1 00:00:00,040 --> 00:00:03,320 Speaker 1: The coin Bureau podcast is a production of I Heart Radio. 2 00:00:03,760 --> 00:00:05,840 Speaker 1: It's almost certain that governments are going to try and 3 00:00:05,840 --> 00:00:09,320 Speaker 1: a road privacy further in crypto and elsewhere. They're going 4 00:00:09,400 --> 00:00:11,039 Speaker 1: to keep They're going to keep doing it because it's 5 00:00:11,080 --> 00:00:14,680 Speaker 1: about control, you know. And we've got other technologies. It's 6 00:00:14,680 --> 00:00:17,320 Speaker 1: not just crypto, you know. We've got other technologies, things 7 00:00:17,320 --> 00:00:21,479 Speaker 1: like AI facial recognition being harnessed to fight to fight 8 00:00:21,520 --> 00:00:24,520 Speaker 1: against personal privacy. And again going back to something that 9 00:00:24,560 --> 00:00:27,800 Speaker 1: we touched on in the discussion about the cash list society, 10 00:00:28,360 --> 00:00:31,520 Speaker 1: we've also got things like central bank digital currency cmdcs 11 00:00:31,760 --> 00:00:35,159 Speaker 1: attacking the the market place leaders and then introduce your 12 00:00:35,200 --> 00:00:38,320 Speaker 1: own one. Yeah. Yeah. And obviously this this form of 13 00:00:38,360 --> 00:00:41,800 Speaker 1: this form of central bank issued cash, central bank issued 14 00:00:41,840 --> 00:00:45,920 Speaker 1: money that is very very easy to trace. That's the 15 00:00:46,000 --> 00:01:00,480 Speaker 1: kind of control that that government's dream of. Welcome everyone 16 00:01:00,560 --> 00:01:03,040 Speaker 1: to the coin view a podcast. My name is Guy. 17 00:01:03,080 --> 00:01:07,200 Speaker 1: This gentleman's name gentleman. Oh yes, this man's name is 18 00:01:07,240 --> 00:01:13,600 Speaker 1: mad Mike Mooch. Third, goodness, they still haven't got it right. Uh. 19 00:01:13,640 --> 00:01:17,080 Speaker 1: And today I thought we would following on from our 20 00:01:17,200 --> 00:01:20,920 Speaker 1: discussion about cash the cash list society, from the last 21 00:01:20,920 --> 00:01:23,640 Speaker 1: couple of episodes, which I don't know about you, Mike, 22 00:01:23,680 --> 00:01:26,399 Speaker 1: but I really enjoyed that. Yeah. Yeah, I've made a 23 00:01:26,440 --> 00:01:29,240 Speaker 1: concerted effort to to use cash a bit more. And 24 00:01:29,280 --> 00:01:32,560 Speaker 1: how's it going. It's good? Yeah, are you carry you're 25 00:01:32,600 --> 00:01:34,600 Speaker 1: carrying a few quid around? You've got hund quid in 26 00:01:34,600 --> 00:01:37,720 Speaker 1: with that. Okay, that's good to know. All right, Well 27 00:01:37,760 --> 00:01:39,280 Speaker 1: i'll have that when you're out of the room then. 28 00:01:39,840 --> 00:01:42,280 Speaker 1: But yes, I thought that I was really kind of 29 00:01:42,520 --> 00:01:45,200 Speaker 1: I thought that I really enjoyed that cash List Society 30 00:01:45,280 --> 00:01:48,960 Speaker 1: episode that becoming more and more apt and I sort 31 00:01:48,960 --> 00:01:51,720 Speaker 1: of was looking at I saw a YouTube video about 32 00:01:51,760 --> 00:01:54,840 Speaker 1: it in Sweden where Sweden is a big push to 33 00:01:54,880 --> 00:01:57,960 Speaker 1: be sort of cash to society and the government is 34 00:01:58,000 --> 00:02:02,640 Speaker 1: like because obviously um Russia is on is on their doorstep, 35 00:02:02,680 --> 00:02:05,800 Speaker 1: and the government apparently has been sending out preper advice 36 00:02:05,840 --> 00:02:09,120 Speaker 1: to them the last two years and like this year 37 00:02:09,120 --> 00:02:11,920 Speaker 1: they've gone okay, cool, look we've we said be prepared 38 00:02:11,960 --> 00:02:15,839 Speaker 1: for a few days, maybe go for a week. And 39 00:02:15,960 --> 00:02:19,200 Speaker 1: it's kind of crazy that you know that that that 40 00:02:19,480 --> 00:02:22,440 Speaker 1: you know, a government is sending out documents to every 41 00:02:22,480 --> 00:02:24,640 Speaker 1: household this is what you need to have to be 42 00:02:24,720 --> 00:02:28,239 Speaker 1: able to survive in the woods for four or five days, actually, no, 43 00:02:28,440 --> 00:02:32,679 Speaker 1: make it a week. Yeah, it's very sort of Scandinavian pragmatisms, 44 00:02:32,680 --> 00:02:34,800 Speaker 1: and so I think they're doing I think they're even 45 00:02:34,800 --> 00:02:36,919 Speaker 1: more so in Finland because obviously Finland has got a 46 00:02:36,960 --> 00:02:40,839 Speaker 1: very long border with and you know they've had they've 47 00:02:40,880 --> 00:02:44,399 Speaker 1: had Barney's before. But yeah, I think like Finland, there's 48 00:02:44,440 --> 00:02:46,799 Speaker 1: a huge kind of network of bunkers and things like that. 49 00:02:47,160 --> 00:02:49,720 Speaker 1: It's so I think if I think Putin would invade 50 00:02:49,760 --> 00:02:53,280 Speaker 1: Finland at his peril, these guys are pretty tough, yeah, 51 00:02:53,280 --> 00:02:56,880 Speaker 1: and they're pretty well prepared as well, and got money. Yeah, yeah, 52 00:02:56,880 --> 00:02:58,880 Speaker 1: I think I think that. Yeah, I think I think 53 00:02:58,880 --> 00:03:01,320 Speaker 1: I mean, all those Nordic sort of candy sort of 54 00:03:01,360 --> 00:03:05,919 Speaker 1: places have got Yeah, they're all quite quite well flush. 55 00:03:06,240 --> 00:03:10,200 Speaker 1: So yeah, So after last week's discussion about cash Leist Society, 56 00:03:10,280 --> 00:03:13,200 Speaker 1: there was something we mentioned a lot. We talked a 57 00:03:13,240 --> 00:03:16,800 Speaker 1: lot about privacy in that discussion, and I thought we 58 00:03:17,000 --> 00:03:19,760 Speaker 1: just devote another episode to kind of talking about that 59 00:03:19,960 --> 00:03:23,640 Speaker 1: in a little bit more detail. Because since we recorded 60 00:03:23,639 --> 00:03:27,560 Speaker 1: that Cashlist Society episode, there have been some pretty significant 61 00:03:27,560 --> 00:03:31,760 Speaker 1: developments in the crypto space, which are which have huge 62 00:03:31,800 --> 00:03:36,440 Speaker 1: implications for privacy and it's um, well, well we'll talk 63 00:03:36,480 --> 00:03:40,120 Speaker 1: about those in in a moment or so. But yeah, basically, 64 00:03:40,920 --> 00:03:45,920 Speaker 1: the crypto industry is is now kind of having to 65 00:03:45,960 --> 00:03:48,160 Speaker 1: look again. I mean, privacy has always kind of been 66 00:03:49,080 --> 00:03:52,160 Speaker 1: a talking point in crypto, but it's kind of really 67 00:03:52,160 --> 00:03:55,480 Speaker 1: floated up to the surface, floated up to the top 68 00:03:55,480 --> 00:03:57,760 Speaker 1: of the agenda in a lot of ways, especially over 69 00:03:57,800 --> 00:04:00,520 Speaker 1: the last few weeks. So I thought it interesting to 70 00:04:00,600 --> 00:04:04,800 Speaker 1: just have a discussion about privacy and about privacy and 71 00:04:04,920 --> 00:04:07,560 Speaker 1: crypto and kind of where we go from here. And 72 00:04:07,600 --> 00:04:09,960 Speaker 1: I thought, just for you, we might even touch on 73 00:04:09,960 --> 00:04:12,240 Speaker 1: on something that I know is very close to your heart, 74 00:04:12,320 --> 00:04:14,880 Speaker 1: but we'll we'll get to that. So yeah, so kind 75 00:04:14,880 --> 00:04:18,160 Speaker 1: of lots to lots to discuss, not just about privacy, 76 00:04:18,160 --> 00:04:21,480 Speaker 1: but also privacy in relation to crypto, and therefore we 77 00:04:21,520 --> 00:04:25,080 Speaker 1: can fulfill our remit of talking about cryptocurrency but also 78 00:04:25,160 --> 00:04:28,679 Speaker 1: have what I hope is an interesting discussion about something 79 00:04:28,720 --> 00:04:31,920 Speaker 1: that's so fundamentally important these days and it's something that's 80 00:04:32,200 --> 00:04:36,560 Speaker 1: slipping away. So let's start by let's start by just 81 00:04:36,560 --> 00:04:40,200 Speaker 1: talking about privacy, I guess, in in the Internet age, 82 00:04:40,240 --> 00:04:45,680 Speaker 1: because privacy is something that is very much enshrined in 83 00:04:45,800 --> 00:04:48,600 Speaker 1: I mean, it's enshrined in various various parts of the 84 00:04:48,720 --> 00:04:52,119 Speaker 1: U S Constitution. We've also got things like the Human 85 00:04:52,200 --> 00:04:58,400 Speaker 1: Rights Act, which was introduced in Europe. I remember, remember 86 00:04:58,440 --> 00:05:01,919 Speaker 1: that was a big thing. You remember when the Labor 87 00:05:01,960 --> 00:05:06,040 Speaker 1: government won a landslide here in the UK seven and 88 00:05:06,080 --> 00:05:07,960 Speaker 1: one of the big things that they did the following 89 00:05:08,040 --> 00:05:11,200 Speaker 1: year was make us part of the European Human Rights Act. 90 00:05:11,920 --> 00:05:16,919 Speaker 1: And Article eight of that Act protects your right to 91 00:05:17,120 --> 00:05:19,880 Speaker 1: your to respect for your private life, your family life, 92 00:05:19,960 --> 00:05:23,160 Speaker 1: your home, and your correspondence letters, telephone calls and emails 93 00:05:23,200 --> 00:05:27,360 Speaker 1: for example. Um, so this is something that's very much 94 00:05:27,480 --> 00:05:30,719 Speaker 1: enshrined in the idea, particularly of I guess you'd call 95 00:05:30,760 --> 00:05:34,360 Speaker 1: it Western democracy. It's something that we it's something that 96 00:05:34,480 --> 00:05:38,400 Speaker 1: is a fundamental right, and it is something, as I say, 97 00:05:38,440 --> 00:05:41,520 Speaker 1: that's under threat. And obviously governments and the like have 98 00:05:41,600 --> 00:05:43,680 Speaker 1: got a kind of get out clause for this. I 99 00:05:43,680 --> 00:05:46,960 Speaker 1: thought i'd quote this one. This is from This is 100 00:05:47,000 --> 00:05:50,960 Speaker 1: again from the European Human Rights Act. There's shut quote. 101 00:05:51,160 --> 00:05:53,839 Speaker 1: There shall be no interference by a public authority with 102 00:05:53,920 --> 00:05:57,839 Speaker 1: the exercise of this right, except as is in accordance 103 00:05:57,920 --> 00:06:00,360 Speaker 1: with the law and is necessary in a demo cratic 104 00:06:00,400 --> 00:06:04,880 Speaker 1: society in the interests of national security, public safety, or 105 00:06:04,880 --> 00:06:07,320 Speaker 1: the economic well being of the country, for the prevention 106 00:06:07,320 --> 00:06:10,640 Speaker 1: of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, 107 00:06:11,040 --> 00:06:15,160 Speaker 1: or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others. 108 00:06:15,200 --> 00:06:19,000 Speaker 1: So it's this very it seems privacy is this very 109 00:06:19,080 --> 00:06:21,920 Speaker 1: kind of elastic thing. You know, it's enshrined as a 110 00:06:21,920 --> 00:06:23,760 Speaker 1: as a right, as something that we have a right to, 111 00:06:24,680 --> 00:06:28,320 Speaker 1: but also there are circumstances where that right can be 112 00:06:28,440 --> 00:06:30,800 Speaker 1: taken away. And I guess so much of what is 113 00:06:30,839 --> 00:06:34,039 Speaker 1: happening today is how how elastic is that, you know, 114 00:06:34,120 --> 00:06:38,640 Speaker 1: how where where is the line beyond which a government 115 00:06:39,120 --> 00:06:43,000 Speaker 1: cannot cross? And obviously, in more recent times, certainly in 116 00:06:43,040 --> 00:06:45,520 Speaker 1: the twenty first century, we've seen things like the US 117 00:06:45,600 --> 00:06:48,279 Speaker 1: the Patriot Act that the US introduced in the wake 118 00:06:48,360 --> 00:06:53,040 Speaker 1: of nine eleven and very all those other terrorists. You remember, 119 00:06:53,040 --> 00:06:57,240 Speaker 1: people were getting sent anthrax in the post sort of stuff. Um, 120 00:06:57,320 --> 00:06:59,440 Speaker 1: so they introduced the Patriot Act to kind of crack 121 00:06:59,520 --> 00:07:03,479 Speaker 1: down on terrorism. But a great name. But yeah, no 122 00:07:03,520 --> 00:07:06,320 Speaker 1: one's gonna disagree with the Patriot Act. Yeah, you're like 123 00:07:06,360 --> 00:07:09,320 Speaker 1: a Patriot Act, you must be an asshole or a 124 00:07:09,360 --> 00:07:13,080 Speaker 1: god damn red Actually, do you know, patriot stands for something, 125 00:07:13,600 --> 00:07:16,560 Speaker 1: So patriot is an acronym. So the formal name of 126 00:07:16,560 --> 00:07:22,840 Speaker 1: the statute is the unitening and Strengthening America by providing 127 00:07:23,280 --> 00:07:31,600 Speaker 1: appropriate tools required to intercept and obstruct terrorism Patriot, which 128 00:07:31,640 --> 00:07:35,400 Speaker 1: I had no idea of. And I think whoever, whoever 129 00:07:35,560 --> 00:07:39,240 Speaker 1: reverse engineered that acronym it should should win some sort 130 00:07:39,280 --> 00:07:42,720 Speaker 1: of prize because that is, there's no way I could 131 00:07:42,720 --> 00:07:45,080 Speaker 1: do that. That's very clever. Um. So, yeah, So the 132 00:07:45,200 --> 00:07:48,760 Speaker 1: US Patriot Act was introduced in the name of preventing 133 00:07:48,760 --> 00:07:52,960 Speaker 1: and combating terrorism, and but we've seen it being used 134 00:07:53,000 --> 00:07:57,160 Speaker 1: to encroach on individual privacy in you know, in in 135 00:07:57,200 --> 00:07:59,600 Speaker 1: the name of preventing terrorism. It's I think it's been 136 00:07:59,680 --> 00:08:02,120 Speaker 1: kind of a too easily abused in the sort of 137 00:08:02,200 --> 00:08:05,680 Speaker 1: twenty or so years since it since it was introduced. 138 00:08:06,320 --> 00:08:08,720 Speaker 1: And I think another thing that's that struck me when 139 00:08:08,800 --> 00:08:11,280 Speaker 1: thinking about privacy was it's kind of telling that every 140 00:08:11,280 --> 00:08:15,400 Speaker 1: time we every time we imagine a really dystopian society. 