WEBVTT - Nouriel Roubini Sees A Bad Recovery, Then Inflation, Then A Depression

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<v Speaker 1>Hello, and welcome to another episode of the Thoughts Podcast.

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<v Speaker 1>I'm Tracy Allaway and I'm Joe. WI isn't thal So, Joe,

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<v Speaker 1>you know all those economic recovery shape letters that everyone's

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<v Speaker 1>talking about. Yes, W V U, L lowercase v M,

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<v Speaker 1>the square root sign. OK, I've seen them all. There's

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<v Speaker 1>some really esoteric ones out there. So what do you

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<v Speaker 1>think is the most sort of parish out of all

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<v Speaker 1>those shapes or letters or symbols or whatever. That's a

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<v Speaker 1>good question. I mean probably I guess the L or

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<v Speaker 1>the U something like that. I mean anything that doesn't

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<v Speaker 1>isn't premised on there being some sort of snap by. Also,

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<v Speaker 1>maybe just the eye just as straight letter down, they

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<v Speaker 1>just never never comes back. I suppose that's a possibility

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<v Speaker 1>to that people don't talk about. I'm glad you said

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<v Speaker 1>I so, I actually hadn't heard that many people talking

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<v Speaker 1>about this letter. But yes, there is an eye shaped

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<v Speaker 1>economic recovery which is a straight line going down. So

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<v Speaker 1>it's really not an economic recovery at all. And um,

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<v Speaker 1>it's probably the most parish of all the forecast. And

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<v Speaker 1>the person we're going to speak to today is someone

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<v Speaker 1>who has written about that. I possibility yes, so, um,

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<v Speaker 1>I'm looking forward to our talk today. It's someone who's

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<v Speaker 1>going to be very well known to our audience who

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<v Speaker 1>in the past, and I don't even know if it's

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<v Speaker 1>rightly or wrongly. I'm not even sure where he uh

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<v Speaker 1>if he always embraced the nickname, but nonetheless his nickname

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<v Speaker 1>doctor Doom became many people would have heard it during

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<v Speaker 1>the last crisis. Yeah, and I think as soon as

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<v Speaker 1>you say the name doctor Doom, everyone knows who we're

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<v Speaker 1>going to be talking about. But it's Neureal Rubini, the

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<v Speaker 1>chairman of Rubini Macro Associates, and he's known well, he's

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<v Speaker 1>known for forecasting the previous financial crisis back in two

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<v Speaker 1>thousand eight, but he's also known for pretty bearish prognostications.

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<v Speaker 1>And uh, it's been very parish of late, has it not.

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<v Speaker 1>Things have not been great, So I guess I would

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<v Speaker 1>say that that is a safe call. Alright, understatement of

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<v Speaker 1>the year. Okay, Well, without further ado, then let's bring

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<v Speaker 1>on neur Real Rubini. Neurial, it's so great to have you,

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<v Speaker 1>thanks so much for coming on the show. Great to

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<v Speaker 1>being with you today. It's a pleasure, so Neurial, Joe

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<v Speaker 1>and I were sort of joking just then, But you

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<v Speaker 1>do have the Doctor Doom moniker. Do you feel I

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<v Speaker 1>guess vindicated isn't the right word given current events, But

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<v Speaker 1>do you feel that you are living up to that

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<v Speaker 1>doom reputation? Well, usually I say that I'm doctor really

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<v Speaker 1>is not Dr Doom. If you look at the last decades,

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<v Speaker 1>I have not been negative all the time. Whether a

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<v Speaker 1>risk of episodes, I pointed them out. When there was

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<v Speaker 1>economic and market recovery, I pointed it out as well.

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<v Speaker 1>So it's not as if I'm permanently at perma bear.

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<v Speaker 1>I think that would be a mischaracterization of my views. Um,

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<v Speaker 1>so call me Dr Realists. Something I'm curious about is,

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<v Speaker 1>you know, we see these economists forecast right now. They're like, okay,

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<v Speaker 1>Q two GDP is going to plunge, and then maybe

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<v Speaker 1>we'll have a small recovery in Q three, and then

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<v Speaker 1>maybe we'll have a real bust recovery keyboard, whatever it is,

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<v Speaker 1>How do you go about the process of making a

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<v Speaker 1>recovery forecast? How does anyone while separating them that recovery

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<v Speaker 1>from the policy response, Because of course we got the

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<v Speaker 1>Cars Act at the end of March, and that probably

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<v Speaker 1>helps slow down the crash somewhat, But it seems hard

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<v Speaker 1>to make any sort of forecas usked about Q four

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<v Speaker 1>or Q one of next year without having of you

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<v Speaker 1>on how robust uh the policy response from both the

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<v Speaker 1>Fed and fiscal authorities will continue to be throughout the

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<v Speaker 1>course of this year. Well, usually when there is a recession,

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<v Speaker 1>it's very hard to make a forecast about the length

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<v Speaker 1>of it, and the shape of the recovery by definition,

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<v Speaker 1>is a change in regime, and even traditional economic forecasting

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<v Speaker 1>models essentially break down because those models don't tend to

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<v Speaker 1>predict recessions. So once you are in a recession or

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<v Speaker 1>financial crisis, you have to ask yourself in a more

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<v Speaker 1>i would say qualitative way rather than a quantitative one,

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<v Speaker 1>what is going to be in the shape of the

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<v Speaker 1>economic recovery. So, for example, you know, I wrote a

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<v Speaker 1>recent paper with my global economic outlook with my research colleagues,

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<v Speaker 1>and we argued that there are three scenarios. One is

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<v Speaker 1>what we call the greater recession will be more like

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<v Speaker 1>a YOU shape coovery. Second one is a downside scenario

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<v Speaker 1>quality depression as shaped. And then there is a upside

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<v Speaker 1>scenario of a V shape recovery. Now, markets for the

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<v Speaker 1>last few weeks, especially US equities, seem to be pricing

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<v Speaker 1>a V shaped recovery in that paper, and a lot

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<v Speaker 1>of time to go on every point of it. But

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<v Speaker 1>we present about fourteen separate factors why we believe that

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<v Speaker 1>the recover is going to be YOU shaped rather than

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<v Speaker 1>V shaped. Now, those predictions are not based on a

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<v Speaker 1>formal econometric models, because by definition those forecasting models are

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<v Speaker 1>useless when we are in the depth of recession. But

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<v Speaker 1>you're trying to understand what's going to be the economic

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<v Speaker 1>dynamic of the behavior of the private sector, households and corporates,

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<v Speaker 1>what's going to be the policy response, And of course

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<v Speaker 1>any prediction you make on the shape of the recovery

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<v Speaker 1>of economies and markets depends on the policy response. We

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<v Speaker 1>know a lot of the policy response, how strong it

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<v Speaker 1>has been in the United States, are strong, but not

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<v Speaker 1>as strong in Europe and Japan more constraining emerging markets.

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<v Speaker 1>So an economic forecast, of course makes also predictions about

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<v Speaker 1>the policy pat monetary policy, fiscal policy, credit policy, regulatory

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<v Speaker 1>policy in this case of course help policy, because we

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<v Speaker 1>have to decide how fast or how slowly to reopen

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<v Speaker 1>and you feed that one into your essentially model in

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<v Speaker 1>terms of predicting the shape of the recovery. So certainly

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<v Speaker 1>the shape of the recovery is not independent from the

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<v Speaker 1>policy response, and you can make sense of that policy response.

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<v Speaker 1>We we're already front loaded in one month in terms

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<v Speaker 1>of unconventional amountary fiscal policy. What it took about three

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<v Speaker 1>years during the global financial crisis to occur. The entire

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<v Speaker 1>tool kit of unconventional tools that affect created between two

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<v Speaker 1>thousand and seven thousand and nine have been redeployed in

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<v Speaker 1>less than amounts because were there and they were available,

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<v Speaker 1>and they made the decision of of going in front

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<v Speaker 1>clothing and they created even new ones, like, for example,

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<v Speaker 1>purchasing corporate bonds is something that the fact did not

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<v Speaker 1>do during the global financial crisis, And not only the

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<v Speaker 1>started to purchase high grade investment grade, but they've also

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<v Speaker 1>now gone into willingness to purchase hid something they might

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<v Speaker 1>do is very risky, but changes completely, for example, the

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<v Speaker 1>dynamic of the recovery of spread products, including corporate bonds

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<v Speaker 1>high grade than yield. I want to dig into the

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<v Speaker 1>central pink response, but before we do, if we zoom

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<v Speaker 1>in on the US and talk about your forecast, which

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<v Speaker 1>is this U shaped recovery sort of length the road

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<v Speaker 1>back to economic health. What do you think is the

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<v Speaker 1>biggest factor in driving that scenario. Is it health policy

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<v Speaker 1>or is it economic and monetary policy? I guess another

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<v Speaker 1>way of asking that question is whether or not economic

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<v Speaker 1>and monetary policy can fully offset the impact of the coronavirus. Well,

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<v Speaker 1>I do take the policy respond as being very aggressive

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<v Speaker 1>both monetary credit and physical and that everything else equal

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<v Speaker 1>is positive for making sure that this recession is only

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<v Speaker 1>two quarters Q and and Q two and then there

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<v Speaker 1>is a recovery. But I think that there are many

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<v Speaker 1>factors that lead me to essentially express the view that

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<v Speaker 1>my baseline said sixty percent probability is a U shaped recovery,

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<v Speaker 1>and I signed only a twenty percent probability to the

