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Speaker 1: Today I Dig Deep with Colonel Sean Smith, twenty twenty

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Speaker 1: elections cyber security expert and analysts today on the David

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Speaker 1: Rutherford Show. Colonel Smith, it is a real privilege and

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Speaker 1: an honor to welcome you to the show today. I'd

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Speaker 1: love to just jump right in and can you explain

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Speaker 1: what advanced persistent threats are in relation to what you've

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Speaker 1: learned from the twenty twenty election fiasco.

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Speaker 2: Sure, an advance of an advanced persistent threat is a

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Speaker 2: characterization of an adversary, typically nation state, almost exclusively nation

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Speaker 2: state or nation state affiliated, because of the resources required

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Speaker 2: to generate that kind of expertise and focus and support it.

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Speaker 2: You see some of that expertise in international and non

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Speaker 2: governmental like criminal organizations, but by and large, the advanced

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Speaker 2: persistent threats are nation state owned, operated, or sponsored.

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Speaker 3: You know, sometimes they'll use a.

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Speaker 2: Cutout for plausible deniability an advance persistent threat. So you've

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Speaker 2: got two aspects to it. There's two adjectives. One is advanced.

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Speaker 2: This means these are not you know, what we would

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Speaker 2: call like script kitties. This is not somebody messing around

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Speaker 2: like war games. This is not accidental. These are people

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Speaker 2: with years and sometimes decades long nation state campaigns that

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Speaker 2: are intended to penetrate, compromise and exploit vulnerabilities in Western technology,

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Speaker 2: not just as if they come upon them, you know,

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Speaker 2: as if they had nothing to do with them, but

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Speaker 2: also they're involved in the supply chain frequently. So there's

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Speaker 2: some nation states like China that are doing a lot

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Speaker 2: of manufacturing of electronics and computers and they have intentionally

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Speaker 2: woven compromises into the supply chain. So they work hand

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Speaker 2: in hand between their sort of research institutions like CACA,

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Speaker 2: CASKS CCC, those work alongside the advanced persistent threat elements

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Speaker 2: from their intelligence and military communities, so that the intelligence

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Speaker 2: and military communities are being essentially delivered tools and access

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Speaker 2: in Western technology. And it's across it all elements of

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Speaker 2: national security. So it's the you know, diplomatic realm, informational realm,

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Speaker 2: it is a financial realm as well as military or

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Speaker 2: defense industrial and so an advanced persistent threat is advanced

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Speaker 2: in terms of their expertise, skill set and tools. And

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Speaker 2: then the persistence is the part that most people don't understand.

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Speaker 2: So you can't you know, we talk about red teaming.

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Speaker 2: People sometimes have heard the term red teaming. Red team

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Speaker 2: just means protect need to be the adversary what we

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Speaker 2: used to do in the military, even which is probably

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Speaker 2: the most well developed and capable among US national security

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Speaker 2: institutions in terms of it cyber defensive and offensive capability,

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Speaker 2: in particularly the cyber defensive. I mean, Department of Defense

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Speaker 2: spends eight to twelve billion dollars per year on cyber

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Speaker 2: primarily on defense, but also on offensive capabilities. You know,

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Speaker 2: the military understands that you cannot emulate a persistent threat,

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Speaker 2: one that has been preparing for that battlefield or for

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Speaker 2: their execution of particular vulnerabilities and compromises. You can't emulate

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Speaker 2: that with somebody who just shows up on site. You

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Speaker 2: have to have a persistent operation where you are, you know,

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Speaker 2: inserting people into companies five years before you want to

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Speaker 2: take advantage of that insertion in an rational sense. So

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Speaker 2: there's two elements to the threat. Advanced and persistent. There

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Speaker 2: are from a public open source standpoint, there are more

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Speaker 2: than thirty advanced persistent threats.

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Speaker 3: There are far more than that.

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Speaker 2: Most of them are clearly associated with a particular nation

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Speaker 2: state China, Russia, Iran, North Korea. There are a few

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Speaker 2: others like there some in India, but the you know,

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Speaker 2: the lion's share of resources in terms of manpower and

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Speaker 2: other facilities and that kind of thing. China and then

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Speaker 2: and then Russia and then probably Iran and North Korea.

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Speaker 2: North Korea's was focused more on sort of financial exploitation.

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Speaker 2: China's was focused and has been fund Russia has been

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Speaker 2: focused sort of on their own defense in a sense

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Speaker 2: as well as financial exploitation. China has been focused for

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Speaker 2: at least twenty years on defeating the West, which makes it,

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Speaker 2: you know, unfortunate and in a sense tragic that we

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Speaker 2: offshored so much of our manufacturing and sourcing of electronics

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Speaker 2: and computers to the People's Republic of China because it

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Speaker 2: is just an open door for them to exploit all

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Speaker 2: of that access.

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Speaker 1: And that's what's fascinating to me. You know, everybody, I

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Speaker 1: think has been incredibly comfortable with acknowledging that, you know, one,

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Speaker 1: China has been an advancing and growing threat over the

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Speaker 1: last twenty plus years. We've seen that with relationships with

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Speaker 1: you know, within our own hemisphere. We saw that recently,

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Speaker 1: there's an extensive relationship with Venezuela, with Brazil, we've seen

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Speaker 1: it in all over Africa, and so it's interesting to

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Speaker 1: me that people can grasp that level of persistent right

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Speaker 1: threat that's growing and advancing, you know, advanced as you described.

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Speaker 1: How come you believe and you've been in this from

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Speaker 1: the beginning, maybe you could start with your own story,

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Speaker 1: is how come it's so difficult for the American public

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Speaker 1: to not be able to acknowledge that what happened in

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Speaker 1: twenty twenty elections is indicative of that level of global threat?

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Speaker 2: Well so, yeah, So the first thing I would say

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Speaker 2: about that is the institutions that they would depend upon,

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Speaker 2: which would be first of all government and second media

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Speaker 2: to inform them, were at best derelict, and I would

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Speaker 2: say at worst complicit. So what I saw I saw.

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Speaker 2: I'll go back into my background. I'm not really a

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Speaker 2: cyber guy. I'm a I'm a space and missile operator.

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Speaker 3: That's what I did.

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Speaker 2: But I also did a lot of special technical operations,

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Speaker 2: which is the compartmented sort of you know, secret we

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Speaker 2: call it jokingly secret Schole. I did a lot of

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Speaker 2: that within Department of Defense, from the tactical level all

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Speaker 2: the way through, you know, planning for new systems and requirements,

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Speaker 2: and you know, writing orders for national defense authorities, writing

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Speaker 2: orders for the president, writing white papers to inform the

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Speaker 2: president about things that were happening and what should be done,

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Speaker 2: that kind of thing. So I got that full experience,

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Speaker 2: including doing the testing on the systems. When you do

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Speaker 2: the operational testing, you have to be aware of the

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Speaker 2: threats because you're supposed to represent those threats accurately within

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Speaker 2: the testing to make sure that those systems are survivable

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Speaker 2: and can fight and are reliable in the operational environment

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Speaker 2: with typical operators.

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Speaker 3: And then so I did that.

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Speaker 2: I was on active duty for a little over twenty

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Speaker 2: five years, and then when I retired, my boss, who

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Speaker 2: you know, I had a lot of respect for.

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Speaker 3: At Department of Defense.

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Speaker 2: Under OSD, there's a directorate called the Director of Operational

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Speaker 2: Test Evaluation.

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Speaker 3: This is a.

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Speaker 2: Presidential appointee whose Senate confirmed, who nominally reports through the

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Speaker 2: Secretary Defense, but really just reports to House and Senate

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Speaker 2: Armed Services Committee. This is the guy who's the truth teller.

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Speaker 2: So his job is oversight over operational testing the weapons systems.

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Speaker 2: But as part of that he gets to decide what

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Speaker 2: he exercises oversight on and so if they're testing, if

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Speaker 2: they're developing, if they're modifying, he can decide he's going

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Speaker 2: to have oversight, and because of that, he gets insight

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Speaker 2: into what's happening in those programs, and then he does

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Speaker 2: independent reporting to the House and Senate Armed Services committees.

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Speaker 2: Because all the incentives in that defense procurement environment are

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Speaker 2: set up. You know, I could mince words, but it's

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Speaker 2: set up to incentivize all the people involved to lie

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Speaker 2: because if they, you know, tell the truth about problems

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Speaker 2: in their program, they might lose funding, they might have

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Speaker 2: to replan. And and most of those are you know,

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Speaker 2: they're capabilities that the military believes they need or want,

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Speaker 2: and so they're very waned do that.

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Speaker 3: And so there's this whole structure where you end up.

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Speaker 2: You know, you're familiar with the story of like policy,

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Speaker 2: Somebody up at the top makes a stupid decision and

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Speaker 2: down at the bottom they say, this is you know,

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Speaker 2: this is.

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Speaker 3: Garbage, right, this is.

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Speaker 2: Trash, And by the time it gets back up at

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Speaker 2: the top, it's reaffirming for them, telling them how great

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Speaker 2: it is. That's the and it's that system. And so

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Speaker 2: the the director of Operational Test Evaluation, you know, I

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Speaker 2: never wanted to go to the Pentagon, and so but

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Speaker 2: I took this assignment to the to the Rand Corporation

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Speaker 2: and do some research that I wanted to do very

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Speaker 2: late in my career, realizing that they were going to

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Speaker 2: then make me go to the Pentagon, which I had

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Speaker 2: never wanted to do. And of all the jobs at

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Speaker 2: the Pentagon, none of them really was I well suited for,

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Speaker 2: because I'm just I'm allergic to anything but just naked truth. Yeah,

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Speaker 2: And in the Pentagon in DC are not the environment.

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Speaker 2: They don't embrace people who just tell the truth, especially

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Speaker 2: you know, unvarnished the way I'm I'm in the habit

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Speaker 2: of doing, especially because I spent so much time with

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Speaker 2: operators and tactical units when something's bad, you know, I'm

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Speaker 2: just critically aware that stupid decisions by higher headquarters kill

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Speaker 2: people and break national security objectives.

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Speaker 3: And so anyway I got I.

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Speaker 2: Got brought because of my operational testing background with the

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Speaker 2: Air Force Operational Test Evaluation Center, which by the way,

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Speaker 2: I had tried to hide. So I had taken a

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Speaker 2: bunch of defense acquisition courses and I got them successfully

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Speaker 2: removed from my record because I never wanted to go

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Speaker 2: do that in my career again. But they faced you know,

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Speaker 2: they looked back at my assignment history, and they pulled

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Speaker 2: me into this office, and probably any other office would

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Speaker 2: have killed me, like literally tried to kill me, because

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Speaker 2: but when I met first.

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Speaker 4: You are the disruptor man. You were the guy came.

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Speaker 1: In that stuff that's mess though.

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Speaker 2: And the other thing the director when I got there,

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Speaker 2: was doctor Gilmore, and he didn't care about anything but

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Speaker 2: the truth either. So my first meeting with him, you

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Speaker 2: know usually have an introductory meeting. My first meeting with

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Speaker 2: him literally went like this, sir, you know I've read

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Speaker 2: all your policy documents, I read your remarks, I understand

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Speaker 2: your intent. I believe I can execute it. If I can't,

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Speaker 2: I'll let you know and you can relieve me. And

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Speaker 2: we shook hands and that was it. And that's how

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Speaker 2: it went. And doctor Gilmore was like a four star

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Speaker 2: plus equivalent within the Department of Defense, and you know,

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Speaker 2: if the President want to fire him, he had to

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Speaker 2: tell the Senate why. And so this was a guy

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Speaker 2: who just cared about the truth. So that's what I

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Speaker 2: got to do. And then when I retired, my boss

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Speaker 2: asked me to stay on and help with a project

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Speaker 2: called Adversarial assessment where we were looking at what I

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Speaker 2: think I still can't say who, but we were looking

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Speaker 2: at what specific foreign adversaries had exfiltrated, penetrated, and exfiltraded

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Speaker 2: from the US defense and National security establishment, including government

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Speaker 2: and non government, so including contractors. This was a massive,

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Speaker 2: massive amount of data and what it became clear as

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Speaker 2: we looked at this. We had a team. I was

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Speaker 2: part of a team looking at it, and it went

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Speaker 2: so well that we wrote a couple of reports that

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Speaker 2: went one went right to the President, the second one

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Speaker 2: the director. The new director would not sign because he

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Speaker 2: thought it was embarrassing to the military services. That's that's

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Speaker 2: when I walked away and said, I'm you know, I'm

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Speaker 2: not gonna I only did this as a favorite of

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Speaker 2: my old boss.

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Speaker 3: I really don't want to be in DC anymore. That was,

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Speaker 3: you know, I had gotten.

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Speaker 2: Up one day in twenty fifteen and wanted a jeep

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Speaker 2: and then I'm driving it home. I realized is because

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Speaker 2: I don't ever want to come back here. I want

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Speaker 2: to go to the mountains and stay there. But I

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Speaker 2: had agreed to stay, and I said I'll give you

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Speaker 2: a year, and I did, and we did this analysis

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Speaker 2: and what I saw in there was foreign nation had

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Speaker 2: penetrated and exfiltrated massive amounts of intellectual property, had had

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Speaker 2: access to defense and national security and weapons system design

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Speaker 2: and technology. US government leadership was aware of it and

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Speaker 2: didn't stop it, and there was no mistaking it. It

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Speaker 2: was clearly a massive amount of theft. I'm talking about

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Speaker 2: trillions of dollars of national sort of jewels, including information

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Speaker 2: that compromised weapon systems that were fielded and weapon systems

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Speaker 2: that were in development. So our reports identified specific weapon

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Speaker 2: systems that we believed, based on what had been exfiltrated

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Speaker 2: and the corresponding changes in the national security objectives and

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Speaker 2: technology objectives of the adversaries, we believed they understood the

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Speaker 2: vulnerabilities of our weapon systems to the point where they

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Speaker 2: would not be combat effective. So in other words, we

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Speaker 2: would send people, you know, to war with them and

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Speaker 2: they would just be slaughtered.

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Speaker 4: You know.

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Speaker 2: There were I won't say the specific programs, but there

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Speaker 2: were programs that I said should be called coffins because

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Speaker 2: of because of how thorough the compromise was, and there

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Speaker 2: were there were weapon systems, including very expensive weapon systems,

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Speaker 2: that were canceled. The programs were canceled because we identified

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Speaker 2: that they were no longer going to be effective in

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Speaker 2: a in a threat environment. And so that's what I saw.

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Speaker 2: And part of that was seeing how thoroughly the adversaries

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Speaker 2: had penetrated all these national security and defense establishments, the

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Speaker 2: techniques they had used, the tactics they employed. You know,

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Speaker 2: it was if you look at MITER, which is a

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Speaker 2: you know, federally funded research and development corporation, If you

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Speaker 2: look at their attack at T and the and symbol

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Speaker 2: c K, if you look at their attack framework for

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Speaker 2: cyber threats, we saw all of the elements of that

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Speaker 2: taking place and being exercised against US national security and

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Speaker 2: defense establishment. And so and I understood the capability level

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Speaker 2: of our national security establishment in terms of cyber defense,

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Speaker 2: how much.

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Speaker 3: Resources and effort was being put towards it.

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Speaker 2: And then you know the flip side of that coin,

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Speaker 2: how thoroughly it had been penetrated and compromised because of

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Speaker 2: these gaps and shortcomings, mostly from a policy standpoint. A

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Speaker 2: great example is how the Department Offense decided to go

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Speaker 2: to cloud. So cloud was cheaper, civilian communications infrastructure was cheaper,

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Speaker 2: both of them critically vulnerable. And I could in a

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Speaker 2: different form. I could go on about some of the

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Speaker 2: vulnerabilities we identified because they were vast and you know,

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Speaker 2: dramatic threats to defense capabilities, including within continentally United States.

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Speaker 2: So anyway, that's the background, and then I got away

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Speaker 2: from that. So the Director of used to sign the

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Speaker 2: second report. It got it to the president anyway, kind

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Speaker 2: of a backdoor. It's a long story, but but that's

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Speaker 2: when I said, I'm you know, I'm done, and let

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Speaker 2: me know if the director locates. I named a body part,

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Speaker 2: but imagine it being associated with courage and so so

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Speaker 2: I you know, I never intended to have anything to

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Speaker 2: do with government again, that was my hope and intent.

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Speaker 2: And then twenty twenty November election day, I voted. I'm

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Speaker 2: sitting at home. I read an article about turnout in

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Speaker 2: my here in my state of Colorado, and I thought,

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Speaker 2: that doesn't seem right, and it just triggered in me

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Speaker 2: what I had, you know, been trained to do, which

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Speaker 2: was research. You know, I'd done research at Naval post

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Speaker 2: Graduate School, research with the Rain Corporation. I'm a trained,

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Speaker 2: experienced researcher and with a lot of expertise in some

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Speaker 2: specific areas. I know a lot about cyber threats. I'm

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Speaker 2: not a keyboard guy, I know a lot about the

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Speaker 2: threat and so anyway, I went to do some research,

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Speaker 2: and the more I read, the more concerned I got.