141 00:08:15,400 --> 00:08:17,920 Speaker 1: And I guess the best example is something like George 142 00:08:18,000 --> 00:08:21,280 Speaker 1: Orwell in four, but there are you know, there are 143 00:08:21,280 --> 00:08:23,960 Speaker 1: plenty of others both in literature and in film and 144 00:08:24,080 --> 00:08:27,640 Speaker 1: you know, popular culture. Whenever we imagine a dystopian society, 145 00:08:27,960 --> 00:08:30,480 Speaker 1: it always seems that privacy is one of the things 146 00:08:30,520 --> 00:08:34,839 Speaker 1: that straightaway you notice has gone. And in four they 147 00:08:34,880 --> 00:08:38,400 Speaker 1: have these uh they everyone has a tele screen on 148 00:08:38,440 --> 00:08:40,720 Speaker 1: the wall, which is bear in mind this was written 149 00:08:40,760 --> 00:08:44,760 Speaker 1: in eight so televisions were a very new thing. But 150 00:08:44,840 --> 00:08:47,480 Speaker 1: everyone had a telescreen which was kind of on all 151 00:08:47,520 --> 00:08:49,880 Speaker 1: the time. You couldn't turn it off, and the authorities 152 00:08:49,960 --> 00:08:53,240 Speaker 1: were able to watch you through it as well. And 153 00:08:53,280 --> 00:08:56,320 Speaker 1: there's a and there's an incident where you know, there 154 00:08:56,360 --> 00:08:58,880 Speaker 1: are kind of police helicopters flying around and they're always 155 00:08:58,880 --> 00:09:02,240 Speaker 1: snooping in people's windows and stuff, and you know, basically privacy, 156 00:09:02,440 --> 00:09:06,400 Speaker 1: individual privacy is a thing of the past. And I think, yeah, 157 00:09:06,440 --> 00:09:09,840 Speaker 1: it's interesting that that that seems to be a common 158 00:09:09,880 --> 00:09:13,400 Speaker 1: theme of any kind of nightmare society in the individual 159 00:09:13,440 --> 00:09:18,560 Speaker 1: privacy is gone. Um, But I think it's it's one 160 00:09:18,600 --> 00:09:21,640 Speaker 1: of the things that it's such a it's a difficult 161 00:09:21,679 --> 00:09:24,840 Speaker 1: concept to grasp privacy, isn't it, because sometimes you know, 162 00:09:25,200 --> 00:09:29,200 Speaker 1: it's that idea of well, I've got nothing to hide. Yeah, yeah, 163 00:09:29,320 --> 00:09:32,079 Speaker 1: And we've touched on this before a few times, this this, this, 164 00:09:32,280 --> 00:09:35,440 Speaker 1: which is a simplistic way to look at it, because 165 00:09:35,720 --> 00:09:40,000 Speaker 1: what you've got to hide maybe you being you know, 166 00:09:40,840 --> 00:09:45,600 Speaker 1: for example, if you know the resistance, if you're the resistance, 167 00:09:45,640 --> 00:09:48,240 Speaker 1: what have you got to hide? I'm hiding me being 168 00:09:48,280 --> 00:09:51,480 Speaker 1: a good guy? Yeah, from the bad guys. And I 169 00:09:51,520 --> 00:09:57,520 Speaker 1: think people's views on government sometimes um rose tinted or 170 00:09:57,559 --> 00:10:00,400 Speaker 1: like oh, you know, they don't think the worst. They 171 00:10:00,440 --> 00:10:03,679 Speaker 1: assume that governments are always working in your best interests, 172 00:10:03,720 --> 00:10:06,160 Speaker 1: in your best interests, when in actual fact is probably 173 00:10:06,200 --> 00:10:11,000 Speaker 1: for corporations or cronies. Absolutely absolutely, which is this kind 174 00:10:11,000 --> 00:10:15,439 Speaker 1: of yeah, which which is modern capitalism, which shareholder capitalism, 175 00:10:15,480 --> 00:10:19,320 Speaker 1: and yeah, it's it's It can be quite difficult, I think, 176 00:10:19,840 --> 00:10:22,520 Speaker 1: to to to put your finger on on why exactly 177 00:10:22,840 --> 00:10:25,280 Speaker 1: privacy is so important. It's like, well, why do you know, 178 00:10:25,320 --> 00:10:29,040 Speaker 1: why don't you want anyone reading your emails or seeing 179 00:10:29,320 --> 00:10:32,880 Speaker 1: where you spend your money or looking in in your window. 180 00:10:33,080 --> 00:10:36,840 Speaker 1: It's like, I don't know, I just don't. And I 181 00:10:36,840 --> 00:10:40,600 Speaker 1: think it's because the vast majority of people don't have 182 00:10:40,720 --> 00:10:44,959 Speaker 1: any secrets that are too um important, you know. It's 183 00:10:45,000 --> 00:10:47,439 Speaker 1: like what do I do? Is what what everyone sort 184 00:10:47,480 --> 00:10:48,960 Speaker 1: of goes, well, I don't do I'm not I'm not 185 00:10:49,000 --> 00:10:51,400 Speaker 1: I'm not a bad person. Why why you know, if 186 00:10:51,400 --> 00:10:52,959 Speaker 1: someone is looking at me, I don't see why that's 187 00:10:52,960 --> 00:10:56,400 Speaker 1: a big deal. But then then you have things like 188 00:10:56,480 --> 00:10:59,760 Speaker 1: you know, Edward Snowden sort of being a whistleblower, and 189 00:11:00,160 --> 00:11:07,840 Speaker 1: you know how how governments are unscrupulous, Yeah, watching us. 190 00:11:09,840 --> 00:11:12,959 Speaker 1: But like you know, so how there'd be influential people 191 00:11:13,160 --> 00:11:17,760 Speaker 1: and their daughter had a drink drive accident or something 192 00:11:17,840 --> 00:11:21,840 Speaker 1: like that, or was was involved in some minor sort 193 00:11:21,840 --> 00:11:24,800 Speaker 1: of drugs offense, and they were blackmailed or or pressured 194 00:11:24,840 --> 00:11:28,600 Speaker 1: and coerced into doing something that they would not normally 195 00:11:28,640 --> 00:11:33,000 Speaker 1: do for the benefit of the government and not necessarily 196 00:11:34,000 --> 00:11:37,559 Speaker 1: the benefit of the people. Yeah. Yeah, I mean individual 197 00:11:37,679 --> 00:11:41,600 Speaker 1: individual privacy is just it. It's so specific to every 198 00:11:41,840 --> 00:11:45,640 Speaker 1: single person I think. I mean, I think everyone pretty 199 00:11:45,720 --> 00:11:50,240 Speaker 1: much has some aspect of their life at least that 200 00:11:50,480 --> 00:11:53,120 Speaker 1: they would not want anyone else to know, however innocent 201 00:11:53,200 --> 00:11:57,800 Speaker 1: that person maybe, however inoffensive, however quietly they live or whatever. 202 00:11:58,080 --> 00:12:00,640 Speaker 1: There are just certain things that you don't want anyone 203 00:12:00,640 --> 00:12:03,760 Speaker 1: else to know. And what those things are is not 204 00:12:03,840 --> 00:12:07,120 Speaker 1: really our business to even speculate on it's just it's 205 00:12:07,200 --> 00:12:10,760 Speaker 1: just your business. And it makes I get again. I 206 00:12:10,760 --> 00:12:12,840 Speaker 1: think it makes this idea of well why do you 207 00:12:12,840 --> 00:12:16,000 Speaker 1: want why do you want privacy? It can be difficult 208 00:12:16,040 --> 00:12:19,760 Speaker 1: to answer. It's just I just don't want you other people, 209 00:12:19,880 --> 00:12:23,000 Speaker 1: the government, corporations, etcetera. I just don't want you to 210 00:12:23,120 --> 00:12:26,600 Speaker 1: know that because it's none of your business. It's it's 211 00:12:26,640 --> 00:12:30,800 Speaker 1: it's private to me. But I think the Internet has 212 00:12:30,920 --> 00:12:36,800 Speaker 1: changed the game so comprehensively, and it's made our personal data, 213 00:12:37,760 --> 00:12:42,080 Speaker 1: our privacy, really such a lucrative prize for for not 214 00:12:42,160 --> 00:12:46,360 Speaker 1: only governments, but for private corporations as well, who harvest 215 00:12:46,400 --> 00:12:48,720 Speaker 1: it and sell it and use it for advertising purposes, 216 00:12:48,760 --> 00:12:51,960 Speaker 1: all this sort of stuff. Um, it seems now that 217 00:12:52,040 --> 00:12:55,480 Speaker 1: our privacy is is kind of ebbing away faster than 218 00:12:55,520 --> 00:12:59,839 Speaker 1: before because we have this amazing communications tool, which is 219 00:13:00,120 --> 00:13:03,520 Speaker 1: because we're sort of almost so willing to give it up. 220 00:13:04,679 --> 00:13:10,800 Speaker 1: Like it's like social media has really sort of made 221 00:13:10,800 --> 00:13:17,080 Speaker 1: it the just the norm to display your life, to 222 00:13:17,240 --> 00:13:21,240 Speaker 1: display your you know, and maybe not be your actual life, 223 00:13:21,240 --> 00:13:24,320 Speaker 1: but just be outputting stuff. Cool. This is what this 224 00:13:24,400 --> 00:13:26,400 Speaker 1: is me. Don't forget me, me, me, me, me, me 225 00:13:26,520 --> 00:13:29,200 Speaker 1: me to make yourself into your own personal brand and 226 00:13:29,200 --> 00:13:32,920 Speaker 1: all that horrible crap. Yeah, it's it's so true, and 227 00:13:32,960 --> 00:13:37,120 Speaker 1: I please do follow me or move about social coin 228 00:13:37,160 --> 00:13:40,600 Speaker 1: bureau dot com. Um, No, it's it's it's absolutely it's 229 00:13:40,600 --> 00:13:42,600 Speaker 1: absolutely right. And we again, we touched on this when 230 00:13:42,640 --> 00:13:45,600 Speaker 1: we talked about cashlessness, didn't we. We We've sacrificed a 231 00:13:45,600 --> 00:13:49,319 Speaker 1: lot of privacy on the altar of convenience because it's 232 00:13:49,360 --> 00:13:52,199 Speaker 1: just it's so easy to use a mard it's so easy, 233 00:13:52,440 --> 00:13:54,920 Speaker 1: and it's so easy to use these services. And you know, 234 00:13:55,000 --> 00:13:57,680 Speaker 1: let's face it, things like things like Facebook came along 235 00:13:57,720 --> 00:14:00,480 Speaker 1: and they were convenient. They were it was convenient. Also 236 00:14:00,640 --> 00:14:05,040 Speaker 1: think that it is just we are sheep, do you 237 00:14:05,080 --> 00:14:07,359 Speaker 1: know what I mean? Like so, and and it affects 238 00:14:07,920 --> 00:14:13,439 Speaker 1: kids first. So if every kid is on TikTok, your 239 00:14:13,520 --> 00:14:15,600 Speaker 1: kid will want to be on TikTok because it's just 240 00:14:15,679 --> 00:14:18,280 Speaker 1: the fear of missing out. Kids want to conform, kids 241 00:14:18,320 --> 00:14:19,880 Speaker 1: want to be part of the group. He's want to 242 00:14:19,920 --> 00:14:24,040 Speaker 1: be involved. And you know, if you if you get 243 00:14:24,040 --> 00:14:25,920 Speaker 1: the kids at that point and then they've got those 244 00:14:25,960 --> 00:14:28,280 Speaker 1: accounts as they grow up and you know, as they 245 00:14:28,400 --> 00:14:30,880 Speaker 1: start wanting to those sort of meat boys or girls 246 00:14:30,960 --> 00:14:34,680 Speaker 1: or whatever, then you know, it's it's just it's getting 247 00:14:34,680 --> 00:14:36,520 Speaker 1: them young and getting them into the system. And these 248 00:14:36,600 --> 00:14:39,720 Speaker 1: kids are growing up with their lives on social media already, 249 00:14:39,760 --> 00:14:43,120 Speaker 1: so it's kind of eroded that, Hey, hang on about 250 00:14:43,160 --> 00:14:45,080 Speaker 1: if I just want to have something to myself. Yeah, 251 00:14:45,080 --> 00:14:47,240 Speaker 1: they have no frame of reference, they've no idea what 252 00:14:47,320 --> 00:14:49,920 Speaker 1: it's like living without these things. And you're absolutely right, 253 00:14:50,000 --> 00:14:52,320 Speaker 1: kids especially, But I think I think a lot of people, 254 00:14:52,800 --> 00:14:55,480 Speaker 1: i'd say kids, we were the first generation probably to 255 00:14:55,560 --> 00:14:59,000 Speaker 1: have a bit of both, you know. I was we 256 00:14:59,000 --> 00:15:01,160 Speaker 1: were at Union, there was no Facebook, there was no 257 00:15:01,480 --> 00:15:03,960 Speaker 1: came out just after we just after we left. I remember, 258 00:15:04,000 --> 00:15:06,240 Speaker 1: and I remember for what well we talked about this week, 259 00:15:06,240 --> 00:15:08,320 Speaker 1: but you could only get it with certain university emails, 260 00:15:08,360 --> 00:15:15,680 Speaker 1: and we weren't too stupid. Yeah, it's it's Yeah, I 261 00:15:15,720 --> 00:15:18,520 Speaker 1: think standing out from the crowd in that way, you know, 262 00:15:18,560 --> 00:15:21,400 Speaker 1: making those sorts of decisions is often is a hard 263 00:15:21,440 --> 00:15:24,240 Speaker 1: thing to do, and actually taking the steps to preserve 264 00:15:24,280 --> 00:15:28,960 Speaker 1: your privacy is it has been made really inconvenient. I 265 00:15:29,000 --> 00:15:32,200 Speaker 1: often think, I mean, I still use WhatsApp because all 266 00:15:32,280 --> 00:15:35,360 Speaker 1: my friends use it. I don't like using WhatsApp because 267 00:15:35,520 --> 00:15:39,680 Speaker 1: I don't matter. Yeah, and I just I would much right, 268 00:15:39,800 --> 00:15:44,720 Speaker 1: but very interesting story. What'sapp actually, um, it's I don't 269 00:15:44,720 --> 00:15:48,440 Speaker 1: want to derail this, but there's the guys who set 270 00:15:48,480 --> 00:15:52,680 Speaker 1: it up. Would just all about privacy because it is 271 00:15:52,760 --> 00:15:56,680 Speaker 1: end to end encrypted, isn't it. It's changed Okay a lot. 272 00:15:56,760 --> 00:16:00,680 Speaker 1: It is encrypted, but it's not what it was definitely, 273 00:16:01,240 --> 00:16:04,600 Speaker 1: and the way that they set up and the sort 274 00:16:04,600 --> 00:16:07,840 Speaker 1: of foundations of it have been the goal post have moved. 275 00:16:08,280 --> 00:16:10,920 Speaker 1: There's a there's a couple of great YouTube videos on it. 276 00:16:11,720 --> 00:16:14,320 Speaker 1: Go go, you know, watch the story of What's Up 277 00:16:14,480 --> 00:16:18,520 Speaker 1: because it is fascinating. Okay, I will will. Maybe we 278 00:16:18,520 --> 00:16:22,160 Speaker 1: can do a podcast on that. Maybe What's Up talk 279 00:16:22,200 --> 00:16:24,560 Speaker 1: about it on WhatsApp later. Have to find a crypto 280 00:16:24,600 --> 00:16:28,200 Speaker 1: angle for it though, But yeah, I think it's fair 281 00:16:28,240 --> 00:16:33,480 Speaker 1: to say that we were just as a just as people, 282 00:16:33,680 --> 00:16:36,720 Speaker 1: just as a species, were really unprepared for the impact 283 00:16:36,720 --> 00:16:40,640 Speaker 1: the internet would have. And we have, we have allowed 284 00:16:40,840 --> 00:16:44,160 Speaker 1: those freedoms to be rowed back because of what the 285 00:16:44,160 --> 00:16:46,360 Speaker 1: internet can give us, you know, can give us. It 286 00:16:46,360 --> 00:16:51,720 Speaker 1: gives us so much. But it's worth remembering this, and again, 287 00:16:51,760 --> 00:16:54,560 Speaker 1: this is something we covered in in earlier episodes. We 288 00:16:54,640 --> 00:16:56,720 Speaker 1: covered it when we started to talk about bitcoin, but 289 00:16:56,760 --> 00:16:59,640 Speaker 1: I thought it was worth kind of revisiting this. There 290 00:16:59,640 --> 00:17:03,120 Speaker 1: were a few people who who weren't so unprepared for 291 00:17:03,160 --> 00:17:05,159 Speaker 1: what the Internet was going to do to privacy, so 292 00:17:06,200 --> 00:17:08,800 Speaker 1: Tosi Nakamoto among others. But yeah, mostly, you know, the 293 00:17:08,800 --> 00:17:12,440 Speaker 1: cipher punks in general, and we had the likes of 294 00:17:12,800 --> 00:17:15,280 Speaker 1: and do you think that's because they are nerds and 295 00:17:15,320 --> 00:17:19,040 Speaker 1: they have seen these, like several dystopian sort of storylines. 