 1: from one airport to another. Sometimes you got to throw

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Speaker 1: out your heat protected or your expensive perfume. So we

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Speaker 1: know that. So what do we want to know personally?

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Speaker 1: I want to know more about the tech. It's a

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Speaker 1: different scanner at every airport. Whether it's gonna pick up

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Speaker 1: my ank lit or not, I don't know how is

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Speaker 1: that working. And speaking of tech, I want to know

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Speaker 1: about the tech associated with you know, the real idea

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Speaker 1: that they're saying that we have to have you have yours. Yes,

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Speaker 1: they've been telling us this for six years. Oh, I

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Speaker 1: know some folks still don't got it. I know they don't.

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Speaker 1: They're going to be at home. That's wild to me.

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Speaker 1: But I also want to know if TSA is actually

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Speaker 1: protecting us or is it just the illusion of protection,

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Speaker 1: Because I feel like I'm constantly seeing like women lived

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Speaker 1: in airport for two weeks or snuck onto plane. I'm like,

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Speaker 1: I can't sneak a lotion into my carry on, so

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Speaker 1: how did that happen? I think this is a great

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Speaker 1: place to start, so let's jump into the dissection for

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Speaker 1: today's lab our. Guests are the hosts of No Such

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Speaker 1: Thing podcast.

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Speaker 2: My name is Manny. I'm a co hosts for No

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Speaker 2: Such Thing. I'm Noah.

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Speaker 3: I'm also a cost of No Such Thing.

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Speaker 4: And I'm Devin also I'm co host. I'm No such Thing.

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Speaker 1: But before we get into the nitty gritty, let's get

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Speaker 1: some background on TSA. So the TSA became a thing

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Speaker 1: in November nineteenth of two thousand and one, so that

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Speaker 1: was barely two months after nine to eleven, and it

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Speaker 1: was out of the Aviation and Transportation Security Act and

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Speaker 1: so on the heels of nine to eleven and all

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Speaker 1: of the reaction, TSA was able to federalize sixty thousand screeners,

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Speaker 1: so those are people to screen you coming through. In

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Speaker 1: under a year. They had a budget that ballooned from

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Speaker 1: one billion dollars in two thousand and two to fast

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Speaker 1: forward to today a budget of over ten billion dollars.

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Speaker 1: So it's about to be summer. Last summer, TSA screened

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Speaker 1: over three million people in one day. People. That's a

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Speaker 1: ton of people. We're heading into another record season and

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Speaker 1: they're expected to surpass about eight hundred million screenings this year,

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Speaker 1: and I'm just like, what's going on with tsall?

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Speaker 3: Right?

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Speaker 1: Is this system keeping up? Are we just squeezing more

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Speaker 1: people through the same old bottom nicks? Yeah, Okay, y'all

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Speaker 1: did a great episode about TSA on your podcast, so

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Speaker 1: I want to know y'all's take on the TSA.

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Speaker 5: I was actually in your neck of the woods in

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Speaker 5: Atlanta in January and I got stuck at in the

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Speaker 5: TSA lines, and I think it was one of the

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Speaker 5: inspirations to do this episode, which was like, I'm getting

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Speaker 5: yelled at by this guy who's telling me not to

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Speaker 5: take my laptop out, even though the sign behind him

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Speaker 5: is saying that I have to take my laptop out.

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Speaker 5: And I think, just like, these frustrations are so common.

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Speaker 1: This is my wheelhouse because I've worked with a lot

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Speaker 1: of scanning devices in my day. Go off, let me

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Speaker 1: come the reason why we have to take the laptops out,

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Speaker 1: so the old school X rays they can't really see

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Speaker 1: through dense batteries, So you have to take your laptop

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Speaker 1: out of your bag so that I can really get,

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Speaker 1: you know, a good picture. It's not about the laptop,

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Speaker 1: about the items in the bag. Yeah, that's not clear

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Speaker 1: to other items. Yeah, because it's a two D X ray.

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Speaker 1: So they fire a fan shaped X ray beams straight

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Speaker 1: through your bag and it produces this flat picture on

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Speaker 1: the monitor, and they calculate density by how much of

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Speaker 1: that beam is absorbed. The more dense an object is,

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Speaker 1: the brighter that blob is on the screen. So lithium

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Speaker 1: ion laptop batteries pack layers of metal foil, so aluminum,

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Speaker 1: copper and some other metals, and plus this steel shell

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Speaker 1: that's around the battery, and those have high atopic numbers,

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Speaker 1: and so those are gonna light up like a Christmas

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Speaker 1: tree when you send it through that X ray scanner.

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Speaker 1: And so then they can't see my you know, over

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Speaker 1: three point four ounce perfume that's in my bag if

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Speaker 1: the laptop is blocking it exactly, exactly, somebody should have

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Speaker 1: said that I thought they were looking for things in

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Speaker 1: my laptop and that's why it needed to be out

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Speaker 1: the bag. Yes, I mean it. If they explain that

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Speaker 1: I feel like a lot of folks would be less upset.

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Speaker 1: It's like, hey, this big old laptop battery is just

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Speaker 1: blocking everything else. I don't know if you got, you know,

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Speaker 1: a hammer in there, or if you in Atlanta a

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Speaker 1: hammer in there. Hammer. Yeah. So with the new types

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Speaker 1: of scanners, they're called computed tomography scanners, they fire hundreds

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Speaker 1: of X rays slices, producing a three D model of

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Speaker 1: what's inside of your bag. So the software is able

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Speaker 1: to see your laptop and rotate it around and see

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Speaker 1: what's all around it. So it could basically pick up

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Speaker 1: your bag rotated on the screen, it could see every

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Speaker 1: item that's in there. So there's no need to take

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Speaker 1: your laptop out because they can see everything. So laptop

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Speaker 1: in the bag when you have these new scanners. Ah,

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Speaker 1: So it's just do you have the old tech or

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Speaker 1: the new tech exactly. And TSA has been rolling out

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Speaker 1: CT units since twenty twenty four and it's been installed

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Speaker 1: at more than two hundred and fifty lanes nationwide and

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Speaker 1: they have one point three billion dollars with a B

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Speaker 1: to finish the job over the next few years, so

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Speaker 1: they're going to be rolling out more and more. So

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Speaker 1: I think people can be excited about being able to

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Speaker 1: leave their laptops in their bag. Eventually, well it doesn't

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Speaker 1: stop there.

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Speaker 5: We've got a new layer coming into this whole tsa

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Speaker 5: thing because the real ID.

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Speaker 1: Yes. So the nine to eleven Commission set up the

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Speaker 1: real ID Act of two thousand and five and signed

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Speaker 1: it in two thousand and five. So we've had some time.

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Speaker 1: They were flagging sloppy state by state license rules and

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Speaker 1: they were saying, hey, this is a security gap. So

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Speaker 1: it ordered the Department of Homeland Security to set a

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Speaker 1: minimum issuance and car security standard before any ID could

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Speaker 1: be used to board a plane or intra federal site.

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Speaker 1: Now what this means is that you have a superdense

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Speaker 1: card that can hold a lot of information compared to

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Speaker 1: a non real ID card, and all fifty six jurisdictions

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Speaker 1: in the United States must encode the same data fields,

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Speaker 1: so every scanner can speak the same language, just like, hey, everybody,

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Speaker 1: let's get on the same page, get the choreography right,

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Speaker 1: and we can say who's passing with real ID or

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Speaker 1: who's failing get information? And so there are some anti

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Speaker 1: counterfeit elements that are incorporated into the real ID, so

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Speaker 1: they have UV ghost images, microprinting, laser perforations, color shift, inc.

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Speaker 1: And that telltale star that is on the front of

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Speaker 1: your ID. That's the only thing I've noticed is the star. Okay,

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Speaker 1: if you have a real ID, take it out, look

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Speaker 1: at it. You'll see all of these little characteristics that

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Speaker 1: all make it so that it's harder to counterfeit or

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Speaker 1: almost impossible to counterfeit the ID.

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Speaker 5: Even getting a real ID is kind of paining the

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Speaker 5: ass because I tried to get one a couple of

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Speaker 5: years ago, Like, went to the DMV with this mission

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Speaker 5: in mind, and I guess I brought like only three

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Speaker 5: out of the four documents I and I just ended

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Speaker 5: up waiting in line for three hours and getting a

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Speaker 5: regular ass ID. And so now I've just taken my

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Speaker 5: passport everywhere with me.

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Speaker 1: So just steal no star. Steal no star on your idea.

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Speaker 4: Yeah, you don't get the star on a corner.

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Speaker 2: Sticker on the It's terrible stuff.

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Speaker 1: So the way that real ID works when you get

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Speaker 1: to the TSA podium is that their tablet checks it

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Speaker 1: in about a second and at the checkpoint, a credential

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Speaker 1: authentication technology or CAT unit grabs the barcode decodes your name,

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Speaker 1: your data, birth, your license number and issuing state, and

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Speaker 1: then the embedded security signatures they confirm that the card

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Speaker 1: hasn't been tampered with, and then using a secure look

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Speaker 1: up via the American Association of Motor Vehicles Administrations in

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Speaker 1: their network, they make sure that you don't hold two

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Speaker 1: licenses in different states. Yeah, out they're catfish and they're

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Speaker 1: gonna find you and then be with the credential authentication

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Speaker 1: technology so cat as we were calling, it is also

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Speaker 1: wired to the TSA Secure flight database, so they're able

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Speaker 1: to instantly match your ID with your flight reservation. So

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Speaker 1: the end result is something very close to a two

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Speaker 1: factor authentication for your face and your ticket without even

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Speaker 1: having a hand over your boarding pass.

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Speaker 4: Well, I saw today the reporter was saying that lax,

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Speaker 4: because of course nobody knows this is happening, and nobody

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Speaker 4: has their real IDs, and they're saying if you don't

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Speaker 4: have real i D, they just give you a piece

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Speaker 4: of paper that says you should get a real i

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Speaker 4: D and they still let you go through. Okay, well

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Speaker 4: next time, next time, this lax.

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Speaker 1: Don't you know.

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Speaker 4: I can't speak for a friendly.

