1 00:00:01,760 --> 00:00:04,960 Speaker 1: Al Zone Media. 2 00:00:05,240 --> 00:00:08,880 Speaker 2: Welcome back to It Could Happen Here and our special 3 00:00:08,960 --> 00:00:13,920 Speaker 2: two part series Irregular Naval Warfare and You, where James 4 00:00:13,960 --> 00:00:17,200 Speaker 2: and I teach you how you too can challenge the 5 00:00:17,360 --> 00:00:20,640 Speaker 2: US Navy's dominance of the seas, or at least the 6 00:00:20,680 --> 00:00:25,279 Speaker 2: coasts for fun and profit. Actually today, last episode we 7 00:00:25,320 --> 00:00:28,760 Speaker 2: talked about people challenging the US Navy's coastal dominance. Today 8 00:00:28,760 --> 00:00:32,120 Speaker 2: we're talking about doing the same thing for the Russian Navy. 9 00:00:32,400 --> 00:00:34,519 Speaker 2: So that's going to be fun. And of course the 10 00:00:34,600 --> 00:00:37,040 Speaker 2: Navy of Meanmar, which is a bit of a different 11 00:00:37,040 --> 00:00:40,279 Speaker 2: class from the US and Russian Navy, but no less interesting. 12 00:00:41,280 --> 00:00:43,560 Speaker 3: Yeah, still fun. I'd love to see about lose. 13 00:00:43,800 --> 00:00:45,839 Speaker 2: Yeah. Well I just like boats going down, you know, 14 00:00:45,880 --> 00:00:46,640 Speaker 2: I just hate a boat. 15 00:00:46,720 --> 00:00:51,800 Speaker 3: Yeah, yeah, USS, many many such cases. Yeah, I'm going 16 00:00:51,840 --> 00:00:53,800 Speaker 3: to start with Ukraine, and then we're going to throw 17 00:00:53,840 --> 00:00:56,240 Speaker 3: to James to talk about our friends in Myanmar and 18 00:00:56,280 --> 00:01:00,920 Speaker 3: how they have repurposed civilian technology and stolen weapons to 19 00:01:01,800 --> 00:01:04,600 Speaker 3: counter a navy without really having one of their own. 20 00:01:04,760 --> 00:01:08,920 Speaker 2: But first Ukraine. In twenty fourteen, when the Russian Army 21 00:01:08,920 --> 00:01:12,480 Speaker 2: invaded eastern Ukraine and took Crimea, Ukraine lost a significant 22 00:01:12,480 --> 00:01:16,080 Speaker 2: portion of it's already not that impressive navy. Most of 23 00:01:16,120 --> 00:01:18,680 Speaker 2: their boats were just taken by Russia, along with a 24 00:01:18,760 --> 00:01:21,679 Speaker 2: number of sailors who defected. A lot of other sailors 25 00:01:21,720 --> 00:01:24,160 Speaker 2: fled the region, leaving behind their homes and cities like 26 00:01:24,200 --> 00:01:27,080 Speaker 2: Sebastopol to continue serving their country in a war that 27 00:01:27,160 --> 00:01:30,920 Speaker 2: a decade later is still ongoing. One of these sailors, 28 00:01:30,959 --> 00:01:33,640 Speaker 2: who is a Sebastopol native and had to flee his home, 29 00:01:33,880 --> 00:01:37,480 Speaker 2: possibly forever, in order to continue serving his country, is 30 00:01:37,520 --> 00:01:42,040 Speaker 2: the current commander of Ukraine's navy, Admiral Nazpapa. He leads 31 00:01:42,080 --> 00:01:45,160 Speaker 2: a navy that is almost without manned ships, and on paper, 32 00:01:45,240 --> 00:01:49,400 Speaker 2: it is utterly incapable of challenging Russia's legendary Black sea Fleet. 33 00:01:49,840 --> 00:01:51,960 Speaker 2: Since the age of the Tsars, the black sea Fleet 34 00:01:51,960 --> 00:01:55,880 Speaker 2: has been infamous as a pillar of Russian military power. However, 35 00:01:56,160 --> 00:01:58,760 Speaker 2: also since the age of the Tsars, it's had a 36 00:01:58,800 --> 00:02:01,840 Speaker 2: nasty tendency to get utterly housed by enemies that should 37 00:02:01,840 --> 00:02:02,840 Speaker 2: have been able to beat it. 38 00:02:03,000 --> 00:02:03,200 Speaker 1: Right. 39 00:02:03,880 --> 00:02:06,720 Speaker 3: Yeah, yeah, yeah, not the first time. It's taking an 40 00:02:06,800 --> 00:02:07,720 Speaker 3: unexpected loot. 41 00:02:08,000 --> 00:02:08,200 Speaker 1: Yeah. 42 00:02:08,440 --> 00:02:11,440 Speaker 2: It has a legendary history. That doesn't mean good. There's bad. 43 00:02:11,520 --> 00:02:16,600 Speaker 2: Legendsy out there, you know, Yeah, it's well known. Yeah 44 00:02:16,639 --> 00:02:20,480 Speaker 2: today that enemy is Ukraine. Since the expanded Russian invasion 45 00:02:20,480 --> 00:02:24,240 Speaker 2: in twenty twenty two, just two years, Ukraine has destroyed 46 00:02:24,360 --> 00:02:27,160 Speaker 2: or badly damaged more than a third of the Black 47 00:02:27,200 --> 00:02:30,440 Speaker 2: Sea fleet. Despite having no battleships or destroyers in the 48 00:02:30,480 --> 00:02:33,399 Speaker 2: sea to counter Russian naval power. They have done enough 49 00:02:33,480 --> 00:02:37,120 Speaker 2: damage to reopen Odessa and at least one other port 50 00:02:37,160 --> 00:02:39,960 Speaker 2: on the Black Sea to international commerce, which has provided 51 00:02:40,040 --> 00:02:43,280 Speaker 2: Ukraine with a crucial economic and strategic lifeline. And that's 52 00:02:43,320 --> 00:02:46,200 Speaker 2: a remarkable achievement. Sinking a third of the Black Sea fleet, 53 00:02:46,240 --> 00:02:49,280 Speaker 2: and basically when you reopen a port, that means that 54 00:02:49,320 --> 00:02:52,200 Speaker 2: you have taken away naval dominance from a country that 55 00:02:52,320 --> 00:02:56,519 Speaker 2: has a navy and you don't. That's pretty good, pretty 56 00:02:56,520 --> 00:03:01,679 Speaker 2: good stuff. Over the last two years, had damaged, irreparably 57 00:03:01,800 --> 00:03:05,359 Speaker 2: or sunk seven active landing ships and one to seven 58 00:03:05,400 --> 00:03:08,359 Speaker 2: active landing ships and one landing vessel. I don't know 59 00:03:08,400 --> 00:03:10,720 Speaker 2: the difference. They've They've fucked up a lot of boats. 60 00:03:10,760 --> 00:03:14,519 Speaker 2: They have destroyed a submarine with seed to ground capability 61 00:03:14,520 --> 00:03:17,120 Speaker 2: that was docked for repairs. They have sunk a cruiser, 62 00:03:17,160 --> 00:03:19,880 Speaker 2: the capital ship of the entire Black Sea fleet, the Moskva. 63 00:03:20,320 --> 00:03:22,720 Speaker 2: They've also sunk a supply vessel and a handful of 64 00:03:22,720 --> 00:03:25,240 Speaker 2: patrol boats and missile boats, and a number of other 65 00:03:25,280 --> 00:03:28,480 Speaker 2: boats have been damaged. That's a significant rate of casualties, 66 00:03:28,800 --> 00:03:31,880 Speaker 2: especially when you consider that every actually destroyed vessel we're 67 00:03:31,880 --> 00:03:35,600 Speaker 2: looking at a year's multiple years lead time to replace. 68 00:03:36,000 --> 00:03:40,640 Speaker 2: You cannot make naval vessels very quickly anymore. Back during 69 00:03:40,840 --> 00:03:44,840 Speaker 2: the big dub Dub dose, the US did, but nobody 70 00:03:44,840 --> 00:03:48,440 Speaker 2: really does that anymore, not with the big ones. At 71 00:03:48,520 --> 00:03:52,320 Speaker 2: least you just roll through that. We were just yeating 72 00:03:52,440 --> 00:03:54,160 Speaker 2: aircraft carriers. 73 00:03:53,680 --> 00:03:56,960 Speaker 3: Into the sea, just just flotting them out. 74 00:03:57,320 --> 00:03:58,440 Speaker 2: Yeah, it don't take them out a week. 75 00:03:58,840 --> 00:04:02,960 Speaker 3: Yeah, because it's because Raisi de Rivetay was really riveting 76 00:04:02,960 --> 00:04:03,640 Speaker 3: at a high speed. 77 00:04:03,800 --> 00:04:08,040 Speaker 2: She was quite a riveter. So at the start of hostilities, Turkey, 78 00:04:08,080 --> 00:04:11,920 Speaker 2: which controls access to the Black Sea forbade any additional 79 00:04:12,000 --> 00:04:15,080 Speaker 2: military vessels or at least military vessels of significant size, 80 00:04:15,080 --> 00:04:17,520 Speaker 2: from entering the area. What this means this has a 81 00:04:17,560 --> 00:04:21,520 Speaker 2: significant impact on how well Ukraine strikes work, because even 82 00:04:21,640 --> 00:04:24,719 Speaker 2: if Russia can replace the losses physically, they can't actually 83 00:04:24,800 --> 00:04:27,600 Speaker 2: get replacements into the Black Sea easily. They can't sail 84 00:04:27,720 --> 00:04:30,400 Speaker 2: new shit past the Turks. The Turks are not allowing 85 00:04:30,400 --> 00:04:33,520 Speaker 2: that right now. So again, this is a situation that 86 00:04:33,560 --> 00:04:36,120 Speaker 2: has kind of favored the way in which Ukraine has 87 00:04:36,279 --> 00:04:40,279 Speaker 2: adapted to countering Russian naval dominance. It is possible that 88 00:04:40,320 --> 00:04:42,679 Speaker 2: at the present rate of attrition, the Black Sea Fleet 89 00:04:42,720 --> 00:04:46,000 Speaker 2: could be rendered inoperable in less than two years. Like 90 00:04:46,040 --> 00:04:47,800 Speaker 2: if they keep going at this rates, like eighteen months 91 00:04:47,920 --> 00:04:49,880 Speaker 2: or something before, there's not really much of a fleet 92 00:04:49,920 --> 00:04:53,279 Speaker 2: anymore now. If Ukraine had accomplished this task with a 93 00:04:53,360 --> 00:04:57,040 Speaker 2: traditional navy using standard naval tactics, this would have been 94 00:04:57,080 --> 00:05:00,200 Speaker 2: an impressive victory given the disparity in resources between the 95 00:05:00,200 --> 00:05:02,040 Speaker 2: two nations. But they have done all this with a 96 00:05:02,080 --> 00:05:04,960 Speaker 2: mix of cruise missiles, many of which are produced in country, 97 00:05:05,200 --> 00:05:09,839 Speaker 2: aerial drones, and new bespoke locally produced suicide drone boats. 