296 00:17:20,040 --> 00:17:21,560 Speaker 1: I think there could be I think there could be 297 00:17:21,560 --> 00:17:25,199 Speaker 1: an like through the the sort of reading of fiction 298 00:17:25,240 --> 00:17:28,480 Speaker 1: and and and uh yeah, let's make it. Let's make 299 00:17:28,520 --> 00:17:32,200 Speaker 1: a gross generalization which will have some degree of truth 300 00:17:32,240 --> 00:17:36,080 Speaker 1: to it. Lots of the cipher punks would almost certainly 301 00:17:36,200 --> 00:17:39,040 Speaker 1: have read quite a lot of science fiction, and there 302 00:17:39,040 --> 00:17:41,119 Speaker 1: would have been you know, a lot of kind of 303 00:17:41,200 --> 00:17:45,040 Speaker 1: dystopian sort of society, dystopian, futuristic, whatever sort of societies 304 00:17:45,080 --> 00:17:48,399 Speaker 1: like that. And I would I would be very willing 305 00:17:48,400 --> 00:17:50,680 Speaker 1: to bet that a lot of cipher punk ideas were 306 00:17:51,040 --> 00:17:54,720 Speaker 1: partly inspired by you know, by those kinds of by 307 00:17:54,720 --> 00:17:58,000 Speaker 1: those and possibly also real worth, real life events that 308 00:17:58,040 --> 00:18:00,200 Speaker 1: have been happening. Yeah, yeah, I mean these are these 309 00:18:00,200 --> 00:18:04,639 Speaker 1: are very clever people, very sort of you know, with 310 00:18:04,680 --> 00:18:09,560 Speaker 1: an understanding I guess, of of computing and computer science 311 00:18:09,720 --> 00:18:14,160 Speaker 1: and the Internet and how we communicate and cryptogy, cryptography 312 00:18:14,160 --> 00:18:16,239 Speaker 1: and things like that that the rest of us, you know, 313 00:18:16,280 --> 00:18:19,160 Speaker 1: that just leave the rest of us in the dust. So, yeah, 314 00:18:19,200 --> 00:18:22,520 Speaker 1: they were they were very they were very kind of prescient. 315 00:18:22,600 --> 00:18:26,120 Speaker 1: They saw before pretty much before anyone else, what this 316 00:18:26,320 --> 00:18:30,199 Speaker 1: amazing new form of communication could do, and also the 317 00:18:30,320 --> 00:18:33,040 Speaker 1: dangers of it and how something was going to have 318 00:18:33,119 --> 00:18:36,040 Speaker 1: to be done in order to kind of mitigate against that. So, 319 00:18:36,320 --> 00:18:40,280 Speaker 1: you know, it's again their their contribution before we even 320 00:18:40,320 --> 00:18:45,040 Speaker 1: get to cryptocurrency is really really important, just because they 321 00:18:45,040 --> 00:18:49,120 Speaker 1: were so they had all this foresight. And remember that 322 00:18:49,240 --> 00:18:52,000 Speaker 1: we one of the big concerns over privacy and the 323 00:18:52,040 --> 00:18:56,600 Speaker 1: Internet came about with this idea of transacting online, and 324 00:18:56,720 --> 00:18:59,359 Speaker 1: you had people like David Chaum who we've talked about, 325 00:18:59,560 --> 00:19:02,560 Speaker 1: you know, these prominent cipherpunks who were who were thinking like, 326 00:19:02,680 --> 00:19:05,560 Speaker 1: how are we going to do this safely? How are 327 00:19:05,600 --> 00:19:07,800 Speaker 1: we going to come up with a system whereby you know, 328 00:19:07,840 --> 00:19:10,760 Speaker 1: and you know, they alighted on cryptography. You know, how 329 00:19:10,760 --> 00:19:14,080 Speaker 1: are we going to use cryptography to protect you know, 330 00:19:14,200 --> 00:19:16,440 Speaker 1: so as we can transact online so we can use 331 00:19:16,480 --> 00:19:19,879 Speaker 1: the Internet to its full potential. And this obviously drove 332 00:19:19,960 --> 00:19:24,240 Speaker 1: David Cham to invent diggi cash, your favorite favorite. I 333 00:19:24,240 --> 00:19:26,280 Speaker 1: thought we'd get in a reference to diggi cash there 334 00:19:26,960 --> 00:19:29,399 Speaker 1: because I know how much you love it. It's I 335 00:19:29,480 --> 00:19:33,040 Speaker 1: love the name. It's yeah, it's great. It was. It's 336 00:19:33,040 --> 00:19:36,200 Speaker 1: such an interesting project and it gets as we discussed. 337 00:19:36,240 --> 00:19:37,960 Speaker 1: I think it was an episode five when we first 338 00:19:38,000 --> 00:19:41,359 Speaker 1: talked about bitcoin. It did come quite close to, you know, 339 00:19:41,440 --> 00:19:44,760 Speaker 1: to catching on. And I quoted this from David Cham 340 00:19:44,760 --> 00:19:47,919 Speaker 1: in that Bitcoin episode, but it's worth citing again quote 341 00:19:47,960 --> 00:19:50,080 Speaker 1: he This was from a BBC interview that he did. 342 00:19:50,480 --> 00:19:54,040 Speaker 1: Privacy is intimately tied to human potential, and it's an 343 00:19:54,040 --> 00:20:00,399 Speaker 1: extraordinarily important aspect of democracy. So yes, so this cipherpunk ideal, 344 00:20:00,440 --> 00:20:04,359 Speaker 1: you know, they really understood how important privacy is and 345 00:20:04,560 --> 00:20:06,760 Speaker 1: how it was going to be threatened. And I think 346 00:20:06,840 --> 00:20:10,000 Speaker 1: understanding that debate around privacy in the age of the 347 00:20:10,040 --> 00:20:13,760 Speaker 1: Internet is key to understanding why cryptocurrency emerged in the 348 00:20:13,800 --> 00:20:18,720 Speaker 1: first place. It wasn't it wasn't created in order that 349 00:20:18,760 --> 00:20:21,920 Speaker 1: we could all buy dog coins online. It was created 350 00:20:22,119 --> 00:20:30,680 Speaker 1: with this just just just like that was one of 351 00:20:30,720 --> 00:20:34,000 Speaker 1: those early sort of email threads or forum chats, and 352 00:20:34,040 --> 00:20:35,680 Speaker 1: it's just like talking about, you know, how this is 353 00:20:35,680 --> 00:20:42,480 Speaker 1: going to change the world. Christmas folk, you new coin 354 00:20:42,880 --> 00:20:47,480 Speaker 1: to the moon? Yeah, um, but you know, and I 355 00:20:47,480 --> 00:20:49,840 Speaker 1: mean this would be this I think if I if 356 00:20:49,880 --> 00:20:52,919 Speaker 1: I was introduced to Satoshi Nakamoto, you know, one of 357 00:20:52,920 --> 00:20:55,199 Speaker 1: the I think probably the first question I'd like to 358 00:20:55,240 --> 00:20:58,560 Speaker 1: ask him would be along the lines of, you know, 359 00:20:59,520 --> 00:21:03,440 Speaker 1: you you invented, you invented bitcoin for very specific purposes, 360 00:21:03,960 --> 00:21:06,160 Speaker 1: but you know, what do you make of the fact 361 00:21:06,200 --> 00:21:09,520 Speaker 1: that privacy and crypto is now very much an illusion, 362 00:21:09,920 --> 00:21:13,920 Speaker 1: you know, for in most including bitcoin. Yeah, especially bitcoin. 363 00:21:13,960 --> 00:21:16,600 Speaker 1: And I think, I mean this is bitcoin is Bitcoin 364 00:21:16,680 --> 00:21:19,280 Speaker 1: is amazing. But one of the big drawbacks is that 365 00:21:19,359 --> 00:21:22,800 Speaker 1: it's so traceable. But I don't think that's a drawback. 366 00:21:22,840 --> 00:21:24,640 Speaker 1: Like as you said, there was there was an incident 367 00:21:24,680 --> 00:21:28,879 Speaker 1: where these A T M machines we're sort of pumping 368 00:21:28,880 --> 00:21:33,280 Speaker 1: out people were depositing, depositing bitcoin and then taking cash out. 369 00:21:34,160 --> 00:21:38,280 Speaker 1: Oh yeah, and people got their cash. But this company 370 00:21:38,400 --> 00:21:41,440 Speaker 1: basically lost all its bitcoin because they got hacked. But 371 00:21:41,640 --> 00:21:44,000 Speaker 1: there's a safe, safe, safe bet that they will probably 372 00:21:44,040 --> 00:21:46,720 Speaker 1: be able to get that back because it's so trained 373 00:21:46,720 --> 00:21:49,240 Speaker 1: because it's traceable. Yeah, I mean it does certainly so 374 00:21:49,280 --> 00:21:52,560 Speaker 1: that I have I have like a um you know, 375 00:21:53,359 --> 00:21:55,640 Speaker 1: it's not it's not like an n f T where 376 00:21:55,640 --> 00:21:58,719 Speaker 1: it's kind of gotten, isn't it like if someone has 377 00:21:58,760 --> 00:22:01,280 Speaker 1: an NFT and they hack it, then it's kind of gone. Well, 378 00:22:01,280 --> 00:22:04,080 Speaker 1: it's still no, I mean it's yeah. I mean, it's 379 00:22:04,119 --> 00:22:07,439 Speaker 1: certainly true that the transaction can't be reversed. But this 380 00:22:07,520 --> 00:22:10,240 Speaker 1: is the thing with This is the thing with bitcoin, ethery, 381 00:22:11,080 --> 00:22:17,159 Speaker 1: most major cryptos, is that transactions on blockchains are publicly viewable, 382 00:22:17,200 --> 00:22:20,760 Speaker 1: and they are publicly viewable forever. And I think this 383 00:22:20,840 --> 00:22:23,639 Speaker 1: could have consequences in the future because if there is 384 00:22:23,640 --> 00:22:28,080 Speaker 1: a big crackdown on crypto, then they could the authorities 385 00:22:28,080 --> 00:22:30,960 Speaker 1: could conceivably go quite a long way back in time 386 00:22:31,600 --> 00:22:34,199 Speaker 1: and and they would have a record of where you 387 00:22:34,240 --> 00:22:38,960 Speaker 1: were spending that bitcoin way back in or something like that. 388 00:22:39,480 --> 00:22:42,080 Speaker 1: Um so, And I mean that is a genuine concern. 389 00:22:42,200 --> 00:22:47,000 Speaker 1: But yeah, blockchain tracking is becoming more and more sophisticated. 390 00:22:47,520 --> 00:22:50,720 Speaker 1: And this idea that you often see advanced in the 391 00:22:50,480 --> 00:22:52,840 Speaker 1: in the kind of mainstream media and elsewhere, that that 392 00:22:52,920 --> 00:22:57,120 Speaker 1: crypto is an ideal tool for for criminals. For hackers, 393 00:22:57,160 --> 00:23:00,600 Speaker 1: it really isn't like if you were a hacker and 394 00:23:00,880 --> 00:23:03,600 Speaker 1: you you know, and you've got to your you know, 395 00:23:03,640 --> 00:23:06,480 Speaker 1: you stole your you've got the ransom for your ransomware 396 00:23:06,480 --> 00:23:09,080 Speaker 1: in bitcoin or something like that, you're screwed because you 397 00:23:09,720 --> 00:23:12,879 Speaker 1: can never cash out, you know that you be unless 398 00:23:12,920 --> 00:23:16,120 Speaker 1: you do it through someone else's account. Well, and yeah, 399 00:23:16,200 --> 00:23:19,520 Speaker 1: unless you use there are various tools for doing that 400 00:23:20,040 --> 00:23:24,560 Speaker 1: and or tools certainly for for kind of breaking that 401 00:23:24,560 --> 00:23:26,879 Speaker 1: that visible chain, which will get onto in a moment. 402 00:23:26,920 --> 00:23:30,600 Speaker 1: But yeah, you know, blockchain tracking companies the tools that 403 00:23:30,640 --> 00:23:35,119 Speaker 1: they use are getting more and more sophisticated. Um and 404 00:23:35,320 --> 00:23:38,680 Speaker 1: you know, basically, criminals, I guess, are way better off 405 00:23:38,760 --> 00:23:41,440 Speaker 1: using cash. Cash is much harder than to trace than 406 00:23:41,640 --> 00:23:46,040 Speaker 1: than crypto. So before we talk about privacy tools in crypto, 407 00:23:46,160 --> 00:24:03,359 Speaker 1: let's take a quick break. Sure, welcome back to part two. 408 00:24:03,640 --> 00:24:08,800 Speaker 1: I've called this part I thought we'd call this crypto 409 00:24:08,840 --> 00:24:12,760 Speaker 1: privacy tools and a big old can of worms, because yeah, 410 00:24:12,800 --> 00:24:15,199 Speaker 1: I think it's fair to say that, certainly in recent 411 00:24:15,320 --> 00:24:17,680 Speaker 1: weeks as well, a big can of worms has been opened. 412 00:24:17,760 --> 00:24:22,119 Speaker 1: Most cryptos are so publicly traceable, so viewable, there have 413 00:24:22,240 --> 00:24:24,800 Speaker 1: been tools developed to try and combat this. Now, the 414 00:24:24,800 --> 00:24:26,680 Speaker 1: one that we've talked about quite a few times before 415 00:24:26,720 --> 00:24:30,639 Speaker 1: as privacy coins, Yeah, Manero, we've also got things like 416 00:24:30,720 --> 00:24:34,439 Speaker 1: z cash. We've also got coins that have sort of 417 00:24:34,480 --> 00:24:39,719 Speaker 1: implemented privacy features. Um, so we'll we'll talk about some 418 00:24:39,760 --> 00:24:42,280 Speaker 1: of those at you know, maybe a bit later on. 419 00:24:42,520 --> 00:24:47,920 Speaker 1: But another popular tool for privacy has been mixers. Now, 420 00:24:48,040 --> 00:24:50,959 Speaker 1: these are basically designed to sever the link between the 421 00:24:51,000 --> 00:24:55,840 Speaker 1: sending and receiving addresses of a crypto transaction. So let's 422 00:24:55,840 --> 00:24:59,119 Speaker 1: have a hypothetical example. Let's say you're a Russian, you 423 00:24:59,200 --> 00:25:04,159 Speaker 1: live somewhere Russia, and you have family in Ukraine, and 424 00:25:04,520 --> 00:25:06,959 Speaker 1: you want to send them some money because you know, 425 00:25:07,000 --> 00:25:09,359 Speaker 1: you know that they're having a hard time whatever. You 426 00:25:09,400 --> 00:25:11,960 Speaker 1: decide that you're going to use crypto because you don't 427 00:25:11,960 --> 00:25:13,560 Speaker 1: want to have to send it through the banking system. 428 00:25:13,600 --> 00:25:15,000 Speaker 1: You certainly don't want to have to put cash in 429 00:25:15,040 --> 00:25:18,240 Speaker 1: the post. I doubt the post between Russia and Ukraine 430 00:25:18,320 --> 00:25:21,080 Speaker 1: is working particularly well at the moment. So you've decided 431 00:25:21,080 --> 00:25:23,720 Speaker 1: that you're going to send them some cryptocurrency, which is 432 00:25:23,760 --> 00:25:27,680 Speaker 1: great because it's trust less, it's permissionless, there's no one 433 00:25:27,880 --> 00:25:31,959 Speaker 1: in the middle of that transaction. But you know that 434 00:25:32,000 --> 00:25:34,760 Speaker 1: the Russian government, which is not a government you want 435 00:25:34,800 --> 00:25:37,440 Speaker 1: to get on the wrong side of, they could they 436 00:25:37,440 --> 00:25:42,119 Speaker 1: could quite easily track that transaction, and they could, you know, 437 00:25:42,160 --> 00:25:45,000 Speaker 1: they could, they could see that that crypto being moved, 438 00:25:45,040 --> 00:25:47,000 Speaker 1: and that could land you in a lot of trouble. 439 00:25:47,040 --> 00:25:49,280 Speaker 1: It could land your relatives in a lot of trouble. 