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Speaker 2: The big deadline is just a friendly reminder.

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Speaker 5: Yeah, they kept pushing it back for five years to

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Speaker 5: remind you.

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Speaker 2: They're like, oh, that's today.

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Speaker 1: You talked about being yelled at by TSA, and I

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Speaker 1: think everyone has stories about being yelled at by TSA.

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Speaker 1: It feels like that's what you have to be able

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Speaker 1: to do to have the job, is yell at strangers

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Speaker 1: who are dragging a bag and a baby and all

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Speaker 1: these things behind them. Why is this the case? I mean,

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Speaker 1: it feels like, specifically TSA screening, it still feels so

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Speaker 1: fraud even though we're twenty plus years after nine eleven,

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Speaker 1: which is when you know TSA really really really became

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Speaker 1: a thing.

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Speaker 4: Yeah, I guess, yeah, that was my big thing, right,

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Speaker 4: It's like, what, Okay, it's hard enough to follow the rules,

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Speaker 4: Why are y'all coming with this energy like chill?

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Speaker 1: You know.

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Speaker 4: It's like, if you're gonna make it confusing, I'm gonna

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Speaker 4: be confused. That's like the way it's gonna work. But

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Speaker 4: when we talked to Darryl, like, it did make me

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Speaker 4: feel a little bit more sympathetic because they're one of

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Speaker 4: the lowest paid government workers, you know, they they start

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Speaker 4: out making I think he said like thirty five K,

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Speaker 4: and then they work their way up to forty two,

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Speaker 4: which is nothing, especially nowadays, and then for a long

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Speaker 4: period of time they're on probation. So it's like they're

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Speaker 4: yelling at you because they're trying not to get in

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Speaker 4: trouble from their supervisors because if they do anything within

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Speaker 4: I think he said those first two years that is deemed,

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Speaker 4: you know, a violation about their supervisor. The's not like

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Speaker 4: trial or anything, you could just get fired. So I

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Speaker 4: think they're anxious because they're not being paid a lot,

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Speaker 4: and their supervisors are you know, have for any reasons

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Speaker 4: to fire them. So then they put that anxiety onto us,

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Speaker 4: the passengers who are just you know, trying to understand

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Speaker 4: the very confusing rules, and I think creates a cycle

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Speaker 4: because then we give them that energy back.

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Speaker 1: Mentioned Darryl and I have to shout him out. Dryl

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Speaker 1: Campbell is the author of this article, The Humiliating History

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Speaker 1: of TSA, and you all had him on your podcast

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Speaker 1: as well. Everybody should read that article because it led

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Speaker 1: to me looking up stats and it was saying that

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Speaker 1: like ts agents are in basically hostile work environments and

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Speaker 1: that could be what affects our customer service. It is

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Speaker 1: a lot to unpack, but I also am curious, like

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Speaker 1: TSA feels like such a huge production. Just recently, just

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Speaker 1: this past weekend, my bag got stuck and I was like,

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Speaker 1: what's happening? The guys like pause, I'm like, what the

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Speaker 1: machine is on pause? I'm on pause? Can I move

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Speaker 1: to the other line?

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Speaker 5: Like?

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Speaker 1: Is anybody can get my stuff out of there? It

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Speaker 1: just always feels so confusing, and I'm like, oh, well,

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Speaker 1: they really are working hard, They're really protecting us. But

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Speaker 1: I saw where they said ninety five percent of the

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Speaker 1: time they were failing to like when they do these tests,

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Speaker 1: they're failing to detect mock weapons. And I'm like, in Atlanta,

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Speaker 1: I mean that's an all TSA. But baby, right, it

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Speaker 1: just feels like I'm concerned about that. You know where

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Speaker 1: we are. I'm throwing away full cans of he protected

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Speaker 1: for my hair and it's goods moving through you not

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Speaker 1: just feel like my motion back yes, And I just

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Speaker 1: feel like, is this something that's about compliance or is

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Speaker 1: this about actual threat detection? And where do we land

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Speaker 1: on that it is TSA deterring threats?

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Speaker 4: I think the long and short of it is no

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Speaker 4: like they're pretty bad at stopping. Like you said, the

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Speaker 4: I think a ninety number. They they said, hey, we

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Speaker 4: got better. A couple of years later after that, I

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Speaker 4: think it was like twenty seventeen. Seventy percent of the

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Speaker 4: weapons got through.

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Speaker 1: That's a that's not good. That's still still thirty out

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Speaker 1: of one hundred.

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Speaker 4: You're letting a lot of weapons. Should be zero. But yeah,

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Speaker 4: there's been lots of studies on this.

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Speaker 1: Right.

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Speaker 4: They do this like cost per late life saved metric.

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Speaker 4: If we want to say, like TSA, you're stopping every

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Speaker 4: single terrorist attack. Is the only organization that's going to

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Speaker 4: stop it. There's no police that, there's no FBI, we

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Speaker 4: have no intelligence, it's all TSA. If we say that,

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Speaker 4: if we give them that benefit of the doubt, it's

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Speaker 4: fifteen million dollars per life save, which is well above

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Speaker 4: what you know the government wants to spend. If you

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Speaker 4: start to take into account, well, you know, you got

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Speaker 4: the FBI, you got other agencies involved. Most people who

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Speaker 4: are planning this type of thing don't even make it

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Speaker 4: onto the plane. Then it goes up to something like

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Speaker 4: I think he said, like one hundred million, five hundred million.

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Speaker 4: Like the numbers get crazy high. But it's the sort

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Speaker 4: of thing where it's this is just the way that

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Speaker 4: it's been.

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Speaker 1: Right.

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Speaker 4: We haven't had another nine eleven since nine to eleven,

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Speaker 4: So nobody wants to put their neck out and be like, oh,

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Speaker 4: maybe we should stop doing this thing, because what if

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Speaker 4: a year from now there is another terrorist attack. Even

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Speaker 4: if TSA wouldn't have stopped it, there's always going to

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Speaker 4: be that thing in the back of people's minds of like, oh,

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Speaker 4: we should have just kept doing that annoying thing.

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Speaker 1: Right. There was a time where me and Takia we

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Speaker 1: uh we travel with the well to the same place

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Speaker 1: a few times in the last year, and we were

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Speaker 1: leaving Boston and I had a newborn baby and so

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Speaker 1: I was like I was pumping and things like that,

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Speaker 1: and I had this big ass container of breast milk

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Speaker 1: and so they were like, okay, we have to swap it.

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Speaker 1: I said, that's fine. They came back and said it

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Speaker 1: tested positive for explosives.

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Speaker 2: Any explanation, Yeah, was this true? Yeah? Did they stop you?

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Speaker 4: Yeah, we gotta take we gotta take you to a lab.

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Speaker 1: I was like, excuse me, and he was like, yeah,

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Speaker 1: so we have to do more testing. So they called

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Speaker 1: this man out, that's like the head of bomb squad

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Speaker 1: or something. He comes out with this whole kit. He's

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Speaker 1: taking droppers of my breast milk and cringing it into

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Speaker 1: all these things. And he's like, I can confirm that

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Speaker 1: is a liquid, and I can confirm that it is

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Speaker 1: not alcohol. Yeah, me too.

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Speaker 5: The baby can confirm that.

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Speaker 1: No, that man drunk all the time. And he said,

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Speaker 1: I can say that it is not explosive, but I

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Speaker 1: cannot say that it is milk.

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Speaker 2: Yeah.

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Speaker 5: I imagine the TSA machines aren't necessarily built to confirm

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Speaker 5: whether something is milk or not.

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Speaker 1: Right, So what those initial swaps are looking for is

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Speaker 1: trace nitro benzene residue. So that's a cousin to TNT

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Speaker 1: or dynamite. And the problem with that is that gliscerin

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Speaker 1: and lotions hand sanitizer and even some breast milk bags

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Speaker 1: can mimic the chemical signature of nitro benzene, and so

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Speaker 1: that might explain the flag on my breast milk or

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Speaker 1: or you know, yes, I am Alex Mack. Are y'all

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Speaker 1: too young for Alex Mack? I am it? Look it up.

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Speaker 5: I ran into a similar thing in Atlanta once again,

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Speaker 5: where I go through the machine and it's beeping, and

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Speaker 5: I go back and I take off my belt and

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Speaker 5: I go through and it beeps again. And you know,

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Speaker 5: we went through that over and over in tim like

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Speaker 5: almost naked at this point, and it's still beeping. And

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Speaker 5: so finally they're like, okay, we have to pat you down,

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Speaker 5: and they, to their credit, gave me a little warning

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Speaker 5: that the pat down was like pretty invasive, and I

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Speaker 5: was like, whatever, I need to get back to New York.

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Speaker 5: But at the end I asked him, I was like, so,

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Speaker 5: why does the machine beep if there's no metal on me?

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Speaker 5: And he just said he just shrugged his shoulders. He

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Speaker 5: said he doesn't and didn't know. And then I was like,

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Speaker 5: all right bye, Like that just wasted twenty minutes of

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Speaker 5: my life, and it feels like these machines should be

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Speaker 5: better equipped to handle that.

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Speaker 1: We talked about scanning bodies earlier, but scanning people is

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Speaker 1: where I also lose my cool for TSA, because metal

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Speaker 1: detectors feels like such old technology. It is the first

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Speaker 1: airport deployment of metal detectors came in nineteen seventy three,

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Speaker 1: after a whole bunch of hijacking platforms. People were wearing

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Speaker 1: platforms and build bottomies going through metal detectors. Yes, with

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Speaker 1: the big collars on your shirt. Then by the early eighties,

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Speaker 1: the magnetometer arc was really common in all airports, and

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Speaker 1: today TSA still fields thousands of units nationwide, especially in

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Speaker 1: the pre check lanes, because they're cheap, fast and require

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Speaker 1: no radiation waivers. So the amount of radiation that comes

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Speaker 1: out of those arcs is below the limit that will

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Speaker 1: require you to sign a waiver to go. Wait, but

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Speaker 1: what if you're going through a lot. I don't know.

