1 00:00:00,880 --> 00:00:03,560 Speaker 1: It's hard to explain, but when you look in somebody's 2 00:00:03,640 --> 00:00:07,000 Speaker 1: eyes and their pupils are you know it. It's like they're 3 00:00:07,040 --> 00:00:09,280 Speaker 1: afraid and they're not afraid of me. This is a 4 00:00:09,320 --> 00:00:11,520 Speaker 1: good meeting, right because they're afraid they're going to get caught. 5 00:00:13,360 --> 00:00:16,360 Speaker 2: I'm John Cipher and I'm Jerry O'she. I served in 6 00:00:16,400 --> 00:00:19,959 Speaker 2: the CIA's Clandestine Service for twenty eight years, living undercover 7 00:00:20,200 --> 00:00:20,880 Speaker 2: all around the. 8 00:00:20,800 --> 00:00:23,320 Speaker 1: World, and in my thirty three years with the CIA, 9 00:00:23,520 --> 00:00:26,520 Speaker 1: I served in Africa, Asia, Europe, and the Middle East. 10 00:00:26,680 --> 00:00:28,920 Speaker 2: Although we don't usually look at it this way, we 11 00:00:29,040 --> 00:00:31,120 Speaker 2: created conspiracies. 12 00:00:30,560 --> 00:00:33,559 Speaker 1: In our operations. We got people to believe things that 13 00:00:33,640 --> 00:00:34,320 Speaker 1: weren't true. 14 00:00:34,440 --> 00:00:37,360 Speaker 2: Now we're investigating the conspiracy theories we see in the 15 00:00:37,400 --> 00:00:38,600 Speaker 2: news almost every day. 16 00:00:38,800 --> 00:00:41,080 Speaker 1: Will break them down for you to determine whether they 17 00:00:41,120 --> 00:00:43,479 Speaker 1: could be real or whether we're being manipulated. 18 00:00:43,760 --> 00:00:46,040 Speaker 2: Welcome to Mission implausible. 19 00:00:49,600 --> 00:00:53,280 Speaker 3: Welcome to Mission Implausible. I'm Adam Davidson. I'm here with 20 00:00:53,920 --> 00:00:59,960 Speaker 3: CIA officer veterans Legends. That's Jerry O'sha and John Seifer 21 00:01:00,120 --> 00:01:04,560 Speaker 3: for so we always jump into the conspiracy theories and 22 00:01:04,680 --> 00:01:07,880 Speaker 3: I love that, But I just realize I was just 23 00:01:07,920 --> 00:01:09,800 Speaker 3: talking to my son. I'm like, I talked to these two. 24 00:01:10,080 --> 00:01:12,640 Speaker 3: You guys together have about four hundred and seventy three 25 00:01:12,760 --> 00:01:17,560 Speaker 3: years of experience as intelligence officers, and I never ask 26 00:01:17,640 --> 00:01:20,600 Speaker 3: you questions about what it's like to be an intelligence officer, 27 00:01:20,720 --> 00:01:22,200 Speaker 3: and so I wanted to. Can I ask you a 28 00:01:22,200 --> 00:01:23,440 Speaker 3: few questions. 29 00:01:23,160 --> 00:01:24,919 Speaker 2: As long as you don't mind as lying to sure. 30 00:01:24,880 --> 00:01:27,240 Speaker 3: Yeah, okay, great, Well no, that wouldn't be the first time. 31 00:01:27,280 --> 00:01:28,399 Speaker 3: That wouldn't be the novel thing. 32 00:01:28,640 --> 00:01:32,560 Speaker 1: This is like the anti conspiracy theory episode, because this 33 00:01:32,600 --> 00:01:34,920 Speaker 1: is what is really not what like Hollywood or the 34 00:01:34,920 --> 00:01:36,160 Speaker 1: conspiracy theory say that. 35 00:01:36,560 --> 00:01:38,080 Speaker 3: Yes, No, I've gotten to know you guys, so I 36 00:01:38,120 --> 00:01:42,600 Speaker 3: know there's no like impressive physical feats or like sudden 37 00:01:42,680 --> 00:01:46,160 Speaker 3: moments of profound insight or anything like that. It's more 38 00:01:46,200 --> 00:01:49,120 Speaker 3: basic than that, all right. One thing that I've heard about, 39 00:01:49,440 --> 00:01:51,600 Speaker 3: I've read about, I feel like I've seen in movies, 40 00:01:51,600 --> 00:01:56,000 Speaker 3: but I don't fundamentally understand surveillance detection routes. What do 41 00:01:56,040 --> 00:01:57,000 Speaker 3: you call DSR? 42 00:01:57,200 --> 00:02:01,440 Speaker 2: Where you SDR surveillance detection route or run or whatever? 43 00:02:01,560 --> 00:02:03,360 Speaker 3: How does that work? And explain what it is? What 44 00:02:03,480 --> 00:02:03,720 Speaker 3: is it? 45 00:02:04,080 --> 00:02:07,880 Speaker 2: Essentially for us? Obviously, the thing that's most important to 46 00:02:07,960 --> 00:02:10,560 Speaker 2: us in the Clandestine Service part of the CIA that 47 00:02:10,760 --> 00:02:13,560 Speaker 2: oversees running spies outside the CIA is cool if you 48 00:02:13,560 --> 00:02:15,960 Speaker 2: have someone who's willing to risk their life to provide 49 00:02:15,960 --> 00:02:18,600 Speaker 2: you the secrets that the US government needs. If they're 50 00:02:18,639 --> 00:02:21,679 Speaker 2: seen with you even once by the local police and 51 00:02:21,720 --> 00:02:25,640 Speaker 2: local security services anybody, they can be arrested, they can 52 00:02:25,680 --> 00:02:29,000 Speaker 2: be killed, their family can be arrested. And so for us, 53 00:02:29,200 --> 00:02:32,840 Speaker 2: that period of time is you cannot be seen together 54 00:02:33,080 --> 00:02:36,480 Speaker 2: with your source. So everything we do is to try 55 00:02:36,480 --> 00:02:39,560 Speaker 2: to find a way to communicate with the source or 56 00:02:39,680 --> 00:02:43,360 Speaker 2: meeting personally so that it's completely hidden, so nobody sees 57 00:02:43,400 --> 00:02:46,080 Speaker 2: what's happening, even if they were trying to disguise it, 58 00:02:46,120 --> 00:02:48,280 Speaker 2: and someone sees it and reports it, even if we 59 00:02:48,280 --> 00:02:50,880 Speaker 2: think we've done something clever that can get that person 60 00:02:51,160 --> 00:02:52,800 Speaker 2: arrested or killed. And a lot of it depends on 61 00:02:52,840 --> 00:02:55,600 Speaker 2: the kind of country we're in and the house the 62 00:02:55,880 --> 00:02:58,760 Speaker 2: security services as So what we do is when we're 63 00:02:58,760 --> 00:03:02,000 Speaker 2: on our way to me a source physically somewhere in 64 00:03:02,000 --> 00:03:05,239 Speaker 2: a hotel room, in a safe house, in an alleyway 65 00:03:05,520 --> 00:03:08,760 Speaker 2: even or just exchange money for information or what have you, 66 00:03:08,960 --> 00:03:11,280 Speaker 2: we have to be sure that there's nobody following us. 67 00:03:11,360 --> 00:03:15,040 Speaker 2: That the security service who tracks us. Oftentimes they put 68 00:03:15,160 --> 00:03:18,040 Speaker 2: cars on us, they follow us around town, they listen 69 00:03:18,080 --> 00:03:20,320 Speaker 2: to our phones to see where we are, those type 70 00:03:20,320 --> 00:03:23,200 Speaker 2: of things, and so essentially a surveillance detection, which is 71 00:03:23,240 --> 00:03:26,600 Speaker 2: just the means by which you become sure that you're 72 00:03:26,639 --> 00:03:28,880 Speaker 2: what we call black you don't have surveillance, so that 73 00:03:29,080 --> 00:03:31,000 Speaker 2: when it's time to meet that person, you're one hundred 74 00:03:31,000 --> 00:03:31,760 Speaker 2: percent confident. 