1 00:00:04,400 --> 00:00:07,800 Speaker 1: Welcome to tech Stuff, a production from I Heart Radio. 2 00:00:12,039 --> 00:00:14,560 Speaker 1: Hey there, and welcome to tech Stuff. I'm your host, 3 00:00:14,680 --> 00:00:17,759 Speaker 1: Jonathan Strickland. I'm an executive producer with I Heart Radio 4 00:00:17,880 --> 00:00:20,079 Speaker 1: and a lot of all things tech. And this is 5 00:00:20,120 --> 00:00:25,000 Speaker 1: the tech news for Thursday, September nine, twenty one. And 6 00:00:25,079 --> 00:00:27,800 Speaker 1: before I jump into the news, I want to address 7 00:00:27,880 --> 00:00:31,560 Speaker 1: something I said earlier this week about political groups using 8 00:00:31,720 --> 00:00:35,360 Speaker 1: pressure to gain data from various companies, you know, companies 9 00:00:35,400 --> 00:00:42,400 Speaker 1: like telecommunications companies or internet service providers or social media platforms, etcetera. Uh, 10 00:00:42,479 --> 00:00:48,519 Speaker 1: specifically data about and belonging to other politicians. A lot 11 00:00:48,520 --> 00:00:50,520 Speaker 1: of folks reached out to me and made some really 12 00:00:50,720 --> 00:00:53,920 Speaker 1: good points, you know, kind of in opposition to what 13 00:00:53,960 --> 00:00:56,320 Speaker 1: I was saying. I spent a lot of time thinking 14 00:00:56,320 --> 00:00:59,760 Speaker 1: about my perspective and I tried to really critically analyze it, 15 00:00:59,840 --> 00:01:03,360 Speaker 1: and just as a reminder, I said that generally I 16 00:01:03,400 --> 00:01:06,959 Speaker 1: am against the idea of politicians doing this because I 17 00:01:06,959 --> 00:01:10,320 Speaker 1: feel it can lead to a situation in which whatever 18 00:01:10,440 --> 00:01:13,600 Speaker 1: political party happens to be in power can use that 19 00:01:13,720 --> 00:01:17,520 Speaker 1: kind of leverage to disempower the other party, and that 20 00:01:17,680 --> 00:01:22,640 Speaker 1: is fundamentally antithetical to the democratic process. However, I also 21 00:01:22,680 --> 00:01:27,240 Speaker 1: have to acknowledge that if there is a criminal investigation 22 00:01:27,480 --> 00:01:31,320 Speaker 1: and if there's a sufficient evidence to support a subpoena, 23 00:01:31,640 --> 00:01:33,840 Speaker 1: you know, you can't just make a subpoena, you have 24 00:01:33,880 --> 00:01:37,960 Speaker 1: to file for one and get a court appointed subpoena. 25 00:01:38,480 --> 00:01:42,040 Speaker 1: If that is the case, then investigators should exercise that 26 00:01:42,160 --> 00:01:44,320 Speaker 1: to look at data and see what it holds with 27 00:01:44,360 --> 00:01:49,480 Speaker 1: regard to a crime, and that telecommunications companies and I 28 00:01:49,680 --> 00:01:53,040 Speaker 1: s p s and whatnot should obey subpoenas if those 29 00:01:53,040 --> 00:01:57,840 Speaker 1: subpoenas are legally valid. I'm still wary of this sort 30 00:01:58,000 --> 00:02:02,440 Speaker 1: of approach snowballing beyond situations that appear to be justified, 31 00:02:02,840 --> 00:02:06,640 Speaker 1: Like we were talking about the January six insurrection. That's 32 00:02:06,680 --> 00:02:12,400 Speaker 1: a very high stakes, specific situation. But as we all know, 33 00:02:12,560 --> 00:02:16,000 Speaker 1: justifications can get pretty loosey goosey as time goes on. 34 00:02:16,480 --> 00:02:19,160 Speaker 1: So like once you start to chip away it's stuff 35 00:02:19,760 --> 00:02:22,360 Speaker 1: you've got to be super careful or or you know, 36 00:02:22,400 --> 00:02:25,840 Speaker 1: the whole damn breaks and you get flooded. But under 37 00:02:26,000 --> 00:02:30,200 Speaker 1: very controlled circumstances, I think seeking out that information can 38 00:02:30,280 --> 00:02:34,000 Speaker 1: be valid if if all those processes are followed. I 39 00:02:34,160 --> 00:02:36,920 Speaker 1: just worry that we'll lose a grip on those controls. 40 00:02:37,600 --> 00:02:41,160 Speaker 1: By the way, just full disclosure. It is not easy 41 00:02:41,240 --> 00:02:43,560 Speaker 1: for me to amend my thoughts because, like a lot 42 00:02:43,639 --> 00:02:46,600 Speaker 1: of folks, when I form an opinion, I'm loath to 43 00:02:46,760 --> 00:02:50,760 Speaker 1: change it. But critical thinking says I need to resist 44 00:02:51,120 --> 00:02:54,160 Speaker 1: that urge, and sometimes I actually managed to do that, 45 00:02:54,400 --> 00:02:57,560 Speaker 1: probably not nearly as frequently as I should, but I 46 00:02:57,680 --> 00:03:00,360 Speaker 1: wanted to get that all the way first. Now, let's 47 00:03:00,360 --> 00:03:03,840 Speaker 1: go on to the news in Israel. Hacker using the 48 00:03:03,880 --> 00:03:08,359 Speaker 1: handle Sung Council, and I apologize. I'm sure I've mispronounced 49 00:03:08,400 --> 00:03:15,240 Speaker 1: that claims to have stolen personal information from seven million Israeli's. Now, 50 00:03:15,280 --> 00:03:18,320 Speaker 1: if like me, you wondered how many people live in Israel, 51 00:03:18,800 --> 00:03:21,560 Speaker 1: a quick search tells you it's a little more than 52 00:03:21,639 --> 00:03:24,480 Speaker 1: nine million. It's like almost nine and a half million. 