WEBVTT - Beating the S&P For Generations with Davis Funds Chairman Chris Davis

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<v Speaker 1>Bloomberg Audio Studios, Podcasts, radio news. This is Masters in

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<v Speaker 1>Business with Barry Ritholts on Bloomberg Radio.

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<v Speaker 2>This week on the podcast strap Yourself In for Another Banger,

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<v Speaker 2>Chris Davis choose up the scenery. He is the portfolio

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<v Speaker 2>manager of Davis Advisors. They've been kicking the smps but

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<v Speaker 2>for the past I don't know, since nineteen sixty nine,

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<v Speaker 2>twenty billion dollars in client assets. Fascinating conversation. Charlie Munger

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<v Speaker 2>was his mentor. He sits on the board of Coke

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<v Speaker 2>and On Berkshire Hathaway. I thought this conversation was spectacular.

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<v Speaker 2>I think you will also with no further ado, my

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<v Speaker 2>sit down with Chris Davis.

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<v Speaker 3>It's so always good to be with you. Thank you

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<v Speaker 3>so much.

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<v Speaker 2>So before we get into your career, master's degree with

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<v Speaker 2>honors from the University of Saint Andrews in Scotland, Like,

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<v Speaker 2>how did that come about?

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<v Speaker 3>Well, and one of the things that confuses people is

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<v Speaker 3>I actually don't have an undergraduate degree. I only have

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<v Speaker 3>the master's degree. Wait, I sort of skipped that.

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<v Speaker 2>Did you did you go to an undergraduate college?

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<v Speaker 3>Well, what happened is I went to Saint Andrews. I

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<v Speaker 3>had originally only intended to go for a year. I

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<v Speaker 3>wanted to be a veterinarian's that's a longside story. And

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<v Speaker 3>I had worked at the Bronx Zoo. I wait, wait, wait,

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<v Speaker 3>Humane Society.

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<v Speaker 2>So the original plan wasn't Dad's a fund manager, grand

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<v Speaker 2>fought pause a grant fund manager. I guess I'm going

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<v Speaker 2>to be a going to the family business. That was

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<v Speaker 2>not the plan.

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<v Speaker 3>Definitely not. But I give both of them credit. They

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<v Speaker 3>you know, they felt that all of their kids should

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<v Speaker 3>be financially literate. And so every kid worked for my

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<v Speaker 3>father or for my grandfather at some point point and

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<v Speaker 3>learned because they just felt like, look, you'll have money

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<v Speaker 3>over time. It's not taught in schools, just the basic

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<v Speaker 3>fundamentals of investing. And if you got help, you turn

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<v Speaker 3>on the TV, you're going to get a totally distorted view.

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<v Speaker 2>Of what invstipos of nonsense exactly.

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<v Speaker 3>And so we all had this grounding. But you know,

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<v Speaker 3>for example, my my smartest sibling without question, as my sister,

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<v Speaker 3>my younger sister. But she's a small town doctor, but

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<v Speaker 3>boy does she understands investing. She's very thoughtful in how

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<v Speaker 3>she's managed her financial affairs. So we owed that route,

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<v Speaker 3>but we all thought we were going different paths. She

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<v Speaker 3>was interested in medicine. I was interested in veterinary medicine,

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<v Speaker 3>and so I was going to go to Cornell. And

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<v Speaker 3>I was very young for my high school class, and

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<v Speaker 3>I was very late hitting puberty. I mean I was

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<v Speaker 3>five feet tall my senior year in high school. That's

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<v Speaker 3>when I broke five feet so you know that you

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<v Speaker 3>can imagine what this looked like. But but my scores

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<v Speaker 3>and grades were okay. And so Cornell took me into

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<v Speaker 3>their prevet program. But the woman that ran it said, look,

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<v Speaker 3>this is a seven year program. It's intense. Why don't

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<v Speaker 3>you take a year off, like a gap year. So

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<v Speaker 3>I propose that to my father. He said, we don't

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<v Speaker 3>do that in our family. Like you could go study,

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<v Speaker 3>but there's no like year off like to go ski year.

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<v Speaker 3>Find this.

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<v Speaker 2>Did you skip a grade or you?

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<v Speaker 1>Like me?

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<v Speaker 2>The back of like October November December, So you're young

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<v Speaker 2>relative to no.

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<v Speaker 3>I had skipped a grade sort of early because I bazarrely.

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<v Speaker 3>I didn't nobody in my family believes this now, but

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<v Speaker 3>I didn't talk until quite late. So they had sort

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<v Speaker 3>of and.

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<v Speaker 4>Then when I started talking, they jumped to me out

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<v Speaker 4>and it never stopped since then.

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<v Speaker 3>But anyway, so I had this year period and it

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<v Speaker 3>was the first year that the University of Saint Andrews

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<v Speaker 3>wast in taking direct applications from students that where they

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<v Speaker 3>dropped the requirement to have A levels or O levels

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<v Speaker 3>to sort of British entry exams, mostly because they wanted

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<v Speaker 3>the Yankee dollar. You've got to remember Thatcher had just

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<v Speaker 3>become Prime Minister. She was slashing the public support of

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<v Speaker 3>the Scottish universities. So I applied. There were I think

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<v Speaker 3>eight of US Americans that came in that first year,

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<v Speaker 3>and they had a program where after two years you

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<v Speaker 3>could apply into the honors program, which would allow you

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<v Speaker 3>to concentrate on just one subject, and I ended up

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<v Speaker 3>picking two, but needless, it was philosophy and theology and interesting,

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<v Speaker 3>you know. I picked them my freshman year, thinking well,

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<v Speaker 3>when I go back to Cornell, I'm going to be

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<v Speaker 3>filled up with organic chemistry and biology and anatomy and

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<v Speaker 3>so on, so I may as well pick things that

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<v Speaker 3>I would never I'll never get to study again. So

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<v Speaker 3>I picked things like medieval history, philosophy, theology.

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<v Speaker 2>I love that. That's something I always, in hindsight wish

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<v Speaker 2>I did. And I started out physics and math and

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<v Speaker 2>switched the political science and philosophy. So I got to

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<v Speaker 2>study some stuff that was fun. But like medieval history,

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<v Speaker 2>sounds like that would be a delightful semester.

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<v Speaker 3>You use the perfect word fun. I mean I became

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<v Speaker 3>a good student in high school. I wasn't a good student.

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<v Speaker 3>In fact, recently I found my elementary school my eighth

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<v Speaker 3>grade final report card. I went to a school here

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<v Speaker 3>in New York and it was a pretty strict, you

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<v Speaker 3>know where, a uniform sort of boys' school, and the

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<v Speaker 3>headmaster would review each report card before it went to

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<v Speaker 3>the parents and then make a comment on the bottom.

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<v Speaker 3>And the headmaster's comment on my final elementary school report

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<v Speaker 3>card was yet another semester of squandered potential.

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<v Speaker 2>Not living up to his potential. God, my children classic.

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<v Speaker 4>My children found that my mother David to my children,

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<v Speaker 4>which was a big problem you could imagine.

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<v Speaker 3>But anyway, so I thought I'll just be in Scotland

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<v Speaker 3>for a year. I picked subjects I would never study again.

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<v Speaker 3>They were so fun.

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<v Speaker 2>It was just it was especially in Scotland.

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<v Speaker 3>Medieval in a medieval university and where Hume had been

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<v Speaker 3>a professor. I mean, you know, it was just amazing,

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<v Speaker 3>And of course it was. It's also a Presbyterian seminary,

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<v Speaker 3>so so Saint Mary's, which is one of the colleges there.

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<v Speaker 3>So I thought, well, you know, and I'm not. It

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<v Speaker 3>wasn't that I was a deeply faithful sort of person.

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<v Speaker 3>I more thought of theology from the point of view

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<v Speaker 3>of you know, people organize their lives around religion, people

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<v Speaker 3>die for it, people, you know, I should study this.

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<v Speaker 3>And but I also there was a secondary reason that

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<v Speaker 3>I was interested, which is, if you look at communities

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<v Speaker 3>that have a religious institution at their center, whether they're rural,

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<v Speaker 3>whether the urban suburban, almost all outcomes are better, you know,

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<v Speaker 3>intact families, crime rates, graduation rates, you know, all of

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<v Speaker 3>these sorts of statistics tend to go better. So to me,

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<v Speaker 3>there's I was lucky that I didn't. I was never

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<v Speaker 3>you know, didn't have one of those childhoods where it

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<v Speaker 3>was beaten into me or something. So it was more

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<v Speaker 3>this curiosity about how it seemed to serve communities to

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<v Speaker 3>have a shared value system. Anyway, I picked those subjects

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<v Speaker 3>I applied into this honors program, so I was able

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<v Speaker 3>to get the Masters at the end, but there was

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<v Speaker 3>no undergraduate degree along the way.

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<v Speaker 2>And there was no going back to Cornell to become

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<v Speaker 2>a vet now, although the order for that faded.

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<v Speaker 3>Although because I deferred my admission freshman year, I still

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<v Speaker 3>get mailings from their alumni department because I matriculated but

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<v Speaker 3>then deferred, And I'd like to think the Development department

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<v Speaker 3>has nothing to do with them sending me these mailings.

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<v Speaker 3>But I lived on a sheep farm in Scotland, and

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<v Speaker 3>of course that was when I realized I was confusing

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<v Speaker 3>loving animals with wanting to be a vet, and those

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<v Speaker 3>are very different things.

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<v Speaker 2>Yeah, very much.

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<v Speaker 3>So.

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<v Speaker 2>I'm always as we used to foster dogs and get

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<v Speaker 2>them adopted, and anytime I meet someone who was like, oh,

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<v Speaker 2>I really don't care for dogs, it's like.

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<v Speaker 3>Oh, that's a big ex don We weren't allowed to

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<v Speaker 3>have dogs when I was a kid, But I grew

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<v Speaker 3>up right in the city of East eighty fourth Street.

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<v Speaker 3>But my parents from the time I was in maybe

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<v Speaker 3>third grade or so, so what would that be, probably

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<v Speaker 3>nine years old or eight years old something like that,

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<v Speaker 3>they said I could walk dog, I could be a

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<v Speaker 3>dog walker, provided I didn't cross any street, so you know,

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<v Speaker 3>i'd put up a notice in the elevator and their

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<v Speaker 3>building if anybody needed their dog walk, and then I

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<v Speaker 3>would just walk the dogs around the block before school

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<v Speaker 3>and after school. I can still remember the name of

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<v Speaker 3>every dog I walked, which is amazing. And I loved it.

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<v Speaker 3>And of course it actually became seed capital, which is unexpected.

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<v Speaker 3>But the reason was, you know, I could probably charge

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<v Speaker 3>fifty cents a walk back then, so it was nothing,

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<v Speaker 3>but I got to be with dogs and I enjoyed it.

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<v Speaker 3>It was like a.

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<v Speaker 2>Paper running a small business. I had a paper route

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<v Speaker 2>and it was just so formative so far.

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<v Speaker 3>And this was like a paper route for city kids

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<v Speaker 3>because you didn't couldn't have a paper route New York.

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<v Speaker 3>But then an amazing thing happened New York City around

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<v Speaker 3>nineteen I'd have to be around nineteen seventy seven or

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<v Speaker 3>seventy eight passed the Pooper Scooper line, I remember, and

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<v Speaker 3>everything changed because people had these dogs with nobody even

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<v Speaker 3>knew what to do they nobody had ever imagined cleaning

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<v Speaker 3>up after a dog. There are all sorts of inventions,

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<v Speaker 3>you know, talls, but people didn't you know people were

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<v Speaker 3>so gross they had to carry shovels with them.

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<v Speaker 2>Change the diaper on the baby. How it's just processed food.

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<v Speaker 2>There's no big deal.

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<v Speaker 3>Well for me that my rates could go from fifty

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<v Speaker 3>cents to five dollars and people were glad to pay it.

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<v Speaker 3>And instead of one or two dogs, I had four

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<v Speaker 3>or five. And it was real money because what it

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<v Speaker 3>meant was I was suddenly making you know, fifty dollars

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<v Speaker 3>a week.

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<v Speaker 2>In nine sixty.

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<v Speaker 3>Dollars a week.

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<v Speaker 2>Yeah, that's good.

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<v Speaker 3>Yeah, And so you start, you know, thinking about holy cow,

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<v Speaker 3>you know, I'm making two hundred and fifty dollars a month.

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<v Speaker 3>You know, I'm making thousands of dollars a year. And

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<v Speaker 3>it was just fantastic. So I've I've loved dogs ever since.

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<v Speaker 2>So let's talk a little bit about the early days

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<v Speaker 2>of the career. You start as an accountant at State

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<v Speaker 2>Street Bank and ultimately end up as a unglamorous research

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<v Speaker 2>analyst at Tanaka Capital Management. These are, you know, very

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<v Speaker 2>much bottom rung on the Oh Street ladders. What you

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<v Speaker 2>learn in those well, it.

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<v Speaker 3>Wasn't really my first job. My first job was I

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<v Speaker 3>became a pastoral ass at the American Cathedral in Paris,

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<v Speaker 3>so I lived. I moved from rural Scotland to Paris. Well,

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<v Speaker 3>that was like landing in oz you know, you get

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<v Speaker 3>honest to God, you my eyes lit up, but again

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<v Speaker 3>in the same way that living on the sheep farm

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<v Speaker 3>convinced me I was confusing loving animals with wanting to

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<v Speaker 3>be a vet, you know. Working for the American Cathedral

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<v Speaker 3>convinced me I was confusing loving people with wanting to

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<v Speaker 3>you know, be a priest or something. So I moved

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<v Speaker 3>from there to Boston, and I thought about teaching. I

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<v Speaker 3>actually even applied to the CIA because I was very

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<v Speaker 3>interested in research and international affairs. I'd lived abroad then

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<v Speaker 3>five years, and I thought it would be an amazing

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<v Speaker 3>thing to be the greatest expert on let's say Czechoslovakia's

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<v Speaker 3>learned the language, the history, the people, the economics, the business,

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<v Speaker 3>the military, the topography. And so I didn't want to

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<v Speaker 3>be a spy, but I wanted to be an analyst.

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<v Speaker 3>And CIA wisely turned me down, having briefly had a

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<v Speaker 3>stint in you know, sort of the Worker's Revolutionary Party,

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<v Speaker 3>you know, and.

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<v Speaker 2>Oh so they looked at your history and said, this guy's.

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<v Speaker 3>Yeah, they're like, this needs to ripe it a little more.

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<v Speaker 2>We don't know have ethical malleability that we're looking for.

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<v Speaker 3>But I and so, you know, I started thinking about

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<v Speaker 3>the summers that I had spent working with my dad

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<v Speaker 3>and my grandfather, both of whom loved their jobs. They

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<v Speaker 3>loved investing, they loved their career, and of course that

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<v Speaker 3>was infectious even as kids. I thought the idea of

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<v Speaker 3>investing was so interesting because they didn't highlight the math

0:12:43.360 --> 0:12:48.880
<v Speaker 3>to begin with. They highlighted the stories, the people, the ideas.

0:12:48.920 --> 0:12:51.199
<v Speaker 3>And but I realized that even though I've had this

0:12:51.880 --> 0:12:55.280
<v Speaker 3>study of sort of the idea of businesses being made

0:12:55.360 --> 0:12:59.080
<v Speaker 3>up of people and ideas and this sort of interest

0:12:59.240 --> 0:13:03.719
<v Speaker 3>in that, I had no grounding in the rigor of it.

0:13:04.280 --> 0:13:06.960
<v Speaker 3>And so what I like to say is, you know,

0:13:07.120 --> 0:13:10.800
<v Speaker 3>my father and grandfather, you know, let us live in

0:13:10.840 --> 0:13:14.000
<v Speaker 3>a foreign country, like live in France for some time

0:13:14.440 --> 0:13:18.280
<v Speaker 3>and hear French spoken and see this new culture. But

0:13:19.880 --> 0:13:22.320
<v Speaker 3>we did that before. We had to learn the grammar

0:13:22.559 --> 0:13:24.600
<v Speaker 3>and read the textbooks and so on. So they got

0:13:24.600 --> 0:13:28.280
<v Speaker 3>the order right for setting the hook of curiosity. But

0:13:28.559 --> 0:13:31.080
<v Speaker 3>I knew enough to know that I couldn't go into

0:13:31.160 --> 0:13:34.520
<v Speaker 3>investing without a real grounding, and of course a bank

0:13:34.640 --> 0:13:37.800
<v Speaker 3>is perfect. And I got I mean I interviewed a

0:13:37.800 --> 0:13:41.440
<v Speaker 3>lot of places. George Putnam himself turned me down for

0:13:41.480 --> 0:13:43.080
<v Speaker 3>a job at Putnam. So I had a lot of

0:13:43.120 --> 0:13:47.240
<v Speaker 3>rejects before. And State Street Bank had an program for

0:13:47.400 --> 0:13:50.920
<v Speaker 3>entry level accountants, and you know, they had a wonderful

0:13:51.280 --> 0:13:57.160
<v Speaker 3>training program. And so I had an operations center in Quincy, Massachusetts,

0:13:57.200 --> 0:14:00.400
<v Speaker 3>and I would take the red line down there and

0:14:00.400 --> 0:14:03.440
<v Speaker 3>and I could do my day job. But they would

0:14:03.440 --> 0:14:06.720
<v Speaker 3>also pay for all of any schooling you wanted. They

0:14:06.760 --> 0:14:11.040
<v Speaker 3>had something called the State Street Institute, and you could

0:14:11.080 --> 0:14:15.920
<v Speaker 3>take courses and anything to do with economics, accounting, business,

0:14:15.960 --> 0:14:19.000
<v Speaker 3>and so I took advantage of that, although I will

0:14:19.040 --> 0:14:21.960
<v Speaker 3>say I was fooled by one course. They had a

0:14:22.040 --> 0:14:25.440
<v Speaker 3>course in their catalog that was called the Rules of

0:14:25.600 --> 0:14:26.640
<v Speaker 3>Rhythmic Touch.

0:14:27.560 --> 0:14:29.840
<v Speaker 2>Now I thought that sounds like massage.

0:14:29.920 --> 0:14:32.560
<v Speaker 4>That sounds pretty good, right, I figure I circled that

0:14:32.600 --> 0:14:33.920
<v Speaker 4>one in a little course catalog.

0:14:34.000 --> 0:14:39.000
<v Speaker 3>It was only a two night's course, and I showed

0:14:39.080 --> 0:14:42.880
<v Speaker 3>up and it was how to use a ten punch

0:14:43.120 --> 0:14:46.680
<v Speaker 3>tape calculator, you know, without looking at your hands, so

0:14:46.880 --> 0:14:50.600
<v Speaker 3>you know when you're summing up the column is the

0:14:50.680 --> 0:14:53.040
<v Speaker 3>rules of rhythmic touch. And I would say, if you

0:14:53.080 --> 0:14:55.720
<v Speaker 3>put what on this table now, I would be calf

0:14:55.840 --> 0:14:57.600
<v Speaker 3>I would bet you a large sum of money. I

0:14:57.600 --> 0:14:59.800
<v Speaker 3>could run a column of numbers faster than you.

0:15:00.040 --> 0:15:03.480
<v Speaker 2>I'm going to that one.

0:15:03.520 --> 0:15:06.520
<v Speaker 3>But so that's so I got the grounding there. Graham

0:15:06.560 --> 0:15:10.080
<v Speaker 3>Tanaka was somebody I had met during my summer jobs.

0:15:10.880 --> 0:15:15.800
<v Speaker 3>He was a very talented analyst at Fiduciary Trust. He'd

0:15:15.800 --> 0:15:19.760
<v Speaker 3>been at JP Morgan before, and uh, we'd sort of

0:15:19.760 --> 0:15:23.040
<v Speaker 3>stayed in touch, and I learned that he was hanging

0:15:23.040 --> 0:15:26.360
<v Speaker 3>out his own shingle and starting his own firm. And

0:15:27.000 --> 0:15:31.840
<v Speaker 3>he's a Japanese American really a very you know, driven,

0:15:32.320 --> 0:15:36.479
<v Speaker 3>talented guy. And uh he said he wanted an apprentice,

0:15:37.160 --> 0:15:40.200
<v Speaker 3>and uh, and you know it would be everything. I

0:15:40.240 --> 0:15:43.200
<v Speaker 3>would be his first hire and we would go from there.

0:15:43.640 --> 0:15:46.800
<v Speaker 3>And that was a terrific hell did I stayed there

0:15:46.920 --> 0:15:51.760
<v Speaker 3>about two years. Uh, And we stayed because what happened

0:15:51.800 --> 0:15:55.600
<v Speaker 3>after the first stretch is my grandfather, who I was

0:15:55.640 --> 0:15:58.200
<v Speaker 3>close with when I went to work for Tanaka. My

0:15:58.280 --> 0:16:02.000
<v Speaker 3>grandfather opened up an account at Tanaka because he thought

0:16:02.040 --> 0:16:06.560
<v Speaker 3>this was you know, he had big investments in Japanese firms.

0:16:06.560 --> 0:16:10.640
<v Speaker 3>He had a lot of admiration for Japanese culture values, and.

0:16:11.960 --> 0:16:14.960
<v Speaker 2>He admired late seventies, early eighties.

0:16:15.120 --> 0:16:18.280
<v Speaker 3>This was late eighties now, so we're probably in eighty nine,

0:16:18.400 --> 0:16:22.280
<v Speaker 3>something like eighty eight eighty. Yeah. Well, but Graham was

0:16:23.160 --> 0:16:27.000
<v Speaker 3>a growth investor primarily in the US, and so he

0:16:27.160 --> 0:16:30.600
<v Speaker 3>just happened to have Japanese heritage. But so my grandfather

0:16:30.640 --> 0:16:35.040
<v Speaker 3>opened account and as the time there progressed, my grandfather

0:16:35.640 --> 0:16:39.800
<v Speaker 3>was worried about his health failing. He loved the business

0:16:39.880 --> 0:16:42.400
<v Speaker 3>and he wanted to die at his desk, and so

0:16:42.480 --> 0:16:44.960
<v Speaker 3>he started asking if I would come in on the

0:16:45.000 --> 0:16:48.720
<v Speaker 3>weekends and go through his you know, his accounts with him.