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Speaker 2: I started downloading data from the Secretary of State, doing

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Speaker 2: some regression analysis to see if there were deflections in

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Speaker 2: turnout and in voter role status compared to prior years,

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Speaker 2: and then looking for the reasons for those. And then

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Speaker 2: I found out that they had the voting system manuals,

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Speaker 2: test reports, and test plans online as well as the standards.

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Speaker 3: And up to that point I knew nothing, literally had

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Speaker 3: never read.

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Speaker 1: A single thing, never thought about it, never even even back.

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Speaker 4: You weren't like.

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Speaker 1: When there was nothing about Clinton's response in sixteen that

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Speaker 1: didn't trigger, like none any of it.

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Speaker 3: I was busy. I was bad.

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Speaker 2: Even when I was in DC, which was probably the

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Speaker 2: easiest I'd had in ten years. In terms of workload,

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Speaker 2: I was still you know, fifty to sixty hour week

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Speaker 2: was pretty normal, and I would usually work at home,

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Speaker 2: you know, at nights and on weekends. If there were

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Speaker 2: things I couldn't get done at work, I was doing

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Speaker 2: them at home to kind of bring myself up to

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Speaker 2: speed on especially technical issues. But prior to the election

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Speaker 2: day twenty twenty, I couldn't have named a single voting

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Speaker 2: system vendor. I couldn't have told you what the standards were,

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Speaker 2: how they were tested. Nothing I knew, none of it.

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Speaker 2: All I needed was I had a ballot. You know,

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Speaker 2: I'd always voted on paper ballots, never on a computer.

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Speaker 2: I'd had no choice but to vote by mail or

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Speaker 2: absentee because military away from my home state. You know,

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Speaker 2: I'd done that for my whole career, basically my entire

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Speaker 2: adult life. You know, I came on active duty at

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Speaker 2: I was twenty one years old, and you know I

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Speaker 2: had After that point, I was I was almost never

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Speaker 2: in my home state, so so an nice.

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Speaker 4: Yeah, you see.

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Speaker 1: So you see it that day you start doing the

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Speaker 1: research where what was guiding your intuition at the time.

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Speaker 4: What aspect was it the voter rolls?

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Speaker 1: Was it the the seemingly expansive turnouts that they were

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Speaker 1: talking about?

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Speaker 4: What was the trigger for that deep that research.

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Speaker 3: There was an article.

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Speaker 2: There was an article and some guy, I can't remember

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Speaker 2: the news source in Chloraide, it was probably some local

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Speaker 2: news TV station, and it said it made a comment

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Speaker 2: about high turnout and I had been you know, i'd

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Speaker 2: voted in person. I didn't drop it in a box.

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Speaker 2: I went and voted in person. Even then I didn't

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Speaker 2: trust the drop boxes or mail and voting. But when

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Speaker 2: I read that article, I thought, that doesn't seem right,

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Speaker 2: and like it. You know, it feels like a rabbit

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Speaker 2: hole that I fell down and have never come out of.

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Speaker 2: Because I started, you know, I had done statistical research.

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Speaker 2: I knew how to do statistical research, not not very advanced,

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Speaker 2: but I could do regression analyses and things like that.

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Speaker 2: I had done that for my first master's thesis and

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Speaker 2: that was pretty easy. And I just started assembling data

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Speaker 2: from different sources. But and I thought, this data doesn't

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Speaker 2: look right. These significant you know, you don't see massive

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Speaker 2: changes in turnout in developed countries.

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Speaker 3: You just don't.

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Speaker 2: You know, you see them after the end of wars

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Speaker 2: or the or the end of a regime, or when

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Speaker 2: there's a periodic change in sort of the society, like

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Speaker 2: you go like Japan, you know, you go from Meiji

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Speaker 2: Japan into you know, a modern era or something like that,

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Speaker 2: but you don't see them in developed nations. You don't

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Speaker 2: see twenty percent change in like elections. It just doesn't happen,

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Speaker 2: but it happened, and so I saw it first in Colorado,

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Speaker 2: and then I started looking at the turnout data in

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Speaker 2: other states. But I was really focused at that point

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Speaker 2: on Colorado. I didn't realize what I was going to

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Speaker 2: be doing. I just something looked wrong. I started researching.

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Speaker 2: It was just a pattern that I'd been involved in.

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Speaker 2: But then when I started reading the voting system technical

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Speaker 2: data and especially the test report, so I said, I'm

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Speaker 2: not a cyber expert, and I'm not not like somebody

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Speaker 2: like Clay Periic or doctor Doherty. Doctor Doherty, you know,

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Speaker 2: he's a real computer sidist. Clay is a real serious

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Speaker 2: forensic expert for cyber forensics, you know, very experienced. Both

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Speaker 2: of those, very experienced in different aspects of it. I

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Speaker 2: know a lot about the threat, but I'm I haven't

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Speaker 2: done keyboard work, at least not much of it in

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Speaker 2: a long time. I did some a long time ago

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Speaker 2: in the military. I almost got court martialed for it

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Speaker 2: because it was that's a whole other story. That's one

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Speaker 2: of the many times that you know, general officers have

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Speaker 2: yelled at me in my career, probably for good reason.

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Speaker 2: I mean, I was well intentioned, but so were they.

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Speaker 2: But when I started reading, what I am is an

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Speaker 2: expert in testing, and so when I started reading the

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Speaker 2: test plans for the weapon for the voting systems, I thought,

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Speaker 2: this can't be right, this can't be how they're testing it.

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Speaker 3: And that's what.

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Speaker 2: Led me to go back and read all of the

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Speaker 2: federal and state statutes, the documentation out of the Election

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Speaker 2: Assistants Commission, the Voting System Testing Lab manuals. I started

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Speaker 2: reading report after report looking for evidence that they were

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Speaker 2: doing adequate testing because I knew, you know, I had

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Speaker 2: just got done in twenty sixteen or seventeen, I had

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Speaker 2: wrote essentially a prescriptive standard for threat representation for Department

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Speaker 2: of Defense space system testing because it was inadequate. It

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Speaker 2: wasn't being adequately represented in operational testing, and it had

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Speaker 2: to change because we were fielding systems that couldn't survive

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Speaker 2: first contact with the enemy, right, And you know, so

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Speaker 2: I under you know, I'd helped the National Cyber Range

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Speaker 2: walk through what they needed to do to develop. I

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Speaker 2: had worked through with with the developmental test side at

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Speaker 2: OSD what they needed to do to develop the resource

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Speaker 2: and capabilities. I had written some of the requirements for

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Speaker 2: hypersonic testing. I understood what needed to happen, and I

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Speaker 2: didn't see any of that in our election system and

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Speaker 2: voting system testing requirements, and so that.

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Speaker 4: And that was that I'm sorry to interrupt.

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Speaker 1: Was that at your local level, the county level, the

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Speaker 1: state level, where were you analyzing initially?

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Speaker 2: So originally I was reading the plans and reports that

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Speaker 2: were associated with Colorado state voting systems. Got it, but

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Speaker 2: they were test plans and reports that were executed by

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Speaker 2: the election assistants commissions accredited not actually a credit, but

401
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Speaker 2: they were supposed to be accredited voting system testing labs.

402
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Speaker 2: So at that time twenty twenty, there were only two

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Speaker 2: accredited voting system testing labs. One of them was prov

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Speaker 2: and VATA Huntsville, and the other was SLI in Colorado.

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Speaker 2: Most of the ones I read were pro v and

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Speaker 2: V because that's who tended to do the majority of

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Speaker 2: dominion voting system testing. And from twenty fourteen and fifteen onward,

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Speaker 2: Colorado Secretary of State had implemented this project called Uniform

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Speaker 2: Voting System where they had selected a single voting system

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Speaker 2: for the state and it was dominion voting systems Democracy suite,

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Speaker 2: except for a couple counties which had essentially had to

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Speaker 2: fight the state to get a different voting system. They

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Speaker 2: won in court, and because of that they had selected

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Speaker 2: clear ballot systems. So there were two voting systems in Colorado.

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Speaker 2: But Colorado, luckily for me, put a lot of the

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Speaker 2: documentation online and so I did the same thing I

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Speaker 2: did when I was doing oversight of weapon systems, operational

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Speaker 2: Testing and Department of Defense.

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Speaker 3: I would go read all of the technical data.

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Speaker 2: I read every single thing I could find, and by

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Speaker 2: the time I got done with that, once I saw

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Speaker 2: how the systems were built, I was intimately familiar. At

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Speaker 2: that point because of both the operational Testing oversight and

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Speaker 2: the Adversarial Assessment project. I knew what our adversaries were

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Speaker 2: doing and how, and I knew the threat to supply chain,

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Speaker 2: which most Americans, you know, never have to deal with

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Speaker 2: or consider.

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Speaker 3: You know, you don't think about it, but the defense

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Speaker 3: establishment does.

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Speaker 2: And at that point, by by twenty twenty, it was pervasive.

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Speaker 2: You know, there was very few computers and electronic systems

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Speaker 2: that were manufactured in some cases even in part, but

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Speaker 2: let alone in whole. In the United States. Most of

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Speaker 2: it was overseas, and the majority of the overseas was

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Speaker 2: in People's Republic of China. So when I saw the

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Speaker 2: composition of our voting systems and the equipment and components

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Speaker 2: they were using, I thought, well, there's a lot more

438
00:25:45,000 --> 00:25:47,520
Speaker 2: testing they have to be doing. And then I found

439
00:25:47,560 --> 00:25:48,879
Speaker 2: out they weren't doing any of it.

440
00:25:49,760 --> 00:25:51,879
Speaker 1: Wow, all right, So let me back up with the

441
00:25:51,920 --> 00:25:57,040
Speaker 1: supply chain, because obviously after COVID, which you know, I

442
00:25:57,080 --> 00:26:00,520
Speaker 1: think was a component of the conditioning for the election

443
00:26:00,680 --> 00:26:03,040
Speaker 1: for sure, But that's a whole nother story. We can

444
00:26:03,160 --> 00:26:07,639
Speaker 1: go a whole other story, but all connected, right, I

445
00:26:07,760 --> 00:26:12,080
Speaker 1: you know, think people finally were recognized, oh, our vulnerabilities,

446
00:26:12,840 --> 00:26:16,560
Speaker 1: right in terms of if we need some right, antibiotics

447
00:26:16,600 --> 00:26:21,159
Speaker 1: became one, right, then it was all right, the chips

448
00:26:21,200 --> 00:26:25,240
Speaker 1: from Taiwan. But it kind of kind of petered out there.

449
00:26:25,840 --> 00:26:29,960
Speaker 1: And so I when you say supply chain and you

450
00:26:30,000 --> 00:26:35,120
Speaker 1: say the components, you're talking about every board that's in

451
00:26:35,320 --> 00:26:40,600
Speaker 1: every voter rule processing unit, of every check in station,

452
00:26:41,320 --> 00:26:44,960
Speaker 1: of every router that's involved, or every and then the

453
00:26:45,000 --> 00:26:48,640
Speaker 1: dominion machine. Like you're talking about the nut the literal

454
00:26:48,760 --> 00:26:53,399
Speaker 1: nuts and bolts of how these systems were built where

455
00:26:53,440 --> 00:26:57,800
Speaker 1: they were built, and then the in the the complete

456
00:26:58,320 --> 00:27:04,040
Speaker 1: complete breakdown in the evaluation that our advert our foreign

457
00:27:04,200 --> 00:27:07,320
Speaker 1: enemy are the that's where these things are coming from.

458
00:27:07,400 --> 00:27:09,560
Speaker 4: That that's what you're describing.

459
00:27:09,080 --> 00:27:11,480
Speaker 3: Correct, exactly, That's exactly okay.

460
00:27:11,560 --> 00:27:14,520
Speaker 2: So there's no industry in China, you know, it's just

461
00:27:14,520 --> 00:27:17,879
Speaker 2: like they're telecommunications. If something comes out of China on

462
00:27:17,920 --> 00:27:22,040
Speaker 2: the Internet, it's because it was allowed by the Chinese

463
00:27:22,080 --> 00:27:27,760
Speaker 2: Communist Party and the government. There's no industry or manufacturing

464
00:27:27,800 --> 00:27:33,800
Speaker 2: that is not accessible to if not accessed by elements

465
00:27:33,840 --> 00:27:37,840
Speaker 2: of the national government, including principally Ministry of State Security,

466
00:27:37,880 --> 00:27:41,639
Speaker 2: and especially when it is any kind of national security

467
00:27:41,640 --> 00:27:46,280
Speaker 2: critical infrastructure or component for a Western nation, in particular

468
00:27:46,400 --> 00:27:51,520
Speaker 2: the United States. So yes, every single voting system component

469
00:27:52,160 --> 00:27:55,680
Speaker 2: used in the United States is using one or more

470
00:27:57,119 --> 00:28:01,879
Speaker 2: subcomponents that are manufactured entirely in the People's Republic of

471
00:28:01,960 --> 00:28:05,840
Speaker 2: China by Chinese nationals with access of the Ministry of

472
00:28:05,880 --> 00:28:09,240
Speaker 2: State Security, which is sort of like a combination of

473
00:28:09,280 --> 00:28:13,080
Speaker 2: our CIA and NSA in terms of their capabilities and

474
00:28:13,080 --> 00:28:17,679
Speaker 2: breadth of responsibility. But in some cases it's the whole computer,

475
00:28:17,760 --> 00:28:20,240
Speaker 2: it's every single component in it, including O my god,

476
00:28:20,320 --> 00:28:23,800
Speaker 2: trusted platform modules that are supposed to be authenticating the

477
00:28:23,840 --> 00:28:27,120
Speaker 2: other hardware. So imagine, you know, imagine if you had

478
00:28:27,119 --> 00:28:30,520
Speaker 2: security cameras at your house and the thieves were the

479
00:28:30,520 --> 00:28:32,280
Speaker 2: ones that provided the cameras.

480
00:28:32,600 --> 00:28:34,280
Speaker 4: Yeah, yeah, that's exactly right.

481
00:28:34,359 --> 00:28:36,919
Speaker 1: And I would imagine with the work you had just

482
00:28:37,119 --> 00:28:41,360
Speaker 1: completed about that threat assessment and how vulnerably we were

483
00:28:41,480 --> 00:28:44,640
Speaker 1: that you put in multiple reports, you see this and

484
00:28:44,680 --> 00:28:47,480
Speaker 1: are reading this, and it's I mean, it must have

485
00:28:47,560 --> 00:28:52,360
Speaker 1: been kind of not only I mean shockings too little

486
00:28:52,360 --> 00:28:56,600
Speaker 1: of a descriptive where but like probably to the point like, oh,

487
00:28:56,600 --> 00:28:59,160
Speaker 1: we're under attack, like we're at war?

488
00:28:59,760 --> 00:29:00,160
Speaker 4: Was it?

489
00:29:00,200 --> 00:29:04,800
Speaker 1: Was it that guttural when you recognize the level of vulnerability.

490
00:29:05,440 --> 00:29:06,320
Speaker 3: It was. Yeah.

491
00:29:06,360 --> 00:29:09,360
Speaker 2: The phrase, and I've used this in a couple of presentations,

492
00:29:10,280 --> 00:29:14,080
Speaker 2: the phrase that immediately just popped into mind was enemy

493
00:29:14,080 --> 00:29:14,800
Speaker 2: inside the wire.

494
00:29:16,160 --> 00:29:17,360
Speaker 3: So that's a that's a.

495
00:29:18,200 --> 00:29:21,239
Speaker 2: You know, the in that case that that originates with

496
00:29:21,640 --> 00:29:25,040
Speaker 2: like the fence wire around the perimeter of a garrison

497
00:29:25,160 --> 00:29:28,280
Speaker 2: or an operating location. And when you have an enemy

498
00:29:28,360 --> 00:29:31,720
Speaker 2: inside the wire, that's worst case because now you don't

499
00:29:31,720 --> 00:29:34,760
Speaker 2: have a safe direction. Now you have to watch in

500
00:29:34,840 --> 00:29:40,400
Speaker 2: every single direction. You know, you've got sabotage, sapping, assassination,

501
00:29:40,480 --> 00:29:41,480
Speaker 2: all happening inside.

502
00:29:41,560 --> 00:29:44,760
Speaker 3: That's the worst case. And when I saw.