53 00:03:24,960 --> 00:03:26,960 Speaker 1: But if this claim is true, then that means the 54 00:03:26,960 --> 00:03:30,200 Speaker 1: hacker got access to the personal information of nearly everyone 55 00:03:30,280 --> 00:03:33,440 Speaker 1: in Israel. The hacker says that they targeted a website 56 00:03:33,440 --> 00:03:36,520 Speaker 1: called City for You. That's c I t Y the 57 00:03:36,640 --> 00:03:40,320 Speaker 1: number for and the letter you, and Israel uses that 58 00:03:40,400 --> 00:03:43,600 Speaker 1: as sort of a payment processing utility, so folks can 59 00:03:43,840 --> 00:03:48,280 Speaker 1: pay stuff like fines or bills and their taxes through 60 00:03:48,320 --> 00:03:51,880 Speaker 1: this site. The hacker has shared images of documents that 61 00:03:51,920 --> 00:03:55,200 Speaker 1: they claimed to have stolen from this website and included 62 00:03:55,240 --> 00:03:59,280 Speaker 1: documentation with like personal details like like I D Cards 63 00:03:59,320 --> 00:04:01,960 Speaker 1: and tax bill. Is that kind of thing? The hacker 64 00:04:02,040 --> 00:04:04,560 Speaker 1: says that they want to sell this data off to 65 00:04:04,640 --> 00:04:07,720 Speaker 1: interest ad buyers on the black market. Uh. The National 66 00:04:07,840 --> 00:04:13,000 Speaker 1: Cyber Directorate meanwhile, says that they don't think this is 67 00:04:13,040 --> 00:04:16,040 Speaker 1: a legit claim. They say that they believe these documents 68 00:04:16,040 --> 00:04:19,000 Speaker 1: that the hacker has released actually come from an older 69 00:04:19,040 --> 00:04:22,479 Speaker 1: document leak, and that it's unlikely the hacker has actually 70 00:04:22,560 --> 00:04:26,200 Speaker 1: stolen that much data. But that's all the information I 71 00:04:26,279 --> 00:04:29,919 Speaker 1: have as of right now. Several news outlets report that 72 00:04:30,000 --> 00:04:33,800 Speaker 1: Los Angeles police officers have been directed to ask people 73 00:04:33,839 --> 00:04:36,599 Speaker 1: to hand over social media details and have been doing 74 00:04:36,640 --> 00:04:39,680 Speaker 1: so for years, and that includes stuff like the handles 75 00:04:39,680 --> 00:04:43,640 Speaker 1: that people use online, and that was whenever the police 76 00:04:43,720 --> 00:04:47,440 Speaker 1: stopped anyone, even if that person wasn't a suspect of 77 00:04:47,480 --> 00:04:50,599 Speaker 1: any sort of crime. So a cops stops someone in 78 00:04:50,760 --> 00:04:52,880 Speaker 1: l A and then asks them to reveal their social 79 00:04:52,920 --> 00:04:56,919 Speaker 1: media handles, which seems weird right, also a little invasive, 80 00:04:57,440 --> 00:05:01,000 Speaker 1: and the only reason we even know about This officially 81 00:05:01,160 --> 00:05:04,520 Speaker 1: is because a nonprofit New York University agency called the 82 00:05:04,600 --> 00:05:09,080 Speaker 1: Brennan Center for Justice filed a request under California's Public 83 00:05:09,120 --> 00:05:12,400 Speaker 1: Records Act and wanted to learn how the l a 84 00:05:12,480 --> 00:05:15,839 Speaker 1: p D uses social media as a means to monitor 85 00:05:15,960 --> 00:05:19,960 Speaker 1: and conduct surveillance on people. The l a p D 86 00:05:20,480 --> 00:05:24,320 Speaker 1: declined to acquiesce to that request, so the agency brought 87 00:05:24,320 --> 00:05:26,839 Speaker 1: the matter to the California Superior Court, at which point 88 00:05:26,920 --> 00:05:29,120 Speaker 1: the l a p D said it's a fair cup 89 00:05:29,240 --> 00:05:34,000 Speaker 1: and handed over the information, which included around six thousand 90 00:05:34,120 --> 00:05:37,720 Speaker 1: pages of documentation. And this practice appears to have been 91 00:05:37,720 --> 00:05:40,040 Speaker 1: in place for several years, like I mentioned, with cops 92 00:05:40,200 --> 00:05:45,160 Speaker 1: regularly collecting social media information presumably for the purposes of surveillance, 93 00:05:45,600 --> 00:05:48,320 Speaker 1: and again that was for everyone, whether or not they 94 00:05:48,360 --> 00:05:51,599 Speaker 1: were suspected of being involved in a crime. The documentation 95 00:05:51,680 --> 00:05:53,400 Speaker 1: also showed that the l a p D had been 96 00:05:53,440 --> 00:05:57,960 Speaker 1: monitoring specific hashtags for activity on social media, such as 97 00:05:58,480 --> 00:06:02,440 Speaker 1: black Lives Matter. Once again we see how the combination 98 00:06:02,600 --> 00:06:07,000 Speaker 1: of our social interactions online and a surveillance state can 99 00:06:07,040 --> 00:06:12,080 Speaker 1: converge into a pretty nasty horror show of a scenario. Anyway, 100 00:06:12,120 --> 00:06:16,360 Speaker 1: fun times when