98 00:05:10,200 --> 00:05:13,000 Speaker 2: This irregular naval warfare has been successful enough that one 99 00:05:13,120 --> 00:05:16,440 Speaker 2: Rand Corporation engineer and analyst, Scott Savatz, described the Black 100 00:05:16,480 --> 00:05:20,160 Speaker 2: Sea Fleet as a fleet in being quote, it represents 101 00:05:20,160 --> 00:05:22,880 Speaker 2: a potential threat that needs to be vigilantly guarded against, 102 00:05:22,920 --> 00:05:25,640 Speaker 2: but one that remains in check for now. And I'm 103 00:05:25,640 --> 00:05:27,719 Speaker 2: going to quote from a New York Times article on 104 00:05:27,800 --> 00:05:31,000 Speaker 2: the topic, it brought a little more context. Ukraine has 105 00:05:31,000 --> 00:05:33,880 Speaker 2: effectively turned around ten thousand square miles in the western 106 00:05:33,880 --> 00:05:36,240 Speaker 2: Black Sea off its southern coast into what the military 107 00:05:36,279 --> 00:05:39,200 Speaker 2: calls a gray zone, where neither side can sail without 108 00:05:39,240 --> 00:05:42,599 Speaker 2: the threat of attack. James Heapy, Britain's Armed Forces minister, 109 00:05:42,760 --> 00:05:45,599 Speaker 2: told a recent security conference in Warsaw that Russia's Black 110 00:05:45,600 --> 00:05:48,640 Speaker 2: Sea fleet had suffered a functional defeat, and contended that 111 00:05:48,680 --> 00:05:51,120 Speaker 2: the liberation of Ukraine's coastal waters in the Black Sea 112 00:05:51,240 --> 00:05:54,200 Speaker 2: was every bit as important as the successful counter offensives 113 00:05:54,240 --> 00:05:57,480 Speaker 2: on land and Corsona and Kharkiv last year. The classical 114 00:05:57,520 --> 00:06:00,320 Speaker 2: approach that we studied at military maritime academies is not 115 00:06:00,400 --> 00:06:03,320 Speaker 2: work now, Admiral Nese Papas said. Therefore, we have to 116 00:06:03,320 --> 00:06:05,839 Speaker 2: be as flexible as possible and change approaches to planning 117 00:06:05,880 --> 00:06:08,760 Speaker 2: and implementing work as much as possible. That at articles 118 00:06:08,800 --> 00:06:11,920 Speaker 2: about a year old or so so. The Neptune anti 119 00:06:11,920 --> 00:06:14,680 Speaker 2: ship missile is one of the prides of Ukraine's nason 120 00:06:14,760 --> 00:06:18,440 Speaker 2: arms industry. Neptune missiles are credited with destroying the Moskva 121 00:06:18,560 --> 00:06:21,560 Speaker 2: in April of twenty twenty two. Ukraine also has access 122 00:06:21,600 --> 00:06:24,840 Speaker 2: to several Western anti ship missiles, including these storm Shadow 123 00:06:24,880 --> 00:06:27,160 Speaker 2: and Scalp missiles. I believe the storm Shadow comes from 124 00:06:27,200 --> 00:06:31,760 Speaker 2: your folks, right, James, Yeah, convention, Yeah yeah. And these 125 00:06:31,760 --> 00:06:34,640 Speaker 2: seem to be pretty effective missiles. These obviously much more advanced. 126 00:06:34,640 --> 00:06:37,800 Speaker 2: And these are modern naval weapons, right. These are much 127 00:06:37,839 --> 00:06:40,080 Speaker 2: more advanced than, for example, the weapons to who these have. 128 00:06:40,279 --> 00:06:42,200 Speaker 2: These are the kind of things that can counter to 129 00:06:42,279 --> 00:06:46,640 Speaker 2: some extent modern anti missile technology. For an example of 130 00:06:46,720 --> 00:06:48,200 Speaker 2: kind of how that tends to work, they used a 131 00:06:48,240 --> 00:06:51,279 Speaker 2: barrage of I believe it was mostly storm shadows to 132 00:06:51,400 --> 00:06:55,240 Speaker 2: rain death on the crime import of Sebastopol. Recently. Seven 133 00:06:55,320 --> 00:06:57,560 Speaker 2: out of eighteen of the missiles fired made it through 134 00:06:57,640 --> 00:07:00,760 Speaker 2: Russian air defenses. And these damaged or just destroyed four 135 00:07:00,880 --> 00:07:03,320 Speaker 2: landing ships and a single strike. And these are sizable 136 00:07:03,400 --> 00:07:06,440 Speaker 2: maple vessels. This is the most recent attack, although as 137 00:07:06,520 --> 00:07:08,760 Speaker 2: after I wrote this, there was another attack on the 138 00:07:08,839 --> 00:07:11,680 Speaker 2: Kirch Bridge. I'm not really sure how that took place 139 00:07:11,880 --> 00:07:14,080 Speaker 2: yet that seems to have shut it down again. But 140 00:07:14,160 --> 00:07:15,880 Speaker 2: that gives you an idea of like what you actually 141 00:07:15,880 --> 00:07:17,400 Speaker 2: have to do. How much of these missiles you have 142 00:07:17,440 --> 00:07:18,920 Speaker 2: to put in the air to get some through. And 143 00:07:18,960 --> 00:07:21,560 Speaker 2: that's not too bad, right eighteen missiles seven get through, 144 00:07:21,600 --> 00:07:25,440 Speaker 2: four ships down. That's a really good rate of return. 145 00:07:25,640 --> 00:07:28,120 Speaker 3: Especially when you consider that, like you know, we were 146 00:07:28,160 --> 00:07:30,200 Speaker 3: talking in our first episode about how the US is 147 00:07:30,240 --> 00:07:35,080 Speaker 3: spending significant resources on maintaining its defending its carriers, right 148 00:07:35,840 --> 00:07:38,680 Speaker 3: Russia does not have the same ability to keep good 149 00:07:38,720 --> 00:07:43,360 Speaker 3: lord munitions, no, and so like that's a finite resource, 150 00:07:43,400 --> 00:07:46,080 Speaker 3: right there, their means of defining that. Defending their ships 151 00:07:46,240 --> 00:07:49,880 Speaker 3: and defending really anything against missiles are a finite resource. 152 00:07:49,920 --> 00:07:53,400 Speaker 3: So any time you can, even if the ship doesn't 153 00:07:53,920 --> 00:07:56,040 Speaker 3: get sunk, if the ship has to deploy one of 154 00:07:56,080 --> 00:07:58,960 Speaker 3: these missiles, which it doesn't, which the whole country doesn't 155 00:07:59,000 --> 00:08:00,480 Speaker 3: have very many of, that's win. 156 00:08:00,920 --> 00:08:04,040 Speaker 2: Now, this is we are talking about irregular naval warfare, 157 00:08:04,080 --> 00:08:06,800 Speaker 2: and then this is not what most people would have 158 00:08:06,840 --> 00:08:11,000 Speaker 2: considered a traditional naval conflict prior to the expansion of 159 00:08:11,040 --> 00:08:14,000 Speaker 2: hostilities in Ukraine. However, we are talking this is very 160 00:08:14,000 --> 00:08:16,280 Speaker 2: different than the case of the Huthis. Ukraine is a state. 161 00:08:16,400 --> 00:08:18,720 Speaker 2: It doesn't have a massive arms industry, but it has one, 162 00:08:18,960 --> 00:08:22,120 Speaker 2: and it has the support of nations with sizable arms industries, right, 163 00:08:22,160 --> 00:08:24,560 Speaker 2: So we are not talking about this part. We are 164 00:08:24,600 --> 00:08:27,440 Speaker 2: going to talk about the aspects of Ukrainian irregular naval 165 00:08:27,480 --> 00:08:31,200 Speaker 2: warfare that are some guys that are hobbyists building shit. Yeah, 166 00:08:31,240 --> 00:08:33,719 Speaker 2: this is not that part yet. But I think this 167 00:08:34,120 --> 00:08:36,320 Speaker 2: information is kind of significant and that it shows the 168 00:08:36,400 --> 00:08:39,200 Speaker 2: tactical use of anti ship cruise missiles and their ability 169 00:08:39,200 --> 00:08:42,800 Speaker 2: to significantly shape an operational environment even when the country 170 00:08:42,880 --> 00:08:45,920 Speaker 2: using them has minimal conventional naval assets of their own. 171 00:08:46,200 --> 00:08:48,240 Speaker 2: It is largely through the use of these missiles that 172 00:08:48,320 --> 00:08:50,680 Speaker 2: Ukraine has been able to reopen their black sea ports. 