503
00:29:47,160 --> 00:29:50,000
Speaker 2: What are what was being done with our voting and

504
00:29:50,000 --> 00:29:53,720
Speaker 2: election systems and just how poor, honestly, just how poor

505
00:29:53,840 --> 00:29:57,280
Speaker 2: the security was. And and not just it's not just

506
00:29:57,360 --> 00:30:01,600
Speaker 2: the security itself, it's the mentality or culture like it

507
00:30:01,640 --> 00:30:04,719
Speaker 2: wasn't even being questioned. So at that time, in twenty twenty,

508
00:30:05,240 --> 00:30:11,200
Speaker 2: despite so there's a within the Election Assistances Commission. According

509
00:30:11,200 --> 00:30:14,560
Speaker 2: to the federal statute, there's a Technical Guidelines Development Committee

510
00:30:14,680 --> 00:30:17,880
Speaker 2: that develops the voting system standards. They're voluntary, but a

511
00:30:17,920 --> 00:30:20,840
Speaker 2: lot of states require them by statute require compliance for

512
00:30:20,880 --> 00:30:21,480
Speaker 2: their systems.

513
00:30:21,680 --> 00:30:24,080
Speaker 3: Colorado was one of those, and.

514
00:30:25,560 --> 00:30:30,680
Speaker 2: The statutory advisor to the Technical Guidelines Development Committee for

515
00:30:30,680 --> 00:30:34,760
Speaker 2: the Election Assistants Commission is NIST, the director of NIST,

516
00:30:35,640 --> 00:30:40,280
Speaker 2: and NIST had advised the federal government all agencies, including

517
00:30:40,320 --> 00:30:43,840
Speaker 2: EAC in twenty twelve and then again in twenty fifteen,

518
00:30:44,560 --> 00:30:47,960
Speaker 2: that the risk from supply chain compromises was severe.

519
00:30:48,720 --> 00:30:51,040
Speaker 1: That there was because it was the fact was that

520
00:30:51,120 --> 00:30:56,120
Speaker 1: dominion had been flagged multiple times prior to that over

521
00:30:56,160 --> 00:30:58,760
Speaker 1: the course of their ability to penetrate and become the

522
00:30:58,920 --> 00:31:02,080
Speaker 1: overarching you know, voting system.

523
00:31:02,120 --> 00:31:03,680
Speaker 4: Right, it wasn't new like this.

524
00:31:03,760 --> 00:31:08,440
Speaker 1: What people had from California to all over the country

525
00:31:08,520 --> 00:31:13,520
Speaker 1: had already realized the vulnerabilities, and including the Democratic Party

526
00:31:13,560 --> 00:31:16,560
Speaker 1: we saw in nineteen and when you know, Kamala Harris

527
00:31:16,640 --> 00:31:18,800
Speaker 1: was making her speech like these votes and you know

528
00:31:18,960 --> 00:31:20,280
Speaker 1: they did a big documentary.

529
00:31:20,320 --> 00:31:24,200
Speaker 2: I mean it's wild, yeah, they and this is so

530
00:31:24,240 --> 00:31:25,960
Speaker 2: I'll go back to a comment I made about the

531
00:31:27,400 --> 00:31:31,480
Speaker 2: winning government officials allowing the exploitation. It's worse than that

532
00:31:31,520 --> 00:31:33,160
Speaker 2: with our voting systems. So when you look at our

533
00:31:33,240 --> 00:31:37,040
Speaker 2: voting systems. So you have to remember twenty ten, dominion

534
00:31:37,120 --> 00:31:40,000
Speaker 2: voting systems practically didn't exist in the United States.

535
00:31:41,000 --> 00:31:42,600
Speaker 3: By the end of twenty.

536
00:31:42,200 --> 00:31:46,560
Speaker 2: Twelve, they had a huge market share and access. And

537
00:31:46,600 --> 00:31:49,800
Speaker 2: the reason they had that is because of the Obama

538
00:31:49,800 --> 00:31:54,520
Speaker 2: Administration's Department of Justice. So Obama administration Department of Justice

539
00:31:54,800 --> 00:32:02,120
Speaker 2: forced ESN S to divest the Sequoia technology and the

540
00:32:02,160 --> 00:32:07,920
Speaker 2: Premier technology both to Dominion Voting Systems, which really just

541
00:32:08,000 --> 00:32:10,480
Speaker 2: a year before, a year and a half before, was

542
00:32:10,520 --> 00:32:14,880
Speaker 2: a Canadian voting system company. So they could have and

543
00:32:14,920 --> 00:32:19,120
Speaker 2: they did it under antitrust principles, So, in other words,

544
00:32:19,120 --> 00:32:22,880
Speaker 2: to enforce competition or insure competition, that was the stated reason.

545
00:32:23,520 --> 00:32:25,040
Speaker 3: But they didn't force.

546
00:32:25,120 --> 00:32:29,360
Speaker 2: ESNs to divest to an approved company like heart Inner Civic.

547
00:32:29,720 --> 00:32:34,080
Speaker 2: They forced them to divest to Dominion, which really wasn't

548
00:32:34,080 --> 00:32:35,920
Speaker 2: a US They had registered at that point, but they

549
00:32:35,920 --> 00:32:38,400
Speaker 2: weren't a US company. First they registered in Delaware. Then

550
00:32:38,400 --> 00:32:42,320
Speaker 2: they established a second headquarters in Denver, but their headquarters

551
00:32:42,360 --> 00:32:47,200
Speaker 2: was Toronto. Right, they were co located right with non

552
00:32:47,240 --> 00:32:52,000
Speaker 2: governmental organizations that were very hard leftist leaning. They had

553
00:32:52,000 --> 00:32:56,640
Speaker 2: already been associated with compromise elections in the Philippines, their

554
00:32:56,720 --> 00:33:03,960
Speaker 2: relationship with Sequoia, which was really a relationship with Smartmatic

555
00:33:04,040 --> 00:33:07,320
Speaker 2: out of Venezuela, which was already identified by US Department

556
00:33:07,320 --> 00:33:11,560
Speaker 2: of Justice as being involved in corrupt elections in Venezuela.

557
00:33:11,680 --> 00:33:20,120
Speaker 2: So the Obama Department of Justice wittingly and deliberately forced

558
00:33:21,200 --> 00:33:25,520
Speaker 2: intellectual property associated with the ability to manipulate elections from

559
00:33:25,600 --> 00:33:28,600
Speaker 2: both Premiere which was the old d Bold which was

560
00:33:28,600 --> 00:33:32,720
Speaker 2: the old AES or gems system, as well as the

561
00:33:32,720 --> 00:33:36,800
Speaker 2: win edes stuff and Sequoias all towards.

562
00:33:37,160 --> 00:33:41,040
Speaker 3: Dominion voting systems. Wow, and I don't you know, I

563
00:33:41,080 --> 00:33:41,360
Speaker 3: have this.

564
00:33:41,440 --> 00:33:43,440
Speaker 2: I have to say this sometimes because some people think

565
00:33:43,480 --> 00:33:45,320
Speaker 2: that there is a voting system you can trust.

566
00:33:45,640 --> 00:33:46,720
Speaker 3: I don't trust any of them.

567
00:33:46,760 --> 00:33:51,240
Speaker 2: You know, ESNs fielded voting systems that had undisclosed t

568
00:33:51,240 --> 00:33:54,480
Speaker 2: HEELEC communications capabilities. Heart Inner Civic had to be sued

569
00:33:54,480 --> 00:33:58,880
Speaker 2: by a whistleblower key TAM under Fraudulent Claims Act. It

570
00:33:58,920 --> 00:34:02,120
Speaker 2: was the Singer versus Inner Civic because they were lying

571
00:34:02,160 --> 00:34:05,400
Speaker 2: about their security and the integrity and reliability of their

572
00:34:06,160 --> 00:34:10,000
Speaker 2: election results and processes and so and then you know,

573
00:34:10,040 --> 00:34:13,320
Speaker 2: you get into a clear ballot which basically is derivative

574
00:34:13,320 --> 00:34:17,719
Speaker 2: from ES and S same. You know, software designer went

575
00:34:17,719 --> 00:34:21,680
Speaker 2: from Premiere to esn S to Clear Ballot. Tab Iyerdale

576
00:34:22,239 --> 00:34:27,120
Speaker 2: Unison is wholly and completely owned by International Lottery and Totalizator,

577
00:34:27,400 --> 00:34:31,400
Speaker 2: which is owned by Burjaya, a Malaysian registered company who's

578
00:34:31,400 --> 00:34:35,040
Speaker 2: CEO as close ties to People's Republic of China Communist

579
00:34:35,080 --> 00:34:38,520
Speaker 2: Party leadership. So there is no and that's that's our

580
00:34:38,600 --> 00:34:42,040
Speaker 2: five top voting system vendors. That's ninety five ninety six

581
00:34:42,040 --> 00:34:42,560
Speaker 2: percent of.

582
00:34:42,480 --> 00:34:45,160
Speaker 4: The years of a Yeah, all election market.

583
00:34:45,480 --> 00:34:50,040
Speaker 1: All right, thank you for outlining the that that complex issue.

584
00:34:50,200 --> 00:34:52,840
Speaker 4: All right, So you are now doing the research.

585
00:34:53,719 --> 00:34:55,799
Speaker 1: One of the things that I love that you talk

586
00:34:55,880 --> 00:35:02,120
Speaker 1: about in your videos on your channel on rumbol America

587
00:35:02,320 --> 00:35:07,759
Speaker 1: is the necessity to team up. And I really just

588
00:35:07,840 --> 00:35:11,040
Speaker 1: that that just hit me constantly, like you.

589
00:35:10,960 --> 00:35:12,240
Speaker 4: Can't do this alone.

590
00:35:12,320 --> 00:35:15,720
Speaker 1: And I love how you're guiding people to find people

591
00:35:15,760 --> 00:35:19,399
Speaker 1: maybe lawyers that have a skill in that, or accountants

592
00:35:19,520 --> 00:35:22,320
Speaker 1: or you know, to really kind of bring people together.

593
00:35:22,800 --> 00:35:26,560
Speaker 1: At what point in your journey in twenty twenty did

594
00:35:26,600 --> 00:35:31,080
Speaker 1: you recognize I've got something that I'm seeing. I need

595
00:35:31,120 --> 00:35:33,920
Speaker 1: to be able to confirm this as well as tap

596
00:35:34,000 --> 00:35:37,200
Speaker 1: into some of you know, somebody that has similar skill

597
00:35:37,239 --> 00:35:40,520
Speaker 1: sets or even better forensic skill sets or whatever it

598
00:35:40,640 --> 00:35:43,280
Speaker 1: might be, like doctor Doherty or I'm sorry, I forgot

599
00:35:43,520 --> 00:35:44,480
Speaker 1: Clay's last name.

600
00:35:46,160 --> 00:35:48,839
Speaker 4: Pre When did that moment hit for you?

601
00:35:48,880 --> 00:35:53,160
Speaker 1: And then what were you developing a tactical approach at

602
00:35:53,200 --> 00:35:54,160
Speaker 1: that point yet?

603
00:35:55,040 --> 00:35:58,879
Speaker 2: No, So what happened was at that point in time

604
00:35:59,239 --> 00:36:02,160
Speaker 2: in on election, I was still involved with Conventional States,

605
00:36:02,560 --> 00:36:04,560
Speaker 2: So I was voluntearing with Conventional States, and we had

606
00:36:04,600 --> 00:36:07,480
Speaker 2: a weekly call, volunteer call, and we were waiting for

607
00:36:07,480 --> 00:36:09,040
Speaker 2: everybody to show up for the call. There are some

608
00:36:09,080 --> 00:36:11,399
Speaker 2: of us on there and I was. This was right

609
00:36:11,440 --> 00:36:15,839
Speaker 2: after the election day, it was probably the Monday afterwards,

610
00:36:16,440 --> 00:36:19,479
Speaker 2: and I was just telling people some of the things

611
00:36:19,480 --> 00:36:21,600
Speaker 2: I had found. And one of the people on the

612
00:36:21,640 --> 00:36:24,640
Speaker 2: call said, essentially, oh my god, would you talk to

613
00:36:24,719 --> 00:36:28,319
Speaker 2: my state legislator? And I said sure, and it was

614
00:36:28,400 --> 00:36:32,880
Speaker 2: Ron Hanks in Colorado, and so Ron I talked to

615
00:36:32,960 --> 00:36:35,279
Speaker 2: him for a couple hours, and I could tell he

616
00:36:35,440 --> 00:36:37,799
Speaker 2: was kind of shocked when I was done. And he's

617
00:36:37,880 --> 00:36:41,600
Speaker 2: another you know, another veteran Air Force veteran, and he said,

618
00:36:41,680 --> 00:36:44,880
Speaker 2: let me let me get another legislator on. It's Dave Williams. Well,

619
00:36:44,920 --> 00:36:47,719
Speaker 2: Dave Williams was my state representative, so I knew him

620
00:36:47,719 --> 00:36:49,759
Speaker 2: because I had spoken to him already. And so then

621
00:36:49,800 --> 00:36:51,400
Speaker 2: I talked to the two of them and they said,

622
00:36:51,840 --> 00:36:55,719
Speaker 2: would you come and speak to the Legislative Audit Committee

623
00:36:55,760 --> 00:36:59,040
Speaker 2: in the Colorado General Assembly? And I said, okay, because

624
00:36:59,080 --> 00:37:01,680
Speaker 2: you know I back in DC, i'd spoken to you know,

625
00:37:01,719 --> 00:37:02,960
Speaker 2: I dealt with general.

626
00:37:02,640 --> 00:37:03,760
Speaker 4: Audition for everybody.

627
00:37:03,840 --> 00:37:06,160
Speaker 3: Yeah, your rational dolgations, they're all the same to me.

628
00:37:06,360 --> 00:37:09,600
Speaker 2: You know, I've got no I don't I'm never starstruck,

629
00:37:10,000 --> 00:37:13,040
Speaker 2: you know, I've got I appreciate anybody doing their duty,

630
00:37:13,239 --> 00:37:15,920
Speaker 2: who's a faithful public servant. And I have no use

631
00:37:15,960 --> 00:37:18,600
Speaker 2: for politics, and so anybody who wants to hear what's true,

632
00:37:19,080 --> 00:37:20,960
Speaker 2: if I know it, I'll tell them. And so I

633
00:37:21,000 --> 00:37:22,560
Speaker 2: agreed to go do that, and then we got on

634
00:37:22,640 --> 00:37:25,799
Speaker 2: the phone with Prior to that point, I had made

635
00:37:25,840 --> 00:37:29,840
Speaker 2: contact with a guy named Harvey Branscom who's a lifelong Democrat,

636
00:37:30,120 --> 00:37:33,160
Speaker 2: and he was an election integrity researcher, you know, for

637
00:37:33,200 --> 00:37:36,440
Speaker 2: twenty years in Colorado, before I had ever even thought

638
00:37:36,480 --> 00:37:39,000
Speaker 2: of looking at anything. And so, but I had read

639
00:37:39,000 --> 00:37:42,520
Speaker 2: an article that was written by he and someone that

640
00:37:42,560 --> 00:37:44,560
Speaker 2: I had worked with that I knew and respected, and

641
00:37:44,600 --> 00:37:46,080
Speaker 2: I said, hey, well you introduced me. I want to

642
00:37:46,120 --> 00:37:48,439
Speaker 2: talk to him about some of these things. So then

643
00:37:49,920 --> 00:37:54,399
Speaker 2: Ron Hanks and Dave Williams put got together with us

644
00:37:54,440 --> 00:37:57,520
Speaker 2: on the call with Lori Saine, and Lorie Sayne was

645
00:37:57,560 --> 00:38:00,840
Speaker 2: the chair of the Legislative Audit Committee. Unbeknownst to me,

646
00:38:01,320 --> 00:38:04,200
Speaker 2: actually they didn't do it. It was another citizen activist

647
00:38:04,800 --> 00:38:07,520
Speaker 2: and she asked me to talk to Laurie, saying she

648
00:38:07,560 --> 00:38:09,120
Speaker 2: just brought her up on the phone. And Laurie Sayn

649
00:38:09,160 --> 00:38:11,600
Speaker 2: will talk to Harvey and I and said, will you

650
00:38:11,680 --> 00:38:15,279
Speaker 2: guys be a panel at this hearing, and Harvey and

651
00:38:15,320 --> 00:38:17,920
Speaker 2: I said sure, and so I was in person.

652
00:38:18,000 --> 00:38:22,040
Speaker 3: He was remote. We showed up, but the committee turned in.

653
00:38:22,000 --> 00:38:25,160
Speaker 2: Because it was a bipartisan it happened to be chaired

654
00:38:25,160 --> 00:38:28,000
Speaker 2: because they rotate it even though there's a super majority

655
00:38:28,000 --> 00:38:30,680
Speaker 2: in Colorado with the Democrats. It was at that point

656
00:38:30,719 --> 00:38:33,360
Speaker 2: shared by Laurie Saying, who was a Republican, and so

657
00:38:33,640 --> 00:38:35,640
Speaker 2: without that they never would have had the hearing. But

658
00:38:35,680 --> 00:38:38,160
Speaker 2: they had the hearing. I didn't even know how the

659
00:38:38,200 --> 00:38:40,319
Speaker 2: hearing had come about. The hearing had come about at

660
00:38:40,360 --> 00:38:43,560
Speaker 2: the request and with a sort of pressure from other

661
00:38:43,640 --> 00:38:47,000
Speaker 2: citizens who I didn't know and didn't meet until I

662
00:38:47,040 --> 00:38:49,400
Speaker 2: was at the hearing. And the reason I met them

663
00:38:49,800 --> 00:38:53,080
Speaker 2: is because inside the committee room they had shares for

664
00:38:53,160 --> 00:38:56,879
Speaker 2: the presenters as well as witnesses or audience, and they

665
00:38:56,880 --> 00:38:59,760
Speaker 2: were all six feet apart in this kind of diamond pattern.