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<v Speaker 1>V shaped recovery of the economy. The markets is a

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<v Speaker 1>different story. I think the main factors that would point

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<v Speaker 1>out are that on the health side, we know there's

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<v Speaker 1>going to be a second wave. The second wave could

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<v Speaker 1>occur already in July and August, depending on how fast

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<v Speaker 1>we reopen, and there is a temptation to reopen to

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<v Speaker 1>fast Cyconly, there will be another second wave or a

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<v Speaker 1>third wave in the winter when we are not going

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<v Speaker 1>to get a vaccine, and when the cold weather comes back,

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<v Speaker 1>we're gonna have it again. How severe is going to be,

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<v Speaker 1>we don't know, but we don't we know there's not

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<v Speaker 1>gonna be a vaccine by then, and depending on how

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<v Speaker 1>much we flattered the curve, it could be severe or

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<v Speaker 1>less severe. But I think that the fundamental reason why

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<v Speaker 1>I believe it's going to be you is that you

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<v Speaker 1>have two critical agents in the economy in the private sector,

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<v Speaker 1>households and corporations, and both of them are going to

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<v Speaker 1>be stressed. The household sector is going to be in

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<v Speaker 1>a situation which is effectively millions of people that have

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<v Speaker 1>lost jobs. Even when there is a reopening, many of

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<v Speaker 1>them are not going to regain their jobs, or if

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<v Speaker 1>there again, their jobs are going to be part time jobs,

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<v Speaker 1>in formal workers, gig workers, contractors, so their income generation

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<v Speaker 1>is going to be much weaker. So you have consumers

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<v Speaker 1>that are one shell shocked, two they're still scared of

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<v Speaker 1>the virus. Three their income challenged for their asset crashed.

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<v Speaker 1>Five their burden with a huge amount of that mortgages,

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<v Speaker 1>auto loans, student loans, consumer loans, credit cards, and anybody

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<v Speaker 1>sensible should be more precautionary in their consumption and saving behavior. Right,

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<v Speaker 1>there will be a massive increase in a precautionary savings

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<v Speaker 1>for any level of income. And your income is going

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<v Speaker 1>to be certain lower than before. So you have lower income,

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<v Speaker 1>you spend less, you save more. Why do you save

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<v Speaker 1>more because you know of us households allegedly have less

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<v Speaker 1>than four hundred dollars of cash in the case of

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<v Speaker 1>an emergency. So after what has happened, with the risk

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<v Speaker 1>of another shock coming from the corona, you're losing your job,

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<v Speaker 1>not regaining it. Better safe rather than sorry. So I

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<v Speaker 1>expect that the savings rate of the household sector is

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<v Speaker 1>going to be sharply up, and the investment of the

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<v Speaker 1>household sector, what's investment for household is purchases of homes

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<v Speaker 1>is going to be sharply down. Moved you own to

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<v Speaker 1>buy a home, you know, even with the lower mortgage rates,

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<v Speaker 1>and your credit score is going to be worse. So

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<v Speaker 1>you have higher saving your lower investment for households. Same

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<v Speaker 1>story for the corporate sector. The corporate sector, as we know,

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<v Speaker 1>was highly leveraged, leverage rational we have not seen in

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<v Speaker 1>the last forty years. For the corporate sector. This is

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<v Speaker 1>an accident waiting to happen, and every corporate will have

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<v Speaker 1>to survive reduce leverage. How you survive by reducing leverage

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<v Speaker 1>by cutting costs, labor costs and other costs. So you

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<v Speaker 1>have to increase your saving rate and you have to

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<v Speaker 1>cut on your capax option value of waiting. Right, there's

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<v Speaker 1>a lot of capacity. You don't know how recovery is

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<v Speaker 1>going to be, so you're gonna have an increasing savings

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<v Speaker 1>of the corporate reduction of capax. So the financial balances

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<v Speaker 1>of both households and corporates is the difference between their

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<v Speaker 1>savings and the investment. And they're going to improve improve

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<v Speaker 1>because they have to save more and they have to

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<v Speaker 1>cut spending on capax on residential While that's individually rational

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<v Speaker 1>in equilibrium, higher saving and lower investment means that depressed

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<v Speaker 1>economic recovery, even if the physical authority and even the

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<v Speaker 1>monitory authority are doing monitoring physical stamuls. So you have

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<v Speaker 1>one positive coming from the policy, but the deleveraging thes

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<v Speaker 1>to curve in the private sector leads you to this thing. Now,

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<v Speaker 1>during the global financial crisis, the households were highly leveraged,

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<v Speaker 1>and that this deleveraging. But the corporates were not as

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<v Speaker 1>leverage this time around. With high leverage of corporate and

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<v Speaker 1>high leverage of households, so both of them have to

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<v Speaker 1>be leveraged by increasing savings reducing investment. That's a recipe

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<v Speaker 1>for a you shaped recovery. There are many other factors,

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<v Speaker 1>but that's a key argument. But why it's going to

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<v Speaker 1>be a you rather than a V And I think

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<v Speaker 1>it makes a compelling argument when you talk about sort

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<v Speaker 1>of the quasitive behavioral ramifications of this. So households will

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<v Speaker 1>have just watched their incomes vanish at a shocking speed,

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<v Speaker 1>same with corporate revenues. Are there other periods in the past,

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<v Speaker 1>either specific economic events in US or global history, that

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<v Speaker 1>show how sudden shocks to the economy leave lasting changes

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<v Speaker 1>in business or household inclination to in to spend well.

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<v Speaker 1>The difference between this recession and all the other ones

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<v Speaker 1>is that even the Global Financial Crisis, even the Great

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<v Speaker 1>Depression were slow motion train wreck. It took three years

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<v Speaker 1>for output to fall this match for an employmenty to

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<v Speaker 1>go these up, for stock market to fall, fift for

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<v Speaker 1>credit spreads to rise you know at you know, double

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<v Speaker 1>digit levels and so on and so on. This kind

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<v Speaker 1>of a shock instead is like an asteroid hitting Planet

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<v Speaker 1>Heard and not just one country but the entire world

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<v Speaker 1>and shutting down economic activities. So we have never had

0:13:32.760 --> 0:13:36.840
<v Speaker 1>this experiment. We've had experiments, of course, of asolated cases.

0:13:36.920 --> 0:13:39.680
<v Speaker 1>There is a hurricane, you know, in Puerto Rico or

0:13:39.720 --> 0:13:42.600
<v Speaker 1>in somewhere in the Caribbean, or a major natural disaster.

0:13:42.720 --> 0:13:45.920
<v Speaker 1>Of course you have that shock limited to that particular

0:13:46.400 --> 0:13:49.720
<v Speaker 1>you know, region of the world or town or whatever,

0:13:50.040 --> 0:13:52.680
<v Speaker 1>and you have those dynamics of course of a massive

0:13:52.920 --> 0:13:55.880
<v Speaker 1>shock that this economic and financial and otherwise. But this

0:13:56.000 --> 0:13:59.920
<v Speaker 1>is something that's pretty much Planet Heard, so it's very different.

0:14:00.040 --> 0:14:04.080
<v Speaker 1>But even if it's different, you can make inferences intelligently

0:14:04.200 --> 0:14:07.480
<v Speaker 1>based on economic behavior and the dynamic of what's happening

0:14:07.520 --> 0:14:10.360
<v Speaker 1>to income, to jobs and so on. They're gonna lead

0:14:10.400 --> 0:14:13.520
<v Speaker 1>you to understand what's the shape of the recovery. I mean,

0:14:13.520 --> 0:14:16.600
<v Speaker 1>there was already after the global financials, an example, a

0:14:16.600 --> 0:14:20.760
<v Speaker 1>tendency for firms not to hire full time workers with

0:14:20.880 --> 0:14:24.840
<v Speaker 1>full benefits right those jobs were gradually going away. Was

0:14:24.880 --> 0:14:30.200
<v Speaker 1>all gig workers, part time workers, contractors, freelancers, our workers,

0:14:30.280 --> 0:14:33.040
<v Speaker 1>and so on and so on. Given the shock has occurred,

0:14:33.080 --> 0:14:35.680
<v Speaker 1>right now, we know that twenty six billion Americans have

0:14:35.800 --> 0:14:38.160
<v Speaker 1>lost their jobs. Probably at the peak is going to

0:14:38.200 --> 0:14:41.760
<v Speaker 1>be more like thirty five million people. These people are

0:14:41.760 --> 0:14:43.600
<v Speaker 1>not going to get their jobs back. I mean, I

0:14:43.680 --> 0:14:46.760
<v Speaker 1>live in New York City. Take anybody who worked in

0:14:46.880 --> 0:14:49.800
<v Speaker 1>a restaurant or in hospitality and so on. Even when

0:14:49.840 --> 0:14:53.560
<v Speaker 1>you reopen a restaurant, you'll be back in in rent

0:14:53.640 --> 0:14:56.280
<v Speaker 1>by three months, four months. You have to pay back.

0:14:56.440 --> 0:14:58.920
<v Speaker 1>They're not going to cancel it. You'll have to have

0:14:58.960 --> 0:15:03.920
<v Speaker 1>every other table empty for security. And these restaurants live

0:15:03.960 --> 0:15:06.520
<v Speaker 1>on a margin of you know, five time percent. There

0:15:06.600 --> 0:15:08.400
<v Speaker 1>is no way half of the old restaurants in New

0:15:08.480 --> 0:15:10.920
<v Speaker 1>York are gonna be gone for good. Half of the

0:15:10.920 --> 0:15:13.240
<v Speaker 1>retail stores in New York and will be gone for good.