173 00:08:51,240 --> 00:08:54,400 Speaker 2: That matters to people seeking to understand both this conflict 174 00:08:54,440 --> 00:08:56,920 Speaker 2: and the future of unconventional naval warfare. I mean, I 175 00:08:56,920 --> 00:08:58,960 Speaker 2: guess you could say this is the future of conventional 176 00:08:59,040 --> 00:09:02,479 Speaker 2: naval warfare, but think we're still leaning on the unconventional 177 00:09:02,520 --> 00:09:04,240 Speaker 2: side at the moment, at least in terms of how 178 00:09:04,520 --> 00:09:07,040 Speaker 2: doctrine is changing as a result of this. So maybe 179 00:09:07,040 --> 00:09:10,319 Speaker 2: I should update how we're defining this. But for our 180 00:09:10,360 --> 00:09:13,200 Speaker 2: purposes as people unlikely to have access to cruise missiles 181 00:09:13,240 --> 00:09:16,559 Speaker 2: but significantly likely to find ourselves waging an unconventional war 182 00:09:16,640 --> 00:09:19,400 Speaker 2: than having cruise missiles, it's more relevant to look at 183 00:09:19,440 --> 00:09:22,040 Speaker 2: the new weapons systems Ukraine has developed that have helped 184 00:09:22,080 --> 00:09:25,600 Speaker 2: them lock down the Black Sea Fleet using civilian hobbyists. 185 00:09:25,640 --> 00:09:29,800 Speaker 2: And this is where we get to drones. Ukraine's conventional 186 00:09:29,840 --> 00:09:32,920 Speaker 2: aerial drones are a mix of actual military hardware. I'm 187 00:09:32,920 --> 00:09:36,840 Speaker 2: talking about stuff like the Bairaktar, the Turkish drone, which 188 00:09:36,880 --> 00:09:38,960 Speaker 2: is like kind of like the Predator, all right, it's 189 00:09:38,960 --> 00:09:42,200 Speaker 2: like an actual military product. But the majority in terms 190 00:09:42,200 --> 00:09:45,760 Speaker 2: of numbers of drones that Ukraine is fielding are civilian drones, 191 00:09:45,840 --> 00:09:49,120 Speaker 2: or at least drones that started out a civilian technology. 192 00:09:49,160 --> 00:09:51,439 Speaker 2: A lot of these are now built to be military, 193 00:09:51,480 --> 00:09:53,959 Speaker 2: but they're still based on these designs that started with 194 00:09:54,000 --> 00:09:57,640 Speaker 2: people hacking and cobbling together civilian drones and outside of 195 00:09:57,720 --> 00:10:00,200 Speaker 2: naval stuff. Prior to the war, there had been a 196 00:10:00,240 --> 00:10:03,080 Speaker 2: lot of veterans and hobbyists who were veterans trying to 197 00:10:03,080 --> 00:10:06,079 Speaker 2: convince the Ukrainian military that it needed to adopt drone 198 00:10:06,280 --> 00:10:08,600 Speaker 2: warfare on a large scale, the kind of drone warfare 199 00:10:08,640 --> 00:10:11,480 Speaker 2: that you can do with these these less expensive drones, 200 00:10:11,920 --> 00:10:14,080 Speaker 2: and they received a lot of pushback until the war 201 00:10:14,120 --> 00:10:16,160 Speaker 2: started and these guys just took to the field and 202 00:10:16,280 --> 00:10:20,680 Speaker 2: started fucking murking Russian armed units and infantry and killing 203 00:10:20,720 --> 00:10:23,800 Speaker 2: generals and shit. And now Ukraine has integrated in a 204 00:10:23,800 --> 00:10:26,760 Speaker 2: way that everyone is going to follow. Like Ukrainian like 205 00:10:26,760 --> 00:10:29,880 Speaker 2: battalions have like companies now that are drone assault companies 206 00:10:29,920 --> 00:10:31,680 Speaker 2: and like line battalions, and. 207 00:10:31,840 --> 00:10:36,040 Speaker 3: Within infantry you have people used artillery eating transport zebibas. 208 00:10:36,320 --> 00:10:38,760 Speaker 2: Yes, all over. They have set a goal for this 209 00:10:38,840 --> 00:10:41,160 Speaker 2: year producing at least a million and ideally more like 210 00:10:41,160 --> 00:10:43,600 Speaker 2: two million drones, and at least from what I read, 211 00:10:43,600 --> 00:10:45,720 Speaker 2: that looks like very plausible. And most of these are 212 00:10:45,760 --> 00:10:48,600 Speaker 2: quite small, right, but that doesn't mean obviously ineffective. 213 00:10:48,840 --> 00:10:50,240 Speaker 3: I know they buy a lot of their drones in 214 00:10:50,280 --> 00:10:53,680 Speaker 3: the UK because the UK has consistently kicked itself in 215 00:10:53,720 --> 00:10:56,520 Speaker 3: the nuts when it comes to like breaxit, and so 216 00:10:56,840 --> 00:10:59,280 Speaker 3: the pound is significantly weaker, and so they're able to 217 00:10:59,280 --> 00:11:01,320 Speaker 3: get the drones cheap a price and then drive them 218 00:11:01,360 --> 00:11:04,840 Speaker 3: all the way across. Yeah, people who've done that. I 219 00:11:04,880 --> 00:11:06,600 Speaker 3: was going to go join them, but never wait it out. 220 00:11:06,880 --> 00:11:10,680 Speaker 2: Yeah, And you know there are a number of different 221 00:11:10,720 --> 00:11:15,080 Speaker 2: like these drones earlier in the war had an easier 222 00:11:15,160 --> 00:11:17,960 Speaker 2: time being effective and causing casualties in the Russians. Then 223 00:11:18,000 --> 00:11:20,760 Speaker 2: later this is something that you know, kind of the 224 00:11:21,080 --> 00:11:24,360 Speaker 2: hooplaw and support which I think is necessary that Ukraine gets. 225 00:11:24,400 --> 00:11:27,600 Speaker 2: Lead some people to discount the degree to which Russian 226 00:11:27,600 --> 00:11:30,480 Speaker 2: forces have adapted and gotten smarter. And one of the 227 00:11:30,520 --> 00:11:32,800 Speaker 2: ways in which they've adapted and gotten smarter is in 228 00:11:32,920 --> 00:11:35,320 Speaker 2: blocking drones and using drones of their own. You know, 229 00:11:35,360 --> 00:11:37,040 Speaker 2: one of the stories the last couple of weeks is 230 00:11:37,080 --> 00:11:41,160 Speaker 2: that Russia has succeeded in carrying out strikes on advanced 231 00:11:41,200 --> 00:11:45,720 Speaker 2: weapons systems like samsites deep in Ukrainian territory. They've extended 232 00:11:45,760 --> 00:11:48,320 Speaker 2: their kill chain beyond what they used to be capable of, 233 00:11:48,360 --> 00:11:51,839 Speaker 2: and that's because they've adapted. They're also adapted with less 234 00:11:51,880 --> 00:11:55,600 Speaker 2: efficacy at blocking drones and attacks on naval vessels. Some 235 00:11:55,640 --> 00:11:57,160 Speaker 2: of this has been kind of funny. I want to 236 00:11:57,160 --> 00:12:00,360 Speaker 2: read a quote from a Business Insider article here. Russia 237 00:12:00,400 --> 00:12:02,959 Speaker 2: is painting silhouettes on naval vessels on land to try 238 00:12:03,000 --> 00:12:06,200 Speaker 2: and trick Ukraine, which keeps destroying its warships. In an 239 00:12:06,240 --> 00:12:09,000 Speaker 2: intelligence update on Wednesday, the UK Ministry of Defense said 240 00:12:09,000 --> 00:12:11,360 Speaker 2: that silhouettes of vessels have also been painted on the 241 00:12:11,400 --> 00:12:15,280 Speaker 2: side of K's probably to confuse the uncrude aerial vehicle operators. 242 00:12:15,679 --> 00:12:18,400 Speaker 2: They showed there's some images of this. They don't seem 243 00:12:18,520 --> 00:12:21,760 Speaker 2: convincing to me. I don't know if I think this 244 00:12:21,960 --> 00:12:22,520 Speaker 2: is working. 245 00:12:23,160 --> 00:12:27,320 Speaker 3: This is great. I love this. Have a cardboard navy nags. 246 00:12:27,440 --> 00:12:31,000 Speaker 2: Yeah, it's very bugs bunny. Yes, they're not working as 247 00:12:31,040 --> 00:12:31,959 Speaker 2: well as bugs would. 248 00:12:32,320 --> 00:12:33,959 Speaker 3: More like a hole in the side of the cliff 249 00:12:34,000 --> 00:12:35,959 Speaker 3: face and crushing. 250 00:12:35,600 --> 00:12:39,679 Speaker 2: Into it, keeps throwing at it. It's very funny. I 251 00:12:39,679 --> 00:12:42,760 Speaker 2: mean obviously they just Ukraine just sank like or damn 252 00:12:42,800 --> 00:12:45,000 Speaker 2: it badly damaged four boats. So I don't think this 253 00:12:45,080 --> 00:12:47,920 Speaker 2: is I haven't seen evidence this is working well. Their 254 00:12:47,960 --> 00:12:50,560 Speaker 2: actual like jamming efforts have been much more successful. 