666
00:39:00,200 --> 00:39:02,399
Speaker 2: And I was standing in there, and the closest guy

667
00:39:02,480 --> 00:39:04,000
Speaker 2: to me was a guy I'd never met before. His

668
00:39:04,080 --> 00:39:07,680
Speaker 2: name was Dennis haw And and he and I started talking.

669
00:39:08,760 --> 00:39:11,120
Speaker 2: But I didn't have a mask and had no intention

670
00:39:11,160 --> 00:39:12,000
Speaker 2: of wearing one.

671
00:39:12,120 --> 00:39:12,560
Speaker 3: He didn't.

672
00:39:12,600 --> 00:39:15,440
Speaker 2: He wasn't wearing one, but the sergeant at arms came

673
00:39:15,480 --> 00:39:18,400
Speaker 2: and told us both to put them on and I

674
00:39:18,440 --> 00:39:21,000
Speaker 2: said that that's not going to be happening. I'm not

675
00:39:21,040 --> 00:39:23,960
Speaker 2: going to be doing that, and so they made me

676
00:39:24,080 --> 00:39:27,080
Speaker 2: leave the room, and so I had to stand out

677
00:39:27,080 --> 00:39:28,960
Speaker 2: in the hallway. I stood out there, I don't know,

678
00:39:29,040 --> 00:39:32,400
Speaker 2: eight nine hours while the hearing was going on, waiting

679
00:39:32,440 --> 00:39:36,800
Speaker 2: to testify. Dennis was so pissed off because they basically

680
00:39:36,920 --> 00:39:39,319
Speaker 2: used all the front time for the people who were

681
00:39:39,800 --> 00:39:42,520
Speaker 2: telling them what they wanted to hear, which is that

682
00:39:42,600 --> 00:39:45,240
Speaker 2: everything was great and fantastic and look out good. We

683
00:39:45,440 --> 00:39:49,239
Speaker 2: grated ourselves when we got an A and Dennis. So,

684
00:39:49,320 --> 00:39:53,160
Speaker 2: Dennis was another retired Air Force officer. He was a

685
00:39:53,200 --> 00:39:58,880
Speaker 2: mathematician and he was a computer scientist in earnest he

686
00:39:58,880 --> 00:40:01,200
Speaker 2: had he had helped design some of the original three

687
00:40:01,200 --> 00:40:05,320
Speaker 2: eighty six bios, sitting literally next to Intel's Andy Grove

688
00:40:06,200 --> 00:40:09,920
Speaker 2: and so, so Dennis was the first guy I met

689
00:40:10,239 --> 00:40:14,439
Speaker 2: who had a technical perspective that was, you know, complimentary

690
00:40:14,480 --> 00:40:17,239
Speaker 2: to mine. And he and I started talking, but then

691
00:40:17,280 --> 00:40:20,160
Speaker 2: out in the hallway, I started meeting the people who

692
00:40:20,160 --> 00:40:23,600
Speaker 2: had been responsible for pressuring to get the committee hearing

693
00:40:23,640 --> 00:40:28,000
Speaker 2: to begin with and that was people from Colorado's USIP,

694
00:40:28,160 --> 00:40:30,920
Speaker 2: which was a citizen grassroots organization, and that was the

695
00:40:31,000 --> 00:40:31,640
Speaker 2: ash EPP.

696
00:40:32,640 --> 00:40:33,839
Speaker 3: I think Tom Buorklund.

697
00:40:34,400 --> 00:40:36,200
Speaker 2: There were some other you know, some people I didn't

698
00:40:36,239 --> 00:40:38,839
Speaker 2: I didn't even know who any of them were. And

699
00:40:38,960 --> 00:40:42,640
Speaker 2: until that point I wasn't connected to anybody. And then

700
00:40:42,719 --> 00:40:45,120
Speaker 2: later on some of the people from al Paso County

701
00:40:45,120 --> 00:40:47,520
Speaker 2: that Dennis had introduced me to. And l Paso County

702
00:40:47,560 --> 00:40:51,880
Speaker 2: is the largest county in Colorado population wise, it's like

703
00:40:51,960 --> 00:40:53,760
Speaker 2: neck and neck with Denver, but I think it's ahead

704
00:40:53,800 --> 00:40:56,680
Speaker 2: now and growing more than Denver is for a good reason, right,

705
00:40:56,719 --> 00:40:59,680
Speaker 2: Denver is a they turned it into it just at

706
00:40:59,719 --> 00:41:00,120
Speaker 2: di A.

707
00:41:01,200 --> 00:41:03,520
Speaker 3: It's Venezuela up until this last week.

708
00:41:04,080 --> 00:41:08,000
Speaker 2: And so anyway, so I was talking to those guys,

709
00:41:08,040 --> 00:41:10,719
Speaker 2: and Dennis was connected to the USIP group, which I

710
00:41:10,760 --> 00:41:14,279
Speaker 2: had not really followed up with or talked to, and

711
00:41:14,320 --> 00:41:16,680
Speaker 2: Dennis said, hey, well you go talk to their data people,

712
00:41:17,239 --> 00:41:19,640
Speaker 2: and that's how I got involved with USP. That was

713
00:41:19,800 --> 00:41:23,560
Speaker 2: February of twenty twenty one. So I had no intention

714
00:41:23,640 --> 00:41:27,560
Speaker 2: when I started of doing anything. I was curious and

715
00:41:27,600 --> 00:41:30,319
Speaker 2: that led to concern, and then when I expressed my

716
00:41:30,400 --> 00:41:33,759
Speaker 2: concerns other people said, wait, this guy knows something, and

717
00:41:33,800 --> 00:41:36,560
Speaker 2: then we started working together. So that's how I got

718
00:41:36,600 --> 00:41:39,160
Speaker 2: involved in the whole thing. And I've never I'm still

719
00:41:39,200 --> 00:41:41,560
Speaker 2: down that rabbit hole. I've never gotten out of it.

720
00:41:41,719 --> 00:41:49,960
Speaker 1: So I mean, if you love the country, regardless of

721
00:41:50,000 --> 00:41:55,400
Speaker 1: what your politics are, and you give yourself an honest

722
00:41:55,600 --> 00:41:59,239
Speaker 1: opportunity to listen to what you and a lot of

723
00:41:59,280 --> 00:42:05,040
Speaker 1: these other acts berts are saying, there's there's quantifiable proof

724
00:42:05,920 --> 00:42:10,759
Speaker 1: that our entire country is compromised right now, and we

725
00:42:10,960 --> 00:42:16,040
Speaker 1: saw the outcomes of that within the last administration to

726
00:42:16,120 --> 00:42:19,680
Speaker 1: it to just you know, as in a smaller capacity

727
00:42:19,719 --> 00:42:22,319
Speaker 1: than what it ultimately could be. I you know, I

728
00:42:22,360 --> 00:42:26,160
Speaker 1: mean you listen to Elon musk on Rogan, he said

729
00:42:26,160 --> 00:42:29,000
Speaker 1: this will be the last election if we lose. And

730
00:42:29,000 --> 00:42:32,759
Speaker 1: and I think anybody who had been paying attention since

731
00:42:32,800 --> 00:42:35,919
Speaker 1: twenty twenty and put all that together, even I even back,

732
00:42:35,960 --> 00:42:39,440
Speaker 1: I think you can argue that the Trump's first term

733
00:42:39,600 --> 00:42:42,640
Speaker 1: was like what is going on? Like this is this

734
00:42:42,760 --> 00:42:46,799
Speaker 1: is this is bizarre? Right, what's happening internally? What's going

735
00:42:46,840 --> 00:42:50,680
Speaker 1: on with his directives not manifesting overseas?

736
00:42:50,719 --> 00:42:50,880
Speaker 4: You know?

737
00:42:50,880 --> 00:42:52,319
Speaker 1: And I had a lot of friends do it still

738
00:42:52,320 --> 00:42:56,319
Speaker 1: doing work overseas, and like, you know, for me, the

739
00:42:56,360 --> 00:42:59,320
Speaker 1: big one was finding out that when he had said

740
00:43:00,120 --> 00:43:02,880
Speaker 1: get everybody out of Syria, and then my friend Scott

741
00:43:02,920 --> 00:43:07,200
Speaker 1: Wortz got blown up, you know, in the winter with

742
00:43:07,480 --> 00:43:10,280
Speaker 1: Shannon Kent, you know, Joe Kent's wife at the time,

743
00:43:10,640 --> 00:43:13,560
Speaker 1: and a couple other people. I was like, wait a minute,

744
00:43:13,960 --> 00:43:17,000
Speaker 1: that's not right, Like they were ordered to be out,

745
00:43:17,040 --> 00:43:18,880
Speaker 1: we shouldn't have been in there, but they were still

746
00:43:18,880 --> 00:43:20,680
Speaker 1: in there, you know, And I was like, all right,

747
00:43:20,719 --> 00:43:23,320
Speaker 1: this has gotten out of control. But then twenty twenty

748
00:43:23,320 --> 00:43:26,160
Speaker 1: obviously was just like all flags go up in the air.

749
00:43:27,840 --> 00:43:33,920
Speaker 1: When obviously from from November to February, a lot of

750
00:43:33,960 --> 00:43:38,040
Speaker 1: other things were taking place. Obviously, I mean from January

751
00:43:38,120 --> 00:43:42,319
Speaker 1: sixth to Rudy Giuliani and Bernie Carrick trying to bring

752
00:43:42,400 --> 00:43:46,160
Speaker 1: these to do these town halls to get in front

753
00:43:46,200 --> 00:43:50,960
Speaker 1: of these boards to present evidence, Sidney Powell and you

754
00:43:51,000 --> 00:43:52,680
Speaker 1: know this other group.

755
00:43:52,440 --> 00:43:54,320
Speaker 4: That was like something's wrong.

756
00:43:55,120 --> 00:43:58,640
Speaker 1: And then you know, Bernie told me this great story

757
00:44:00,080 --> 00:44:03,600
Speaker 1: that they went in after the couple nights and they

758
00:44:03,680 --> 00:44:07,880
Speaker 1: called an emergency meeting with Trump's team and he and

759
00:44:07,960 --> 00:44:12,080
Speaker 1: Juliano showed up at the main offices in DC, thinking

760
00:44:12,120 --> 00:44:16,400
Speaker 1: there'd be you know, standing room only, and there was

761
00:44:16,480 --> 00:44:20,600
Speaker 1: a one attorney showed up and was like, we're done,

762
00:44:20,760 --> 00:44:23,600
Speaker 1: it's over. What are you trying to do? And they're like, wait,

763
00:44:23,640 --> 00:44:26,640
Speaker 1: what are you talking about? And and that was kind

764
00:44:26,640 --> 00:44:29,560
Speaker 1: of another you know, heads up, like, oh, this is

765
00:44:29,600 --> 00:44:36,840
Speaker 1: something deeper? Right? Did did all of those external things?

766
00:44:36,840 --> 00:44:40,960
Speaker 1: Because now you're you're realizing something's afoot, it's it's deeper,

767
00:44:41,080 --> 00:44:46,520
Speaker 1: it's it's systemic in nature in a the most malevolent.

768
00:44:46,040 --> 00:44:47,520
Speaker 4: Machiavellian way known.

769
00:44:48,480 --> 00:44:52,280
Speaker 1: How did you start to like how did you start

770
00:44:52,320 --> 00:44:53,040
Speaker 1: to come up.

771
00:44:52,920 --> 00:44:54,560
Speaker 4: With a tactical approach?

772
00:44:54,680 --> 00:44:57,239
Speaker 1: Right? I remember my buddies that were a part of

773
00:44:57,440 --> 00:44:59,960
Speaker 1: the Red Teams back in the eighties and nineties at

774
00:45:00,080 --> 00:45:05,239
Speaker 1: Damnick would talk about, right, we would just find a

775
00:45:05,320 --> 00:45:09,560
Speaker 1: thread right on a base or wherever we were, and

776
00:45:09,600 --> 00:45:13,000
Speaker 1: we would just pick at that thread until we couldn't

777
00:45:13,080 --> 00:45:16,000
Speaker 1: pull any more on it, and and if there was

778
00:45:16,080 --> 00:45:18,440
Speaker 1: vulnerabilt we just kept going and come go what what

779
00:45:18,560 --> 00:45:22,080
Speaker 1: were some of the threads that you identified quickly like

780
00:45:22,440 --> 00:45:26,040
Speaker 1: all right, this is where it's obvious and I and

781
00:45:26,360 --> 00:45:27,920
Speaker 1: I'm just going to go down that route.

782
00:45:29,160 --> 00:45:31,680
Speaker 2: Well, the so The first thing I'd seen was the

783
00:45:31,760 --> 00:45:33,760
Speaker 2: voter rules, so I knew there was an issue there.

784
00:45:34,120 --> 00:45:36,239
Speaker 2: But I'm not a data guy. I mean, I can

785
00:45:36,320 --> 00:45:39,080
Speaker 2: do some data work, but I'm not a pro at it.

786
00:45:39,600 --> 00:45:43,680
Speaker 2: So at that point, usc IP already had a data professional,

787
00:45:44,000 --> 00:45:47,080
Speaker 2: a guy who was a serious data professional. He's I

788
00:45:47,160 --> 00:45:49,520
Speaker 2: won't say the company, but he's a you know, he's

789
00:45:49,640 --> 00:45:53,000
Speaker 2: the principal data guy for a major healthcare company.

790
00:45:53,040 --> 00:45:54,040
Speaker 3: And those guys live and.

791
00:45:54,000 --> 00:45:55,720
Speaker 4: Die by their data for sure.

792
00:45:56,000 --> 00:46:00,520
Speaker 2: And so he was the one principally that was digging

793
00:46:00,600 --> 00:46:03,000
Speaker 2: into voter rolls.

794
00:46:03,640 --> 00:46:05,440
Speaker 3: And I had already seen.

795
00:46:05,200 --> 00:46:08,160
Speaker 2: Some things that I knew could not be true, but

796
00:46:08,440 --> 00:46:10,760
Speaker 2: I was I didn't have the tools that he had,

797
00:46:11,000 --> 00:46:13,840
Speaker 2: but I understood how to dig into computer systems.

798
00:46:13,880 --> 00:46:15,160
Speaker 3: I knew what kind of and.

799
00:46:15,080 --> 00:46:17,799
Speaker 2: So once I saw what was going on with the

800
00:46:18,000 --> 00:46:21,360
Speaker 2: voting system testing labs and how corrupt, how that was

801
00:46:21,400 --> 00:46:24,359
Speaker 2: like kabuki theater, right, that was a placebo for people.

802
00:46:24,400 --> 00:46:27,520
Speaker 2: Oh it's federally tested, well, but they don't have any

803
00:46:27,560 --> 00:46:32,080
Speaker 2: cyber capability. They're not experts, they're not forensic cyber people,

804
00:46:32,760 --> 00:46:37,080
Speaker 2: and they're restricted in what they look at. And they're

805
00:46:37,080 --> 00:46:39,080
Speaker 2: not even looking at the commerce you know, most of

806
00:46:39,080 --> 00:46:42,680
Speaker 2: the software on a voting system is commercial software. They're

807
00:46:42,719 --> 00:46:45,280
Speaker 2: not examining the commercial software because they have an assumption

808
00:46:45,320 --> 00:46:49,200
Speaker 2: and assertion that that is already tested and those issues

809
00:46:49,239 --> 00:46:53,400
Speaker 2: are evaluated. Well, then you look at cyber vulnerabilities that

810
00:46:53,440 --> 00:46:57,759
Speaker 2: have been publicly identified in those software products, and you

811
00:46:57,840 --> 00:47:01,520
Speaker 2: start asking, well, did they mitigate they addressed those vulnerabilities

812
00:47:01,520 --> 00:47:03,600
Speaker 2: that are already known in the commercial products, and the

813
00:47:03,600 --> 00:47:06,319
Speaker 2: answers no. And then when I found out, you know,

814
00:47:06,360 --> 00:47:10,480
Speaker 2: they had no supply chain security whatsoever. Literally, it wasn't

815
00:47:10,480 --> 00:47:14,640
Speaker 2: even mentioned in any standard in dun till twenty twenty

816
00:47:14,640 --> 00:47:17,640
Speaker 2: one standard, which means none of the voting systems in

817
00:47:17,640 --> 00:47:21,800
Speaker 2: the United States had any security or mitigation whatsoever against

818
00:47:21,800 --> 00:47:25,160
Speaker 2: supply chain vulnerabilities. And again there were elements of the

819
00:47:25,160 --> 00:47:29,319
Speaker 2: federal government that were aware of that, and so so

820
00:47:29,480 --> 00:47:32,360
Speaker 2: that was you know, I was focused on that aspect.