it comes to talking about misinformation and 101 00:06:16,480 --> 00:06:20,320 Speaker 1: disinformation online. I usually end up talking about Facebook, Twitter, 102 00:06:20,440 --> 00:06:24,320 Speaker 1: and YouTube, but US Senator Elizabeth Warren has issue with 103 00:06:24,400 --> 00:06:27,800 Speaker 1: Amazon's role in the matter as well. Warren says that 104 00:06:27,839 --> 00:06:30,919 Speaker 1: her staff, while searching for materials about COVID nineteen and 105 00:06:31,040 --> 00:06:35,520 Speaker 1: vaccines on Amazon, received results that included books dedicated to 106 00:06:35,560 --> 00:06:40,080 Speaker 1: spreading falsehoods about those issues, and Warren wrote, quote, as 107 00:06:40,160 --> 00:06:43,800 Speaker 1: cases of COVID nineteen continue to rise, Amazon is feeding 108 00:06:43,800 --> 00:06:48,320 Speaker 1: misinformation loops through its search and best seller algorithms, potentially 109 00:06:48,440 --> 00:06:51,200 Speaker 1: leading countless Americans to risk their health and the health 110 00:06:51,279 --> 00:06:54,919 Speaker 1: of their neighbors based on misleading and inaccurate information that 111 00:06:54,960 --> 00:06:58,960 Speaker 1: they discover on Amazon's website end quote. Warren's office is 112 00:06:59,000 --> 00:07:02,320 Speaker 1: asking Amazon to view its recommendation algorithm and to weed 113 00:07:02,360 --> 00:07:06,240 Speaker 1: out dangerous misinformation. The company has yet to reply as 114 00:07:06,360 --> 00:07:11,240 Speaker 1: of the recording of this podcast. Microsoft, in a move 115 00:07:11,320 --> 00:07:14,520 Speaker 1: that I think is pretty wise, has decided to postpone 116 00:07:14,640 --> 00:07:18,480 Speaker 1: indefinitely a return to the Microsoft headquarters in Washington State. 117 00:07:19,040 --> 00:07:23,120 Speaker 1: This postponement also applies to Microsoft's other offices around the 118 00:07:23,240 --> 00:07:26,360 Speaker 1: United States, and the reason, of course, is the ongoing 119 00:07:26,440 --> 00:07:30,280 Speaker 1: pandemic and the dangers of COVID nineteen Originally, the company 120 00:07:30,360 --> 00:07:33,000 Speaker 1: had planned for employees to come back to the office 121 00:07:33,040 --> 00:07:37,000 Speaker 1: by October four, but now there is no return date 122 00:07:37,040 --> 00:07:39,840 Speaker 1: in place, which is probably for the best because things 123 00:07:39,880 --> 00:07:43,040 Speaker 1: are changing so quickly, it really saves time having to 124 00:07:43,080 --> 00:07:46,760 Speaker 1: push those return dates around. In fact, company executives have 125 00:07:46,840 --> 00:07:50,120 Speaker 1: said that the uncertainty around COVID nineteen is precisely why 126 00:07:50,160 --> 00:07:53,760 Speaker 1: they won't set a new target return date. Further, they 127 00:07:53,760 --> 00:07:56,280 Speaker 1: said that when that time does come, when they do 128 00:07:56,360 --> 00:07:58,400 Speaker 1: feel confident that they can go back to the office, 129 00:07:58,680 --> 00:08:02,280 Speaker 1: employees will have a month long transition period to readjust 130 00:08:02,680 --> 00:08:07,160 Speaker 1: for that reality. Now we've seen several tech companies shift 131 00:08:07,280 --> 00:08:11,200 Speaker 1: their expected return dates. Google, Apple, Facebook, and others all 132 00:08:11,240 --> 00:08:14,720 Speaker 1: planned to return earlier, you know, this year and into 133 00:08:14,720 --> 00:08:16,600 Speaker 1: the fall, but now most of them have pushed that 134 00:08:16,640 --> 00:08:19,920 Speaker 1: back to twenty twenty two. One other bit of Microsoft 135 00:08:20,000 --> 00:08:23,080 Speaker 1: related news, the company has announced that it is updating 136 00:08:23,120 --> 00:08:27,600 Speaker 1: it's Microsoft Teams product, which is a virtual meeting software solution, 137 00:08:27,880 --> 00:08:31,440 Speaker 1: and the update will incorporate Teams features into car Play. 138 00:08:31,480 --> 00:08:35,600 Speaker 1: That's the Apple standard that let's say Vehicles Entertainment System 139 00:08:35,640 --> 00:08:39,040 Speaker 1: act as the user interface for an iOS device, So 140 00:08:39,120 --> 00:08:42,400 Speaker 1: you pair your iPhone with your car's entertainment system. Then 141 00:08:42,480 --> 00:08:45,959 Speaker 1: you can control your iPhone through the car system. Now, 142 00:08:46,000 --> 00:08:48,240 Speaker 1: this means that if you do have an iOS device 143 00:08:48,360 --> 00:08:51,960 Speaker 1: with Microsoft Teams installed on it, and if you're connected 144 00:08:52,040 --> 00:08:54,520 Speaker 1: via car Play to your car, you'll be able to 145 00:08:54,600 --> 00:08:57,439 Speaker 1: join in Microsoft Teams meetings from the comfort of your 146 00:08:57,440 --> 00:09:00,920 Speaker 1: car seat, uh in a very sameless way. You can 147 00:09:01,000 --> 00:09:04,920 Speaker 1: even use Siri to do it. This feature only supports 148 00:09:04,960 --> 00:09:07,719 Speaker 1: audio mode, so folks will not see video of you 149 00:09:07,920 --> 00:09:10,320 Speaker 1: as you do mad drifts around the street corners with 150 00:09:10,400 --> 00:09:15,160 Speaker 1: the fam. Microsoft also announced several other updates Teams that 151 00:09:15,240 --> 00:09:18,880 Speaker 1: do not involve vehicles, such as additional features the team's 152 00:09:18,880 --> 00:09:22,080 Speaker 1: mobile app to make it easier to access chat and 153 00:09:22,280 --> 00:09:27,079 Speaker 1: the Microsoft white Board. Today, Facebook and ray Ban introduced 154 00:09:27,120 --> 00:09:31,319 Speaker 1: some smart glasses called ray Ban Stories. They cost two 155 00:09:31,400 --> 00:09:35,640 Speaker 1: hundred and nine dollars eight princely some so what do 156 00:09:35,720 --> 00:09:39,640 Speaker 1: they do? While? They've got to five megapixel cameras built 157 00:09:39,640 --> 00:09:42,880 Speaker 1: into the frames, one at either corner on the outside 158 00:09:42,920 --> 00:09:47,000 Speaker 1: the eyes. They have speakers built into the stems on 159 00:09:47,080 --> 00:09:49,280 Speaker 1: the frames so you can listen to audio from a 160 00:09:49,280 --> 00:09:52,720 Speaker 1: connected device. They've got a physical button that you can 161 00:09:52,800 --> 00:09:55,520 Speaker 1: use to take photos or record videos, or you can 162 00:09:55,600 --> 00:09:59,240 Speaker 1: use voice commands to activate the cameras. They do not 163 00:09:59,600 --> 00:10:03,400 Speaker 1: have any sort of in lens display, so these glasses 164 00:10:03,440 --> 00:10:07,359 Speaker 1: are not capable of providing any sort of augmented reality experience. 165 00:10:07,800 --> 00:10:10,520 Speaker 1: Nor can you see the photos that you've just taken 166 00:10:10,559 --> 00:10:13,120 Speaker 1: with the glasses themselves. To do that, you will need 167 00:10:13,160 --> 00:10:15,560 Speaker 1: to use a connected phone and open up an app 168 00:10:15,640 --> 00:10:18,520 Speaker 1: called Facebook View, which is kind of like a simple 169 00:10:18,720 --> 00:10:23,200 Speaker 1: photo camera roll app. And these don't sound that different 170 00:10:23,240 --> 00:10:26,120 Speaker 1: from the Snapchat glasses we saw a while back, but 171 00:10:26,160 --> 00:10:28,360 Speaker 1: I do have to admit that these glasses look like 172 00:10:28,440 --> 00:10:32,520 Speaker 1: you know, sunglasses. They don't look clunky or anything like that. 173 00:10:32,880 --> 00:10:35,120 Speaker 1: So if you have a need for glasses that will 174 00:10:35,200 --> 00:10:38,079 Speaker 1: let you take photos without using your hands, I guess 175 00:10:38,120 --> 00:10:40,360 Speaker 1: these could fit the bill for a lot of us. 176 00:10:40,400 --> 00:10:44,600 Speaker 1: I'm not sure there's a strong use case. Maybe if 177 00:10:44,600 --> 00:10:47,320 Speaker 1: I were wearing these and going kayaking or something, I 178 00:10:47,360 --> 00:10:50,040 Speaker 1: could use the glasses to take photos and I could 179 00:10:50,080 --> 00:10:52,199 Speaker 1: leave my phone behind so I don't have to worry about, 180 00:10:52,400 --> 00:10:55,040 Speaker 1: you know, dunking it in the water. Although the glasses 181 00:10:55,040 --> 00:10:57,240 Speaker 1: are also not waterproof, They're not meant to get wet, 182 00:10:57,679 --> 00:11:00,240 Speaker 1: but the glasses can hold up to around five those 183 00:11:00,400 --> 00:11:04,079 Speaker 1: or are somewhere around ten to twelve thirty second video 184 00:11:04,120 --> 00:11:07,080 Speaker 1: clips before you would need to offload them from the 185 00:11:07,120 --> 00:11:11,199 Speaker 1: glasses into some other device, and they connect via WiFi 186 00:11:11,240 --> 00:11:14,880 Speaker 1: to authorized devices and then they synchronize using that Facebook 187 00:11:14,920 --> 00:11:18,360 Speaker 1: View app I was talking about. So from the description 188 00:11:18,360 --> 00:11:19,920 Speaker 1: I read, it sounds like you could use them to 189 00:11:19,920 --> 00:11:23,200 Speaker 1: take photos without being directly connected to some other device. 190 00:11:23,640 --> 00:11:26,480 Speaker 1: That makes them different from some other gadgets that I've used, 191 00:11:26,520 --> 00:11:30,800 Speaker 1: where they were kind of conduits for your smartphone. Uh. 192 00:11:30,840 --> 00:11:33,880 Speaker 1: They sound interesting, but I don't think I'll be putting 193 00:11:33,920 --> 00:11:37,080 Speaker 1: them on my holiday wish list. We've got some more 194 00:11:37,160 --> 00:11:39,839 Speaker 1: stories to cover, but before we get to that, let's 195 00:11:39,880 --> 00:11:50,199 Speaker 1: take a quick break. We're back and we're going to 196 00:11:50,280 --> 00:11:52,839 Speaker 1: talk some more about Facebook and organization in the UK 197 00:11:53,040 --> 00:11:56,440 Speaker 1: called Global Witnesses accusing Facebook of being negligent when it 198 00:11:56,480 --> 