255 00:12:50,679 --> 00:12:53,880 Speaker 3: Right, Yeah, they always will be on civilian One of 256 00:12:53,880 --> 00:12:56,400 Speaker 3: the thing that's really interesting compared to me and is 257 00:12:56,440 --> 00:12:59,240 Speaker 3: that Ukraine tends to rely on modified off the shelf 258 00:12:59,280 --> 00:13:02,160 Speaker 3: civilian drone. Right your dji is that kind of thing 259 00:13:02,679 --> 00:13:07,160 Speaker 3: in Mianma because of where a lot of the PDFs are. 260 00:13:07,240 --> 00:13:10,000 Speaker 3: Because but they increasingly do control the borders, but they 261 00:13:10,000 --> 00:13:13,880 Speaker 3: haven't always. They have been making their own drones. The 262 00:13:13,880 --> 00:13:16,160 Speaker 3: group called Federal Wings you can find them on telegram, 263 00:13:16,360 --> 00:13:19,360 Speaker 3: who make their own drones and I think those seem 264 00:13:19,480 --> 00:13:24,560 Speaker 3: to be less. The Jammas that the sac that the 265 00:13:24,640 --> 00:13:29,120 Speaker 3: Tamadoor has are Chinese made like Jamma rifles. You see 266 00:13:29,160 --> 00:13:31,160 Speaker 3: them all the time in captured weapon cases, but they 267 00:13:31,160 --> 00:13:34,560 Speaker 3: don't seem to be having as much impact on these 268 00:13:34,600 --> 00:13:36,280 Speaker 3: homemade drones, which is really interesting. 269 00:13:37,080 --> 00:13:40,120 Speaker 2: Yeah. Yeah, and it's you know, I've mentioned a couple 270 00:13:40,120 --> 00:13:42,680 Speaker 2: of times we're doing this in part because the odds 271 00:13:42,720 --> 00:13:46,320 Speaker 2: that people listening might be involved in an irregular conflict 272 00:13:46,360 --> 00:13:49,600 Speaker 2: are not zero. You know what I think about when 273 00:13:49,600 --> 00:13:51,920 Speaker 2: I say that is not that there's high odds for 274 00:13:51,920 --> 00:13:55,400 Speaker 2: any individual person fighting themselves in that situation, but there is, 275 00:13:55,559 --> 00:13:57,480 Speaker 2: given the number of people who listen to this podcast, 276 00:13:57,600 --> 00:14:00,680 Speaker 2: probably someone who is not currently involved in conflict that 277 00:14:00,720 --> 00:14:03,360 Speaker 2: will find themselves that way in the future. And I 278 00:14:03,400 --> 00:14:04,840 Speaker 2: based that in part on the fact that all of 279 00:14:04,840 --> 00:14:07,240 Speaker 2: our friends in Myanmar who are currently fighting a war 280 00:14:07,520 --> 00:14:10,480 Speaker 2: were a couple of years ago delivery drivers and you know, 281 00:14:10,640 --> 00:14:13,400 Speaker 2: playing pubg online and not really thinking they would wind 282 00:14:13,480 --> 00:14:14,320 Speaker 2: up as insurgents. 283 00:14:14,559 --> 00:14:16,360 Speaker 3: Yeah. I've spoken to a number of people who are 284 00:14:16,360 --> 00:14:19,880 Speaker 3: currently fighting on in Mianma who have listened to our 285 00:14:19,920 --> 00:14:23,760 Speaker 3: Meanma podcast and realized the capacity of three D printing, Yeah, 286 00:14:23,840 --> 00:14:26,920 Speaker 3: to be very useful and so like, even in that sense, 287 00:14:27,080 --> 00:14:29,200 Speaker 3: it's already happening. But yeah, don't know one in Memma, 288 00:14:30,680 --> 00:14:33,440 Speaker 3: Like many of them said, their entire combat experiences playing 289 00:14:33,480 --> 00:14:36,480 Speaker 3: pubg Yeah, now they're murking ships. 290 00:14:36,640 --> 00:14:39,320 Speaker 2: Yeah. So anyway, it bears thinking about this stuff. And 291 00:14:39,320 --> 00:14:42,560 Speaker 2: this brings me back to Ukraine's irregular drone warfare units, 292 00:14:42,560 --> 00:14:44,520 Speaker 2: which again a lot of these guys started out as 293 00:14:44,520 --> 00:14:48,240 Speaker 2: civilian enthusiasts who expanded responded to the outbreak or at 294 00:14:48,280 --> 00:14:52,280 Speaker 2: least expansion of hostilities by expanding their hobby into a 295 00:14:52,320 --> 00:14:55,000 Speaker 2: real world military effort that had a real world effect. 296 00:14:55,040 --> 00:14:58,160 Speaker 2: Civilian drones were crucial in the Battle of Kiev, allowing 297 00:14:58,240 --> 00:15:00,440 Speaker 2: Ukraine to do severe damage to that mass of Russian 298 00:15:00,520 --> 00:15:03,280 Speaker 2: armored column heading towards the city and providing intel that 299 00:15:03,320 --> 00:15:06,480 Speaker 2: led to the assassination of multiple general level officers. So 300 00:15:06,560 --> 00:15:09,320 Speaker 2: it is perhaps not surprising that Ukraine looked to the 301 00:15:09,360 --> 00:15:11,760 Speaker 2: same group of volunteer hobbyists when it came time to 302 00:15:11,800 --> 00:15:14,760 Speaker 2: expand their naval arsenal. And there's a really good article 303 00:15:14,800 --> 00:15:18,600 Speaker 2: I found in CNN by Sebastian Shukla, Alex Marcott, and 304 00:15:18,680 --> 00:15:21,400 Speaker 2: Daria Tarasova. And I actually want to give you the 305 00:15:21,440 --> 00:15:23,120 Speaker 2: title of this article. Yeah, I'll try to thriller in 306 00:15:23,200 --> 00:15:26,880 Speaker 2: the show notes is exclusive rare access to Ukraine's sea drones, 307 00:15:26,960 --> 00:15:29,520 Speaker 2: part of Ukraine's fight back in the Black Sea. Haven't 308 00:15:29,560 --> 00:15:31,360 Speaker 2: really seen the word fight back us that way, but 309 00:15:31,400 --> 00:15:32,880 Speaker 2: there you go. So I'm going to read a quote 310 00:15:32,880 --> 00:15:37,080 Speaker 2: from that article. A government link Ukrainian fundraising organization called 311 00:15:37,160 --> 00:15:40,000 Speaker 2: United twenty four has sourced money from companies and individuals 312 00:15:40,000 --> 00:15:42,160 Speaker 2: all around the world, pooling funds to disperse it to 313 00:15:42,200 --> 00:15:45,360 Speaker 2: a variety of developers and initiatives from defense to soccer matches. 314 00:15:45,720 --> 00:15:48,560 Speaker 2: The entire outfit is very security conscious, insisting on strict 315 00:15:48,560 --> 00:15:51,440 Speaker 2: guidelines on filming and revealing identities. Those who see in 316 00:15:51,520 --> 00:15:53,280 Speaker 2: and met with declined to give their full names or 317 00:15:53,280 --> 00:15:56,080 Speaker 2: even their ranks within Ukraine's armed forces. On a creaky 318 00:15:56,080 --> 00:15:58,840 Speaker 2: wooden jetty, a camouflaged sea drone pilot says he wants 319 00:15:58,880 --> 00:16:01,280 Speaker 2: to go by shark. In front of him is a long, 320 00:16:01,320 --> 00:16:05,440 Speaker 2: black hardshell briefcase. He unveils a bespoke multi screened mission control, 321 00:16:05,720 --> 00:16:09,040 Speaker 2: essentially an elaborate gaming center combined complete with levers, joysticks, 322 00:16:09,040 --> 00:16:11,400 Speaker 2: a monitor, and buttons that have covers over switches that 323 00:16:11,440 --> 00:16:15,520 Speaker 2: shouldn't accidentally be knocked with labels like blast. The developer 324 00:16:15,520 --> 00:16:17,480 Speaker 2: of the drone, who asked to remain anonymous, said their 325 00:16:17,480 --> 00:16:19,720 Speaker 2: work on sea drones only began once the war started. 326 00:16:19,960 --> 00:16:22,000 Speaker 2: It was very important because we did not have many 327 00:16:22,000 --> 00:16:24,760 Speaker 2: forces to resist the maritime state Russia, and we needed 328 00:16:24,760 --> 00:16:26,840 Speaker 2: to develop something of our own because we didn't have 329 00:16:26,920 --> 00:16:31,880 Speaker 2: the existing capabilities. So again, these are hobbyist design I mean, 330 00:16:31,920 --> 00:16:34,160 Speaker 2: this guy's not really a hobbyist in anymore, but that's 331 00:16:34,200 --> 00:16:36,760 Speaker 2: how he started. He's only not a hobbyist because the 332 00:16:36,760 --> 00:16:39,400 Speaker 2: military recognized the value of what he was doing. And 333 00:16:39,480 --> 00:16:42,320 Speaker 2: the current iterations of this sea drone weigh a little 334 00:16:42,320 --> 00:16:45,720 Speaker 2: over two thousand pounds with an explosive six hundred and 335 00:16:45,800 --> 00:16:48,880 Speaker 2: sixty one pound payload, a five hundred mile range and 336 00:16:48,920 --> 00:16:51,160 Speaker 2: a max speed of fifty miles per hour. That is 337 00:16:51,680 --> 00:16:55,600 Speaker 2: a significant weapons system. Yeah, multiple sea drones have been 338 00:16:55,680 --> 00:16:57,640 Speaker 2: used to strike Russian assets in the Black Sea, and 339 00:16:57,720 --> 00:17:01,120 Speaker 2: drones were involved in a successful attack that severely damaged 340 00:17:01,160 --> 00:17:05,280 Speaker 2: the Kirch Bridge last July, rendering it impassable since until September. 