0:15:13.520 --> 0:15:15.520
<v Speaker 1>Even if there is a reopening of these things, the

0:15:15.640 --> 0:15:18.480
<v Speaker 1>opening means nothing. There was an article yesterday in the

0:15:18.520 --> 0:15:21.760
<v Speaker 1>Financial Time saying that they reopened all the shops in Berlin.

0:15:22.160 --> 0:15:25.720
<v Speaker 1>By the way, in Germany they heat too. Income has

0:15:25.720 --> 0:15:28.440
<v Speaker 1>been much less because we're not firing everybody. That this

0:15:28.520 --> 0:15:32.160
<v Speaker 1>system of sharing, right, so you have not had mass unemployment.

0:15:32.400 --> 0:15:35.120
<v Speaker 1>So the stores are open and nobody's going there because

0:15:35.120 --> 0:15:38.200
<v Speaker 1>everybody's scared and everybody's worried about their future. It was

0:15:38.240 --> 0:15:41.200
<v Speaker 1>gonna buy a car, who's gonna buy a home, Who's

0:15:41.240 --> 0:15:43.440
<v Speaker 1>gonna take a vacation, Who's gonna go on an airplane,

0:15:43.520 --> 0:15:46.160
<v Speaker 1>who's gonna take a cruise? I mean, these are changes

0:15:46.400 --> 0:15:49.000
<v Speaker 1>that regardless of where they opened. A close a store,

0:15:49.400 --> 0:15:51.480
<v Speaker 1>or an airplane or a cruise ship are going to

0:15:51.640 --> 0:15:54.600
<v Speaker 1>change behavior. The issue is not whether we reopen, but

0:15:54.720 --> 0:15:57.600
<v Speaker 1>once we're reopened, whether they're gonna show up. In my view,

0:15:57.760 --> 0:16:00.720
<v Speaker 1>most people are not gonna show up. What does that

0:16:00.800 --> 0:16:04.240
<v Speaker 1>imply for inflation? Because on the one hand, you have

0:16:04.320 --> 0:16:08.000
<v Speaker 1>people who are probably saving more and spending less you

0:16:08.080 --> 0:16:10.600
<v Speaker 1>put it. But on the other hand, you have central

0:16:10.600 --> 0:16:13.400
<v Speaker 1>banks who are sort of throwing the kitchen sink and

0:16:13.480 --> 0:16:16.520
<v Speaker 1>everything right now, and some people are even talking about

0:16:16.560 --> 0:16:20.360
<v Speaker 1>debt monetization. So how do you see net net inflation

0:16:20.400 --> 0:16:25.680
<v Speaker 1>shaping up? Well, last November, before this crisis even was

0:16:25.800 --> 0:16:29.160
<v Speaker 1>on the horizon, I wrote a long paper saying, if

0:16:29.200 --> 0:16:33.560
<v Speaker 1>and when the next recession will occur, monetary and physical

0:16:33.600 --> 0:16:37.680
<v Speaker 1>policy is going to become even more unconventional and I said, effectively,

0:16:37.920 --> 0:16:41.720
<v Speaker 1>we're gonna have a monetization of large physical deficits, what

0:16:41.840 --> 0:16:47.160
<v Speaker 1>people call otherwise modern monetary theory melicopter drop of money

0:16:47.280 --> 0:16:50.720
<v Speaker 1>or people's kew ee, or the new euphemism that people

0:16:50.760 --> 0:16:55.560
<v Speaker 1>like Bernanco Stan Fisher uses coordination of monetary physical policies.

0:16:55.600 --> 0:16:59.520
<v Speaker 1>So what's clear that once a recession occurs, policymaker cannot

0:16:59.520 --> 0:17:02.600
<v Speaker 1>sit there doing nothing, pretending they don't have the policy bullets.

0:17:02.720 --> 0:17:05.000
<v Speaker 1>And we're seeing it. We've had now budget deficit in

0:17:05.040 --> 0:17:07.760
<v Speaker 1>the US are going to be twenty of GDP, and

0:17:07.800 --> 0:17:10.680
<v Speaker 1>the FACT is saying unlimited qui. And this morning the

0:17:10.760 --> 0:17:13.440
<v Speaker 1>BJ is saying unlimited qui, and the c B is

0:17:13.480 --> 0:17:16.000
<v Speaker 1>not yet saying unlimited qui, but they're gonna soon be

0:17:16.040 --> 0:17:19.680
<v Speaker 1>a unlimited Q. So you have massive monetization of physical deficits.

0:17:19.840 --> 0:17:23.040
<v Speaker 1>So we're going even more unconventional now. In the short run,

0:17:23.560 --> 0:17:28.879
<v Speaker 1>this shock is a recessionary and is leading to deflation

0:17:29.040 --> 0:17:31.760
<v Speaker 1>because while there is a supply shock, the shock to

0:17:31.840 --> 0:17:33.879
<v Speaker 1>agree with the man is bigger. And then you have

0:17:33.920 --> 0:17:37.640
<v Speaker 1>a massive slack in goods market, tons of capacity machines

0:17:37.800 --> 0:17:40.520
<v Speaker 1>that are not working, and tons of people, tens of

0:17:40.600 --> 0:17:43.840
<v Speaker 1>millions who are not working, so that is deflationary in

0:17:43.880 --> 0:17:48.400
<v Speaker 1>the short run, and therefore monetizing physical deficit prevents one

0:17:48.800 --> 0:17:54.080
<v Speaker 1>economic depression to prevent a deflation from setting in. However,

0:17:54.640 --> 0:17:57.119
<v Speaker 1>the point that I've made in that paper and is

0:17:57.160 --> 0:18:00.680
<v Speaker 1>repeated now is that over time, I fear that the

0:18:00.800 --> 0:18:04.280
<v Speaker 1>one of the medium term consequences of these crisis is

0:18:04.280 --> 0:18:08.760
<v Speaker 1>gonna be permanent negative supply shocks. We're gonna have more

0:18:09.119 --> 0:18:12.639
<v Speaker 1>the globalization. We're gonna have more decap litween US and China,

0:18:12.920 --> 0:18:16.320
<v Speaker 1>with more melchanization of global supply chains because they're not

0:18:16.440 --> 0:18:18.879
<v Speaker 1>safe if they're all conspted on on. China will have

0:18:18.960 --> 0:18:23.080
<v Speaker 1>more fragmentation of the global economy with more populist parties

0:18:23.359 --> 0:18:27.120
<v Speaker 1>in power say I'm going to protect my workers, my firms.

0:18:27.320 --> 0:18:30.719
<v Speaker 1>So more protection is more tariffs, more restriction to trade

0:18:30.800 --> 0:18:35.160
<v Speaker 1>in goods, in services, in capital, in labor, in technology

0:18:35.200 --> 0:18:38.919
<v Speaker 1>and data and information. That's a negative supply shock that

0:18:39.080 --> 0:18:44.480
<v Speaker 1>over time reduces potential growth and reduces actual output. It's

0:18:44.520 --> 0:18:48.080
<v Speaker 1>like the negative all shocks that we had in the nineties, seventies,

0:18:48.080 --> 0:18:50.720
<v Speaker 1>seventies seventy nine. Think of it as a negative supply

0:18:50.800 --> 0:18:54.280
<v Speaker 1>shock that reduces potential growth and increases cost of production.

0:18:54.600 --> 0:18:56.359
<v Speaker 1>Now what happened in the seventh is when we're did

0:18:56.400 --> 0:18:59.960
<v Speaker 1>to all shocks, we monetize them. Monetary policy was done

0:19:00.000 --> 0:19:03.119
<v Speaker 1>a curve and we physicalize them. But the extent, by

0:19:03.119 --> 0:19:06.199
<v Speaker 1>the way of those physical stabulus and monetary stabulus was

0:19:06.280 --> 0:19:09.520
<v Speaker 1>limited compared to today, where we're running budget deficit of

0:19:09.600 --> 0:19:13.399
<v Speaker 1>twenty of GDP and we're fully monetizing with QUI. At

0:19:13.440 --> 0:19:16.080
<v Speaker 1>that time you were just behind the curve in terms

0:19:16.080 --> 0:19:19.080
<v Speaker 1>of monetary policy. You're not that negative policy rate's let

0:19:19.080 --> 0:19:22.000
<v Speaker 1>along QUI. So the extent of the monethor and physical

0:19:22.080 --> 0:19:25.960
<v Speaker 1>stabulus is ten order of magnitude bigger than the seventies. Now,

0:19:26.000 --> 0:19:29.879
<v Speaker 1>you throw monetize physical deficits in an economy where over

0:19:30.000 --> 0:19:33.399
<v Speaker 1>time you have negative supply shocks, and then you end

0:19:33.480 --> 0:19:38.920
<v Speaker 1>up with not stagged deflation like today's stagnation and deflation

0:19:39.119 --> 0:19:42.280
<v Speaker 1>when you get with stagflation that occurred in the seventies,

0:19:42.480 --> 0:19:45.680
<v Speaker 1>where effectively, when you monetize physical deaths were negative supply shock,

0:19:45.960 --> 0:19:49.320
<v Speaker 1>you get inflation and recession over time. Now, this is

0:19:49.320 --> 0:19:52.040
<v Speaker 1>not a story for two thousand and twenty. It may

0:19:52.080 --> 0:19:54.400
<v Speaker 1>not even be a story for two thousand and twenty one.