00:12:00,280 Speaker 1: comes to making certain that's advertising platform is not using 199 00:12:00,320 --> 00:12:04,839 Speaker 1: discriminatory targeting of advertising to users. Now, that's essentially to 200 00:12:04,920 --> 00:12:08,760 Speaker 1: say that Facebook was not stopping companies from breaking equality 201 00:12:08,840 --> 00:12:14,200 Speaker 1: laws by specifically targeting some subgroups while specifically excluding others, 202 00:12:14,240 --> 00:12:18,000 Speaker 1: particularly in the job category. The group did an experiment 203 00:12:18,040 --> 00:12:20,719 Speaker 1: to see what kind of advertisements might be shown to 204 00:12:20,800 --> 00:12:24,240 Speaker 1: different types of people, and in that experiment they found 205 00:12:24,280 --> 00:12:27,800 Speaker 1: that for certain categories of products or services, nearly all 206 00:12:27,840 --> 00:12:31,000 Speaker 1: the ads would be shown to one gender or the other. So, 207 00:12:31,040 --> 00:12:33,720 Speaker 1: for example, if it was an ad for a mechanic, 208 00:12:34,360 --> 00:12:36,960 Speaker 1: it was almost a guarantee that that ad would only 209 00:12:37,000 --> 00:12:41,120 Speaker 1: be displayed to a male Facebook user. If it were 210 00:12:41,160 --> 00:12:44,120 Speaker 1: a nursery nurse, it would almost be guaranteed it would 211 00:12:44,160 --> 00:12:47,880 Speaker 1: only be shown to a female Facebook user. In another experiment, 212 00:12:47,920 --> 00:12:51,680 Speaker 1: the group sent two job ads to Facebook, with one 213 00:12:51,720 --> 00:12:54,480 Speaker 1: of the ads saying Facebook should not show that ad 214 00:12:54,480 --> 00:12:58,360 Speaker 1: to women, and the other saying that Facebook should not 215 00:12:58,400 --> 00:13:02,560 Speaker 1: show that add to anyone older than Facebook did approve 216 00:13:02,920 --> 00:13:05,640 Speaker 1: both of those ads. However, it also sent back a 217 00:13:05,679 --> 00:13:10,560 Speaker 1: little message to the group to Global Witness, saying, Hey, 218 00:13:10,600 --> 00:13:13,680 Speaker 1: you need to acknowledge that you promise you won't discriminate 219 00:13:13,679 --> 00:13:17,280 Speaker 1: against these groups by taking this little box. However, if 220 00:13:17,360 --> 00:13:20,880 Speaker 1: Facebook actually was only showing the ad to, you know, 221 00:13:20,920 --> 00:13:27,560 Speaker 1: the people that were designated by Global Witness, then it 222 00:13:27,640 --> 00:13:30,880 Speaker 1: sounds to me like you can't avoid discrimination. Like just 223 00:13:30,920 --> 00:13:32,880 Speaker 1: the very nature of the fact that you have limited 224 00:13:32,880 --> 00:13:36,640 Speaker 1: the ad so that you know certain groups can't see it. 225 00:13:37,360 --> 00:13:41,360 Speaker 1: That seems at least that it's facilitating discrimination. Now, whether 226 00:13:41,440 --> 00:13:46,440 Speaker 1: this escalates to UK government action remains to be seen. Meanwhile, 227 00:13:46,480 --> 00:13:49,920 Speaker 1: the Australian government continues to make decisions that I think 228 00:13:49,960 --> 00:13:52,959 Speaker 1: are ill advised. I talked about the Surveillance Bill earlier 229 00:13:53,000 --> 00:13:55,440 Speaker 1: this week that would allow law enforcement to potentially alter 230 00:13:55,559 --> 00:13:59,720 Speaker 1: a person's online posts without their consent. But now I 231 00:13:59,760 --> 00:14:01,719 Speaker 1: want to talk about something else. A decision that was 232 00:14:01,760 --> 00:14:04,440 Speaker 1: made by the Australian High Court that's kind of like 233 00:14:04,520 --> 00:14:07,840 Speaker 1: the U. S. Supreme Court. That court found that Facebook 234 00:14:07,960 --> 00:14:11,080 Speaker 1: users can be held liable for content posted by people 235 00:14:11,160 --> 00:14:14,719 Speaker 1: who are commenting on their posts. So if you were 236 00:14:14,760 --> 00:14:17,000 Speaker 1: to post something on Facebook, let's say it's even something 237 00:14:17,000 --> 00:14:19,560 Speaker 1: that's just a goofy meme, it's totally harmless, and then 238 00:14:19,600 --> 00:14:22,360 Speaker 1: someone else leaves a comment that includes like a threat 239 00:14:22,880 --> 00:14:26,840 Speaker 1: or libelous content, then you could be held responsible for 240 00:14:27,280 --> 00:14:30,400 Speaker 1: the post of that person because, according to the court, 241 00:14:30,840 --> 00:14:35,160 Speaker 1: you're effectively a publisher from that moment forward. Your original 242 00:14:35,200 --> 00:14:38,880 Speaker 1: post is a publication platform, so someone leaving a comment 243 00:14:39,200 --> 00:14:42,760 Speaker 1: is being published through you, and as a publisher, you 244 00:14:42,800 --> 00:14:45,720 Speaker 1: can be held liable for the stuff they post without 245 00:14:45,800 --> 00:14:50,280 Speaker 1: your control. At least, if I'm understanding this, correctly. That's 246 00:14:50,280 --> 00:14:53,840 