75 00:03:32,040 --> 00:03:34,119 Speaker 3: And do you get to one hundred percent, like, isn't 76 00:03:34,120 --> 00:03:36,200 Speaker 3: there always a chance that someone. 77 00:03:36,080 --> 00:03:37,960 Speaker 2: Well, there's always a chance that somebody could come in 78 00:03:38,240 --> 00:03:40,560 Speaker 2: at the end, but you need to be confident that 79 00:03:40,640 --> 00:03:43,880 Speaker 2: no one has tracked you to that meeting. Now there's 80 00:03:43,880 --> 00:03:47,240 Speaker 2: a chance that you're meeting someone and by happenstance, you're 81 00:03:47,240 --> 00:03:48,960 Speaker 2: in the wrong place or what have you. But you 82 00:03:49,000 --> 00:03:51,240 Speaker 2: still you need to do that. And so it's just 83 00:03:51,320 --> 00:03:55,720 Speaker 2: a process of knowing your environment, knowing the city, knowing 84 00:03:55,760 --> 00:03:58,040 Speaker 2: how to move around that city, knowing how the other 85 00:03:58,160 --> 00:04:01,800 Speaker 2: security services were, how do they surveil, how many people 86 00:04:01,800 --> 00:04:03,960 Speaker 2: do they have on the streets, do they have cameras 87 00:04:04,000 --> 00:04:07,400 Speaker 2: in places? And so you're sort of moving through space 88 00:04:07,440 --> 00:04:10,600 Speaker 2: and time, maybe stopping the shop or do something that 89 00:04:10,640 --> 00:04:12,880 Speaker 2: looks natural, so that even if you are followed, that 90 00:04:12,880 --> 00:04:14,920 Speaker 2: people are following you don't know that you're on your 91 00:04:14,960 --> 00:04:16,200 Speaker 2: way to meet a secret source. 92 00:04:16,480 --> 00:04:19,200 Speaker 3: So you have to be doing this without it obvious 93 00:04:19,240 --> 00:04:20,080 Speaker 3: that you're doing this. 94 00:04:20,680 --> 00:04:21,120 Speaker 2: That's right. 95 00:04:21,200 --> 00:04:22,640 Speaker 4: That's what the movies always get wrong. 96 00:04:22,880 --> 00:04:24,760 Speaker 2: That's right, Yeah, because they need to be sort of 97 00:04:24,800 --> 00:04:26,760 Speaker 2: lulled to sleep. Or if you decide you're under surveillance 98 00:04:26,760 --> 00:04:28,719 Speaker 2: and you can't meet this person, you can break off 99 00:04:28,760 --> 00:04:32,000 Speaker 2: and not meet them, and the other side, the security 100 00:04:32,040 --> 00:04:33,359 Speaker 2: service wants to say, oh my god, he was on 101 00:04:33,400 --> 00:04:34,839 Speaker 2: his way to meet someone. We need to put more 102 00:04:34,960 --> 00:04:37,360 Speaker 2: resources on him next time. But over time you sort 103 00:04:37,400 --> 00:04:40,840 Speaker 2: of move along through this way, and the more confident 104 00:04:40,839 --> 00:04:43,400 Speaker 2: that you are you don't have surveillance, maybe the more 105 00:04:43,400 --> 00:04:46,680 Speaker 2: aggressive or provocative you are to try to move and 106 00:04:46,720 --> 00:04:48,840 Speaker 2: make sure that there's nobody following you. So by the end, 107 00:04:48,839 --> 00:04:50,479 Speaker 2: when you're about to meet someone, you might be doing 108 00:04:50,560 --> 00:04:53,200 Speaker 2: things to try to pull somebody out. So if there's 109 00:04:53,240 --> 00:04:56,599 Speaker 2: a surveillance, you might go into an apartment building and 110 00:04:56,640 --> 00:04:58,320 Speaker 2: wait in there to see if somebody comes in to 111 00:04:58,320 --> 00:05:00,479 Speaker 2: see what's happening, or those type of things. It's just 112 00:05:00,520 --> 00:05:03,239 Speaker 2: a means to meet someone securely. 113 00:05:02,680 --> 00:05:05,840 Speaker 3: And it's not surveillance escape, Like you're not trying to 114 00:05:05,839 --> 00:05:07,840 Speaker 3: lose them, you're just trying to see if they're there. 115 00:05:08,480 --> 00:05:12,400 Speaker 1: Yes, because if you lose them, they're like, oh, this 116 00:05:12,440 --> 00:05:14,800 Speaker 1: guy is clearly a spy, and then they'll just put 117 00:05:14,839 --> 00:05:16,920 Speaker 1: more on you. And this is what John said is 118 00:05:17,000 --> 00:05:20,080 Speaker 1: this is the most simple form of fans. It's this 119 00:05:20,240 --> 00:05:24,479 Speaker 1: is one oh one. But it gets exponentially more complicated 120 00:05:24,520 --> 00:05:26,359 Speaker 1: and difficult as you go along, as you get to 121 00:05:26,440 --> 00:05:30,760 Speaker 1: technical questions, and they have different rings of surveillance, and 122 00:05:31,120 --> 00:05:33,560 Speaker 1: are you going to see this source to like have 123 00:05:33,680 --> 00:05:34,360 Speaker 1: a discussion. 124 00:05:34,560 --> 00:05:35,360 Speaker 4: Are you going to do. 125 00:05:35,440 --> 00:05:37,440 Speaker 1: Like a bump where you just like bump into each 126 00:05:37,480 --> 00:05:40,520 Speaker 1: other and exchange something. Are you going to not see 127 00:05:40,520 --> 00:05:43,120 Speaker 1: a source but do a dead drop where you place 128 00:05:43,160 --> 00:05:45,360 Speaker 1: a package and you're going to go pick it up. 129 00:05:45,480 --> 00:05:49,040 Speaker 1: It gets really more complicated than that. But and it's 130 00:05:49,160 --> 00:05:51,520 Speaker 1: basics at what it is. But Jenn if you could 131 00:05:51,680 --> 00:05:55,279 Speaker 1: briefly tell the story of the shoes, that's a really 132 00:05:55,320 --> 00:05:58,919 Speaker 1: good one. They how they you've got to make surveillance 133 00:05:59,080 --> 00:06:00,600 Speaker 1: feel as though they're in command. 134 00:06:00,760 --> 00:06:03,359 Speaker 2: Right, So, when I was in Moscow, as I've probably 135 00:06:03,400 --> 00:06:06,640 Speaker 2: said on that podcast, before you know, in Moscow, the KGB, 136 00:06:06,880 --> 00:06:10,280 Speaker 2: the local security services are paranoid. They don't want any 137 00:06:10,480 --> 00:06:13,000 Speaker 2: Americans or any foreigners to be meeting Russians that they're 138 00:06:13,040 --> 00:06:16,000 Speaker 2: not unaware of. And so the surveillance is stifling, right. 139 00:06:16,040 --> 00:06:18,760 Speaker 2: There's people who follow you everywhere you go. It's not 140 00:06:19,040 --> 00:06:20,920 Speaker 2: hyperbole for me to say I was there two years. 141 00:06:21,000 --> 00:06:23,160 Speaker 2: I had surveillance tam I mean the entire time, twenty 142 00:06:23,160 --> 00:06:24,280 Speaker 2: four hours a day. If you got up in the 143 00:06:24,320 --> 00:06:25,880 Speaker 2: middle of the night, left my apartment, there would be 144 00:06:25,920 --> 00:06:28,640 Speaker 2: surveillance teams following me. My house was bugged with audio. 145 00:06:28,839 --> 00:06:32,320 Speaker 2: We had that bugged with video. Everybody I met was questioned, 146 00:06:32,520 --> 00:06:36,200 Speaker 2: and so you're trying to understand their capability and figure 147 00:06:36,200 --> 00:06:39,280 Speaker 2: out how to meet someone securely even in that environment. 