0:19:54.720 --> 0:19:57.879
<v Speaker 1>But I do believe that the policies over the medium

0:19:57.960 --> 0:20:00.240
<v Speaker 1>term are going to lead us back to start the nation.

0:20:00.280 --> 0:20:02.600
<v Speaker 1>And once you're in start deflation, then you're in a

0:20:02.720 --> 0:20:06.119
<v Speaker 1>nightmare because you have a negative growth and you have inflation.

0:20:06.480 --> 0:20:10.200
<v Speaker 1>When you have started deflation, recession and deflation, it's easy.

0:20:10.520 --> 0:20:12.480
<v Speaker 1>You have to stimulate the column to get you out

0:20:12.480 --> 0:20:15.439
<v Speaker 1>of a recession and out of a deflation, So you

0:20:15.480 --> 0:20:18.600
<v Speaker 1>need to do montor physical stimulus. Once you have inflation

0:20:18.680 --> 0:20:22.280
<v Speaker 1>together with economic stagnation, then you have a problem because

0:20:22.280 --> 0:20:25.040
<v Speaker 1>you can of these monetary policy if you care about inflation.

0:20:25.480 --> 0:20:27.840
<v Speaker 1>So we're gonna get there, but it's gonna take two

0:20:27.920 --> 0:20:46.400
<v Speaker 1>or three years. So we've basically seen for decades now arguably,

0:20:46.440 --> 0:20:49.879
<v Speaker 1>so it's the very early eighties and Vulcar era, the

0:20:49.960 --> 0:20:55.040
<v Speaker 1>sort of gradual opening up of the global economy, expanding supply,

0:20:56.080 --> 0:21:01.640
<v Speaker 1>liberalizing policy, etcetera. And this is the moment to something

0:21:01.720 --> 0:21:04.800
<v Speaker 1>that it reverses all those trends about forty years to

0:21:04.920 --> 0:21:09.000
<v Speaker 1>some extent. What this this virus and the aftermath will

0:21:09.400 --> 0:21:13.359
<v Speaker 1>will finally be the reversal of the nerview. Well, the

0:21:13.400 --> 0:21:17.200
<v Speaker 1>reversal started to occur after the global financial crisis, because

0:21:17.240 --> 0:21:22.640
<v Speaker 1>the era of hyper globalization started either in nineteen seventy

0:21:22.680 --> 0:21:25.800
<v Speaker 1>nine when then shall being opened up China, or nineteen

0:21:25.920 --> 0:21:28.520
<v Speaker 1>eighty nine, when, of course the Berlin Wall collapse and

0:21:28.560 --> 0:21:31.959
<v Speaker 1>the Outer Court and collapse and the opening up of Russia,

0:21:32.000 --> 0:21:35.320
<v Speaker 1>Soviet Union and Eastern Central Europe. So we had four

0:21:35.400 --> 0:21:40.360
<v Speaker 1>decades of globalization, more trading goods, in services, in capital

0:21:40.320 --> 0:21:44.800
<v Speaker 1>and labor, technology, data information, you name it. We reach

0:21:44.920 --> 0:21:48.159
<v Speaker 1>peak globalization in my view, already ten years ago because

0:21:48.400 --> 0:21:51.639
<v Speaker 1>after the global financial crisis there was a slowdown of

0:21:51.680 --> 0:21:55.399
<v Speaker 1>global trade. There was the beginning of protectionist policies or

0:21:55.400 --> 0:21:59.600
<v Speaker 1>inward oriented policies. So peak globalization probably already ten years ago.

0:21:59.840 --> 0:22:05.280
<v Speaker 1>By certainly these crisis implies much more diglobalization, much more

0:22:05.320 --> 0:22:08.199
<v Speaker 1>decoupling within US and China. The cold world is going

0:22:08.240 --> 0:22:11.080
<v Speaker 1>to become colder than two city trap is gonna get

0:22:11.119 --> 0:22:16.399
<v Speaker 1>worse whatever, total balkanization of global supply chains first in

0:22:16.520 --> 0:22:20.280
<v Speaker 1>technology than manufacturing, than in services. You know, you cannot

0:22:20.320 --> 0:22:23.359
<v Speaker 1>rely anymore on China. You have to reach shore. And

0:22:23.440 --> 0:22:25.920
<v Speaker 1>by the way, if you reach shore economic activity, you're

0:22:25.920 --> 0:22:29.000
<v Speaker 1>not going to create jobs because you're restoring economic activity

0:22:29.119 --> 0:22:32.320
<v Speaker 1>from places where costs are low, say China and Asia,

0:22:32.600 --> 0:22:35.359
<v Speaker 1>two places where labor costs are high. So it's gonna

0:22:35.480 --> 0:22:38.919
<v Speaker 1>lead either to use more gig workers and pay them nothing,

0:22:39.400 --> 0:22:42.440
<v Speaker 1>or to use machines. So the process of automation and

0:22:42.600 --> 0:22:45.920
<v Speaker 1>robotization is going to accelerate, so we'll have more activity

0:22:45.920 --> 0:22:48.240
<v Speaker 1>in the US is going to help. Capital is gonna

0:22:48.280 --> 0:22:51.200
<v Speaker 1>still screw labor like it has for the last decades.

0:22:51.400 --> 0:22:54.320
<v Speaker 1>So these trends are gonna get worse. But certainly is

0:22:54.400 --> 0:22:56.840
<v Speaker 1>a world in which will have more restriction to everything,

0:22:57.440 --> 0:23:01.119
<v Speaker 1>and even supply of safe supply chains of food are

0:23:01.200 --> 0:23:04.240
<v Speaker 1>gonna be disrupted globally because every country says, hey, I

0:23:04.320 --> 0:23:07.119
<v Speaker 1>want to keep my food for myself in case coronavirus

0:23:07.200 --> 0:23:10.080
<v Speaker 1>comes back. Well, have restriction to exportation of food. Of course,

0:23:10.080 --> 0:23:14.360
<v Speaker 1>we'll have restriction to exportation of pharma products and medical equipment.

0:23:14.600 --> 0:23:17.119
<v Speaker 1>Everybody's gonna want to keep it for themselves. And we

0:23:17.240 --> 0:23:20.119
<v Speaker 1>of course have given the tech war between US and China.

0:23:20.440 --> 0:23:22.920
<v Speaker 1>The entire text sector is going to the couple, and

0:23:23.000 --> 0:23:25.160
<v Speaker 1>we'll have a splinter night, and we'll have two completely

0:23:25.640 --> 0:23:29.280
<v Speaker 1>system for tech and internet and five G and you

0:23:29.440 --> 0:23:33.800
<v Speaker 1>name it going ahead. So there'll be massive Balkanization of

0:23:33.880 --> 0:23:37.440
<v Speaker 1>the global economy. That's a massive negative supply shock the

0:23:37.560 --> 0:23:42.440
<v Speaker 1>permanently reduces potential growth and is eventually given them North

0:23:42.520 --> 0:23:47.840
<v Speaker 1>and fiscal policy stactulation ary over time. M hm. So,

0:23:48.040 --> 0:23:49.960
<v Speaker 1>one of the things that always strikes me whenever I

0:23:50.040 --> 0:23:52.560
<v Speaker 1>read your work or listen to you talk on TV

0:23:53.160 --> 0:23:56.200
<v Speaker 1>or the radio or podcast like this UM is your

0:23:56.280 --> 0:24:00.560
<v Speaker 1>sort of um specificity of your four cats, as well

0:24:00.600 --> 0:24:02.760
<v Speaker 1>as your confidence in making them. I'm just wondering, in

0:24:02.800 --> 0:24:08.040
<v Speaker 1>the current situation, is there anything that's surprised you or

0:24:08.160 --> 0:24:12.520
<v Speaker 1>that you weren't expecting to happen. Well, initially, of course,

0:24:12.640 --> 0:24:16.399
<v Speaker 1>the free fall in economic activity take took even me

0:24:16.520 --> 0:24:19.280
<v Speaker 1>by surprise. You know, at the beginning was not a you,

0:24:19.960 --> 0:24:22.000
<v Speaker 1>was not a V, was not even an L, was

0:24:22.080 --> 0:24:30.080
<v Speaker 1>a I. Literally free fall. The collapse of output, employment, consumption, investment, export, imports,

0:24:30.240 --> 0:24:33.600
<v Speaker 1>pretty much every component of AGGREITHM and aggree supply was

0:24:33.680 --> 0:24:36.400
<v Speaker 1>like a free fall. And you know, even Morgan, Stanley,

0:24:36.480 --> 0:24:40.080
<v Speaker 1>JP Morgan and Goldman sachs now saying into two the

0:24:40.200 --> 0:24:44.359
<v Speaker 1>contractional output in US, for example, at the annual rate

0:24:44.480 --> 0:24:48.359
<v Speaker 1>is gonna between thirty five and all rate right, So

0:24:48.720 --> 0:24:51.600
<v Speaker 1>so everybody was taken one by the free fall because

0:24:51.640 --> 0:24:54.399
<v Speaker 1>we're not seeing the shocks of this sort of sudden

0:24:54.480 --> 0:24:58.439
<v Speaker 1>stop where everything shuts down. In any typical financial crisis

0:24:58.520 --> 0:25:00.840
<v Speaker 1>or economic crisis, you have a you know, a build

0:25:00.880 --> 0:25:04.239
<v Speaker 1>up of the economic downturn. But it's lawing gradual. As