341 00:17:05,680 --> 00:17:07,760 Speaker 2: So these have had a real battlefield effect and they 342 00:17:07,800 --> 00:17:10,639 Speaker 2: probably will continue to do so. The developer of these 343 00:17:10,720 --> 00:17:13,800 Speaker 2: drones told CNN these drones are a completely Ukrainian production. 344 00:17:13,920 --> 00:17:16,160 Speaker 2: They are designed, drawn and tested here. It's our own 345 00:17:16,200 --> 00:17:19,200 Speaker 2: production of holes, electronics and software. More than fifty percent 346 00:17:19,200 --> 00:17:22,040 Speaker 2: of the production of equipment is here in Ukraine. And 347 00:17:22,080 --> 00:17:25,320 Speaker 2: that's really significant because you know, I think we're all 348 00:17:25,320 --> 00:17:28,760 Speaker 2: aware of the difficulty Ukraine has had getting weaponry lately 349 00:17:28,880 --> 00:17:31,880 Speaker 2: from the West as a result of fucking around in Congress, 350 00:17:32,240 --> 00:17:34,760 Speaker 2: and so it is a necessity for them to be 351 00:17:34,800 --> 00:17:38,000 Speaker 2: able to develop weapon systems like this that can interdict 352 00:17:38,040 --> 00:17:40,840 Speaker 2: and counteract more advanced and expensive weapon systems and can 353 00:17:41,000 --> 00:17:43,879 Speaker 2: be produced indigenously. You know, I don't think we have 354 00:17:43,960 --> 00:17:48,240 Speaker 2: seen a mass suicide boat attack. I'm interested in what 355 00:17:48,359 --> 00:17:51,879 Speaker 2: happens when we do, like with more significant numbers than 356 00:17:51,880 --> 00:17:55,480 Speaker 2: we've seen deployed. I kind of wonder the degree to 357 00:17:55,480 --> 00:17:57,440 Speaker 2: which the Russians have gotten good at spotting this stuff. 358 00:17:57,600 --> 00:17:59,320 Speaker 2: I've come across at least a couple of stories of 359 00:17:59,320 --> 00:18:02,000 Speaker 2: these boats like that destroyed on approach. So they certainly 360 00:18:02,040 --> 00:18:04,080 Speaker 2: don't always work or even a majority of the time. 361 00:18:04,400 --> 00:18:06,040 Speaker 2: But given the cost of these things, they don't have 362 00:18:06,119 --> 00:18:08,520 Speaker 2: to get through the majority of the time, very much 363 00:18:08,560 --> 00:18:12,560 Speaker 2: worth it right now. In that interview with The New 364 00:18:12,640 --> 00:18:17,080 Speaker 2: York Times, Admiral Najpapa caution that Ukraine is still outgunned 365 00:18:17,080 --> 00:18:19,639 Speaker 2: in the Black Sea. Even though the Russians no longer 366 00:18:19,680 --> 00:18:23,640 Speaker 2: have supremacy, they still have air superiority. They are still 367 00:18:23,640 --> 00:18:26,320 Speaker 2: able to launch from the sea long range missiles at 368 00:18:26,560 --> 00:18:31,040 Speaker 2: Ukrainian targets, including civilian targets. So this is not again 369 00:18:31,080 --> 00:18:33,719 Speaker 2: a situation that should be portrayed as them having their 370 00:18:33,760 --> 00:18:36,600 Speaker 2: own way. Their ability to kind of interdict the sea 371 00:18:36,640 --> 00:18:39,440 Speaker 2: has been the primary effects of it have been number one, 372 00:18:39,840 --> 00:18:42,160 Speaker 2: the reopening of trade in the Black Sea, and earlier 373 00:18:42,200 --> 00:18:44,959 Speaker 2: in the war, by locking down the ability of these 374 00:18:45,040 --> 00:18:47,320 Speaker 2: landing ships to put more troops on ground and by 375 00:18:47,359 --> 00:18:49,840 Speaker 2: doing damage to the Kurch Bridge, they were able to 376 00:18:49,960 --> 00:18:54,120 Speaker 2: slow Russian reinforcements in Russian materiel from entering the war 377 00:18:54,240 --> 00:18:56,680 Speaker 2: zone in order to and this aided in some of 378 00:18:56,720 --> 00:19:00,600 Speaker 2: the advances, particularly in areas like Carson. At this moment, 379 00:19:00,640 --> 00:19:03,960 Speaker 2: the situation has changed because again the Russians aren't just 380 00:19:04,080 --> 00:19:06,160 Speaker 2: kind of like sitting around doing the same thing over 381 00:19:06,200 --> 00:19:08,960 Speaker 2: and over again, or at least not always, and we 382 00:19:09,000 --> 00:19:10,960 Speaker 2: don't tend to talk as much about successes on the 383 00:19:11,040 --> 00:19:13,000 Speaker 2: Russian side of things, but that is an important part 384 00:19:13,000 --> 00:19:15,240 Speaker 2: of the story. And one of the things the Russians 385 00:19:15,240 --> 00:19:17,640 Speaker 2: have done is kind of acknowledge that the Black Sea 386 00:19:17,680 --> 00:19:21,520 Speaker 2: Fleet may not be a fleet in being forever and 387 00:19:21,680 --> 00:19:24,880 Speaker 2: certainly cannot be relied upon to handle everything they initially 388 00:19:24,920 --> 00:19:27,800 Speaker 2: thought it would handle. And so Russian engineers spent a 389 00:19:27,800 --> 00:19:31,240 Speaker 2: significant period of time building a sizeable new railroad that 390 00:19:31,240 --> 00:19:35,160 Speaker 2: connects Rostov and southern Russia to Mariopol and occupied southern Ukraine. 391 00:19:35,440 --> 00:19:38,880 Speaker 2: This has allowed them to get high volume shipments into 392 00:19:38,920 --> 00:19:43,040 Speaker 2: the area and supply troops to the area along Ukraine's 393 00:19:43,040 --> 00:19:47,000 Speaker 2: southern front without relying on that bridge or relying on 394 00:19:47,080 --> 00:19:47,840 Speaker 2: naval landings. 395 00:19:47,920 --> 00:19:48,120 Speaker 1: Right. 396 00:19:48,920 --> 00:19:50,960 Speaker 2: So the fact that Ukraine has been able to take 397 00:19:51,000 --> 00:19:53,720 Speaker 2: out for landing ships recently is good. That's a win 398 00:19:53,840 --> 00:19:56,960 Speaker 2: for Ukraine. It reduces Russian capability, but it is not 399 00:19:57,080 --> 00:19:58,879 Speaker 2: half the same effect that it would have had, for example, 400 00:19:58,880 --> 00:20:03,280 Speaker 2: two years earlier. Yeah, because Russia has also evolved, and 401 00:20:03,359 --> 00:20:06,040 Speaker 2: among other things, railroads are a lot easier or a 402 00:20:06,040 --> 00:20:08,920 Speaker 2: lot harder to destroy to like take out. Right, It's 403 00:20:08,920 --> 00:20:11,040 Speaker 2: easy to damage a railroad, but they're easy to fix. 404 00:20:11,080 --> 00:20:13,000 Speaker 2: It's not. It doesn't take a lot to get some 405 00:20:13,000 --> 00:20:15,840 Speaker 2: guys over to fix a damage sunk of railroad. Fixing 406 00:20:15,840 --> 00:20:18,160 Speaker 2: a bridge that's been blown up or a sunk boat 407 00:20:18,280 --> 00:20:19,040 Speaker 2: is a lot harder. 408 00:20:19,400 --> 00:20:22,320 Speaker 3: Yeah. Absolutely, I mean, and there are people within Russia 409 00:20:22,320 --> 00:20:25,560 Speaker 3: even who are sabotaging railroads, but as you say, it's 410 00:20:25,600 --> 00:20:28,160 Speaker 3: like it's very high stakes for them, and it's relatively 411 00:20:28,200 --> 00:20:31,159 Speaker 3: low cost for the Russian state to fix that stuff, 412 00:20:31,359 --> 00:20:33,640 Speaker 3: so like it's not as effective. 413 00:20:34,160 --> 00:20:36,040 Speaker 2: Yeah, but I think this gives you an idea of 414 00:20:36,080 --> 00:20:38,440 Speaker 2: kind of like what we're looking at when we look 415 00:20:38,440 --> 00:20:42,520 Speaker 2: at this kind of ongoing irregular conflict is the side 416 00:20:42,600 --> 00:20:45,520 Speaker 2: that does not have access to a functional navy, not 417 00:20:45,600 --> 00:20:48,840 Speaker 2: able to interdict or destroy fleets, but able to stop 418 00:20:48,880 --> 00:20:51,080 Speaker 2: them from dominating the coast. And when you can stop 419 00:20:51,160 --> 00:20:53,920 Speaker 2: them from dominating the coast, you have effectively denied them 420 00:20:54,400 --> 00:20:58,000 Speaker 2: terrain that they can act in without being countered, and 421 00:20:58,160 --> 00:21:00,960 Speaker 2: you have also denied them from stopping you from acting 422 00:21:01,000 --> 00:21:03,200 Speaker 2: in that same terrain, even if you don't have total 423 00:21:03,200 --> 00:21:08,320 Speaker 2: safety in that area. That opens up the operational possibilities substantially. 