0:16:48.800 --> 0:16:54.040
<v Speaker 3>And Graham, of course, was so respectful of that, and

0:16:54.160 --> 0:16:57.160
<v Speaker 3>so it was sort of a very gradual transition out.

0:16:57.200 --> 0:17:00.600
<v Speaker 3>There wasn't an end date of my time with Graham

0:17:00.680 --> 0:17:02.760
<v Speaker 3>so much as there was a start date of my

0:17:02.880 --> 0:17:04.600
<v Speaker 3>time working with my dad and father.

0:17:04.760 --> 0:17:08.879
<v Speaker 2>So your father launched Davis Advisors in nineteen sixty nine, yea,

0:17:09.560 --> 0:17:17.159
<v Speaker 2>and your grandfather was still running his Davis investing shop. Yeah, parallel.

0:17:17.320 --> 0:17:21.800
<v Speaker 2>Did they ever end up murging what happens when they

0:17:21.960 --> 0:17:25.000
<v Speaker 2>decided all right, it's you know, it's time.

0:17:25.359 --> 0:17:30.720
<v Speaker 3>Well, my father was my grandfather's only son, and as

0:17:30.880 --> 0:17:36.840
<v Speaker 3>often happens, they had a very complicated relationship, and so

0:17:36.920 --> 0:17:42.720
<v Speaker 3>they never worked together. My father grew up with his

0:17:42.920 --> 0:17:46.560
<v Speaker 3>famous name because your numbers were right. In the beginning.

0:17:46.600 --> 0:17:48.840
<v Speaker 3>It was one hundred thousand dollars that he borrowed from

0:17:48.880 --> 0:17:52.439
<v Speaker 3>his wife's family. It was eight hundred million when he died,

0:17:52.600 --> 0:17:56.080
<v Speaker 3>and it was two point two billion when his wife died,

0:17:57.280 --> 0:18:00.240
<v Speaker 3>and she was sort of the successor trustee, and then

0:18:00.280 --> 0:18:03.119
<v Speaker 3>it all went to charity after that. He didn't believe

0:18:03.119 --> 0:18:05.639
<v Speaker 3>in inheritance, but it was in trust for her and

0:18:06.040 --> 0:18:07.840
<v Speaker 3>she lived to be one hundred and six.

0:18:08.080 --> 0:18:08.480
<v Speaker 2>Wow.

0:18:08.680 --> 0:18:11.320
<v Speaker 3>Although I will tell you I managed her account, and

0:18:12.280 --> 0:18:15.520
<v Speaker 3>you know, in two thousand and eight, of course I

0:18:15.560 --> 0:18:17.000
<v Speaker 3>had to go see her and we had a lot

0:18:17.040 --> 0:18:20.520
<v Speaker 3>of financial stocks and we had a really bad mark

0:18:20.560 --> 0:18:23.919
<v Speaker 3>at the bottom, probably down forty or fifty percent. And

0:18:24.000 --> 0:18:25.880
<v Speaker 3>I went to see her in Florida and I said,

0:18:25.920 --> 0:18:29.199
<v Speaker 3>you know, grand I just I want you to know

0:18:29.280 --> 0:18:32.840
<v Speaker 3>the businesses are sound. You know, we took some body blows,

0:18:32.880 --> 0:18:35.000
<v Speaker 3>but you know, in the long run, it's going to

0:18:35.040 --> 0:18:38.600
<v Speaker 3>be fine. She said, you idiot, I'm ninety eight years old.

0:18:40.080 --> 0:18:43.080
<v Speaker 4>She said, I don't buy green bananas, and you're you're

0:18:43.200 --> 0:18:47.160
<v Speaker 4>telling me I'm down fifty percent and you go.

0:18:47.080 --> 0:18:50.679
<v Speaker 3>Get back to work. So she teached me because of

0:18:50.720 --> 0:18:53.040
<v Speaker 3>course she lived long enough to see it all come back.

0:18:53.920 --> 0:18:56.159
<v Speaker 3>But we would always she would always tease me about

0:18:56.440 --> 0:18:59.480
<v Speaker 3>not buying green bananas, and my telling her she just

0:18:59.520 --> 0:19:01.719
<v Speaker 3>had to have a little bit of a longer term perspective.

0:19:02.960 --> 0:19:06.440
<v Speaker 3>But anyway, so my my my grandfather built his firm

0:19:06.480 --> 0:19:09.320
<v Speaker 3>which was called Shelby Colin Davis and Company. My father

0:19:09.400 --> 0:19:11.800
<v Speaker 3>built his which in the beginning was called Davis, Palmer

0:19:11.840 --> 0:19:15.080
<v Speaker 3>and Biggs and Uh. And then the New York Venture

0:19:15.119 --> 0:19:18.720
<v Speaker 3>Fund was a client or a fund managed by Davis,

0:19:18.760 --> 0:19:23.760
<v Speaker 3>Palmer and Biggs. And And when I was working at Tanaka,

0:19:24.240 --> 0:19:26.760
<v Speaker 3>I went to a meeting. It was Chub Insurance, you know,

0:19:26.840 --> 0:19:29.840
<v Speaker 3>analyst day sort of thing. And there weren't that many

0:19:29.880 --> 0:19:32.000
<v Speaker 3>analysts then, so it was held around a big sort

0:19:32.000 --> 0:19:35.800
<v Speaker 3>of boardroom table, and the CEO is Dino Hare, and

0:19:35.840 --> 0:19:39.280
<v Speaker 3>he'd sit there and say, we Chubb you know this

0:19:39.480 --> 0:19:43.119
<v Speaker 3>he was it was and uh, And I looked around

0:19:43.119 --> 0:19:45.439
<v Speaker 3>the table and both my father and grandfather were at

0:19:45.440 --> 0:19:48.880
<v Speaker 3>the same meeting by chance, and uh and I thought

0:19:48.960 --> 0:19:53.000
<v Speaker 3>this seems a little nuts and uh uh. And so

0:19:54.040 --> 0:19:56.800
<v Speaker 3>you know, I spoke to them both because I was

0:19:56.920 --> 0:20:00.080
<v Speaker 3>very close with them both. And you know, one of

0:20:00.080 --> 0:20:02.320
<v Speaker 3>of the things my father was very clear on is

0:20:02.359 --> 0:20:05.240
<v Speaker 3>he wanted out at age sixty. He said, I'm not

0:20:05.560 --> 0:20:09.560
<v Speaker 3>yep our age. Yeah, hard stop. And here was my

0:20:09.680 --> 0:20:12.720
<v Speaker 3>grandfather at the time, and he was probably in his

0:20:13.240 --> 0:20:18.200
<v Speaker 3>late eighties and early eighties probably then, and he said,

0:20:18.320 --> 0:20:20.600
<v Speaker 3>you know, I want to die at my desk. I mean,

0:20:20.640 --> 0:20:23.480
<v Speaker 3>he was the one that called investing the best game

0:20:23.520 --> 0:20:25.800
<v Speaker 3>in town. He would say, this is the best game

0:20:25.840 --> 0:20:30.359
<v Speaker 3>in town. He loved his firm. He loved now his firm,

0:20:30.359 --> 0:20:33.960
<v Speaker 3>well most of it was his own capital, and so

0:20:34.119 --> 0:20:36.000
<v Speaker 3>in a way he was just managing his own but

0:20:36.080 --> 0:20:39.639
<v Speaker 3>he loved being in the flow. He loved in a way,

0:20:39.400 --> 0:20:42.600
<v Speaker 3>my grandfather loved being a great man. You know. He

0:20:42.640 --> 0:20:46.040
<v Speaker 3>had served as an ambassador, He was a co founder

0:20:46.119 --> 0:20:49.440
<v Speaker 3>of the Heritage Foundation chairman for a long time. He

0:20:49.440 --> 0:20:54.119
<v Speaker 3>had very conservative political views, although that was slightly different

0:20:54.200 --> 0:20:58.439
<v Speaker 3>organization twenty five years ago than it is now. But

0:20:58.560 --> 0:21:01.240
<v Speaker 3>he was a passionate Reagan Republican and sort of a

0:21:01.280 --> 0:21:07.600
<v Speaker 3>Hoover Institute sort of Republican, and his namesake, Shelby Cullum, was,

0:21:08.359 --> 0:21:12.080
<v Speaker 3>you know, a Republican senator and governor under Lincoln. So

0:21:12.240 --> 0:21:14.800
<v Speaker 3>I mean, you know, it was it was in him deep.

0:21:15.200 --> 0:21:19.439
<v Speaker 3>And so he loved the game, and it wouldn't have

0:21:19.520 --> 0:21:23.760
<v Speaker 3>occurred to him to stop working. My father loved investing,

0:21:23.800 --> 0:21:27.400
<v Speaker 3>but he did not like the responsibility of the business.

0:21:27.520 --> 0:21:31.760
<v Speaker 3>He didn't like boards and clients and you know, employees.

0:21:31.840 --> 0:21:36.879
<v Speaker 3>That was not his thing. Is much more a wonderful

0:21:37.400 --> 0:21:40.560
<v Speaker 3>human being, but very different than my grandfather. So he

0:21:40.640 --> 0:21:44.679
<v Speaker 3>wanted out before he turned sixty. My grandfather wanted to

0:21:44.720 --> 0:21:46.560
<v Speaker 3>die at his desk. And I thought, well, here I am.

0:21:46.600 --> 0:21:48.880
<v Speaker 3>I don't know what I am at the time, twenty

0:21:48.920 --> 0:21:52.480
<v Speaker 3>six or something. I was like, well, here's a great idea.

0:21:52.480 --> 0:21:56.640
<v Speaker 3>Why don't we merge the companies and then I'll come

0:21:56.680 --> 0:21:59.320
<v Speaker 3>in and you know, I'll learn from both of you.

0:22:00.119 --> 0:22:03.080
<v Speaker 3>And I was an SNL and a banking analyst then,

0:22:03.119 --> 0:22:05.720
<v Speaker 3>and of course this was going right into the teeth

0:22:05.760 --> 0:22:08.600
<v Speaker 3>of the SNL crisis, so it was an exciting time

0:22:08.640 --> 0:22:13.199
<v Speaker 3>to invest. And then you know, we'll figure out a

0:22:13.200 --> 0:22:14.720
<v Speaker 3>way for the three of us to do.

0:22:14.680 --> 0:22:17.000
<v Speaker 2>It, and how long did it take for that to

0:22:17.080 --> 0:22:17.920
<v Speaker 2>all come together?

0:22:18.119 --> 0:22:23.520
<v Speaker 3>I think my grandfather my father turned sixty in nineteen

0:22:23.640 --> 0:22:28.359
<v Speaker 3>ninety seven, nineteen ninety eight, somewhere like that. And my

0:22:28.480 --> 0:22:30.720
<v Speaker 3>grandfather died six.

0:22:32.080 --> 0:22:33.680
<v Speaker 2>Eighty six something like that, you.

0:22:33.640 --> 0:22:40.840
<v Speaker 3>Know, don't quiz me. And then my grandfather died in

0:22:41.400 --> 0:22:45.280
<v Speaker 3>let's see, nineteen ninety four, so I have to say

0:22:45.320 --> 0:22:48.439
<v Speaker 3>he was eighty six or eighty seven when he died,

0:22:48.640 --> 0:22:52.520
<v Speaker 3>and so in a way, the timing all sort of

0:22:52.640 --> 0:22:56.560
<v Speaker 3>overlapped beautifully. And so my grandfather worked almost to the end.

0:22:57.320 --> 0:23:00.520
<v Speaker 3>My father helped coach me through that transition, and then

0:23:00.720 --> 0:23:03.359
<v Speaker 3>he walked out the door in nineteen ninety eight, and

0:23:04.400 --> 0:23:08.480
<v Speaker 3>that was that. And wow, he's been an incredible mentor.

0:23:08.600 --> 0:23:11.960
<v Speaker 3>He's always available to talk, but as he said, I'm

0:23:12.000 --> 0:23:14.200
<v Speaker 3>here to give you advice, I'm not giving any orders.

0:23:14.840 --> 0:23:17.879
<v Speaker 3>And he didn't sit on our boards, and you know,

0:23:17.960 --> 0:23:23.600
<v Speaker 3>he just walked out, and just like my grandfather, started

0:23:23.600 --> 0:23:28.240
<v Speaker 3>giving his money away. And he's you know, he created

0:23:28.320 --> 0:23:32.960
<v Speaker 3>and oversees the largest international scholarship program on earth.

0:23:33.560 --> 0:23:37.760
<v Speaker 2>Really, yeah, I know there's a foundation. I haven't read

0:23:37.800 --> 0:23:42.760
<v Speaker 2>the book, but online there's John Rothchild, who was I

0:23:42.800 --> 0:23:47.200
<v Speaker 2>think Peter Lynch's Yeah, author lovely man, the Davis Dynasty.

0:23:48.119 --> 0:23:54.600
<v Speaker 2>How odd is it to have, like, hey, you know

0:23:54.680 --> 0:23:57.480
<v Speaker 2>this story, the game isn't over and you're you're writing

0:23:57.520 --> 0:24:00.600
<v Speaker 2>this book. How odd is it to be art of

0:24:00.680 --> 0:24:01.680
<v Speaker 2>a book like that?

0:24:02.320 --> 0:24:05.920
<v Speaker 3>Well, you know, first, it's probably a book read by

0:24:05.960 --> 0:24:08.840
<v Speaker 3>dozens of people nationwide because remember it is the riveting

0:24:09.040 --> 0:24:12.479
<v Speaker 3>biography of the dean of insurance stocks. So it's not

0:24:12.640 --> 0:24:14.560
<v Speaker 3>you know, that's a pretty narrow.

0:24:14.600 --> 0:24:17.560
<v Speaker 2>Narrow pool, not a hot seller yourself.

0:24:17.600 --> 0:24:22.800
<v Speaker 3>And I do think I experienced the writing of that

0:24:22.880 --> 0:24:27.200
<v Speaker 3>book as you know, sort of terrifying, you know, really, yeah,

0:24:27.280 --> 0:24:29.680
<v Speaker 3>because it was a lot to live up to. Well,

0:24:29.680 --> 0:24:33.600
<v Speaker 3>it's a lot to live up to. And I will

0:24:33.640 --> 0:24:37.960
<v Speaker 3>say it's it's something that I'm just profoundly grateful to

0:24:38.000 --> 0:24:40.760
<v Speaker 3>my dad, well really to both of them. But my

0:24:40.880 --> 0:24:45.199
<v Speaker 3>dad was is a very humble person. And you know,

0:24:45.280 --> 0:24:48.600
<v Speaker 3>when you in that book, it is, you know, ninety

0:24:48.640 --> 0:24:52.399
<v Speaker 3>percent about my grandfather. And my dad was, you know,

0:24:52.560 --> 0:24:55.720
<v Speaker 3>sort of what I call a quiet doer. He loved investing,

0:24:55.760 --> 0:25:00.040
<v Speaker 3>he loved research, but he was very low profile and

0:25:00.240 --> 0:25:04.000
<v Speaker 3>so his view was very much that despite the sort

0:25:04.040 --> 0:25:07.439
<v Speaker 3>of graphic title, this is really a book about his father,

0:25:07.800 --> 0:25:12.680
<v Speaker 3>and I think that that's true. And in fact, when

0:25:13.040 --> 0:25:18.040
<v Speaker 3>we at our firm, we made slim down versions of

0:25:18.080 --> 0:25:21.800
<v Speaker 3>that book and called it the Davis Discipline instead, which

0:25:21.880 --> 0:25:25.120
<v Speaker 3>was much more consistent with our sort of view of life,

0:25:26.160 --> 0:25:31.680
<v Speaker 3>because you know, dynasty implies sort of dynastic wealth, it

0:25:31.720 --> 0:25:34.359
<v Speaker 3>implies inherent and there's no inherent and there was that

0:25:34.480 --> 0:25:35.919
<v Speaker 3>was none of that, which, as.

0:25:35.880 --> 0:25:39.240
<v Speaker 2>I would imagine, people would be surprised to learn.

0:25:39.800 --> 0:25:44.520
<v Speaker 3>Yeah, and it's funny, it's it's not something I'm quite

0:25:44.520 --> 0:25:45.600
<v Speaker 3>as fanatic about.

0:25:46.400 --> 0:25:49.879
<v Speaker 2>Well, Warren Buffett is a big believer in, hey, if

0:25:49.920 --> 0:25:53.560
<v Speaker 2>you give your kids, you should give your kids enough.

0:25:53.600 --> 0:25:55.840
<v Speaker 2>I know, I'm going to mangle this. Give them enough

0:25:55.920 --> 0:25:58.360
<v Speaker 2>money so they could do anything, but not so much

0:25:58.400 --> 0:26:00.240
<v Speaker 2>money that they can do nothing.

0:26:00.280 --> 0:26:03.440
<v Speaker 3>You didn't mangle it. You stuck the landing. That's exactly,

0:26:03.480 --> 0:26:06.320
<v Speaker 3>and that is exactly the right floss. And I would say,

0:26:06.680 --> 0:26:09.080
<v Speaker 3>you know, my father, my grandfather sort of believed that.

0:26:09.160 --> 0:26:13.119
<v Speaker 3>I mean, I have siblings that you know where you

0:26:13.200 --> 0:26:16.399
<v Speaker 3>know they were helped out, and you know I had

0:26:16.440 --> 0:26:20.760
<v Speaker 3>an aunt. You know that that my my grandfather left

0:26:20.800 --> 0:26:23.560
<v Speaker 3>some money to to ensure that she and her kids

0:26:23.560 --> 0:26:27.960
<v Speaker 3>would be all right and so on. So it wasn't ruthless,

0:26:28.000 --> 0:26:30.440
<v Speaker 3>and I think, but I think there was. It came

0:26:30.480 --> 0:26:32.520
<v Speaker 3>from a place of sort of compassion. I mean the

0:26:32.680 --> 0:26:36.240
<v Speaker 3>sort of view that you know, there's something dignified about

0:26:36.280 --> 0:26:42.080
<v Speaker 3>burning your way in the world, and and I think

0:26:42.160 --> 0:26:46.480
<v Speaker 3>there's you know, the idea of wanting well, look, Barry,

0:26:46.560 --> 0:26:48.800
<v Speaker 3>let's I mean, if you look at the greater world,

0:26:49.480 --> 0:26:52.679
<v Speaker 3>there's a lot of fear. And fear can be a motivator,

0:26:53.119 --> 0:26:56.560
<v Speaker 3>but God, is it a weight to you know, people live,

0:26:57.359 --> 0:27:01.679
<v Speaker 3>you know, one operation away from bankruptcy or you know,

0:27:02.119 --> 0:27:05.880
<v Speaker 3>a layoff away from being foreclosed on. That is it.

0:27:05.920 --> 0:27:08.879
<v Speaker 3>I mean, if you as a parent can put a

0:27:08.880 --> 0:27:11.840
<v Speaker 3>safety net if our society doesn't, if you as a

0:27:11.840 --> 0:27:13.879
<v Speaker 3>parent can do that for your kids. And my grandfather

0:27:14.000 --> 0:27:16.240
<v Speaker 3>did that, and my father did that, there was I

0:27:16.280 --> 0:27:18.199
<v Speaker 3>don't think we ever grew up with a feeling that

0:27:18.240 --> 0:27:21.600
<v Speaker 3>there wasn't a safety net. And so the freedom from

0:27:21.640 --> 0:27:25.000
<v Speaker 3>that fear is a huge gift you give your kids.

0:27:25.080 --> 0:27:26.760
<v Speaker 3>It was a huge gift that was given to me.

0:27:27.400 --> 0:27:30.400
<v Speaker 3>And that's what gives you the confidence to be able

0:27:30.440 --> 0:27:33.679
<v Speaker 3>to try anything right because you're not worried that you know,

0:27:34.280 --> 0:27:37.080
<v Speaker 3>especially when you start having kids, and you think, my god,

0:27:37.119 --> 0:27:39.800
<v Speaker 3>if you know, I can't I can't take this risk.

0:27:40.080 --> 0:27:43.439
<v Speaker 3>I can't leave State Street. You know. It's it's like

0:27:43.520 --> 0:27:45.520
<v Speaker 3>it never occurred to me that I couldn't leave and

0:27:45.760 --> 0:27:51.240
<v Speaker 3>and and so I but I think their view was,

0:27:51.440 --> 0:27:55.639
<v Speaker 3>you know, if you raise your kids with you know.

0:27:55.880 --> 0:27:58.960
<v Speaker 3>The fortunate thing was both my dad and my grandfather

0:27:59.000 --> 0:28:02.680
<v Speaker 3>were very frugal, and so we didn't live in hardship.