440 00:25:49,960 --> 00:25:51,800 Speaker 1: So what you can do, what you have the option 441 00:25:51,840 --> 00:25:54,520 Speaker 1: to do, is send your crypto to a mixer. A 442 00:25:54,560 --> 00:25:59,800 Speaker 1: mixer is basically basically like a smart contract which mixes 443 00:26:00,040 --> 00:26:02,400 Speaker 1: it mixes it together with amounts of the same crypto 444 00:26:02,480 --> 00:26:05,280 Speaker 1: from other sources. I guess you can think of it as, 445 00:26:05,720 --> 00:26:08,359 Speaker 1: you know, you know, like a top boiler pack. Yeah, 446 00:26:08,680 --> 00:26:10,520 Speaker 1: it's like it's like putting your money into it. Yeah, 447 00:26:10,520 --> 00:26:14,960 Speaker 1: putting everyone puts, you know, a pound coin into a tombowler. Yeah, 448 00:26:15,080 --> 00:26:17,720 Speaker 1: call everyone else gets a pound coin out. But it 449 00:26:17,840 --> 00:26:20,040 Speaker 1: may not necessarily be that that that pound coin from 450 00:26:20,080 --> 00:26:22,760 Speaker 1: the same person, And you've got no way of proving 451 00:26:22,920 --> 00:26:25,240 Speaker 1: that the pound coin that you've taken out was the 452 00:26:25,240 --> 00:26:27,760 Speaker 1: pound coin taken in because it's all sort of mixed 453 00:26:27,760 --> 00:26:29,800 Speaker 1: and tumbled together. I guess that's an easy way of 454 00:26:29,840 --> 00:26:33,880 Speaker 1: thinking about it. Um and then the same amount can 455 00:26:33,920 --> 00:26:38,399 Speaker 1: be withdrawn from the mixing protocol. And to touch on something, 456 00:26:38,720 --> 00:26:41,720 Speaker 1: to touch on an element of crypto privacy, which is 457 00:26:42,200 --> 00:26:43,960 Speaker 1: so they're kind of like just little notes where you 458 00:26:44,000 --> 00:26:48,879 Speaker 1: can pay through. And because it's just like anonymous or 459 00:26:49,040 --> 00:26:51,440 Speaker 1: it's just that's all it's there for, it's it's impossible 460 00:26:51,560 --> 00:26:55,000 Speaker 1: or more trickier to trace. Yeah. Yeah, as I say, 461 00:26:55,040 --> 00:26:59,000 Speaker 1: it breaks the link between your sending address and the 462 00:26:59,280 --> 00:27:03,520 Speaker 1: receiving as that you're sending it to small fee I imagine. Yeah, yeah, 463 00:27:03,560 --> 00:27:06,320 Speaker 1: I mean that's how they Yeah, that's how they make that. 464 00:27:06,680 --> 00:27:09,800 Speaker 1: The mixer with the protocol will make its money charge 465 00:27:09,840 --> 00:27:12,480 Speaker 1: a little charge, a small transaction fee on top of that. 466 00:27:13,119 --> 00:27:15,560 Speaker 1: Um So, now the withdrawing address, the way they the 467 00:27:15,600 --> 00:27:17,280 Speaker 1: way they withdraw it as they use something called a 468 00:27:17,400 --> 00:27:21,120 Speaker 1: zero knowledge proof. Now this is basically a cryptographic way 469 00:27:21,160 --> 00:27:27,200 Speaker 1: of proving that you have some information without revealing that information. 470 00:27:28,200 --> 00:27:30,760 Speaker 1: And this is something I mean, we we could start 471 00:27:30,800 --> 00:27:33,560 Speaker 1: talking about zero knowledge proofs. It's very very kind of 472 00:27:34,000 --> 00:27:36,159 Speaker 1: dense and involved. What I'd like to do, Actually, at 473 00:27:36,200 --> 00:27:37,959 Speaker 1: some point, let's have an episode where we get kind 474 00:27:37,960 --> 00:27:41,000 Speaker 1: of a privacy expert in to talk about zero knowledge 475 00:27:41,040 --> 00:27:43,160 Speaker 1: proofs because it's a rabbit hole that goes pretty deep. 476 00:27:44,119 --> 00:27:46,119 Speaker 1: But basically, you know, you use this zero and not 477 00:27:46,480 --> 00:27:49,320 Speaker 1: the receiving address is able to use this zero knowledge 478 00:27:49,320 --> 00:27:51,760 Speaker 1: proof to say, you know, I know that sir, that 479 00:27:51,920 --> 00:27:55,080 Speaker 1: this amount of say has gone in and therefore I 480 00:27:55,080 --> 00:27:59,720 Speaker 1: am able to withdraw it. So the yes, so the 481 00:28:00,080 --> 00:28:05,840 Speaker 1: so has has has obscured where this transaction came from. Now, 482 00:28:05,920 --> 00:28:10,359 Speaker 1: this is essentially how a program, a protocol called Tornado 483 00:28:10,400 --> 00:28:14,520 Speaker 1: cash worked. And I mean that's a name. I like, yeah, 484 00:28:14,680 --> 00:28:19,200 Speaker 1: anything with did you cash? Tornado cash, it's it's it's 485 00:28:19,240 --> 00:28:21,800 Speaker 1: already in your book. Tornado cash is better than did 486 00:28:21,800 --> 00:28:23,800 Speaker 1: you cash? Yeah, that's pretty cool, isn't it. And actually 487 00:28:23,880 --> 00:28:26,760 Speaker 1: Tornado cash I think it's quite it's it's quite as 488 00:28:26,880 --> 00:28:29,399 Speaker 1: It's quite a useful name, you know, to how you 489 00:28:29,440 --> 00:28:32,200 Speaker 1: think about the protocol, because it's like sort of slinging 490 00:28:32,600 --> 00:28:35,600 Speaker 1: slinging your coins into a tornado which mixes it up 491 00:28:35,640 --> 00:28:39,040 Speaker 1: so and then you know you take them out elsewhere. Um, 492 00:28:39,960 --> 00:28:41,520 Speaker 1: and yeah, it's a good name for a mixing. No, 493 00:28:41,640 --> 00:28:45,520 Speaker 1: Tornado cash is basically an ethereum based mixer, so it 494 00:28:45,520 --> 00:28:48,760 Speaker 1: can be used to, you know, to to put through 495 00:28:48,920 --> 00:28:53,920 Speaker 1: its e or other kind of eath based tokens. And 496 00:28:54,200 --> 00:28:57,720 Speaker 1: basically what has happened is that Tornado cash has been 497 00:28:58,120 --> 00:29:01,360 Speaker 1: in a couple of weeks ago, was saying anctioned by 498 00:29:01,600 --> 00:29:04,280 Speaker 1: the U. S. Department of the Treasury by by a 499 00:29:04,040 --> 00:29:07,240 Speaker 1: subsection of the of the Treasury Department called the Office 500 00:29:07,360 --> 00:29:15,080 Speaker 1: of Foreign Assets Control or oh FAC. Oh FAC Yeah exactly. Um, 501 00:29:15,160 --> 00:29:19,120 Speaker 1: now I'll just read you the Wikipedia definition of oh FAC. So, 502 00:29:19,200 --> 00:29:22,440 Speaker 1: the Office of Foreign Assets Control is a financial intelligence 503 00:29:22,520 --> 00:29:25,720 Speaker 1: and enforcement agency of the U. S. Treasury Department. It 504 00:29:25,800 --> 00:29:29,760 Speaker 1: administers and enforces economic and trade sanctions in support of U. 505 00:29:29,880 --> 00:29:35,480 Speaker 1: S National security and foreign policy objectives. Now, yeah, oh 506 00:29:35,480 --> 00:29:39,480 Speaker 1: FAC is something is an organization is not to be 507 00:29:39,560 --> 00:29:43,120 Speaker 1: fa with, not to be fact exactly. You don't want 508 00:29:43,120 --> 00:29:44,720 Speaker 1: to fall on the wrong side of these guys, a 509 00:29:44,840 --> 00:29:48,600 Speaker 1: very very powerful department. And the I mean when you say, 510 00:29:48,640 --> 00:29:53,160 Speaker 1: you know, foreign policy and government interests. Yeah yeah, yeah, 511 00:29:53,400 --> 00:29:56,240 Speaker 1: like that's that's that's not a train you stand in 512 00:29:56,240 --> 00:30:01,800 Speaker 1: the win and I mean the oscar IRAQ yeah exactly. Yeah. 513 00:30:02,080 --> 00:30:06,640 Speaker 1: And and the the the penalties for sanctions violations can 514 00:30:06,680 --> 00:30:09,440 Speaker 1: be pretty big. I mean we're talking sort of thirty 515 00:30:09,440 --> 00:30:12,920 Speaker 1: odd years in jail, ten million dollar. Fine, it's it's 516 00:30:12,960 --> 00:30:16,760 Speaker 1: not good. So if you if you're getting sanctioned, is 517 00:30:16,800 --> 00:30:20,360 Speaker 1: a is a big deal. So now, the reason why 518 00:30:20,520 --> 00:30:24,320 Speaker 1: O FACT decided to sanction Tornado cash was because it 519 00:30:24,400 --> 00:30:27,320 Speaker 1: was being used by the Lazarus Group. And are you 520 00:30:27,360 --> 00:30:31,360 Speaker 1: familiar with these guys? I mean no, I put that. 521 00:30:32,000 --> 00:30:37,440 Speaker 1: Have you heard of them? It turns out it turns 522 00:30:37,440 --> 00:30:40,200 Speaker 1: out I'm working for the c I A. Are you 523 00:30:40,240 --> 00:30:44,400 Speaker 1: familiar with them? Okay, yeah, I know, Oh yeah, okay, 524 00:30:44,760 --> 00:30:48,080 Speaker 1: do well you're no, I haven't I'm not familiar with Okay, 525 00:30:48,560 --> 00:30:51,840 Speaker 1: the Lazarus Group. This is really really interesting. There's some 526 00:30:52,040 --> 00:30:55,360 Speaker 1: very interesting material about Lazarus Group out there. The Lazarus 527 00:30:55,400 --> 00:31:01,360 Speaker 1: Group is basically North Korea's hacking And thought, that's me. 528 00:31:01,680 --> 00:31:04,000 Speaker 1: I just well, you know, I know you've got I 529 00:31:04,000 --> 00:31:05,960 Speaker 1: know you've got connection. I thought you might have heard 530 00:31:06,000 --> 00:31:10,400 Speaker 1: through your underworld people. Anyhow, we'll talk about that in 531 00:31:10,400 --> 00:31:15,240 Speaker 1: in a shipping container where. But yeah, so the Treasury 532 00:31:15,280 --> 00:31:18,400 Speaker 1: had identified that the Lazarus Group, which is behind a 533 00:31:18,680 --> 00:31:21,520 Speaker 1: numerous kind of crypto hacks and exploits all sorts of 534 00:31:21,760 --> 00:31:26,360 Speaker 1: bad stuff. Rascals they are, they are rascals. Yeah. Um, 535 00:31:26,520 --> 00:31:31,680 Speaker 1: they were using Tornado cash to launder stolen crypto. And 536 00:31:32,080 --> 00:31:36,280 Speaker 1: now let's not you know, let's not pretend otherwise here, 537 00:31:36,360 --> 00:31:40,000 Speaker 1: Like Tornado cash was certain you know, that was there 538 00:31:40,040 --> 00:31:43,800 Speaker 1: was an element of that happening. Yeah, it was certainly 539 00:31:43,840 --> 00:31:46,560 Speaker 1: being used to launder funds. There's there's no question about that. 540 00:31:46,720 --> 00:31:50,560 Speaker 1: But you know, casinos launder funds. Well, yeah, banks were 541 00:31:50,560 --> 00:31:55,200 Speaker 1: set up, HSBC was laundering them cartel's money, Yeah, exactly, exactly. 542 00:31:55,240 --> 00:31:59,200 Speaker 1: And we'll touch not that that's okay, not not yeah, 543 00:31:59,280 --> 00:32:01,720 Speaker 1: not condoning for a moment, but but you know, sometimes 544 00:32:01,800 --> 00:32:04,600 Speaker 1: something is set up for privacy, you know, or for 545 00:32:04,720 --> 00:32:07,920 Speaker 1: one reason maybe used for another, like a car wash 546 00:32:08,040 --> 00:32:10,200 Speaker 1: if you're absolutely well, this is something I want to 547 00:32:10,200 --> 00:32:12,239 Speaker 1: touch on in just a moment because this is you know, 548 00:32:12,320 --> 00:32:14,320 Speaker 1: this is an argument that a lot of people have 549 00:32:14,400 --> 00:32:18,520 Speaker 1: made in relation to these Tornado Cash sanctions. But before 550 00:32:18,520 --> 00:32:20,840 Speaker 1: we get to that, so yeah, oh, fact basically claimed 551 00:32:21,400 --> 00:32:24,800 Speaker 1: when when it's announced these sanctions that seven billion dollars 552 00:32:24,840 --> 00:32:27,280 Speaker 1: had been laundered through Tornado Cash, which is a lot 553 00:32:27,320 --> 00:32:29,960 Speaker 1: of money. However, this isn't actually true. That's how much 554 00:32:30,000 --> 00:32:33,240 Speaker 1: it has been used. Yeah, that's not everything is is, 555 00:32:33,600 --> 00:32:36,960 Speaker 1: you know, launded money exactly right. So, yes, seven billion 556 00:32:36,960 --> 00:32:40,360 Speaker 1: dollars worth of crypto has gone through Tornado Cash, but 557 00:32:41,000 --> 00:32:44,160 Speaker 1: not all of that is illicit funds. In fact, Chain Analysis, 558 00:32:44,200 --> 00:32:45,960 Speaker 1: which is one of the which is arguably I think 559 00:32:45,960 --> 00:32:49,640 Speaker 1: the biggest blockchain tracking company and is you know, is 560 00:32:49,640 --> 00:32:52,400 Speaker 1: a US based company, is very much, you know, very 561 00:32:52,440 --> 00:32:56,760 Speaker 1: much tied to the authorities. Chain Analysis estimates that only 562 00:32:56,800 --> 00:33:00,320 Speaker 1: around seventeen seven percent of the funds going through Ornada 563 00:33:00,400 --> 00:33:04,360 Speaker 1: Cash were related to illicit activity. Now that is still 564 00:33:04,360 --> 00:33:06,760 Speaker 1: a lot. That is still a lot of money, you know, 565 00:33:07,640 --> 00:33:12,160 Speaker 1: but certainly it's it's nothing like, you know, it's nothing 566 00:33:12,200 --> 00:33:14,880 Speaker 1: like the seven billion dollars that O fact claimed. I 567 00:33:14,920 --> 00:33:20,240 Speaker 1: was watching a documentary on Chinese gangs laundering money through 568 00:33:20,880 --> 00:33:25,120 Speaker 1: Vancouver casinos and they had a similar sort of figure. 569 00:33:25,120 --> 00:33:27,640 Speaker 1: I don't think it was the highest seventeen, but I 570 00:33:27,680 --> 00:33:30,000 Speaker 1: think it was. It was it was eight or nine 571 00:33:30,000 --> 00:33:34,360 Speaker 1: percent or something like that of of of the casinos 572 00:33:34,360 --> 00:33:37,360 Speaker 1: turnover was something to do with Chinese was it the 573 00:33:37,360 --> 00:33:39,160 Speaker 1: real estate anyway? But it's a it was a figure 574 00:33:39,200 --> 00:33:41,400 Speaker 1: that I was like, wow, that is a lot of incredible, 575 00:33:41,440 --> 00:33:44,120 Speaker 1: isn't it. And I mean, yeah, that the the idea 576 00:33:44,200 --> 00:33:47,360 Speaker 1: that the idea that a lot of people believe in 577 00:33:47,400 --> 00:33:50,080 Speaker 1: that you know, krypto is just one big, massive money 578 00:33:50,160 --> 00:33:53,600 Speaker 1: laundering scheme. It's it's nonsense, you know, especially in comparison 579 00:33:54,240 --> 00:33:57,080 Speaker 1: to to to the amount of money laundering that goes 580 00:33:57,080 --> 00:33:58,960 Speaker 1: on in the real world. I mean, we're talking trillions 581 00:33:59,000 --> 00:34:03,040 Speaker 1: of dollars here. Um. So yeah, as I say, it's 582 00:34:03,080 --> 00:34:07,480 Speaker 1: been estimated that look at those candy shops on Oxford Street. Yeah, yeah, 583 00:34:07,480 --> 00:34:13,120 Speaker 1: they're basically yeah, they're basically money laundering operations, allegedly. Allegedly. Yeah. Now, 584 00:34:13,200 --> 00:34:16,640 Speaker 1: the effects of these sanctions, beyond Tornado Cash being announced, 585 00:34:16,960 --> 00:34:19,960 Speaker 1: were pretty immediate and pretty scary. Like the Tornado Cash 586 00:34:20,000 --> 00:34:25,719 Speaker 1: website went down, the code disappeared from GitHub. Now bear 587 00:34:25,800 --> 00:34:27,920 Speaker 1: in mind, this isn't this is an important thing to 588 00:34:27,920 --> 00:34:31,279 Speaker 1: to to remember. This was an open source code, so 589 00:34:31,320 --> 00:34:34,160 Speaker 1: this code was available for everyone to see, for everyone 590 00:34:34,200 --> 00:34:37,680 Speaker 1: to copy, for everyone to fork. Um. So the code 591 00:34:37,719 --> 00:34:41,880 Speaker 1: disappeared from GitHub. And now what was also sanctioned was 592 00:34:41,960 --> 00:34:45,080 Speaker 1: not only the Tornado Cash protocol itself, but also a 593 00:34:45,160 --> 00:34:49,120 Speaker 1: number of wallets that were associated with the protocol, and 594 00:34:49,160 --> 00:34:51,279 Speaker 1: these held something in the region of like over four 595 00:34:51,680 --> 00:34:55,759 Speaker 1: million dollars worth of crypto, not your keys not here. Yeah, yeah, absolutely. Now, 596 00:34:56,040 --> 00:34:58,279 Speaker 1: there was a lot of there was a lot of 597 00:34:58,280 --> 00:35:01,200 Speaker 1: obviously a lot of money sitting in the in these wallets. 