148 00:06:39,279 --> 00:06:41,080 Speaker 2: But just to give a sense of the kind of 149 00:06:41,160 --> 00:06:43,760 Speaker 2: surveillance a place, as one of my colleagues in the 150 00:06:43,760 --> 00:06:47,320 Speaker 2: embassy was a runner, and as you can imagine, long nasty, 151 00:06:47,680 --> 00:06:50,159 Speaker 2: cold winters in the middle of this big city, and 152 00:06:50,200 --> 00:06:52,200 Speaker 2: it was starting to get springtime and he was going 153 00:06:52,279 --> 00:06:54,840 Speaker 2: to start running again. He hadn't run through the whole winter, 154 00:06:54,960 --> 00:06:57,359 Speaker 2: and so he got home from work on what was 155 00:06:57,400 --> 00:07:00,479 Speaker 2: finally a decent enough day, and we live in these big, 156 00:07:00,960 --> 00:07:03,360 Speaker 2: nasty apartment buildings. And he made his way down the 157 00:07:03,360 --> 00:07:06,599 Speaker 2: apartment building in his running gear and took off and 158 00:07:06,640 --> 00:07:08,720 Speaker 2: went across the street and to a tunnel to the 159 00:07:08,800 --> 00:07:10,680 Speaker 2: other side, made his way to Gorky Park where he 160 00:07:10,760 --> 00:07:13,600 Speaker 2: ran through the park along the river and then back home. 161 00:07:13,680 --> 00:07:15,040 Speaker 2: And he just went for a run. And so the 162 00:07:15,080 --> 00:07:17,000 Speaker 2: next day he went to work, and he came back 163 00:07:17,080 --> 00:07:19,240 Speaker 2: and went to go to sneakers to go for a 164 00:07:19,320 --> 00:07:22,120 Speaker 2: run again, and one of his shoes was gone, and 165 00:07:22,160 --> 00:07:25,280 Speaker 2: he's pretty meticulous. Everything is together, and he's, okay, I 166 00:07:25,320 --> 00:07:26,840 Speaker 2: don't know. So I went to work the next day 167 00:07:27,440 --> 00:07:29,400 Speaker 2: and during work he got some time off, and it 168 00:07:29,440 --> 00:07:31,480 Speaker 2: was it's hard to move around Moscow. It's just so 169 00:07:31,560 --> 00:07:33,080 Speaker 2: much traffic and stuff. But he found a place to 170 00:07:33,120 --> 00:07:35,160 Speaker 2: go get a new pair of running shoes. So he 171 00:07:35,240 --> 00:07:38,360 Speaker 2: went home that night, same thing, down the elevator, out 172 00:07:38,800 --> 00:07:40,880 Speaker 2: through town to Gorky Park to go for a run, 173 00:07:41,240 --> 00:07:42,960 Speaker 2: went to work the next day, came back that night 174 00:07:43,720 --> 00:07:47,160 Speaker 2: and one of his shoes has gone again. So he says, oh, okay, 175 00:07:47,200 --> 00:07:50,080 Speaker 2: I know what's going on. Surreilles is upset and they're 176 00:07:50,120 --> 00:07:51,720 Speaker 2: coming in and they're taking the shoe to send a 177 00:07:51,720 --> 00:07:53,600 Speaker 2: signal to me. So he said, but I know my 178 00:07:53,680 --> 00:07:55,920 Speaker 2: house is bugged. So he went to the living room 179 00:07:55,960 --> 00:07:57,600 Speaker 2: and he stood and he looked at his ceiling and said, Okay, 180 00:07:57,600 --> 00:07:59,880 Speaker 2: here's the deal. I'm going to run and I'm going 181 00:07:59,880 --> 00:08:03,320 Speaker 2: to keep buying shoes every time i need to run. 182 00:08:03,320 --> 00:08:05,240 Speaker 2: And here's my route. I'm going to go down the 183 00:08:05,400 --> 00:08:08,240 Speaker 2: escalator or elevator and I'm going to go out this door, 184 00:08:08,280 --> 00:08:11,000 Speaker 2: through this place, under this tunnel to this gates, said 185 00:08:11,040 --> 00:08:12,720 Speaker 2: Geky Park, going to run along the river here, and 186 00:08:12,720 --> 00:08:15,080 Speaker 2: I'm going to come back out loud in his apartment building. 187 00:08:15,200 --> 00:08:18,360 Speaker 2: And so, because the work the next day comes back 188 00:08:18,560 --> 00:08:20,600 Speaker 2: and both sets of shoes are back in his house 189 00:08:22,160 --> 00:08:23,520 Speaker 2: and he goes for a run. And so he does 190 00:08:23,600 --> 00:08:25,240 Speaker 2: exactly what he says, and he's going for a run, 191 00:08:25,320 --> 00:08:27,280 Speaker 2: and when he gets to the gates to go into 192 00:08:27,280 --> 00:08:30,200 Speaker 2: Gorky Park, he sees the surveillance car pull up and 193 00:08:30,440 --> 00:08:32,000 Speaker 2: they opened the trunk of the car and they had 194 00:08:32,040 --> 00:08:35,240 Speaker 2: these little foldable bicycles where they can follow him through 195 00:08:35,280 --> 00:08:38,040 Speaker 2: the park when he's running. So essentially what happened is 196 00:08:38,040 --> 00:08:41,240 Speaker 2: surveillance wasn't ready. They probably tracked him. They followed him. 197 00:08:41,240 --> 00:08:42,880 Speaker 2: They go back to their bosses every day. Okay, he 198 00:08:42,920 --> 00:08:44,440 Speaker 2: did this, he did that, and all of a sudden 199 00:08:44,480 --> 00:08:46,400 Speaker 2: he went for a run and they were like, and 200 00:08:46,880 --> 00:08:48,640 Speaker 2: they couldn't follow him, and so they had to go 201 00:08:48,679 --> 00:08:50,840 Speaker 2: back to their bosses and say, oh, we lost them. 202 00:08:50,960 --> 00:08:53,920 Speaker 2: And that's in a bureaucracy, that's the worst thing. And 203 00:08:53,960 --> 00:08:55,680 Speaker 2: so they were sending a signal to him, like you 204 00:08:55,760 --> 00:08:58,760 Speaker 2: need to stop running, and so he sent a signal. 205 00:08:58,520 --> 00:08:59,560 Speaker 3: Back and negotiated. 206 00:09:00,120 --> 00:09:04,400 Speaker 5: Awesome, Okay, let's take a break from the craziness just 207 00:09:04,480 --> 00:09:15,719 Speaker 5: for a minute or two. 208 00:09:11,640 --> 00:09:12,480 Speaker 2: And we're back. 209 00:09:14,520 --> 00:09:17,800 Speaker 3: How long does it take to do a surveillance detection run? 210 00:09:18,360 --> 00:09:21,320 Speaker 2: What's interesting, It takes as long as necessary, depending on 211 00:09:21,720 --> 00:09:24,120 Speaker 2: what the service does, how hard they are, how much 212 00:09:24,160 --> 00:09:27,839 Speaker 2: resources they put on you. I've done surveillance detection roots 213 00:09:27,880 --> 00:09:30,640 Speaker 2: that took a week, and I've done some that took 214 00:09:30,679 --> 00:09:33,160 Speaker 2: an hour or two. Usually a little more than that. 215 00:09:33,240 --> 00:09:35,920 Speaker 3: But and go to other countries. I feel like you 216 00:09:36,000 --> 00:09:39,080 Speaker 3: mentioned once, like you're going to somewhere, let's say Greece 217 00:09:39,200 --> 00:09:42,440 Speaker 3: or whatever, and it's a bunch of trains and buses 218 00:09:42,480 --> 00:09:44,439 Speaker 3: and moving around to different countries. 219 00:09:45,000 --> 00:09:46,960 Speaker 2: That's part of the process of yeah, making sure that 220 00:09:47,000 --> 00:09:51,040 Speaker 2: you're meeting someone securely. You might use alias documentation or something, 221 00:09:51,040 --> 00:09:52,839 Speaker 2: but yeah, the goal is you have to if you're 222 00:09:52,840 --> 00:09:55,320 Speaker 2: going to meet that source, you need to be confident 223 00:09:55,640 --> 00:09:58,240 Speaker 2: that they're one hundred percent secure when you do so, 224 00:09:58,480 --> 00:09:59,600 Speaker 2: there's nothing to keep. 225 00:09:59,440 --> 00:10:02,080 Speaker 3: Saying a undred percent that feels like overcompeted. 