Speaker 1: how it goes now. To be fair, this whole thing 247 00:14:53,920 --> 00:14:57,160 Speaker 1: was really more about news media outlets and their Facebook 248 00:14:57,200 --> 00:15:00,400 Speaker 1: pages posting content and then not modoring the moments that 249 00:15:00,440 --> 00:15:04,000 Speaker 1: were left under that content. But the implications extend well 250 00:15:04,040 --> 00:15:07,040 Speaker 1: beyond those companies, Like you could see how this could 251 00:15:07,160 --> 00:15:11,200 Speaker 1: quickly become a true nightmare in other news, Twitter is 252 00:15:11,200 --> 00:15:14,440 Speaker 1: starting a rollout of a new feature called Communities. I 253 00:15:14,520 --> 00:15:17,840 Speaker 1: say it's new, but it sounds like this particular feature 254 00:15:17,880 --> 00:15:21,200 Speaker 1: has actually languished in development at Twitter for half a decade. 255 00:15:21,560 --> 00:15:24,200 Speaker 1: The ideas that you can create a community of users 256 00:15:24,200 --> 00:15:27,400 Speaker 1: focused on a particular subject, like I don't know, the 257 00:15:27,440 --> 00:15:31,040 Speaker 1: Marvel Cinematic Universe. Okay, you've got a Marvel Cinematic Universe 258 00:15:31,080 --> 00:15:34,040 Speaker 1: Twitter community as so you can apply to Twitter to 259 00:15:34,160 --> 00:15:36,640 Speaker 1: create the community. You can't just make it yourself, at 260 00:15:36,680 --> 00:15:40,040 Speaker 1: least not right now. And then once it's created, folks 261 00:15:40,120 --> 00:15:43,720 Speaker 1: can join that community, and then you can tweet to 262 00:15:43,840 --> 00:15:46,840 Speaker 1: that community in particular, and you spare everyone else who 263 00:15:46,920 --> 00:15:51,120 Speaker 1: follows you all of your endless theories about how Mephisto 264 00:15:51,320 --> 00:15:53,560 Speaker 1: is most definitely going to end up being the one 265 00:15:53,600 --> 00:15:55,920 Speaker 1: who is responsible for all the bad stuff going on 266 00:15:56,000 --> 00:15:58,440 Speaker 1: in the m c U these days. Now, I actually 267 00:15:58,480 --> 00:16:01,560 Speaker 1: applied to create a community around tech so that I 268 00:16:01,560 --> 00:16:04,280 Speaker 1: can send tech related takes there and anyone who follows 269 00:16:04,280 --> 00:16:07,360 Speaker 1: me just for my dad jokes or pictures of my dog, 270 00:16:07,440 --> 00:16:10,080 Speaker 1: Tiblet can be spared. All the talk about the Hoosts 271 00:16:10,120 --> 00:16:13,600 Speaker 1: and Watsons galore. I'm not sure if this feature is 272 00:16:13,600 --> 00:16:16,280 Speaker 1: actually gonna drive more engagement on Twitter. That's something that 273 00:16:16,320 --> 00:16:18,960 Speaker 1: the company has really been concerned with, because, you know, 274 00:16:19,000 --> 00:16:22,080 Speaker 1: Twitter adoption has really leveled off, so in order for 275 00:16:22,160 --> 00:16:25,720 Speaker 1: the company to show value, it needs to drive more engagement. 276 00:16:26,200 --> 00:16:29,520 Speaker 1: Twitter has previously launched features that didn't catch on in 277 00:16:29,560 --> 00:16:32,280 Speaker 1: the platform later abandoned them. So we'll have to see 278 00:16:32,560 --> 00:16:34,440 Speaker 1: and I'll let you know if they approve my request 279 00:16:34,480 --> 00:16:37,960 Speaker 1: to create that community. And finally, some quick stories to 280 00:16:38,120 --> 00:16:41,560 Speaker 1: end out today's episode, The James Webb Space Telescope has 281 00:16:41,600 --> 00:16:44,720 Speaker 1: a new launch date. If all goes well, the telescope 282 00:16:44,760 --> 00:16:48,080 Speaker 1: should finally let slip the bonds of Earth on December. 283 00:16:49,240 --> 00:16:52,440 Speaker 1: The telescope has had a long and sometimes rough journey 284 00:16:52,480 --> 00:16:54,880 Speaker 1: over the years to get to this point. The launch 285 00:16:54,920 --> 00:16:57,840 Speaker 1: has had several delays over that time, and the James 286 00:16:57,880 --> 00:17:01,040 Speaker 1: Webb Space telescope is in many ways the spiritual successor 287 00:17:01,080 --> 00:17:03,960 Speaker 1: to the Hubble telescope and has the potential to allow 288 00:17:04,000 --> 00:17:06,880 Speaker 1: us to learn more about how our galaxy works. It's 289 00:17:06,920 --> 00:17:10,400 Speaker 1: a super interesting piece of technology. And heck, I even 290 00:17:10,400 --> 00:17:13,520 Speaker 1: have a tattoo because of this telescope. I even got 291 00:17:13,560 --> 00:17:16,639 Speaker 1: that tattoo while on camera for an episode of the 292 00:17:16,680 --> 00:17:19,560 Speaker 1: show Forward Thinking that I used to host. So there's 293 00:17:19,600 --> 00:17:22,280 Speaker 1: a there's a video of me getting tattooed with a 294 00:17:22,280 --> 00:17:26,919 Speaker 1: tattoo that's inspired by the James Webbs James web Space telescope. Anyway, 295 00:17:26,960 --> 00:17:28,520 Speaker 1: I really hope it all works