598 00:35:01,840 --> 00:35:04,840 Speaker 1: Now any U s d C u USDC being the 599 00:35:04,880 --> 00:35:07,719 Speaker 1: big stable coin, the fourth I think it's the fourth 600 00:35:07,800 --> 00:35:11,120 Speaker 1: largest cryptocurrency by market cap UM and the second largest 601 00:35:11,120 --> 00:35:15,000 Speaker 1: stable coin, any USDC that was sitting in wallets associated 602 00:35:15,040 --> 00:35:17,880 Speaker 1: with Tornado Cash was frozen by Circle, which is the 603 00:35:17,920 --> 00:35:22,480 Speaker 1: company that issues U s DC. And we also started 604 00:35:22,480 --> 00:35:27,160 Speaker 1: to see decentralized applications blocking access to their front ends. UM. 605 00:35:27,360 --> 00:35:30,160 Speaker 1: You know, any wallets that had interacted with Tornado Cash. 606 00:35:30,200 --> 00:35:33,680 Speaker 1: Bear in mind everything is viewable on chain UM. They 607 00:35:34,320 --> 00:35:37,160 Speaker 1: you know, they found themselves unable to interact with a 608 00:35:37,160 --> 00:35:41,520 Speaker 1: lot of defied protocols, with a lot of decentralized applications. UM. 609 00:35:41,600 --> 00:35:45,239 Speaker 1: We also had a number some of the big RPC providers, 610 00:35:45,280 --> 00:35:49,759 Speaker 1: Now these are basically services that enable decentralized applications to 611 00:35:50,080 --> 00:35:56,680 Speaker 1: communicate with blockchains. UM, they began restricting access to Tornado 612 00:35:56,680 --> 00:36:00,560 Speaker 1: cash smart contract to you know, and so this was 613 00:36:00,600 --> 00:36:04,239 Speaker 1: another you know, this big sort of centralized entity was 614 00:36:05,040 --> 00:36:09,080 Speaker 1: blocking access to Tornado Cash. And then we also had 615 00:36:09,400 --> 00:36:12,680 Speaker 1: we also saw someone began sending very very small amounts 616 00:36:12,680 --> 00:36:17,399 Speaker 1: of east to that have been through Tornado Cash too 617 00:36:17,960 --> 00:36:21,480 Speaker 1: well known addresses. Now, are you familiar. I think we've 618 00:36:21,480 --> 00:36:24,120 Speaker 1: talked about this before, this idea of a blockchain domain, 619 00:36:24,680 --> 00:36:27,480 Speaker 1: of a human readable blockchain domains, so you could have 620 00:36:27,760 --> 00:36:31,440 Speaker 1: Mad Mike Mooch dot eath, which also functions as a 621 00:36:31,480 --> 00:36:35,120 Speaker 1: crypto wallet. It so a number of people, Jimmy Fallon, 622 00:36:35,160 --> 00:36:38,040 Speaker 1: the comedian um Steve Aoki, who you've heard of, and 623 00:36:38,080 --> 00:36:40,920 Speaker 1: I'm not all that familiar with Brian Armstrong, who's the 624 00:36:40,960 --> 00:36:44,920 Speaker 1: CEO of coin Base, they found themselves being dusted, I 625 00:36:45,400 --> 00:36:48,799 Speaker 1: because basically contaminating their wallets so that they were crypto 626 00:36:49,800 --> 00:36:52,840 Speaker 1: shut down as well. Well yeah, yeah, basically yeah, basically 627 00:36:52,920 --> 00:36:55,960 Speaker 1: sending them I guess contaminated eas because it had come 628 00:36:56,000 --> 00:36:59,600 Speaker 1: from you know, these these Tornado Cash associated wallets and 629 00:36:59,640 --> 00:37:01,960 Speaker 1: that could be abused by government as well. Yeah, so 630 00:37:02,680 --> 00:37:04,560 Speaker 1: you know, as as I now, I did a video 631 00:37:04,560 --> 00:37:06,360 Speaker 1: on this last week, which I'm going to put up 632 00:37:06,400 --> 00:37:08,520 Speaker 1: as the put the audio up as a as a podcast. 633 00:37:08,520 --> 00:37:10,279 Speaker 1: In fact, it should already be up by the time 634 00:37:10,520 --> 00:37:13,120 Speaker 1: this is released. So if you want, if anyone listening 635 00:37:13,160 --> 00:37:15,439 Speaker 1: kind of wants to know, more about what's been going 636 00:37:15,440 --> 00:37:20,000 Speaker 1: on with Tornado Cash than watch or listen to that. Um, 637 00:37:20,040 --> 00:37:22,400 Speaker 1: but yeah, I did speculate in that video. It's like, Okay, 638 00:37:22,440 --> 00:37:26,239 Speaker 1: so does that mean Jimmy Fallon is you know, has been. 639 00:37:26,280 --> 00:37:28,799 Speaker 1: I've always suspected him from one. I mean he was. 640 00:37:28,960 --> 00:37:30,960 Speaker 1: You don't get to the top by being just a nice, 641 00:37:31,000 --> 00:37:34,800 Speaker 1: funny guy. Yeah, it's run to you, Jimmy. Yeah, Jimmy, 642 00:37:34,800 --> 00:37:38,279 Speaker 1: we're coming. The Feds are coming for you. Is he 643 00:37:38,520 --> 00:37:41,000 Speaker 1: is he now? Is he now in breach of sanctions 644 00:37:41,040 --> 00:37:45,120 Speaker 1: because he has interacted even though he hasn't himself. But 645 00:37:45,200 --> 00:37:47,320 Speaker 1: you know something, because he's we don't know that because 646 00:37:47,320 --> 00:37:51,000 Speaker 1: he's received We don't. But I think Jimmy Fallon deserves 647 00:37:51,080 --> 00:37:54,839 Speaker 1: the presumption of innocence. Um but yees. So it's it's 648 00:37:54,840 --> 00:38:00,480 Speaker 1: thrown up Jimmy Fallon. So yeah, so we had, you know, 649 00:38:00,520 --> 00:38:03,160 Speaker 1: we had this throwing up all these kind of questions. 650 00:38:03,239 --> 00:38:06,240 Speaker 1: You know what happens if what happens to people staking 651 00:38:06,600 --> 00:38:08,440 Speaker 1: you know what happens if they receive you know what 652 00:38:08,960 --> 00:38:14,279 Speaker 1: this contaminated It's basically is created is basically open to 653 00:38:14,320 --> 00:38:18,000 Speaker 1: can of worms as time. We all know what they're like. Um, now, 654 00:38:18,120 --> 00:38:21,279 Speaker 1: The scariest thing, however, the most worrying thing was that 655 00:38:21,280 --> 00:38:25,239 Speaker 1: one of the Tornado Cash developers has been arrested by 656 00:38:25,239 --> 00:38:30,239 Speaker 1: by Dutch police. Stop you're under arrested in It was 657 00:38:30,360 --> 00:38:33,080 Speaker 1: rested in Amsterdam. At the time that we record this, 658 00:38:33,120 --> 00:38:36,760 Speaker 1: it's been nearly two weeks ago. He's still not been charged, 659 00:38:37,360 --> 00:38:41,400 Speaker 1: and it's still not clear. This is a chap called 660 00:38:42,000 --> 00:38:46,920 Speaker 1: well entirely clear, it's not entirely clear. They haven't actually 661 00:38:47,080 --> 00:38:49,839 Speaker 1: made it clear what a law what law? This chap 662 00:38:49,880 --> 00:38:55,880 Speaker 1: has been arrested under. His name is Alexei Petzev. And yeah, 663 00:38:55,920 --> 00:38:59,200 Speaker 1: he's been he's being held. You know, we we the 664 00:38:59,280 --> 00:39:01,120 Speaker 1: kind of assumption is that they're going to charge him 665 00:39:01,160 --> 00:39:05,319 Speaker 1: with some sort of sanctions violational money laundering thing. But 666 00:39:05,760 --> 00:39:09,879 Speaker 1: that's all complete speculation. That's scary, like a guy has 667 00:39:09,920 --> 00:39:14,000 Speaker 1: been arrested for writing code and they still haven't We 668 00:39:14,000 --> 00:39:16,480 Speaker 1: still don't know what he's actually been charged with. And 669 00:39:16,520 --> 00:39:19,800 Speaker 1: this is two weeks later, he's still under arrest um 670 00:39:19,840 --> 00:39:22,799 Speaker 1: now obviously, yeah, and as I said, obviously all this 671 00:39:22,880 --> 00:39:26,280 Speaker 1: is being done because of the fear of sanctions violation 672 00:39:26,880 --> 00:39:30,719 Speaker 1: and which obviously carries these pretty severe penalties. And I 673 00:39:30,760 --> 00:39:34,040 Speaker 1: should say, like these entities like Circle that's been restricted, 674 00:39:34,080 --> 00:39:35,480 Speaker 1: you know, that's been free. Well I think I think 675 00:39:35,520 --> 00:39:40,320 Speaker 1: also you know this is an intimidation, yeah, sort of tactic. 676 00:39:41,200 --> 00:39:46,080 Speaker 1: You know, like this guy has been arrested, uh, not charged, 677 00:39:46,320 --> 00:39:51,040 Speaker 1: held there on some you know, some technicality and who 678 00:39:51,080 --> 00:39:56,400 Speaker 1: probably have because I watched a lot of YouTube obviously, 679 00:39:56,440 --> 00:40:01,000 Speaker 1: and there's a couple of criminal sort of costs, and 680 00:40:01,080 --> 00:40:04,719 Speaker 1: the the US government and the legal system is just 681 00:40:05,600 --> 00:40:08,879 Speaker 1: it's just a bully. It's not there for justice. It's 682 00:40:08,880 --> 00:40:12,279 Speaker 1: there for the win and the what they they So 683 00:40:12,360 --> 00:40:15,520 Speaker 1: you'll be charged, you'll have all of these charges you know, 684 00:40:16,040 --> 00:40:21,239 Speaker 1: racked up, so you're facing hundreds of years in prison um, 685 00:40:21,280 --> 00:40:23,920 Speaker 1: and then you'll get a plea bargain, and it's kind 686 00:40:23,960 --> 00:40:25,720 Speaker 1: of like, okay, cool, well this is the plea bargain. 687 00:40:25,760 --> 00:40:27,799 Speaker 1: It's it's not what you've done, it's not, but it's 688 00:40:27,800 --> 00:40:30,239 Speaker 1: going to be. All they care about is that win, 689 00:40:30,920 --> 00:40:32,880 Speaker 1: and it's it's the intimidation, and it's kind of like 690 00:40:32,920 --> 00:40:36,280 Speaker 1: that that fear of if you don't take the plea bargain, 691 00:40:36,360 --> 00:40:39,680 Speaker 1: they go for you even harder and make examples of you. 692 00:40:39,760 --> 00:40:44,000 Speaker 1: And it's not for justice, it's for fear. Yeah, and 693 00:40:44,000 --> 00:40:46,520 Speaker 1: and yeah, you get people who are people who have 694 00:40:46,560 --> 00:40:49,680 Speaker 1: done nothing wrong. It's like, Okay, I take a plea bargain, 695 00:40:49,719 --> 00:40:51,279 Speaker 1: I get ten years or I fight it. I could 696 00:40:51,320 --> 00:40:55,080 Speaker 1: get forty years. And this is where privacy comes in. Yeah. 697 00:40:55,080 --> 00:40:56,640 Speaker 1: So it's kind of like, this guy has just written 698 00:40:56,680 --> 00:40:59,319 Speaker 1: some code, But what what's there too hide if I've 699 00:40:59,360 --> 00:41:02,440 Speaker 1: not done anything. Yeah, I mean there's so much that 700 00:41:02,560 --> 00:41:05,879 Speaker 1: there's so many Uh, there's going to be so many 701 00:41:05,960 --> 00:41:09,600 Speaker 1: legal consequences of this because what what O Fhak has 702 00:41:09,640 --> 00:41:15,279 Speaker 1: done is pretty is pretty unprecedented. You know, they've sanctioned 703 00:41:15,640 --> 00:41:20,279 Speaker 1: a piece of code, and it throws up all kinds 704 00:41:20,320 --> 00:41:23,200 Speaker 1: of questions, you know, because code is now code is 705 00:41:23,360 --> 00:41:28,040 Speaker 1: considered when code is that code is law asked any 706 00:41:28,080 --> 00:41:31,960 Speaker 1: ask any cypherpunk. But since code has been considered a 707 00:41:32,040 --> 00:41:36,960 Speaker 1: speech in the US, Yeah, and that should be protected 708 00:41:37,040 --> 00:41:39,040 Speaker 1: under the First Amendment. Bear in mind, you know, I 709 00:41:39,040 --> 00:41:42,040 Speaker 1: should say this guy has been arrested in the in 710 00:41:42,080 --> 00:41:45,280 Speaker 1: the Netherlands, so you know, I mean, whether there's whether 711 00:41:45,320 --> 00:41:48,560 Speaker 1: there's talk of extraditing extraditing into the U S. I 712 00:41:48,560 --> 00:41:51,680 Speaker 1: don't know, but you know, in terms of in terms 713 00:41:51,680 --> 00:41:53,040 Speaker 1: of what's happening in the US. You know, this is 714 00:41:53,040 --> 00:41:55,040 Speaker 1: a U. S entity. O FAK is a U S 715 00:41:55,160 --> 00:41:58,080 Speaker 1: entity that has that has imposed these sanctions, and what 716 00:41:58,120 --> 00:42:01,360 Speaker 1: it is essentially doing is sanctioning a piece of a 717 00:42:01,440 --> 00:42:04,520 Speaker 1: public good. Yeah, you know, it's sanctioning speech. And the 718 00:42:04,640 --> 00:42:08,480 Speaker 1: legal implications of this are you know, the Treasury is 719 00:42:08,520 --> 00:42:11,080 Speaker 1: kind of effectively saying that the speech itself is illegal. 720 00:42:12,120 --> 00:42:14,360 Speaker 1: Now that is a that is a quagmire that is 721 00:42:14,360 --> 00:42:16,360 Speaker 1: going to take you a lot of a lot of 722 00:42:16,360 --> 00:42:18,279 Speaker 1: a lot of lawyers are gonna make a lot of money. Yeah, 723 00:42:18,320 --> 00:42:19,520 Speaker 1: I mean, there are going to be There are going 724 00:42:19,560 --> 00:42:23,200 Speaker 1: to be legal challenges to this, and there are coin Shares, 725 00:42:23,239 --> 00:42:25,400 Speaker 1: which is a crypto lobbying group, is already kind of 726 00:42:25,400 --> 00:42:28,799 Speaker 1: talking about this, and I you know, there's no way 727 00:42:28,800 --> 00:42:31,799 Speaker 1: that this can be allowed to just stand. But kind 728 00:42:31,800 --> 00:42:33,680 Speaker 1: of going back to what you said about the about 729 00:42:33,719 --> 00:42:36,960 Speaker 1: the US justice system, you know, it's it's a bully. 730 00:42:37,040 --> 00:42:40,319 Speaker 1: So although there will be legal challenges to this, they're 731 00:42:40,320 --> 00:42:42,240 Speaker 1: going to take a heck of a long time to resolve. 732 00:42:42,520 --> 00:42:47,120 Speaker 1: And whilst they are unresolved, those sanctions remain in place. 