0:28:03.000 --> 0:28:05.760
<v Speaker 3>But we certainly didn't go to Southampton and Palm Beach

0:28:05.840 --> 0:28:09.080
<v Speaker 3>and Aspen and you know that was all uh, you know,

0:28:09.119 --> 0:28:12.399
<v Speaker 3>they had a very sort of puritanical sense of that

0:28:12.400 --> 0:28:15.320
<v Speaker 3>that you know, that sort of view that uh, you know,

0:28:15.400 --> 0:28:17.240
<v Speaker 3>we went out to Fire Island and we had a

0:28:17.400 --> 0:28:20.680
<v Speaker 3>house on stilts that I still have a house out there,

0:28:21.119 --> 0:28:23.840
<v Speaker 3>you know, and it's in a swamp and and uh,

0:28:24.160 --> 0:28:27.320
<v Speaker 3>you know, it's one storm away from the end, and

0:28:27.480 --> 0:28:30.200
<v Speaker 3>there's no cars. You take a little aerry out there,

0:28:30.240 --> 0:28:33.080
<v Speaker 3>and and you know, I always think of it as

0:28:33.080 --> 0:28:36.959
<v Speaker 3>the anti Hampton's uh very much. Yeah, and so and

0:28:37.000 --> 0:28:40.440
<v Speaker 3>that's that's what what I love. And and uh, and

0:28:40.800 --> 0:28:43.480
<v Speaker 3>you know, my parents had a place in Maine, but

0:28:43.560 --> 0:28:46.320
<v Speaker 3>it was just you know, it was no not a

0:28:46.360 --> 0:28:51.600
<v Speaker 3>fanily deal. Yeah, they had a nice house, but it

0:28:51.680 --> 0:28:55.680
<v Speaker 3>wasn't it wasn't a Newport mansion. And they had it because,

0:28:55.760 --> 0:28:57.720
<v Speaker 3>you know, they used to call them in the twenties,

0:28:58.080 --> 0:29:01.080
<v Speaker 3>people like my grandparents were called rusty caters. Isn't that

0:29:01.120 --> 0:29:03.160
<v Speaker 3>a funny word? And it was people that were wealthy

0:29:03.200 --> 0:29:05.959
<v Speaker 3>but would go and live very simply in the summer,

0:29:06.080 --> 0:29:09.440
<v Speaker 3>you know, very and that it's very much just sort

0:29:09.440 --> 0:29:13.680
<v Speaker 3>of a Scandinavian ethic, and I think it developed especially

0:29:13.760 --> 0:29:16.760
<v Speaker 3>in the late nineteenth century. There was a movement called

0:29:16.800 --> 0:29:22.000
<v Speaker 3>the Chautauqua Movement that I'm still a supporter of, which

0:29:22.040 --> 0:29:25.120
<v Speaker 3>basically said, as the bourgeoisie and wealth was being created,

0:29:25.640 --> 0:29:31.120
<v Speaker 3>there was this one branch of wealth creators that decided

0:29:31.160 --> 0:29:34.840
<v Speaker 3>they wanted to be English aristocrats and they built mansions

0:29:35.240 --> 0:29:39.080
<v Speaker 3>in Newport and they had yachts. And then there was

0:29:39.120 --> 0:29:42.240
<v Speaker 3>another branch that sort of said that's not the American

0:29:42.280 --> 0:29:46.880
<v Speaker 3>way and they and in many ways, I mean Rockefeller

0:29:46.920 --> 0:29:49.320
<v Speaker 3>in many ways embodied a certain amount of that, that

0:29:49.440 --> 0:29:53.600
<v Speaker 3>sense of stewardship some or even more extreme in terms

0:29:53.680 --> 0:29:59.080
<v Speaker 3>of restraint. But the Chautauqua movement sprung up and said

0:30:00.000 --> 0:30:03.440
<v Speaker 3>they created these there's still one left. It's in upstate

0:30:03.480 --> 0:30:06.120
<v Speaker 3>New York. But where you would go with your family

0:30:06.240 --> 0:30:09.440
<v Speaker 3>for self improvement and you would live simply and there

0:30:09.440 --> 0:30:12.960
<v Speaker 3>would be lectures, there would be you would improve your mind,

0:30:13.080 --> 0:30:15.760
<v Speaker 3>you'd improve your soul, and you'd improve your health, and

0:30:15.800 --> 0:30:18.040
<v Speaker 3>you'd bring your kids and there would be sort of

0:30:18.080 --> 0:30:21.000
<v Speaker 3>daycamp for the kids, and there'd be church on Sunday.

0:30:21.240 --> 0:30:24.920
<v Speaker 3>But it was a non denominational church that was about service,

0:30:25.040 --> 0:30:27.920
<v Speaker 3>and then there was you know, there were lectures. It's

0:30:27.920 --> 0:30:31.760
<v Speaker 3>where Solomon Rushdie was stabbed. If you remember a couple

0:30:31.800 --> 0:30:34.640
<v Speaker 3>of years ago, he was in Chautauqua. He was lecturing

0:30:34.800 --> 0:30:37.680
<v Speaker 3>at this place that still exists. People go for a

0:30:37.720 --> 0:30:40.440
<v Speaker 3>week or two weeks every year. So that's what the

0:30:40.440 --> 0:30:42.760
<v Speaker 3>place I go on Fire Island was part of that

0:30:42.880 --> 0:30:45.800
<v Speaker 3>Chautauqua movement. But the ethos of it, I think is

0:30:45.840 --> 0:30:48.920
<v Speaker 3>something my parents and grandparents really subscribed to.

0:30:49.160 --> 0:30:53.400
<v Speaker 2>Huh, really really fascinating. Coming up, we continue our conversation

0:30:53.520 --> 0:30:58.320
<v Speaker 2>with Chris Davis, chairman and portfolio manager at Davis Advisors,

0:30:58.960 --> 0:31:05.040
<v Speaker 2>discussing how he developed his philosophy and investment process at Davis.

0:31:05.480 --> 0:31:09.040
<v Speaker 2>I'm Barry Ridults, you're listening to Masters in Business on

0:31:09.160 --> 0:31:28.040
<v Speaker 2>Bloomberg Radio. I'm Barry Ridults. You're listening to Masters in

0:31:28.120 --> 0:31:32.680
<v Speaker 2>Business on Bloomberg Radio. Chris Davis is my extra special guest.

0:31:32.760 --> 0:31:36.400
<v Speaker 2>He is the chairman of Davis Advisors. In two thousand

0:31:36.400 --> 0:31:40.520
<v Speaker 2>and five, he was named Morning Stars Portfolio Manager of

0:31:40.560 --> 0:31:45.040
<v Speaker 2>the Year. He helps to oversee twenty billion dollars in

0:31:45.120 --> 0:31:49.400
<v Speaker 2>client assets, a healthy chunk of which is he and

0:31:49.560 --> 0:31:57.720
<v Speaker 2>his colleagues. We briefly mentioned Buffett earlier when I later on,

0:31:57.760 --> 0:32:01.200
<v Speaker 2>I get to ask people who they're meant were. But

0:32:01.280 --> 0:32:03.960
<v Speaker 2>I have to bring this to this part of the conversation.

0:32:05.040 --> 0:32:09.360
<v Speaker 2>Warren Buffett and Charlie Munger were your mentors. Is this

0:32:09.520 --> 0:32:13.640
<v Speaker 2>remotely true? It just seems insane. Oh.

0:32:13.760 --> 0:32:17.440
<v Speaker 3>I mean it started and I want to say it

0:32:17.480 --> 0:32:23.280
<v Speaker 3>was nineteen might have been nineteen ninety ninety.

0:32:23.040 --> 0:32:27.440
<v Speaker 2>So he's already a well known investing rock star at

0:32:27.440 --> 0:32:27.800
<v Speaker 2>that point.

0:32:27.840 --> 0:32:30.440
<v Speaker 3>Well, the way it really started was with Charlie. I

0:32:30.480 --> 0:32:34.240
<v Speaker 3>met Charlie long before Warren. Oh really. But the reason

0:32:34.400 --> 0:32:38.000
<v Speaker 3>was I was trying to sell a business my grandfather.

0:32:38.160 --> 0:32:40.720
<v Speaker 3>As I started going through his accounts and going in

0:32:40.760 --> 0:32:44.800
<v Speaker 3>there on the weekends. He had a business called securities lending.

0:32:44.840 --> 0:32:49.440
<v Speaker 3>And I don't know how well you know that your business.

0:32:48.000 --> 0:32:50.400
<v Speaker 2>And anytime you're in a short stock, you gotta need

0:32:50.480 --> 0:32:53.000
<v Speaker 2>to borrow somebody, and it's going to cost you a little.

0:32:52.720 --> 0:32:54.880
<v Speaker 3>It's going to cost you a little margin. So my

0:32:55.080 --> 0:32:58.840
<v Speaker 3>grandfather's view was he had a portfolio of appreciated stocks

0:32:58.880 --> 0:33:01.400
<v Speaker 3>that he was never going to sell, and he said,

0:33:01.400 --> 0:33:04.360
<v Speaker 3>if somebody wants to short the stock and pay me

0:33:04.920 --> 0:33:08.600
<v Speaker 3>to borrow it, fine, And you the number one borrowed

0:33:08.640 --> 0:33:13.120
<v Speaker 3>stock in those days was Birkshaw, of course, because you

0:33:13.120 --> 0:33:17.120
<v Speaker 3>couldn't borrow it anywhere because everybody had the certificates and

0:33:17.160 --> 0:33:20.240
<v Speaker 3>you know they weren't literally, yeah, there was no There

0:33:20.320 --> 0:33:23.200
<v Speaker 3>was very little Berkshire that was in street name. It

0:33:23.240 --> 0:33:26.000
<v Speaker 3>was in individual pew and therefore you couldn't borrow it.

0:33:25.920 --> 0:33:27.400
<v Speaker 2>It was locked away in safe.

0:33:27.480 --> 0:33:31.080
<v Speaker 3>Yeah. So he had a big holding and he had

0:33:31.400 --> 0:33:35.840
<v Speaker 3>a broker dealer, Shelby cam Davis was a registered broker dealer,

0:33:36.240 --> 0:33:39.560
<v Speaker 3>and so he could lead down the shares and make

0:33:39.600 --> 0:33:43.040
<v Speaker 3>a couple hundred basis points a year extra return on

0:33:43.120 --> 0:33:46.120
<v Speaker 3>top of the Berkshire return. So that's how he started

0:33:46.160 --> 0:33:51.080
<v Speaker 3>in the securities lending business. But gradually the guy who

0:33:51.160 --> 0:33:54.280
<v Speaker 3>was doing it for him and administering it. Said well,

0:33:54.360 --> 0:33:57.040
<v Speaker 3>you know, we could also help. We've got all these

0:33:57.080 --> 0:33:59.680
<v Speaker 3>people that want to short all sorts of different securities,

0:34:00.080 --> 0:34:02.440
<v Speaker 3>and we can be act as what was called a

0:34:02.440 --> 0:34:05.800
<v Speaker 3>broker finder. We'll go out and find the securities for

0:34:05.880 --> 0:34:08.480
<v Speaker 3>these people to short, and we'll make a little a

0:34:08.520 --> 0:34:13.120
<v Speaker 3>little spread as they go through. Well, this business grew

0:34:13.239 --> 0:34:15.200
<v Speaker 3>and grew and grew, and soon there were you know,

0:34:15.320 --> 0:34:19.080
<v Speaker 3>seventeen employees in this securities lending business, and it was

0:34:19.120 --> 0:34:24.319
<v Speaker 3>a big operation. And my grandfather by then was you know,

0:34:24.440 --> 0:34:29.040
<v Speaker 3>probably in his eighties, and was nervous because, you know,

0:34:29.080 --> 0:34:31.760
<v Speaker 3>as I went through the list of counterparties with him,

0:34:31.920 --> 0:34:33.880
<v Speaker 3>there were firms we had never heard of. There was

0:34:33.920 --> 0:34:40.799
<v Speaker 3>this one called l TCM, and he and I said,

0:34:40.800 --> 0:34:44.000
<v Speaker 3>what is this LTCM. We've got like, you know, five

0:34:44.080 --> 0:34:47.120
<v Speaker 3>eight hundred million dollars lent out to them. What oh,

0:34:47.200 --> 0:34:52.480
<v Speaker 3>that's long term capital management. So we talked about it.

0:34:52.520 --> 0:34:54.279
<v Speaker 3>He said, yeah, I think we've got we got to

0:34:54.320 --> 0:34:55.879
<v Speaker 3>get it. We got to get rid of this thing.

0:34:56.320 --> 0:34:58.200
<v Speaker 3>That reminds me by the way of what Jerry side.

0:34:58.320 --> 0:35:00.680
<v Speaker 2>Wait, did he hold on to that business? So did they?

0:35:00.680 --> 0:35:04.040
<v Speaker 3>So I said to him, like you know, we got

0:35:04.040 --> 0:35:06.439
<v Speaker 3>to get rid of this thing. And he said, fine, well,

0:35:06.440 --> 0:35:08.520
<v Speaker 3>see if you can find somebody to take it over,

0:35:08.520 --> 0:35:11.319
<v Speaker 3>because we do have seventeen employees and you know, they

0:35:11.400 --> 0:35:13.840
<v Speaker 3>made their careers here. We're not going to fire everybody.

0:35:13.920 --> 0:35:17.399
<v Speaker 3>And so we started calling around and I thought, what

0:35:17.520 --> 0:35:20.520
<v Speaker 3>characteristics do we need. We need a lot of excess capital,

0:35:21.280 --> 0:35:26.239
<v Speaker 3>I help. Ideally an appreciated portfolio of securities, you know,

0:35:26.280 --> 0:35:29.760
<v Speaker 3>sort of a triple A type balance sheet, and somebody

0:35:29.760 --> 0:35:35.120
<v Speaker 3>that can understand. So I thought, well, Berkshire. So a

0:35:35.160 --> 0:35:40.200
<v Speaker 3>wonderful friend in those days named Bob Lensner, who was

0:35:40.239 --> 0:35:43.920
<v Speaker 3>a reporter at Forbes but was very I recall I had.

0:35:43.920 --> 0:35:47.480
<v Speaker 2>Lunch with him at I want to say, the Harvard Club.

0:35:47.920 --> 0:35:49.080
<v Speaker 2>I think he was an alumnus.

0:35:49.200 --> 0:35:52.680
<v Speaker 3>They could have been his kids, our kids were. Our

0:35:52.760 --> 0:35:56.640
<v Speaker 3>kids were in the same elementary school. And I got

0:35:56.719 --> 0:35:59.560
<v Speaker 3>to know him just, you know, watching basketball game but

0:35:59.680 --> 0:36:02.680
<v Speaker 3>third graders or something, and he was and I have

0:36:03.040 --> 0:36:05.320
<v Speaker 3>you know, I heard his name around and he said

0:36:06.360 --> 0:36:09.319
<v Speaker 3>he mentioned casually in the conversation that he had met

0:36:09.320 --> 0:36:12.680
<v Speaker 3>this brilliant guy, Charlie Munger. And I said, well, I

0:36:13.239 --> 0:36:16.040
<v Speaker 3>you know, I know Charlie is but I'm dying to

0:36:16.080 --> 0:36:19.160
<v Speaker 3>meet him, and so Bob arranged for us to have breakfast,

0:36:19.719 --> 0:36:22.560
<v Speaker 3>and Charlie was in New York and I went down.

0:36:22.600 --> 0:36:25.359
<v Speaker 3>It was at the Millennium Hotel down by the World

0:36:25.440 --> 0:36:29.800
<v Speaker 3>Trade Center, and I went down and I sat down

0:36:29.880 --> 0:36:32.760
<v Speaker 3>and introduced mister Munger. Pleased to meet you. I'm Chris David,

0:36:33.080 --> 0:36:35.360
<v Speaker 3>and I said, you know, I'm working with my grandfather.

0:36:35.440 --> 0:36:37.279
<v Speaker 3>Shall we call him David's a company? And have I

0:36:37.360 --> 0:36:42.600
<v Speaker 3>got a business for you? And I pitched our securities

0:36:42.800 --> 0:36:45.880
<v Speaker 3>lending business, and Charlie put up his hand after about

0:36:45.920 --> 0:36:48.719
<v Speaker 3>four minutes and he said, I have no intention of

0:36:48.760 --> 0:36:52.600
<v Speaker 3>buying a business run by seven guys named Vinnie.

0:36:53.920 --> 0:36:55.120
<v Speaker 2>And Verry.

0:36:55.200 --> 0:36:58.680
<v Speaker 3>It was the perfect description. I mean, we had Vinnie, Tony, Mikey, Nikki,

0:36:58.719 --> 0:37:03.200
<v Speaker 3>you know. And so we did end up finding finding

0:37:03.440 --> 0:37:07.080
<v Speaker 3>a buyer eventually. Yeah, And it wasn't really a buyer.

0:37:07.120 --> 0:37:08.920
<v Speaker 3>We just did sort of an earn out. We just

0:37:08.960 --> 0:37:11.919
<v Speaker 3>wanted everybody. We just wanted them to have jobs. And

0:37:12.000 --> 0:37:14.360
<v Speaker 3>so they all got a job at a broker dealer.

0:37:14.440 --> 0:37:17.000
<v Speaker 2>And so beyond the pitch to monger how to do

0:37:17.000 --> 0:37:17.920
<v Speaker 2>your relationships well?

0:37:18.000 --> 0:37:21.000
<v Speaker 3>So the pitch ended in four and a half minutes,

0:37:21.600 --> 0:37:23.919
<v Speaker 3>and so I said, well, I'm sorry I wasted your time.

0:37:23.960 --> 0:37:25.359
<v Speaker 3>And I got up to leave, and he said, where

0:37:25.360 --> 0:37:28.200
<v Speaker 3>are you going? And I said, well, I just don't leave.

0:37:28.360 --> 0:37:31.080
<v Speaker 3>I'm only just getting to know you. I'm not interested

0:37:31.080 --> 0:37:33.399
<v Speaker 3>in your business. But tell me about you and tell

0:37:33.440 --> 0:37:38.400
<v Speaker 3>me and we got talking about, you know, a few things.

0:37:38.800 --> 0:37:42.680
<v Speaker 3>But what really happened was I started listening. And so

0:37:42.719 --> 0:37:45.960
<v Speaker 3>you can tell I like to talk around Charlie. I

0:37:46.080 --> 0:37:49.360
<v Speaker 3>just listened as much as I could, and we sat

0:37:49.400 --> 0:37:52.799
<v Speaker 3>at that table till lunchtime. Charlie said, I have to

0:37:52.840 --> 0:37:56.000
<v Speaker 3>go to a lunch but if you find yourself in

0:37:56.040 --> 0:37:59.560
<v Speaker 3>Los Angeles, give me a call and I'll make time

0:37:59.600 --> 0:38:03.000
<v Speaker 3>for you. And so of course I started going to

0:38:03.280 --> 0:38:08.800
<v Speaker 3>Los Angeles pretty regularly. And so that was a huge

0:38:08.840 --> 0:38:13.799
<v Speaker 3>gift in my life. And it was a gift professionally,

0:38:13.840 --> 0:38:15.960
<v Speaker 3>but my god, it was a gift personally. I mean,

0:38:15.960 --> 0:38:19.720
<v Speaker 3>he helped me through some hard times in my personal life.

0:38:19.800 --> 0:38:23.080
<v Speaker 3>I mean he was just a wonderful mentor in every dimension.

0:38:23.360 --> 0:38:26.480
<v Speaker 2>So there is a lot of things that all of

0:38:26.560 --> 0:38:30.400
<v Speaker 2>us have learned from Warren and Charlie, through the letters,

0:38:30.400 --> 0:38:33.920
<v Speaker 2>through the annual meetings, through just all sorts of stuff.

0:38:34.480 --> 0:38:38.040
<v Speaker 2>I'm curious, what did you learn from Charlie that none

0:38:38.080 --> 0:38:49.440
<v Speaker 2>of us can find in the public materials. Well, good question.

0:38:49.880 --> 0:38:55.400
<v Speaker 3>I think most deeply, I learned about integrity in the

0:38:55.600 --> 0:39:01.239
<v Speaker 3>traditional sense, meaning wholeness. Charlie was a whole person. He

0:39:02.080 --> 0:39:05.439
<v Speaker 3>the alignment. What he thought, what he said, what he did,

0:39:05.960 --> 0:39:10.880
<v Speaker 3>they were all the same thing. And his sense of

0:39:12.440 --> 0:39:20.680
<v Speaker 3>his own code of being was so disciplined, but was

0:39:20.719 --> 0:39:23.839
<v Speaker 3>filled with this sort of you know, his reputation as

0:39:23.840 --> 0:39:28.279
<v Speaker 3>a curmudgeon may have been cultivated, I never saw it.

0:39:28.360 --> 0:39:31.600
<v Speaker 3>He was a truth speaker, but he was also, in

0:39:31.640 --> 0:39:36.320
<v Speaker 3>a very profound way, a very loving person, a very cheerful,

0:39:37.040 --> 0:39:43.359
<v Speaker 3>very committed, profoundly loyal, and so it was, you know.

0:39:44.200 --> 0:39:46.480
<v Speaker 3>I used to sort of joke that if I did

0:39:46.520 --> 0:39:49.120
<v Speaker 3>a ven diagram of the things that I admire about

0:39:49.160 --> 0:39:51.680
<v Speaker 3>my father and the things I admire about Charlie Munger,

0:39:51.920 --> 0:39:56.400
<v Speaker 3>there's surprisingly little overlap. They were both frugal, but my

0:39:56.960 --> 0:40:02.799
<v Speaker 3>Charlie didn't was an incredibly broad thinker. My father was

0:40:02.960 --> 0:40:07.200
<v Speaker 3>just single minded about investing. Charlie was curious in everything.

0:40:08.520 --> 0:40:15.360
<v Speaker 3>Charlie was very sort of committed to relationship, continuity, to breadth.

0:40:15.560 --> 0:40:19.000
<v Speaker 3>My father is very sort of specialized. Very Now, my

0:40:19.080 --> 0:40:24.879
<v Speaker 3>father is incredibly physically fit and remains to this day

0:40:25.400 --> 0:40:31.759
<v Speaker 3>very vigorous. You know, Charlie was willfully sedentary. You know,

0:40:31.880 --> 0:40:35.520
<v Speaker 3>my father is very nomadic. And Charlie went to the

0:40:35.560 --> 0:40:38.840
<v Speaker 3>same island in Minnesota and the same lived in the

0:40:38.880 --> 0:40:42.520
<v Speaker 3>same house his whole life. You know, it's very you know,

0:40:42.800 --> 0:40:45.400
<v Speaker 3>very much a creature of habit and so they were

0:40:45.520 --> 0:40:46.520
<v Speaker 3>very different that way.

0:40:46.760 --> 0:40:49.719
<v Speaker 2>Just imagine if Charlie exercised, how much longer he could

0:40:49.719 --> 0:40:50.040
<v Speaker 2>have left.

0:40:50.120 --> 0:40:52.439
<v Speaker 3>I don't know. Ninety nine and three quoters is pretty good.

0:40:53.560 --> 0:40:55.239
<v Speaker 3>That's one of the things he said. He said, I'm

0:40:55.280 --> 0:40:56.640
<v Speaker 3>not sure I see the alignment.

0:40:58.320 --> 0:41:01.920
<v Speaker 2>So let's talk a little bit about the returns and

0:41:02.000 --> 0:41:07.840
<v Speaker 2>about the philosophy. Back of the envelope. I calculated Davis

0:41:07.880 --> 0:41:12.839
<v Speaker 2>Advisors has been compounding shareholder wealth at greater than ten

0:41:12.880 --> 0:41:16.880
<v Speaker 2>percent annually since nineteen sixty nine. Does that sound remotely?