out and that we 296 00:17:28,560 --> 00:17:31,320 Speaker 1: see the telescope triumphantly take its place in orbit. Later 297 00:17:31,400 --> 00:17:34,840 Speaker 1: this year, in Iceland, an enormous facility called Orca has 298 00:17:34,880 --> 00:17:38,520 Speaker 1: come online. And Orca's purpose is to capture carbon dioxide 299 00:17:38,600 --> 00:17:41,240 Speaker 1: from the air and lock it into mineral form. So 300 00:17:41,280 --> 00:17:45,919 Speaker 1: it's a carbon capture and sequestration facility. In other words. Now, 301 00:17:46,080 --> 00:17:47,879 Speaker 1: before you start to think that we've got the climate 302 00:17:47,920 --> 00:17:52,480 Speaker 1: issue solved thanks to this technology, let's talk limitations. This 303 00:17:52,640 --> 00:17:56,560 Speaker 1: is the largest carbon capture facility in the world up 304 00:17:56,600 --> 00:17:58,840 Speaker 1: to this point, and according to the companies that are 305 00:17:58,840 --> 00:18:01,440 Speaker 1: behind it, it will be able to capture around four 306 00:18:01,480 --> 00:18:04,680 Speaker 1: thousand tons of carbon dioxide out of the air each year. 307 00:18:05,160 --> 00:18:08,760 Speaker 1: The US Environmental Protection Agency says that's approximately equal to 308 00:18:08,800 --> 00:18:12,280 Speaker 1: the amount of carbon emissions generated by eight seventy cars 309 00:18:12,359 --> 00:18:17,119 Speaker 1: running on internal combustion engines, presumably in a year. Well, 310 00:18:17,200 --> 00:18:20,600 Speaker 1: that's fewer than a thousand cars. There are millions of 311 00:18:20,640 --> 00:18:25,359 Speaker 1: cars out there, not to mention airplanes, coal plants, oil refineries, 312 00:18:25,640 --> 00:18:28,920 Speaker 1: and other sources of carbon dioxide emissions. This is why 313 00:18:28,920 --> 00:18:32,080 Speaker 1: it's good to remember that carbon capture, while it can 314 00:18:32,119 --> 00:18:35,800 Speaker 1: be a critical component of mitigating the problems of climate change, 315 00:18:36,200 --> 00:18:39,719 Speaker 1: is only part of that solution. We cannot look at 316 00:18:39,760 --> 00:18:43,800 Speaker 1: carbon capture as absolving us of the responsibility to cut 317 00:18:43,840 --> 00:18:48,520 Speaker 1: back on carbon emissions. Unfortunately, that's how the practice often 318 00:18:48,520 --> 00:18:51,880 Speaker 1: gets marketed. I see a lot of companies saying, hey, look, 319 00:18:51,880 --> 00:18:54,159 Speaker 1: we don't need to cut back. We'll just catch the 320 00:18:54,200 --> 00:18:56,879 Speaker 1: carbon dioxide using this facility, and we'll just keep on 321 00:18:56,920 --> 00:18:59,560 Speaker 1: doing stuff the way we always have. Maybe we'll even 322 00:18:59,600 --> 00:19:02,840 Speaker 1: crank up the carbon emissions. Now, the truth of the 323 00:19:02,880 --> 00:19:06,240 Speaker 1: matter is, we just can't do that. We cannot keep 324 00:19:06,320 --> 00:19:10,360 Speaker 1: up with that kind of approach. Finally, the Stanford Computational 325 00:19:10,440 --> 00:19:12,960 Speaker 1: imaging lab or at least a paper describing a really 326 00:19:13,040 --> 00:19:16,439 Speaker 1: cool technology. Cool and a little creepy. They developed a 327 00:19:16,520 --> 00:19:20,160 Speaker 1: new non line of sight imaging tech and that's kind 328 00:19:20,160 --> 00:19:22,480 Speaker 1: of what it sounds like. It's technology that can take 329 00:19:22,520 --> 00:19:25,560 Speaker 1: images of stuff that isn't in the actual line of 330 00:19:25,560 --> 00:19:28,479 Speaker 1: sight of the imaging technology or you know, like the lens. 331 00:19:29,160 --> 00:19:30,880 Speaker 1: And you may have heard about cameras that can quote 332 00:19:30,960 --> 00:19:35,320 Speaker 1: unquote see around corners. Well, that's a subset of this 333 00:19:35,400 --> 00:19:37,720 Speaker 1: type of technology, and the way it works is not 334 00:19:37,920 --> 00:19:42,280 Speaker 1: that different from echolocation. A camera will include a light 335 00:19:42,440 --> 00:19:45,600 Speaker 1: emitter and it shoots out light, perhaps outside of the 336 00:19:45,680 --> 00:19:48,439 Speaker 1: visible spectrum, that goes out ahead of the camera. So 337 00:19:48,520 --> 00:19:50,480 Speaker 1: let's say you're going down a hallway and the hallway 338 00:19:50,520 --> 00:19:53,680 Speaker 1: has a ninety degree corner in it, so it turns 339 00:19:53,720 --> 00:19:58,399 Speaker 1: off to the left and you're using this, uh this device, 340 00:19:58,480 --> 00:19:59,840 Speaker 1: and some light is coming out of the end of 341 00:19:59,880 --> 00:20:03,920 Speaker 1: the device. It hits the corner that you're facing, bounces 342 00:20:03,960 --> 00:20:05,919 Speaker 1: off the corner, it goes off to the left side. 343 00:20:06,359 --> 00:20:09,560 Speaker 1: Some of that light could encounter an object, let's say 344 00:20:09,600 --> 00:20:12,040 Speaker 1: it's the Bobba duke, and then some of that