424 00:21:08,520 --> 00:21:11,840 Speaker 2: And this is something that I kind of don't think 425 00:21:11,920 --> 00:21:13,760 Speaker 2: is going to get put back in the bag. Even 426 00:21:13,800 --> 00:21:16,800 Speaker 2: if some of these Star Wars ass weapons systems do 427 00:21:16,880 --> 00:21:19,520 Speaker 2: come out in the near future, you know, maybe that'll 428 00:21:20,000 --> 00:21:22,639 Speaker 2: have an impact in the immediate term on people like 429 00:21:22,680 --> 00:21:25,160 Speaker 2: the Houthis, but I don't think that it really will 430 00:21:25,720 --> 00:21:28,680 Speaker 2: on you know, for example, what what Ukraine's doing right? 431 00:21:28,880 --> 00:21:32,879 Speaker 3: Yes, yeah, Russia can't keep up with getting decent small arms, 432 00:21:33,000 --> 00:21:36,000 Speaker 3: body armor, grenades and shit like it's there's no way 433 00:21:36,040 --> 00:21:38,600 Speaker 3: it's going to implement some kind of massive Star Wars 434 00:21:38,960 --> 00:21:41,120 Speaker 3: system over its navy. Not right now in the middle 435 00:21:41,160 --> 00:21:43,360 Speaker 3: of a conflict. That's it's struggling to supply. 436 00:21:44,240 --> 00:21:46,480 Speaker 2: Yep, you know what, here's an ad break. 437 00:21:57,320 --> 00:22:00,399 Speaker 3: All right, we're back and we are traveling around the 438 00:22:00,400 --> 00:22:03,240 Speaker 3: world's been your little globe in your head, and look 439 00:22:03,280 --> 00:22:07,640 Speaker 3: for Meanma, which is of course in Asia. Now I'm 440 00:22:07,680 --> 00:22:12,080 Speaker 3: talking about two different I guess anti ship sabotage or 441 00:22:12,119 --> 00:22:14,879 Speaker 3: attack or two different ways the ships have been sunk 442 00:22:14,920 --> 00:22:16,880 Speaker 3: in the EMMA. I'll start with the first one, which 443 00:22:16,920 --> 00:22:21,960 Speaker 3: is undoubtedly the flashiest, just because it's fun. So a 444 00:22:22,160 --> 00:22:25,680 Speaker 3: ship in the port of Yangon about about a month ago, 445 00:22:25,760 --> 00:22:27,360 Speaker 3: so we're recording on A twenty. It's about the first 446 00:22:27,400 --> 00:22:30,840 Speaker 3: of March. It was in the river in the river 447 00:22:30,920 --> 00:22:34,720 Speaker 3: in yangon right, and it was carrying allegedly carrying jet fuel. Now, 448 00:22:34,920 --> 00:22:39,760 Speaker 3: if you follow Burmese activists, people in the Burmese Freedom Movement, 449 00:22:40,080 --> 00:22:42,280 Speaker 3: they will one of their demands for a long time 450 00:22:42,359 --> 00:22:45,560 Speaker 3: has been to stop supplying the Hunter with jet fuel, 451 00:22:45,600 --> 00:22:51,280 Speaker 3: which would in turn stop it being able to bomb villages, schools, civilians, 452 00:22:51,600 --> 00:22:55,240 Speaker 3: PDF formations, just about anyone in the country. It's bombed 453 00:22:55,240 --> 00:22:57,879 Speaker 3: at some point in the last couple of years. And 454 00:22:58,240 --> 00:23:00,000 Speaker 3: they haven't been to exactly right. They haven't been able 455 00:23:00,200 --> 00:23:03,359 Speaker 3: to stop the supply of jet fuel coming to the Hunter. 456 00:23:03,800 --> 00:23:05,639 Speaker 3: So they've taken it into their own hands. And what 457 00:23:05,680 --> 00:23:08,440 Speaker 3: they did on the first of March was that they 458 00:23:09,080 --> 00:23:13,160 Speaker 3: snuck onto a boat. So two this is the story 459 00:23:13,240 --> 00:23:17,120 Speaker 3: from the Burmese National Unity Government's Ministry of Defense. Anyway, 460 00:23:17,960 --> 00:23:22,719 Speaker 3: combat divers snuck onto this boat planted a kilogram of 461 00:23:22,720 --> 00:23:25,159 Speaker 3: TNT or a charge equivalent to a kilogram of TNT. 462 00:23:25,560 --> 00:23:28,040 Speaker 3: Robert and I've both spoken to people who make explosives 463 00:23:28,040 --> 00:23:30,240 Speaker 3: in memis we do. We definitely know the PDF has 464 00:23:30,320 --> 00:23:33,199 Speaker 3: access to a range of explosives. They set it on 465 00:23:33,240 --> 00:23:35,639 Speaker 3: a five hour fuse and it blew up in the 466 00:23:35,640 --> 00:23:38,520 Speaker 3: middle of the night, and there's definitely footage of a 467 00:23:38,560 --> 00:23:42,280 Speaker 3: ship on fire having blown up. Now, this is pretty 468 00:23:42,320 --> 00:23:46,199 Speaker 3: remarkable for never real. This is why the United States 469 00:23:46,240 --> 00:23:49,280 Speaker 3: has units like the Navy Seals, right, like the higher 470 00:23:49,359 --> 00:23:55,160 Speaker 3: speed guys, because it is not easy to scuba dive 471 00:23:55,200 --> 00:23:58,760 Speaker 3: across a harbor, climb onto a ship, send an explosive 472 00:23:58,840 --> 00:24:01,440 Speaker 3: charge without being detected, and then leave that ship and 473 00:24:01,680 --> 00:24:04,119 Speaker 3: have the charge go off and sink the ship without 474 00:24:04,160 --> 00:24:08,440 Speaker 3: you being compromised, without the charge itself being like compromised, 475 00:24:08,480 --> 00:24:11,320 Speaker 3: and the ship being saved. Right, this is some like. 476 00:24:11,480 --> 00:24:14,760 Speaker 3: This is some classic like. This is why there are 477 00:24:14,760 --> 00:24:19,080 Speaker 3: special units within the US military. Now. The PDF very 478 00:24:19,080 --> 00:24:22,080 Speaker 3: obviously did not have combat divers. Two years ago, I 479 00:24:22,119 --> 00:24:26,360 Speaker 3: was looking into hobby scuba diving in Yangon. The rivers 480 00:24:26,440 --> 00:24:29,560 Speaker 3: in that area are extremely muddy and visibility is very low. 481 00:24:30,400 --> 00:24:33,480 Speaker 3: So the people who you find diving in that area 482 00:24:33,560 --> 00:24:36,440 Speaker 3: are not so much like hobby scuba divers or free divers, 483 00:24:36,520 --> 00:24:40,840 Speaker 3: but they're salvage divers. And there's a whole little industry 484 00:24:40,840 --> 00:24:46,199 Speaker 3: of people. And these people are diving in equipment that 485 00:24:46,240 --> 00:24:49,560 Speaker 3: I would not consider safe or reliable. It's clamping an 486 00:24:49,640 --> 00:24:53,119 Speaker 3: air hose in between your teeth and diving down and 487 00:24:53,160 --> 00:24:56,080 Speaker 3: trying to find there's a large deposit of coal in 488 00:24:56,080 --> 00:24:57,840 Speaker 3: one of the rivers in Yangon because of a ship 489 00:24:57,840 --> 00:25:01,160 Speaker 3: that's sunk. There was, of course copper, which everyone all 490 00:25:01,160 --> 00:25:04,359 Speaker 3: around the world, including the big Coong in Santia, stealing copper. 491 00:25:05,200 --> 00:25:08,359 Speaker 3: There's iron, right, So these people are diving down and 492 00:25:08,400 --> 00:25:12,119 Speaker 3: trying to collect scrap and sell that for whatever minimal 493 00:25:12,160 --> 00:25:12,800 Speaker 3: amount they can. 494 00:25:12,880 --> 00:25:13,000 Speaker 1: Right. 495 00:25:13,040 --> 00:25:19,560 Speaker 3: It's an extremely dangerous and extremely low income. It's one 496 00:25:19,600 --> 00:25:22,359 Speaker 3: of the sort of really high risk, low reward jobs 497 00:25:22,400 --> 00:25:24,760 Speaker 3: that you get in economies where people are really struggling 498 00:25:24,760 --> 00:25:28,320 Speaker 3: to make ends meet. Right, So those are the only 499 00:25:28,440 --> 00:25:31,240 Speaker 3: divers I can find evidence of in Yangon. I don't 500 00:25:31,240 --> 00:25:33,399 Speaker 3: think it was them who did this, because you have 501 00:25:33,480 --> 00:25:35,120 Speaker 3: to have a boat above you with a pump if 502 00:25:35,119 --> 00:25:37,160 Speaker 3: you're diving with a rubber hose in your teeth, right, 503 00:25:37,480 --> 00:25:43,360 Speaker 3: So it seems like somebody in within the They said 504 00:25:43,359 --> 00:25:45,679 Speaker 3: it was a Yangon PDF, that's what they attribute it to, 505 00:25:45,840 --> 00:25:49,240 Speaker 3: So that would be one of these. It would likely 506 00:25:49,240 --> 00:25:52,200 Speaker 3: be an underground group within the PDF. Right. Some people 507 00:25:52,240 --> 00:25:54,920 Speaker 3: living in the city who were able to sneak onto 508 00:25:54,960 --> 00:25:56,800 Speaker 3: this boat set a charge and blow it up, and 509 00:25:56,840 --> 00:25:59,040 Speaker 3: they would also had to have intelligence at the boat 510 00:25:59,640 --> 00:26:02,680 Speaker 3: where it was, what it was carrying, et cetera. It's 511 00:26:02,720 --> 00:26:06,720 Speaker 3: a pretty pretty daring mission that this is the first 512 00:26:06,720 --> 00:26:09,000 Speaker 3: one like this we've seen, and we haven't seen anything since. 