0:41:17.239 --> 0:41:20.799
<v Speaker 3>That sounds right. You're still ahead of the market from

0:41:20.800 --> 0:41:22.120
<v Speaker 3>the beginnings.

0:41:21.880 --> 0:41:25.239
<v Speaker 2>Starting out in nineteen sixty nine, so you're, you know,

0:41:25.400 --> 0:41:29.720
<v Speaker 2>early days of a horrific bear market. You have managed

0:41:29.760 --> 0:41:33.239
<v Speaker 2>money through well, you're in grad school. But your dad

0:41:33.320 --> 0:41:36.680
<v Speaker 2>during the eighty seven crash, you're involved during the dot

0:41:36.680 --> 0:41:41.040
<v Speaker 2>com implosion, during the financial crisis, during the pandemic. I mean,

0:41:41.480 --> 0:41:45.279
<v Speaker 2>you have seen lots and lots of cycles across all

0:41:45.320 --> 0:41:49.640
<v Speaker 2>of these decades and all of these different environments. What

0:41:49.840 --> 0:41:55.399
<v Speaker 2>key investment principles stand out as absolutely core, non negotiable.

0:41:55.960 --> 0:41:58.920
<v Speaker 2>This is the heart of what we do well.

0:41:59.040 --> 0:42:02.560
<v Speaker 3>The entire investment and process boils down to these two questions,

0:42:02.320 --> 0:42:05.040
<v Speaker 3>what sort of businesses do we want to own? And

0:42:05.160 --> 0:42:08.719
<v Speaker 3>how much do we pay for them? And you know

0:42:09.120 --> 0:42:13.880
<v Speaker 3>the types of business characteristics that we focus But in

0:42:13.920 --> 0:42:16.000
<v Speaker 3>the interplace, I should say before I go on that

0:42:16.080 --> 0:42:20.680
<v Speaker 3>the interplay between those two is part of the nuance

0:42:20.760 --> 0:42:24.759
<v Speaker 3>of investing. You may own a slightly lower quality business

0:42:25.080 --> 0:42:29.759
<v Speaker 3>because the price is so extreme, But the characteristics that

0:42:29.800 --> 0:42:31.880
<v Speaker 3>we look for in every business have to do with

0:42:31.920 --> 0:42:35.520
<v Speaker 3>the durability, because we buy businesses thinking we will our

0:42:35.560 --> 0:42:38.040
<v Speaker 3>goal is to own it forever. Our goal is for

0:42:38.080 --> 0:42:41.640
<v Speaker 3>the return to be driven by the year earnings yield

0:42:41.760 --> 0:42:44.880
<v Speaker 3>on the business over time, not by some change in

0:42:44.920 --> 0:42:49.560
<v Speaker 3>the valuation and finding an exit strategy. And so those

0:42:49.600 --> 0:42:52.560
<v Speaker 3>sorts of characteristics are exactly the characteristics you would look

0:42:52.600 --> 0:42:54.400
<v Speaker 3>for if I said you've got to put a business

0:42:54.440 --> 0:42:57.279
<v Speaker 3>away for your kids or your grandkids. So you know

0:42:57.360 --> 0:43:01.160
<v Speaker 3>the nature of the business, the returns on capital, the

0:43:01.320 --> 0:43:07.960
<v Speaker 3>competitive modes, the nature the balance sheet, the risk and

0:43:08.480 --> 0:43:10.960
<v Speaker 3>very importantly the character of the people running it. We

0:43:11.040 --> 0:43:13.960
<v Speaker 3>spend a lot of time on management evaluation in this

0:43:14.360 --> 0:43:16.719
<v Speaker 3>land of AI. You know, I just came back from

0:43:16.719 --> 0:43:20.520
<v Speaker 3>the Markel annual meeting. You know, character will not show

0:43:20.640 --> 0:43:24.000
<v Speaker 3>up efficiently, I don't think in the AI world. And

0:43:24.320 --> 0:43:28.640
<v Speaker 3>boy does it matter when you think about navigating in

0:43:28.880 --> 0:43:32.920
<v Speaker 3>unpredictable future. Just that ability to be resilient, to adapt,

0:43:33.040 --> 0:43:36.160
<v Speaker 3>but always to be investing the money as if it's

0:43:36.200 --> 0:43:39.480
<v Speaker 3>your own. And they're CEOs that do that. So those

0:43:39.520 --> 0:43:41.759
<v Speaker 3>are the nature of the business. And then the valuation

0:43:41.960 --> 0:43:45.680
<v Speaker 3>discipline is sort of the securities analysis part of what

0:43:45.719 --> 0:43:48.440
<v Speaker 3>we do. If the first part is business research, then

0:43:48.480 --> 0:43:53.279
<v Speaker 3>it's the securities analysis. It's adjusting the income statement, you know,

0:43:53.440 --> 0:43:56.839
<v Speaker 3>that's where the accounting training comes in, and it is

0:43:57.200 --> 0:44:03.520
<v Speaker 3>understanding the incremental returns on capital, and it's adjusting the

0:44:03.520 --> 0:44:06.200
<v Speaker 3>balance sheet, every account on the balance sheet, because of

0:44:06.239 --> 0:44:09.360
<v Speaker 3>course gap earnings is a convention, but it may or

0:44:09.360 --> 0:44:13.200
<v Speaker 3>may not reflect reality. And so you know, you put

0:44:13.239 --> 0:44:16.919
<v Speaker 3>those two things together and we build an i RR,

0:44:17.040 --> 0:44:20.520
<v Speaker 3>an internal rate of return forecast. We work on this

0:44:20.640 --> 0:44:24.319
<v Speaker 3>concept of owner earnings in each business, and then we

0:44:24.360 --> 0:44:26.680
<v Speaker 3>focus on the quality and the durability of the business.

0:44:26.800 --> 0:44:30.520
<v Speaker 2>I can help but point out that you talk about

0:44:31.640 --> 0:44:36.799
<v Speaker 2>buying or owning businesses, not buying stocks. That seems to

0:44:36.840 --> 0:44:42.200
<v Speaker 2>be like a very fundamental distinction compared to most fund manager.

0:44:43.040 --> 0:44:47.399
<v Speaker 3>It's so profoundly important, you know. It is. We view

0:44:47.440 --> 0:44:50.840
<v Speaker 3>ourselves as business owners. We view the management as our partners.

0:44:51.400 --> 0:44:56.000
<v Speaker 3>In most cases, we view the you know, the signs

0:44:56.080 --> 0:45:00.800
<v Speaker 3>of short termism as dangerous. It's one of the reasons

0:45:01.040 --> 0:45:05.080
<v Speaker 3>we feel that the activist movement has completely lost the

0:45:05.160 --> 0:45:08.440
<v Speaker 3>thread and should be greatly resisted, whereas it was very

0:45:08.560 --> 0:45:13.240
<v Speaker 3>useful when it started. And we can talk about that later.

0:45:13.320 --> 0:45:16.960
<v Speaker 3>But absolutely, we're owning businesses, and we're trying to own

0:45:17.000 --> 0:45:21.200
<v Speaker 3>businesses that are compounding machines. Right. I watched what it

0:45:21.280 --> 0:45:24.680
<v Speaker 3>meant for my grandfather to owned businesses for twenty thirty

0:45:24.840 --> 0:45:28.480
<v Speaker 3>forty years. You know, I look at our own portfolio.

0:45:28.520 --> 0:45:31.960
<v Speaker 3>I look at companies like you know, American Express or

0:45:32.280 --> 0:45:35.759
<v Speaker 3>Wells Fargo or JP Morgan. In the financial world, look

0:45:35.760 --> 0:45:39.440
<v Speaker 3>at you know more recently at companies like Amazon Texas Instruments.

0:45:39.600 --> 0:45:42.399
<v Speaker 3>You look at what a business can do compound over

0:45:42.440 --> 0:45:45.279
<v Speaker 3>twenty thirty years. I mentioned Markel. You know, when I

0:45:45.400 --> 0:45:48.360
<v Speaker 3>first met the now CEO of Markel, we met in

0:45:48.440 --> 0:45:51.640
<v Speaker 3>Omaha at the Orpheum Theater at a Berkshire Annual meeting

0:45:51.640 --> 0:45:54.720
<v Speaker 3>in like nineteen ninety. The stock was at like nineteen

0:45:54.840 --> 0:45:57.520
<v Speaker 3>or twenty and it's at two thousand now, you know.

0:45:57.640 --> 0:46:00.440
<v Speaker 3>And by the way, they have an activist idiotic saying

0:46:00.440 --> 0:46:03.960
<v Speaker 3>they split up the company. It's like company's doing fine,

0:46:04.080 --> 0:46:06.720
<v Speaker 3>and it's a company that is being built to last.

0:46:07.360 --> 0:46:10.160
<v Speaker 3>And the idea of getting a quick sugar fix because

0:46:10.160 --> 0:46:12.480
<v Speaker 3>you can sell some part to private equity at a

0:46:12.520 --> 0:46:15.600
<v Speaker 3>premium that doesn't serve capitalism and it really won't serve

0:46:15.640 --> 0:46:17.400
<v Speaker 3>the long term shareholders of that business.

0:46:17.960 --> 0:46:24.480
<v Speaker 2>You mentioned a number of financials in that list. I'm

0:46:24.520 --> 0:46:29.040
<v Speaker 2>kind of curious because financials have had some pretty good years.

0:46:29.080 --> 0:46:33.160
<v Speaker 2>They've had some pretty rough years. Obviously, the financial crisis

0:46:33.520 --> 0:46:40.160
<v Speaker 2>was devastating. Although my pet theory about JP Morgan Chase

0:46:40.760 --> 0:46:45.040
<v Speaker 2>is when they had their subprime problem, it predated everybody

0:46:45.040 --> 0:46:47.279
<v Speaker 2>by five years, and there was still a bid when

0:46:47.320 --> 0:46:49.640
<v Speaker 2>they had to get out, so they got a little lucky,

0:46:49.760 --> 0:46:54.960
<v Speaker 2>and they happen to have a particularly talented CEO. But

0:46:55.480 --> 0:47:00.280
<v Speaker 2>this concentration of financials, I'm curious what led to it,

0:47:00.320 --> 0:47:05.200
<v Speaker 2>And I'm curious of the relationship between what some people

0:47:05.239 --> 0:47:09.800
<v Speaker 2>describe as high conviction investing and concentration in a particular

0:47:09.880 --> 0:47:11.920
<v Speaker 2>sector like financials.

0:47:11.960 --> 0:47:16.760
<v Speaker 3>Well, I think high conviction investing is exactly the right description.

0:47:17.239 --> 0:47:19.279
<v Speaker 3>And if we end up with a focus on a

0:47:19.280 --> 0:47:22.759
<v Speaker 3>particular sector, it's not necessarily because of a view of

0:47:22.760 --> 0:47:26.480
<v Speaker 3>the sector. It's because the individual companies. Financials is one

0:47:26.480 --> 0:47:30.400
<v Speaker 3>of the most misleading sectors there is, because to me,

0:47:30.640 --> 0:47:35.320
<v Speaker 3>what creates a correlation risk is when businesses are tied

0:47:35.360 --> 0:47:40.360
<v Speaker 3>to the same macroeconomic variables. Financials is a massively broad category.

0:47:40.640 --> 0:47:44.280
<v Speaker 3>There are financials that have risk if the wind blows

0:47:44.400 --> 0:47:47.239
<v Speaker 3>in certain parts of the world, the financials that have

0:47:47.440 --> 0:47:50.680
<v Speaker 3>risk if interest rates change, financials that have risked that

0:47:50.840 --> 0:47:53.799
<v Speaker 3>have to do with recessions, some to capital markets. They

0:47:53.800 --> 0:47:57.120
<v Speaker 3>are all different. And I'll give you a really powerful example.

0:47:57.640 --> 0:48:00.400
<v Speaker 3>I started our financial fund, I don't know, something like

0:48:00.480 --> 0:48:05.279
<v Speaker 3>nineteen ninety. That fund, from then to today has outperformed

0:48:05.320 --> 0:48:08.719
<v Speaker 3>the S and P five hundred, and it has outperformed

0:48:08.719 --> 0:48:11.960
<v Speaker 3>the S and P five hundred quite meaningfully when you

0:48:12.040 --> 0:48:16.080
<v Speaker 3>compound it out. At the time we started it, I

0:48:16.120 --> 0:48:19.560
<v Speaker 3>didn't even know there was a financials index. But it

0:48:19.600 --> 0:48:22.480
<v Speaker 3>was founded with this belief that one of the and

0:48:22.560 --> 0:48:25.719
<v Speaker 3>my grandfather of course, specialized in financials. I started as

0:48:25.760 --> 0:48:29.000
<v Speaker 3>a financials analyst, and he had a phrase that he loved,

0:48:29.000 --> 0:48:32.759
<v Speaker 3>which is, in financials you can find growth stocks in disguise.

0:48:33.440 --> 0:48:36.160
<v Speaker 3>And he said, the reason is is that you have

0:48:36.840 --> 0:48:41.880
<v Speaker 3>very You have businesses industries that are huge where companies

0:48:41.920 --> 0:48:45.440
<v Speaker 3>can grow for a long period of time by simply growing.

0:48:45.960 --> 0:48:49.520
<v Speaker 3>Just this year, Progressive finally passed State Farm. Progressive has

0:48:49.520 --> 0:48:53.880
<v Speaker 3>probably compounded in the high teens for thirty years and

0:48:53.920 --> 0:48:58.080
<v Speaker 3>it still is. Just became maybe the largest insurance company

0:48:58.320 --> 0:49:02.880
<v Speaker 3>in personal Auto's massive industries where you can compound for

0:49:02.920 --> 0:49:07.160
<v Speaker 3>a long time without outgrowing your sector. Second advantage, the

0:49:07.160 --> 0:49:10.440
<v Speaker 3>business model doesn't really go obsolete, right making us spread

0:49:10.440 --> 0:49:13.080
<v Speaker 3>on money is about the oldest business there is, maybe

0:49:13.239 --> 0:49:17.839
<v Speaker 3>maybe the second oldest, thank you. What else, It's an

0:49:17.920 --> 0:49:23.920
<v Speaker 3>industry where you have huge dispersion of outcomes but relatively

0:49:23.960 --> 0:49:27.880
<v Speaker 3>homogeneous valuations. So you I mentioned Progressive I mean, you

0:49:27.920 --> 0:49:32.359
<v Speaker 3>have companies that have grown Capital one. You look at

0:49:32.360 --> 0:49:35.799
<v Speaker 3>Capital One's growth record from nineteen eighty seven today, and

0:49:35.880 --> 0:49:38.840
<v Speaker 3>yet it's trading at nine or ten times earnings because

0:49:38.840 --> 0:49:41.479
<v Speaker 3>it's a financial I'm like, it looks like a growth

0:49:41.480 --> 0:49:44.040
<v Speaker 3>stock to me. Right, I've got it's still run by

0:49:44.040 --> 0:49:47.320
<v Speaker 3>the founder, it's a fintech company, it's a data science company.

0:49:47.480 --> 0:49:49.800
<v Speaker 3>It's in the top ten of all holders of AI

0:49:49.840 --> 0:49:53.080
<v Speaker 3>and machine learning patents. But it trades at nine point

0:49:53.120 --> 0:49:56.120
<v Speaker 3>eight times earnings and one point two times book value

0:49:56.160 --> 0:50:00.600
<v Speaker 3>liquidating value with a mid teen's return on equity. It

0:50:00.680 --> 0:50:03.680
<v Speaker 3>seems just nuts to me, but whatever, we love it.

0:50:03.719 --> 0:50:06.319
<v Speaker 3>So that's the idea of growth stocks and discussion. And

0:50:06.360 --> 0:50:09.799
<v Speaker 3>the last advantage of financials is that culture is a

0:50:09.880 --> 0:50:12.520
<v Speaker 3>defining and sustainable difference.

0:50:12.680 --> 0:50:15.480
<v Speaker 2>This is a theme I have heard from so many

0:50:15.680 --> 0:50:22.600
<v Speaker 2>really savvy executors CEOs as well as investors. How do you,

0:50:22.640 --> 0:50:28.840
<v Speaker 2>as an investor wrap your arms around culture? It feels

0:50:28.840 --> 0:50:31.560
<v Speaker 2>like you almost have to be in it to see it, Like,

0:50:31.680 --> 0:50:34.879
<v Speaker 2>is it something that as an outside investor you get

0:50:34.920 --> 0:50:38.920
<v Speaker 2>access to? You how do you identify quality culture?

0:50:39.080 --> 0:50:42.080
<v Speaker 3>Well, it's it's a perfect question, but I'll give you

0:50:42.120 --> 0:50:47.160
<v Speaker 3>the punchline for the differentiation. Last year, our financial fund,

0:50:47.200 --> 0:50:53.240
<v Speaker 3>which is ninety five percent in large cap financials, outperformed

0:50:53.719 --> 0:50:57.120
<v Speaker 3>the S and P Financials Index and the XLF the

0:50:57.239 --> 0:51:01.680
<v Speaker 3>largest financials ETF by twelve one hundred basis points.

0:51:01.760 --> 0:51:05.760
<v Speaker 2>Not too shabby, right, So, I mean it was a great.

0:51:05.640 --> 0:51:08.000
<v Speaker 3>Year for us. But the point is that they're in

0:51:08.080 --> 0:51:10.839
<v Speaker 3>large cap financials. We're in large cap financials. How can

0:51:10.880 --> 0:51:12.839
<v Speaker 3>you get such dispersion? Right?

0:51:13.040 --> 0:51:15.560
<v Speaker 2>But the same is they own everything and you own them.

0:51:16.760 --> 0:51:20.720
<v Speaker 3>But they're very concentrated. They're concentrated in the megacap banks

0:51:20.719 --> 0:51:23.080
<v Speaker 3>by and large and Visa and MasterCard, you know. But

0:51:23.800 --> 0:51:26.839
<v Speaker 3>we're fairly concentrated to We only have twenty twenty five

0:51:26.960 --> 0:51:30.719
<v Speaker 3>names and they, you know, twenty or twenty five names

0:51:30.719 --> 0:51:33.560
<v Speaker 3>are probably eighty percent of the index.

0:51:33.960 --> 0:51:38.160
<v Speaker 2>Does the gap come from the stock selection or the

0:51:38.239 --> 0:51:40.160
<v Speaker 2>screening out of what you don't like?

0:51:41.080 --> 0:51:44.080
<v Speaker 3>Well, it really goes back to the culture question. So

0:51:44.280 --> 0:51:46.760
<v Speaker 3>to bring it full circle to your question about culture,

0:51:47.320 --> 0:51:51.000
<v Speaker 3>what it is is that within financials, we are looking

0:51:51.080 --> 0:51:54.000
<v Speaker 3>for the companies that we feel can be compounding machines,

0:51:54.480 --> 0:51:57.920
<v Speaker 3>and we're looking for the companies where their culture creates

0:51:58.000 --> 0:52:02.800
<v Speaker 3>a durable advantage. The reason culture can create an advantage

0:52:02.840 --> 0:52:06.440
<v Speaker 3>in financials is because in most cases, your cost of

0:52:06.480 --> 0:52:09.759
<v Speaker 3>goods sold is an estimate, and if you have an

0:52:09.760 --> 0:52:17.120
<v Speaker 3>aggressive management, they can use accounting to upfront earnings that

0:52:17.760 --> 0:52:21.560
<v Speaker 3>you'll pay the piper three five, excuse me, ten years

0:52:21.560 --> 0:52:24.360
<v Speaker 3>from now. So we think can look good for a

0:52:24.400 --> 0:52:27.440
<v Speaker 3>long time, whereas if you do the opposite, if you

0:52:27.480 --> 0:52:30.680
<v Speaker 3>have a good culture, you're understating the near term, but

0:52:30.719 --> 0:52:33.920
<v Speaker 3>you're building cushion for the long term. And so when

0:52:33.960 --> 0:52:36.560
<v Speaker 3>the times go rough, when the tide goes out, and

0:52:36.600 --> 0:52:39.879
<v Speaker 3>you see who's swimming without a bathing suit, that's where

0:52:39.920 --> 0:52:42.920
<v Speaker 3>the culture really matters. Now, you mentioned all of the

0:52:42.960 --> 0:52:45.680
<v Speaker 3>crises that I've seen over my career. I've seen a

0:52:45.680 --> 0:52:48.919
<v Speaker 3>lot of these management teams and these companies go through

0:52:48.960 --> 0:52:52.279
<v Speaker 3>crises and you see who's wearing a bathing suit. So

0:52:52.640 --> 0:52:56.320
<v Speaker 3>we just went through an interest rate crisis right to

0:52:56.600 --> 0:52:58.920
<v Speaker 3>five hundred base and we used to get questions from

0:52:58.920 --> 0:53:02.560
<v Speaker 3>clients all the time, don't you own first Republic? In October,

0:53:02.880 --> 0:53:07.440
<v Speaker 3>my colleague Pierce Crosby wrote a research report just internal

0:53:07.560 --> 0:53:11.279
<v Speaker 3>just for his own saying he's just startled by the

0:53:11.320 --> 0:53:15.000
<v Speaker 3>amount of risk Silicon Valley and First Republic are taking

0:53:15.600 --> 0:53:17.760
<v Speaker 3>He said, it's sort of amazing look at the duration

0:53:17.920 --> 0:53:21.600
<v Speaker 3>on their assets. They're assuming that their liabilities, their deposits

0:53:22.080 --> 0:53:24.320
<v Speaker 3>are going to be with them for eight, ten, twelve

0:53:24.400 --> 0:53:27.719
<v Speaker 3>years and that they're uncorrelated. So, you know, we used

0:53:27.719 --> 0:53:29.560
<v Speaker 3>to get questions, why don't you own them? They've been

0:53:29.600 --> 0:53:32.560
<v Speaker 3>they've had such great growth records, and our view as well,

0:53:32.640 --> 0:53:34.560
<v Speaker 3>it's been a mistake not to own them in terms

0:53:34.600 --> 0:53:37.399
<v Speaker 3>of they've outperformed. But we are not going to own

0:53:37.480 --> 0:53:41.279
<v Speaker 3>the companies that are optimized to the upcycle, right, and

0:53:41.320 --> 0:53:44.239
<v Speaker 3>that's a different culture. They had a growth culture, but

0:53:44.360 --> 0:53:47.239
<v Speaker 3>it was it blew them up, and so you know,

0:53:47.440 --> 0:53:51.000
<v Speaker 3>we instead looked at companies like well JP Morgan was

0:53:51.000 --> 0:53:55.520
<v Speaker 3>an outstanding example. Wells Fargo was capital one where they

0:53:55.760 --> 0:53:59.680
<v Speaker 3>didn't reach for the easy money of taking that extra

0:54:00.160 --> 0:54:02.759
<v Speaker 3>risk on the interest rates they could have. You know,

0:54:03.960 --> 0:54:06.360
<v Speaker 3>Jamie Diamond stood up at an analyst meeting said I

0:54:06.360 --> 0:54:08.520
<v Speaker 3>could add a billion or two billion dollars to my

0:54:08.640 --> 0:54:12.600
<v Speaker 3>profits with a phone call, and I'm not going to.