733 00:42:47,760 --> 00:42:49,759 Speaker 1: And I think, going back to what I'm sort of 734 00:42:49,800 --> 00:42:52,000 Speaker 1: touching on earlier, you know, the fact that you have 735 00:42:52,080 --> 00:42:54,359 Speaker 1: all these entities. You have the likes of Circle, you know, 736 00:42:54,440 --> 00:42:58,160 Speaker 1: and Infura, which is this RPC node provider, you know, 737 00:42:58,200 --> 00:43:02,239 Speaker 1: another kind of entities. They obviously come in for criticism 738 00:43:02,280 --> 00:43:04,680 Speaker 1: for for for doing what they're doing. But I mean 739 00:43:04,760 --> 00:43:07,480 Speaker 1: you can't really blame them because you you don't get 740 00:43:07,560 --> 00:43:10,080 Speaker 1: on the wrong side of the U S. Government. You 741 00:43:10,160 --> 00:43:14,239 Speaker 1: don't violate sanctions unless unless you want to spend thirty 742 00:43:14,320 --> 00:43:16,600 Speaker 1: years in jail or face a massive fine. They don't, 743 00:43:16,760 --> 00:43:20,239 Speaker 1: they don't really have a choice. But the consequences of 744 00:43:20,239 --> 00:43:24,839 Speaker 1: this for decentralization, our diet, and we'll and we'll get 745 00:43:24,840 --> 00:43:30,040 Speaker 1: onto we'll get onto that shortly. But so what what 746 00:43:30,040 --> 00:43:35,640 Speaker 1: what country could you set up something which is imperially 747 00:43:35,760 --> 00:43:42,320 Speaker 1: like is free from US pressure, well from China or Russia, 748 00:43:42,360 --> 00:43:45,680 Speaker 1: which has its own sort pressure. I mean, you don't 749 00:43:45,760 --> 00:43:48,600 Speaker 1: really have many options. I mean the US, the US 750 00:43:48,640 --> 00:43:52,360 Speaker 1: has a pretty long reach and I mean, yeah, I 751 00:43:52,360 --> 00:43:58,080 Speaker 1: guess you're what countries don't they extradite? Um, there are 752 00:43:58,120 --> 00:44:00,680 Speaker 1: a number of countries that don't extradite to the US. 753 00:44:01,560 --> 00:44:03,480 Speaker 1: I don't think the UAI does, the United Air of 754 00:44:03,480 --> 00:44:10,520 Speaker 1: emorrates M Yeah, so there are a few but you 755 00:44:10,560 --> 00:44:13,280 Speaker 1: know it's I don't think France does actually think France 756 00:44:13,280 --> 00:44:17,279 Speaker 1: extra day. I think you're right. Um so, but you 757 00:44:17,280 --> 00:44:21,040 Speaker 1: know it's you don't you get on the You get 758 00:44:21,080 --> 00:44:23,680 Speaker 1: on the wrong side of of of US authorities at 759 00:44:23,680 --> 00:44:26,839 Speaker 1: your peril. Just ask Edward Snowden. I mean last I 760 00:44:26,880 --> 00:44:31,800 Speaker 1: heard he was still in Moscow. Um So, yeah, Basically, 761 00:44:32,440 --> 00:44:35,239 Speaker 1: these the you know this, this is a tool that's 762 00:44:35,239 --> 00:44:37,359 Speaker 1: been sanctioned. And as you kind of touched on as well, 763 00:44:37,400 --> 00:44:39,800 Speaker 1: it's like, if you're sanctioning a tool a public good 764 00:44:40,360 --> 00:44:44,120 Speaker 1: because it's been used by criminals, you can you can 765 00:44:44,160 --> 00:44:47,000 Speaker 1: extrapolate that out pretty easily. It's like, well, okay, so 766 00:44:47,280 --> 00:44:49,400 Speaker 1: are you going to sanction Are you going to sanction 767 00:44:49,480 --> 00:44:53,920 Speaker 1: cash because criminals use it? As as we've talked about telephones, Yeah, 768 00:44:54,280 --> 00:44:57,800 Speaker 1: drug dealers use telephones, so why not sanction them? Another 769 00:44:57,840 --> 00:45:01,440 Speaker 1: example I used was, you know parks, are you going 770 00:45:01,480 --> 00:45:04,280 Speaker 1: to close off access to public parks because drug dealers 771 00:45:04,360 --> 00:45:05,759 Speaker 1: use them? Are you going to close off access to 772 00:45:05,840 --> 00:45:08,920 Speaker 1: roads because drug dealers drive on them? Or airlines because 773 00:45:09,480 --> 00:45:12,040 Speaker 1: you know the Mexican cartels might use I don't know that. 774 00:45:12,120 --> 00:45:16,920 Speaker 1: It's it's crazy, um and you know there's also the example, 775 00:45:16,960 --> 00:45:18,680 Speaker 1: are you going to sanction the whole of the Internet, 776 00:45:18,719 --> 00:45:21,080 Speaker 1: because let's face it, there's a lot of crime that 777 00:45:21,120 --> 00:45:25,280 Speaker 1: goes on there. So yeah, I mean where this all goes, 778 00:45:25,360 --> 00:45:28,600 Speaker 1: where this all leads is is kind of anyone's guest, 779 00:45:28,640 --> 00:45:31,160 Speaker 1: But I mean, it's it's it's going to be it's 780 00:45:31,160 --> 00:45:33,200 Speaker 1: going to be playing the consequence of this are going 781 00:45:33,239 --> 00:45:36,600 Speaker 1: to play out for years, really, and the consequences for 782 00:45:36,640 --> 00:45:42,120 Speaker 1: privacy are are pretty worrying. Um Now, really, I think 783 00:45:42,160 --> 00:45:46,120 Speaker 1: the sanctions on Tornado Cash itself are only going to 784 00:45:46,160 --> 00:45:50,280 Speaker 1: affect those people who were legitimately using the protocol. Remember 785 00:45:50,320 --> 00:45:52,440 Speaker 1: this is a this is open source code. It's up 786 00:45:52,480 --> 00:45:54,040 Speaker 1: there on the intet. It can't be taken down. So 787 00:45:54,080 --> 00:45:57,520 Speaker 1: Tornado you can you can still use Tornado Cash, So 788 00:45:57,600 --> 00:46:00,160 Speaker 1: the criminals who are using it in the first plays 789 00:46:00,840 --> 00:46:04,160 Speaker 1: can carry on using it, you know, because they don't 790 00:46:04,200 --> 00:46:07,719 Speaker 1: care their criminals. They could also they could also someone 791 00:46:07,760 --> 00:46:12,320 Speaker 1: could also fork the code and create Cyclone cash, Hurricane cash, 792 00:46:12,560 --> 00:46:16,200 Speaker 1: mad Mike Mooch cash, you know, whatever they want. So really, 793 00:46:16,239 --> 00:46:22,680 Speaker 1: the only fact cash fact cash. Yeah, yeah, double down, 794 00:46:22,880 --> 00:46:27,719 Speaker 1: Oh there they are. Um, so yeah, it's legitimate users, 795 00:46:27,760 --> 00:46:31,920 Speaker 1: people who were using Tornado Cash for their own private purposes, 796 00:46:31,960 --> 00:46:34,200 Speaker 1: of their own privacy are really the only ones who 797 00:46:34,200 --> 00:46:39,120 Speaker 1: have been affected by these sanctions. Um. And it's it's 798 00:46:39,160 --> 00:46:41,800 Speaker 1: also I think it's worth pointing out that this is 799 00:46:41,840 --> 00:46:44,279 Speaker 1: the most egregious example of this, but that we have 800 00:46:44,400 --> 00:46:48,200 Speaker 1: seen pushback against other kind of privacy focused crypto projects 801 00:46:48,239 --> 00:46:50,600 Speaker 1: in in in the recent past. A good example is 802 00:46:50,960 --> 00:46:55,160 Speaker 1: light coin. Light coin implemented some privacy features fairly recently. 803 00:46:55,160 --> 00:46:59,680 Speaker 1: It had an upgrade which enabled some privacy features very 804 00:46:59,760 --> 00:47:02,399 Speaker 1: much opped in um so it didn't become a full 805 00:47:02,600 --> 00:47:08,120 Speaker 1: privacy coin, but lights ltc was delisted from several South 806 00:47:08,200 --> 00:47:12,480 Speaker 1: Korean exchanges after that, you know, regulatory pressure was piled on. 807 00:47:12,920 --> 00:47:14,719 Speaker 1: And we've also got the likes of Manero. I mean, 808 00:47:14,840 --> 00:47:17,719 Speaker 1: Manero has been in the sites of governments for a 809 00:47:17,760 --> 00:47:21,479 Speaker 1: long long time now. Manera uses different technology in order 810 00:47:21,560 --> 00:47:24,200 Speaker 1: to Manera uses something, among other things, something called ring 811 00:47:24,239 --> 00:47:27,399 Speaker 1: signatures to rather than you know, rather than this kind 812 00:47:27,400 --> 00:47:30,920 Speaker 1: of mixing at this idea of mixing. So you know, 813 00:47:30,960 --> 00:47:33,600 Speaker 1: there are other ways that you can protect your privacy 814 00:47:33,600 --> 00:47:35,600 Speaker 1: and crypto. I don't think, well we we we won't 815 00:47:35,640 --> 00:47:38,719 Speaker 1: kind of talk too much about them because again that's 816 00:47:39,000 --> 00:47:40,839 Speaker 1: you know, that's a rabbit hole that goes quite deep. 817 00:47:41,760 --> 00:47:46,840 Speaker 1: But yeah, crypto privacy, in crypto and by extension, I 818 00:47:46,840 --> 00:47:50,319 Speaker 1: think privacy itself is has really come under attack from 819 00:47:50,400 --> 00:47:53,759 Speaker 1: these from these sanctions, and I think it's worth just 820 00:47:53,840 --> 00:47:56,000 Speaker 1: kind of going back to the idea of the importance 821 00:47:56,239 --> 00:48:00,960 Speaker 1: of Internet privacy because the tools that were developed by 822 00:48:01,080 --> 00:48:03,799 Speaker 1: people like Phil Zimmerman, who we met in episode six. 823 00:48:03,840 --> 00:48:06,280 Speaker 1: He was the guy who created p g P Pretty 824 00:48:06,280 --> 00:48:08,840 Speaker 1: Good Privacy. Now, I don't know if you remember this, 825 00:48:08,880 --> 00:48:12,280 Speaker 1: but Pretty Good Privacy was this messaging system that used 826 00:48:12,440 --> 00:48:17,400 Speaker 1: public key cryptography to allow people to basically encrypt their communications. 827 00:48:18,360 --> 00:48:22,560 Speaker 1: And the US government really through its toys out of 828 00:48:22,560 --> 00:48:26,080 Speaker 1: the PRAM about this. They were very, very worried that, 829 00:48:26,239 --> 00:48:28,319 Speaker 1: you know, and their argument was like, why would you 830 00:48:28,320 --> 00:48:30,719 Speaker 1: want to encrypt your communications unless you're an enemy of 831 00:48:30,719 --> 00:48:34,399 Speaker 1: the US or you're a criminal. And they really went 832 00:48:34,480 --> 00:48:41,839 Speaker 1: after Phil Zimmerman. They charged him with exporting munitions. They 833 00:48:41,920 --> 00:48:45,319 Speaker 1: charged him with munitions export without a license because they 834 00:48:45,480 --> 00:48:49,040 Speaker 1: argued that this p g P and other encryption technologies 835 00:48:49,200 --> 00:48:53,960 Speaker 1: were basically kind of weapons grade. Um, Jesus, Yeah, this 836 00:48:54,040 --> 00:48:56,120 Speaker 1: is the bullying, isn't it. Yeah, this is yeah, this 837 00:48:56,200 --> 00:48:58,640 Speaker 1: is the bully kind of just abuse of the of 838 00:48:58,680 --> 00:49:03,759 Speaker 1: the the or YA munitions. It's crazy. And do you 839 00:49:03,760 --> 00:49:08,080 Speaker 1: remember the way Zimmerman got around it was got around 840 00:49:08,080 --> 00:49:12,239 Speaker 1: the restrictions on exporting digital code. He just published the 841 00:49:12,239 --> 00:49:18,800 Speaker 1: details of p GPS as an actual book um freedom. Yeah, yeah, exactly, 842 00:49:19,320 --> 00:49:21,239 Speaker 1: and yes, sort of gotten a lot of it here. 843 00:49:21,880 --> 00:49:26,759 Speaker 1: The charges were eventually dropped. But but does the bullying stop? Yeah, 844 00:49:26,800 --> 00:49:28,560 Speaker 1: I mean it was a good It was I guess 845 00:49:28,560 --> 00:49:31,120 Speaker 1: a good. I guess the US government would have would 846 00:49:31,160 --> 00:49:33,479 Speaker 1: have seen it as a benefit because it says like, look, 847 00:49:33,520 --> 00:49:35,319 Speaker 1: if you're going to if you're going to develop something 848 00:49:35,360 --> 00:49:37,560 Speaker 1: like this, it doesn't matter if it's legal. If we 849 00:49:37,600 --> 00:49:40,040 Speaker 1: don't like it, we will go after you. And the 850 00:49:40,120 --> 00:49:42,560 Speaker 1: question you have to ask yourself is is it worth it? 851 00:49:43,120 --> 00:49:45,480 Speaker 1: You know, even if you don't end up getting charged, 852 00:49:46,520 --> 00:49:49,560 Speaker 1: is it worth having the threat, you know, having Uncle 853 00:49:49,640 --> 00:49:52,520 Speaker 1: Sam kind of looming over you for do have your 854 00:49:52,560 --> 00:49:55,880 Speaker 1: life just be tied up by litigation and court cases. 855 00:49:55,920 --> 00:49:59,960 Speaker 1: It's the same way, you know, certain scrupulous, unscrupulous business 856 00:50:00,040 --> 00:50:03,640 Speaker 1: men just will just litigate you constantly until until you 857 00:50:03,680 --> 00:50:05,680 Speaker 1: don't have any more money. And yeah, and we've seen 858 00:50:05,719 --> 00:50:09,480 Speaker 1: this with with journalists as well speaking out against I think, 859 00:50:09,480 --> 00:50:13,000 Speaker 1: you know a lot of Russians who got sanctioned, um, 860 00:50:13,239 --> 00:50:15,160 Speaker 1: you know, we're a lot of journalists have tried to 861 00:50:15,200 --> 00:50:17,640 Speaker 1: dig into, you know, why some of these Russians are 862 00:50:17,680 --> 00:50:21,080 Speaker 1: so damn rich and have been basically hit with lawsuits, 863 00:50:21,120 --> 00:50:25,839 Speaker 1: you know, British journalists hit by hit with lawsuits by 864 00:50:26,320 --> 00:50:30,080 Speaker 1: British law firms in order to just keep them quiet, 865 00:50:30,760 --> 00:50:32,759 Speaker 1: you know, and and just making when you're when you're 866 00:50:32,800 --> 00:50:35,400 Speaker 1: earning not very much money from being a journalist, and 867 00:50:35,680 --> 00:50:39,719 Speaker 1: it's kind of just kind of becomes a lot less appealing. Yeah, exactly, 868 00:50:39,760 --> 00:50:43,279 Speaker 1: it's it's it's it's it's to gag people. It's pure 869 00:50:43,320 --> 00:50:47,480 Speaker 1: and simple. Now, weirdly enough, or ironically enough, I guess 870 00:50:47,600 --> 00:50:50,640 Speaker 1: that the tools that Fills Zimmim and others helped create 871 00:50:51,080 --> 00:50:54,640 Speaker 1: have basically shaped the e commerce revolution because they were 872 00:50:54,680 --> 00:50:59,400 Speaker 1: looking you know, these these encryption technologies have enabled you know, 873 00:50:59,640 --> 00:51:03,719 Speaker 1: having able people to safely transact online. So really the 874 00:51:03,800 --> 00:51:07,160 Speaker 1: US government was shooting itself in the foot by trying 875 00:51:07,160 --> 00:51:12,200 Speaker 1: to suppress this stuff. But um, you know, it's it's 876 00:51:12,719 --> 00:51:16,320 Speaker 1: it kind of shows you why people like the cipher 877 00:51:16,360 --> 00:51:19,000 Speaker 1: punks were so obsessed with this. It's something that should 878 00:51:19,000 --> 00:51:22,640 Speaker 1: concern us. Concern us all privacy is it's not just 879 00:51:22,760 --> 00:51:26,719 Speaker 1: about keeping you know, keeping prying eyes away, but it's 880 00:51:26,800 --> 00:51:31,520 Speaker 1: it's about human progress, um and and the protection against 881 00:51:31,520 --> 00:51:36,200 Speaker 1: tyrannical governments. Yeah. Absolutely, And by sanctioning tools like Tornado cash, 882 00:51:36,239 --> 00:51:39,480 Speaker 1: the US is kind of setting a pretty dangerous precedent, 883 00:51:39,560 --> 00:51:42,560 Speaker 1: I think. And it's it's putting itself on a path 884 00:51:42,640 --> 00:51:46,040 Speaker 1: to becoming more like China. And we talked about in 885 00:51:46,080 --> 00:51:49,360 Speaker 1: that last episode about cashless society didn't mean how China, 886 00:51:49,480 --> 00:51:53,799 Speaker 1: you know, the surveillance state and how um you know, 887 00:51:54,200 --> 00:51:58,200 Speaker 1: technology is making it that surveillance state even more efficient. 