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Speaker 1: You got to tell me how this works. Because I'm

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Speaker 1: going through a lot. You need a docimiter. Yes, I

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Speaker 1: do tell me that the little quick click clicklicklick tell

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Speaker 1: me the dose. Now do remember that from experiments lab Absolutely.

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Speaker 1: And the way that these metal detectors work is that

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Speaker 1: there is a coil in the side panels that fire

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Speaker 1: one hundred to one thousand micropulses of current per second,

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Speaker 1: and each current generates a magnetic field very quickly, and

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Speaker 1: when the pulse stops, the field snaps back and induces

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Speaker 1: a tiny echo current in the coil. And if a

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Speaker 1: metal object is in that field, the electrons on that

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Speaker 1: metal object will wiggle some, stretching the echo for a

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Speaker 1: few extra microseconds, and the machine measures that stretch, so

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Speaker 1: then it's able to create a sound. So it bounces

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Speaker 1: back and it creates this be beep to let you

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Speaker 1: know metal has been detected. Huh. And so I don't

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Speaker 1: think I realized that. But also I don't have to

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Speaker 1: carry a docimitar because I am able to walk by

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Speaker 1: those machines. And I want to talk about being able

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Speaker 1: to bypass those machines because it feels like for ninety dollars,

399
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Speaker 1: I can avoid all of that. And now I can

400
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Speaker 1: keep my shoes on and my laptop can stay in

401
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Speaker 1: my bag and my camera whatever, everything full size, everything

402
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Speaker 1: be going through there, okay, big mom, Big mom. And

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Speaker 1: I'm like, what is it that these things like clear

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Speaker 1: and pre check. Is it that heaven ninety dollars makes

405
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Speaker 1: me less of a threat, Like.

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Speaker 4: If you got at, you ain't going too much?

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Speaker 2: You got too much slip for here?

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Speaker 1: He nah, you're a terrorist. And what kind of surveillance

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Speaker 1: are we opting into? Because I know if the line

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Speaker 1: where they scan me is shorter, I'm going there and

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Speaker 1: I know better. But I'm going there.

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Speaker 4: Yeah.

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Speaker 1: Yeah. Pre check is a background check with fingerprints that

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Speaker 1: shows that you're low risk, and TSA still screens your

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Speaker 1: back clear. Do you give private biometrics so your iris,

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Speaker 1: your eyeball, or your face verifies you and then hands

417
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Speaker 1: you to TSA. It's in ID fast passed and it's

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Speaker 1: not a security pass. One of the things I have

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Speaker 1: been so shocked to find out is that only fifteen

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Speaker 1: percent of travelers have pre check. Less than two percent

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Speaker 1: used Clear. Let me tell you, the last time I

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Speaker 1: was at the airport, it did not feel. It doesn't

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Speaker 1: feel my line was wrapped around the corner. I said,

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Speaker 1: imight as well go through regular security and take off

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Speaker 1: from my shoes. I would have been done faster. One

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Speaker 1: percent is in Atlanta because it feels like everybody has

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Speaker 1: pre check and Clear. And so I just don't understand

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Speaker 1: because in my world, money does not equal innocence. Okay,

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Speaker 1: So I don't know. You can have a lot of

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Speaker 1: money and some ill intent, you know, yeah, most of

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Speaker 1: the people I know what a lot of money got

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Speaker 1: ill intent. I'm talking about Zakiah.

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Speaker 4: What I just actually just got pre checked, and I

434
00:23:38,840 --> 00:23:42,479
Speaker 4: was kind of shocked by how quickly it happened. Well,

435
00:23:42,520 --> 00:23:45,520
Speaker 4: they fingerprint you, which is the big thing, and then

436
00:23:45,720 --> 00:23:47,760
Speaker 4: like I needed to provide you give them a lot

437
00:23:47,760 --> 00:23:49,760
Speaker 4: of information. The thing is like, I have no idea

438
00:23:49,800 --> 00:23:52,240
Speaker 4: what they're doing with that information, right, So they they

439
00:23:52,359 --> 00:23:54,800
Speaker 4: ran some sort of background check on me to make

440
00:23:54,800 --> 00:23:57,000
Speaker 4: sure I guess I'm not a terrorist because I got

441
00:23:57,000 --> 00:23:59,600
Speaker 4: caught in the line where it took me like two

442
00:23:59,640 --> 00:24:01,520
Speaker 4: hours through security and I was like, I can't let

443
00:24:01,520 --> 00:24:03,119
Speaker 4: that happen again. I guess I gotta spend the ninety

444
00:24:03,119 --> 00:24:07,159
Speaker 4: dollars And I'm like, yeah, what is that? What is

445
00:24:07,240 --> 00:24:11,240
Speaker 4: having my fingerprints? Like why is that the difference?

446
00:24:11,440 --> 00:24:15,320
Speaker 5: Yeah, God forbid someone wants to do something that's you know,

447
00:24:15,800 --> 00:24:18,880
Speaker 5: similar to like a suicide mission, they're not gonna They're like, fine,

448
00:24:18,880 --> 00:24:19,600
Speaker 5: take my fingerprints.

449
00:24:19,640 --> 00:24:19,960
Speaker 2: Who care?

450
00:24:20,040 --> 00:24:22,439
Speaker 5: Like that's not really a deterrent, right, Yeah.

451
00:24:22,600 --> 00:24:25,760
Speaker 1: And I also don't think terror is on a background

452
00:24:25,800 --> 00:24:31,840
Speaker 1: report like r I just had two years in terrorist school.

453
00:24:33,000 --> 00:24:34,880
Speaker 1: I just don't think. I just don't know what we're

454
00:24:34,920 --> 00:24:35,560
Speaker 1: gonna get there.

455
00:24:35,800 --> 00:24:37,680
Speaker 5: It's something that came up when we talked to Darryl,

456
00:24:38,040 --> 00:24:42,919
Speaker 5: This this concept of security theater. Right, So it's like

457
00:24:43,440 --> 00:24:45,480
Speaker 5: doing a bunch of stuff that makes it look like

458
00:24:45,560 --> 00:24:48,320
Speaker 5: we're a lot safer than we are, and that's kind

459
00:24:48,320 --> 00:24:49,760
Speaker 5: of all that needs to happen.

460
00:24:50,119 --> 00:24:53,400
Speaker 4: He talked about how he interviewed some people who were

461
00:24:53,480 --> 00:24:56,280
Speaker 4: being stopped, like once you get past TSA at the

462
00:24:56,520 --> 00:25:00,239
Speaker 4: actual gate, we're going to the plane and getting like

463
00:25:00,359 --> 00:25:03,840
Speaker 4: rechecked and padded down in front of everybody, and it's like, what,

464
00:25:04,480 --> 00:25:06,280
Speaker 4: like what could possibly happen from the time you go

465
00:25:06,359 --> 00:25:08,320
Speaker 4: through TSA to the time you get to your gate

466
00:25:08,400 --> 00:25:10,160
Speaker 4: that are like, oh, we need to check this person again.

467
00:25:10,480 --> 00:25:13,320
Speaker 4: And obviously the people you talked to were brown, right,

468
00:25:13,400 --> 00:25:15,280
Speaker 4: so it's like, all right, they're putting on a little

469
00:25:15,280 --> 00:25:18,560
Speaker 4: show for everybody, like, hey, white people, Look, we're checking

470
00:25:18,600 --> 00:25:21,760
Speaker 4: them real good, y'all are gonna be good for this flight.

471
00:25:21,840 --> 00:25:23,560
Speaker 4: We double checked them. This is the second time we're

472
00:25:23,560 --> 00:25:25,399
Speaker 4: doing it, right, So it's like it's a lot of

473
00:25:25,440 --> 00:25:27,600
Speaker 4: this stuff that it's like, why are like the you're

474
00:25:27,600 --> 00:25:29,800
Speaker 4: talking about the liquid thing. It's like, what do we like,

475
00:25:30,080 --> 00:25:33,000
Speaker 4: is that actually a threat nowadays or are we just

476
00:25:33,119 --> 00:25:37,480
Speaker 4: doing it because you know, it's we feel safer if

477
00:25:37,480 --> 00:25:39,080
Speaker 4: we can't bring liquids, if you have to take off

478
00:25:39,119 --> 00:25:40,040
Speaker 4: our shoes.

479
00:25:39,960 --> 00:25:41,600
Speaker 1: And they checking for liquids and they need to be

480
00:25:41,680 --> 00:25:45,919
Speaker 1: checking for solids seventyons. I don't think they're liquid with

481
00:25:48,160 --> 00:25:53,960
Speaker 1: that thing is metal? Okay, Noah, I'm curious to hear

482
00:25:54,000 --> 00:25:58,000
Speaker 1: from you about what Devin just talked about with biases

483
00:25:58,040 --> 00:26:00,440
Speaker 1: that come into TSA screenings.

484
00:26:00,480 --> 00:26:06,680
Speaker 4: And let me say so, we just went to white Man.

485
00:26:06,920 --> 00:26:08,800
Speaker 3: Yeah, we just went to Miami and as a white

486
00:26:08,840 --> 00:26:13,639
Speaker 3: I was padded down both those directions, which was disturbing.

487
00:26:15,000 --> 00:26:16,200
Speaker 2: I was dressed pretty light.

488
00:26:16,280 --> 00:26:19,920
Speaker 3: I had like shorts on, I don't know, t shirt.

489
00:26:20,200 --> 00:26:21,720
Speaker 3: I had just like a napkin in my pocket. So

490
00:26:21,920 --> 00:26:24,000
Speaker 3: it set off the detector. It seemed like they pointed

491
00:26:24,000 --> 00:26:26,359
Speaker 3: at the thing. They're like, there's something in your groin area.

492
00:26:26,720 --> 00:26:27,960
Speaker 3: I'm like, okay, you can.

493
00:26:27,800 --> 00:26:28,360
Speaker 2: Pap me down.

494
00:26:28,840 --> 00:26:30,600
Speaker 3: Then we have to wait for the advisor to come

495
00:26:30,640 --> 00:26:33,280
Speaker 3: and supervise it. It was like a twenty two year

496
00:26:33,320 --> 00:26:37,400
Speaker 3: old guy doing it. I'm like, all right, I'm standing around.