513 00:26:09,119 --> 00:26:12,320 Speaker 3: But it's of course possible that this is a story 514 00:26:12,320 --> 00:26:14,880 Speaker 3: that we're being told. In fact, they had like someone 515 00:26:14,960 --> 00:26:17,879 Speaker 3: undercover on the ship, right or like they had some 516 00:26:17,960 --> 00:26:20,639 Speaker 3: other means of getting this charge onto the ship. But 517 00:26:21,520 --> 00:26:23,320 Speaker 3: one way or another they managed to blow up this 518 00:26:23,359 --> 00:26:27,400 Speaker 3: ship carrying fuel, which is a significant detriment. Yeah, right, 519 00:26:27,840 --> 00:26:29,600 Speaker 3: And that's how they get most of their ship. It's 520 00:26:29,600 --> 00:26:32,520 Speaker 3: not over land, especially with more the. 521 00:26:32,560 --> 00:26:36,639 Speaker 2: Terrain there is just absolutely, like even with modern technology 522 00:26:36,680 --> 00:26:38,680 Speaker 2: difficult to get significant amounts of shit through. 523 00:26:39,119 --> 00:26:42,760 Speaker 3: They're resupplying some of their outposts that are ten miles 524 00:26:42,800 --> 00:26:45,600 Speaker 3: from a town with helicopters right now, like A the 525 00:26:45,720 --> 00:26:52,440 Speaker 3: terrain is burly, and B they don't have They PDF 526 00:26:52,480 --> 00:26:55,159 Speaker 3: has denied them access that any time they send out 527 00:26:55,160 --> 00:26:58,679 Speaker 3: a convoy, it gets attacked, so sending out plus you 528 00:26:58,680 --> 00:27:01,880 Speaker 3: know that their land board crossings are increasingly falling into 529 00:27:01,920 --> 00:27:05,639 Speaker 3: the hands of the PDFs and the eros, So getting 530 00:27:05,680 --> 00:27:07,199 Speaker 3: stuff through the ocean is one of the ways that 531 00:27:07,200 --> 00:27:09,800 Speaker 3: they can still get stuff. And if this keeps happening, 532 00:27:09,840 --> 00:27:12,280 Speaker 3: then they will make that more expensive for them. And 533 00:27:12,400 --> 00:27:15,840 Speaker 3: they're not exactly a wealthy hunter, even though I guess 534 00:27:16,040 --> 00:27:19,040 Speaker 3: Mina Lang just made himself an air Force one recently. 535 00:27:19,160 --> 00:27:20,120 Speaker 3: I was just looking at it today. 536 00:27:20,160 --> 00:27:20,800 Speaker 2: He's good. 537 00:27:20,840 --> 00:27:24,520 Speaker 3: He's got himself too luxury. Yeah, they called it dictator class, 538 00:27:24,960 --> 00:27:27,040 Speaker 3: like he's upgraded from president class. 539 00:27:27,119 --> 00:27:27,399 Speaker 2: Nice. 540 00:27:28,119 --> 00:27:32,960 Speaker 3: Yeah, yeah, yes, he has in many ways. So yeah, 541 00:27:32,960 --> 00:27:35,119 Speaker 3: that's one way that the PDF has been blowing up 542 00:27:35,119 --> 00:27:37,080 Speaker 3: ships in the yang On. But Robert, do you know 543 00:27:37,160 --> 00:27:40,880 Speaker 3: who else has been blowing up ships in the in Yangon? 544 00:27:41,600 --> 00:27:46,760 Speaker 2: Well, we are sponsored entirely by the British Navy circa 545 00:27:46,840 --> 00:27:51,440 Speaker 2: the mid eighteen hundreds, so I would guess them, that's right, Yeah, yeah, yeah, 546 00:27:51,520 --> 00:27:52,000 Speaker 2: yeah yeah. 547 00:27:52,000 --> 00:27:55,320 Speaker 3: Lots of repressed, repressed feelings and growing. 548 00:27:55,119 --> 00:28:00,280 Speaker 2: Up a lot of cabin boys with deep trauma. Anyway, it, 549 00:28:11,960 --> 00:28:12,960 Speaker 2: Eric Rebeca. 550 00:28:12,960 --> 00:28:15,000 Speaker 3: We hope you enjoyed that. That pivot one of our 551 00:28:15,000 --> 00:28:19,200 Speaker 3: best ones yet. And we're talking about the Arakan Army now, 552 00:28:19,560 --> 00:28:22,560 Speaker 3: So the Arakan Army are not to be confused with 553 00:28:22,600 --> 00:28:25,560 Speaker 3: the Arakan Rahine of Salvation Army. Different group. Arakan is 554 00:28:25,560 --> 00:28:28,320 Speaker 3: the name of what is now a kind state before 555 00:28:28,320 --> 00:28:30,920 Speaker 3: it was colonized by the Burmese. That was I think 556 00:28:30,960 --> 00:28:33,520 Speaker 3: Arakan was a king before it was colonized by the Burmese, 557 00:28:33,560 --> 00:28:35,920 Speaker 3: so that that's where that refers to. It's a geographical 558 00:28:36,520 --> 00:28:40,640 Speaker 3: appellation rather than like necessarily an ethnic one. The Racine 559 00:28:40,680 --> 00:28:43,880 Speaker 3: would be the ethnic group. So what the AA have 560 00:28:44,000 --> 00:28:48,720 Speaker 3: done is sunk. I think at least four Hunter ships now, 561 00:28:48,920 --> 00:28:51,040 Speaker 3: and most of these ships are kind of they're like 562 00:28:51,160 --> 00:28:54,720 Speaker 3: the They look like big Higgins boats. They're like landing 563 00:28:54,800 --> 00:28:58,280 Speaker 3: craft or like car ferries, like flat bottom with a 564 00:28:58,360 --> 00:29:00,840 Speaker 3: bow that goes down. Right. I ride around a lot 565 00:29:00,840 --> 00:29:03,200 Speaker 3: in the Marshall Islands in little landing craft like that 566 00:29:03,240 --> 00:29:05,240 Speaker 3: because they can get them in. They don't have like docks, 567 00:29:05,560 --> 00:29:06,880 Speaker 3: so they can just ride that right up to the 568 00:29:06,880 --> 00:29:08,840 Speaker 3: beach and then drop the front and off you go. 569 00:29:09,640 --> 00:29:11,880 Speaker 3: And they use them a lot. The Hunter doesn't have 570 00:29:11,960 --> 00:29:15,560 Speaker 3: like per se marines that they don't have maritime infantry, 571 00:29:16,000 --> 00:29:19,200 Speaker 3: but they use them to transport their regular army around, right, 572 00:29:19,720 --> 00:29:21,800 Speaker 3: and they use them to transport them up river. They 573 00:29:21,800 --> 00:29:24,840 Speaker 3: also use them a lot in Rakhine State to shell 574 00:29:25,600 --> 00:29:29,560 Speaker 3: AA positions and any townships that they've decided they want 575 00:29:29,560 --> 00:29:31,240 Speaker 3: to wipe off the map and kill all the people 576 00:29:31,280 --> 00:29:33,880 Speaker 3: in right, So, these these boats have been a real 577 00:29:34,880 --> 00:29:37,600 Speaker 3: thorn in the side of the Arakan Army. After Operation 578 00:29:37,720 --> 00:29:42,000 Speaker 3: ten twenty seven when they joined with two other groups 579 00:29:42,000 --> 00:29:44,440 Speaker 3: to form the Three Brotherhood Alliances A launch attacks on 580 00:29:44,480 --> 00:29:48,200 Speaker 3: the Hunter all over MA. And so what they've been doing, 581 00:29:48,240 --> 00:29:53,040 Speaker 3: it appears, is using underwater mines to think these ships, 582 00:29:53,280 --> 00:29:59,120 Speaker 3: which is interesting, right. I guess the mines are like 583 00:29:59,480 --> 00:30:02,040 Speaker 3: a very old technology, right, Like it's probably one hundred 584 00:30:02,120 --> 00:30:07,120 Speaker 3: years plus underwater mines have existed. It seems the way that, like, 585 00:30:07,280 --> 00:30:10,040 Speaker 3: the reason they're able to get away with using what 586 00:30:10,160 --> 00:30:13,200 Speaker 3: is their relatively dated technology is because the Hunter doesn't 587 00:30:13,320 --> 00:30:16,400 Speaker 3: expect to encounter anything, right, and so has not equipped 588 00:30:16,400 --> 00:30:19,960 Speaker 3: its ships as such. Like they do have stuff like submarines, 589 00:30:20,000 --> 00:30:21,840 Speaker 3: but that's not what's getting sunk. What's getting sun to 590 00:30:21,920 --> 00:30:24,920 Speaker 3: these big kind of landing craft riverboats, And it seems 591 00:30:24,920 --> 00:30:28,120 Speaker 3: that they're using mines and then once they disable the ship, 592 00:30:28,160 --> 00:30:31,480 Speaker 3: they're then attacking it with small boats, small arms like 593 00:30:31,560 --> 00:30:35,240 Speaker 3: indirect fire mortars and stuff. I saw one post that 594 00:30:35,280 --> 00:30:37,760 Speaker 3: suggested they'd use which is pretty cool if they did. 595 00:30:37,960 --> 00:30:41,160 Speaker 3: The Burmese military has these like tank destroyers. 