821
00:47:32,360 --> 00:47:33,879
Speaker 2: But I have to say, and you know, Doc Frank

822
00:47:33,920 --> 00:47:37,239
Speaker 2: has talked about this. Doc Doherty has talked about this.

823
00:47:38,000 --> 00:47:40,239
Speaker 2: I think Clay has talked about it, Mike's talked about it,

824
00:47:41,640 --> 00:47:44,040
Speaker 2: Dave Clements has talked about it, all of us and

825
00:47:44,080 --> 00:47:47,759
Speaker 2: this is I call this the the blinders of morality.

826
00:47:48,440 --> 00:47:52,319
Speaker 2: So I've done red teamwork. I've done red team work

827
00:47:52,320 --> 00:47:57,000
Speaker 2: for physical penetration. I've directed red teamwork for cyber and

828
00:47:57,040 --> 00:48:02,160
Speaker 2: for other threats, so I can think like an enemy.

829
00:48:02,480 --> 00:48:04,920
Speaker 2: And there were times when I haven't thought like an enemy,

830
00:48:05,680 --> 00:48:08,080
Speaker 2: and it's an embarrassment to me because I have the

831
00:48:08,120 --> 00:48:10,480
Speaker 2: background that should have prevented that.

832
00:48:10,560 --> 00:48:12,200
Speaker 3: And J six is a perfect example.

833
00:48:12,320 --> 00:48:17,279
Speaker 2: So I wore I wore a plate carrier on the

834
00:48:17,280 --> 00:48:20,040
Speaker 2: plane when I flew to J six without plates in it,

835
00:48:20,080 --> 00:48:22,560
Speaker 2: because I thought that's going to really alarm these people.

836
00:48:22,960 --> 00:48:25,080
Speaker 2: And when I got to DC, I stayed with a

837
00:48:25,080 --> 00:48:30,080
Speaker 2: friend the night before. I fabricated expedient plates for the

838
00:48:30,080 --> 00:48:33,239
Speaker 2: plate carrier out of ceramics and metals.

839
00:48:33,239 --> 00:48:35,120
Speaker 3: Because I assumed we were going to be attacked.

840
00:48:36,680 --> 00:48:39,080
Speaker 2: But at that point, I still even though I had

841
00:48:39,120 --> 00:48:44,520
Speaker 2: concluded in twenty seventeen, based on in late twenty seventeen

842
00:48:44,560 --> 00:48:47,279
Speaker 2: early twenty eighteen, based on some of the work that

843
00:48:47,320 --> 00:48:50,680
Speaker 2: I was doing for the Adversarial Assessment Program and some

844
00:48:50,719 --> 00:48:53,720
Speaker 2: other support work, I had concluded it by that point

845
00:48:53,760 --> 00:48:56,920
Speaker 2: that there were elements within the US intelligence community that

846
00:48:56,960 --> 00:49:00,680
Speaker 2: were committing treason against the president. And I can't go

847
00:49:00,680 --> 00:49:05,640
Speaker 2: into detail about that, but it was not a not

848
00:49:05,760 --> 00:49:08,880
Speaker 2: a natural assumption for me. And when I became aware

849
00:49:08,920 --> 00:49:12,359
Speaker 2: of it, it you know, it was a little bit.

850
00:49:12,400 --> 00:49:13,279
Speaker 3: It shook me a.

851
00:49:13,320 --> 00:49:16,359
Speaker 4: Little bit, of course, of course, But.

852
00:49:16,360 --> 00:49:19,880
Speaker 2: Even at that point, I wasn't looking domestically. I just

853
00:49:19,880 --> 00:49:21,440
Speaker 2: didn't have that. You know, that's not where I had

854
00:49:21,480 --> 00:49:24,520
Speaker 2: looked my entire career. I'd been focused on overseas, the

855
00:49:25,040 --> 00:49:30,480
Speaker 2: away game. But anyway, so you know, I started to

856
00:49:31,040 --> 00:49:34,239
Speaker 2: connect some of those dots and see some of them

857
00:49:34,280 --> 00:49:41,160
Speaker 2: not just negligence among public officials, but deliberate decisions to

858
00:49:41,920 --> 00:49:46,000
Speaker 2: allow or look the other way, you know, neglect to prosecute,

859
00:49:46,120 --> 00:49:47,120
Speaker 2: neglect to mitigate.

860
00:49:47,880 --> 00:49:52,000
Speaker 3: So I wouldn't say it was a.

861
00:49:51,719 --> 00:49:55,440
Speaker 2: Complete picture, but we were hampered at that point because

862
00:49:55,480 --> 00:49:59,399
Speaker 2: all of us too. I think to the last thought, well,

863
00:49:59,480 --> 00:50:04,520
Speaker 2: we'll just hell leaders, public officials what's true, and then

864
00:50:04,560 --> 00:50:05,479
Speaker 2: they'll do the right thing.

865
00:50:06,000 --> 00:50:08,880
Speaker 4: That's how I was right, right, right, right.

866
00:50:09,560 --> 00:50:12,160
Speaker 2: I call that. You know, I think back to the verse.

867
00:50:12,480 --> 00:50:14,759
Speaker 2: You know, when I was a child. I thought as

868
00:50:14,760 --> 00:50:15,880
Speaker 2: a child, I spoke.

869
00:50:15,640 --> 00:50:16,200
Speaker 3: As a child.

870
00:50:16,920 --> 00:50:19,960
Speaker 2: There's a naivety to that, which was surprising to me

871
00:50:20,280 --> 00:50:23,160
Speaker 2: after a career of dealing with threats I just didn't

872
00:50:23,160 --> 00:50:24,279
Speaker 2: have that mindset yet.

873
00:50:24,760 --> 00:50:26,840
Speaker 3: But once we started talking to public officials.

874
00:50:26,880 --> 00:50:30,239
Speaker 2: By probably April May of twenty one, I bet I

875
00:50:30,239 --> 00:50:34,160
Speaker 2: had talked to sixty election officials and different counties or

876
00:50:34,160 --> 00:50:36,960
Speaker 2: at the state level. I'd had state level officials and

877
00:50:37,040 --> 00:50:40,880
Speaker 2: multiple states lie to me about question you know, in

878
00:50:41,000 --> 00:50:45,000
Speaker 2: answering questions I was asking, watched them lie to legislators.

879
00:50:46,719 --> 00:50:50,839
Speaker 2: I had heard county level officials lie. I'd had them

880
00:50:50,880 --> 00:50:53,360
Speaker 2: lie right to my face. In some cases, they didn't

881
00:50:53,360 --> 00:50:54,840
Speaker 2: know what they were saying. They were just saying what

882
00:50:54,880 --> 00:50:56,840
Speaker 2: they had been told to say. They didn't know the difference,

883
00:50:57,040 --> 00:50:59,319
Speaker 2: but they were still they knew that they were being

884
00:50:59,320 --> 00:51:00,160
Speaker 2: told something.

885
00:51:00,520 --> 00:51:01,279
Speaker 3: They did have.

886
00:51:01,400 --> 00:51:05,239
Speaker 2: No ability to verify, you know, or determine any of

887
00:51:05,280 --> 00:51:07,600
Speaker 2: the answers to what they were saying themselves. Like they

888
00:51:07,600 --> 00:51:10,040
Speaker 2: would say things to me that they got away with

889
00:51:10,080 --> 00:51:14,080
Speaker 2: saying to the general public or to media that didn't

890
00:51:14,080 --> 00:51:15,960
Speaker 2: have the skill set, the background, or the will to

891
00:51:16,080 --> 00:51:18,279
Speaker 2: question them. But I knew better with some of the

892
00:51:18,280 --> 00:51:20,360
Speaker 2: things that they were saying already, Like you know, I

893
00:51:20,400 --> 00:51:22,800
Speaker 2: had the elections director in Colorado tell me, oh, no,

894
00:51:23,440 --> 00:51:26,239
Speaker 2: there's no connection to this system. And he said that

895
00:51:26,280 --> 00:51:28,719
Speaker 2: to me on the phone, and at the time he

896
00:51:28,760 --> 00:51:30,440
Speaker 2: was saying that to me, I was looking at the

897
00:51:30,480 --> 00:51:34,560
Speaker 2: technical documentation from the vendor that said they required that

898
00:51:34,719 --> 00:51:40,160
Speaker 2: application programming interface connection to the statewide registration database. So

899
00:51:40,360 --> 00:51:43,560
Speaker 2: an API or application program interface is a machine to

900
00:51:43,600 --> 00:51:47,680
Speaker 2: machine interface. He lied to me directly, and I then

901
00:51:47,760 --> 00:51:50,239
Speaker 2: saw him lie in many other you know, his name's

902
00:51:50,280 --> 00:51:52,439
Speaker 2: jud Show. I don't mind calling him a liar because

903
00:51:52,480 --> 00:51:55,799
Speaker 2: he is one. He lied in a criminal manner, and

904
00:51:55,880 --> 00:51:59,120
Speaker 2: I had seen so many of those by late April

905
00:51:59,239 --> 00:52:02,400
Speaker 2: early May. At that point, I knew, okay, this is

906
00:52:02,440 --> 00:52:04,080
Speaker 2: not going to be the I thought this was going

907
00:52:04,120 --> 00:52:06,279
Speaker 2: to be just exposing the truth. It's not going to

908
00:52:06,280 --> 00:52:09,960
Speaker 2: be exposing the truth because we were being opposed, suppressed,

909
00:52:10,120 --> 00:52:15,160
Speaker 2: targeted by media, by institutions, by the government, the federal

910
00:52:15,200 --> 00:52:19,160
Speaker 2: government at that point, state government. You know, I was effectively,

911
00:52:19,520 --> 00:52:22,040
Speaker 2: you know, an enemy of my state and an enemy

912
00:52:22,080 --> 00:52:24,680
Speaker 2: of the state at that point. And I got it,

913
00:52:24,760 --> 00:52:26,920
Speaker 2: you know, I got it mild. Other people were getting it,

914
00:52:26,960 --> 00:52:28,800
Speaker 2: you know, they were getting around. I was at J six,

915
00:52:30,040 --> 00:52:32,000
Speaker 2: you know, I was on the Capitol steps. I saw

916
00:52:32,080 --> 00:52:34,480
Speaker 2: some of those things go down there, and you know,

917
00:52:34,600 --> 00:52:37,920
Speaker 2: I thought, or I thought, what I had to worry

918
00:52:37,960 --> 00:52:40,839
Speaker 2: about was the leftists. What I had to worry about

919
00:52:40,880 --> 00:52:43,520
Speaker 2: there was my own government. So when I saw what

920
00:52:43,600 --> 00:52:46,799
Speaker 2: my own government was doing, how it tried to make

921
00:52:46,880 --> 00:52:50,840
Speaker 2: that into something that it wasn't and then colluded with

922
00:52:51,040 --> 00:52:55,720
Speaker 2: media to describe it inaccurately, to lie about what was happening,

923
00:52:57,080 --> 00:52:59,920
Speaker 2: you know, that's when I think I realized first then

924
00:53:00,160 --> 00:53:01,719
Speaker 2: that it was going to be a very different fight.

925
00:53:02,520 --> 00:53:03,160
Speaker 4: Oh for me.

926
00:53:03,480 --> 00:53:07,640
Speaker 1: J six was the recognition of that, you know, we

927
00:53:07,640 --> 00:53:11,000
Speaker 1: were in a color revolution. That that's that's that's when

928
00:53:11,040 --> 00:53:14,799
Speaker 1: I was confirmed to me, right, the lead up from

929
00:53:14,840 --> 00:53:19,640
Speaker 1: the year before with COVID, you know, won just the

930
00:53:19,719 --> 00:53:22,239
Speaker 1: Russia Gates stuff. I was like, this is this is

931
00:53:22,360 --> 00:53:26,240
Speaker 1: a soft coup for sure, and then leading then COVID

932
00:53:26,480 --> 00:53:30,040
Speaker 1: and then the BLM stuff, you know, and then when

933
00:53:30,080 --> 00:53:32,600
Speaker 1: I all myself and a lot of other guys just

934
00:53:32,600 --> 00:53:37,000
Speaker 1: start getting throttled and shut down, and the cancelations ramped

935
00:53:37,080 --> 00:53:39,399
Speaker 1: up to just shut all of our voices down, all

936
00:53:39,440 --> 00:53:44,400
Speaker 1: the military guys down, right, you know, And I was like,

937
00:53:44,800 --> 00:53:49,680
Speaker 1: this is what effectively the intelligence community has been running

938
00:53:50,160 --> 00:53:52,400
Speaker 1: all over the world for the last you know, since

939
00:53:52,640 --> 00:53:55,880
Speaker 1: probably Bosnia or you can argue in different forms prior

940
00:53:55,920 --> 00:53:58,880
Speaker 1: to that too, But this was the playbook, This was

941
00:53:59,400 --> 00:54:01,080
Speaker 1: the mind revolution.

942
00:54:00,840 --> 00:54:02,160
Speaker 4: This was the whole thing.

943
00:54:02,239 --> 00:54:08,719
Speaker 1: And and so for me, by that time, like I'd

944
00:54:09,160 --> 00:54:12,319
Speaker 1: lost my career, I'd lost everything. So I was in

945
00:54:12,400 --> 00:54:16,879
Speaker 1: this dark, dark, depressive state. And I every time I'd

946
00:54:16,920 --> 00:54:20,880
Speaker 1: get excited about someone like you or or one of

947
00:54:20,920 --> 00:54:25,640
Speaker 1: your other compatriots out there that were making these advancements

948
00:54:25,640 --> 00:54:30,560
Speaker 1: in discoveries and presenting them as we've been narrowed down

949
00:54:30,600 --> 00:54:33,480
Speaker 1: to rumble and parlor and you know the other places

950
00:54:33,520 --> 00:54:37,600
Speaker 1: at that time, Yeah, yeah, just narrowed us down to

951
00:54:38,360 --> 00:54:44,120
Speaker 1: just a few available delivery delivery places. I was just like, Okay,

952
00:54:44,960 --> 00:54:47,480
Speaker 1: how is this going to break through? And what are

953
00:54:47,520 --> 00:54:51,640
Speaker 1: we going to do? And and and it was. It

954
00:54:51,719 --> 00:54:54,240
Speaker 1: was a very It was probably one of the darkest

955
00:54:54,360 --> 00:54:57,880
Speaker 1: experiences I've ever had in my life, other than the

956
00:54:57,920 --> 00:55:02,040
Speaker 1: Afghan pull out that was depressing for me. Obviously, the

957
00:55:02,800 --> 00:55:06,560
Speaker 1: bin Laden raid followed by extortion seventeen was brutal for me.

958
00:55:07,320 --> 00:55:10,000
Speaker 1: You know, when you realize, wait a minute, how is this,

959
00:55:10,200 --> 00:55:13,640
Speaker 1: you know, and you start to question all this stuffy

960
00:55:13,880 --> 00:55:17,040
Speaker 1: and I think that's that's the great challenge for the

961
00:55:17,080 --> 00:55:21,800
Speaker 1: American public and has been as as obviously one of

962
00:55:21,840 --> 00:55:25,560
Speaker 1: the things that really impressed me about David when he

963
00:55:25,640 --> 00:55:27,680
Speaker 1: came on and you can you know, there's just the

964
00:55:27,680 --> 00:55:30,320
Speaker 1: way he speaks, right, the sentiment that's in his voice

965
00:55:30,840 --> 00:55:35,080
Speaker 1: of that all in tone, but it's calm. It's like

966
00:55:35,680 --> 00:55:38,759
Speaker 1: it's like, no, this like it's I imagine this is

967
00:55:38,800 --> 00:55:40,719
Speaker 1: what the guy you guys feel like the guys at

968
00:55:40,719 --> 00:55:44,400
Speaker 1: the Alamo, right, or you feel like, uh what some

969
00:55:44,440 --> 00:55:47,200
Speaker 1: of the Knights of Malta on that island where they

970
00:55:47,280 --> 00:55:49,480
Speaker 1: you know, like it's just this is it.

971
00:55:49,680 --> 00:55:50,799
Speaker 4: This is where we're at.

972
00:55:51,800 --> 00:55:56,320
Speaker 1: Did you in that April time frame, was there any

973
00:55:56,440 --> 00:55:57,919
Speaker 1: place where.

974
00:55:59,800 --> 00:56:00,839
Speaker 4: You felt like.