497
00:26:37,520 --> 00:26:38,000
Speaker 4: He does it.

498
00:26:38,359 --> 00:26:40,280
Speaker 3: Obviously there's nothing in there. So then I'm on my

499
00:26:40,320 --> 00:26:41,960
Speaker 3: way back. I'm like, all right, no tissues this time,

500
00:26:42,080 --> 00:26:43,400
Speaker 3: Like I'll find one.

501
00:26:43,480 --> 00:26:44,120
Speaker 1: I'll find one.

502
00:26:44,080 --> 00:26:48,159
Speaker 3: Later on in the in the gate, same shorts, empty

503
00:26:48,200 --> 00:26:51,879
Speaker 3: pockets happens again so I'm like, I don't know, Like, so,

504
00:26:52,240 --> 00:26:54,520
Speaker 3: you know, all to say is, you know, I understand

505
00:26:54,560 --> 00:26:56,800
Speaker 3: now what everyone's going through.

506
00:26:56,960 --> 00:27:01,040
Speaker 1: Like Manny Nore essentially a black man.

507
00:27:01,160 --> 00:27:05,000
Speaker 3: Now, yes, I wasn't gonna say it, but yeah, I

508
00:27:05,000 --> 00:27:07,719
Speaker 3: mean it is like but when Daryl was saying that,

509
00:27:07,800 --> 00:27:11,080
Speaker 3: it is like, once we're already at the gate and

510
00:27:11,119 --> 00:27:13,080
Speaker 3: gone through security, it is like you just wonder what

511
00:27:13,119 --> 00:27:15,840
Speaker 3: the actual directive is from, you know, top down, to

512
00:27:15,880 --> 00:27:17,520
Speaker 3: be like all right, now pull some extra people and

513
00:27:17,600 --> 00:27:20,639
Speaker 3: just search them again later on, Like is that in

514
00:27:20,680 --> 00:27:23,119
Speaker 3: writing anywhere? Like how does that actually get communicated? Is

515
00:27:23,160 --> 00:27:25,480
Speaker 3: kind of what's hard for me to even really fathom.

516
00:27:25,520 --> 00:27:29,080
Speaker 3: But obviously it like these people are there making barely

517
00:27:29,119 --> 00:27:31,600
Speaker 3: any money. They're not doing this for fun, you know.

518
00:27:31,880 --> 00:27:34,280
Speaker 3: So it's like, right, I don't know, it's it is

519
00:27:34,320 --> 00:27:34,840
Speaker 3: mind blowing.

520
00:27:35,160 --> 00:27:38,320
Speaker 1: Yeah, I mean, it feels like it's become so normalized

521
00:27:39,119 --> 00:27:42,199
Speaker 1: and I'm not really sure how we got here. Like

522
00:27:42,280 --> 00:27:46,359
Speaker 1: nine to eleven happens and then everybody's racist against people

523
00:27:46,440 --> 00:27:50,040
Speaker 1: wearing key jobs, brown people, people who they just assume

524
00:27:50,240 --> 00:27:54,640
Speaker 1: look arab, and it feels like it made its way

525
00:27:54,640 --> 00:27:57,120
Speaker 1: through TSA. Maybe it was in the training, like if

526
00:27:57,119 --> 00:27:59,000
Speaker 1: you see these types of people, you have to screen

527
00:27:59,040 --> 00:28:03,880
Speaker 1: them extra but it's persistent. I think I remember where

528
00:28:03,880 --> 00:28:06,200
Speaker 1: I was for nine eleven. I mean I was barely born,

529
00:28:06,359 --> 00:28:17,159
Speaker 1: but I think that's right. But I remember George Bush

530
00:28:17,440 --> 00:28:22,919
Speaker 1: being like, you're basically with us or you're with terrorism,

531
00:28:23,040 --> 00:28:26,679
Speaker 1: and that those were your choices. Yeah, And so I

532
00:28:26,720 --> 00:28:31,000
Speaker 1: think you start to see this empowerment or overreach from

533
00:28:31,080 --> 00:28:34,480
Speaker 1: this organization, and people are like signing up and feeling like, yes,

534
00:28:34,600 --> 00:28:38,400
Speaker 1: I am a guardian of the flight galaxy, and it

535
00:28:38,640 --> 00:28:41,760
Speaker 1: just spirals. And now every now and then it's rare

536
00:28:42,120 --> 00:28:44,880
Speaker 1: you see somebody like really push back against TSA. I

537
00:28:44,920 --> 00:28:47,840
Speaker 1: saw a man recently in HM where was I coming

538
00:28:47,840 --> 00:28:50,800
Speaker 1: from from Brussels coming back to Atlanta. They took that

539
00:28:50,840 --> 00:28:52,680
Speaker 1: man away, and when the door closed, I said, we'll

540
00:28:52,720 --> 00:28:55,520
Speaker 1: never hear from that man again. He was yelling out,

541
00:28:55,680 --> 00:28:58,080
Speaker 1: he was saying things. They took him behind that door.

542
00:28:58,080 --> 00:29:00,560
Speaker 1: I said, that's sound proof. That's a problem. If you

543
00:29:00,560 --> 00:29:02,640
Speaker 1: don't need a soundproof door in the airport, not that

544
00:29:02,680 --> 00:29:04,560
Speaker 1: I can think of, and I don't want to go

545
00:29:04,600 --> 00:29:20,880
Speaker 1: behind it. If there is a The Government Accountability Office

546
00:29:20,960 --> 00:29:25,240
Speaker 1: or the GAO in twenty twenty three found TSA collects

547
00:29:25,280 --> 00:29:30,560
Speaker 1: discrimination complaints but doesn't systematically analyze the outcomes by race

548
00:29:30,600 --> 00:29:36,320
Speaker 1: and gender. This is an opportunity for machine learning bias detection.

549
00:29:36,720 --> 00:29:39,160
Speaker 1: This is an opportunity to go back to the basics,

550
00:29:39,240 --> 00:29:42,800
Speaker 1: because what kind of data analysis? Then, what are you

551
00:29:42,840 --> 00:29:44,760
Speaker 1: doing with it? They said, throw it in the air.

552
00:29:45,320 --> 00:29:47,400
Speaker 1: Don't compile the results, just throw it in the air.

553
00:29:48,400 --> 00:29:50,560
Speaker 1: The thing is, most people don't file complaints, just like

554
00:29:50,600 --> 00:29:53,280
Speaker 1: you said, you know, like I didn't feel comfortable or

555
00:29:53,280 --> 00:29:55,560
Speaker 1: this thing was happening, But nobody wants to be on

556
00:29:55,600 --> 00:29:58,160
Speaker 1: the no fly list. Nobody wants to have all future

557
00:29:58,200 --> 00:30:00,840
Speaker 1: travel impacted, so you kind of just suck it up. Yeah,

558
00:30:00,840 --> 00:30:02,560
Speaker 1: And I'm like, I wonder what is it? Do you

559
00:30:02,560 --> 00:30:05,959
Speaker 1: think it's just fear that keeps us not saying anything

560
00:30:06,000 --> 00:30:09,040
Speaker 1: and allowing them to talk to us crazy out the

561
00:30:09,080 --> 00:30:11,320
Speaker 1: side of their neckstep psa, like even if they are

562
00:30:11,360 --> 00:30:13,120
Speaker 1: stressed out, Like, what do you think allows us to

563
00:30:13,160 --> 00:30:14,880
Speaker 1: continue to go on? Yeah?

564
00:30:14,920 --> 00:30:16,880
Speaker 5: I feel like, you know, nine times out of ten

565
00:30:16,920 --> 00:30:18,800
Speaker 5: and you're out of airport, you're kind of in a rush.

566
00:30:19,000 --> 00:30:21,280
Speaker 5: You're like, you don't really have a ton of time

567
00:30:21,320 --> 00:30:26,640
Speaker 5: to strike up a conversation or do a more procedural complaint,

568
00:30:27,240 --> 00:30:30,960
Speaker 5: and you know, like inconveniences that happened in my regular,

569
00:30:31,400 --> 00:30:33,480
Speaker 5: everyday life. It takes a lot for me to be like,

570
00:30:33,520 --> 00:30:35,440
Speaker 5: wait a second, I got to confront someone about this.

571
00:30:36,040 --> 00:30:38,520
Speaker 4: Okay, they are updating the machines, but a lot of

572
00:30:38,560 --> 00:30:43,160
Speaker 4: trans people going through the older algorithm for the body

573
00:30:43,160 --> 00:30:46,040
Speaker 4: scanners would get stopped because they would be like, I

574
00:30:46,160 --> 00:30:48,560
Speaker 4: perceive you as a man, why is there something in

575
00:30:48,600 --> 00:30:51,520
Speaker 4: your growing area? And they would get pated down, and

576
00:30:51,920 --> 00:30:53,720
Speaker 4: a lot of them said a lot of trans people

577
00:30:53,760 --> 00:30:57,200
Speaker 4: said like I like it was embarrassing, so I didn't

578
00:30:57,240 --> 00:30:58,760
Speaker 4: want to draw attention to it. So I'm not going

579
00:30:58,800 --> 00:31:00,960
Speaker 4: to file a complaint or talk about it afterwards. I'm

580
00:31:00,960 --> 00:31:02,600
Speaker 4: just going to keep it moving. And I think that's

581
00:31:02,680 --> 00:31:05,120
Speaker 4: kind of mentality everybody has with TSA, is just sort

582
00:31:05,120 --> 00:31:08,640
Speaker 4: of like it's for the better good. Like shortest sucks

583
00:31:08,680 --> 00:31:11,400
Speaker 4: for me, but like if I have to be inconvenience

584
00:31:11,440 --> 00:31:13,840
Speaker 4: so they can stop somebody who's trying to, you know,

585
00:31:14,040 --> 00:31:16,600
Speaker 4: bring a gun or a bomb onto the plane, then

586
00:31:16,680 --> 00:31:19,760
Speaker 4: it's okay, right, it's fine. I think you saw the

587
00:31:20,040 --> 00:31:23,000
Speaker 4: similar energy like you're saying after nine eleven, where you know,

588
00:31:23,120 --> 00:31:25,200
Speaker 4: like the government was doing some stuff and taking away

589
00:31:25,240 --> 00:31:27,240
Speaker 4: some rights, and people were like, well, I'm not a terrorist,

590
00:31:27,240 --> 00:31:29,640
Speaker 4: so it doesn't really matter that, like if they're listening

591
00:31:29,640 --> 00:31:33,600
Speaker 4: to my phone calls or like monitoring my online conversations.