0:54:12.640 --> 0:54:14.200
<v Speaker 2>Do it because of the risk.

0:54:14.280 --> 0:54:16.320
<v Speaker 3>Because of the risk, you guys want you know, I

0:54:16.360 --> 0:54:19.279
<v Speaker 3>could put out my money for five seven years and

0:54:19.400 --> 0:54:22.799
<v Speaker 3>he didn't do it. So when that you could see that.

0:54:22.920 --> 0:54:25.960
<v Speaker 3>So some of it is quantitative. You identify culture by

0:54:26.000 --> 0:54:29.680
<v Speaker 3>accounting choices. Look at how accident your reserves develop at

0:54:29.719 --> 0:54:32.560
<v Speaker 3>insurance companies, look how credit loss developed, Look at the

0:54:32.640 --> 0:54:36.759
<v Speaker 3>duration in the asset portfolio of a bank, look at

0:54:36.760 --> 0:54:40.560
<v Speaker 3>the mark to market risks that an investment bank is taking,

0:54:40.640 --> 0:54:45.880
<v Speaker 3>so on. So you can identify culture quantitatively in financials.

0:54:45.920 --> 0:54:49.960
<v Speaker 3>That's a big advantage. But then the next part is qualitative,

0:54:50.000 --> 0:54:52.040
<v Speaker 3>and there I think Warren put it best. He said,

0:54:52.040 --> 0:54:55.279
<v Speaker 3>in a complex financial the CEO has to be the

0:54:55.320 --> 0:54:58.760
<v Speaker 3>chief risk officer, and you could have somebody with that title.

0:54:58.760 --> 0:55:01.480
<v Speaker 3>But if the CEO doesn't the nature and the complexity

0:55:01.520 --> 0:55:03.360
<v Speaker 3>of the risks, they should not be the CEO of

0:55:03.400 --> 0:55:04.320
<v Speaker 3>a financial company.

0:55:04.440 --> 0:55:07.000
<v Speaker 2>So not only am I hearing a lot of Warren's

0:55:07.080 --> 0:55:10.879
<v Speaker 2>voice in things you say, I'm also hearing a lot

0:55:10.880 --> 0:55:17.360
<v Speaker 2>of similar companies Coca Cola, MX, Wells, Fargo coincidence.

0:55:18.200 --> 0:55:25.520
<v Speaker 3>Well, I mean it would be strange if we ended

0:55:25.560 --> 0:55:27.920
<v Speaker 3>up different. Of course, I always like it when we

0:55:27.960 --> 0:55:30.960
<v Speaker 3>owned it first. So for example, we were I think

0:55:31.000 --> 0:55:35.839
<v Speaker 3>the largest shareholder of General Ree before Berkshire bought it,

0:55:36.440 --> 0:55:41.759
<v Speaker 3>and so and by the way, our research was not

0:55:41.920 --> 0:55:45.040
<v Speaker 3>so good on that one. Really no, and as you

0:55:45.360 --> 0:55:50.160
<v Speaker 3>see subsequently, Jenry did not perform very well for many years.

0:55:51.239 --> 0:55:54.600
<v Speaker 3>It was And I think Warren would say, I mean,

0:55:54.640 --> 0:55:56.960
<v Speaker 3>I think he has said publicly, I won't put words.

0:55:57.160 --> 0:56:00.319
<v Speaker 3>I think he said that that was well, I'll put

0:56:00.360 --> 0:56:02.839
<v Speaker 3>it this not his favorite pick. Yeah. Well, I'll tell

0:56:02.840 --> 0:56:05.239
<v Speaker 3>you what, Charlie. Charlie came to visit us and we

0:56:05.280 --> 0:56:08.360
<v Speaker 3>have a wall of mistakes where we frame the stock certificate.

0:56:09.760 --> 0:56:10.480
<v Speaker 2>Is that what that is?

0:56:10.560 --> 0:56:13.120
<v Speaker 3>Yeah? And Charlie was looking through it and he said,

0:56:13.160 --> 0:56:16.359
<v Speaker 3>where the hell's here, Genery, And I said, Jenry wasn't

0:56:16.360 --> 0:56:20.719
<v Speaker 3>a mistake. We got Berkshire stock for Jenry. That was fantastic.

0:56:21.640 --> 0:56:24.080
<v Speaker 2>Did you have anything to do with the transaction or

0:56:24.120 --> 0:56:26.040
<v Speaker 2>they just went out and bought him? And you happen

0:56:26.080 --> 0:56:26.520
<v Speaker 2>to be a big O.

0:56:26.800 --> 0:56:32.560
<v Speaker 3>And you know we we were big Geico shareholders, you know,

0:56:32.680 --> 0:56:36.400
<v Speaker 3>so no, it was uh and we overlapped an MX

0:56:36.440 --> 0:56:40.800
<v Speaker 3>but we but no, I mean we're much more diversified.

0:56:40.920 --> 0:56:44.759
<v Speaker 3>We never owned Apple. We you know, there's there's huge differences.

0:56:44.800 --> 0:56:47.360
<v Speaker 3>I mean, starting with the fact that you know, Warren

0:56:47.440 --> 0:56:51.719
<v Speaker 3>has outperformed all investment advisors for fifty years and and so,

0:56:52.840 --> 0:56:57.959
<v Speaker 3>but you'd be crazy not to study, you know, when

0:56:58.160 --> 0:57:00.520
<v Speaker 3>Warren owned something, or to study Berkshire itself.

0:57:00.920 --> 0:57:04.480
<v Speaker 2>And that makes a lot of sense. There's another distinction

0:57:05.520 --> 0:57:09.600
<v Speaker 2>between the two of you. You say that you are

0:57:09.760 --> 0:57:16.160
<v Speaker 2>neither deep value nor go go growth. So what does

0:57:16.200 --> 0:57:20.320
<v Speaker 2>that leave you? You growth at a reasonable price Somewhere something

0:57:20.400 --> 0:57:21.200
<v Speaker 2>is you love.

0:57:21.080 --> 0:57:22.880
<v Speaker 3>Growth at a reasonable price because what are the other

0:57:24.200 --> 0:57:25.840
<v Speaker 3>growth at unreasonable prices?

0:57:25.880 --> 0:57:27.400
<v Speaker 2>That were unreasonable?

0:57:28.840 --> 0:57:32.320
<v Speaker 3>And now, I think what we would say is it's

0:57:32.480 --> 0:57:35.280
<v Speaker 3>obvious to us that growth is a component of value.

0:57:35.720 --> 0:57:38.840
<v Speaker 2>Right, Growth is a component of value.

0:57:38.880 --> 0:57:43.120
<v Speaker 3>So a company that grows profitably is more valuable than

0:57:43.200 --> 0:57:47.600
<v Speaker 3>one that doesn't grow, right, I mean it's it's again,

0:57:47.880 --> 0:57:51.280
<v Speaker 3>think of the business. A business that grows profitably is

0:57:51.360 --> 0:57:55.080
<v Speaker 3>more valuable. A business that can redeploy its capital at

0:57:55.200 --> 0:57:58.680
<v Speaker 3>high incremental rates of return is way more valuable than

0:57:58.760 --> 0:58:02.040
<v Speaker 3>one that it can't, one that's capital intensive and shrinking

0:58:02.080 --> 0:58:05.320
<v Speaker 3>and so on. So growth is a component of value.

0:58:05.640 --> 0:58:09.120
<v Speaker 3>And the difference between us and a typical growth manager

0:58:09.720 --> 0:58:14.080
<v Speaker 3>is we tend to believe more deeply, based on experience,

0:58:14.560 --> 0:58:20.360
<v Speaker 3>that high rates of growth attract competition. Competition lowers returns,

0:58:20.960 --> 0:58:24.280
<v Speaker 3>and so we believe in capitalism, and we believe that

0:58:24.440 --> 0:58:28.080
<v Speaker 3>growth is hard and maintaining growth is hard. So we

0:58:28.200 --> 0:58:31.440
<v Speaker 3>tend to be more skeptical than the average go go

0:58:31.600 --> 0:58:37.440
<v Speaker 3>growth investor, but we tend to be more open to

0:58:37.640 --> 0:58:41.800
<v Speaker 3>paying a fair price for a company that can grow

0:58:41.880 --> 0:58:45.760
<v Speaker 3>profitably than the typical value investor. So so much of

0:58:45.800 --> 0:58:50.200
<v Speaker 3>our research is about the durability of the growth, the

0:58:50.240 --> 0:58:55.080
<v Speaker 3>competitive advantages that a business has. So our portfolio currently

0:58:55.160 --> 0:58:57.880
<v Speaker 3>trades in aggregate. If you took all of our companies

0:58:58.280 --> 0:59:01.960
<v Speaker 3>at something like fourteen times times earnings, well, the market

0:59:02.200 --> 0:59:04.640
<v Speaker 3>middle of the role is at twenty or twenty one,

0:59:05.880 --> 0:59:09.800
<v Speaker 3>the value indexes at nineteen times. And yet we have

0:59:09.840 --> 0:59:12.360
<v Speaker 3>a portfolio of companies that have grown their earnings over

0:59:12.360 --> 0:59:15.320
<v Speaker 3>the last five years. It's something like fourteen percent a year.

0:59:15.840 --> 0:59:18.080
<v Speaker 3>So we feel we have what my dad used to

0:59:18.080 --> 0:59:21.320
<v Speaker 3>call the value investors dream, right, and that's what we

0:59:21.520 --> 0:59:27.120
<v Speaker 3>low cost, fast growth, low valuation, and durable sustainable.

0:59:26.480 --> 0:59:31.280
<v Speaker 2>Growth really really fascinating. So before we jump too deep

0:59:31.320 --> 0:59:34.840
<v Speaker 2>into the current state of affairs, I have to ask

0:59:34.880 --> 0:59:37.280
<v Speaker 2>you about a quote of yours that I really like.

0:59:38.440 --> 0:59:41.480
<v Speaker 2>As human beings, we don't welcome fear and panic, but

0:59:41.560 --> 0:59:47.040
<v Speaker 2>as investors, we welcome the bargain prices that those emotions

0:59:47.560 --> 0:59:48.480
<v Speaker 2>tend to produce.

0:59:49.480 --> 0:59:55.200
<v Speaker 3>Discuss well, you know, obviously the market is of course

0:59:55.240 --> 0:59:58.960
<v Speaker 3>a voting machine in the short term, it reflects psychology

1:00:00.120 --> 1:00:01.040
<v Speaker 3>term a weighing machine.

1:00:01.120 --> 1:00:03.760
<v Speaker 2>And that's that's a great quote I'm gonna write there.

1:00:04.840 --> 1:00:13.520
<v Speaker 3>Yeah, and so psychology and helps shape prices. And what

1:00:13.880 --> 1:00:17.760
<v Speaker 3>happens we find is that risk is you know, there's time,

1:00:17.880 --> 1:00:21.520
<v Speaker 3>it's all, there's always risk. What varies is people's perception

1:00:21.600 --> 1:00:23.960
<v Speaker 3>of it. And I think today we're in a time

1:00:24.000 --> 1:00:30.280
<v Speaker 3>when people are underestimating risks and therefore prices are generally high.

1:00:30.560 --> 1:00:32.800
<v Speaker 3>It's one of the reasons I find it so amazing

1:00:32.840 --> 1:00:36.400
<v Speaker 3>that our portfolio is trading at fourteen times earnings. I'm like,

1:00:36.560 --> 1:00:39.760
<v Speaker 3>you know, the market scares me at twenty one, twenty

1:00:39.800 --> 1:00:44.200
<v Speaker 3>two times earnings, but our portfolio feels like this below

1:00:44.280 --> 1:00:48.680
<v Speaker 3>long time averages. So I feel this disconnect where I'm

1:00:48.720 --> 1:00:53.760
<v Speaker 3>simultaneously pessimistic about the market because of the euphoria. There's

1:00:53.880 --> 1:00:58.960
<v Speaker 3>no skepticism, there's no fear in prices, and at the

1:00:58.960 --> 1:01:02.960
<v Speaker 3>same time, very feel very comfortable with our portfolio.

1:01:03.360 --> 1:01:06.960
<v Speaker 2>So let me push back a little bit, just to

1:01:07.000 --> 1:01:12.320
<v Speaker 2>hear your reaction. We keep hearing artificial intelligence and Nvidia

1:01:12.400 --> 1:01:16.120
<v Speaker 2>and all the semis being compared to the dot com era,

1:01:16.680 --> 1:01:20.320
<v Speaker 2>and every time I hear that, aside from the fact

1:01:20.400 --> 1:01:24.280
<v Speaker 2>that many of those companies forget profits, didn't even have revenues,

1:01:24.680 --> 1:01:29.680
<v Speaker 2>and this is a giant revenue, giant profit era, markets

1:01:29.720 --> 1:01:34.120
<v Speaker 2>today are training at twenty twenty two times. We finished

1:01:34.480 --> 1:01:39.880
<v Speaker 2>the nineties at thirty two times. Theoretically, there's a ton

1:01:39.920 --> 1:01:47.200
<v Speaker 2>of upside from here, especially if Earning's growth continues. Is

1:01:47.200 --> 1:01:50.400
<v Speaker 2>is it the contrarian take that, hey, this market could

1:01:50.480 --> 1:01:54.320
<v Speaker 2>go another five or ten years before things get really stupid.

1:01:54.600 --> 1:01:57.000
<v Speaker 3>Well, what I'd say is, right now, as I look

1:01:57.000 --> 1:02:02.040
<v Speaker 3>out there, I see two types of you know, end investor. Right.

1:02:02.120 --> 1:02:04.480
<v Speaker 3>One is this sort of belief that we're on a

1:02:04.480 --> 1:02:10.840
<v Speaker 3>plateau of permanent prosperity. This time is different permanently yes, yes,

1:02:10.960 --> 1:02:16.120
<v Speaker 3>And and they are all in on the momentum trade,

1:02:16.160 --> 1:02:20.960
<v Speaker 3>which has worked so well. Now I have a really

1:02:21.960 --> 1:02:27.120
<v Speaker 3>i am believe that momentum investing, even though it's worked

1:02:27.280 --> 1:02:30.560
<v Speaker 3>so well, to me is crazy because it's not common sense.

1:02:31.000 --> 1:02:32.800
<v Speaker 2>It works until it stops, it works.

1:02:32.680 --> 1:02:35.320
<v Speaker 3>Until it stops, and when it stops, you really feel

1:02:35.320 --> 1:02:37.200
<v Speaker 3>foolish that the fact that you are paying an ever

1:02:37.320 --> 1:02:39.919
<v Speaker 3>higher price you thought was a good thing.

1:02:40.400 --> 1:02:43.480
<v Speaker 2>Why does price matter if it's going up by it

1:02:43.520 --> 1:02:45.920
<v Speaker 2>if it stops going up exactly.

1:02:46.200 --> 1:02:50.280
<v Speaker 3>And so that's one group of investors, and they're taking

1:02:50.320 --> 1:02:52.640
<v Speaker 3>a lot of risk because they tend to be in

1:02:52.680 --> 1:02:56.280
<v Speaker 3>the highest multiple parts of the market and the parts

1:02:56.320 --> 1:03:00.760
<v Speaker 3>of the market where there is the most presumption that

1:03:01.080 --> 1:03:05.280
<v Speaker 3>high margins and high growth rates are sustainable. And the

1:03:05.440 --> 1:03:08.000
<v Speaker 3>data is over. I think fewer than three percent of

1:03:08.040 --> 1:03:13.040
<v Speaker 3>companies can maintain a ten growth rate in revenue of

1:03:13.320 --> 1:03:16.400
<v Speaker 3>twenty percent for more than a decade. Like fewer than

1:03:16.480 --> 1:03:17.439
<v Speaker 3>three percent.

1:03:17.240 --> 1:03:20.080
<v Speaker 2>I mean, and that's a huge growth rate for a

1:03:20.120 --> 1:03:20.640
<v Speaker 2>long time.

1:03:20.920 --> 1:03:23.240
<v Speaker 3>And there are a lot of valuations today that have

1:03:23.320 --> 1:03:26.840
<v Speaker 3>that baked in. You get these analysts reports, and there's

1:03:26.920 --> 1:03:30.240
<v Speaker 3>even fewer less than I think it's five tenths of

1:03:30.280 --> 1:03:33.160
<v Speaker 3>one percent, but you could check me. It's either might

1:03:33.200 --> 1:03:35.720
<v Speaker 3>be three tenths, but it's a low fraction of a

1:03:35.760 --> 1:03:40.640
<v Speaker 3>percent that are able to maintain fifty percent margins for

1:03:40.800 --> 1:03:43.520
<v Speaker 3>more than a decade. Those are very high margins. But again,

1:03:43.600 --> 1:03:45.880
<v Speaker 3>there are in a lot of models right now, So

1:03:46.600 --> 1:03:49.400
<v Speaker 3>I think there's risk on that. Now. The other side

1:03:49.520 --> 1:03:52.000
<v Speaker 3>of people taking risk are the ones that are huddled

1:03:52.040 --> 1:03:56.040
<v Speaker 3>in cash, saying it's the end of the world. Everything

1:03:56.080 --> 1:03:59.600
<v Speaker 3>that's happening AI is going to swallow our children. The

1:04:00.480 --> 1:04:03.720
<v Speaker 3>world is falling apart. Everything that's happening in washings, and

1:04:03.800 --> 1:04:07.320
<v Speaker 3>they're sitting in cash, which is risky as well, really risky.

1:04:07.400 --> 1:04:10.400
<v Speaker 3>I mean, just since two thousand, the purchasing power of

1:04:10.440 --> 1:04:14.560
<v Speaker 3>a dollars down something like fifty five percent. Right in

1:04:15.320 --> 1:04:18.400
<v Speaker 3>my grandmother's lifetime, I think the purchasing power of a

1:04:18.440 --> 1:04:21.240
<v Speaker 3>dollar fell like ninety four ninety five percent, So.

1:04:21.280 --> 1:04:24.560
<v Speaker 2>They're take sevand dollars for exactly.

1:04:24.960 --> 1:04:29.280
<v Speaker 3>So though, I think these huge crowded sides of the market,

1:04:29.360 --> 1:04:31.800
<v Speaker 3>the people sitting in cash and the people at the

1:04:32.160 --> 1:04:34.720
<v Speaker 3>assuming the extreme growth, are both taking a lot of risk.

1:04:35.000 --> 1:04:38.080
<v Speaker 2>That's a terrible barbell. You've just spake yes, Like the

1:04:38.120 --> 1:04:41.600
<v Speaker 2>extremes are either either inflation is going to kill them

1:04:41.720 --> 1:04:42.920
<v Speaker 2>or speculation is going to go.

1:04:43.200 --> 1:04:45.880
<v Speaker 3>And where I would say, you know, we land in

1:04:45.920 --> 1:04:49.560
<v Speaker 3>the middle is with this idea that there are durable,

1:04:49.640 --> 1:04:53.280
<v Speaker 3>overlooked businesses right now and they're business as I say,

1:04:53.480 --> 1:04:56.280
<v Speaker 3>we have a portfolio of twenty five companies trading at

1:04:56.280 --> 1:04:59.240
<v Speaker 3>an aggregate portfolio of fourteen and a half times. By

1:04:59.240 --> 1:05:02.840
<v Speaker 3>the way, that in includes owning some Amazon, it includes

1:05:02.920 --> 1:05:06.560
<v Speaker 3>owning some Google, but also owning some Capital One, owning

1:05:06.600 --> 1:05:10.640
<v Speaker 3>some Tyson Food, some MGM. You know which portfolio is this?

1:05:10.640 --> 1:05:14.439
<v Speaker 3>This is our flagship portfolio. So there's the Davis Adventure Fund.

1:05:14.600 --> 1:05:18.480
<v Speaker 3>But really the way people are finding us increasingly. Ten

1:05:18.560 --> 1:05:22.960
<v Speaker 3>years ago, Barry we launched our ETFs. We were alone

1:05:23.040 --> 1:05:26.520
<v Speaker 3>for nine years. Like no, we're the only true active

1:05:26.640 --> 1:05:29.840
<v Speaker 3>manager running a value ETIM. I think our value ETAM

1:05:29.880 --> 1:05:33.040
<v Speaker 3>which is called DUSA. D USA is the number one

1:05:33.680 --> 1:05:37.520
<v Speaker 3>active or passive value ETF for three years. But nobody

1:05:37.560 --> 1:05:40.480
<v Speaker 3>really cares. It's just you know, it's but that's all right.

1:05:40.720 --> 1:05:43.560
<v Speaker 2>Although the past year or two we have seen a

1:05:43.600 --> 1:05:46.760
<v Speaker 2>lot of flows. Hey, most of the money you're going

1:05:46.800 --> 1:05:50.920
<v Speaker 2>to the passive indexes. But the things that the third

1:05:51.040 --> 1:05:55.480
<v Speaker 2>or quarter that's not going there active exactly.

1:05:55.560 --> 1:05:57.720
<v Speaker 3>So they're finding our way and I'm proud that we

1:05:57.720 --> 1:05:59.960
<v Speaker 3>were so early. I don't mind being early, you know.