975
00:56:02,719 --> 00:56:06,800
Speaker 1: Momentum like from other people, like you were gaining traction

976
00:56:07,680 --> 00:56:11,359
Speaker 1: or was it just because that's what I think what

977
00:56:11,400 --> 00:56:14,160
Speaker 1: people want to understand is how do you stay invested

978
00:56:14,160 --> 00:56:18,359
Speaker 1: in this for so long when nobody's listening and it's

979
00:56:18,400 --> 00:56:21,440
Speaker 1: the biggest issue in the world, Like, how do you

980
00:56:21,520 --> 00:56:22,040
Speaker 1: keep going?

981
00:56:23,640 --> 00:56:26,120
Speaker 2: Well, a lot of I mean a lot of people

982
00:56:26,480 --> 00:56:29,080
Speaker 2: you know, I would say we're inspirational, but you know,

983
00:56:29,200 --> 00:56:33,480
Speaker 2: remember I'm an officer, So my job is that you know,

984
00:56:33,520 --> 00:56:35,959
Speaker 2: your emotions don't matter. It doesn't matter whether you're in courage,

985
00:56:36,000 --> 00:56:38,799
Speaker 2: your job is to be that to you know, to

986
00:56:38,840 --> 00:56:41,400
Speaker 2: execute the mission. Once you see it and it's a

987
00:56:42,320 --> 00:56:43,920
Speaker 2: you know, it's a mission I didn't want. It's a

988
00:56:43,920 --> 00:56:44,799
Speaker 2: blessing and a curse.

989
00:56:44,880 --> 00:56:45,080
Speaker 3: Right.

990
00:56:45,120 --> 00:56:48,200
Speaker 2: But once you see your duty, if you can, if

991
00:56:48,200 --> 00:56:50,399
Speaker 2: you can ignore it, then you're just not that guy.

992
00:56:51,920 --> 00:56:54,719
Speaker 2: I'm not the guy that can ignore my duty. I

993
00:56:54,760 --> 00:56:57,239
Speaker 2: might misinterpret it sometimes, but I can't ignore it. So

994
00:56:57,320 --> 00:56:59,439
Speaker 2: once I saw it clearly. But but they were all

995
00:56:59,480 --> 00:57:02,560
Speaker 2: I mean, Dave Clements was one of the people who helped,

996
00:57:02,600 --> 00:57:05,440
Speaker 2: you know. It was again Dennis Haw introduced me to him.

997
00:57:05,440 --> 00:57:08,680
Speaker 2: So Dennis, unfortunately they killed him with the you know,

998
00:57:08,760 --> 00:57:10,960
Speaker 2: he he and I had some discussions before he took

999
00:57:11,000 --> 00:57:11,720
Speaker 2: the first jab.

1000
00:57:12,280 --> 00:57:14,160
Speaker 3: It was his company required it.

1001
00:57:14,239 --> 00:57:18,200
Speaker 2: He ended up having a heart attack on on stage.

1002
00:57:18,240 --> 00:57:20,200
Speaker 3: We lost him that way. As far as I'm.

1003
00:57:20,040 --> 00:57:23,520
Speaker 2: Concerned, our government killed him, and which is you know,

1004
00:57:23,840 --> 00:57:26,400
Speaker 2: not not just considering what he gave to the nation.

1005
00:57:26,600 --> 00:57:30,640
Speaker 2: But he had told me about David Clements, and it

1006
00:57:30,680 --> 00:57:33,080
Speaker 2: was because David Clements had had I think Josh Meret

1007
00:57:33,120 --> 00:57:34,920
Speaker 2: on and then they were talking, the three of them

1008
00:57:34,920 --> 00:57:41,400
Speaker 2: were talking, and I working with USCIP, the Colorado grassroots group,

1009
00:57:42,040 --> 00:57:45,080
Speaker 2: we had realized some things we had, you know, identified

1010
00:57:45,120 --> 00:57:47,880
Speaker 2: some techniques. So our objective was to connect everybody and

1011
00:57:47,920 --> 00:57:50,240
Speaker 2: then to share what was working and what we knew.

1012
00:57:50,280 --> 00:57:52,400
Speaker 2: If we developed a tool, we wanted to share it.

1013
00:57:52,440 --> 00:57:54,520
Speaker 2: If somebody else had a tool, we wanted to use it.

1014
00:57:55,160 --> 00:57:58,480
Speaker 2: And our objective was to you know, link grassroots groups

1015
00:57:58,520 --> 00:58:03,000
Speaker 2: and share her success, you know, to try to win together,

1016
00:58:03,160 --> 00:58:06,040
Speaker 2: to try to restore together. And so I had reached

1017
00:58:06,080 --> 00:58:09,920
Speaker 2: out to Marilyn Todd in New Hampshire because I saw

1018
00:58:09,920 --> 00:58:12,520
Speaker 2: a Facebook post from her, and so I tracked her

1019
00:58:12,520 --> 00:58:14,160
Speaker 2: down and said, hey, you know, what do you need?

1020
00:58:14,680 --> 00:58:17,280
Speaker 2: And she told me what she needed and we didn't

1021
00:58:17,360 --> 00:58:20,720
Speaker 2: have it. But I reached out to David Clements and asked, hey,

1022
00:58:20,880 --> 00:58:23,920
Speaker 2: could you will you talk to her and help. I

1023
00:58:23,920 --> 00:58:26,200
Speaker 2: did actually the same thing with Jovon Pulitzer when they

1024
00:58:26,200 --> 00:58:28,160
Speaker 2: were looking for somebody to help with their audit.

1025
00:58:29,520 --> 00:58:32,080
Speaker 3: I had so again through Dennis.

1026
00:58:32,080 --> 00:58:35,000
Speaker 2: Dennis was connected to somebody down in Arizona, and when

1027
00:58:35,960 --> 00:58:41,080
Speaker 2: State Senator Fan was sort of leading the Senate audit

1028
00:58:41,720 --> 00:58:44,840
Speaker 2: effort there, she was, you know, in charge in effect

1029
00:58:44,840 --> 00:58:48,360
Speaker 2: from the Senate. You know, they didn't have cyber expertise,

1030
00:58:48,800 --> 00:58:51,480
Speaker 2: and so they had asked for some recommendations for some

1031
00:58:51,560 --> 00:58:54,520
Speaker 2: things including who could.

1032
00:58:54,360 --> 00:58:55,080
Speaker 3: Look at ballots.

1033
00:58:55,120 --> 00:58:57,080
Speaker 2: And I had done a lot of work in research

1034
00:58:57,200 --> 00:59:00,320
Speaker 2: looking at what question document examiners did, what tools they use,

1035
00:59:00,400 --> 00:59:03,240
Speaker 2: what capabilities they had with their throughput? Was looked at

1036
00:59:03,240 --> 00:59:07,520
Speaker 2: the problem set in in Maracopa, And you know, part

1037
00:59:07,560 --> 00:59:11,640
Speaker 2: of my recommendation to Center State Center Fan was this

1038
00:59:11,800 --> 00:59:14,200
Speaker 2: was all sort of you know, behind the scenes, we

1039
00:59:14,200 --> 00:59:15,680
Speaker 2: were talking about this with other people.

1040
00:59:15,680 --> 00:59:18,440
Speaker 3: It was sort of considered. I wouldn't say, you know,

1041
00:59:18,600 --> 00:59:19,920
Speaker 3: secret or anything like that, but it.

1042
00:59:19,960 --> 00:59:23,160
Speaker 4: Was, you know, you wanted to have some op sect

1043
00:59:23,200 --> 00:59:26,080
Speaker 4: for sure. Well, yeah, I'm sure, I'm sure there were

1044
00:59:26,120 --> 00:59:28,200
Speaker 4: people trying to penetrate you guys at that time.

1045
00:59:28,240 --> 00:59:31,120
Speaker 2: By yeah, there were there were, you know, we would

1046
00:59:31,160 --> 00:59:32,640
Speaker 2: get them all the time, and in fact, some of

1047
00:59:32,640 --> 00:59:36,520
Speaker 2: them were media that then went on to write false,

1048
00:59:36,920 --> 00:59:41,680
Speaker 2: fraudulent stories that then led to us being targeted by

1049
00:59:42,280 --> 00:59:47,040
Speaker 2: some of the civil rights NGOs that came and sued

1050
00:59:47,120 --> 00:59:50,800
Speaker 2: us and accused of us of violating KKK Act, Civil

1051
00:59:50,840 --> 00:59:54,959
Speaker 2: Rights Act, Voting Rights Act. We beat them in federal court,

1052
00:59:55,000 --> 00:59:57,680
Speaker 2: although the appeal is ongoing right now. But that's another story.

1053
00:59:57,680 --> 01:00:03,800
Speaker 2: But anyway, you know, I'd recommended Jovon Pulitzer for the

1054
01:00:03,840 --> 01:00:08,760
Speaker 2: paper audit to assist Marilyn Todd in New Hampshire. Not

1055
01:00:09,320 --> 01:00:11,560
Speaker 2: and you know, I have a different perspective about him now,

1056
01:00:11,640 --> 01:00:14,440
Speaker 2: but but at the time I thought, well, he's the

1057
01:00:14,480 --> 01:00:18,480
Speaker 2: only one who's described any kind of technical capability to

1058
01:00:19,520 --> 01:00:25,480
Speaker 2: produce ballot examination at the throughput level required, you know,

1059
01:00:25,560 --> 01:00:28,800
Speaker 2: for the periods of these audits. So so there were

1060
01:00:28,840 --> 01:00:30,360
Speaker 2: a lot of people like that. I mean, they're just

1061
01:00:30,400 --> 01:00:32,200
Speaker 2: coming out of the woodwork, you know, we were not

1062
01:00:32,280 --> 01:00:35,120
Speaker 2: all connected at that point. At this point, I would say,

1063
01:00:35,120 --> 01:00:37,800
Speaker 2: there it's very rare that I hear a name that

1064
01:00:37,880 --> 01:00:41,600
Speaker 2: I'm not familiar with if they're doing something significant election integrity,

1065
01:00:42,160 --> 01:00:44,040
Speaker 2: not because they you know, come to me or anything

1066
01:00:44,080 --> 01:00:46,000
Speaker 2: like that, but just because we try to help people

1067
01:00:46,400 --> 01:00:48,680
Speaker 2: and if there's somebody doing something that we don't know

1068
01:00:48,720 --> 01:00:50,600
Speaker 2: how to do or that we're not the best, we

1069
01:00:50,640 --> 01:00:53,440
Speaker 2: try to get them connected to them. So there were

1070
01:00:53,440 --> 01:00:55,960
Speaker 2: a lot, you know, David Clement, so I'd say it

1071
01:00:56,000 --> 01:00:58,640
Speaker 2: was one of the first people to be doing any

1072
01:00:58,720 --> 01:01:04,360
Speaker 2: kind of long format discussion about election integrity issues, and

1073
01:01:04,440 --> 01:01:07,000
Speaker 2: so he became known for that right he was.

1074
01:01:07,520 --> 01:01:10,920
Speaker 3: He took an interest it wasn't something he had.

1075
01:01:10,760 --> 01:01:13,840
Speaker 2: A background in either, but at this point, you know,

1076
01:01:13,880 --> 01:01:16,720
Speaker 2: and he and his wife, and he'd probably say this too,

1077
01:01:16,760 --> 01:01:19,520
Speaker 2: but you know, Aaron's the Aaron's the smart one in

1078
01:01:19,560 --> 01:01:22,760
Speaker 2: that couple, and David's pretty smart, but Aaron's a smart one.

1079
01:01:22,840 --> 01:01:26,440
Speaker 3: So, you know, we talked with them about some of.

1080
01:01:26,360 --> 01:01:29,600
Speaker 2: The work in New Mexico, which I you know, I

1081
01:01:29,680 --> 01:01:31,880
Speaker 2: had lived in New Mexico before, I understood some things

1082
01:01:31,880 --> 01:01:35,720
Speaker 2: about New Mexico politics and political environment, and so there

1083
01:01:35,720 --> 01:01:37,760
Speaker 2: were a lot of people, you know, I there were,

1084
01:01:38,360 --> 01:01:41,000
Speaker 2: including some of the sort of I would call them

1085
01:01:41,040 --> 01:01:44,280
Speaker 2: like original gangsters, intellection, integrity. I wasn't even aware of it.

1086
01:01:44,320 --> 01:01:45,840
Speaker 2: You know, I didn't know the call your brothers. I

1087
01:01:45,840 --> 01:01:49,240
Speaker 2: didn't know Bev Harris. Now I'm great admirers of those

1088
01:01:49,240 --> 01:01:51,760
Speaker 2: people who were doing that work. I would say they,

1089
01:01:51,800 --> 01:01:55,920
Speaker 2: you know, they tried to warn us. You know Sheila

1090
01:01:56,040 --> 01:02:00,000
Speaker 2: Parks in her twenty twelve folk while we still have time. Yeah,

1091
01:02:00,080 --> 01:02:02,760
Speaker 2: she was another Democrat educator. So there were a lot

1092
01:02:02,760 --> 01:02:06,320
Speaker 2: of people. They just weren't well known because the legacy media,

1093
01:02:06,840 --> 01:02:11,600
Speaker 2: mainstream media did all it could after twenty nineteen, especially

1094
01:02:12,000 --> 01:02:15,440
Speaker 2: after mid twenty twenty to just shut down in discussion.

1095
01:02:15,800 --> 01:02:17,120
Speaker 3: It was like the end of history.

1096
01:02:17,240 --> 01:02:20,280
Speaker 2: You know, they didn't want to even acknowledge what you

1097
01:02:20,320 --> 01:02:25,280
Speaker 2: know what Widen and Harris and all those PEO Ron Widen,

1098
01:02:25,280 --> 01:02:28,040
Speaker 2: you know what they had said in congressional hearings about

1099
01:02:28,040 --> 01:02:29,600
Speaker 2: the threats and vulnerabilities.

1100
01:02:30,480 --> 01:02:34,040
Speaker 1: That's thank you for that context. That's fantastic, because what

1101
01:02:34,640 --> 01:02:38,080
Speaker 1: I want people to know is that there is a

1102
01:02:38,160 --> 01:02:43,840
Speaker 1: significant group that have dedicated thousands and thousands of hours

1103
01:02:44,480 --> 01:02:49,400
Speaker 1: in this collective effort to categorically disprove that that was

1104
01:02:49,440 --> 01:02:54,400
Speaker 1: the safest election in history. And I think the more

1105
01:02:54,600 --> 01:03:02,200
Speaker 1: people understand the technical expertise, the the patriotic commitment to

1106
01:03:02,240 --> 01:03:06,400
Speaker 1: the country, your services, you know, where people are coming from.

1107
01:03:06,440 --> 01:03:10,080
Speaker 4: Why what they've sacrificed. I mean, for God's sake.

1108
01:03:10,120 --> 01:03:14,040
Speaker 1: Look at Tina Peters, you know, staring at nine years

1109
01:03:14,080 --> 01:03:19,560
Speaker 1: of incarceration for doing her job. You know, I just

1110
01:03:19,760 --> 01:03:21,800
Speaker 1: I think, you know, that's one of the things that

1111
01:03:21,960 --> 01:03:26,240
Speaker 1: is finally breaking through as well. Here's this gold star mother,

1112
01:03:26,440 --> 01:03:29,280
Speaker 1: you know, mother of a team guy too, you know,

1113
01:03:29,640 --> 01:03:33,480
Speaker 1: and was willing to just go against the system, and

1114
01:03:33,520 --> 01:03:37,080
Speaker 1: the system is still in place where they can incarcerate her.

1115
01:03:37,760 --> 01:03:42,560
Speaker 1: Can you describe her case just briefly, because I'd love

1116
01:03:43,120 --> 01:03:45,840
Speaker 1: I'd love to have you back on in the near

1117
01:03:45,920 --> 01:03:49,840
Speaker 1: future so we can go down the legal aspects of

1118
01:03:50,040 --> 01:03:52,440
Speaker 1: the whole thing as well. But just to kind of

1119
01:03:52,440 --> 01:03:55,760
Speaker 1: wrap up this first show with you, can you describe

1120
01:03:56,080 --> 01:04:00,480
Speaker 1: Tina's case, why it's relevant in the great and Er

1121
01:04:00,480 --> 01:04:05,800
Speaker 1: context and and what it means for the the proverbial

1122
01:04:05,960 --> 01:04:10,320
Speaker 1: choke hold on on the system, if you will, that's

1123
01:04:10,640 --> 01:04:14,960
Speaker 1: hanging on by the threads now before this thing just explodes.

1124
01:04:16,560 --> 01:04:19,200
Speaker 2: Yeah, I would say, so let me start with something

1125
01:04:19,200 --> 01:04:22,439
Speaker 2: that'll that'll uh, you know, you'll see it right away.

1126
01:04:22,600 --> 01:04:26,160
Speaker 2: Other people will maybe realize at the end. So uh,

1127
01:04:26,200 --> 01:04:28,960
Speaker 2: you know, at one point, I'm trying to remember the year.