592
00:31:33,960 --> 00:31:36,200
Speaker 4: And I think like, now because we have some distance

593
00:31:36,200 --> 00:31:39,160
Speaker 4: from it, people are starting to be like, WHOA, that's

594
00:31:39,160 --> 00:31:41,400
Speaker 4: like where the government was doing a lot, Maybe we

595
00:31:41,440 --> 00:31:43,400
Speaker 4: need to take back somebody's rights. But I think any

596
00:31:43,480 --> 00:31:45,800
Speaker 4: aftermath of some of these big events, people are more

597
00:31:45,840 --> 00:31:49,680
Speaker 4: willing to give up their rights or be inconvenience for

598
00:31:49,760 --> 00:31:52,360
Speaker 4: the quote unquote greater good, even if in this case,

599
00:31:52,360 --> 00:31:53,920
Speaker 4: the greater good is not doing that great of a

600
00:31:54,000 --> 00:31:55,880
Speaker 4: job at keeping us safe.

601
00:31:55,640 --> 00:32:00,440
Speaker 5: And TSA ends up not having any incentive to ever

602
00:32:00,480 --> 00:32:03,600
Speaker 5: address the source of our complaints. Anyway, it's a federal

603
00:32:03,720 --> 00:32:06,719
Speaker 5: organization and they're not necessarily making money. Like if there

604
00:32:06,720 --> 00:32:10,440
Speaker 5: were a company, a private company, where you know, a

605
00:32:10,560 --> 00:32:13,480
Speaker 5: large amount of complaints might actually affect their business, then

606
00:32:13,560 --> 00:32:16,760
Speaker 5: they would feel incentivized to address them. But you know,

607
00:32:17,000 --> 00:32:19,440
Speaker 5: it's kind of like, why would they care about our complaints?

608
00:32:19,560 --> 00:32:21,960
Speaker 5: That's they're just like the end all be all for

609
00:32:22,480 --> 00:32:25,240
Speaker 5: airport security as of now. Yeah, yeah, and like you're

610
00:32:25,240 --> 00:32:27,520
Speaker 5: still gonna fly when you need to see your family

611
00:32:27,600 --> 00:32:29,680
Speaker 5: or do whatever. It's not like it's not like picking

612
00:32:29,680 --> 00:32:33,480
Speaker 5: a airline or something, and it's just like you just

613
00:32:33,520 --> 00:32:34,840
Speaker 5: need to go there and do.

614
00:32:34,840 --> 00:32:39,040
Speaker 1: It right, because I'm not taking to greyhound. That's a

615
00:32:39,080 --> 00:32:41,520
Speaker 1: really great point that all of you are making. I

616
00:32:41,560 --> 00:32:45,800
Speaker 1: think the machines with trans folks, people with wheelchairs and

617
00:32:45,840 --> 00:32:49,800
Speaker 1: medical devices and things like that. TSA claims to accommodate them,

618
00:32:50,000 --> 00:32:52,640
Speaker 1: but we always hear all of these horror stories about

619
00:32:52,840 --> 00:32:57,200
Speaker 1: wheelchairs being broken and devices being misplaced or lost or broken,

620
00:32:57,320 --> 00:33:01,680
Speaker 1: and it's just like, who were these systems built to serve?

621
00:33:01,960 --> 00:33:04,640
Speaker 1: And who is it not built to serve? And it's

622
00:33:04,720 --> 00:33:09,160
Speaker 1: clear that they are excluded from that scope. I think

623
00:33:09,200 --> 00:33:12,480
Speaker 1: the point that you bring up about privatization is also

624
00:33:12,520 --> 00:33:15,360
Speaker 1: a good point, because there's a bill in Congress right now,

625
00:33:15,360 --> 00:33:18,240
Speaker 1: the abolished TSA Act that I think a Republican out

626
00:33:18,280 --> 00:33:22,200
Speaker 1: of Utah actually put up, and it would transfer airport

627
00:33:22,280 --> 00:33:26,400
Speaker 1: screening to private companies. Yeah, twenty two United States airports,

628
00:33:26,480 --> 00:33:31,680
Speaker 1: including San Francisco, use private screeners under TSA's Screening Partnership program,

629
00:33:32,280 --> 00:33:36,400
Speaker 1: same rules, just different employer badge. So studies show that

630
00:33:36,440 --> 00:33:39,000
Speaker 1: they are able to get people through faster, but they're

631
00:33:39,080 --> 00:33:43,120
Speaker 1: not more effective. It's not like they're catching more security risks.

632
00:33:43,200 --> 00:33:47,160
Speaker 1: Do you guys feel like that would fix something or

633
00:33:47,840 --> 00:33:50,680
Speaker 1: just make it harder for folks to be held accountable

634
00:33:50,880 --> 00:33:52,920
Speaker 1: in the ways that they need to be held accountable,

635
00:33:52,920 --> 00:33:54,800
Speaker 1: like we were just talking about with biases.

636
00:33:55,480 --> 00:33:58,760
Speaker 4: We actually gotten a very angry email after our episode

637
00:33:58,960 --> 00:34:03,479
Speaker 4: about this because San Francisco has private security. No, but

638
00:34:03,640 --> 00:34:05,840
Speaker 4: they're you know, they're following the rules of the TSA,

639
00:34:05,920 --> 00:34:07,840
Speaker 4: so they have to be TSA compliance to someone who's

640
00:34:07,840 --> 00:34:10,719
Speaker 4: basically reaching out being like privatization is not the way

641
00:34:10,760 --> 00:34:12,520
Speaker 4: to go. I fly out of San Francisco and I

642
00:34:12,600 --> 00:34:14,880
Speaker 4: have all these same issues, which I didn't think we

643
00:34:14,920 --> 00:34:17,080
Speaker 4: said privatization was the way to go in the episode,

644
00:34:17,160 --> 00:34:25,200
Speaker 4: but I think, yeah, simply making airport security private doesn't

645
00:34:25,200 --> 00:34:28,240
Speaker 4: fix the problem if you're still abiding by TSA rules

646
00:34:28,320 --> 00:34:29,719
Speaker 4: and you know, like if you still have all these

647
00:34:29,719 --> 00:34:31,920
Speaker 4: same issues of like not paying people a lot of money,

648
00:34:32,280 --> 00:34:35,400
Speaker 4: like the rules being confusing, not having job security people

649
00:34:35,520 --> 00:34:37,919
Speaker 4: like turnover larry to being high, like it doesn't matter

650
00:34:37,960 --> 00:34:40,640
Speaker 4: who really is in charge, right, Like you got to

651
00:34:40,680 --> 00:34:44,200
Speaker 4: rethink the system entirely, which you know I haven't read

652
00:34:44,200 --> 00:34:45,960
Speaker 4: too much in this to this bill, but I don't

653
00:34:46,000 --> 00:34:49,360
Speaker 4: think that's what this is attempting to do. I think

654
00:34:49,640 --> 00:34:51,880
Speaker 4: the real way to fix TSA is like a big,

655
00:34:52,080 --> 00:34:54,640
Speaker 4: huge overhaul, and I think it's hard to do that

656
00:34:54,719 --> 00:35:00,000
Speaker 4: without like an event causing people to really like put

657
00:35:00,120 --> 00:35:04,799
Speaker 4: to urgency and like money and effort into it. So

658
00:35:04,920 --> 00:35:08,520
Speaker 4: I don't see it ever being fixed at this point

659
00:35:08,800 --> 00:35:11,319
Speaker 4: because there's like, you know, it's one thing for there

660
00:35:11,360 --> 00:35:13,400
Speaker 4: to be a big event to cause you to like

661
00:35:13,719 --> 00:35:15,719
Speaker 4: up airport security. What's going to be a big event

662
00:35:15,760 --> 00:35:17,400
Speaker 4: for people to be like, oh, maybe we should be

663
00:35:17,400 --> 00:35:19,520
Speaker 4: more chill about like airport security.

664
00:35:20,760 --> 00:35:21,239
Speaker 1: Right. Yeah.

665
00:35:21,280 --> 00:35:26,480
Speaker 5: I'm generally a proponent of government taking on responsibility of

666
00:35:26,560 --> 00:35:29,360
Speaker 5: some things as long as it's obviously done in an efficient,

667
00:35:29,400 --> 00:35:32,360
Speaker 5: in a smart way. Yeah, I worry that if airport

668
00:35:32,440 --> 00:35:35,240
Speaker 5: security became privatized. We've seen it a million times before,

669
00:35:35,360 --> 00:35:39,120
Speaker 5: even with airlines, where they'll take certain shortcuts in order

670
00:35:39,160 --> 00:35:43,040
Speaker 5: to maximize profits, and that ends up leading to disastrous

671
00:35:43,080 --> 00:35:45,560
Speaker 5: events happening. And so we are kind of, like, as

672
00:35:45,640 --> 00:35:48,319
Speaker 5: Evan's been saying, we're kind of in a conundrum here

673
00:35:48,719 --> 00:35:51,360
Speaker 5: because I don't want it to be private but I

674
00:35:51,400 --> 00:35:54,040
Speaker 5: also don't like what it is right now. Yeah, I

675
00:35:54,080 --> 00:35:56,000
Speaker 5: think the main thing is like we we mainly, I mean,

676
00:35:56,040 --> 00:35:58,560
Speaker 5: the biggest complaint is we just want consistency. Like it's

677
00:35:58,600 --> 00:36:00,640
Speaker 5: fine if it's horrible to need to take you shoes off,

678
00:36:00,640 --> 00:36:03,080
Speaker 5: but like, at least I would like to know that

679
00:36:03,200 --> 00:36:06,520
Speaker 5: I need to do that, Like, like why not just

680
00:36:06,560 --> 00:36:08,640
Speaker 5: make a big newsletter you smail out to everyone like

681
00:36:08,640 --> 00:36:10,440
Speaker 5: a phone book at the beginning of the year and say,

682
00:36:10,520 --> 00:36:13,600
Speaker 5: this year, take the laptops out, keep your shoes on,

683
00:36:14,960 --> 00:36:19,280
Speaker 5: no liquids, no baby milk, whatever, like until.