888 00:51:58,920 --> 00:52:03,320 Speaker 1: So yeah, this, this sanctioning of Tornado cash is a 889 00:52:03,400 --> 00:52:07,399 Speaker 1: kind of worrying development. And um yeah, we're gonna look. 890 00:52:07,840 --> 00:52:10,279 Speaker 1: Let's but it has a lot of it has a 891 00:52:10,320 --> 00:52:14,800 Speaker 1: lot more implications for crypto beyond kind of just privacy. 892 00:52:15,320 --> 00:52:16,960 Speaker 1: But let's take a quick break and we'll talk about 893 00:52:17,000 --> 00:52:35,239 Speaker 1: those in thought. Welcome back to part three. Now we're 894 00:52:35,280 --> 00:52:36,640 Speaker 1: we're going to talk a bit. And that was a 895 00:52:36,719 --> 00:52:38,919 Speaker 1: kind of worms. That really was a kind of worms. Yeah, 896 00:52:39,080 --> 00:52:41,759 Speaker 1: there are there are worms everywhere, the worms all over 897 00:52:41,760 --> 00:52:45,840 Speaker 1: the floor, we're going to be picking them up for days. Um, 898 00:52:45,880 --> 00:52:51,080 Speaker 1: is that a dad joke? Is that a joke? There 899 00:52:51,120 --> 00:52:55,920 Speaker 1: we are, so let's talk about let's talk about what 900 00:52:55,960 --> 00:52:59,440 Speaker 1: all this means for crypto. Now, I should start by 901 00:52:59,520 --> 00:53:04,480 Speaker 1: pointing out not everyone thinks privacy and crypto privacy is 902 00:53:04,520 --> 00:53:08,520 Speaker 1: necessarily a good thing. Um. Institutions, for instance, they don't 903 00:53:08,520 --> 00:53:11,240 Speaker 1: really care about it, or rather they want to see 904 00:53:11,719 --> 00:53:15,680 Speaker 1: a crypto a decentralized finance sector that has compliance built in. 905 00:53:15,719 --> 00:53:19,520 Speaker 1: They don't they don't want they want to put an 906 00:53:19,600 --> 00:53:22,439 Speaker 1: end to what one to what one institutional figure put 907 00:53:22,440 --> 00:53:25,840 Speaker 1: it as you know, this kind of cowboy culture in crypto. 908 00:53:26,040 --> 00:53:28,759 Speaker 1: You know, institutions they want to make money and they 909 00:53:28,800 --> 00:53:30,880 Speaker 1: certainly don't want to have to fall foul of governments 910 00:53:30,880 --> 00:53:34,120 Speaker 1: while doing so. And I think you can, I think 911 00:53:34,160 --> 00:53:36,520 Speaker 1: you can say we remember we talked, we touched on 912 00:53:36,560 --> 00:53:39,160 Speaker 1: this when we talked to Nate from crypto Slate a 913 00:53:39,160 --> 00:53:42,239 Speaker 1: few weeks ago. Now, all these kind of hacks and 914 00:53:42,360 --> 00:53:46,040 Speaker 1: exploits that we've seen of various defied protocols, you know, 915 00:53:46,120 --> 00:53:50,480 Speaker 1: of various crypto platforms over the past few months, you know, 916 00:53:50,719 --> 00:53:54,040 Speaker 1: millions and millions of dollars stolen and a lot of 917 00:53:54,080 --> 00:53:58,960 Speaker 1: that launded through places like Tornado Cash and elsewhere. And 918 00:53:58,960 --> 00:54:01,080 Speaker 1: and then you've also got this thing of so many 919 00:54:01,120 --> 00:54:03,520 Speaker 1: of these protocols then actually offer to pay the hacker, 920 00:54:03,640 --> 00:54:05,480 Speaker 1: you know, a fairly generous bounty in a lot of 921 00:54:05,520 --> 00:54:08,239 Speaker 1: the cases that they return it, which I I kind 922 00:54:08,239 --> 00:54:10,000 Speaker 1: of disagree with. I mean, I see why they do it, 923 00:54:10,040 --> 00:54:13,239 Speaker 1: but I disagree with it. But you know, you can 924 00:54:13,280 --> 00:54:16,799 Speaker 1: see from an institutional point of view, from you know, 925 00:54:16,960 --> 00:54:20,040 Speaker 1: from maybe you know, an asset manager or a bank 926 00:54:20,120 --> 00:54:21,879 Speaker 1: or a pension fund or something that wants to invest 927 00:54:21,960 --> 00:54:24,719 Speaker 1: in crypto, that's that's not something they're ever going to 928 00:54:24,760 --> 00:54:28,560 Speaker 1: be comfortable with. So I think they are, you know, 929 00:54:28,719 --> 00:54:31,520 Speaker 1: and they make the point that there should be consequences 930 00:54:31,560 --> 00:54:34,400 Speaker 1: for people who commit such crimes, and I agree with them. 931 00:54:34,400 --> 00:54:35,959 Speaker 1: I don't think you should just be paying them off. 932 00:54:36,239 --> 00:54:38,680 Speaker 1: And I also don't think that anyone really wants their 933 00:54:38,719 --> 00:54:42,200 Speaker 1: stolen crypto being used to fund North Korea's nuclear program, 934 00:54:42,280 --> 00:54:44,840 Speaker 1: which is what the Lazarus Group is, you know, basically 935 00:54:44,880 --> 00:54:47,480 Speaker 1: all about. You know, that's what it exists for. That's 936 00:54:47,480 --> 00:54:50,919 Speaker 1: what I want, actually, that's what you Yeah, yeah, I'm 937 00:54:50,960 --> 00:54:53,560 Speaker 1: all for that. Okay, you think you think a nuclear 938 00:54:53,640 --> 00:54:57,200 Speaker 1: armed North Korea is a good thing. Balances out. Yeah, 939 00:54:57,360 --> 00:55:01,480 Speaker 1: I like a fair fight, a fight where everyone ends 940 00:55:01,520 --> 00:55:05,800 Speaker 1: up dead. Um. But yeah, so a lot of yeah, 941 00:55:05,960 --> 00:55:09,560 Speaker 1: there are there are certainly arguments, you know, arguments against it. 942 00:55:09,600 --> 00:55:11,759 Speaker 1: But I think innocent people should still have the right 943 00:55:11,840 --> 00:55:15,440 Speaker 1: to transact privately. We we lose that right at our peril, 944 00:55:15,840 --> 00:55:18,279 Speaker 1: or perhaps you should. Perhaps another way of looking at 945 00:55:18,280 --> 00:55:22,560 Speaker 1: that is companies and governments shouldn't be able to snoop 946 00:55:22,600 --> 00:55:26,080 Speaker 1: on private citizens going about their business. There should be 947 00:55:26,120 --> 00:55:30,520 Speaker 1: there should be controls against that. Now the really big, 948 00:55:31,880 --> 00:55:34,360 Speaker 1: the other can kind of can of worms has been opened, 949 00:55:34,840 --> 00:55:39,000 Speaker 1: um is in regards to Ethereum. And this is what 950 00:55:39,080 --> 00:55:41,879 Speaker 1: I want to just finish up by talking two point 951 00:55:41,920 --> 00:55:43,400 Speaker 1: oh but when we can't call it that, Yeah, we 952 00:55:43,400 --> 00:55:45,040 Speaker 1: can't call it two point oh. But yeah, as you know, 953 00:55:45,400 --> 00:55:49,880 Speaker 1: Ethereum is in the middle of of a massive network 954 00:55:49,960 --> 00:55:53,000 Speaker 1: upgrade and the next step of that is coming in 955 00:55:53,040 --> 00:55:55,680 Speaker 1: a few weeks time, and that is the merge, which 956 00:55:55,719 --> 00:55:59,040 Speaker 1: is the transition to proof of steak. Now we've talked 957 00:55:59,040 --> 00:56:01,560 Speaker 1: about proof of stake few times before, but just for 958 00:56:01,600 --> 00:56:04,360 Speaker 1: the benefit of anyone new to it, just to remind ourselves. 959 00:56:04,840 --> 00:56:08,799 Speaker 1: When ethereum becomes proof of sake, the network will then 960 00:56:08,840 --> 00:56:13,480 Speaker 1: be secured and transactions will be processed by validators rather 961 00:56:13,560 --> 00:56:16,440 Speaker 1: than miners. Now, a validator is someone who will have 962 00:56:16,520 --> 00:56:19,640 Speaker 1: locked up a certain amount of in order to earn 963 00:56:19,680 --> 00:56:22,600 Speaker 1: the right to process transactions and get the rewards that 964 00:56:22,600 --> 00:56:25,960 Speaker 1: they do that either you know, block rewards or transaction fees. 965 00:56:26,560 --> 00:56:29,280 Speaker 1: And as we know, it's it's similar to a lottery 966 00:56:29,320 --> 00:56:31,400 Speaker 1: system in a way that the more you stake, the 967 00:56:31,440 --> 00:56:34,000 Speaker 1: more tickets you buy, the bigger your chance of winning, 968 00:56:34,080 --> 00:56:37,920 Speaker 1: bigger your chance of being selected. Now, obviously not everyone 969 00:56:38,080 --> 00:56:41,279 Speaker 1: can afford to do this, which means that the control 970 00:56:41,520 --> 00:56:43,960 Speaker 1: of a proof of state network, and you know, the 971 00:56:44,000 --> 00:56:49,279 Speaker 1: control of a few people were fewer. Yeah, yeah, it 972 00:56:49,360 --> 00:56:53,080 Speaker 1: basically is is a centralization issue, and a lot of 973 00:56:53,080 --> 00:56:56,279 Speaker 1: people are very concerned that you know, these big sort 974 00:56:56,280 --> 00:57:01,080 Speaker 1: of validators, these big institutions, could they not limit how 975 00:57:01,200 --> 00:57:03,799 Speaker 1: how like so kind of okay, cool? You can only 976 00:57:03,960 --> 00:57:07,400 Speaker 1: certain people only validate so much they're not you know, 977 00:57:08,080 --> 00:57:10,239 Speaker 1: a ceiling on it. I don't think, I mean, I 978 00:57:10,239 --> 00:57:13,960 Speaker 1: don't encourage more micro validators. Well, I mean there are ways, 979 00:57:14,000 --> 00:57:16,120 Speaker 1: like you can you know, there are a validator. There 980 00:57:16,120 --> 00:57:19,800 Speaker 1: are staking pools you can delegate, you know, ordinary people 981 00:57:19,800 --> 00:57:22,040 Speaker 1: who might you know, let's say you've only got half 982 00:57:22,080 --> 00:57:24,120 Speaker 1: an eath that you want to that you want to stake. 983 00:57:24,400 --> 00:57:25,960 Speaker 1: You know you can do that, and you can, but 984 00:57:26,080 --> 00:57:29,080 Speaker 1: you are obviously earn a fraction small percentage of what 985 00:57:29,160 --> 00:57:32,640 Speaker 1: that steaking pool would would earn from, you know, a 986 00:57:32,680 --> 00:57:39,120 Speaker 1: block reward or whatever. Um. I think limiting limiting you know, 987 00:57:39,800 --> 00:57:42,640 Speaker 1: how many validator nodes a company can run. I think 988 00:57:42,720 --> 00:57:46,280 Speaker 1: that it's difficult nat are essentially because you can just yeah, 989 00:57:46,440 --> 00:57:48,640 Speaker 1: and it's also kind of centralized in its own way. 990 00:57:48,680 --> 00:57:51,479 Speaker 1: You know that who would who would oversee? Who would 991 00:57:51,480 --> 00:57:54,640 Speaker 1: call those shots? Me? You would? Are you putting yourselflessly, 992 00:57:54,680 --> 00:57:57,920 Speaker 1: putting yourself forward? I'll let vitarlic No, I'm sure, I'm 993 00:57:57,920 --> 00:58:01,400 Speaker 1: sure he'd like to hear from you. Um so yeah, 994 00:58:01,440 --> 00:58:03,440 Speaker 1: So there is this, there is this going to be 995 00:58:03,480 --> 00:58:08,480 Speaker 1: this concentration of power into the hands of these validators. Now, 996 00:58:09,000 --> 00:58:13,560 Speaker 1: the concern here is that although validators are incentivized to 997 00:58:13,800 --> 00:58:18,200 Speaker 1: to remain honest, they're incentivized to process transactions properly. They're 998 00:58:18,240 --> 00:58:21,760 Speaker 1: incentivized and not censor transactions, not interfere in any way 999 00:58:22,960 --> 00:58:26,160 Speaker 1: because well, firstly, they're incentivized because you know, they have 1000 00:58:26,680 --> 00:58:30,120 Speaker 1: a literal steak on the network. So if they start acting, 1001 00:58:30,600 --> 00:58:34,280 Speaker 1: you know, dishonestly, then that lowers the value of their 1002 00:58:34,320 --> 00:58:37,120 Speaker 1: steak because it lowers trust in the network. So there's 1003 00:58:37,120 --> 00:58:40,160 Speaker 1: that incentive. There's also I think we've touched on this before, 1004 00:58:40,160 --> 00:58:43,680 Speaker 1: there's also slashing. Now if you're if you're a validator 1005 00:58:43,760 --> 00:58:46,800 Speaker 1: and you're seen to act dishonestly or you're scene to 1006 00:58:46,840 --> 00:58:49,960 Speaker 1: implement you know, you're seemed to interfere in any way, 1007 00:58:50,240 --> 00:58:53,120 Speaker 1: you can have your sum or all of your steak slashed. 1008 00:58:53,480 --> 00:58:56,400 Speaker 1: And that's it. So that is that is well, is 1009 00:58:56,400 --> 00:58:59,360 Speaker 1: a big incentive to behave, to behave well, to behave honestly. 1010 00:59:00,360 --> 00:59:06,800 Speaker 1: Problem is, although these incentives exist, they these validators can 1011 00:59:06,840 --> 00:59:11,000 Speaker 1: still be coerced into doing so. And this is the 1012 00:59:11,040 --> 00:59:13,440 Speaker 1: big worry, and this is what the Tornado cash saga 1013 00:59:13,480 --> 00:59:16,680 Speaker 1: has kind of illustrated. And again, you know, companies like 1014 00:59:16,800 --> 00:59:20,720 Speaker 1: Circle for instance, which run validator nodes, control huge amounts 1015 00:59:20,720 --> 00:59:24,320 Speaker 1: of liquidity. They could be coerced by the US government 1016 00:59:24,360 --> 00:59:28,000 Speaker 1: to in in to implement censorship at the protocol level. 1017 00:59:28,600 --> 00:59:33,560 Speaker 1: And that is there are not enough validators around the 1018 00:59:33,600 --> 00:59:37,600 Speaker 1: world who would be able to so that it wouldn't 1019 00:59:37,640 --> 00:59:40,400 Speaker 1: just grind to a halt or anything like that. I 1020 00:59:40,440 --> 00:59:43,240 Speaker 1: mean there are lots. Yeah, Ethereum certainly does have a 1021 00:59:43,280 --> 00:59:45,960 Speaker 1: lot of validators, you know, it is it is very 1022 00:59:46,040 --> 00:59:50,720 Speaker 1: very decentralized, especially compared to other proof of stake cryptocurrencies. 1023 00:59:51,280 --> 00:59:52,960 Speaker 1: But I think it's you know, you have to look 1024 00:59:53,000 --> 00:59:54,880 Speaker 1: at it as a kind of slippery slope. If if 1025 00:59:54,920 --> 00:59:57,800 Speaker 1: one validator corrupts the network. You know, if one validator 1026 00:59:57,880 --> 01:00:01,920 Speaker 1: is shown to be processing transactions incorrectly or or to 1027 01:00:01,960 --> 01:00:06,920 Speaker 1: be implementing protocol level censorship, then others could you know, 1028 01:00:07,040 --> 01:00:11,320 Speaker 1: could also be influenced to do so. Um And this, 1029 01:00:11,480 --> 01:00:14,040 Speaker 1: you know, this is centralization in a way. This is 1030 01:00:14,560 --> 01:00:17,560 Speaker 1: and this is putting Ethereum in a position where sanctions 1031 01:00:17,600 --> 01:00:21,400 Speaker 1: could be implemented at the protocol level by the US government. 