226 00:10:02,080 --> 00:10:04,959 Speaker 2: Well, that's you have to Everybody talks about sometimes, oh 227 00:10:05,000 --> 00:10:06,680 Speaker 2: what you did, it must have been dangerous and scary. 228 00:10:06,720 --> 00:10:09,240 Speaker 2: It's not dangerous so much for us. It is in 229 00:10:09,240 --> 00:10:11,440 Speaker 2: places like we talked about Bagdad and Afghanistan, it can 230 00:10:11,480 --> 00:10:14,000 Speaker 2: be certainly dangerous. But the biggest concern you have is 231 00:10:14,000 --> 00:10:16,720 Speaker 2: for your source. That person is put their life in 232 00:10:16,800 --> 00:10:19,560 Speaker 2: your hands, and you need to be confident that you're 233 00:10:19,640 --> 00:10:22,280 Speaker 2: you are not leading them to be arrested. And so 234 00:10:22,880 --> 00:10:24,960 Speaker 2: if you're on your way to meet someone and you're 235 00:10:25,000 --> 00:10:27,040 Speaker 2: about five minutes out and all you realize, oh my god, 236 00:10:27,080 --> 00:10:29,480 Speaker 2: do I am I really confident? I'm like sure that 237 00:10:29,520 --> 00:10:32,120 Speaker 2: I've done everything that I need to do. Am I 238 00:10:32,240 --> 00:10:35,040 Speaker 2: walking this person into their death? So it's a pretty 239 00:10:35,480 --> 00:10:37,319 Speaker 2: heady thing, pretty much nerve wrecking. 240 00:10:37,760 --> 00:10:37,960 Speaker 4: Now. 241 00:10:38,240 --> 00:10:41,800 Speaker 3: I was reading a spy novel, so obviously factual, and 242 00:10:42,559 --> 00:10:46,120 Speaker 3: there's a line there. You can never beat static surveillance, 243 00:10:46,160 --> 00:10:48,160 Speaker 3: Like if they really want you, they could just have 244 00:10:48,400 --> 00:10:51,160 Speaker 3: people positioned all over the city and just. 245 00:10:51,160 --> 00:10:53,040 Speaker 1: Be like they have to know where you're going to 246 00:10:53,120 --> 00:10:55,959 Speaker 1: have the static surveillance in place. The static surveillance can 247 00:10:55,960 --> 00:10:59,960 Speaker 1: catch you. And what we're discussing too is we retire 248 00:11:00,640 --> 00:11:04,080 Speaker 1: a bit ago is basic stuff once you introduce technology. 249 00:11:04,200 --> 00:11:07,200 Speaker 1: So in the old days you had static surveillance in Russia, 250 00:11:07,280 --> 00:11:10,600 Speaker 1: you might have Babushka sitting in an apartment like looking 251 00:11:10,600 --> 00:11:13,920 Speaker 1: out the window or a policeman. Today, like in London, 252 00:11:14,000 --> 00:11:17,400 Speaker 1: static surveillance is everywhere. It's a m CCTV cameras, right, 253 00:11:17,480 --> 00:11:18,599 Speaker 1: they can go and trace it. 254 00:11:18,760 --> 00:11:21,120 Speaker 3: So yeah, that's drones with like well. 255 00:11:21,679 --> 00:11:23,360 Speaker 2: We used to have airplanes that would be up when 256 00:11:23,360 --> 00:11:25,000 Speaker 2: we go out to try to so that was part 257 00:11:25,040 --> 00:11:26,880 Speaker 2: of them, is like making sure that goods are right. 258 00:11:28,720 --> 00:11:30,960 Speaker 1: Maybe the biggest problem now is our phones that we 259 00:11:31,000 --> 00:11:32,840 Speaker 1: carry around with us. They tell us where we're going, 260 00:11:33,000 --> 00:11:35,280 Speaker 1: and if you turn it off, that's a tell that 261 00:11:35,320 --> 00:11:37,840 Speaker 1: you're up to no good. They're like, oh, he turned 262 00:11:37,880 --> 00:11:41,680 Speaker 1: his telephone off. Why and so let's swarm and yeah, 263 00:11:41,760 --> 00:11:43,840 Speaker 1: so like we need to like, really look at this guy. 264 00:11:44,080 --> 00:11:44,240 Speaker 4: Man. 265 00:11:44,320 --> 00:11:45,800 Speaker 2: That's a game on their side too in some of 266 00:11:45,840 --> 00:11:49,000 Speaker 2: these places, is we want to catch Jerry, meet his source. 267 00:11:49,080 --> 00:11:51,040 Speaker 2: We know he's a CIA guy. What we'll do is 268 00:11:51,080 --> 00:11:54,760 Speaker 2: we'll follow with three four cars every day and then 269 00:11:54,960 --> 00:11:57,560 Speaker 2: on holidays, what we'll do is make it look to 270 00:11:57,640 --> 00:11:59,520 Speaker 2: him like we're not there. And we'll do that by 271 00:11:59,559 --> 00:12:01,720 Speaker 2: instead of three four cars, we're going to put two 272 00:12:01,760 --> 00:12:04,240 Speaker 2: hundred and fifty people on them. And no car is 273 00:12:04,280 --> 00:12:06,600 Speaker 2: ever going to turn the corner with him. I'm just 274 00:12:06,600 --> 00:12:08,440 Speaker 2: going to call it to someone else who's going through. 275 00:12:09,040 --> 00:12:11,320 Speaker 2: And so his ability to then say, oh, I've seen 276 00:12:11,320 --> 00:12:13,480 Speaker 2: that car before and the other part of town therefore 277 00:12:13,559 --> 00:12:15,439 Speaker 2: might be surveillance is going to be harder. So their 278 00:12:15,480 --> 00:12:19,480 Speaker 2: goal is to make you think that you're clear and 279 00:12:19,559 --> 00:12:22,640 Speaker 2: clean and make a thing so it can be a 280 00:12:23,559 --> 00:12:25,360 Speaker 2: difficult and time consuming. 281 00:12:25,880 --> 00:12:27,760 Speaker 3: And now some of the FBI is doing this in 282 00:12:28,000 --> 00:12:29,640 Speaker 3: DC and other places as well. 283 00:12:30,280 --> 00:12:32,320 Speaker 4: Or I'll talk about their sources and methods, but they 284 00:12:32,800 --> 00:12:33,160 Speaker 4: not too. 285 00:12:33,800 --> 00:12:35,839 Speaker 2: But that is their job, though, to make sure that 286 00:12:36,400 --> 00:12:39,959 Speaker 2: foreign intelligence officers are either thwarted or stopped or caught. 