684
00:36:19,040 --> 00:36:20,719
Speaker 3: You get another one of these. That's the rule for

685
00:36:20,760 --> 00:36:24,200
Speaker 3: every airport in the United States. And like it can

686
00:36:24,239 --> 00:36:26,160
Speaker 3: be private, public, whatever you want.

687
00:36:26,600 --> 00:36:30,160
Speaker 1: Yeah, I think it seems like what you're advocating for

688
00:36:30,480 --> 00:36:34,399
Speaker 1: is some big event in the reverse where we can

689
00:36:34,440 --> 00:36:37,759
Speaker 1: get relaxed. Personally, I would like it to just be

690
00:36:37,800 --> 00:36:39,960
Speaker 1: a lottery thing. Like you get there, you pull a number,

691
00:36:40,120 --> 00:36:42,600
Speaker 1: and you don't know if you're gonna get screened or not.

692
00:36:43,000 --> 00:36:46,799
Speaker 1: Now you know, and that really get it randomized. We

693
00:36:46,840 --> 00:36:49,360
Speaker 1: see what's going on, you can't control it. Like the

694
00:36:49,440 --> 00:36:56,120
Speaker 1: price is right, you come on at a little fun

695
00:36:56,120 --> 00:37:00,640
Speaker 1: a little gamification to the process I do.

696
00:37:00,760 --> 00:37:02,320
Speaker 4: Are the other people just going through.

697
00:37:02,280 --> 00:37:07,800
Speaker 1: It's like you are in the studio audience. We're picking

698
00:37:07,880 --> 00:37:12,560
Speaker 1: five out of years. The rest of y'all go and

699
00:37:12,640 --> 00:37:14,680
Speaker 1: we get to see your entire contents of your bag.

700
00:37:15,239 --> 00:37:16,760
Speaker 4: Yeah, we're going through everything.

701
00:37:16,840 --> 00:37:17,719
Speaker 3: You can give it away too.

702
00:37:17,760 --> 00:37:22,080
Speaker 1: Some of the stuff, I just think there's just it

703
00:37:22,120 --> 00:37:25,560
Speaker 1: feels like this unnecessary thing to me. But I think

704
00:37:25,640 --> 00:37:29,000
Speaker 1: also there there is some good that comes out of TSA.

705
00:37:29,200 --> 00:37:31,120
Speaker 1: I think we know that. I think there are some

706
00:37:31,160 --> 00:37:34,000
Speaker 1: flawed policies for sure. I mean, we've talked about real

707
00:37:34,040 --> 00:37:37,120
Speaker 1: I D. But what we haven't talked about, you know,

708
00:37:37,520 --> 00:37:40,000
Speaker 1: is you mentioned there should be a newsletter where they

709
00:37:40,000 --> 00:37:42,120
Speaker 1: should say this is exactly what you should be screened for.

710
00:37:42,160 --> 00:37:44,839
Speaker 1: Everybody's talking about real ID, but there's like eleven things

711
00:37:44,880 --> 00:37:47,480
Speaker 1: that TSA said, Now you can include this in your

712
00:37:47,480 --> 00:37:51,000
Speaker 1: bag and we won't stop you. TSA is tweeting funny

713
00:37:51,000 --> 00:37:52,640
Speaker 1: memes and I'm like, this is what you need to

714
00:37:52,640 --> 00:37:56,799
Speaker 1: be outy. I'm not laughing. This should what should be

715
00:37:56,840 --> 00:38:02,120
Speaker 1: on threats, like not not you roasting the Windy's, you know,

716
00:38:03,000 --> 00:38:06,120
Speaker 1: like it just can I put my ratail comb in

717
00:38:06,400 --> 00:38:12,160
Speaker 1: my back right right? I think I'm curious. You know,

718
00:38:12,200 --> 00:38:14,520
Speaker 1: I've given you my take, and we always like to

719
00:38:14,520 --> 00:38:16,920
Speaker 1: have something a little fun. Uh. If you were to

720
00:38:16,960 --> 00:38:21,080
Speaker 1: build our airport security from scratch based on what you know? Now, okay,

721
00:38:22,239 --> 00:38:24,240
Speaker 1: how would you build one that you felt like actually

722
00:38:24,320 --> 00:38:27,600
Speaker 1: kept us safe and treated people with dignity? Already told

723
00:38:27,640 --> 00:38:30,319
Speaker 1: you by Mark the Lottery.

724
00:38:30,760 --> 00:38:35,759
Speaker 4: Yeah, I actually I think that you can do like

725
00:38:36,280 --> 00:38:39,120
Speaker 4: you should treat airports like you're getting on a train.

726
00:38:39,640 --> 00:38:42,160
Speaker 4: M There's no you didn't. No one's looking through your

727
00:38:42,160 --> 00:38:43,120
Speaker 4: bag when you get on a train.

728
00:38:43,640 --> 00:38:43,880
Speaker 1: You know.

729
00:38:44,040 --> 00:38:46,680
Speaker 4: It's like and I think the things that would stop

730
00:38:46,800 --> 00:38:50,319
Speaker 4: someone from hijacking a plane like have nothing to do

731
00:38:50,400 --> 00:38:51,439
Speaker 4: with them checking your bags.

732
00:38:51,520 --> 00:38:51,640
Speaker 1: Right.

733
00:38:51,640 --> 00:38:55,360
Speaker 4: The cockpits are enforced down so you can't get in

734
00:38:55,400 --> 00:38:57,920
Speaker 4: there if you're not a pilot. Everybody else on the

735
00:38:57,920 --> 00:39:01,040
Speaker 4: plane if you do some fishy stuff, as we see,

736
00:39:01,680 --> 00:39:04,000
Speaker 4: people will jump on you, like I saw. I was

737
00:39:04,160 --> 00:39:06,520
Speaker 4: just watching video the other day of a flight attendant

738
00:39:06,600 --> 00:39:08,879
Speaker 4: punching his dude in the face because he was having

739
00:39:08,880 --> 00:39:10,520
Speaker 4: like some sort of spasm and he was pulling like

740
00:39:10,520 --> 00:39:12,520
Speaker 4: this woman's here in front of him, and my dude

741
00:39:12,560 --> 00:39:17,520
Speaker 4: was like boxing, and it's like people aren't people don't. Yeah,

742
00:39:17,520 --> 00:39:19,480
Speaker 4: people don't have that energy like pre nine to eleven.

743
00:39:19,560 --> 00:39:21,880
Speaker 4: It's like if you do anything fishy on a plane

744
00:39:22,200 --> 00:39:23,680
Speaker 4: like ten, people would be like, what are you doing?

745
00:39:23,760 --> 00:39:24,320
Speaker 2: Yeah?

746
00:39:24,360 --> 00:39:27,799
Speaker 4: So I think between just those two things, like most

747
00:39:27,840 --> 00:39:29,480
Speaker 4: of the situations will be taken care of.

748
00:39:29,800 --> 00:39:34,279
Speaker 5: Sometimes in smaller airports, i'll see better technology where you

749
00:39:34,360 --> 00:39:38,720
Speaker 5: can kind of implement newer stuff a little easier because

750
00:39:38,719 --> 00:39:41,080
Speaker 5: not so many people go through that airport. This happened

751
00:39:41,160 --> 00:39:44,800
Speaker 5: to me in Hartford, Connecticut. They have an airport up there,

752
00:39:46,080 --> 00:39:48,360
Speaker 5: and there was a lot of people at the airport,

753
00:39:48,440 --> 00:39:50,719
Speaker 5: but the security line was a sinch because we're just

754
00:39:50,719 --> 00:39:53,040
Speaker 5: like moving through this like futuristic kind of. I don't

755
00:39:53,040 --> 00:39:55,759
Speaker 5: know exactly what it was, but I wondered if it

756
00:39:55,840 --> 00:39:59,640
Speaker 5: was detecting, you know, for a bomb. And that's pretty

757
00:39:59,680 --> 00:40:03,800
Speaker 5: much it. Like there's blades. I'm not super worried about guns.

758
00:40:03,840 --> 00:40:05,960
Speaker 5: Obviously I'm worried about but like I walk around every

759
00:40:06,040 --> 00:40:07,000
Speaker 5: day around gun like that.

760
00:40:11,080 --> 00:40:15,200
Speaker 1: My god, you want problems, I got problems too.

761
00:40:16,239 --> 00:40:18,120
Speaker 5: I really just want to make sure that the plane

762
00:40:18,560 --> 00:40:22,320
Speaker 5: lands and it's at its destination. All the other stuff,

763
00:40:22,360 --> 00:40:25,239
Speaker 5: I feel like, you know, I don't know, I'm just

764
00:40:25,280 --> 00:40:26,640
Speaker 5: I've never been that worried about it.

765
00:40:28,120 --> 00:40:30,960
Speaker 3: I think they should use more dogs for sniffing the bombs.

766
00:40:31,000 --> 00:40:33,880
Speaker 2: Perhaps. I like seeing the dogs.

767
00:40:34,360 --> 00:40:38,120
Speaker 3: It's a pretty harmless and you know, I think it's

768
00:40:38,120 --> 00:40:40,759
Speaker 3: a pretty painless way for it that to happen, to

769
00:40:40,880 --> 00:40:43,680
Speaker 3: have the dogs roaming, whether before or after. I think

770
00:40:43,719 --> 00:40:44,840
Speaker 3: we should have metal detectors.

771
00:40:44,880 --> 00:40:46,120
Speaker 2: I'll say it.