1:06:00.120 --> 1:06:04.840
<v Speaker 3>And so but what I'd say is that the optimistic

1:06:04.920 --> 1:06:11.240
<v Speaker 3>case layout, I think the three elements of change in

1:06:11.280 --> 1:06:16.560
<v Speaker 3>the civilization that our increasing risk today is we certainly

1:06:16.600 --> 1:06:20.320
<v Speaker 3>have a change in the monetary world order. Right, You

1:06:20.440 --> 1:06:23.680
<v Speaker 3>and I spent our entire careers in a world of

1:06:23.720 --> 1:06:28.800
<v Speaker 3>falling interest rates, approaching zero, falling inflation. All of the

1:06:28.840 --> 1:06:35.040
<v Speaker 3>things that fed into that, you know, low wage pressure, deunionization, globalization,

1:06:35.240 --> 1:06:39.360
<v Speaker 3>all of that stuff, all of that has stunningly and permanently,

1:06:39.400 --> 1:06:41.320
<v Speaker 3>I believe come to an end. We are in a

1:06:41.360 --> 1:06:44.760
<v Speaker 3>state where you know, we are printing so much money

1:06:44.840 --> 1:06:48.280
<v Speaker 3>relative to what the interest rates are. I think there's

1:06:48.320 --> 1:06:50.960
<v Speaker 3>a lot of risk, but certainly we're not going back

1:06:51.000 --> 1:06:54.480
<v Speaker 3>to zero probably ever. Again, that was a once in

1:06:54.640 --> 1:06:59.600
<v Speaker 3>history phenomena free money. The second big change is geopolitics.

1:07:00.120 --> 1:07:03.040
<v Speaker 3>There's no question that for our entire career, we are

1:07:03.080 --> 1:07:05.760
<v Speaker 3>in a world of globalization. We're in a world of

1:07:05.840 --> 1:07:09.400
<v Speaker 3>functional peace, we are in a world of stability. We're

1:07:09.400 --> 1:07:12.280
<v Speaker 3>in a world where the wall fell and markets doubled.

1:07:12.840 --> 1:07:16.120
<v Speaker 3>All of these things that is also absolutely come to

1:07:16.160 --> 1:07:18.919
<v Speaker 3>an end, and that increases risk. So those first two

1:07:18.960 --> 1:07:22.880
<v Speaker 3>things increase risk. And what's the third ai there's this

1:07:23.120 --> 1:07:27.600
<v Speaker 3>massive technological change that increases risk. It increases the risk

1:07:27.720 --> 1:07:32.240
<v Speaker 3>of all different types of businesses, and it increases opportunity

1:07:32.480 --> 1:07:36.600
<v Speaker 3>but increases risk. So when you have three fundamental shifts

1:07:36.640 --> 1:07:40.880
<v Speaker 3>going on, all of which have unpredictable outcomes, and yet

1:07:40.920 --> 1:07:46.480
<v Speaker 3>you have valuations not at all time highs, but elevated highs,

1:07:46.480 --> 1:07:50.000
<v Speaker 3>certainly relative to the direction of travel of interest rates

1:07:50.000 --> 1:07:53.200
<v Speaker 3>over time, then I'd say, you know, I like where

1:07:53.240 --> 1:07:57.160
<v Speaker 3>we are with our fourteen fourteen yield. You know, solid

1:07:57.200 --> 1:08:00.800
<v Speaker 3>growth rate in the businesses, durability AI as a lens,

1:08:00.840 --> 1:08:04.240
<v Speaker 3>globalization as a lens, inflation as a lens. Put those

1:08:04.280 --> 1:08:07.280
<v Speaker 3>things together. We sit with twenty five companies with these

1:08:07.320 --> 1:08:10.680
<v Speaker 3>great characteristics in our etf or and our funds or

1:08:11.000 --> 1:08:13.440
<v Speaker 3>SMA or however the advisor finds.

1:08:13.240 --> 1:08:17.720
<v Speaker 2>Us really interesting. Coming up, we continue our conversation with

1:08:17.840 --> 1:08:23.839
<v Speaker 2>Chris Davis, portfolio manager at Davis Advisors, discussing the current

1:08:24.320 --> 1:08:28.560
<v Speaker 2>market environment. I'm Barry Ridults. You're listening to Masters in

1:08:28.640 --> 1:08:47.360
<v Speaker 2>Business on Bloomberg Radio. I'm Barry Ridults. You're listening to

1:08:47.479 --> 1:08:51.120
<v Speaker 2>Masters in Business on Bloomberg Radio. Chris Davis is my

1:08:51.280 --> 1:08:54.599
<v Speaker 2>extra special guest. He is the chairman and portfolio manager

1:08:55.200 --> 1:09:01.240
<v Speaker 2>of Davis Advisors. So I'm glad you mentioned add artificial

1:09:01.280 --> 1:09:05.840
<v Speaker 2>intelligence as one of those three big shifts that are

1:09:05.840 --> 1:09:09.880
<v Speaker 2>taking place. How do you, as an analyst and a

1:09:10.000 --> 1:09:16.960
<v Speaker 2>fund manager separate what is a transformative technology and potentially

1:09:17.439 --> 1:09:23.480
<v Speaker 2>a transformative source of value creation from just the rampant

1:09:23.720 --> 1:09:27.960
<v Speaker 2>speculative excess that rears its head on a regular bag.

1:09:28.040 --> 1:09:31.160
<v Speaker 3>Well, what we're seeing is Amara's law in full bloom,

1:09:31.160 --> 1:09:35.640
<v Speaker 3>and Amar's law states that transformative technologies are overestimated in

1:09:35.680 --> 1:09:38.320
<v Speaker 3>the short term, they're underestimated in the long term. We're

1:09:38.320 --> 1:09:41.920
<v Speaker 3>in the overestimation hype phase. And what I would say

1:09:41.960 --> 1:09:46.200
<v Speaker 3>we do is we recognize it as a transformative technology.

1:09:46.400 --> 1:09:50.559
<v Speaker 3>That is absolutely a baseline assumption. Our other baseline assumption

1:09:50.680 --> 1:09:53.559
<v Speaker 3>at this stage is that we don't see it as

1:09:53.560 --> 1:09:56.240
<v Speaker 3>a winner take all. So we see it more a

1:09:56.280 --> 1:09:59.840
<v Speaker 3>little bit like railroads or something where or the tele

1:10:00.360 --> 1:10:03.920
<v Speaker 3>or electricity where the users maybe end up making more

1:10:03.960 --> 1:10:08.320
<v Speaker 3>money than the builders. And so we will talk about

1:10:08.320 --> 1:10:12.160
<v Speaker 3>hedging that bet. But we do think it increases the

1:10:12.280 --> 1:10:16.920
<v Speaker 3>risk environment in terms of terrorism, it increases the risk

1:10:16.920 --> 1:10:19.960
<v Speaker 3>of obsolescence in certain businesses. But we start with this

1:10:20.040 --> 1:10:22.920
<v Speaker 3>idea that it's real. Then what we do is, as

1:10:22.960 --> 1:10:26.040
<v Speaker 3>we do our research, we found every company we look

1:10:26.080 --> 1:10:29.000
<v Speaker 3>at falls into one of five categories. It's the emerging winners.

1:10:29.040 --> 1:10:31.840
<v Speaker 3>That's where all the heat is, all the speculation, and

1:10:31.960 --> 1:10:35.120
<v Speaker 3>there there's real danger. You and I started very early

1:10:35.160 --> 1:10:38.840
<v Speaker 3>talking about Cisco and remembering, well, the three obvious winners

1:10:38.880 --> 1:10:41.840
<v Speaker 3>of the Internet were AOL, Yahoo, and Cisco. You know,

1:10:41.960 --> 1:10:44.760
<v Speaker 3>the two don't exist and one's a fraction of what

1:10:44.800 --> 1:10:48.320
<v Speaker 3>it was. And so picking the emerging winners in the

1:10:48.479 --> 1:10:52.360
<v Speaker 3>early hype phase is risky. But we'd say, if you

1:10:52.439 --> 1:10:55.360
<v Speaker 3>want to look in that space, focus on the businesses

1:10:55.360 --> 1:10:57.880
<v Speaker 3>that have a real shot at being emerging winners but

1:10:58.160 --> 1:11:02.120
<v Speaker 3>do not have to constantly raise capital, have proven business models,

1:11:02.160 --> 1:11:06.920
<v Speaker 3>proven leaders, and businesses that are accreted by the investments

1:11:06.960 --> 1:11:09.160
<v Speaker 3>that they're making, so that they earn more money by

1:11:09.160 --> 1:11:12.120
<v Speaker 3>making these investments, even if it takes longer than not

1:11:12.160 --> 1:11:15.680
<v Speaker 3>the hyperscale, not the hyperscalers, I think that that is.

1:11:15.800 --> 1:11:18.600
<v Speaker 3>And so for us, that's where we've sat with a

1:11:18.640 --> 1:11:22.400
<v Speaker 3>little bit of Google, we still have Meta and Amazon.

1:11:22.479 --> 1:11:25.240
<v Speaker 3>We've trimmed the first two because they were huge holdings

1:11:25.240 --> 1:11:26.760
<v Speaker 3>for us because we bought them when they were so

1:11:26.840 --> 1:11:28.760
<v Speaker 3>out of favor. But if you're going to play in

1:11:28.760 --> 1:11:31.880
<v Speaker 3>the emerging winners, that's The first second category is, Okay,

1:11:32.080 --> 1:11:35.080
<v Speaker 3>who are the enablers of this technology? Right, that's the

1:11:35.560 --> 1:11:39.160
<v Speaker 3>pigs and shovels mindset. They're the ones that are going

1:11:39.240 --> 1:11:42.280
<v Speaker 3>to benefit from the spending wave but will not be

1:11:42.360 --> 1:11:45.200
<v Speaker 3>penalized if the return on the spending is very low.

1:11:45.400 --> 1:11:46.600
<v Speaker 2>So semiconductors.

1:11:46.720 --> 1:11:48.920
<v Speaker 3>So yeah, I would say there for us, it's been

1:11:49.000 --> 1:11:53.680
<v Speaker 3>analog chips, Texas instruments, it's been semiconductor capital equipment. We

1:11:53.720 --> 1:11:57.960
<v Speaker 3>are a big shareholder of Samsung, you know, which did nothing, nothing, nothing,

1:11:57.960 --> 1:12:00.240
<v Speaker 3>and then went up fourfold and in the.

1:12:00.280 --> 1:12:04.920
<v Speaker 2>Year they're driving the entire toss by UH in Korea.

1:12:05.640 --> 1:12:08.760
<v Speaker 3>It's a amazing, amazing So but you know again that

1:12:08.840 --> 1:12:10.960
<v Speaker 3>we viewed those as enablers. But in Indian enablers, I

1:12:10.960 --> 1:12:14.439
<v Speaker 3>would also include things like natural gas and copper. Right,

1:12:14.479 --> 1:12:16.760
<v Speaker 3>they're going to be they are big, big beneficiary. So

1:12:16.800 --> 1:12:21.240
<v Speaker 3>we own you know, Kotera which is now Devin, UH Conico, Phillips,

1:12:21.760 --> 1:12:25.320
<v Speaker 3>UH Tourmaline. You know, our focus is on natural gas

1:12:25.520 --> 1:12:28.599
<v Speaker 3>and copper. Okay, so those are the enablers, the users

1:12:29.000 --> 1:12:31.559
<v Speaker 3>who are going to be the beneficiaries use it. Well, there,

1:12:31.600 --> 1:12:35.080
<v Speaker 3>You've got to think UH Financials is a great extent

1:12:35.160 --> 1:12:37.840
<v Speaker 3>anything that where you have a big amount of laptop

1:12:37.920 --> 1:12:41.920
<v Speaker 3>class workers. Right, it's what Elon called the laptop class

1:12:42.240 --> 1:12:44.840
<v Speaker 3>that you know, it's likely that AI will do to

1:12:44.880 --> 1:12:50.480
<v Speaker 3>the laptop class what globalization did to to blue collar workers.

1:12:49.520 --> 1:12:51.759
<v Speaker 2>Meaning very much hollow it out.

1:12:51.640 --> 1:12:54.080
<v Speaker 3>Hollow it out, hollow it out. The best will still

1:12:54.120 --> 1:12:56.400
<v Speaker 3>have work, the best will be more valuable, they'll be

1:12:56.439 --> 1:12:59.120
<v Speaker 3>more productive. But there's going to be a you know

1:12:59.160 --> 1:13:02.360
<v Speaker 3>a lot of unemployed second year lawyers and things like that,

1:13:02.479 --> 1:13:07.720
<v Speaker 3>and so that that and so healthcare you know, claims processing, uh,

1:13:08.200 --> 1:13:12.599
<v Speaker 3>compliance functions, things like that. So there we focus on

1:13:12.680 --> 1:13:16.080
<v Speaker 3>the banks that have the scale, the tech stack and

1:13:16.160 --> 1:13:19.000
<v Speaker 3>the management to do it. So Capital one number one.

1:13:19.280 --> 1:13:21.479
<v Speaker 3>I keep Wells Fargo on that list. I think US

1:13:21.600 --> 1:13:24.880
<v Speaker 3>Bank gets over that crosses that chasm. Uh so those

1:13:25.000 --> 1:13:28.320
<v Speaker 3>but also with JP Morgan Chase has done such a

1:13:28.320 --> 1:13:30.639
<v Speaker 3>great job. But the valuation is how do you.

1:13:30.600 --> 1:13:33.799
<v Speaker 2>Put the MX's and master card visas of the world.

1:13:33.840 --> 1:13:37.800
<v Speaker 3>We don't own Visa or MasterCard, and we have a

1:13:37.920 --> 1:13:41.280
<v Speaker 3>very small position in AMEX. And essentially the reason is

1:13:41.320 --> 1:13:44.080
<v Speaker 3>we just think that that is an area where there

1:13:44.160 --> 1:13:46.679
<v Speaker 3>is a big spread. They may be on the other

1:13:46.760 --> 1:13:50.040
<v Speaker 3>side but boy, there are a lot of people, especially merchants,

1:13:50.280 --> 1:13:52.560
<v Speaker 3>that would like to figure out some way to bypass

1:13:52.680 --> 1:13:56.679
<v Speaker 3>that big number. It's a big number.

1:13:56.880 --> 1:14:00.439
<v Speaker 2>This first time in my lifetime, I have started noticing

1:14:01.360 --> 1:14:04.840
<v Speaker 2>cash and credit card prices on restaurant may yeah. Absolutely,

1:14:04.840 --> 1:14:05.960
<v Speaker 2>it's never a thing.

1:14:05.880 --> 1:14:08.040
<v Speaker 3>Though, and you really see it when you travel. Yeah,

1:14:08.120 --> 1:14:11.000
<v Speaker 3>and so that we and again those are they're so

1:14:11.160 --> 1:14:14.840
<v Speaker 3>highly valued at thirty times earnings for visa, you know,

1:14:15.200 --> 1:14:17.240
<v Speaker 3>it just seems does there's too much risk there? I'll

1:14:17.280 --> 1:14:19.680
<v Speaker 3>own the capital one at nine times. So those are

1:14:19.720 --> 1:14:23.519
<v Speaker 3>the users, right. Then the next category or what Jeff

1:14:23.560 --> 1:14:27.400
<v Speaker 3>Bezos we call them the the indifferent or the protected? Right,

1:14:27.439 --> 1:14:29.400
<v Speaker 3>So what Jeff Bezos when he said people ask me

1:14:29.439 --> 1:14:31.160
<v Speaker 3>what's going to change? They all ask me what's not

1:14:31.200 --> 1:14:34.200
<v Speaker 3>going to change? That's a very important question. So there,

1:14:34.240 --> 1:14:36.920
<v Speaker 3>what do we you know, Tyson Foods, all right, Chicken's

1:14:36.960 --> 1:14:38.320
<v Speaker 3>not going to change, right, and.

1:14:38.360 --> 1:14:40.120
<v Speaker 2>We have Chicken's not going to lose their jobs.

1:14:40.360 --> 1:14:43.880
<v Speaker 3>Yeah, yeah, Chicken. It's a good shape. And you know,

1:14:43.960 --> 1:14:45.599
<v Speaker 3>but here you have to be careful because you don't

1:14:45.600 --> 1:14:48.200
<v Speaker 3>have high growth rates, so you don't want to overpay.

1:14:48.360 --> 1:14:51.280
<v Speaker 3>And they're cyclical businesses, so you don't want to pay

1:14:51.280 --> 1:14:55.080
<v Speaker 3>it at the top of a cycle. So Tyson, I

1:14:55.120 --> 1:14:58.840
<v Speaker 3>think is has a low multiple on cyclically depressed earnings.

1:14:58.880 --> 1:15:01.799
<v Speaker 3>What else does MGM? I think owning you know, fifty

1:15:01.840 --> 1:15:04.320
<v Speaker 3>percent of the Las Vegas strip, and you know twenty

1:15:04.360 --> 1:15:06.720
<v Speaker 3>or thirty percent of Macau and one hundred percent of

1:15:06.760 --> 1:15:09.360
<v Speaker 3>the only legal gambling in Japan and Osaka when it

1:15:09.400 --> 1:15:12.479
<v Speaker 3>opens twenty twenty nine, that's very valuable. I don't think

1:15:12.520 --> 1:15:16.560
<v Speaker 3>that gets disintermediated by AI. So call those that protected

1:15:16.600 --> 1:15:19.439
<v Speaker 3>the what won't change. The last category is the walking dead,

1:15:20.080 --> 1:15:23.720
<v Speaker 3>and there you know you mentioned Visa and MasterCard. I

1:15:23.720 --> 1:15:26.120
<v Speaker 3>don't know, title insurance, I don't know. There are all

1:15:26.160 --> 1:15:29.720
<v Speaker 3>sorts of things where it is really amazing how much

1:15:29.760 --> 1:15:32.320
<v Speaker 3>money is made for something that you should be able

1:15:32.360 --> 1:15:34.080
<v Speaker 3>to get around. We've seen some of the pressure in

1:15:34.120 --> 1:15:36.960
<v Speaker 3>the SaaS companies, and so that's the lens that we

1:15:37.040 --> 1:15:40.000
<v Speaker 3>look at for all of our companies. We put them

1:15:40.040 --> 1:15:42.640
<v Speaker 3>through this lens of this fast changing We want to

1:15:42.680 --> 1:15:44.760
<v Speaker 3>stay nimble and barry. One of the things I think

1:15:44.840 --> 1:15:47.439
<v Speaker 3>is really important is I think this is a world

1:15:47.520 --> 1:15:51.200
<v Speaker 3>where taking liquidity risk is really dangerous because there's so

1:15:51.320 --> 1:15:53.759
<v Speaker 3>much flux. So I think that's some of the pressure

1:15:53.760 --> 1:15:56.679
<v Speaker 3>we're seeing in private equity, private credit. I think people

1:15:56.720 --> 1:16:00.639
<v Speaker 3>are saying, why did I lock up my money seven years?

1:16:00.680 --> 1:16:02.960
<v Speaker 3>For seven years if you're lucky, Yeah, it's going to

1:16:03.000 --> 1:16:05.320
<v Speaker 3>be longer, I think. So I think that wheels are

1:16:05.360 --> 1:16:09.480
<v Speaker 3>coming off that. I think that indexes. Remember the Kodak

1:16:09.840 --> 1:16:13.439
<v Speaker 3>you ready for a number, ten million digital cameras had

1:16:13.479 --> 1:16:16.759
<v Speaker 3>been sold when Kodak was still in the top third

1:16:16.800 --> 1:16:18.040
<v Speaker 3>of the S and P five hundred.

1:16:18.040 --> 1:16:19.479
<v Speaker 2>It's amazing, isn't that amazing?

1:16:20.320 --> 1:16:23.080
<v Speaker 3>And it's like ten million people knew they would never

1:16:23.120 --> 1:16:26.439
<v Speaker 3>buy a roll of film again. It was dead. And

1:16:26.520 --> 1:16:30.040
<v Speaker 3>so the advantage you know, when Japan peaked in the eighties,

1:16:30.400 --> 1:16:35.840
<v Speaker 3>every active every active manager in international investing outperformed for

1:16:35.880 --> 1:16:38.320
<v Speaker 3>the next ten years by just saying, oh, Japan's going down,

1:16:38.320 --> 1:16:41.400
<v Speaker 3>I'm out. And so the index got killed because it

1:16:41.479 --> 1:16:43.559
<v Speaker 3>had to sort of go down with the ship. So

1:16:43.640 --> 1:16:49.160
<v Speaker 3>I think nimbleness, liquidity, flexibility, and this sort of research

1:16:49.320 --> 1:16:52.360
<v Speaker 3>lens going to actually become more valuable. So I think

1:16:52.400 --> 1:16:54.840
<v Speaker 3>we could see some of the time tested things that

1:16:54.880 --> 1:16:59.479
<v Speaker 3>worked in the last decade diven end Darling's momentum private

1:16:59.520 --> 1:17:02.960
<v Speaker 3>equity indexing. I think all of those things could be

1:17:03.040 --> 1:17:05.000
<v Speaker 3>challenged given this fast changing world.

1:17:05.080 --> 1:17:08.759
<v Speaker 2>So I'm glad you brought up a few things there,

1:17:09.200 --> 1:17:14.000
<v Speaker 2>because when you look at some of the fallout from

1:17:14.200 --> 1:17:18.320
<v Speaker 2>low cost indexing, the Vanguard effect, Blackrock, whatever you want

1:17:18.320 --> 1:17:22.320
<v Speaker 2>to call it, they have all put the fund industry

1:17:22.520 --> 1:17:27.080
<v Speaker 2>under a lot of pressure. There's fee compression. There's been

1:17:27.120 --> 1:17:30.799
<v Speaker 2>a move to not just indexing, but to ETFs generally.

1:17:32.400 --> 1:17:35.120
<v Speaker 2>So when your own business, you're looking at businesses with

1:17:35.240 --> 1:17:40.839
<v Speaker 2>moats and businesses with defendable proceeds and a good culture.

1:17:41.800 --> 1:17:44.920
<v Speaker 2>You're running a business with a lot of employees and

1:17:44.960 --> 1:17:47.640
<v Speaker 2>a lot of clients. How do you respond to this

1:17:47.720 --> 1:17:52.200
<v Speaker 2>external pressure? How do you manage not the investments, but

1:17:52.280 --> 1:17:57.240
<v Speaker 2>the business of investing when it's just becoming more competitive

1:17:57.280 --> 1:17:58.559
<v Speaker 2>and more challenging than ever.