287 00:12:40,120 --> 00:12:43,120 Speaker 1: The best way to beat espionage, though, is with espionage 288 00:12:43,520 --> 00:12:47,440 Speaker 1: if you recruit somebody who is a surveillance or is 289 00:12:47,480 --> 00:12:50,520 Speaker 1: in charge of surveillance or in that program, they can 290 00:12:50,559 --> 00:12:53,240 Speaker 1: tell you even in advance, ah, today we're going to 291 00:12:53,280 --> 00:12:55,120 Speaker 1: put five cars on you, and this is what we 292 00:12:55,160 --> 00:12:57,559 Speaker 1: be and this is who they are. Right, And people 293 00:12:57,559 --> 00:13:00,680 Speaker 1: who are surveillance often they're not always pay real well, 294 00:13:00,720 --> 00:13:03,880 Speaker 1: it's not like a great job, and they must know 295 00:13:04,160 --> 00:13:06,280 Speaker 1: that we'll pay a lot for that. So you've got 296 00:13:06,320 --> 00:13:08,640 Speaker 1: to be pretty sure your surveillance aren't being turned and 297 00:13:08,640 --> 00:13:11,120 Speaker 1: your surveillance can probably meet you, or somebody in the 298 00:13:11,160 --> 00:13:14,800 Speaker 1: surveillance program running it could meet you easily because they 299 00:13:14,920 --> 00:13:17,040 Speaker 1: know where to do it. So there's there's always okay, 300 00:13:17,080 --> 00:13:18,840 Speaker 1: how do you do that? And you can always tell 301 00:13:18,880 --> 00:13:21,640 Speaker 1: surveillance by their shoes. They'll change maybe their code, or 302 00:13:21,640 --> 00:13:23,800 Speaker 1: they'll put on a scarf if they're a woman. But 303 00:13:23,880 --> 00:13:26,160 Speaker 1: if you've got to walk for like eight to ten 304 00:13:26,160 --> 00:13:27,800 Speaker 1: hours a day, you're never sure whether you're going to 305 00:13:27,800 --> 00:13:30,080 Speaker 1: be in a store or in a park. You've got 306 00:13:30,080 --> 00:13:34,079 Speaker 1: to have sensible shoes. If somebody's wearing If a woman 307 00:13:34,160 --> 00:13:37,160 Speaker 1: is wearing like high heels, like she's not a surveillance, right. 308 00:13:37,240 --> 00:13:39,560 Speaker 3: So we were talking about what are good jobs for 309 00:13:40,160 --> 00:13:44,400 Speaker 3: XCIA officers, and we've talked about people becoming heads of 310 00:13:44,400 --> 00:13:47,480 Speaker 3: security for corporations or whatever, but it sounds like shoe 311 00:13:48,000 --> 00:13:52,840 Speaker 3: manufacturer might be like, that might be the one job 312 00:13:52,880 --> 00:13:54,000 Speaker 3: you're actually qualified for. 313 00:13:54,200 --> 00:13:56,880 Speaker 2: Yeah, I've seen a number of spy novels. Now this 314 00:13:56,960 --> 00:13:59,120 Speaker 2: piece of true information has now made its way, so 315 00:13:59,200 --> 00:14:01,320 Speaker 2: it's now showing up in spine novels. For a period 316 00:14:01,320 --> 00:14:03,560 Speaker 2: of time, in Moscow, one of the ways that we 317 00:14:03,600 --> 00:14:07,400 Speaker 2: could tell surveillance cars was there was a small, little 318 00:14:07,440 --> 00:14:10,600 Speaker 2: sort of diamond shaped piece of dirt on the front 319 00:14:10,600 --> 00:14:13,480 Speaker 2: of the car. So clearly what happened is the the 320 00:14:13,559 --> 00:14:16,839 Speaker 2: surveillance has a car wash somewhere at the KGB and 321 00:14:16,880 --> 00:14:18,600 Speaker 2: they would wash the car from time to time, but 322 00:14:18,720 --> 00:14:22,840 Speaker 2: the brushes or whatever missed this small little place, and 323 00:14:22,960 --> 00:14:24,840 Speaker 2: you couldn't just rely on that. But you'd be driving 324 00:14:24,880 --> 00:14:27,040 Speaker 2: and you'd see this little diamond of dirt. You'd like, Oh, 325 00:14:27,080 --> 00:14:29,160 Speaker 2: I bet you that's a surveillance car. I haven't seen 326 00:14:29,200 --> 00:14:30,600 Speaker 2: them before, but I'm going to keep an eye on 327 00:14:30,600 --> 00:14:33,840 Speaker 2: that car. And some of them had license plates, so 328 00:14:33,880 --> 00:14:35,640 Speaker 2: you'd be watching and you look for this license plate 329 00:14:35,640 --> 00:14:37,360 Speaker 2: and you'd want what you'd want to do is later 330 00:14:37,640 --> 00:14:39,880 Speaker 2: that night to see if you see that license plate again. 331 00:14:40,200 --> 00:14:42,520 Speaker 2: They had license plate that could turn. I remember one 332 00:14:42,560 --> 00:14:45,160 Speaker 2: time having one of those cars that obviously they tried 333 00:14:45,160 --> 00:14:46,560 Speaker 2: to turn the light. They had a little button that 334 00:14:46,560 --> 00:14:47,960 Speaker 2: they could push. They would turn and put a new 335 00:14:48,000 --> 00:14:50,040 Speaker 2: license plate, but it got stuck and so it was 336 00:14:50,080 --> 00:14:51,840 Speaker 2: like pointed at me. So you could see two of the. 337 00:14:51,840 --> 00:14:55,160 Speaker 3: Different license plates, and you are literally walking down the 338 00:14:55,200 --> 00:14:58,280 Speaker 3: street memorizing every license plate that seems impossible. 339 00:14:58,440 --> 00:15:00,840 Speaker 2: Not every license plate, but one's that looked like they 340 00:15:00,880 --> 00:15:03,200 Speaker 2: could be in a moving with you or what have you. 341 00:15:03,320 --> 00:15:06,040 Speaker 1: Know. There's a friend of ours who his dad was 342 00:15:06,040 --> 00:15:08,440 Speaker 1: in the agency and then he later joined it, and 343 00:15:08,480 --> 00:15:10,640 Speaker 1: he's he and his dad served behind there and curtain 344 00:15:10,640 --> 00:15:12,960 Speaker 1: and he was like twelve or thirteen, and they played 345 00:15:12,960 --> 00:15:16,040 Speaker 1: this game where he would write down license plate numbers. 346 00:15:16,120 --> 00:15:18,280 Speaker 1: But he didn't know his dad was CIA and he 347 00:15:18,280 --> 00:15:20,880 Speaker 1: didn't know this was surveillance. And when he came back 348 00:15:20,880 --> 00:15:23,120 Speaker 1: to the States, he's like with his friends in high 349 00:15:23,160 --> 00:15:25,400 Speaker 1: school and like you know that game when like you're 350 00:15:25,400 --> 00:15:27,600 Speaker 1: with your dad and you're copying license plate numbers down 351 00:15:27,640 --> 00:15:32,600 Speaker 1: and they're like, no, I thought everybody did that because 352 00:15:32,640 --> 00:15:33,120 Speaker 1: mom did it. 353 00:15:33,240 --> 00:15:37,160 Speaker 4: Let's play the license plate game. There was one one country. 354 00:15:37,240 --> 00:15:38,280 Speaker 4: There was one. I'm not going to I gotta be 355 00:15:38,280 --> 00:15:39,960 Speaker 4: careful on this, but there was one country. 356 00:15:40,480 --> 00:15:44,280 Speaker 1: To save money, they didn't gas up their surveillance cars 357 00:15:44,680 --> 00:15:46,280 Speaker 1: at any service station they had. 358 00:15:46,320 --> 00:15:47,040 Speaker 4: It was the government. 359 00:15:47,040 --> 00:15:50,360 Speaker 1: They had a special deal at this one sort of 360 00:15:50,440 --> 00:15:53,680 Speaker 1: quasi government gas station, and all the surveillance cars had 361 00:15:53,720 --> 00:15:57,240 Speaker 1: to gas up there. So all you needed to do 362 00:15:57,840 --> 00:16:01,360 Speaker 1: was get a static surveillance or put a hitting camera up, 363 00:16:01,680 --> 00:16:04,120 Speaker 1: and you could just see all their cars going in 364 00:16:04,240 --> 00:16:06,360 Speaker 1: getting gassed up. And it's like you didn't need to 365 00:16:07,160 --> 00:16:09,080 Speaker 1: know they were catch them all as they were doing it. 366 00:16:09,120 --> 00:16:09,960 Speaker 4: You could just like. 367 00:16:10,920 --> 00:16:12,840 Speaker 1: You could just you could just look at the feed 368 00:16:12,920 --> 00:16:15,440 Speaker 1: and they're all lining up for gas along with the guys. 369 00:16:15,480 --> 00:16:19,520 Speaker 3: So that's really funny. Now I'm imagining in my mind 370 00:16:19,880 --> 00:16:22,720 Speaker 3: the first time or two or three, it's exciting. It's wow, 371 00:16:22,760 --> 00:16:25,760 Speaker 3: I'm really like I'm doing it. I'm an intelligence officer. 