772
00:40:46,239 --> 00:40:49,319
Speaker 3: I would prefer no guns on the plane with me,

773
00:40:49,360 --> 00:40:54,520
Speaker 3: except for maybe an air marshall. Maybe I'm conservative, but yeah,

774
00:40:54,560 --> 00:40:57,520
Speaker 3: I think those two as like it's like going into

775
00:40:57,520 --> 00:41:01,920
Speaker 3: a sports you know, are like that plus ad you know,

776
00:41:02,040 --> 00:41:05,360
Speaker 3: add some things, and I think we should be pretty

777
00:41:05,360 --> 00:41:05,719
Speaker 3: good with that.

778
00:41:06,320 --> 00:41:08,399
Speaker 1: I heard, Manny you tell a story, Devin, you told

779
00:41:08,400 --> 00:41:10,200
Speaker 1: a story. No, you didn't have that bad of a

780
00:41:10,200 --> 00:41:13,320
Speaker 1: story except in the neck end. Like I am interested

781
00:41:13,440 --> 00:41:17,839
Speaker 1: in any special airport stories that y'all have that kind

782
00:41:17,920 --> 00:41:21,360
Speaker 1: of crystallizes your all of how you feel about the

783
00:41:21,440 --> 00:41:23,279
Speaker 1: airport experiences.

784
00:41:23,800 --> 00:41:26,840
Speaker 4: There are two things. One, the hoodie thing is always

785
00:41:26,840 --> 00:41:30,320
Speaker 4: a situation. It's like there's they're always telling you conflict,

786
00:41:30,320 --> 00:41:32,160
Speaker 4: take off your hoodie, and then the other person's like,

787
00:41:32,160 --> 00:41:33,719
Speaker 4: you don't need to take off your hoodie? Is like

788
00:41:33,760 --> 00:41:36,080
Speaker 4: all right, y'all need to talk. Y'all standing five feet

789
00:41:36,080 --> 00:41:38,640
Speaker 4: away from each other, maybe you can both get on

790
00:41:38,680 --> 00:41:41,160
Speaker 4: the same page, if not everybody else in the airport.

791
00:41:41,400 --> 00:41:44,440
Speaker 4: And then for a while I took like four or

792
00:41:44,480 --> 00:41:48,279
Speaker 4: five flights where every single time they like checked my

793
00:41:48,400 --> 00:41:51,440
Speaker 4: bag and like opened up my carry on, which y'all know,

794
00:41:51,560 --> 00:41:54,960
Speaker 4: when you pack your carry on, it's not it's not

795
00:41:55,040 --> 00:41:58,480
Speaker 4: meant to be opened and get in a hotel somewhere,

796
00:42:00,160 --> 00:42:02,279
Speaker 4: So they open it up, they go through everything, and

797
00:42:02,280 --> 00:42:04,040
Speaker 4: then they're like, yeah, you're good, and then they just

798
00:42:04,080 --> 00:42:06,799
Speaker 4: sort of push the mess of your open bag to you,

799
00:42:07,080 --> 00:42:10,080
Speaker 4: and there's no place to like lightly put it back there.

800
00:42:10,120 --> 00:42:12,920
Speaker 4: So I would ask like, like, what's is there anything

801
00:42:12,960 --> 00:42:17,520
Speaker 4: in there? Like what's happening? And they're like, basically, there's

802
00:42:17,520 --> 00:42:20,480
Speaker 4: nothing we can tell you. It happened consistently, like four

803
00:42:20,520 --> 00:42:21,800
Speaker 4: or five times when I was flying.

804
00:42:23,280 --> 00:42:26,920
Speaker 5: Yeah, on the hoodie thing, there are dozens of us

805
00:42:27,000 --> 00:42:31,320
Speaker 5: who wear hoodies with without you know, any T shirt underneath.

806
00:42:31,719 --> 00:42:33,319
Speaker 2: I find it to be you you.

807
00:42:33,239 --> 00:42:34,880
Speaker 4: Are, you are on your own with that.

808
00:42:36,360 --> 00:42:41,680
Speaker 5: Yeah, I feel a little bit more comfortable in that scenario.

809
00:42:41,800 --> 00:42:45,080
Speaker 5: And sometimes I'll get as really often I'm like, are

810
00:42:45,120 --> 00:42:45,960
Speaker 5: you sure about that.

811
00:42:47,560 --> 00:42:47,840
Speaker 1: Happened.

812
00:42:47,920 --> 00:42:49,560
Speaker 2: What's happened more than they should have let people like

813
00:42:49,600 --> 00:42:50,560
Speaker 2: that on the plane.

814
00:42:52,040 --> 00:42:54,440
Speaker 1: Because shirt.

815
00:42:55,960 --> 00:42:59,160
Speaker 5: Tsa we're stopping bombs, guns and people who don't wear

816
00:42:59,200 --> 00:43:00,160
Speaker 5: T shirts under their.

817
00:43:03,239 --> 00:43:06,040
Speaker 1: When you're in an airport, though it all feels right,

818
00:43:06,160 --> 00:43:10,360
Speaker 1: no shirt under your hoodie, that man clearly needs additional stream.

819
00:43:11,120 --> 00:43:13,720
Speaker 1: I think all of this stuff is because I watched

820
00:43:13,719 --> 00:43:17,520
Speaker 1: a lot of like con Air and you know, movies

821
00:43:17,600 --> 00:43:21,440
Speaker 1: like that, and I feel like, I, yeah, it's and

822
00:43:21,600 --> 00:43:24,600
Speaker 1: it's probably wrong, like hijackings and all these things. It's

823
00:43:24,600 --> 00:43:28,400
Speaker 1: probably wrong, But the media does such a number like

824
00:43:28,520 --> 00:43:31,160
Speaker 1: on our minds and what we think are clear and

825
00:43:31,239 --> 00:43:36,040
Speaker 1: present danger is. But I think, thank you very much

826
00:43:36,040 --> 00:43:40,279
Speaker 1: with Harrison Ford references there. But I do think, like

827
00:43:41,719 --> 00:43:45,360
Speaker 1: I'm more concerned about somebody like accessing my cell phone

828
00:43:45,360 --> 00:43:47,760
Speaker 1: and all of us getting like, like, I think I'm

829
00:43:48,000 --> 00:43:52,240
Speaker 1: much more worried about digital warfare or you know, digital

830
00:43:52,320 --> 00:43:56,520
Speaker 1: terrorism than I am, like physical because during COVID people

831
00:43:56,520 --> 00:43:58,279
Speaker 1: are going crazy and fighting on the flights, and so

832
00:43:58,320 --> 00:44:00,399
Speaker 1: I'm like, nobody's really risking that. If they are willing

833
00:44:00,440 --> 00:44:03,320
Speaker 1: to do that, then in the middle of a respiratory pandemic,

834
00:44:03,840 --> 00:44:09,200
Speaker 1: imagine what we do now. Similarly, I feel like it

835
00:44:09,280 --> 00:44:11,040
Speaker 1: might not be so much of a threat, or the

836
00:44:11,080 --> 00:44:12,959
Speaker 1: threat's not right, there is somewhere else.

837
00:44:13,040 --> 00:44:17,760
Speaker 4: Yeah, most of the security researchers say, like most terrorist

838
00:44:17,840 --> 00:44:21,080
Speaker 4: organizations are not planning to hijack planes anymore, Like that's

839
00:44:21,080 --> 00:44:25,440
Speaker 4: not there's sadly easier ways to kill people. You know.

840
00:44:25,520 --> 00:44:27,279
Speaker 4: It's like the plane thing is a bit of a

841
00:44:27,320 --> 00:44:31,880
Speaker 4: hassle now, so they're doing other things, right, It's like airports,

842
00:44:31,920 --> 00:44:35,240
Speaker 4: and if airports are being targeted, they're targeting security lines.

843
00:44:35,239 --> 00:44:37,680
Speaker 4: They're not targeting the actual plane. And it's not like

844
00:44:37,800 --> 00:44:40,279
Speaker 4: TSA is strapped, you know. It's like when people go

845
00:44:40,360 --> 00:44:43,440
Speaker 4: through there shooting there, they can't do anything. They need

846
00:44:43,440 --> 00:44:45,160
Speaker 4: to look for the real police to come and help out.

847
00:44:46,280 --> 00:44:48,799
Speaker 4: So it's like it's it's to your point. It's like

848
00:44:48,880 --> 00:44:52,200
Speaker 4: I think the moment TSA was created, like it was

849
00:44:52,200 --> 00:44:55,759
Speaker 4: already outdated because that thing was not going to happen again, right,

850
00:44:55,840 --> 00:44:58,280
Speaker 4: Like they ran the playbook, it's over, they're not running

851
00:44:58,320 --> 00:45:00,920
Speaker 4: it again, But like we have created the whole system

852
00:45:01,040 --> 00:45:03,279
Speaker 4: for that old playbook. Rather than being like, all right,

853
00:45:03,280 --> 00:45:04,680
Speaker 4: what is going to be the next thing, we should

854
00:45:04,680 --> 00:45:05,240
Speaker 4: be worried.

855
00:45:05,040 --> 00:45:09,919
Speaker 5: About I just thinking about TSAs with the hammers on them,

856
00:45:10,080 --> 00:45:11,200
Speaker 5: that that's I.

857
00:45:11,160 --> 00:45:13,839
Speaker 2: Don't want to be in that world ever, And you're

858
00:45:13,880 --> 00:45:14,279
Speaker 2: trying to.

859
00:45:14,800 --> 00:45:16,320
Speaker 1: Do that much attitude.

860
00:45:16,400 --> 00:45:18,840
Speaker 4: Yeah, he's like, I don't have a shirt on to

861
00:45:18,840 --> 00:45:21,719
Speaker 4: hear at gunpoint.

862
00:45:23,480 --> 00:45:25,120
Speaker 1: I think one of the things is sometimes I see

863
00:45:25,120 --> 00:45:28,239
Speaker 1: it on the Internet where people are like, oh, would

864
00:45:28,280 --> 00:45:29,880
Speaker 1: you date this kind of person? And I feel like

865
00:45:30,400 --> 00:45:32,879
Speaker 1: police officers people a lot of times women just because

866
00:45:32,880 --> 00:45:37,760
Speaker 1: they also have statistically, uh terrible interactions with police officers.