1:17:58.760 --> 1:18:02.599
<v Speaker 3>Well, we're lucky because we're one. We're a very we

1:18:02.880 --> 1:18:06.280
<v Speaker 3>charge low fees, right, so we it's you know, if

1:18:06.280 --> 1:18:08.400
<v Speaker 3>you charge two and twenty, you know.

1:18:08.400 --> 1:18:11.840
<v Speaker 2>You're if only I could, I know, I'm just I mean,

1:18:12.000 --> 1:18:15.960
<v Speaker 2>emotion intellectually, I have a problem with that, but part

1:18:16.000 --> 1:18:18.320
<v Speaker 2>of me is like nice work, if.

1:18:18.240 --> 1:18:20.360
<v Speaker 3>You I know, I know, I spoke to a guy

1:18:20.400 --> 1:18:22.320
<v Speaker 3>that charged two and twenty years ago, and I said,

1:18:22.320 --> 1:18:24.559
<v Speaker 3>why too and twenty? What's the business model? He said,

1:18:24.600 --> 1:18:28.920
<v Speaker 3>I can't get three and thirty. So we've always we've

1:18:28.960 --> 1:18:32.120
<v Speaker 3>always just run with this idea, you know, Charlie one

1:18:32.160 --> 1:18:34.320
<v Speaker 3>said to me, Charlie Munger, you know what's wrong with

1:18:34.400 --> 1:18:37.280
<v Speaker 3>giving people a bargain right, or at least a fair

1:18:37.360 --> 1:18:39.680
<v Speaker 3>price right, And it makes it easier for you to

1:18:39.720 --> 1:18:44.000
<v Speaker 3>outperform over time. So so I feel one, we two.

1:18:44.240 --> 1:18:48.439
<v Speaker 3>We're a frugal place. You know, I work with seven colleagues.

1:18:48.479 --> 1:18:52.519
<v Speaker 3>We've been together on average twenty years, twenty five years

1:18:52.640 --> 1:18:56.960
<v Speaker 3>average experience. And we would do this with no outside money,

1:18:57.120 --> 1:18:59.360
<v Speaker 3>right because of the inside money. So we run it

1:18:59.640 --> 1:19:02.800
<v Speaker 3>with what I would call a real family office mindset,

1:19:03.120 --> 1:19:06.839
<v Speaker 3>with our own money alongside in a very low cost operation.

1:19:07.000 --> 1:19:10.160
<v Speaker 3>But we like And the last thing, Barry is we

1:19:10.200 --> 1:19:12.920
<v Speaker 3>are in a lasting game. What I can tell you

1:19:13.000 --> 1:19:15.880
<v Speaker 3>is if ninety percent of the market was passive, the

1:19:16.280 --> 1:19:19.040
<v Speaker 3>remaining ten percent of active would make a fortune.

1:19:19.360 --> 1:19:24.000
<v Speaker 2>I've said that exact thing. Hey, if indexing is taking over,

1:19:24.280 --> 1:19:28.120
<v Speaker 2>doesn't that create all sorts of inefficiencies for a savvy

1:19:28.240 --> 1:19:28.840
<v Speaker 2>active mass.

1:19:29.000 --> 1:19:31.280
<v Speaker 3>Absolutely? And I you know, I don't think it's a

1:19:31.320 --> 1:19:34.479
<v Speaker 3>coincidence that we started out performing the ESSEY. I mean,

1:19:34.479 --> 1:19:37.400
<v Speaker 3>we've outperformed the value index for all periods, but we

1:19:37.800 --> 1:19:41.000
<v Speaker 3>but we lagged the S and P in this momentum market.

1:19:41.040 --> 1:19:45.000
<v Speaker 3>But that changed about four years ago, and nobody's talking.

1:19:44.800 --> 1:19:46.480
<v Speaker 2>About it coming out of the pandemic.

1:19:46.520 --> 1:19:50.519
<v Speaker 3>But basically, yeah, we've been grinding an advantage over the

1:19:50.640 --> 1:19:52.320
<v Speaker 3>S and P for the last three three and a

1:19:52.360 --> 1:19:55.840
<v Speaker 3>half years. I mean, and this is with less than

1:19:56.000 --> 1:19:59.680
<v Speaker 3>half the weight in technology that the index has so

1:20:00.600 --> 1:20:04.840
<v Speaker 3>underweighted the hottest sector. But yet we've been grinding out

1:20:04.880 --> 1:20:08.040
<v Speaker 3>an advantage for three or four years. Why And I

1:20:08.080 --> 1:20:10.880
<v Speaker 3>think it's just because there's way more money index than

1:20:11.120 --> 1:20:15.120
<v Speaker 3>is thought of. There's way more money in momentum than

1:20:15.240 --> 1:20:18.080
<v Speaker 3>is And when I say there's more in indexing, it's

1:20:18.080 --> 1:20:21.439
<v Speaker 3>because there's so much closet indexing. So I think, I

1:20:21.479 --> 1:20:25.280
<v Speaker 3>don't think it's impossible that we're already at seventy percent

1:20:25.720 --> 1:20:29.920
<v Speaker 3>functionally indexed, so that will really help us. So we're

1:20:29.960 --> 1:20:31.880
<v Speaker 3>in a lasting game. We got the balance sheet to

1:20:31.880 --> 1:20:33.400
<v Speaker 3>do it. We're going to be on the other side.

1:20:33.560 --> 1:20:38.720
<v Speaker 2>Huh, that's really fascinating. You mentioned you guys would just

1:20:38.840 --> 1:20:42.759
<v Speaker 2>do this without outside money. But let's put some flesh

1:20:42.760 --> 1:20:48.560
<v Speaker 2>on those bones. Davis Advisors, the company, the Family Foundation,

1:20:49.080 --> 1:20:53.599
<v Speaker 2>you and your partners employees. You collectively have more than

1:20:53.640 --> 1:20:58.800
<v Speaker 2>a few billion dollars in the fund, so you are

1:20:58.840 --> 1:21:02.759
<v Speaker 2>not only a line with your clients. I almost feel

1:21:02.760 --> 1:21:05.479
<v Speaker 2>like skin in the game has become a cliche. But

1:21:05.560 --> 1:21:09.240
<v Speaker 2>the question I want to ask is being invested that

1:21:09.320 --> 1:21:14.080
<v Speaker 2>way alongside the clients, how does that affect your decision

1:21:14.120 --> 1:21:18.200
<v Speaker 2>making process? And what does that do when you're going

1:21:18.200 --> 1:21:21.600
<v Speaker 2>through one of those periodic crises that we've seen so

1:21:21.720 --> 1:21:25.360
<v Speaker 2>much over the past twenty five years, dot COM's GFC pandemic.

1:21:25.800 --> 1:21:29.920
<v Speaker 2>How does having skin in the game affect your decisions?

1:21:30.000 --> 1:21:32.320
<v Speaker 3>Well, I think it makes us much more rational and

1:21:32.439 --> 1:21:36.000
<v Speaker 3>much more long term. It means that, you know, I

1:21:36.120 --> 1:21:40.280
<v Speaker 3>once had a colleague that we had to part ways

1:21:40.680 --> 1:21:44.720
<v Speaker 3>because he said that, you know, I was so unimpressed

1:21:44.920 --> 1:21:48.880
<v Speaker 3>by things like momentum, even if they worked. And he said, look,

1:21:48.920 --> 1:21:51.639
<v Speaker 3>if I had a blind monkey in my office pointing

1:21:51.680 --> 1:21:55.000
<v Speaker 3>to the newspaper every day at a stock and every

1:21:55.040 --> 1:21:57.200
<v Speaker 3>single day that stock went up, that it pointed to

1:21:57.280 --> 1:22:00.320
<v Speaker 3>whatever stock it pointed to went up every day, he said,

1:22:00.320 --> 1:22:02.639
<v Speaker 3>you could watch that monkey for six months. You could

1:22:02.640 --> 1:22:04.000
<v Speaker 3>watch it for a year, you could watch it for

1:22:04.040 --> 1:22:06.559
<v Speaker 3>two years, and you still wouldn't invest with the monkey.

1:22:06.920 --> 1:22:09.960
<v Speaker 3>And I said, of course I wouldn't. It's a blind monkey, right,

1:22:10.040 --> 1:22:12.920
<v Speaker 3>this is my money, this is my client's life savings.

1:22:13.240 --> 1:22:14.960
<v Speaker 3>You think I'm going to say, oh, the blind monkey

1:22:15.000 --> 1:22:18.919
<v Speaker 3>pointed at the paper. So when we're in an environment

1:22:19.240 --> 1:22:22.320
<v Speaker 3>where the market is on a tear and people are saying, oh,

1:22:22.360 --> 1:22:25.400
<v Speaker 3>you're dinosaurs, we're able to hold our discipline. In two

1:22:25.439 --> 1:22:29.080
<v Speaker 3>thousand and seven, we had our financial fund had lagged

1:22:29.120 --> 1:22:31.839
<v Speaker 3>all other financial funds, not all, but most other financial

1:22:31.880 --> 1:22:36.559
<v Speaker 3>wess because we were underweighted in real estate and we

1:22:36.600 --> 1:22:38.840
<v Speaker 3>didn't own any Fanny, we didn't own any Freddy, we

1:22:38.840 --> 1:22:41.080
<v Speaker 3>didn't own any country Wide, we didn't own bear Stearns,

1:22:41.080 --> 1:22:43.920
<v Speaker 3>we didn't own WAMU. And people would say, wow, you're

1:22:43.960 --> 1:22:47.240
<v Speaker 3>like a dinosaur, you know, And it's because it's our money,

1:22:47.840 --> 1:22:50.080
<v Speaker 3>and so we don't mind if it takes a while

1:22:50.160 --> 1:22:53.880
<v Speaker 3>for the reality for that weighing machine to work. What

1:22:54.000 --> 1:22:57.120
<v Speaker 3>we look at every years, did the companies get stronger,

1:22:57.160 --> 1:22:59.760
<v Speaker 3>did they get heavier, did they get more valuable? And

1:23:00.080 --> 1:23:03.800
<v Speaker 3>if so, we view our research as working. Sometimes the

1:23:03.800 --> 1:23:07.280
<v Speaker 3>stocks don't go up, sometimes they do, but we're focused

1:23:07.280 --> 1:23:08.839
<v Speaker 3>on the businesses.

1:23:08.240 --> 1:23:11.360
<v Speaker 2>On the process, and not just what's going up that day.

1:23:11.640 --> 1:23:15.840
<v Speaker 2>You know, the blind monkey reminds me of a fascinating

1:23:15.920 --> 1:23:20.559
<v Speaker 2>quote from Ken French of Dartmouth. Michael Mobison has written

1:23:20.560 --> 1:23:24.599
<v Speaker 2>a lot about the separation between skill and luck and

1:23:25.560 --> 1:23:31.080
<v Speaker 2>French of Fama. French had said, you know, it's very

1:23:31.160 --> 1:23:34.120
<v Speaker 2>challenging to tell the difference between skill and luck with

1:23:34.240 --> 1:23:37.639
<v Speaker 2>fund managers, and to really have a data set where

1:23:37.680 --> 1:23:41.040
<v Speaker 2>you can make an informed decision takes about twenty years.

1:23:41.680 --> 1:23:44.200
<v Speaker 2>So if you're going to wait for that blind monkey,

1:23:44.680 --> 1:23:47.599
<v Speaker 2>you got to wait twenty years. Well, and you're starting

1:23:47.640 --> 1:23:49.600
<v Speaker 2>out with the blind monkey, I think we have to

1:23:49.640 --> 1:23:51.400
<v Speaker 2>assume that it's luck and not skill.

1:23:51.720 --> 1:23:55.760
<v Speaker 3>Well, and look, Berry, your clients come to you. You

1:23:55.800 --> 1:24:01.880
<v Speaker 3>could say that it's because of your performance, and performance matters. Well, well,

1:24:01.920 --> 1:24:04.000
<v Speaker 3>I was going to say, what really matters is trust,

1:24:04.800 --> 1:24:08.320
<v Speaker 3>right and conviction, And so one of the things that

1:24:09.080 --> 1:24:11.080
<v Speaker 3>you know, we have clients that say, hey, you went

1:24:11.120 --> 1:24:13.240
<v Speaker 3>through a period of underperformance, you were at a sync

1:24:13.280 --> 1:24:15.880
<v Speaker 3>with the market. We weren't worried. You're building wealth for

1:24:16.000 --> 1:24:19.479
<v Speaker 3>us every year we don't care all this index one here,

1:24:19.640 --> 1:24:22.320
<v Speaker 3>the index went there. We're with you because we have

1:24:22.400 --> 1:24:25.559
<v Speaker 3>conviction that you'll get us to our retirement, You'll get

1:24:25.640 --> 1:24:28.400
<v Speaker 3>us to our kids college funding. You'll help us achieve

1:24:28.479 --> 1:24:31.840
<v Speaker 3>our goals and maintaining that's something you do with your

1:24:31.840 --> 1:24:34.920
<v Speaker 3>own money. You don't chase the hot dot. But if

1:24:35.000 --> 1:24:38.240
<v Speaker 3>you're an investment manager and all of your value comes

1:24:38.240 --> 1:24:40.880
<v Speaker 3>from the assets under management, you have to chase the

1:24:40.920 --> 1:24:46.320
<v Speaker 3>hot dot. So trust is an undervalued part of the

1:24:46.479 --> 1:24:50.040
<v Speaker 3>promise and the value that an investment manager can give

1:24:50.080 --> 1:24:52.519
<v Speaker 3>to their clients if they If your clients trust you,

1:24:52.720 --> 1:24:56.200
<v Speaker 3>they will get a better return even if you underperform

1:24:56.479 --> 1:25:00.240
<v Speaker 3>an index. If you are if their trust is able

1:25:00.240 --> 1:25:02.639
<v Speaker 3>to keep them invested through the ups and downs.

1:25:02.800 --> 1:25:06.240
<v Speaker 2>Huh really really fascinating. All right, last question before I

1:25:06.240 --> 1:25:08.759
<v Speaker 2>get to my favorites that I ask on my guests.

1:25:09.520 --> 1:25:14.240
<v Speaker 2>What do you think investors are not generally talking about

1:25:14.400 --> 1:25:18.880
<v Speaker 2>thinking about but perhaps should be, could be a topic

1:25:18.920 --> 1:25:24.920
<v Speaker 2>of geography and asset class What important issue is kind

1:25:24.960 --> 1:25:26.559
<v Speaker 2>of getting overlooked these days?

1:25:27.120 --> 1:25:31.160
<v Speaker 3>Well, I think you know, I think this, These three

1:25:31.240 --> 1:25:34.960
<v Speaker 3>big transitions in the economy are going to turn a

1:25:34.960 --> 1:25:38.880
<v Speaker 3>lot of what's become conventional wisdom about investing upside down

1:25:38.920 --> 1:25:42.599
<v Speaker 3>for a while. So I think you know what hasn't worked?

1:25:43.000 --> 1:25:46.920
<v Speaker 3>You know, active management hasn't worked. What hasn't worked? Value

1:25:47.040 --> 1:25:53.160
<v Speaker 3>price discipline hasn't worked. I think you're seeing that. What

1:25:53.160 --> 1:25:57.240
<v Speaker 3>what has worked? Oh, you know alternatives, you know, illiquidity

1:25:57.320 --> 1:26:01.400
<v Speaker 3>that's been great. What you know has worked? That I

1:26:01.439 --> 1:26:06.719
<v Speaker 3>think is dangerous. You know, dividend aristocrats absolutely, I think

1:26:06.760 --> 1:26:07.679
<v Speaker 3>that any you.

1:26:07.560 --> 1:26:11.080
<v Speaker 2>Think divit and aristocrats are dangerous because.

1:26:10.920 --> 1:26:13.840
<v Speaker 3>Because they're looking in the rear view mirror and they

1:26:13.840 --> 1:26:16.559
<v Speaker 3>are not factoring in these big three changes that we

1:26:16.640 --> 1:26:17.520
<v Speaker 3>talked about.

1:26:17.400 --> 1:26:19.679
<v Speaker 2>Well, there isn't that the prob with all models.

1:26:19.760 --> 1:26:23.479
<v Speaker 3>Yeah, Kodak was a dividend aristocrat, you know, Xerox was

1:26:23.520 --> 1:26:26.960
<v Speaker 3>a dividend aristocrat. Polaroid was a dividend And that's fine

1:26:27.280 --> 1:26:31.840
<v Speaker 3>unless there is systemic change, right, And when you have

1:26:31.880 --> 1:26:34.560
<v Speaker 3>a big change like you had coming out of the seventies,

1:26:34.960 --> 1:26:37.800
<v Speaker 3>you know, and the change into the eighties nineties, you know,

1:26:37.880 --> 1:26:42.559
<v Speaker 3>you have these big changes and then everything that worked,

1:26:42.600 --> 1:26:45.400
<v Speaker 3>you know, everything that helped you survive the crash and

1:26:45.439 --> 1:26:48.639
<v Speaker 3>the depression in nineteen forty eight, you could say I'm

1:26:48.640 --> 1:26:50.840
<v Speaker 3>not greedy. I just want to own bonds. Stocks are

1:26:50.840 --> 1:26:53.800
<v Speaker 3>too dangerous, and you were wiped out in a generation

1:26:54.479 --> 1:26:58.080
<v Speaker 3>and bonds became certificates of confiscation. So I think people

1:26:58.080 --> 1:27:04.240
<v Speaker 3>are underestimating how much these conventional strategies, alternatives the rear,

1:27:04.560 --> 1:27:12.120
<v Speaker 3>the backward looking models, including even momentum indexing and versus active.

1:27:12.320 --> 1:27:16.880
<v Speaker 3>And I would even maybe add international International had underperformed

1:27:16.920 --> 1:27:18.599
<v Speaker 3>for so long, and you know.

1:27:18.840 --> 1:27:20.759
<v Speaker 2>Just the past two years starting to look.

1:27:20.920 --> 1:27:22.160
<v Speaker 3>Starting to look pretty good.

1:27:22.320 --> 1:27:23.640
<v Speaker 2>So you like international.

1:27:23.680 --> 1:27:30.280
<v Speaker 3>I like international. We run an international ETFDINT and it's

1:27:30.360 --> 1:27:32.720
<v Speaker 3>just like us. It's all stock picking. It's run by

1:27:32.760 --> 1:27:35.840
<v Speaker 3>my partner, Danton, you know, and our family probably has,

1:27:36.280 --> 1:27:39.720
<v Speaker 3>you know, always keeps probably fifteen to twenty percent our

1:27:39.760 --> 1:27:42.400
<v Speaker 3>assets an international And that looked really stupid until two

1:27:42.439 --> 1:27:44.400
<v Speaker 3>years ago, and it's looking a little better. So I

1:27:44.439 --> 1:27:48.040
<v Speaker 3>think those conventional things are being likely to turn upside down.

1:27:48.080 --> 1:27:50.759
<v Speaker 2>What's the old joke? Being diversified means there is always

1:27:50.760 --> 1:27:54.320
<v Speaker 2>something to apologize for, absolutely all right, So let me

1:27:54.400 --> 1:27:58.479
<v Speaker 2>jump to my favorite questions I ask all my guests.

1:27:58.600 --> 1:28:01.720
<v Speaker 2>Even though I would love to stay here and keep

1:28:01.760 --> 1:28:04.680
<v Speaker 2>you chatting for another three hours, I know you have

1:28:04.800 --> 1:28:09.120
<v Speaker 2>places to go on people to see And the first

1:28:09.200 --> 1:28:11.799
<v Speaker 2>question I always ask, I kind of know the answer,

1:28:11.800 --> 1:28:14.840
<v Speaker 2>but I'm going to give you another opportunity at another

1:28:14.880 --> 1:28:18.639
<v Speaker 2>swing at it. Who were your mentors who helped shape

1:28:18.680 --> 1:28:21.960
<v Speaker 2>your career? And I kind of see four people already.

1:28:22.120 --> 1:28:24.840
<v Speaker 3>Well, you certainly got my dad, my grandfather, and mine

1:28:24.920 --> 1:28:28.880
<v Speaker 3>and Charlie. I think if I was gonna add another one,

1:28:29.000 --> 1:28:32.479
<v Speaker 3>I would add Tom Gaynor, the CEO of marc Al.

1:28:32.720 --> 1:28:36.800
<v Speaker 3>I just think, you know, that sort of principled stewardship leadership,

1:28:37.160 --> 1:28:41.240
<v Speaker 3>that servant leadership, a company that is built with an

1:28:41.360 --> 1:28:45.720
<v Speaker 3>enormous durability and culture of stewardship in mind. You know,

1:28:46.760 --> 1:28:50.519
<v Speaker 3>he's you know, we've served on boards together. He's helped

1:28:50.560 --> 1:28:52.760
<v Speaker 3>me through difficult times. I've done my best to help

1:28:52.800 --> 1:28:54.920
<v Speaker 3>him through difficult times. It's a great thing to go

1:28:55.000 --> 1:28:58.000
<v Speaker 3>through life surrounded by people you admire, and of course

1:28:58.080 --> 1:28:59.920
<v Speaker 3>I get to work with people I admire, and that's

1:29:00.040 --> 1:29:00.559
<v Speaker 3>big plus.

1:29:00.640 --> 1:29:04.400
<v Speaker 2>Huh, really really interesting. Let's talk about I know you're

1:29:04.439 --> 1:29:07.759
<v Speaker 2>a fellow reader. What are some of your favorite books?

1:29:07.760 --> 1:29:09.000
<v Speaker 2>What are you reading currently?

1:29:10.240 --> 1:29:12.559
<v Speaker 3>Well? I have too many favorite books to list, but

1:29:12.720 --> 1:29:14.400
<v Speaker 3>I all.

1:29:14.280 --> 1:29:16.599
<v Speaker 2>The way people always tell me, oh that's my favorite question.

1:29:16.640 --> 1:29:17.800
<v Speaker 2>I'm always looking for something.