light 345 00:20:12,080 --> 00:20:14,320 Speaker 1: bounces off the Bobba duke, and it goes back around 346 00:20:14,320 --> 00:20:17,399 Speaker 1: the corner and hits your sensor on your device, and 347 00:20:17,400 --> 00:20:19,760 Speaker 1: the camera picks up this returning light and says, hey, 348 00:20:19,840 --> 00:20:23,000 Speaker 1: there's something around that corner and you should probably definitely 349 00:20:23,119 --> 00:20:26,920 Speaker 1: not go that way now. Again. It's it's a lot 350 00:20:26,960 --> 00:20:30,560 Speaker 1: like you know echolocation or laser range finders or speed 351 00:20:30,560 --> 00:20:33,800 Speaker 1: tracking devices. Well, the Stanford Group developed a tech that 352 00:20:33,840 --> 00:20:37,400 Speaker 1: they call keyhole imaging because you could, in theory, set 353 00:20:37,440 --> 00:20:40,159 Speaker 1: up a device to shine a laser beam through a 354 00:20:40,240 --> 00:20:42,560 Speaker 1: keyhole or a crack in a wall to hit a 355 00:20:42,600 --> 00:20:45,360 Speaker 1: single point on the opposite side of a closed door, 356 00:20:45,400 --> 00:20:48,199 Speaker 1: So like on the wall opposite of the door. So 357 00:20:48,320 --> 00:20:50,359 Speaker 1: just imagine you're kneeling at a door it's got a 358 00:20:50,440 --> 00:20:52,760 Speaker 1: keyhole in it, one of those classic ones, and you 359 00:20:52,800 --> 00:20:55,080 Speaker 1: stick this device and it's got its a little laser pointer, 360 00:20:55,119 --> 00:20:57,560 Speaker 1: and it shoots the laser across the room and it 361 00:20:57,640 --> 00:21:00,320 Speaker 1: hits the wall on the other side. Well, some of 362 00:21:00,320 --> 00:21:02,280 Speaker 1: the photons and that laser beam are going to be 363 00:21:02,280 --> 00:21:05,280 Speaker 1: bouncing off of all the different stuff that's in that room, 364 00:21:05,320 --> 00:21:07,760 Speaker 1: and some of those bouncing photons will actually make their 365 00:21:07,800 --> 00:21:10,439 Speaker 1: way back to a sensor paired with the laser and 366 00:21:10,480 --> 00:21:13,600 Speaker 1: by measuring the time of travel for those photons, software 367 00:21:13,640 --> 00:21:16,080 Speaker 1: can figure out if stuff is actually moving around on 368 00:21:16,119 --> 00:21:18,359 Speaker 1: the other side of that door. Now I should add 369 00:21:18,600 --> 00:21:21,760 Speaker 1: that moving around part is important. The researchers have noted 370 00:21:21,840 --> 00:21:25,879 Speaker 1: that this method, which uses less surface area than the 371 00:21:25,920 --> 00:21:29,920 Speaker 1: older non light on site imaging technologies, is really limited 372 00:21:29,960 --> 00:21:32,040 Speaker 1: in the amount of information it can gather. If the 373 00:21:32,119 --> 00:21:34,680 Speaker 1: room is static, if nothing is moving there, you really 374 00:21:34,680 --> 00:21:37,240 Speaker 1: can't get a bead on what's inside the room. But 375 00:21:37,600 --> 00:21:40,080 Speaker 1: if there is stuff moving around, with enough time, you 376 00:21:40,119 --> 00:21:42,720 Speaker 1: can gather data to gain an idea of what it 377 00:21:43,000 --> 00:21:45,760 Speaker 1: is that's moving around in there, as well as the 378 00:21:45,760 --> 00:21:49,639 Speaker 1: trajectory of its pathway. So this tech could be useful 379 00:21:49,880 --> 00:21:54,560 Speaker 1: in everything from military applications to integrations with car navigation 380 00:21:54,560 --> 00:21:57,200 Speaker 1: and driver assist systems. And it's just kind of neat 381 00:21:57,200 --> 00:21:59,280 Speaker 1: when you think that this tech, which sounds like it 382 00:21:59,320 --> 00:22:02,239 Speaker 1: belongs in a Mission Impossible movie, could get all that 383 00:22:02,280 --> 00:22:05,359 Speaker 1: information just by shining a laser light through a small 384 00:22:05,440 --> 00:22:08,720 Speaker 1: hole in an otherwise sealed off room. And that's it 385 00:22:09,160 --> 00:22:11,920 Speaker 1: for this episode of tech Stuff. If you have any 386 00:22:12,880 --> 00:22:15,560 Speaker 1: stories you would want me to cover, or any technologies 387 00:22:15,600 --> 00:22:17,480 Speaker 1: you would like me to cover in future episodes reach 388 00:22:17,480 --> 00:22:19,560 Speaker 1: out to me. The best way to do that right now, 389 00:22:19,720 --> 00:22:22,159 Speaker 1: before I get that community going anyway, is just to 390 00:22:22,280 --> 00:22:24,720 Speaker 1: use the regular old Twitter handle for the show, which 391 00:22:24,760 --> 00:22:27,679 Speaker 1: is text Stuff H s W and I'll talk to 392 00:22:27,680 --> 00:22:37,480 Speaker 1: you again really soon Y. Text Stuff is an I 393 00:22:37,600 --> 00:22:41,080 Speaker 1: Heart Radio production. For more podcasts from my Heart Radio, 394 00:22:41,400 --> 00:22:44,600 Speaker 1: visit the I heart Radio app, Apple Podcasts, or wherever 395 00:22:44,680 --> 00:22:46,160 Speaker 1: you listen to your favorite shows