0:25:04.280 --> 0:25:06.680
<v Speaker 1>I said, what happened in the past, even in the

0:25:06.760 --> 0:25:10.320
<v Speaker 1>Great Depression in three years or during the global financial crisis,

0:25:10.440 --> 0:25:14.040
<v Speaker 1>this time around has according three three weeks. The other

0:25:14.160 --> 0:25:17.720
<v Speaker 1>aspect that has been partially surprising but not totally surprising

0:25:17.760 --> 0:25:20.320
<v Speaker 1>to me has been the policy response. But as I said,

0:25:20.680 --> 0:25:23.720
<v Speaker 1>I wrote last November that when the next recession is

0:25:23.760 --> 0:25:25.760
<v Speaker 1>going to occur, we're not going to do the typical

0:25:25.920 --> 0:25:28.920
<v Speaker 1>zero rate negative rates. A little of que liadle of

0:25:29.000 --> 0:25:31.520
<v Speaker 1>credit is a little of forward guidance. We're gonna go

0:25:32.040 --> 0:25:35.600
<v Speaker 1>full Monty on helicopter drop of money. And by the way,

0:25:35.680 --> 0:25:39.760
<v Speaker 1>what's the difference between having helicopter drop of money and

0:25:40.200 --> 0:25:44.600
<v Speaker 1>full direct monetization of physical deficits and having large deficits

0:25:44.680 --> 0:25:48.439
<v Speaker 1>plut QWI. The only difference between the two is when

0:25:48.480 --> 0:25:51.240
<v Speaker 1>you do QUEI, you buy the bounds in the second

0:25:51.280 --> 0:25:54.520
<v Speaker 1>diary market. Well, when you do direct monetization. You're buying

0:25:54.600 --> 0:25:58.000
<v Speaker 1>them in the primary market, right, But that's a big lift.

0:25:58.040 --> 0:26:01.720
<v Speaker 1>The impact on long rates and financial condition is exactly

0:26:01.760 --> 0:26:04.639
<v Speaker 1>the same. Who cares whether you're buying the bonds, uh,

0:26:04.800 --> 0:26:07.800
<v Speaker 1>you know, directly from the government or the government issues

0:26:07.840 --> 0:26:11.200
<v Speaker 1>them and a week later, literally the fat purchases bonds

0:26:11.240 --> 0:26:13.840
<v Speaker 1>at the rate of a d billions per week. It's

0:26:13.920 --> 0:26:16.160
<v Speaker 1>just the same thing, just a big lift to say

0:26:16.359 --> 0:26:19.280
<v Speaker 1>it's not direct modization, it is direct montization. You just

0:26:19.400 --> 0:26:22.359
<v Speaker 1>wait a week rather waiting one hour. It's just the

0:26:22.440 --> 0:26:27.480
<v Speaker 1>same thing. Right, let's call the call it euphemistically coordination

0:26:27.840 --> 0:26:30.960
<v Speaker 1>of monetor in physical policy. It's a joke. Not coordinational

0:26:30.960 --> 0:26:34.760
<v Speaker 1>amount of fiscal policy. It's fiscal dominance. And the Central

0:26:34.840 --> 0:26:38.280
<v Speaker 1>Plank has no option, given the death of twenty GDP

0:26:38.560 --> 0:26:40.639
<v Speaker 1>but fully to monetize it. Because if they were not

0:26:40.960 --> 0:26:43.840
<v Speaker 1>monetizing them, you know ten, your treasuries would not be

0:26:43.960 --> 0:26:45.879
<v Speaker 1>at zero point six. There will be a two or

0:26:45.880 --> 0:26:48.600
<v Speaker 1>three percent that would happen. So there have no option

0:26:48.880 --> 0:26:52.120
<v Speaker 1>with the death of GDP to fully buy the entire

0:26:52.200 --> 0:26:55.360
<v Speaker 1>stock of new bonds issued by the treasury. That's what's

0:26:55.359 --> 0:26:58.160
<v Speaker 1>happening in the US. That's what's happened in Japan, That's

0:26:58.160 --> 0:27:01.679
<v Speaker 1>what's happened in Europe. That's just happening in all advanced economies. Now,

0:27:01.880 --> 0:27:05.560
<v Speaker 1>emerging market is a different story. In emerging markets humanitize

0:27:05.560 --> 0:27:08.200
<v Speaker 1>physical dias in to this extent, you end up in

0:27:08.359 --> 0:27:13.639
<v Speaker 1>hyper inflation like Zimbabwe, like Argentina, like Venezuela. Luckily, in

0:27:13.720 --> 0:27:18.359
<v Speaker 1>advanced economies, web some modicum of policy credibility left and

0:27:18.440 --> 0:27:21.240
<v Speaker 1>we're not going to end up into high inflation or

0:27:21.320 --> 0:27:24.399
<v Speaker 1>iper inflation. But over the next few years we may

0:27:24.480 --> 0:27:27.920
<v Speaker 1>see inflation rise from the current very low levels to

0:27:28.119 --> 0:27:30.760
<v Speaker 1>higher levels. That can happen in the presence of the

0:27:30.840 --> 0:27:34.840
<v Speaker 1>globalization and the supply shots. Now I want to ask

0:27:34.880 --> 0:27:38.240
<v Speaker 1>you a little bit about the sort of pre crisis here.

0:27:38.400 --> 0:27:43.160
<v Speaker 1>You mentioned corporate leverage, was high household leverage as well,

0:27:43.680 --> 0:27:46.320
<v Speaker 1>you know, after the last after the Great Financial Crisis,

0:27:46.400 --> 0:27:49.879
<v Speaker 1>and you look back at two two sexes obvious all

0:27:49.960 --> 0:27:54.440
<v Speaker 1>kinds of risks suppose related to housing. Was the economy

0:27:54.640 --> 0:27:57.680
<v Speaker 1>inherently fragile pre crisis? I mean, we talked about this

0:27:57.800 --> 0:28:01.800
<v Speaker 1>incredible crash, the speed of which literally everyone by surprise.

0:28:02.320 --> 0:28:06.120
<v Speaker 1>Does that mean that the economy must have had weak foundations?

0:28:06.520 --> 0:28:09.560
<v Speaker 1>Going into this or is it just like we turned

0:28:09.560 --> 0:28:11.840
<v Speaker 1>off the economy due to public health risk and this

0:28:12.000 --> 0:28:14.720
<v Speaker 1>is what was going to happen. How much does the

0:28:14.840 --> 0:28:18.639
<v Speaker 1>current crisis sort of indict the stability of the pre

0:28:18.760 --> 0:28:23.960
<v Speaker 1>crisis ecount, Well, there were plenty of fragilities even before

0:28:24.040 --> 0:28:27.120
<v Speaker 1>this crisis occurred, you know, after the global financial crisis,

0:28:27.600 --> 0:28:31.800
<v Speaker 1>in spite of the talk about the great deleveraging, very

0:28:31.880 --> 0:28:35.560
<v Speaker 1>little deleveraging occurred because, of course, as we know, public

0:28:35.760 --> 0:28:39.760
<v Speaker 1>deficits and that wrote significantly both in advanced economies and

0:28:39.800 --> 0:28:45.040
<v Speaker 1>emerging markets, and also private debts remain high or they increased.

0:28:45.400 --> 0:28:47.320
<v Speaker 1>In the case of the U S. There was partial

0:28:47.480 --> 0:28:51.120
<v Speaker 1>deleveraging of the household sector, but the de leveraging did

0:28:51.160 --> 0:28:54.600
<v Speaker 1>not occur through massive increase in savings. Occurred only because

0:28:54.640 --> 0:28:57.920
<v Speaker 1>lots of people defaulted on their mortgages and personal loans

0:28:58.160 --> 0:29:01.200
<v Speaker 1>and eventually that that were used. But there was a

0:29:01.320 --> 0:29:05.000
<v Speaker 1>massive real leveraging of the corporate sector, right whether it

0:29:05.200 --> 0:29:11.880
<v Speaker 1>was you know, clos leverage loans, massive issuance of junk bones,

0:29:12.840 --> 0:29:16.160
<v Speaker 1>a trillion dollar of fallen angels in a high grade

0:29:16.440 --> 0:29:19.520
<v Speaker 1>they're not going to be done graded. All these share

0:29:19.560 --> 0:29:22.320
<v Speaker 1>buy backs that implied a complete change in the capital

0:29:22.400 --> 0:29:26.040
<v Speaker 1>structure of most firms with less equity and more capital

0:29:26.160 --> 0:29:29.520
<v Speaker 1>is a way of boosting earnings per share and evaluation.

0:29:29.680 --> 0:29:33.080
<v Speaker 1>So the levels of corporate debt and people have been

0:29:33.120 --> 0:29:36.160
<v Speaker 1>writing it for the last year. Even the FED recently

0:29:36.240 --> 0:29:38.760
<v Speaker 1>was saying, we're worried about the build up of corporate debt.