596 00:30:42,160 --> 00:30:44,520 Speaker 2: It's a tank, it's. 597 00:30:43,920 --> 00:30:46,480 Speaker 3: What it is. And they've captured the AA has captured 598 00:30:46,480 --> 00:30:48,800 Speaker 3: a number of these, right, and I've seen suggestions that 599 00:30:48,800 --> 00:30:51,640 Speaker 3: they're using some of these on like they just set 600 00:30:51,680 --> 00:30:53,560 Speaker 3: up an ambush along the banks of the river, right 601 00:30:53,640 --> 00:30:55,440 Speaker 3: and as a ship comes in they can they can 602 00:30:55,600 --> 00:30:57,320 Speaker 3: maybe disable it with a mine and then attack it 603 00:30:57,360 --> 00:30:59,760 Speaker 3: with those. But there are videos online you can find 604 00:30:59,800 --> 00:31:03,720 Speaker 3: them of the AA sinking these ships. And then they've 605 00:31:03,720 --> 00:31:07,200 Speaker 3: done some amazing drone photography of like they obviously they 606 00:31:07,240 --> 00:31:10,440 Speaker 3: then like staged their units on the ships, like all 607 00:31:10,480 --> 00:31:13,040 Speaker 3: saluting the drone and they had the Arakan Army flags 608 00:31:13,080 --> 00:31:16,560 Speaker 3: and they're actually really cool photos of them taking these ships. 609 00:31:16,600 --> 00:31:19,320 Speaker 3: But again, like I think this might be the first 610 00:31:19,400 --> 00:31:26,600 Speaker 3: sinking of a Bermese naval ship since since independence from Britain. 611 00:31:26,840 --> 00:31:28,840 Speaker 3: Like I can't think that they were. They al really 612 00:31:28,880 --> 00:31:30,920 Speaker 3: haven't played much of a role at all in its 613 00:31:30,960 --> 00:31:35,400 Speaker 3: conflicts with the Eros, aside as from like basically kind 614 00:31:35,440 --> 00:31:38,000 Speaker 3: of just shelling places when they want to do that. 615 00:31:38,680 --> 00:31:41,239 Speaker 3: But there's never really been any significant opposition to them, 616 00:31:41,240 --> 00:31:44,360 Speaker 3: and that's changed now they have to obviously just like 617 00:31:44,440 --> 00:31:47,040 Speaker 3: everywhere else, watch out for drones. Drones have been used 618 00:31:47,040 --> 00:31:51,800 Speaker 3: to a massive extent in Myanmar, and like the AA 619 00:31:51,840 --> 00:31:54,560 Speaker 3: doesn't have as many like associated PDFs, I haven't seen 620 00:31:54,640 --> 00:31:58,320 Speaker 3: them doing as much of the drone stuff as the PDFs. 621 00:31:58,480 --> 00:32:02,000 Speaker 3: The pdf tend to be like the more urban folks, right, 622 00:32:02,040 --> 00:32:05,280 Speaker 3: the younger folks and the gen Z folks that we've 623 00:32:05,280 --> 00:32:07,760 Speaker 3: spoken about before, and a lot of them have been 624 00:32:07,920 --> 00:32:10,000 Speaker 3: very savvy with their use of drones. Like I said, 625 00:32:10,000 --> 00:32:12,000 Speaker 3: you can look up Federal Wings and you can see 626 00:32:12,080 --> 00:32:15,160 Speaker 3: them dropping bombs with drones on all kinds of stuff 627 00:32:15,600 --> 00:32:19,640 Speaker 3: with their heavy metal soundtracks that they like. But what 628 00:32:19,760 --> 00:32:22,040 Speaker 3: it wasn't even drone here, It's pretty simple. It was 629 00:32:22,120 --> 00:32:25,480 Speaker 3: just mine. So things they do love mines and meat 630 00:32:25,480 --> 00:32:27,960 Speaker 3: of mines all over that country, but in this case, 631 00:32:28,160 --> 00:32:31,440 Speaker 3: these I guess, massive what mines in the rivers. Given 632 00:32:31,440 --> 00:32:34,840 Speaker 3: that the Hunter is the only only entity sending big 633 00:32:34,840 --> 00:32:36,880 Speaker 3: boats up and down, you could set them at a 634 00:32:36,880 --> 00:32:38,800 Speaker 3: certain depth where these small boats wouldn't hit them, and 635 00:32:39,280 --> 00:32:41,320 Speaker 3: eventually one of the Hunter boats is going to hit them, 636 00:32:41,360 --> 00:32:45,080 Speaker 3: I guess. And so it's pretty basic technology, but it's 637 00:32:45,080 --> 00:32:47,360 Speaker 3: still a massive step forward in terms of like a 638 00:32:47,400 --> 00:32:51,959 Speaker 3: place where the state had complete impunity. It now doesn't right. 639 00:32:52,040 --> 00:32:54,760 Speaker 3: They can't just cruise up and down these rivers shelling people. 640 00:32:55,080 --> 00:32:57,360 Speaker 3: They were actually using some of the ships to evacuate 641 00:32:57,480 --> 00:33:00,480 Speaker 3: soldiers and their families from a position, and the soldiers 642 00:33:00,520 --> 00:33:02,640 Speaker 3: they were trying to, like, rather than surrendering, they were 643 00:33:02,640 --> 00:33:04,640 Speaker 3: trying to evacuate them and move them to somewhere else. 644 00:33:06,080 --> 00:33:07,880 Speaker 3: The AA asked them to surrender, and they didn't. They 645 00:33:07,880 --> 00:33:10,040 Speaker 3: tried to evacuate them. So then they mined the ships 646 00:33:10,200 --> 00:33:14,640 Speaker 3: and took those out. I think the hunters like tried 647 00:33:14,680 --> 00:33:17,800 Speaker 3: to spin this as like the AA is attacking civilians, 648 00:33:17,880 --> 00:33:21,040 Speaker 3: But I think a Burmese Navy ship with a Burmese 649 00:33:21,120 --> 00:33:23,400 Speaker 3: Navy flag, when those ships have just been shelling you, 650 00:33:23,480 --> 00:33:25,560 Speaker 3: seems like a legitimate target to me. And I think 651 00:33:25,560 --> 00:33:28,400 Speaker 3: it's very hard. It's you know, it's a hunter, but 652 00:33:28,480 --> 00:33:31,400 Speaker 3: children on one of their naval ships rather than the 653 00:33:31,480 --> 00:33:34,320 Speaker 3: AA who attacked the ship because it had children. You 654 00:33:34,360 --> 00:33:36,400 Speaker 3: can hear in one of the things you can hear 655 00:33:36,480 --> 00:33:38,960 Speaker 3: the AA are like attacking the ship in small boats 656 00:33:39,000 --> 00:33:40,880 Speaker 3: and they're shouting like there are children on board, and 657 00:33:41,200 --> 00:33:43,320 Speaker 3: you can hear them acknowledging it, and there are videos 658 00:33:43,320 --> 00:33:47,800 Speaker 3: of the AA rescuing people who jumped overboard, rescuing them 659 00:33:47,960 --> 00:33:50,200 Speaker 3: from the river, and then like, I guess they just 660 00:33:50,200 --> 00:33:51,520 Speaker 3: held as POWs. 661 00:33:52,960 --> 00:33:53,200 Speaker 2: Cool. 662 00:33:53,880 --> 00:33:57,040 Speaker 3: Yeah, it's cool. It's interesting. Obviously, not many of us 663 00:33:57,040 --> 00:34:02,040 Speaker 3: have access to underwater mines, but you know, maybe in 664 00:34:02,080 --> 00:34:03,320 Speaker 3: a fictional future we might. 665 00:34:04,000 --> 00:34:07,360 Speaker 2: Yeah, well there you go, folks. Uh, this has been 666 00:34:07,520 --> 00:34:12,920 Speaker 2: a regular naval warfare, and you a podcast about a 667 00:34:13,000 --> 00:34:15,160 Speaker 2: regular naval warfare, and you. 668 00:34:15,880 --> 00:34:18,880 Speaker 3: Yeah, send us to your videos of yourself in irregular 669 00:34:18,920 --> 00:34:19,560 Speaker 3: naval war Yeah. 670 00:34:19,560 --> 00:34:22,320 Speaker 2: Absolutely, go out there. Look how about this, Every listener 671 00:34:22,800 --> 00:34:26,840 Speaker 2: go out and sink one naval vessel, you know, don't 672 00:34:26,880 --> 00:34:29,640 Speaker 2: matter who's just any boat. Any go sink a boat, 673 00:34:29,640 --> 00:34:33,880 Speaker 2: any boat, Take a fucking superyot, knock it out. You 674 00:34:33,960 --> 00:34:37,719 Speaker 2: see a dinghy, take that fucker out, people kayaking, fuck 675 00:34:37,800 --> 00:34:41,000 Speaker 2: them up, you know. Ban on a boat, absolutely, a 676 00:34:41,000 --> 00:34:44,000 Speaker 2: banana boat for sure. One of those weird duck boat 677 00:34:44,080 --> 00:34:47,240 Speaker 2: car things that they have in some city. Oh yeah, actually, 678 00:34:47,360 --> 00:34:49,200 Speaker 2: you know what, you don't need to do anything with that. 679 00:34:49,200 --> 00:34:51,880 Speaker 2: That'll kill everybody on board on it. Those things are 680 00:34:51,960 --> 00:34:55,920 Speaker 2: dead traps. Just pray for those people. Yeah. 681 00:34:56,320 --> 00:34:58,680 Speaker 3: Any other boat. Yeah, you see a doughnut, you know 682 00:34:58,760 --> 00:35:00,600 Speaker 3: behind behind a speedboat? 683 00:35:00,800 --> 00:35:07,239 Speaker 2: Oh yeah, market Anyway, Everybody go away. 684 00:35:10,640 --> 00:35:13,000 Speaker 1: It could Happen here as a production of cool Zone Media. 685 00:35:13,239 --> 00:35:15,920 Speaker 1: For more podcasts from cool Zone Media, visit our website 686 00:35:15,960 --> 00:35:19,080 Speaker 1: coolzonemedia dot com or check us out on the iHeartRadio app, 687 00:35:19,080 --> 00:35:22,279 Speaker 1: Apple Podcasts, or wherever you listen to podcasts. You can 688 00:35:22,280 --> 00:35:25,000 Speaker 1: find sources for It could Happen Here, updated monthly at 689 00:35:25,040 --> 00:35:28,280 Speaker 1: coolzonemedia dot com slash sources. Thanks for listening.