372 00:16:25,920 --> 00:16:28,680 Speaker 3: And then it becomes unbelievably boring and annoying. 373 00:16:28,840 --> 00:16:31,440 Speaker 4: Is that well? 374 00:16:31,480 --> 00:16:34,480 Speaker 2: I felt actually liberated. So if you're in a place 375 00:16:34,480 --> 00:16:36,440 Speaker 2: like Moscow or some other place, there's a lot of 376 00:16:36,440 --> 00:16:38,360 Speaker 2: survellans and you have surveillance and a track you all 377 00:16:38,400 --> 00:16:40,920 Speaker 2: the time, and they're listening to you at your house 378 00:16:40,960 --> 00:16:43,440 Speaker 2: and everybody you question if you've done it right, and 379 00:16:43,480 --> 00:16:46,400 Speaker 2: you've gotten away from surveillance, and now you are out 380 00:16:46,600 --> 00:16:49,080 Speaker 2: somewhere in the city. You know it so well, how 381 00:16:49,120 --> 00:16:50,880 Speaker 2: they might try to cover you, where they would be, 382 00:16:51,000 --> 00:16:53,480 Speaker 2: where they would set up, and you know you're black, 383 00:16:53,560 --> 00:16:55,760 Speaker 2: you don't have survillance. It's like, ah, I'm like. 384 00:16:55,840 --> 00:16:56,800 Speaker 3: You just feel free. 385 00:16:56,880 --> 00:16:58,920 Speaker 2: They don't know where I am. And you'd be sitting 386 00:16:58,960 --> 00:17:01,280 Speaker 2: there and hiding the park. You'd be looking long distance, 387 00:17:01,360 --> 00:17:03,680 Speaker 2: maybe some binoculars or something to make sure. They just 388 00:17:03,680 --> 00:17:07,080 Speaker 2: felt it's crazy, but it just felt like I beat them. 389 00:17:07,080 --> 00:17:08,600 Speaker 2: I can do whatever I want right now. 390 00:17:09,000 --> 00:17:12,960 Speaker 1: There was one one famous story and it's declassified, but 391 00:17:13,440 --> 00:17:15,080 Speaker 1: this is really more for John to teb but I'll 392 00:17:15,080 --> 00:17:15,600 Speaker 1: do it anyway. 393 00:17:15,640 --> 00:17:16,840 Speaker 4: But there was this. 394 00:17:17,040 --> 00:17:22,399 Speaker 1: Really years ago, but this really high speed, really important 395 00:17:22,560 --> 00:17:25,320 Speaker 1: technical operation we had going on and behind Thearon curtain, 396 00:17:25,359 --> 00:17:26,840 Speaker 1: and I think we can even say it was Rushi 397 00:17:26,840 --> 00:17:29,080 Speaker 1: at the time, but it was basically they would get black, 398 00:17:29,280 --> 00:17:31,959 Speaker 1: take hours and hours and hours and finally get so 399 00:17:32,040 --> 00:17:35,080 Speaker 1: that they didn't have surveillance on them, and then what 400 00:17:35,119 --> 00:17:38,080 Speaker 1: they did is they like slipped into some overalls and 401 00:17:38,119 --> 00:17:40,960 Speaker 1: went down a manhole. So basically you get free and 402 00:17:41,000 --> 00:17:43,080 Speaker 1: then you basically got to jump into a pit full 403 00:17:43,119 --> 00:17:48,440 Speaker 1: of shit. It's like into a drainage pipe to go 404 00:17:48,520 --> 00:17:50,080 Speaker 1: do something because there's your reward. 405 00:17:50,520 --> 00:17:54,800 Speaker 3: Yeah, Mozeltov, all right, we're going to get right back 406 00:17:54,840 --> 00:17:57,200 Speaker 3: into that, but first let's hear this. 407 00:18:04,359 --> 00:18:07,280 Speaker 1: All right, back to the show. 408 00:18:08,680 --> 00:18:10,880 Speaker 3: Can you turn it off, like when you're back home 409 00:18:10,920 --> 00:18:14,600 Speaker 3: on vacation or something, are you still walking around Virginia 410 00:18:14,840 --> 00:18:15,960 Speaker 3: looking for surveillance. 411 00:18:16,080 --> 00:18:16,280 Speaker 4: No. 412 00:18:16,440 --> 00:18:19,680 Speaker 2: I can turn it off pretty easily. Like I don't 413 00:18:19,680 --> 00:18:21,720 Speaker 2: get paranoid. I don't think people are following me. I 414 00:18:21,720 --> 00:18:23,640 Speaker 2: don't try to when I'm back home. 415 00:18:24,320 --> 00:18:27,280 Speaker 3: No, Because I found in Iraq, I felt fairly safe. 416 00:18:27,320 --> 00:18:29,240 Speaker 3: But then when I was back in Brooklyn was when 417 00:18:29,280 --> 00:18:32,920 Speaker 3: I really I started looking for snipers and I started 418 00:18:33,440 --> 00:18:36,720 Speaker 3: feeling like people are looking at me weird. That might 419 00:18:36,760 --> 00:18:39,840 Speaker 3: just be PTSD or just the way you look, or 420 00:18:40,000 --> 00:18:42,000 Speaker 3: just maybe I looked weird and there were snipers trying 421 00:18:42,000 --> 00:18:43,080 Speaker 3: to kill me. That's possible. 422 00:18:43,160 --> 00:18:44,480 Speaker 4: But there's a difference though. 423 00:18:44,520 --> 00:18:47,200 Speaker 1: So you're describing two different things, and I've bumped into 424 00:18:47,240 --> 00:18:47,640 Speaker 1: them both. 425 00:18:48,240 --> 00:18:48,639 Speaker 4: One is. 426 00:18:49,000 --> 00:18:52,400 Speaker 1: If you've been in the agency and you've been under surveillance, 427 00:18:52,560 --> 00:18:55,520 Speaker 1: you also know what it's like to try to organize surveillance. 428 00:18:55,640 --> 00:18:55,800 Speaker 4: Right. 429 00:18:56,280 --> 00:19:01,200 Speaker 1: It's hard getting five or ten guys together a meeting beforehand, 430 00:19:01,320 --> 00:19:04,879 Speaker 1: and like paying them, and there's surveillances. Oh I can't 431 00:19:04,880 --> 00:19:06,879 Speaker 1: come in today, my wife is sick. I got to 432 00:19:06,920 --> 00:19:09,200 Speaker 1: watch the kid. And you got to organize this team 433 00:19:09,240 --> 00:19:11,280 Speaker 1: of five to ten people. It's like a full time 434 00:19:11,400 --> 00:19:13,920 Speaker 1: friggin job. And then of course when they watch you, 435 00:19:13,960 --> 00:19:15,400 Speaker 1: they got to write it up. You got to get 436 00:19:15,400 --> 00:19:17,159 Speaker 1: these people, they got to sit down and they're going 437 00:19:17,240 --> 00:19:19,600 Speaker 1: to have to get on a typewriter a computer. So 438 00:19:19,960 --> 00:19:22,560 Speaker 1: as far as being followed, I never have that feeling 439 00:19:22,560 --> 00:19:24,840 Speaker 1: because I know how much work it goes into it, 440 00:19:24,920 --> 00:19:26,760 Speaker 1: and I also know I'm not worth it, you know. 441 00:19:26,800 --> 00:19:29,960 Speaker 1: It's like we do this podcast, like no one gives 442 00:19:30,000 --> 00:19:33,359 Speaker 1: a hoot about me. However, when you're in a place 443 00:19:33,440 --> 00:19:37,600 Speaker 1: like Bagdad or Afghanistan, you get something called a hyper 444 00:19:37,720 --> 00:19:41,560 Speaker 1: vigilance where you're just really vigilant because you're afraid you're 445 00:19:41,560 --> 00:19:44,959 Speaker 1: gonna go over an idea, a mind, or you're going 446 00:19:45,000 --> 00:19:48,719 Speaker 1: to get shot. And that is visceral. That's not mental 447 00:19:48,840 --> 00:19:51,119 Speaker 1: where you're thinking about it. That's just a gut feel. 448 00:19:51,560 --> 00:19:55,639 Speaker 1: And when you leave Afghanistan after being hyper vigilant for 449 00:19:56,040 --> 00:19:59,520 Speaker 1: two or three months, that is really hard to turn 450 00:19:59,560 --> 00:20:02,760 Speaker 1: off because it's not a thought process, it's something that 451 00:20:02,800 --> 00:20:06,160 Speaker 1: it's just a it's an amigdal of response that's hard. 452 00:20:06,000 --> 00:20:06,840 Speaker 4: To turn off. 453 00:20:07,040 --> 00:20:09,439 Speaker 3: And also we don't have the training that you guys have, 454 00:20:09,520 --> 00:20:11,359 Speaker 3: and we don't have we don't really talk about this 455 00:20:11,400 --> 00:20:14,080 Speaker 3: as journalists that much. We're just basically sent to a 456 00:20:14,080 --> 00:20:16,560 Speaker 3: war zone and sometimes you get like a two day 457 00:20:16,600 --> 00:20:19,520 Speaker 3: training that's like try to stand behind the car engine, 458 00:20:19,560 --> 00:20:22,360 Speaker 3: not the car door or something. But it's but not 459 00:20:22,520 --> 00:20:24,640 Speaker 3: like we're not going to the farm for a few 460 00:20:24,640 --> 00:20:28,080 Speaker 3: months and living in a culture where everybody's talking about 461 00:20:28,080 --> 00:20:30,320 Speaker 3: this stuff. We're mostly talking about what stories are you getting? 462 00:20:30,760 --> 00:20:37,000 Speaker 3: But you are constantly you're hypervigilant. Both the actual vigilance 463 00:20:37,080 --> 00:20:39,199 Speaker 3: like you're worried that, oh is that car following me? 464 00:20:39,240 --> 00:20:39,960 Speaker 4: Physical thing, but. 465 00:20:39,920 --> 00:20:42,960 Speaker 3: You're also like, I do think it's extra exhausting when 466 00:20:43,480 --> 00:20:46,280 Speaker 3: you don't know what doing it well is. Nobody's taught 467 00:20:46,359 --> 00:20:48,720 Speaker 3: you that, so you're also like, do I even know 468 00:20:48,760 --> 00:20:51,439 Speaker 3: what the hell I'm doing? Am I varying my path 469 00:20:51,560 --> 00:20:52,360 Speaker 3: and my times. 470 00:20:52,560 --> 00:20:52,800 Speaker 1: Enough. 471 00:20:53,040 --> 00:20:54,840 Speaker 3: This is the first time in my entire life I've 472 00:20:54,840 --> 00:20:57,280 Speaker 3: ever talked to anyone professional about how do you do 473 00:20:57,320 --> 00:21:00,760 Speaker 3: surveillance detection? And I'm now realizing, like I was doing 474 00:21:00,840 --> 00:21:03,679 Speaker 3: amateur surveillance detection, I don't know that. I'm sure I 475 00:21:03,760 --> 00:21:06,919 Speaker 3: was surveilled and I'm sure I didn't detect it so well. 476 00:21:06,920 --> 00:21:08,879 Speaker 2: There's different kinds of surveillance too. You almost have to 477 00:21:08,920 --> 00:21:11,080 Speaker 2: know whether it's it's a danger of being killed or 478 00:21:11,080 --> 00:21:13,080 Speaker 2: whether it's so many tracking. Even your car can have 479 00:21:13,320 --> 00:21:15,480 Speaker 2: beacons on it, so you drive around and you don't 480 00:21:15,480 --> 00:21:18,199 Speaker 2: see anything. Oh, I'm fine, but that doesn't mean you're 481 00:21:18,400 --> 00:21:19,200 Speaker 2: fine necessary and. 482 00:21:19,160 --> 00:21:21,639 Speaker 1: You can do the best surveillance run in the world, 483 00:21:22,000 --> 00:21:25,000 Speaker 1: but if you're the person you're meeting, is bad. So 484 00:21:25,119 --> 00:21:28,560 Speaker 1: you call them up and say let's meet, and that 485 00:21:28,560 --> 00:21:31,399 Speaker 1: that call is intercepted, and they want to be your source, Adam, 486 00:21:31,400 --> 00:21:33,160 Speaker 1: and they want to give you a story and they 487 00:21:33,200 --> 00:21:36,280 Speaker 1: really mean it. But then like you've called them and 488 00:21:36,320 --> 00:21:39,440 Speaker 1: suddenly the security service kicks their door in and says, okay, 489 00:21:39,480 --> 00:21:41,280 Speaker 1: we want you to go meet at them, but here's 490 00:21:41,320 --> 00:21:43,480 Speaker 1: the story. We want you to give them a false one, 491 00:21:43,720 --> 00:21:45,520 Speaker 1: whether you love the government or whatever it is. 492 00:21:45,680 --> 00:21:47,400 Speaker 4: So you could do the greatest surveillance in the world. 493 00:21:47,440 --> 00:21:48,480 Speaker 4: But if your agent, the. 494 00:21:48,400 --> 00:21:51,359 Speaker 1: Person you're talking to, has been turned or is bad, 495 00:21:51,400 --> 00:21:52,240 Speaker 1: it doesn't matter that. 496 00:21:52,520 --> 00:21:55,040 Speaker 3: The one thing I did once based on someone's recommendation. 497 00:21:55,200 --> 00:21:56,920 Speaker 3: I don't think there was any reason to do it. 498 00:21:57,000 --> 00:22:00,920 Speaker 3: But I went to a Central Asian country that has 499 00:22:01,800 --> 00:22:06,000 Speaker 3: I was told twenty year old KGB style surveillance was 500 00:22:06,240 --> 00:22:09,040 Speaker 3: the way it was described to me, And the recommendation 501 00:22:09,200 --> 00:22:11,960 Speaker 3: was get a cell phone at the airport, make it 502 00:22:12,040 --> 00:22:15,399 Speaker 3: clear your use your passport and everything. Then get a 503 00:22:15,440 --> 00:22:19,439 Speaker 3: local to get you a second cell phone, and just 504 00:22:19,720 --> 00:22:22,600 Speaker 3: give the first cell phone to somebody and have them 505 00:22:22,880 --> 00:22:25,080 Speaker 3: just walk around the city and then use the second 506 00:22:25,119 --> 00:22:28,280 Speaker 3: cell phone. But then I talked to a telecom expert 507 00:22:28,320 --> 00:22:31,040 Speaker 3: who he was basically like, cute, that was cute. But 508 00:22:31,160 --> 00:22:33,119 Speaker 3: if they want to know where you are, they know 509 00:22:33,160 --> 00:22:33,600 Speaker 3: where you are. 510 00:22:33,720 --> 00:22:37,240 Speaker 2: That's the thing is is are you worth a serious target? 511 00:22:37,359 --> 00:22:39,520 Speaker 2: Right any government? You know, if the United States or 512 00:22:39,560 --> 00:22:41,600 Speaker 2: the FBI has somebody coming to the United States and 513 00:22:41,640 --> 00:22:44,199 Speaker 2: they are concerned that person is really really important to hear, 514 00:22:44,720 --> 00:22:47,080 Speaker 2: there is no way that person's going to get themselves 515 00:22:47,160 --> 00:22:49,320 Speaker 2: away from that survanser what's happening, and it's the same 516 00:22:49,440 --> 00:22:50,960 Speaker 2: and what you want to do. That's why you want 517 00:22:50,960 --> 00:22:53,240 Speaker 2: to act in a way that they don't think you're 518 00:22:53,280 --> 00:22:55,640 Speaker 2: constantly you know, if you act Joe spy out there 519 00:22:55,680 --> 00:22:58,440 Speaker 2: and trying to break away and hide from them, they're 520 00:22:58,440 --> 00:23:00,760 Speaker 2: going to put more read more resources. And there is 521 00:23:00,800 --> 00:23:03,640 Speaker 2: a point at which if you're public enemy number one, 522 00:23:03,680 --> 00:23:05,640 Speaker 2: there's nothing you can do right, and so you're trying 523 00:23:05,680 --> 00:23:06,400 Speaker 2: to avoid. 