0:29:39.000 --> 0:29:42.080
<v Speaker 1>So this is an accident waiting to happen because the

0:29:42.160 --> 0:29:45.320
<v Speaker 1>corporate were leverage like never before in history. You know,

0:29:45.440 --> 0:29:48.640
<v Speaker 1>my colleague at alt Man who's the expert of corporate default,

0:29:48.840 --> 0:29:51.360
<v Speaker 1>and the writting about years about the build up of

0:29:51.440 --> 0:29:53.800
<v Speaker 1>corporate debt and lots of other people did. And in

0:29:53.880 --> 0:29:57.040
<v Speaker 1>the case of the household sector, the death levels were

0:29:57.080 --> 0:29:59.880
<v Speaker 1>not much lower, They did not increase, but they were

0:30:00.040 --> 0:30:02.960
<v Speaker 1>may and iye. What change was that during the last decade,

0:30:03.480 --> 0:30:07.480
<v Speaker 1>private and public debts were higher. Domestic and foreign debts

0:30:07.520 --> 0:30:11.320
<v Speaker 1>were higher. In the private sector, debts of houses of corporates,

0:30:11.600 --> 0:30:14.680
<v Speaker 1>even of the shadow banking system were higher. But given

0:30:15.160 --> 0:30:18.640
<v Speaker 1>near zero policy rates and given very low long rates,

0:30:19.160 --> 0:30:23.320
<v Speaker 1>that servicing ratios were very low. Right, that ratio were

0:30:23.360 --> 0:30:26.760
<v Speaker 1>not low. What made the system sustainable was that we

0:30:26.800 --> 0:30:30.360
<v Speaker 1>had zero rates, if not negative and were long. Rates

0:30:30.440 --> 0:30:33.160
<v Speaker 1>were extremely low all over the world in advanced economies,

0:30:33.360 --> 0:30:36.280
<v Speaker 1>and therefore there was a false sense of security because

0:30:36.400 --> 0:30:39.480
<v Speaker 1>that servicing ratio where a historical law. But you know,

0:30:40.240 --> 0:30:43.400
<v Speaker 1>once the crisis occurs and credit spread blow up, even

0:30:43.480 --> 0:30:47.360
<v Speaker 1>if safe assets like treasury boons and gerbis can go

0:30:47.480 --> 0:30:51.680
<v Speaker 1>even lower, if the spreads for corporate debt or household

0:30:51.880 --> 0:30:54.400
<v Speaker 1>or credit cards or r m B s S or

0:30:54.480 --> 0:30:56.880
<v Speaker 1>you name it go through the roof, then you can

0:30:56.920 --> 0:31:00.400
<v Speaker 1>have had that crisis even with the yield on safe

0:31:00.480 --> 0:31:03.640
<v Speaker 1>bonds being close to zero, if not negative, because it's

0:31:03.680 --> 0:31:06.560
<v Speaker 1>credit spreads are blowing up. And that's what is happening

0:31:06.680 --> 0:31:09.840
<v Speaker 1>right now now this time around. One of the new

0:31:10.000 --> 0:31:12.800
<v Speaker 1>changes is happening is that not only at the V

0:31:13.000 --> 0:31:16.440
<v Speaker 1>shaped recovery of US acuity, the other V shaped recovery

0:31:16.640 --> 0:31:21.320
<v Speaker 1>has occurd for developed markets. Spread products are n BSS,

0:31:21.720 --> 0:31:25.840
<v Speaker 1>money bonds, high yield, high grade and so on. What

0:31:26.080 --> 0:31:29.200
<v Speaker 1>explains it. It explains it the fact that the FED,

0:31:29.520 --> 0:31:32.720
<v Speaker 1>the CB, and now the BOJ have decided to vary

0:31:32.760 --> 0:31:37.560
<v Speaker 1>aggressively by not just government bonds but also to buy

0:31:37.920 --> 0:31:40.440
<v Speaker 1>corporate bonds. Now the bo J and e c B

0:31:40.760 --> 0:31:43.440
<v Speaker 1>were already buying for the last few years corporate bonds.

0:31:43.760 --> 0:31:46.600
<v Speaker 1>But say the d J today announced they're gonna triple

0:31:46.880 --> 0:31:49.440
<v Speaker 1>the amount of corporate bonds and commercial paper that are buying.

0:31:49.720 --> 0:31:53.240
<v Speaker 1>But for the freed is a new to buy corporate bonds,

0:31:53.520 --> 0:31:56.920
<v Speaker 1>and as long as they're buying a high grade investment grade,

0:31:57.120 --> 0:32:00.080
<v Speaker 1>it was okay. But once they decided to go and

0:32:00.200 --> 0:32:03.880
<v Speaker 1>buy even fallen angels that have been downgraded from three

0:32:04.000 --> 0:32:06.840
<v Speaker 1>or B minals to somewhere in the double B range,

0:32:07.520 --> 0:32:10.120
<v Speaker 1>and when they decided to buy even how yield, the

0:32:10.200 --> 0:32:14.080
<v Speaker 1>f tfs that the FAT is going into totally uncharted

0:32:14.520 --> 0:32:17.600
<v Speaker 1>and dangerous territory because you're really buying stuff that is

0:32:17.640 --> 0:32:20.560
<v Speaker 1>highly risky first of all, and you're creating a huge

0:32:20.600 --> 0:32:24.360
<v Speaker 1>amount of moral hazard, and you're not allowing the necessary

0:32:24.760 --> 0:32:28.320
<v Speaker 1>the leveraging that has to occur among leverage firms. They're

0:32:28.320 --> 0:32:30.959
<v Speaker 1>gonna kick the count down the road if you're aggressively

0:32:31.040 --> 0:32:34.240
<v Speaker 1>trying to narrow the spreads, especially for our yield. So

0:32:34.560 --> 0:32:37.520
<v Speaker 1>to me, that's a mistake is again making sure that

0:32:37.680 --> 0:32:42.400
<v Speaker 1>zombie companies, zombie financial institutions, zombie households are gonna stay

0:32:42.440 --> 0:32:45.560
<v Speaker 1>alive on life support where they should be allowed to

0:32:45.680 --> 0:32:49.719
<v Speaker 1>default and restructure, and they both financial and operational restructurally,

0:32:50.000 --> 0:32:52.479
<v Speaker 1>so we're gonna pay the price for that particular policy.

0:32:52.800 --> 0:32:55.880
<v Speaker 1>I think that everything else the FAT is doing maybe right,

0:32:56.320 --> 0:32:59.840
<v Speaker 1>but moving into the space of buying a highly risky

0:33:00.200 --> 0:33:04.040
<v Speaker 1>junk bonds, I think it's crazy. It's utterly crazy. Just

0:33:04.200 --> 0:33:06.480
<v Speaker 1>on the policy question. Is that the one thing that

0:33:06.600 --> 0:33:09.240
<v Speaker 1>you would do differently if if you were in charge

0:33:09.360 --> 0:33:11.920
<v Speaker 1>of the policy response here. So for instance, if you were,

0:33:12.080 --> 0:33:15.960
<v Speaker 1>you know, either in the US administration or Chairman of

0:33:16.040 --> 0:33:18.360
<v Speaker 1>the third or something like that, what would you be

0:33:18.520 --> 0:33:23.680
<v Speaker 1>doing in response to the economic downturn that we're seeing. Well,

0:33:23.800 --> 0:33:26.440
<v Speaker 1>as I said, the idea that you're gonna run large

0:33:26.480 --> 0:33:29.680
<v Speaker 1>budget deficit, that you're gonna monetize them, it's the right

0:33:29.800 --> 0:33:33.520
<v Speaker 1>response in the short run. I worry about the overrang

0:33:33.880 --> 0:33:36.440
<v Speaker 1>of the balance sheet of central banks, and they're not

0:33:36.560 --> 0:33:39.080
<v Speaker 1>gonna be able to run them down because if they

0:33:39.160 --> 0:33:41.560
<v Speaker 1>run them down, there is a dead crisis. Think of it.

0:33:41.680 --> 0:33:47.240
<v Speaker 1>Even the FED started quantitative tightening in two thousand and seventeen,

0:33:47.560 --> 0:33:50.720
<v Speaker 1>but in the fourth quarter of eighteen, when you adjust

0:33:50.840 --> 0:33:55.080
<v Speaker 1>the minor blip, you know, stock markinging down big dealing

0:33:55.240 --> 0:33:59.880
<v Speaker 1>you four after going by January one, Power said Okay,

0:34:00.120 --> 0:34:02.760
<v Speaker 1>I was kidding. I'm not going to continue quty and

0:34:02.800 --> 0:34:06.440
<v Speaker 1>I'm not gonna raise rates until are gonna stop. And

0:34:06.520 --> 0:34:09.280
<v Speaker 1>then three months later he said, okay, we're gonna start

0:34:09.560 --> 0:34:12.520
<v Speaker 1>cutting rates and we're gonna start doing new ripples, a

0:34:12.600 --> 0:34:15.680
<v Speaker 1>new open market operations to increase the balance sheet. So

0:34:16.080 --> 0:34:20.759
<v Speaker 1>well before even this crisis occurred, the Fed realized we

0:34:20.840 --> 0:34:23.279
<v Speaker 1>cannot run down the balance sheet. They try to do it.

0:34:23.600 --> 0:34:25.920
<v Speaker 1>Then the market shop in Q four of eighteen, and

0:34:26.000 --> 0:34:28.800
<v Speaker 1>what happened last year led them to just change and

0:34:28.880 --> 0:34:32.440
<v Speaker 1>completely increase the balance sheet even before this crisis occurred.