1128
01:04:29,000 --> 01:04:34,640
Speaker 2: But Saddam Hussein is still in control of his entire country.

1129
01:04:34,760 --> 01:04:36,800
Speaker 2: You know, he's got a choke hold. It's a he

1130
01:04:36,800 --> 01:04:40,040
Speaker 2: can kill anybody wants. His sons are murderous little bastards.

1131
01:04:40,600 --> 01:04:43,760
Speaker 2: You know, it's just it's just a it's a it's

1132
01:04:43,760 --> 01:04:46,440
Speaker 2: a death it's a death camp. The whole country is

1133
01:04:46,480 --> 01:04:49,320
Speaker 2: a death camp. And who dies as whoever Hussein designs

1134
01:04:49,400 --> 01:04:53,240
Speaker 2: dies and uh, and then you know, a couple of

1135
01:04:53,280 --> 01:04:59,480
Speaker 2: weeks later, he's an a spire hole. And that's that's

1136
01:05:00,480 --> 01:05:01,919
Speaker 2: that is the you know.

1137
01:05:02,000 --> 01:05:06,960
Speaker 3: Modern day And same thing with Maduro, right, big talker, and.

1138
01:05:08,440 --> 01:05:10,880
Speaker 2: You know it's like Tyson said, everybody's got a plan

1139
01:05:11,000 --> 01:05:14,600
Speaker 2: until they get punched in the face. And next thing

1140
01:05:14,640 --> 01:05:17,000
Speaker 2: you know, you know, Maduro's on a US plane headed

1141
01:05:17,000 --> 01:05:21,200
Speaker 2: to the United States, drinking US water, surrounded by US people.

1142
01:05:21,600 --> 01:05:25,360
Speaker 2: And and that's what the phrase sixth semper tarannus means.

1143
01:05:25,840 --> 01:05:26,240
Speaker 3: Right.

1144
01:05:26,440 --> 01:05:29,960
Speaker 2: They abuse, they exceed, and at a certain point it's

1145
01:05:30,000 --> 01:05:34,160
Speaker 2: just not sustainable. Something breaks, they lose control, and it's

1146
01:05:34,200 --> 01:05:37,000
Speaker 2: all downhill. You know, there's occasionally where if they're smart

1147
01:05:38,120 --> 01:05:40,560
Speaker 2: and not too egotistical, they have some sort of an

1148
01:05:40,720 --> 01:05:44,560
Speaker 2: escape route, right, right, right, But anybody who holds on

1149
01:05:44,600 --> 01:05:48,360
Speaker 2: a tyrant, that holds on offentually is you know, they

1150
01:05:48,400 --> 01:05:51,440
Speaker 2: all meet the same fate in some sense. So I

1151
01:05:51,440 --> 01:05:54,040
Speaker 2: think it'll be that way in Colorado. I think the

1152
01:05:54,120 --> 01:05:58,040
Speaker 2: tyrants and it is to it is tyrannical. And now

1153
01:05:58,240 --> 01:06:01,960
Speaker 2: the specifics on on Clerk. So Tina Peters, you know,

1154
01:06:02,120 --> 01:06:05,280
Speaker 2: she's described herself. She was just you know, like most

1155
01:06:05,320 --> 01:06:09,080
Speaker 2: of us, dripping along doing you know, private business, commerce, whatever,

1156
01:06:09,200 --> 01:06:12,320
Speaker 2: her own life. And then she you know, like happens

1157
01:06:12,360 --> 01:06:15,640
Speaker 2: with so many of us. She got irritated by by

1158
01:06:15,720 --> 01:06:18,120
Speaker 2: the long lines at the DMV in her county, and

1159
01:06:18,160 --> 01:06:18,960
Speaker 2: she thought, yeah.

1160
01:06:18,880 --> 01:06:20,240
Speaker 3: I guess I should do something about it.

1161
01:06:20,520 --> 01:06:23,680
Speaker 2: You know, her son was gone, and she thought, okay,

1162
01:06:23,760 --> 01:06:25,560
Speaker 2: I've got her civic response. I can do I can

1163
01:06:25,600 --> 01:06:28,280
Speaker 2: fix this. I got a civic responsibility. So she ran

1164
01:06:28,360 --> 01:06:31,080
Speaker 2: for clerk with no idea. She wasn't she wasn't a

1165
01:06:31,120 --> 01:06:34,000
Speaker 2: political insider. She had no idea the kind of ire

1166
01:06:34,160 --> 01:06:37,240
Speaker 2: that she would incite among the political insiders. But at

1167
01:06:37,240 --> 01:06:41,800
Speaker 2: that point the election, you know, that particular office was

1168
01:06:41,840 --> 01:06:47,959
Speaker 2: not something that the the individuals and organizations that really

1169
01:06:48,000 --> 01:06:52,640
Speaker 2: were controlling the voting systems and election systems. It wasn't

1170
01:06:52,680 --> 01:06:56,040
Speaker 2: something they were trying to secure. And so she got

1171
01:06:56,040 --> 01:07:00,000
Speaker 2: into office. But they immediately, the institutions immediately are rated

1172
01:07:00,040 --> 01:07:03,680
Speaker 2: against her. You know, her the former clerk partnered up

1173
01:07:03,720 --> 01:07:07,240
Speaker 2: colluded a Republican nominally colluded with the Democrat secretary of

1174
01:07:07,240 --> 01:07:09,720
Speaker 2: state to try to recall her from office. They tried

1175
01:07:09,760 --> 01:07:12,920
Speaker 2: to blame her for some ballots they found left over

1176
01:07:12,960 --> 01:07:14,760
Speaker 2: in a bout boxing before she even came into it

1177
01:07:14,800 --> 01:07:17,040
Speaker 2: was the election they elected her, right, she had no

1178
01:07:17,080 --> 01:07:21,200
Speaker 2: responsibility or capability to affect it. So that was the environment.

1179
01:07:21,280 --> 01:07:23,880
Speaker 2: And then but she really went into that clerk's position

1180
01:07:24,200 --> 01:07:25,840
Speaker 2: to try to fix some of the things she saw.

1181
01:07:25,960 --> 01:07:28,480
Speaker 2: She wasn't an expert in election. She was probably like me,

1182
01:07:29,200 --> 01:07:31,240
Speaker 2: you know, in twenty twenty. She didn't know anything about

1183
01:07:31,240 --> 01:07:35,560
Speaker 2: it before she went in, right, but then citizens started

1184
01:07:35,560 --> 01:07:38,240
Speaker 2: coming to her and saying, hey, this isn't right. And

1185
01:07:38,600 --> 01:07:41,160
Speaker 2: I think the main you know, they saw some things

1186
01:07:41,160 --> 01:07:44,680
Speaker 2: in the twenty twenty election, but really it was the

1187
01:07:44,760 --> 01:07:48,880
Speaker 2: municipal election grand Junction in the spring of twenty twenty one,

1188
01:07:49,560 --> 01:07:54,040
Speaker 2: where is nominally a nonpartisan election. But every one of

1189
01:07:53,600 --> 01:07:57,720
Speaker 2: the individuals that were elected or selected, as the movie says,

1190
01:07:58,200 --> 01:08:02,200
Speaker 2: every one of them was you know, proponent or espoused

1191
01:08:02,800 --> 01:08:09,600
Speaker 2: really very strong leftist perspective about government, collectivist perspective in

1192
01:08:09,600 --> 01:08:13,240
Speaker 2: in a town, in a county that really leaned heavily

1193
01:08:13,360 --> 01:08:16,639
Speaker 2: Republican and conservatives. These are people who are not fans

1194
01:08:16,680 --> 01:08:20,000
Speaker 2: of government, and yet you have every one of these

1195
01:08:20,000 --> 01:08:25,360
Speaker 2: public officials in this election gets elected, and none of

1196
01:08:25,360 --> 01:08:28,479
Speaker 2: them were the kind of people that the population was

1197
01:08:28,640 --> 01:08:31,200
Speaker 2: likely to select, you know, if you just had an open,

1198
01:08:31,360 --> 01:08:35,160
Speaker 2: transparent vote. And so she started she started, you know,

1199
01:08:35,320 --> 01:08:38,759
Speaker 2: looking into some of these things without really the tools

1200
01:08:38,880 --> 01:08:40,960
Speaker 2: or much support. It was just a discussion, you know.

1201
01:08:41,040 --> 01:08:44,679
Speaker 2: She thought she was doing her job. Then she found

1202
01:08:44,680 --> 01:08:47,400
Speaker 2: out for the first time, there's a trusted build coming.

1203
01:08:47,640 --> 01:08:49,760
Speaker 2: She didn't know what a trusted build was. Most of

1204
01:08:49,800 --> 01:08:52,320
Speaker 2: the public doesn't know what a trusted build is. Trusted build.

1205
01:08:52,600 --> 01:08:56,639
Speaker 2: You know how most bills in Congress are named something

1206
01:08:56,680 --> 01:08:59,720
Speaker 2: that's the exact opposite of what they did. So I

1207
01:08:59,760 --> 01:09:03,000
Speaker 2: don't know who trusts a trusted build. The population's supposed

1208
01:09:03,040 --> 01:09:06,040
Speaker 2: to trust them. The theory is that it's you know,

1209
01:09:06,160 --> 01:09:08,960
Speaker 2: that's something that you know, the public should have trust in.

1210
01:09:09,360 --> 01:09:13,880
Speaker 2: But the way they conduct them is such a violation

1211
01:09:14,600 --> 01:09:17,000
Speaker 2: not only a federal and state law because they are

1212
01:09:17,240 --> 01:09:19,840
Speaker 2: destroying election records when they do them, but of the

1213
01:09:19,840 --> 01:09:23,280
Speaker 2: public trust. But anyway she hears about this trusted build,

1214
01:09:23,760 --> 01:09:26,719
Speaker 2: she knows that her ballot marketing devices on her county

1215
01:09:26,760 --> 01:09:30,920
Speaker 2: election systems are printing a QR code. She's been told

1216
01:09:30,920 --> 01:09:33,879
Speaker 2: that that QR code is what the optical scanners actually

1217
01:09:33,960 --> 01:09:36,919
Speaker 2: read in order to tally the votes from those ballots.

1218
01:09:37,960 --> 01:09:40,759
Speaker 2: And she's told that this trusted build that the Secretary

1219
01:09:40,840 --> 01:09:43,840
Speaker 2: of State and the vendor dominion voting systems are going

1220
01:09:43,920 --> 01:09:47,439
Speaker 2: to implement, is going to modify her voting system so

1221
01:09:47,479 --> 01:09:51,200
Speaker 2: that her voting system no longer reads QR codes. And

1222
01:09:51,280 --> 01:09:55,920
Speaker 2: her first thought, or or at some point her thought, is, well,

1223
01:09:56,000 --> 01:09:57,600
Speaker 2: how am I going to verify if I have to

1224
01:09:57,680 --> 01:10:00,800
Speaker 2: do an audit what was on the ballot? And the

1225
01:10:00,840 --> 01:10:03,360
Speaker 2: truth is she wouldn't have had a capability, So she's worried.

1226
01:10:03,400 --> 01:10:07,000
Speaker 2: At that point. She's connected to citizens. Those citizens are

1227
01:10:07,000 --> 01:10:10,519
Speaker 2: connected to doctor Frank. Doctor Frank is connected to Mike Lindell,

1228
01:10:10,600 --> 01:10:13,439
Speaker 2: and Mike Lindell is connected to some cyber people who

1229
01:10:13,479 --> 01:10:15,360
Speaker 2: were connected to him because he wasn't He didn't have

1230
01:10:15,400 --> 01:10:18,120
Speaker 2: cyber people. He didn't know anybody who did that until

1231
01:10:18,200 --> 01:10:24,160
Speaker 2: the twenty twenty election. So you know, Mike Lindell's attorney

1232
01:10:24,240 --> 01:10:26,000
Speaker 2: at that point, who's doing a lot of the election

1233
01:10:26,080 --> 01:10:28,559
Speaker 2: work is Kurt Olsen. Kurt Olsen doesn't know a lot

1234
01:10:28,600 --> 01:10:32,080
Speaker 2: of cyber people. They know one cyber guy that you know,

1235
01:10:32,240 --> 01:10:33,679
Speaker 2: was recommended to them.

1236
01:10:34,240 --> 01:10:36,160
Speaker 3: And what Clerk.

1237
01:10:35,920 --> 01:10:40,519
Speaker 2: Peters knew was that she didn't She had asked for

1238
01:10:40,560 --> 01:10:42,880
Speaker 2: support from the Secretary of State, they wouldn't help. Had

1239
01:10:42,920 --> 01:10:45,559
Speaker 2: asked for support from her own it department in her county.

1240
01:10:45,600 --> 01:10:48,800
Speaker 2: They would not help back up the records because she

1241
01:10:48,880 --> 01:10:50,960
Speaker 2: was afraid she would not have the ability to look

1242
01:10:50,960 --> 01:10:51,880
Speaker 2: at those ballots again.

1243
01:10:52,080 --> 01:10:54,880
Speaker 3: She wanted to back up. There wasn't like, oh Trump won,

1244
01:10:54,960 --> 01:10:57,480
Speaker 3: I've got to prove it. It wasn't differs fraud.

1245
01:10:57,200 --> 01:10:59,240
Speaker 2: I've got to prove it. It was how am I going

1246
01:10:59,280 --> 01:11:03,040
Speaker 2: to be able to an audit on records? And also

1247
01:11:03,160 --> 01:11:05,639
Speaker 2: at that point, by that point I personally and other

1248
01:11:05,640 --> 01:11:08,639
Speaker 2: people were advising her, you have an obligation to preserve

1249
01:11:08,840 --> 01:11:11,800
Speaker 2: all the log files and artifacts off those systems because

1250
01:11:11,800 --> 01:11:15,320
Speaker 2: they're necessary to the audit trail. It's literally described right

1251
01:11:15,400 --> 01:11:18,560
Speaker 2: in the federal Voting System Standard, the two thousand and

1252
01:11:18,560 --> 01:11:23,480
Speaker 2: two Voting System Standards, which is a statutory minimum requirement

1253
01:11:23,520 --> 01:11:26,840
Speaker 2: for that voting system in Colorado. And so she was

1254
01:11:26,880 --> 01:11:29,080
Speaker 2: aware of all that, yet couldn't get any help from

1255
01:11:29,080 --> 01:11:31,880
Speaker 2: any of the other election officials or state officials. So

1256
01:11:31,920 --> 01:11:34,240
Speaker 2: she asked, is there some Do you have somebody who

1257
01:11:34,280 --> 01:11:37,080
Speaker 2: can help me. The first person they had was Jerry Wood,

1258
01:11:37,560 --> 01:11:40,640
Speaker 2: and Jerry Wood was not a forensic guy, so he

1259
01:11:40,720 --> 01:11:45,120
Speaker 2: didn't have experience or like an intuitive in the understanding

1260
01:11:45,160 --> 01:11:47,679
Speaker 2: of how to preserve those records in accordance with federal

1261
01:11:47,760 --> 01:11:50,800
Speaker 2: rules for digital evidence at the FBI and Department of

1262
01:11:50,920 --> 01:11:54,160
Speaker 2: Justice published. So she asked for help. Doctor Frank didn't

1263
01:11:54,160 --> 01:11:56,960
Speaker 2: know the guy. He asked Mike, he asked Kurt, and

1264
01:11:57,000 --> 01:11:59,040
Speaker 2: they had a guy that, you know, was the only

1265
01:11:59,080 --> 01:12:00,720
Speaker 2: really the only guy that knew or one of the

1266
01:12:00,800 --> 01:12:03,760
Speaker 2: only people they knew. So that's how the cyber gude,

1267
01:12:03,800 --> 01:12:07,240
Speaker 2: That's how Conan got And I was on a phone

1268
01:12:07,240 --> 01:12:09,760
Speaker 2: call with them, you know, with Conan, I didn't know

1269
01:12:09,800 --> 01:12:12,280
Speaker 2: his name, they didn't say his name, just trying.

1270
01:12:12,040 --> 01:12:15,040
Speaker 3: To help them evaluate whether he knew what he was doing.

1271
01:12:15,120 --> 01:12:17,640
Speaker 2: I was asking questions about what he knew about the

1272
01:12:17,720 --> 01:12:20,800
Speaker 2: voting system itself, whether he knew what he was going

1273
01:12:20,840 --> 01:12:23,320
Speaker 2: to be doing in order to, you know, make a

1274
01:12:23,360 --> 01:12:26,479
Speaker 2: backup of the records for her to preserve, which is

1275
01:12:26,560 --> 01:12:29,880
Speaker 2: you know that that process of preserving those records. It

1276
01:12:29,920 --> 01:12:33,840
Speaker 2: wasn't just her. She wasn't just authorized. She was obligated.