524 00:23:06,160 --> 00:23:10,480 Speaker 1: But that they have resource problems just like everybody else. 525 00:23:10,640 --> 00:23:12,360 Speaker 1: John and I have set in on these meetings where 526 00:23:12,359 --> 00:23:14,960 Speaker 1: it's Okay, our bandwidth is only so much, we've only 527 00:23:15,000 --> 00:23:18,240 Speaker 1: got so many people working so many hours. Like in Baggdad, 528 00:23:18,520 --> 00:23:22,080 Speaker 1: which isis guys, are we going to follow? Technically it's 529 00:23:22,119 --> 00:23:24,399 Speaker 1: a I got a five pound bag and there's one 530 00:23:24,440 --> 00:23:26,800 Speaker 1: hundred pounds of pooh? Which five pounds am I going 531 00:23:26,880 --> 00:23:29,920 Speaker 1: to put in there? And the biggest questions were basically, 532 00:23:30,200 --> 00:23:31,960 Speaker 1: who aren't we going to do right? If we do 533 00:23:32,040 --> 00:23:35,159 Speaker 1: this guy, then we can't do that guy, and or 534 00:23:35,240 --> 00:23:36,840 Speaker 1: we'll do them both but not do them well. 535 00:23:37,040 --> 00:23:39,320 Speaker 2: It became a thing with the FBI after nine to eleven, 536 00:23:39,359 --> 00:23:41,280 Speaker 2: when all of a sudden. They were going to run 537 00:23:41,320 --> 00:23:44,399 Speaker 2: down any potential threat. So some jerk would call in 538 00:23:44,440 --> 00:23:46,240 Speaker 2: and say I'm going to blow up the seven eleven. 539 00:23:46,280 --> 00:23:48,560 Speaker 2: They would have to go out and use their surveillance 540 00:23:48,560 --> 00:23:50,600 Speaker 2: resources to make sure that didn't happen. So they were 541 00:23:50,840 --> 00:23:53,160 Speaker 2: spread so thin that if there is stuff that came 542 00:23:53,240 --> 00:23:55,040 Speaker 2: up that maybe oh there's a rushing in time, like 543 00:23:55,080 --> 00:23:56,920 Speaker 2: we can't we're still busy run out to make sure 544 00:23:56,920 --> 00:23:58,639 Speaker 2: there's not another bomb that goes off that we just 545 00:23:58,640 --> 00:24:00,679 Speaker 2: don't have the resources to. Yeah, everything. 546 00:24:01,240 --> 00:24:04,480 Speaker 3: That's why that Dick Cheney one percent idea that if 547 00:24:04,480 --> 00:24:06,760 Speaker 3: there's a one percent chance this could happen, we must 548 00:24:06,760 --> 00:24:08,840 Speaker 3: treat it like one hundred percent chance. But then there's 549 00:24:08,840 --> 00:24:11,000 Speaker 3: a lot of one percent chances. 550 00:24:10,680 --> 00:24:12,840 Speaker 1: Yeah, how many people do you want to hire for this? 551 00:24:13,680 --> 00:24:16,600 Speaker 1: But there's one other thing and maybe you get a 552 00:24:16,640 --> 00:24:19,320 Speaker 1: sense of this. So you've done your SDR and you're 553 00:24:19,359 --> 00:24:22,000 Speaker 1: sure you're black, and you meet your source, you know, 554 00:24:22,040 --> 00:24:26,800 Speaker 1: either for ESPIONAGI for journalism and this fingerspits and CAFU. 555 00:24:26,960 --> 00:24:30,240 Speaker 1: You look at the guy and if he is like 556 00:24:30,480 --> 00:24:34,960 Speaker 1: really confident, be wary, be careful. If they're taking a 557 00:24:35,000 --> 00:24:37,320 Speaker 1: big chance. They're human beings, you know, I meet with 558 00:24:37,359 --> 00:24:40,400 Speaker 1: a source. Even when they met him like dozens of times, 559 00:24:41,000 --> 00:24:42,760 Speaker 1: you can look in their eyes and you can see 560 00:24:42,800 --> 00:24:46,560 Speaker 1: are they scared? And then there's also you can smell 561 00:24:46,840 --> 00:24:49,720 Speaker 1: fear sometimes in sweat. I can remember this one guy 562 00:24:49,760 --> 00:24:51,800 Speaker 1: and I got into the car and I wasn't sure 563 00:24:51,840 --> 00:24:54,480 Speaker 1: he was like valid or not? Is he good or 564 00:24:54,520 --> 00:24:56,879 Speaker 1: is he bad? Has even turned? And I opened the 565 00:24:56,920 --> 00:25:01,040 Speaker 1: car door and this smell of sweat and year came out, 566 00:25:01,240 --> 00:25:03,000 Speaker 1: and it was like, yeah, he's he's. 567 00:25:02,840 --> 00:25:06,880 Speaker 3: For real good because he's he is shit scared. 568 00:25:07,280 --> 00:25:09,400 Speaker 1: And if he had been turned by his own government, 569 00:25:09,520 --> 00:25:11,520 Speaker 1: he would have been like, hey, you know, get it. 570 00:25:11,520 --> 00:25:12,520 Speaker 4: It's hard to explain. 571 00:25:12,600 --> 00:25:15,840 Speaker 1: But when you look in somebody's eyes and their pupils 572 00:25:15,880 --> 00:25:18,440 Speaker 1: are you know, and it's like they're afraid, and they're 573 00:25:18,440 --> 00:25:20,679 Speaker 1: not afraid of me. This is a good meeting, right 574 00:25:20,680 --> 00:25:22,160 Speaker 1: because they're afraid they're going to get caught. 575 00:25:22,800 --> 00:25:24,840 Speaker 3: All right, guys. SDRs was going to be like one 576 00:25:24,920 --> 00:25:26,520 Speaker 3: little it's I have a long list, so we'll get 577 00:25:26,560 --> 00:25:28,600 Speaker 3: back to some we'll do some other stuff later. I 578 00:25:29,080 --> 00:25:31,639 Speaker 3: am hearing from our listeners, by which I mean my wife, 579 00:25:32,080 --> 00:25:35,920 Speaker 3: that they have our audience that's not our audience. Yeah, 580 00:25:35,960 --> 00:25:38,760 Speaker 3: and I'm not sure she hears every episode, but that 581 00:25:39,160 --> 00:25:42,080 Speaker 3: they actually really love when you guys just talk about 582 00:25:42,119 --> 00:25:45,800 Speaker 3: what life was like in CIA. It's a rare opportunity. 583 00:25:45,840 --> 00:25:48,000 Speaker 3: So I do want to revisit this and ask more questions. 584 00:25:48,000 --> 00:25:51,280 Speaker 3: If people have questions themselves, let us know. All right, 585 00:25:51,640 --> 00:25:53,760 Speaker 3: Thank you guys so much. I love that. I want 586 00:25:53,800 --> 00:25:55,960 Speaker 3: to do that more often. We'll see you next time. 587 00:25:56,160 --> 00:25:59,880 Speaker 3: With some real conspiracies and some very not real conspiracy, 588 00:26:00,040 --> 00:26:01,760 Speaker 3: aies on Mission Implausible. 589 00:26:06,560 --> 00:26:11,640 Speaker 6: Mission Implausible is produced by Adam Davidson, Jerry O'shay, John Seipher, 590 00:26:11,920 --> 00:26:13,280 Speaker 6: and Jonathan Sterner. 591 00:26:13,359 --> 00:26:15,719 Speaker 4: The associate producer is Rachel Harner. 592 00:26:15,960 --> 00:26:19,760 Speaker 6: Mission Implausible is a production of Honorable Mention and Abominable 593 00:26:19,800 --> 00:26:21,800 Speaker 6: Pictures for iHeart Podcasts.