0:34:32.719 --> 0:34:35.200
<v Speaker 1>And now that the crisis occurred, the balance sheet is

0:34:35.239 --> 0:34:38.520
<v Speaker 1>gonna not double, but probably triple. And there's not even

0:34:38.600 --> 0:34:40.959
<v Speaker 1>a sense of whether we're gonna start when we're gonna

0:34:40.960 --> 0:34:43.719
<v Speaker 1>even start raising policy of it's above zero, let alone

0:34:43.800 --> 0:34:46.120
<v Speaker 1>run down the balance sheet. In the case of Europe,

0:34:46.760 --> 0:34:50.920
<v Speaker 1>they quantity of tightening never started. They stopped quei and

0:34:51.000 --> 0:34:53.880
<v Speaker 1>now they've resumed it. In the case of Japan, they

0:34:54.000 --> 0:34:57.839
<v Speaker 1>never stopped their quei qui always continued, and now they're

0:34:57.920 --> 0:35:01.560
<v Speaker 1>ramping it up to infinite ap out right, whatever it takes,

0:35:01.640 --> 0:35:04.560
<v Speaker 1>like the FED has done so these balance sheets are

0:35:04.640 --> 0:35:07.480
<v Speaker 1>never gonna go down, and eventually that type of a

0:35:08.000 --> 0:35:13.000
<v Speaker 1>financial overhang initially leads to asset inflation and asset bubbles.

0:35:13.440 --> 0:35:16.960
<v Speaker 1>Then eventually it leads also to good inflation. Did not

0:35:17.120 --> 0:35:19.640
<v Speaker 1>happen during the last decade because during the last decade,

0:35:19.680 --> 0:35:24.799
<v Speaker 1>with positive supply shocks, with continuation of globalization and technology

0:35:25.719 --> 0:35:29.120
<v Speaker 1>in the next decade whatever reversal of globalization, and that

0:35:29.280 --> 0:35:32.399
<v Speaker 1>the even restriction to what technology can do, because while

0:35:32.440 --> 0:35:35.400
<v Speaker 1>technology is gonna continue to grow, there will be massive

0:35:35.440 --> 0:35:40.440
<v Speaker 1>restriction to the diffusion of technology because of national security technology.

0:35:40.520 --> 0:35:43.360
<v Speaker 1>The TACH sector is going to become a critical component

0:35:43.560 --> 0:35:46.840
<v Speaker 1>of the national security industrial complex and it's going to

0:35:46.920 --> 0:35:50.640
<v Speaker 1>be restricted. So we'll have two major forces gonna lead

0:35:50.880 --> 0:35:54.719
<v Speaker 1>to negative supply shocks rather than positive one. At the time,

0:35:54.760 --> 0:35:58.640
<v Speaker 1>we're doing monetization and physicalization of death icit in an

0:35:58.760 --> 0:36:01.600
<v Speaker 1>order of magnitude of the three or four times bigger

0:36:01.880 --> 0:36:04.480
<v Speaker 1>than what we did after the global financial crisis. That

0:36:04.680 --> 0:36:08.080
<v Speaker 1>eventually leads to asset and credit bubbles and then a

0:36:08.160 --> 0:36:12.160
<v Speaker 1>buston and crush, and it leads even to starculation over time. Again,

0:36:12.200 --> 0:36:14.480
<v Speaker 1>it's not a prediction for this year and next year.

0:36:14.520 --> 0:36:16.799
<v Speaker 1>But for the medium term. My view, by the way,

0:36:16.920 --> 0:36:21.080
<v Speaker 1>is that this decade there will be a coming global depression.

0:36:21.719 --> 0:36:24.040
<v Speaker 1>This is not the short term prediction for two thousand

0:36:24.080 --> 0:36:26.839
<v Speaker 1>and twenty, but I believe there are at least ten

0:36:26.960 --> 0:36:30.560
<v Speaker 1>forces that gonna lead to the coming great depression of

0:36:30.600 --> 0:36:34.360
<v Speaker 1>the two thousand and twenties, not two and two and twenties.

0:36:34.600 --> 0:36:37.719
<v Speaker 1>The coming decade, there will be a global depression in

0:36:37.840 --> 0:36:41.800
<v Speaker 1>the global economy because there are forces and trends and

0:36:42.040 --> 0:36:45.560
<v Speaker 1>risks and imbalances that they were created but the global

0:36:45.600 --> 0:36:50.120
<v Speaker 1>financial crisis they were never resolved. Another outcome this time

0:36:50.160 --> 0:36:52.920
<v Speaker 1>around with a vengeance, and all of these ten negative

0:36:53.000 --> 0:36:57.560
<v Speaker 1>trends are being exacerbated by the coronavirus crisis. I don't

0:36:57.560 --> 0:36:59.200
<v Speaker 1>know if I have time to discuss all of them.

0:36:59.280 --> 0:37:02.320
<v Speaker 1>I'm writing a new book about the subject, about the

0:37:02.360 --> 0:37:06.000
<v Speaker 1>common depression of passion in twenties. But there is essentially

0:37:06.200 --> 0:37:08.640
<v Speaker 1>ten global forces are going to lead us to a

0:37:08.760 --> 0:37:11.480
<v Speaker 1>great depression in the next second. That's my view. So

0:37:11.600 --> 0:37:14.600
<v Speaker 1>in the short run, we avoid that great depression this year.

0:37:14.719 --> 0:37:17.840
<v Speaker 1>My baseline is a U shaped recovery, is not a depression.

0:37:18.120 --> 0:37:22.200
<v Speaker 1>But over time I believe we're gonna face a great depression, Norrio.

0:37:22.280 --> 0:37:25.160
<v Speaker 1>You're certainly living up to your doctor doom Moniker there.

0:37:25.200 --> 0:37:27.960
<v Speaker 1>But I have one final question. So, prior to the crisis,

0:37:28.280 --> 0:37:31.520
<v Speaker 1>one good thing is that we truly had something that

0:37:31.680 --> 0:37:35.840
<v Speaker 1>resembled some wage growth. We had very low unemployment, the

0:37:36.040 --> 0:37:41.680
<v Speaker 1>spread between say, the unemployment in this country among educated

0:37:41.760 --> 0:37:45.520
<v Speaker 1>white people versus minority group different minority groups that started

0:37:45.600 --> 0:37:49.040
<v Speaker 1>to come in. Genuinely positive things that were coming about

0:37:49.480 --> 0:37:53.400
<v Speaker 1>through the long expansion obliterated overnight. What would be a

0:37:53.560 --> 0:37:57.680
<v Speaker 1>model towards getting back to that point that would be

0:37:57.800 --> 0:38:00.440
<v Speaker 1>more sustainable? In your view, if what we so was

0:38:00.560 --> 0:38:05.400
<v Speaker 1>all these sort of un unresolved imbalances, how can we

0:38:05.520 --> 0:38:08.360
<v Speaker 1>get how can we return to what seemed like some

0:38:08.560 --> 0:38:12.640
<v Speaker 1>very positive societal trends in a way that doesn't involve

0:38:13.080 --> 0:38:16.680
<v Speaker 1>and lost bubbles. Well, you know, I would take partial

0:38:16.800 --> 0:38:19.840
<v Speaker 1>issue with your characterization of how well was the situation

0:38:19.920 --> 0:38:23.160
<v Speaker 1>of labor, because you know, the share of labor had

0:38:23.239 --> 0:38:26.440
<v Speaker 1>been falling for a decade and was falling. The share

0:38:26.640 --> 0:38:29.920
<v Speaker 1>of profits was rising in GDP. That's why you had

0:38:30.000 --> 0:38:34.279
<v Speaker 1>outside returns. And yes, people had jobs, but most of

0:38:34.360 --> 0:38:37.480
<v Speaker 1>these jobs were low wages. Yeah, wage gold was picking

0:38:37.560 --> 0:38:41.320
<v Speaker 1>up slightly but was not really robust, and many people

0:38:41.400 --> 0:38:44.840
<v Speaker 1>had jobs that had essentially no benefits because many of

0:38:44.960 --> 0:38:48.840
<v Speaker 1>them became gig workers or part time workers, or contractors

0:38:49.239 --> 0:38:53.160
<v Speaker 1>or freelancers or hourly workers and so on and so on.

0:38:53.520 --> 0:38:56.160
<v Speaker 1>You know, forty percent of Americans did not have more

0:38:56.239 --> 0:38:59.319
<v Speaker 1>than four hundred dollars savings in case of an emergency.

0:38:59.560 --> 0:39:03.680
<v Speaker 1>So those people that were left behind. And they said

0:39:03.719 --> 0:39:07.360
<v Speaker 1>Trump was talking about an American carnage when he was elected.

0:39:07.800 --> 0:39:10.600
<v Speaker 1>I think for most people there is still an American carnage.

0:39:10.640 --> 0:39:13.520
<v Speaker 1>You know, there are eighty tho people today every year

0:39:13.760 --> 0:39:17.440
<v Speaker 1>in the US they die from an opioid overdose. And

0:39:17.560 --> 0:39:20.400
<v Speaker 1>that number is not fallen as following by an epsilon.