867
00:45:37,760 --> 00:45:38,959
Speaker 1: A lot of times women are like, no, I would

868
00:45:38,960 --> 00:45:41,879
Speaker 1: never date a police officer. But I'm like, we haven't

869
00:45:41,880 --> 00:45:44,560
Speaker 1: talked about the bad attitudes of TSA officers and the

870
00:45:44,640 --> 00:45:49,440
Speaker 1: stigma around that, So would you date a TSA officer on?

871
00:45:52,160 --> 00:45:56,120
Speaker 5: No, But obviously there are going to be some exceptions.

872
00:45:56,160 --> 00:45:57,279
Speaker 5: I think if someone is.

873
00:45:57,320 --> 00:45:59,760
Speaker 4: There's some goods officers you're.

874
00:45:59,640 --> 00:46:03,600
Speaker 5: Saying, you know, really, I think it's gonna hate to

875
00:46:03,680 --> 00:46:06,600
Speaker 5: sound a very surface level here, but if it comes

876
00:46:06,640 --> 00:46:08,240
Speaker 5: down to the looks, really, I think.

877
00:46:08,520 --> 00:46:10,919
Speaker 4: If they if they think it looks are good enough,

878
00:46:11,200 --> 00:46:12,680
Speaker 4: you'll overlook them working at TSA.

879
00:46:12,800 --> 00:46:13,920
Speaker 2: Oh yeah, blanket No.

880
00:46:14,120 --> 00:46:17,960
Speaker 5: But obviously, if halle Berry was a TSA officer. I'm

881
00:46:18,000 --> 00:46:20,920
Speaker 5: trying to say is that there are some exceptions reconsidered.

882
00:46:21,080 --> 00:46:24,520
Speaker 1: That's what means that you always say the rules change enough.

883
00:46:24,920 --> 00:46:28,040
Speaker 5: Yeah, everyone has everyone has a stance.

884
00:46:29,040 --> 00:46:31,080
Speaker 1: Oh my god, I've always wanted to be with the TSA.

885
00:46:32,160 --> 00:46:36,399
Speaker 1: Cut me down. I have no shirt on my head.

886
00:46:39,080 --> 00:46:40,000
Speaker 2: I just wanted to let.

887
00:46:39,960 --> 00:46:40,359
Speaker 1: You know.

888
00:46:43,600 --> 00:46:46,840
Speaker 4: What I we. We had a listener who was like,

889
00:46:46,920 --> 00:46:49,600
Speaker 4: there's a type of person who takes this job. And

890
00:46:49,680 --> 00:46:53,480
Speaker 4: it's like it's a person who like wants power, you know,

891
00:46:53,680 --> 00:46:56,080
Speaker 4: and like it doesn't matter if it's just like telling

892
00:46:56,080 --> 00:46:58,759
Speaker 4: people what to put in the basket or whatever. But

893
00:46:59,200 --> 00:47:00,719
Speaker 4: I don't think I could. I don't think I could.

894
00:47:00,760 --> 00:47:04,400
Speaker 4: I think that energy, like someone who has the energy

895
00:47:04,440 --> 00:47:07,000
Speaker 4: to be even decent at their job at t s

896
00:47:07,080 --> 00:47:08,720
Speaker 4: A is like not energy I would.

897
00:47:08,600 --> 00:47:12,640
Speaker 2: Want around me, even if they look like Zendia Date.

898
00:47:13,040 --> 00:47:16,000
Speaker 4: We said, date, all right, fair enough Date. I think

899
00:47:16,040 --> 00:47:17,040
Speaker 4: I would consider it.

900
00:47:17,120 --> 00:47:18,680
Speaker 2: I mean, I don't think it's like a cop.

901
00:47:19,160 --> 00:47:21,040
Speaker 3: I mean, I understand the point, but it's also you

902
00:47:21,040 --> 00:47:23,520
Speaker 3: can say that about teachers or something, you know, respectfully,

903
00:47:23,560 --> 00:47:27,800
Speaker 3: all the teachers teachers put teachers if you want a

904
00:47:27,840 --> 00:47:30,640
Speaker 3: teachers hour in there, I'm not saying it's the same thing.

905
00:47:30,680 --> 00:47:33,560
Speaker 2: That's all I'm saying, Wow, I go on a date.

906
00:47:33,680 --> 00:47:34,680
Speaker 4: I'd go on a date with you.

907
00:47:34,800 --> 00:47:39,959
Speaker 1: I don't know what teachers are catching straight to date.

908
00:47:39,880 --> 00:47:40,520
Speaker 4: With a teacher too.

909
00:47:40,520 --> 00:47:41,759
Speaker 2: While we're having teacher.

910
00:47:41,560 --> 00:47:49,080
Speaker 1: Appreciation Week right now, appreciation, it was like they're overpaid qualified.

911
00:47:49,200 --> 00:47:52,439
Speaker 3: First of all, take some of the teacher paychecks. Put

912
00:47:52,440 --> 00:47:53,080
Speaker 3: them the TSA.

913
00:48:02,239 --> 00:48:04,160
Speaker 1: I feel like I learned a lot with all that

914
00:48:04,160 --> 00:48:05,480
Speaker 1: we know. Now, what are you going to be doing

915
00:48:05,520 --> 00:48:07,879
Speaker 1: different the next time you fly? Z leaving a little

916
00:48:07,920 --> 00:48:10,920
Speaker 1: bit more time because I know the recitlease don't have

917
00:48:11,040 --> 00:48:13,320
Speaker 1: your real eye DC. You know I cut it close anyway.

918
00:48:14,520 --> 00:48:16,480
Speaker 1: I say, if my friend, let me tell you, she's

919
00:48:16,560 --> 00:48:20,560
Speaker 1: chasing the plane down the tarment one second, one second?

920
00:48:20,880 --> 00:48:25,680
Speaker 1: Excuse me, excuse me? Ahwa's what about you? Are you

921
00:48:25,719 --> 00:48:29,239
Speaker 1: doing anything different? I think for me, I don't want

922
00:48:29,239 --> 00:48:31,239
Speaker 1: to go later because them lines are too long. I'd

923
00:48:31,360 --> 00:48:34,000
Speaker 1: rather sit in the airport. I really would then be

924
00:48:34,120 --> 00:48:37,279
Speaker 1: in a line sweating because I've seen people sweat. Excuse me,

925
00:48:37,320 --> 00:48:38,520
Speaker 1: Can I get in front of you? And then people

926
00:48:38,560 --> 00:48:40,920
Speaker 1: be like no, I'm like, that's so mean. I always

927
00:48:40,920 --> 00:48:42,960
Speaker 1: say you can get in front of me. I think

928
00:48:43,320 --> 00:48:47,640
Speaker 1: for me, I just the awareness of, you know, what

929
00:48:47,760 --> 00:48:50,080
Speaker 1: is going on with TSA, like what they're looking for,

930
00:48:50,160 --> 00:48:52,640
Speaker 1: why they do certain things, that kind of takes the

931
00:48:52,719 --> 00:48:55,480
Speaker 1: edge off because I'm just like, Okay, now that makes sense, yes,

932
00:48:55,600 --> 00:48:57,879
Speaker 1: you know what I mean, and knowing their conditions, maybe

933
00:48:57,880 --> 00:49:00,400
Speaker 1: we should be smiling at them, bring a piece of

934
00:49:00,480 --> 00:49:04,120
Speaker 1: chocolate for them, you know. Yeah, yeah, they have it bad.

935
00:49:04,520 --> 00:49:06,920
Speaker 1: They do have it bad. And number of breast milk flying.

936
00:49:07,000 --> 00:49:08,719
Speaker 1: I think I'm done with that. There you go, T

937
00:49:08,840 --> 00:49:16,920
Speaker 1: and T boobs all right back. Yes, thank you so

938
00:49:17,120 --> 00:49:21,319
Speaker 1: much to Devin, Manny and Noah. Y'all were great and

939
00:49:21,360 --> 00:49:24,239
Speaker 1: we can't wait to have y'all back. Yes, everybody. Check

940
00:49:24,280 --> 00:49:26,720
Speaker 1: out No Such Thing anywhere you get podcasts, and also

941
00:49:26,840 --> 00:49:30,279
Speaker 1: check out the Daryl Kimmel article the humiliating history of

942
00:49:30,320 --> 00:49:32,880
Speaker 1: the TSA. Just google it, you'll find it so good.

943
00:49:35,239 --> 00:49:38,080
Speaker 1: You can find us on X and Instagram at Dope

944
00:49:38,200 --> 00:49:41,680
Speaker 1: Labs podcast tt is on X and Instagram at dr

945
00:49:41,920 --> 00:49:45,320
Speaker 1: Underscore t Sho, and you can find Zakiya at z

946
00:49:45,640 --> 00:49:48,800
Speaker 1: said So. Dope Labs is a production of Lemonada Media.

947
00:49:49,080 --> 00:49:53,680
Speaker 1: Our senior supervising producer is Kristin Lapour. And our Associate

948
00:49:53,719 --> 00:49:58,600
Speaker 1: producer is Issara Sives. Dope Labs is sound design, edited

949
00:49:58,640 --> 00:50:02,560
Speaker 1: and mixed by James par Robert. Lemonada Media's Vice President

950
00:50:02,600 --> 00:50:06,879
Speaker 1: of Partnerships and Production is Jackie Danziger. Executive producer from

951
00:50:06,920 --> 00:50:11,040
Speaker 1: iHeart Podcast is Katrina Norbe. Marketing lead is Alison Kantor.

952
00:50:11,719 --> 00:50:15,960
Speaker 1: Original music composed and produced by Taka Yasuzawa and Alex

953
00:50:16,040 --> 00:50:21,000
Speaker 1: sugi Ura, with additional music by Elijah Harvey. Dope Lab

954
00:50:21,120 --> 00:50:24,520
Speaker 1: is executive produced by us T T show Dia and

955
00:50:24,800 --> 00:50:25,400
Speaker 1: Kiah Watti.