1277
01:12:34,600 --> 01:12:37,759
Speaker 2: My statute and if you look at the twenty twenty

1278
01:12:37,800 --> 01:12:43,080
Speaker 2: one DOJ Guidelines for post Election Audits is very explicit

1279
01:12:43,120 --> 01:12:46,200
Speaker 2: about the obligation of every election official to preserve the

1280
01:12:46,240 --> 01:12:49,840
Speaker 2: records that are within their control and domain, and explicit

1281
01:12:49,880 --> 01:12:52,080
Speaker 2: that they had the authority to provide them to someone

1282
01:12:52,640 --> 01:12:55,080
Speaker 2: to retain on their behalf as long as it remained

1283
01:12:55,080 --> 01:12:56,519
Speaker 2: within their administrative control.

1284
01:12:57,200 --> 01:12:59,000
Speaker 3: None of what she did for that.

1285
01:12:59,000 --> 01:13:03,639
Speaker 2: Process was any violation of any state statute or a rule.

1286
01:13:03,720 --> 01:13:09,920
Speaker 2: The only thing that she violated apparently was not telling

1287
01:13:09,960 --> 01:13:13,479
Speaker 2: the Secretary of State about the specific name of who

1288
01:13:13,520 --> 01:13:16,640
Speaker 2: would be present during the trusted built process. So that

1289
01:13:16,800 --> 01:13:19,360
Speaker 2: was the background for her, that was what got her

1290
01:13:19,400 --> 01:13:23,320
Speaker 2: to that point of making the backup. Up until that point,

1291
01:13:23,360 --> 01:13:26,800
Speaker 2: the Secretary of State didn't know, not for that pre

1292
01:13:27,360 --> 01:13:31,639
Speaker 2: trusted build backup which documented the system that was left over,

1293
01:13:31,640 --> 01:13:33,680
Speaker 2: I would say, the residual from the twenty twenty and

1294
01:13:33,720 --> 01:13:36,880
Speaker 2: twenty twenty one election, nor for the post trusted build,

1295
01:13:36,920 --> 01:13:41,080
Speaker 2: which was the new version which had overwritten the active

1296
01:13:41,120 --> 01:13:45,080
Speaker 2: partition on the hard drive of the voting system. Totally unnecessary,

1297
01:13:45,760 --> 01:13:49,360
Speaker 2: absolutely against normal practice, and a violation of state and

1298
01:13:49,400 --> 01:13:52,120
Speaker 2: federal law to do that. And remember, Secretary of State

1299
01:13:52,160 --> 01:13:56,080
Speaker 2: Griswold directed that trusted build in every county right there

1300
01:13:56,520 --> 01:14:01,080
Speaker 2: literally thousands of voting system components on which her direct

1301
01:14:01,160 --> 01:14:06,160
Speaker 2: guidance and mandate over wrote election records. She violated state

1302
01:14:06,240 --> 01:14:12,960
Speaker 2: and federal law. You know, Clerk Peters only violated a

1303
01:14:13,080 --> 01:14:17,559
Speaker 2: rule of the Secretary of State, which by the way,

1304
01:14:18,120 --> 01:14:21,960
Speaker 2: was a league That's right, that's right. So this is

1305
01:14:21,960 --> 01:14:24,439
Speaker 2: where the supremacy clause comes in. And this is why

1306
01:14:25,160 --> 01:14:29,520
Speaker 2: the absolute refusal of the judge to allow the affirmative

1307
01:14:29,560 --> 01:14:33,439
Speaker 2: defense of her intent to comply with a federal law,

1308
01:14:34,479 --> 01:14:37,720
Speaker 2: and in the role of the supremacy clause, that's why

1309
01:14:37,760 --> 01:14:41,360
Speaker 2: that judge's actions are so corrupt in the Peters case,

1310
01:14:41,640 --> 01:14:43,880
Speaker 2: and then especially at her sentence it where you know,

1311
01:14:44,640 --> 01:14:47,879
Speaker 2: he not only talked about about her intent, which was false,

1312
01:14:48,400 --> 01:14:50,679
Speaker 2: you know, he talked about his fear that she would

1313
01:14:50,680 --> 01:14:55,520
Speaker 2: say things basically that he didn't like. I can't even imagine,

1314
01:14:55,600 --> 01:14:59,080
Speaker 2: you know, the corruption involved in allowing a federal judge

1315
01:14:59,320 --> 01:15:01,920
Speaker 2: or a state to sit on the bench when they

1316
01:15:01,960 --> 01:15:05,960
Speaker 2: think it's okay for government to restrict or police or

1317
01:15:06,000 --> 01:15:08,719
Speaker 2: imprison someone to prevent them from speaking.

1318
01:15:10,320 --> 01:15:14,040
Speaker 4: That's what the whole thing was. She's she's the biggest threat, right.

1319
01:15:14,720 --> 01:15:17,559
Speaker 2: Well, it's that and they they really had to set

1320
01:15:17,560 --> 01:15:18,200
Speaker 2: an example.

1321
01:15:18,320 --> 01:15:18,479
Speaker 1: Right.

1322
01:15:18,560 --> 01:15:21,840
Speaker 2: That was a message to every other election official. Federal

1323
01:15:21,880 --> 01:15:25,000
Speaker 2: government won't protect you, The law won't protect you doing

1324
01:15:25,000 --> 01:15:28,960
Speaker 2: your duty won't protect you if you oppose the you know, elections,

1325
01:15:29,040 --> 01:15:31,840
Speaker 2: or challenge or even question or even try to do

1326
01:15:31,920 --> 01:15:35,200
Speaker 2: your job your you know, your actual duty under the

1327
01:15:35,280 --> 01:15:37,960
Speaker 2: law that come after you.

1328
01:15:37,920 --> 01:15:41,280
Speaker 1: With everything that and the defamation cases right that, the

1329
01:15:41,439 --> 01:15:44,920
Speaker 1: ridiculous rulings on all of that. I you know, I

1330
01:15:45,240 --> 01:15:49,880
Speaker 1: I you know. We're an hour and about twenty minutes in.

1331
01:15:50,840 --> 01:15:54,160
Speaker 1: We've given the audience a lot to think about. Thank

1332
01:15:54,200 --> 01:15:57,719
Speaker 1: you so much for the deep dive. If it's okay,

1333
01:15:57,800 --> 01:16:00,439
Speaker 1: I would love to bring you back on. Will go

1334
01:16:00,600 --> 01:16:05,040
Speaker 1: into the legal framework and the technical framework of how

1335
01:16:05,080 --> 01:16:09,360
Speaker 1: it actually took place from a technological perspective, and then

1336
01:16:09,400 --> 01:16:12,080
Speaker 1: that way people can have you know, both of those,

1337
01:16:12,120 --> 01:16:15,000
Speaker 1: because those are those are really the nuts and bolts

1338
01:16:15,040 --> 01:16:20,200
Speaker 1: of how the steel was conducted. I think for sure

1339
01:16:20,680 --> 01:16:24,000
Speaker 1: legally through Mark Lias and the preparation that they did

1340
01:16:24,640 --> 01:16:28,000
Speaker 1: prior to and how are they going to knock down

1341
01:16:28,160 --> 01:16:31,320
Speaker 1: anything that arose. And then also I think you know

1342
01:16:31,400 --> 01:16:34,479
Speaker 1: the technical aspect of how they were able to get

1343
01:16:34,479 --> 01:16:38,599
Speaker 1: into those machines and manipulate them. But we'll do that

1344
01:16:38,680 --> 01:16:46,200
Speaker 1: again to wrap up this particular show, Colonel, as you're

1345
01:16:46,240 --> 01:16:50,400
Speaker 1: sitting in that seat, right now, and it's it's beginning

1346
01:16:50,439 --> 01:16:57,800
Speaker 1: of January twenty six. Obviously, the news cycle is as

1347
01:16:57,880 --> 01:17:01,439
Speaker 1: kinetic as I've seen it, and what's going on on

1348
01:17:01,520 --> 01:17:05,439
Speaker 1: the streets and overseas is actually making becoming kinetic as well.

1349
01:17:07,640 --> 01:17:08,479
Speaker 4: How would you.

1350
01:17:10,000 --> 01:17:17,639
Speaker 1: Assess the necessity for this issue to be addressed.

1351
01:17:19,080 --> 01:17:22,080
Speaker 4: Prior to the twenty six midterms.

1352
01:17:23,479 --> 01:17:25,160
Speaker 2: Well, really, we've got to tell the end of March

1353
01:17:25,160 --> 01:17:30,879
Speaker 2: because that's when the midterm primaries begin. It's the issue,

1354
01:17:31,040 --> 01:17:34,920
Speaker 2: and the reason it's the issue is because it's the bedrock,

1355
01:17:35,479 --> 01:17:39,959
Speaker 2: you know. You see how I would say derelict Congress

1356
01:17:40,040 --> 01:17:45,160
Speaker 2: is in implementing any kind of election integrity support to

1357
01:17:45,280 --> 01:17:49,000
Speaker 2: follow the president's executive orders. There's no question about the

1358
01:17:49,040 --> 01:17:53,519
Speaker 2: reason necessity for them. And yet Congress refuses to act. Right,

1359
01:17:53,560 --> 01:17:56,960
Speaker 2: They've refused to act to remove judges that are acting,

1360
01:17:57,280 --> 01:18:01,000
Speaker 2: you know, complete contravention to their own oaths of office. Right,

1361
01:18:01,080 --> 01:18:04,400
Speaker 2: just absolute nonsense coming out of the judiciary. Even the

1362
01:18:04,439 --> 01:18:09,160
Speaker 2: Supreme Court, you know, has not recommended censure. Even when

1363
01:18:09,200 --> 01:18:13,960
Speaker 2: they're just nine to oh destroying lower court judicial decisions.

1364
01:18:14,360 --> 01:18:18,240
Speaker 2: You still have an activist judiciary and Congress is doing

1365
01:18:18,240 --> 01:18:18,880
Speaker 2: nothing about it.

1366
01:18:18,920 --> 01:18:19,920
Speaker 3: The reason they're doing.

1367
01:18:19,720 --> 01:18:22,760
Speaker 2: Nothing about it is because you know, many of them

1368
01:18:22,960 --> 01:18:26,479
Speaker 2: are are likely not elected and they're not accountable to

1369
01:18:26,520 --> 01:18:29,680
Speaker 2: the people. There will be no accountability. I mean that

1370
01:18:29,880 --> 01:18:31,760
Speaker 2: the executive branch will do what it can, but even

1371
01:18:31,800 --> 01:18:34,559
Speaker 2: that is you know, severely infiltrated. There are a lot

1372
01:18:34,560 --> 01:18:37,640
Speaker 2: of holdovers and a lot of people who have conflicts

1373
01:18:37,640 --> 01:18:40,760
Speaker 2: of interest and other loyalties, which is pretty evident, you

1374
01:18:40,800 --> 01:18:44,760
Speaker 2: know when when they execute what looks like poorly you

1375
01:18:44,760 --> 01:18:47,479
Speaker 2: know executed, oh or you know, it's it's real hard.

1376
01:18:47,880 --> 01:18:49,479
Speaker 3: You know, it's real hard.

1377
01:18:49,520 --> 01:18:52,400
Speaker 2: You know, tigers, tigers until they get into office and

1378
01:18:52,439 --> 01:18:56,879
Speaker 2: then and then you know, lambs, right lions to lambs.

1379
01:18:56,920 --> 01:19:00,160
Speaker 2: So from my perspective, and this is why, this is

1380
01:19:00,200 --> 01:19:04,080
Speaker 2: why I've been doing this since twenty twenty That's why,

1381
01:19:04,240 --> 01:19:06,599
Speaker 2: you know, and in in earnest since twenty twenty one.

1382
01:19:07,720 --> 01:19:11,440
Speaker 2: And why I can't I can't lay down the responsibility

1383
01:19:11,680 --> 01:19:16,439
Speaker 2: is because I think this is just like the last one.

1384
01:19:16,840 --> 01:19:18,080
Speaker 3: This is our last election.

1385
01:19:18,920 --> 01:19:22,479
Speaker 2: You know, if if we don't get some transparency and

1386
01:19:22,520 --> 01:19:26,320
Speaker 2: some integrity restored to our elections, then the last two

1387
01:19:26,400 --> 01:19:29,600
Speaker 2: years of the President Trump's administration are going to be

1388
01:19:29,680 --> 01:19:33,080
Speaker 2: either frustration or a rollback. You know, it doesn't matter

1389
01:19:33,120 --> 01:19:37,800
Speaker 2: what they do from the executive perspective up until the

1390
01:19:37,840 --> 01:19:41,800
Speaker 2: mid terms, it'll all be reversed and worse right, I

1391
01:19:42,320 --> 01:19:46,000
Speaker 2: mean I earnestly believe that. So from my from my perspective,

1392
01:19:47,160 --> 01:19:51,520
Speaker 2: it's the it's the issue above all others.

1393
01:19:52,040 --> 01:19:57,080
Speaker 1: Well, I appreciate your your your honesty. I appreciate your dedication,

1394
01:19:58,600 --> 01:20:01,599
Speaker 1: the work you're done for this country, both in service

1395
01:20:01,680 --> 01:20:04,280
Speaker 1: and now in the real service. As we're in this

1396
01:20:05,160 --> 01:20:08,680
Speaker 1: definite war for the future of our children, in our

1397
01:20:08,760 --> 01:20:12,639
Speaker 1: country and our children's children. I just command you, sir,

1398
01:20:12,880 --> 01:20:16,760
Speaker 1: and what you've been doing. Where can people follow you?

1399
01:20:17,360 --> 01:20:21,640
Speaker 1: And then how can they get educated themselves.

1400
01:20:23,200 --> 01:20:26,200
Speaker 2: So I'm part of Cousoamerica dot org and so you

1401
01:20:26,200 --> 01:20:29,559
Speaker 2: can go to Cosmoamerica dot org and there's a huge

1402
01:20:29,600 --> 01:20:31,400
Speaker 2: digital library there. I was going to say that earlier.

1403
01:20:31,479 --> 01:20:33,160
Speaker 2: You know, when you looked at the one on one videos,

1404
01:20:33,680 --> 01:20:36,439
Speaker 2: those are not me. I mean, I'm talking on a

1405
01:20:36,479 --> 01:20:39,479
Speaker 2: lot of them. But what really again, a team? You

1406
01:20:39,560 --> 01:20:41,599
Speaker 2: need a team. I'm not the data guy. We've got

1407
01:20:41,920 --> 01:20:44,840
Speaker 2: a chief analyst, he runs all the data ops. We've

1408
01:20:44,840 --> 01:20:47,759
Speaker 2: got a digital librarian, Amy does all the video editing.

1409
01:20:48,360 --> 01:20:51,760
Speaker 2: If she wasn't doing that, you know, just be me blabbering,

1410
01:20:51,920 --> 01:20:55,400
Speaker 2: you know, train to you know, change whatever came into

1411
01:20:55,439 --> 01:20:58,160
Speaker 2: my head. She makes those coherents so that people can

1412
01:20:58,200 --> 01:21:00,840
Speaker 2: digest them. We have a digital library, I don't know

1413
01:21:00,880 --> 01:21:04,479
Speaker 2: how many, nine ten thousand docs or something now everything

1414
01:21:04,520 --> 01:21:09,720
Speaker 2: we can find, from forensic reports to the documentation for

1415
01:21:09,760 --> 01:21:13,720
Speaker 2: the voting systems, statutory interpretations, everything you can find out there.

1416
01:21:13,760 --> 01:21:15,760
Speaker 2: And we also have links to other organizations. You know,

1417
01:21:15,800 --> 01:21:19,000
Speaker 2: we're not We're agnostic about where people get their information

1418
01:21:19,080 --> 01:21:23,080
Speaker 2: as long as it's accurate and helpful to them. And

1419
01:21:23,120 --> 01:21:26,280
Speaker 2: so we'll connect people to their own state organizations if

1420
01:21:26,280 --> 01:21:28,320
Speaker 2: they're not already connected, so that they can get in

1421
01:21:28,320 --> 01:21:30,200
Speaker 2: the fight. There's no I like to say, there's no

1422
01:21:30,240 --> 01:21:34,120
Speaker 2: citizenship happening on your couch. You know, you have to engage.

1423
01:21:34,120 --> 01:21:36,280
Speaker 2: If you don't, and if not now, then when you know,

1424
01:21:36,360 --> 01:21:38,960
Speaker 2: I'm not. This isn't for me, my you know, this

1425
01:21:39,120 --> 01:21:42,840
Speaker 2: is for my kids and honestly for the you know

1426
01:21:42,880 --> 01:21:43,920
Speaker 2: people I can't repay.

1427
01:21:44,640 --> 01:21:48,439
Speaker 1: That's right, that's right. Amen, Thank you, sir, God bless

1428
01:21:48,479 --> 01:21:49,759
Speaker 1: you my privilege.

1429
01:21:49,800 --> 01:21:50,120
Speaker 3: Thank you