1032 01:00:21,480 --> 01:00:24,840 Speaker 1: Saying to remember companies like Circle or coin base for instance, 1033 01:00:25,080 --> 01:00:28,960 Speaker 1: these are these are US based entities, and again they 1034 01:00:29,640 --> 01:00:33,880 Speaker 1: might not have any choice but to implement censorship, to 1035 01:00:33,880 --> 01:00:37,960 Speaker 1: to interfere at the protocol level. UM. And this puts, 1036 01:00:38,120 --> 01:00:42,320 Speaker 1: you know, the trustlessness, the permissionless nature of the Ethereum 1037 01:00:42,360 --> 01:00:47,000 Speaker 1: network into doubt. And if that's if that is what 1038 01:00:47,040 --> 01:00:50,880 Speaker 1: Ethereum becomes. If Ethereum becomes this network that is controlled 1039 01:00:50,920 --> 01:00:54,520 Speaker 1: by these validators who are themselves influenced by what the 1040 01:00:54,600 --> 01:00:58,480 Speaker 1: US government is telling them to do, then Ethereum will 1041 01:00:58,520 --> 01:01:00,640 Speaker 1: become just another kind of proxy all of the state 1042 01:01:00,720 --> 01:01:03,800 Speaker 1: and no different really from the current financial system because 1043 01:01:03,800 --> 01:01:10,720 Speaker 1: the banks and payment providers are all you are all influenced. Yeah. Yeah, 1044 01:01:10,840 --> 01:01:13,440 Speaker 1: and this is something that the ethereum community is going 1045 01:01:13,480 --> 01:01:15,400 Speaker 1: to have to address, and there are some who are 1046 01:01:15,440 --> 01:01:19,400 Speaker 1: even calling for the merge to be postponed until this 1047 01:01:19,440 --> 01:01:24,880 Speaker 1: problem can be can be sort of solution to that. Yeah, 1048 01:01:25,520 --> 01:01:27,720 Speaker 1: and a few people are kind of speculating that this 1049 01:01:27,760 --> 01:01:30,280 Speaker 1: could be Ethereum's New York moment. Now, I don't I 1050 01:01:30,280 --> 01:01:32,360 Speaker 1: don't remember if I actually mentioned this when we talked 1051 01:01:32,360 --> 01:01:36,360 Speaker 1: about the when we talked about the history of bitcoin. 1052 01:01:36,400 --> 01:01:40,240 Speaker 1: But back in there was something called the New York Agreement, 1053 01:01:40,240 --> 01:01:42,720 Speaker 1: which is where around kind of fifty companies, including some 1054 01:01:42,800 --> 01:01:47,600 Speaker 1: crypto exchanges, got together and tried to get the bitcoin 1055 01:01:47,680 --> 01:01:53,200 Speaker 1: community to increase bitcoin's block size because they reckon that 1056 01:01:53,200 --> 01:01:55,760 Speaker 1: that would make it easier to use and faster, and 1057 01:01:55,960 --> 01:01:59,160 Speaker 1: the bitcoin community said, no, we're not going to do that. 1058 01:01:59,360 --> 01:02:02,080 Speaker 1: We're not going to do what these institutions wants us 1059 01:02:02,080 --> 01:02:04,720 Speaker 1: to do. And you know this retrospectively, this is a 1060 01:02:04,800 --> 01:02:09,160 Speaker 1: huge moment in bitcoins, in bitcoin development because it showed 1061 01:02:09,240 --> 01:02:12,280 Speaker 1: that even though a whole load of powerful institutions have 1062 01:02:12,400 --> 01:02:15,560 Speaker 1: got together to try and influence the network, they weren't. 1063 01:02:15,920 --> 01:02:19,560 Speaker 1: People were prevailed. Yeah, decentralization one out in the end, 1064 01:02:20,320 --> 01:02:23,480 Speaker 1: and there's a there's speculation that this Ethereum could be 1065 01:02:23,520 --> 01:02:26,000 Speaker 1: approaching this sort of moment, you know, and it's up 1066 01:02:26,040 --> 01:02:29,640 Speaker 1: to the Ethereum community, which and I mean by ethereum community, 1067 01:02:29,680 --> 01:02:32,320 Speaker 1: I guess I mean you know developers, you know, both 1068 01:02:32,360 --> 01:02:36,920 Speaker 1: ethereum developers, but also people building on ethereum and users 1069 01:02:36,920 --> 01:02:39,880 Speaker 1: of ethereum as well. You know, they're going to have 1070 01:02:39,920 --> 01:02:43,160 Speaker 1: to decide at some point like how do we how 1071 01:02:43,160 --> 01:02:46,240 Speaker 1: do we push back against this? And one thing that's 1072 01:02:46,240 --> 01:02:49,200 Speaker 1: been suggested is um we've expected you know, a few 1073 01:02:49,200 --> 01:02:52,080 Speaker 1: of us here at Coimbua are speculated on this um. 1074 01:02:52,120 --> 01:02:55,720 Speaker 1: It could be that stake, any stakers, any any validators 1075 01:02:55,760 --> 01:02:59,600 Speaker 1: who implement censorship at the protocol level should automatically have 1076 01:02:59,640 --> 01:03:02,680 Speaker 1: their stay slashed. And this would take the formula this 1077 01:03:02,680 --> 01:03:05,200 Speaker 1: would take the form of any I P and Ethereum 1078 01:03:05,240 --> 01:03:09,280 Speaker 1: improvement proposal. So it could be that someone you know 1079 01:03:09,320 --> 01:03:11,320 Speaker 1: proposes this and A and A change is going to 1080 01:03:11,400 --> 01:03:12,640 Speaker 1: do that. It's going to be costly and it's not 1081 01:03:12,680 --> 01:03:15,960 Speaker 1: gonna work anyway. It would be difficult. It would be difficult, 1082 01:03:16,120 --> 01:03:19,360 Speaker 1: but it may be more problem solved. Cool, Yeah, we 1083 01:03:19,360 --> 01:03:23,040 Speaker 1: can go ahead. And it's interesting because like Brian Armstrong, 1084 01:03:23,520 --> 01:03:25,840 Speaker 1: the coin based CEO, he's come out and said that 1085 01:03:25,880 --> 01:03:28,640 Speaker 1: he would rather coin base didn't stake at all than 1086 01:03:28,720 --> 01:03:33,160 Speaker 1: be forced to implement protocol level censorship, which is I mean, 1087 01:03:33,520 --> 01:03:36,600 Speaker 1: which is really great to hear. It's it's good to 1088 01:03:36,680 --> 01:03:39,560 Speaker 1: understand people at the top are echoing the sort of 1089 01:03:39,600 --> 01:03:43,840 Speaker 1: sentiments of all the concerns of a large weight of 1090 01:03:43,880 --> 01:03:47,080 Speaker 1: the ethereum community. Yeah, yeah, you know, people like him, 1091 01:03:47,120 --> 01:03:49,720 Speaker 1: They understand what ethereum is trying to do. They understand 1092 01:03:49,720 --> 01:03:53,200 Speaker 1: that ethereum is not about being. And maybe there's tornado 1093 01:03:54,880 --> 01:03:59,120 Speaker 1: fac up is a is a sort of warning shot. Yeah, 1094 01:03:59,280 --> 01:04:01,960 Speaker 1: that was necessarious. So maybe they shot themselves in the foot. 1095 01:04:02,440 --> 01:04:04,919 Speaker 1: It could be, it could be. Certainly, I think it's 1096 01:04:04,920 --> 01:04:07,360 Speaker 1: made that it's made the whole ethereum and kind of 1097 01:04:07,360 --> 01:04:10,160 Speaker 1: wider crypto community very much aware of what is at 1098 01:04:10,200 --> 01:04:13,720 Speaker 1: stake here um. But you know, having said that, there 1099 01:04:13,800 --> 01:04:16,480 Speaker 1: is money to be made from being a validator, so 1100 01:04:17,760 --> 01:04:20,320 Speaker 1: you know, it remains to be seen. But I think 1101 01:04:20,360 --> 01:04:23,880 Speaker 1: Ethereum is that a is that a kind of bit 1102 01:04:23,920 --> 01:04:27,080 Speaker 1: of a crossroads at the moment. And obviously it's undergoing 1103 01:04:27,120 --> 01:04:30,920 Speaker 1: this huge move across you knowing moving the changes that 1104 01:04:30,960 --> 01:04:37,320 Speaker 1: Ethereum is trying to implement are huge. Yeah. So in conclusion, 1105 01:04:37,360 --> 01:04:39,680 Speaker 1: I guess privacy is something you've got to get ready 1106 01:04:39,720 --> 01:04:43,800 Speaker 1: to hear a lot more about because it's almost certain 1107 01:04:43,840 --> 01:04:45,920 Speaker 1: that governments are going to try and a road privacy 1108 01:04:45,960 --> 01:04:49,200 Speaker 1: further in crypto and elsewhere. They're going to keep they're 1109 01:04:49,200 --> 01:04:52,760 Speaker 1: going to keep doing it because it's about control, you know. UM, 1110 01:04:52,840 --> 01:04:55,680 Speaker 1: And we've got other technologies. It's not just crypto, you know, 1111 01:04:55,720 --> 01:04:59,760 Speaker 1: we've got other technologies, things like AI facial recognition being 1112 01:05:00,160 --> 01:05:04,360 Speaker 1: is to fight to fight against personal privacy um. And 1113 01:05:04,400 --> 01:05:06,480 Speaker 1: again going back to something that we touched on in 1114 01:05:06,840 --> 01:05:10,080 Speaker 1: the discussion about the cash list society, we've also got 1115 01:05:10,080 --> 01:05:14,000 Speaker 1: things like central bank digital currency cmdcs attacking the the 1116 01:05:14,000 --> 01:05:18,480 Speaker 1: the the market place leaders and then introduce your own one. Yeah, Yeah, 1117 01:05:18,680 --> 01:05:21,120 Speaker 1: and obviously this this form of this form of central 1118 01:05:21,120 --> 01:05:26,240 Speaker 1: bank issued cash, central bank issued money that is very 1119 01:05:26,360 --> 01:05:28,720 Speaker 1: very easy to trace. That's the kind of control that 1120 01:05:29,120 --> 01:05:31,680 Speaker 1: that government's dream of. And it is happening. You know, 1121 01:05:31,760 --> 01:05:34,320 Speaker 1: It's happening in places like China, and if we're not careful, 1122 01:05:34,800 --> 01:05:38,480 Speaker 1: it will happen in more so called liberal democracies like 1123 01:05:38,520 --> 01:05:42,000 Speaker 1: ours as well. So yeah, that's why I wanted to 1124 01:05:42,040 --> 01:05:44,480 Speaker 1: talk a bit about privacy today, you know, privacy and 1125 01:05:44,480 --> 01:05:46,800 Speaker 1: crypto and privacy in general, because I think as you say, 1126 01:05:46,880 --> 01:05:49,959 Speaker 1: this Tornado cash business, which is still ongoing, there's there's 1127 01:05:50,000 --> 01:05:52,440 Speaker 1: there's certainly going to be a lot more developments in 1128 01:05:52,520 --> 01:05:56,000 Speaker 1: that in that story as we go on. But yeah, 1129 01:05:56,080 --> 01:05:59,000 Speaker 1: it really has thrown into perspective just what is at 1130 01:05:59,040 --> 01:06:03,000 Speaker 1: stake and you know what this means for crypto and 1131 01:06:03,640 --> 01:06:05,720 Speaker 1: you know how much of an issue privacy is. And 1132 01:06:05,760 --> 01:06:07,560 Speaker 1: I think, you know, people are always talking about, well, 1133 01:06:07,560 --> 01:06:09,200 Speaker 1: what are we going to be the next big trends 1134 01:06:09,240 --> 01:06:11,560 Speaker 1: in crypto? What's you know, what's going to be? What 1135 01:06:11,600 --> 01:06:13,120 Speaker 1: do we want to be talking about in the next 1136 01:06:13,440 --> 01:06:17,480 Speaker 1: ballmarkets say? And I think privacy could be a big one. 1137 01:06:18,360 --> 01:06:20,600 Speaker 1: I think more and more people are going to are 1138 01:06:20,640 --> 01:06:22,600 Speaker 1: going to realize that, you know, they have to take 1139 01:06:23,040 --> 01:06:26,600 Speaker 1: some sort of steps to to take control of their 1140 01:06:26,600 --> 01:06:28,800 Speaker 1: own personal privacy, because I think it's one of those 1141 01:06:28,840 --> 01:06:31,760 Speaker 1: things that once it's gone, once you've lost it, you can't. Yeah. 1142 01:06:31,760 --> 01:06:34,920 Speaker 1: It's it's like the like they said with you know, 1143 01:06:35,160 --> 01:06:37,360 Speaker 1: during the whole sickness that we had over the last 1144 01:06:37,400 --> 01:06:41,640 Speaker 1: two years, of these government sort of other reaches are 1145 01:06:41,680 --> 01:06:45,280 Speaker 1: not going to be rolled back. Yeah, very very true. 1146 01:06:45,360 --> 01:06:48,080 Speaker 1: And I mean yeah, I think I think it's the 1147 01:06:48,080 --> 01:06:49,760 Speaker 1: same kind of I think the same kind of thing 1148 01:06:49,800 --> 01:06:52,000 Speaker 1: with inflation as well. It's like all these prices are 1149 01:06:52,040 --> 01:06:57,120 Speaker 1: going up then not you know, even when you know, 1150 01:06:57,200 --> 01:07:01,560 Speaker 1: the sort of all starts flowing again, will these big 1151 01:07:01,600 --> 01:07:05,320 Speaker 1: corporations reflect that and yeah, hey guys are going to 1152 01:07:05,400 --> 01:07:07,920 Speaker 1: cut the price. Well that was a bit much, wasn't it. 1153 01:07:07,960 --> 01:07:10,920 Speaker 1: Don't worry. Yeah, I mean yeah, it's it's a scary 1154 01:07:10,960 --> 01:07:14,160 Speaker 1: thought because you know, it's it shows how much power 1155 01:07:14,640 --> 01:07:18,440 Speaker 1: corporations have, and privacy is one of the few ways 1156 01:07:18,480 --> 01:07:20,440 Speaker 1: that you can that you can push back against that. 1157 01:07:20,640 --> 01:07:28,240 Speaker 1: So yeah, use so another cheery episode. Okay, thanks everyone, 1158 01:07:28,320 --> 01:07:31,080 Speaker 1: we'll be back. We might be I think we're going 1159 01:07:31,120 --> 01:07:33,640 Speaker 1: to take a little bit of a hiatus and because 1160 01:07:33,640 --> 01:07:36,000 Speaker 1: I'm on my travels a bit, but we will be back, 1161 01:07:37,000 --> 01:07:42,640 Speaker 1: so don't you go anywhere. Alrighty bye. Thank you so 1162 01:07:42,720 --> 01:07:45,400 Speaker 1: much for listening to the coin Bureau podcast. If you'd 1163 01:07:45,400 --> 01:07:48,200 Speaker 1: like to learn more about cryptocurrency, you can visit our 1164 01:07:48,280 --> 01:07:52,080 Speaker 1: YouTube channel at YouTube dot com forward slash coin Bureau. 1165 01:07:52,200 --> 01:07:54,240 Speaker 1: You can also go to coin bureau dot com for 1166 01:07:54,320 --> 01:07:57,520 Speaker 1: loads more information about all things crypto. You can follow 1167 01:07:57,560 --> 01:08:00,120 Speaker 1: me on Twitter at coin bureau or one word, and 1168 01:08:00,160 --> 01:08:03,680 Speaker 1: I'm also active on TikTok and Instagram as well. First 1169 01:08:03,720 --> 01:08:06,720 Speaker 1: of all, it's not thank you for listening, You're welcome 1170 01:08:07,040 --> 01:08:11,400 Speaker 1: for great content. Yeah, Like this is free and they're 1171 01:08:11,480 --> 01:08:15,360 Speaker 1: learning about a fairly great topic in a non boring way. 1172 01:08:15,720 --> 01:08:18,080 Speaker 1: If you'd like to visit me and hear more about me, 1173 01:08:18,760 --> 01:08:21,360 Speaker 1: go to mooch about, m O O C H A 1174 01:08:21,520 --> 01:08:34,680 Speaker 1: B O U T or else. For more podcasts from 1175 01:08:34,680 --> 01:08:38,520 Speaker 1: I Heart Radio, visit the I heart Radio app, Apple Podcasts, 1176 01:08:38,720 --> 01:08:49,559 Speaker 1: or wherever we get your podcasts. The coin Gera podcast 1177 01:08:49,720 --> 01:09:13,880 Speaker 1: is a production of I Heart Radio