0:39:20.760 --> 0:39:23.040
<v Speaker 1>Why do they die of this stuff because they are

0:39:23.239 --> 0:39:26.840
<v Speaker 1>totally socially economically desperate. That what leads to the opioid

0:39:26.840 --> 0:39:31.040
<v Speaker 1>academic you're looking at any measure of social kind of

0:39:31.239 --> 0:39:34.759
<v Speaker 1>success or whatever not, it still is. It is an

0:39:34.800 --> 0:39:38.000
<v Speaker 1>American carnage. People have jobs, but they are you know

0:39:38.160 --> 0:39:41.440
<v Speaker 1>then burger flipping jobs, the lower jobs, the temporary jobs

0:39:41.600 --> 0:39:45.319
<v Speaker 1>that have no benefits, having millions of younger millennials having

0:39:45.400 --> 0:39:48.200
<v Speaker 1>to do three or four times for different gig jobs

0:39:48.440 --> 0:39:51.120
<v Speaker 1>and not being paid enough and not having any benefits

0:39:51.480 --> 0:39:54.600
<v Speaker 1>is no is no kind of panasia of any sort,

0:39:55.000 --> 0:39:57.920
<v Speaker 1>So I do believe it. Actually, the situation for labor

0:39:58.320 --> 0:40:02.080
<v Speaker 1>was extremely fragile. Of course, after a decade of a recovery,

0:40:02.560 --> 0:40:05.400
<v Speaker 1>you had an employment rate gone from ten percent to

0:40:05.520 --> 0:40:08.279
<v Speaker 1>three point five. We created twenty two billion jobs, but

0:40:08.360 --> 0:40:11.640
<v Speaker 1>guess not in four weeks the entire jobs have been

0:40:11.680 --> 0:40:15.560
<v Speaker 1>created in ten years that are gone twenty six million,

0:40:15.880 --> 0:40:18.520
<v Speaker 1>and I think it's gonna be thirty five. And ask yourself,

0:40:18.719 --> 0:40:22.520
<v Speaker 1>if you took a decade, ten years of an anemic

0:40:22.600 --> 0:40:27.600
<v Speaker 1>recovery with something happening, for creating twenty two million jobs,

0:40:28.000 --> 0:40:31.880
<v Speaker 1>how many years is gonna take us to essentially reduced

0:40:31.960 --> 0:40:36.000
<v Speaker 1>unemployment rate from thirty six million new people without jobs

0:40:36.320 --> 0:40:38.799
<v Speaker 1>back to normal. It's gonna take a decade, it's gonna

0:40:38.840 --> 0:40:43.840
<v Speaker 1>take two decades. What's gonna take? So honestly, labor is screwed,

0:40:44.280 --> 0:40:46.920
<v Speaker 1>was always screwed, is now screwed more than before, and

0:40:47.000 --> 0:40:50.759
<v Speaker 1>it's gonna be a nightmare. Okay, Well, on that um

0:40:52.120 --> 0:40:56.080
<v Speaker 1>optimistic note, I think we're gonna leave it therenurial. Thank

0:40:56.160 --> 0:40:58.520
<v Speaker 1>you so much for coming on, and I know, you

0:40:58.640 --> 0:41:03.040
<v Speaker 1>call yourself d your realist, but you're painting a pretty

0:41:03.160 --> 0:41:07.080
<v Speaker 1>uh pretty depressing picture of the future. But thank you

0:41:07.200 --> 0:41:10.520
<v Speaker 1>you appreciate it. I'm all I'm wrong. I feel I'm

0:41:10.520 --> 0:41:14.879
<v Speaker 1>gonna be right. I won't play. Thanks for that was great.

0:41:15.560 --> 0:41:24.359
<v Speaker 1>Thank you so Joe. I'm just trying to think all

0:41:24.440 --> 0:41:27.520
<v Speaker 1>the all the ground we just covered. We had a

0:41:27.600 --> 0:41:32.200
<v Speaker 1>great depression, food shortages, the end of globalization, a new

0:41:32.280 --> 0:41:38.320
<v Speaker 1>Cold war, uh, stagflation, you go on. But like pretty

0:41:38.400 --> 0:41:42.520
<v Speaker 1>much every bad scenario was touched upon. So that was

0:41:42.600 --> 0:41:46.840
<v Speaker 1>fun Yeah, you know, it's funny because like I you know,

0:41:46.880 --> 0:41:49.919
<v Speaker 1>when I set it up the intro when we were talking,

0:41:49.960 --> 0:41:51.839
<v Speaker 1>I was like, oh, they called doctor Doom, but I'm

0:41:51.880 --> 0:41:55.160
<v Speaker 1>not sure if he really is a doctor Doom. Maybe

0:41:55.239 --> 0:41:57.120
<v Speaker 1>that was just sort of like I think people called him.

0:41:58.200 --> 0:42:01.600
<v Speaker 1>He's very negative, like he really you know. What the

0:42:01.680 --> 0:42:05.360
<v Speaker 1>interesting thing is is that, um, you know, there's a

0:42:05.440 --> 0:42:08.359
<v Speaker 1>lot of like there's sort of like perma beare uh

0:42:09.080 --> 0:42:11.120
<v Speaker 1>types out there, Like there's other people. In fact, I

0:42:11.200 --> 0:42:13.279
<v Speaker 1>think there's like ten people at the nickname doctor Doom,

0:42:13.640 --> 0:42:15.239
<v Speaker 1>but a lot of them are like they sort of

0:42:15.280 --> 0:42:18.839
<v Speaker 1>like hardcore gold types. He's not really one of them

0:42:18.960 --> 0:42:23.839
<v Speaker 1>so much. No, No, actually, yeah, we should have asked him.

0:42:24.040 --> 0:42:25.680
<v Speaker 1>I guess we should have asked him where he'd be

0:42:25.880 --> 0:42:28.200
<v Speaker 1>putting his money at this point in time. I would

0:42:28.239 --> 0:42:31.000
<v Speaker 1>have been interested in that. But but it was really

0:42:31.040 --> 0:42:35.320
<v Speaker 1>fascinating to hear him talk about a permanent behavioral change

0:42:35.840 --> 0:42:39.839
<v Speaker 1>for people and consumers. Well, it's also sort of interesting too,

0:42:40.000 --> 0:42:43.840
<v Speaker 1>because there is a lot of talk about permanent behavioral change,

0:42:44.440 --> 0:42:49.360
<v Speaker 1>and it's worth sort of disentangling what is the permanent

0:42:49.480 --> 0:42:52.759
<v Speaker 1>behavioral change due to the health crisis. So, Okay, maybe

0:42:52.800 --> 0:42:56.120
<v Speaker 1>some people are gonna avoid different kinds of leisure, or

0:42:56.280 --> 0:42:58.560
<v Speaker 1>they're you know, they're gonna want more space between them

0:42:58.600 --> 0:43:01.680
<v Speaker 1>and the next person that arrests run versus the permanent

0:43:01.760 --> 0:43:06.279
<v Speaker 1>behavioral change that results from saying your income vanish in

0:43:06.360 --> 0:43:09.120
<v Speaker 1>a minute or visiting the revenue vanish in a minute.

0:43:09.120 --> 0:43:11.480
<v Speaker 1>So it'll be interroding because there's really two sorts of

0:43:11.600 --> 0:43:16.279
<v Speaker 1>things that are simultaneously unprecedented in this crisis that could

0:43:16.360 --> 0:43:18.920
<v Speaker 1>leave lasting scars. Yeah, I guess we'll have to have

0:43:19.200 --> 0:43:22.160
<v Speaker 1>a Rubini on in well a couple of years to

0:43:22.600 --> 0:43:24.840
<v Speaker 1>to talk about those changes and also see whether or

0:43:24.880 --> 0:43:28.759
<v Speaker 1>not that that stagflation idea has come to fruition. The

0:43:29.000 --> 0:43:32.440
<v Speaker 1>stagflation thing is particularly interesting because you do get more

0:43:32.600 --> 0:43:36.799
<v Speaker 1>people who had never really been believers in the inflation

0:43:37.080 --> 0:43:41.480
<v Speaker 1>thesis starting to come around, essentially because of some version

0:43:42.120 --> 0:43:46.040
<v Speaker 1>of the permanent change of the supply global trade landscape

0:43:46.080 --> 0:43:49.319
<v Speaker 1>that he described. It feels like if there is going

0:43:49.360 --> 0:43:52.520
<v Speaker 1>to be a moment where some of the inflation predictions

0:43:52.600 --> 0:43:55.719
<v Speaker 1>could start to come to fruition, it's that combination of

0:43:55.800 --> 0:44:00.279
<v Speaker 1>deglobalization and aggressive stimulus that could theoretically do it. Yeah,

0:44:00.719 --> 0:44:04.080
<v Speaker 1>definitely an interesting one to watch. All right, Uh, shall

0:44:04.120 --> 0:44:07.520
<v Speaker 1>we leave it there? Let's leave it there? All right, Well,

0:44:07.640 --> 0:44:11.800
<v Speaker 1>this has been another depressing episode of the All Thoughts podcast.

0:44:11.880 --> 0:44:14.319
<v Speaker 1>I'm Tracy Alloway. You can follow me on Twitter at

0:44:14.400 --> 0:44:17.319
<v Speaker 1>Tracy Alloway. Uh, and I'm Joe Wisn't all. You can

0:44:17.400 --> 0:44:20.479
<v Speaker 1>follow me on Twitter at a Stalwart. And you should

0:44:20.520 --> 0:44:24.040
<v Speaker 1>follow our guest on Twitter. Nuriel Roubini. He's at Neuriel.

0:44:24.520 --> 0:44:27.400
<v Speaker 1>Be sure to follow our producer on Twitter, Laura Carlson.

0:44:27.520 --> 0:44:31.520
<v Speaker 1>She's at Laura M. Carlson. Follow the Bloomberg head of podcast,

0:44:31.640 --> 0:44:34.880
<v Speaker 1>Francesco Leavi at Francesca Today, as well as all the

0:44:34.880 --> 0:44:39.360
<v Speaker 1>Bloomberg podcasts, Onto the handle at podcasts, Thanks for listening.

0:45:00.200 --> 0:45:00.239
<v Speaker 1>T