1:29:18.520 --> 1:29:20.960
<v Speaker 3>Well, I'll give you the most recent one I read

1:29:20.960 --> 1:29:23.559
<v Speaker 3>that I think is a good antidote to the AI

1:29:23.800 --> 1:29:28.479
<v Speaker 3>phenomena or the AI highysteria, or or the AI the

1:29:28.960 --> 1:29:33.000
<v Speaker 3>the obsession, that's a better word. And it's a book

1:29:33.040 --> 1:29:38.160
<v Speaker 3>called Alchemy. The author is Rory Sutherland. Yeah, I think

1:29:38.200 --> 1:29:39.880
<v Speaker 3>that's a very useful.

1:29:39.880 --> 1:29:42.400
<v Speaker 2>Book to read right now on marketing and advertising.

1:29:43.000 --> 1:29:48.120
<v Speaker 3>It's really on ways in which we maybe fetishize. If

1:29:48.160 --> 1:29:51.400
<v Speaker 3>I said that, right, rationality and that when you look

1:29:51.439 --> 1:29:55.679
<v Speaker 3>at human behavior, it's very irrational, but it's often irrational

1:29:55.760 --> 1:29:59.479
<v Speaker 3>and predictable ways. And the more we say what's the

1:29:59.600 --> 1:30:03.960
<v Speaker 3>rational solution to a problem and expect people to obey that,

1:30:04.600 --> 1:30:07.960
<v Speaker 3>the more we're going to keep getting crazy outcomes. People

1:30:08.000 --> 1:30:11.520
<v Speaker 3>react in ways that you know, people react to placebos,

1:30:12.600 --> 1:30:17.320
<v Speaker 3>but we don't study placebos. Right that. The example he

1:30:17.360 --> 1:30:19.679
<v Speaker 3>gives that I love is if you wanted to create

1:30:20.000 --> 1:30:24.960
<v Speaker 3>a really spectacular competitor to Coca Cola and you hired mckensey,

1:30:25.000 --> 1:30:26.960
<v Speaker 3>they would say, well, you should make something that tastes good,

1:30:27.520 --> 1:30:30.439
<v Speaker 3>sell it a little cheaper, and make it ubiquitous. What

1:30:30.439 --> 1:30:32.800
<v Speaker 3>you wouldn't say is make it more expensive, make it

1:30:32.840 --> 1:30:35.360
<v Speaker 3>taste bad, and put it in a smaller can. And

1:30:35.439 --> 1:30:40.679
<v Speaker 3>that's red Bull. And so there's a lot to study

1:30:40.720 --> 1:30:43.360
<v Speaker 3>in a case like that. How has that worked so well?

1:30:43.439 --> 1:30:48.280
<v Speaker 3>So I think alchemy is a useful one now, you know.

1:30:49.000 --> 1:30:52.439
<v Speaker 3>I think everybody should read themselves and then have their

1:30:52.600 --> 1:30:56.479
<v Speaker 3>kids read Morgan Housel's two best books, which should be

1:30:56.520 --> 1:30:59.479
<v Speaker 3>read as a single book, The Psychology of Money and

1:30:59.520 --> 1:31:03.080
<v Speaker 3>The Artist. They go together. I said, one is like

1:31:03.160 --> 1:31:06.200
<v Speaker 3>the sequel to The Godfather. It's the Godfather too. It's

1:31:06.200 --> 1:31:10.640
<v Speaker 3>not a different movie. It's it's it's the culmination in

1:31:10.680 --> 1:31:11.000
<v Speaker 3>a way.

1:31:11.120 --> 1:31:15.480
<v Speaker 2>And you skip three. Okay, that's a three, just doesn't.

1:31:16.720 --> 1:31:21.439
<v Speaker 3>I agree? I agree. And then for a third book,

1:31:22.040 --> 1:31:24.719
<v Speaker 3>you know, just the one that immediately comes to mind

1:31:24.920 --> 1:31:29.960
<v Speaker 3>at the moment is is Americana. Uh. It's a book

1:31:30.000 --> 1:31:33.280
<v Speaker 3>by there's two books by the same name. I know

1:31:33.320 --> 1:31:36.520
<v Speaker 3>because Charlie had told four hundred years of American Capitalism.

1:31:36.760 --> 1:31:38.720
<v Speaker 3>I love that book that I had him on the

1:31:38.760 --> 1:31:39.679
<v Speaker 3>podcast years ago.

1:31:40.760 --> 1:31:40.920
<v Speaker 1>Yeah.

1:31:40.960 --> 1:31:45.759
<v Speaker 2>Spectacular, spectacular, and and it's just really just I think

1:31:45.800 --> 1:31:49.080
<v Speaker 2>people are just so unaware of the history of American

1:31:49.160 --> 1:31:53.679
<v Speaker 2>capitalism and that book just does a fantastic job laying

1:31:53.760 --> 1:31:55.400
<v Speaker 2>out the success.

1:31:54.960 --> 1:31:57.360
<v Speaker 3>And it will help you as an investor if you

1:31:57.600 --> 1:32:01.360
<v Speaker 3>think in chapters of that book, if you think about

1:32:01.400 --> 1:32:05.559
<v Speaker 3>okay Ai is unfolding. You know, he talks about the

1:32:05.600 --> 1:32:09.599
<v Speaker 3>interstate highways being built. Well, the interstate highways were built.

1:32:09.920 --> 1:32:15.200
<v Speaker 3>You know who made money? Right McDonald's Wendy's right. The

1:32:15.320 --> 1:32:18.760
<v Speaker 3>railroads were built. Who made money? It wasn't the railroads, right,

1:32:18.840 --> 1:32:21.360
<v Speaker 3>it was the factory. Is the ability to distribute? And

1:32:21.400 --> 1:32:23.439
<v Speaker 3>who too were the dead men walking? You know when

1:32:23.439 --> 1:32:28.080
<v Speaker 3>the car was developed, But there were three thousand car companies, right,

1:32:28.880 --> 1:32:32.040
<v Speaker 3>there were two three hundred and seventy one publicly traded

1:32:32.040 --> 1:32:35.200
<v Speaker 3>internet companies. You know, that's why picking the emerging winners

1:32:35.439 --> 1:32:38.679
<v Speaker 3>in the early stages is tricky. But think of the chapter,

1:32:38.840 --> 1:32:41.200
<v Speaker 3>think of that whole arc, and that's a terrific book.

1:32:42.439 --> 1:32:45.040
<v Speaker 2>What are you streaming these days? What's keeping you entertained?

1:32:45.160 --> 1:32:47.880
<v Speaker 2>Either Netflix, podcast, whatever?

1:32:48.560 --> 1:32:51.920
<v Speaker 3>Well, you know, anybody who knows me knows that I

1:32:52.960 --> 1:32:56.800
<v Speaker 3>watch almost nothing, and I particularly don't watch sports. I

1:32:56.800 --> 1:33:00.160
<v Speaker 3>don't know a lot about sports. With one exception. I

1:33:00.160 --> 1:33:04.479
<v Speaker 3>love ice hockey, and I love ice hockey in part

1:33:04.640 --> 1:33:07.200
<v Speaker 3>because we had a lot of family history. My mom's

1:33:07.240 --> 1:33:11.759
<v Speaker 3>family helped start the NHL and founded the Boston Bruins.

1:33:11.800 --> 1:33:15.680
<v Speaker 2>Wait what, Yes, your mom's family helped start.

1:33:15.520 --> 1:33:20.280
<v Speaker 3>The NHL and founded the Bruins, and we owned the

1:33:20.280 --> 1:33:23.200
<v Speaker 3>Bruins through my childhood. Can you imagine? Come on, what

1:33:23.360 --> 1:33:27.040
<v Speaker 3>a deal that my father, who's probably been to eight

1:33:27.080 --> 1:33:30.559
<v Speaker 3>hockey games in his life, has his name carved on

1:33:30.640 --> 1:33:34.360
<v Speaker 3>the Stanley Cup twice because he was Shelby Davis was

1:33:34.400 --> 1:33:38.599
<v Speaker 3>the treasurer of the Boston Bruins, and so they won

1:33:38.640 --> 1:33:40.640
<v Speaker 3>the Cup twice. He got his day own choice. But

1:33:40.880 --> 1:33:42.920
<v Speaker 3>I think one of the things that I love about

1:33:42.960 --> 1:33:46.600
<v Speaker 3>it is that my grandfather, in explaining his love for

1:33:46.680 --> 1:33:50.480
<v Speaker 3>it to me, he said, you know, every sport handicaps

1:33:50.520 --> 1:33:53.760
<v Speaker 3>the athletes. You know, you can't use your hands, you

1:33:53.800 --> 1:33:56.080
<v Speaker 3>can't use your feet, you have to dribble, whatever it is.

1:33:56.320 --> 1:34:01.799
<v Speaker 3>He said, hockey accentuates every human ability. And the skates

1:34:01.840 --> 1:34:04.920
<v Speaker 3>and the skates, the stick, the pads, the oval, rink,

1:34:05.040 --> 1:34:10.040
<v Speaker 3>the ice. I mean, it's just an amazing accelerator of

1:34:10.120 --> 1:34:13.800
<v Speaker 3>human ability. And I guess the reason I think of

1:34:13.840 --> 1:34:16.080
<v Speaker 3>it right at this moment, of course, it's we're moving

1:34:16.120 --> 1:34:19.559
<v Speaker 3>into the Stanley Cup playoffs. We were in the last

1:34:19.560 --> 1:34:23.439
<v Speaker 3>two rounds. But it's also because I think there's a

1:34:23.439 --> 1:34:26.879
<v Speaker 3>way to look at AI as accentuating human ability.

1:34:26.960 --> 1:34:27.800
<v Speaker 2>It's an accelerator.

1:34:27.920 --> 1:34:30.719
<v Speaker 3>It's an accelerator. And what that could mean for healthcare,

1:34:30.760 --> 1:34:33.719
<v Speaker 3>what that could mean for health care, inflation going negative.

1:34:33.840 --> 1:34:35.040
<v Speaker 3>I mean, they're all sorts.

1:34:34.800 --> 1:34:39.200
<v Speaker 2>Of We're already finding so many new molecules. If anything's

1:34:39.280 --> 1:34:42.560
<v Speaker 2>going to find a cure to a lot of cancers,

1:34:43.040 --> 1:34:43.519
<v Speaker 2>it's going.

1:34:43.439 --> 1:34:46.760
<v Speaker 3>To be yes. And you know, and again we have

1:34:46.880 --> 1:34:50.639
<v Speaker 3>to recognize that of course, like every technology, there are

1:34:50.640 --> 1:34:52.920
<v Speaker 3>going to be negatives. They're going to be delays, and

1:34:52.960 --> 1:34:55.320
<v Speaker 3>as people get disillusioned, we could get a big swing

1:34:55.400 --> 1:34:58.880
<v Speaker 3>the other way. So equanimity. But again going back to

1:34:58.960 --> 1:35:02.120
<v Speaker 3>Americana and I get to is Hockey. Think of those

1:35:02.240 --> 1:35:03.080
<v Speaker 3>long chapters.

1:35:03.320 --> 1:35:06.839
<v Speaker 2>All right, our final two questions. What sort of advice

1:35:06.880 --> 1:35:10.120
<v Speaker 2>would you give to a recent college grad interest in

1:35:10.160 --> 1:35:11.520
<v Speaker 2>the career in investing?

1:35:13.160 --> 1:35:19.400
<v Speaker 3>Well, I would say, learn everything you can about business,

1:35:20.160 --> 1:35:23.519
<v Speaker 3>and ideally work in business. You know, I met a

1:35:23.560 --> 1:35:26.880
<v Speaker 3>guy down at Markel had their reunion just yesterday. I

1:35:26.920 --> 1:35:30.439
<v Speaker 3>just flew back from Richmond yesterday. Their reunion is a

1:35:30.439 --> 1:35:34.080
<v Speaker 3>great event. I recommend everybody go just buy a Shara Markel.

1:35:34.200 --> 1:35:37.200
<v Speaker 3>Go to the reunion, you'll see something a lot, you know,

1:35:37.280 --> 1:35:40.160
<v Speaker 3>a lot again was compared to Berger. But I just

1:35:41.400 --> 1:35:44.680
<v Speaker 3>I love the value system there. But I met a

1:35:44.720 --> 1:35:48.200
<v Speaker 3>guy who was an engineer at Altria, which is headquartered

1:35:48.200 --> 1:35:50.479
<v Speaker 3>in Richmond. He owned a lot of Altria. He owned

1:35:50.479 --> 1:35:53.320
<v Speaker 3>a lot of PMI, but he started investing for himself

1:35:53.360 --> 1:35:56.560
<v Speaker 3>about twenty twenty five years ago. He showed me his portfolio,

1:35:56.720 --> 1:36:00.160
<v Speaker 3>including his cost basis. He's built a wonderful record as

1:36:00.160 --> 1:36:04.920
<v Speaker 3>an investor. And so, you know, I think I don't

1:36:04.960 --> 1:36:07.640
<v Speaker 3>love all these kids going to the Goldman Sacks and

1:36:07.680 --> 1:36:10.600
<v Speaker 3>to private equity. I think private equity is it was

1:36:10.640 --> 1:36:13.200
<v Speaker 3>a wonderful business to begin with, and I think it

1:36:13.280 --> 1:36:16.080
<v Speaker 3>is absolutely lost the.

1:36:16.120 --> 1:36:19.000
<v Speaker 2>Thread, all the size. It's just ramped up.

1:36:19.160 --> 1:36:22.400
<v Speaker 3>And they're all selling to themselves, right, and they're trying

1:36:22.400 --> 1:36:25.000
<v Speaker 3>to get the widows and orphans in there so that

1:36:25.080 --> 1:36:30.040
<v Speaker 3>they can hold some final sale, just like they did

1:36:30.080 --> 1:36:34.680
<v Speaker 3>with you know, MLPs and the oil and gas partnerships

1:36:34.680 --> 1:36:38.680
<v Speaker 3>in the eighties. And I really hate it. There are

1:36:38.720 --> 1:36:41.360
<v Speaker 3>people within the world of private equity that I admire,

1:36:41.439 --> 1:36:44.759
<v Speaker 3>that have built stunning records, but most of what's happening

1:36:44.800 --> 1:36:48.919
<v Speaker 3>at this scale is just stealing money from pension plans

1:36:49.120 --> 1:36:52.800
<v Speaker 3>for one downments four oh one k's and it's going

1:36:52.840 --> 1:36:57.160
<v Speaker 3>into penhouses and ferraris. You know, where are the customer's yachts.

1:36:57.320 --> 1:36:59.760
<v Speaker 3>Look at the returns over the last ten years of

1:36:59.800 --> 1:37:03.800
<v Speaker 3>the average state pension plan, then look at the breakdown

1:37:03.800 --> 1:37:06.599
<v Speaker 3>of assets, and you realize that all of the drag

1:37:06.680 --> 1:37:08.560
<v Speaker 3>on their returns is alternatives.

1:37:08.720 --> 1:37:12.400
<v Speaker 2>Huh amazing. Final question, what do you know about the

1:37:12.439 --> 1:37:16.720
<v Speaker 2>world of investing today might have been useful back in

1:37:16.800 --> 1:37:20.839
<v Speaker 2>the late eighties early nineties when you were first getting started.

1:37:20.960 --> 1:37:24.000
<v Speaker 3>Well, every investor, if they're honest, will say that their

1:37:24.000 --> 1:37:28.880
<v Speaker 3>biggest mistakes were what they sold, and so you know,

1:37:29.120 --> 1:37:33.719
<v Speaker 3>I would say that I've always put all my money

1:37:33.920 --> 1:37:36.800
<v Speaker 3>in the funds, and I think that's the right alignment.

1:37:37.520 --> 1:37:40.640
<v Speaker 3>But I realize now which I didn't realize then, that

1:37:40.680 --> 1:37:44.400
<v Speaker 3>there's some real differences, which is that, you know, in

1:37:44.479 --> 1:37:49.320
<v Speaker 3>the funds we have to really think about diversification. If

1:37:49.439 --> 1:37:51.280
<v Speaker 3>each time I bought a stock in the funds, I

1:37:51.400 --> 1:37:53.800
<v Speaker 3>bought it in my own name, instead of putting my

1:37:53.840 --> 1:37:56.160
<v Speaker 3>money in the funds and buying I probably would have

1:37:56.160 --> 1:37:58.800
<v Speaker 3>just left it alone for the last thirty years and

1:37:58.840 --> 1:38:02.280
<v Speaker 3>it would have done very well. So you know all

1:38:02.360 --> 1:38:04.680
<v Speaker 3>of the you know, I first bought Amazon in two

1:38:04.760 --> 1:38:07.400
<v Speaker 3>thousand and two, good time, you know, Yeah, but I

1:38:07.439 --> 1:38:10.240
<v Speaker 3>sold it in two thousand and four, so thank you.

1:38:10.479 --> 1:38:13.200
<v Speaker 2>I could, I could tell you the same thing Apple. Yeah,

1:38:13.720 --> 1:38:17.840
<v Speaker 2>it was fifteen dollars or thirteen cash. Yeah, triple my money.

1:38:17.960 --> 1:38:21.240
<v Speaker 2>I was a genius. I was like ten thousand percent ago.

1:38:21.400 --> 1:38:23.400
<v Speaker 3>I know. We did the same thing in Apple, and

1:38:23.439 --> 1:38:25.280
<v Speaker 3>it was we viewed it as a real estate plate.

1:38:25.360 --> 1:38:27.320
<v Speaker 3>We said, if you marked the real estate to market

1:38:28.000 --> 1:38:32.640
<v Speaker 3>and added to the cash, it was an eighty dollars Yeah,

1:38:32.720 --> 1:38:34.920
<v Speaker 3>and then when it went to two dollars, We're like, oh,

1:38:34.960 --> 1:38:38.120
<v Speaker 3>too much for our blood. So I do think that

1:38:38.240 --> 1:38:41.439
<v Speaker 3>I'm trying to really learn and think about how can

1:38:41.520 --> 1:38:45.519
<v Speaker 3>I how can I improve results over the next twenty

1:38:45.640 --> 1:38:51.280
<v Speaker 3>years by being more willing to hold? And what does

1:38:51.280 --> 1:38:53.559
<v Speaker 3>that mean in terms of position size? What does it

1:38:53.600 --> 1:38:55.640
<v Speaker 3>mean in terms of volatility? What does it mean in

1:38:55.720 --> 1:38:59.040
<v Speaker 3>terms of client expectation? Would I feel the same if

1:38:59.080 --> 1:39:02.880
<v Speaker 3>a client has twenty five thousand dollars with us that

1:39:03.120 --> 1:39:06.280
<v Speaker 3>I would if it was just my own money, because

1:39:06.320 --> 1:39:08.639
<v Speaker 3>I can absorb a bigger loss and I can absorb

1:39:08.680 --> 1:39:12.759
<v Speaker 3>more volatility. So that's something I'm still trying to process.

1:39:12.840 --> 1:39:15.720
<v Speaker 3>But God, I love the business. And you know, like

1:39:15.800 --> 1:39:18.439
<v Speaker 3>my grandfather, if I could die at my desk at

1:39:18.439 --> 1:39:22.519
<v Speaker 3>a very old age, I am. I do have the

1:39:22.560 --> 1:39:25.160
<v Speaker 3>best job on Earth. I get to study success. I

1:39:25.200 --> 1:39:27.760
<v Speaker 3>get to work with people I admire. I go and

1:39:27.880 --> 1:39:31.439
<v Speaker 3>visit companies to focus on that elusive idea of culture.

1:39:32.000 --> 1:39:36.240
<v Speaker 3>I get to meet the incredible people that have built

1:39:36.400 --> 1:39:39.680
<v Speaker 3>our society, that have built businesses. And we have a

1:39:39.720 --> 1:39:42.519
<v Speaker 3>country that loves to tear down the heroes, you know,

1:39:42.600 --> 1:39:44.280
<v Speaker 3>so we admire the guy on the way up, but

1:39:44.320 --> 1:39:47.080
<v Speaker 3>once they succeed, we somehow decide they're a villain. I

1:39:47.120 --> 1:39:49.960
<v Speaker 3>don't think that's constructive. I think it's a strange thing

1:39:50.000 --> 1:39:52.919
<v Speaker 3>for us to admire athletes and not admire Jeff Bezos

1:39:53.479 --> 1:39:56.200
<v Speaker 3>for what he created and how it has served all

1:39:56.240 --> 1:40:00.559
<v Speaker 3>of us. Every day we all use Amazon and serves us,

1:40:00.800 --> 1:40:03.320
<v Speaker 3>you know, every day we delight in seeing our kids

1:40:03.360 --> 1:40:07.439
<v Speaker 3>on Instagram or using Google Maps. And you know, the

1:40:07.479 --> 1:40:10.920
<v Speaker 3>idea that we continue to vilify our heroes instead of

1:40:11.240 --> 1:40:14.920
<v Speaker 3>judging people by their biggest accomplishment, not their weakest moment.

1:40:15.560 --> 1:40:18.080
<v Speaker 2>Chris, thank you so much for being so generous with

1:40:18.120 --> 1:40:22.120
<v Speaker 2>your time. This has been absolutely delightful. We have been

1:40:22.240 --> 1:40:26.600
<v Speaker 2>speaking with Chris Davis. He is the chairman and portfolio

1:40:26.680 --> 1:40:32.000
<v Speaker 2>manager at Davis Advisors. If you enjoy this conversation, well

1:40:32.160 --> 1:40:34.439
<v Speaker 2>check out any of the six hundred and forty one

1:40:34.920 --> 1:40:37.960
<v Speaker 2>we've done over the past twelve years. You can find

1:40:38.000 --> 1:40:43.280
<v Speaker 2>those at iTunes, Spotify, YouTube, Bloomberg, wherever you get your

1:40:43.320 --> 1:40:47.240
<v Speaker 2>favorite podcasts. I would be remiss if I didn't thank

1:40:47.280 --> 1:40:51.240
<v Speaker 2>the correct team that helps with these conversations together each week.

1:40:51.400 --> 1:40:56.320
<v Speaker 2>Alexis Noriega is my video producer. Joan Russo is my researcher.

1:40:56.880 --> 1:41:01.639
<v Speaker 2>Anna Luke is my podcast producer. Barry Results. You've been

1:41:01.720 --> 1:41:05.320
<v Speaker 2>listening to Master's in Business on Bloomberg Radio.