Speaker 1: Pushkin from Pushkin Industries. This is Deep Background, the show
Speaker 1: where we explore the stories behind the stories in the news.
Speaker 1: I'm Noah Feldman. As regular listeners know, this season of
Speaker 1: Deep Background is all about power. We've talked about power
Speaker 1: in a range of different forms already and will continue
Speaker 1: to talk about it in many, many different ways. But
Speaker 1: one of the central areas in which power is exercised
Speaker 1: in our world is the area of international affairs. Power
Speaker 1: gets expressed by governments, it gets expressed by militaries, It
Speaker 1: gets expressed by international organizations like the United Nations and
Speaker 1: the alphabet soup of other organizations that go with it.
Speaker 1: All of these forms of power are also exercised by
Speaker 1: real human beings. Over the next few weeks here on
Speaker 1: the show, we're going to be diving deep into the
Speaker 1: question of power in foreign affairs, and particularly the way
Speaker 1: that international power is changing in the current moment of
Speaker 1: historical time. In order to do that, we're going to
Speaker 1: engage some of the world's leading thinkers on power in
Speaker 1: international affairs. The first guest joining us in this series
Speaker 1: of conversations is the extraordinary foreign policy thinker and expert
Speaker 1: and Maurice laughter Ann Ree's accomplishments are so extraordinary there
Speaker 1: are almost too many to list. She started her career
Speaker 1: as an international lawyer and as a professor at Harvard
Speaker 1: Law School. She went on to become the dean of
Speaker 1: Princeton's School of Public and International Affairs. She worked in
Speaker 1: Hillary Clinton's State Department as the director of Policy Planning,
Speaker 1: traditionally the job for a policy intellectual who has the
Speaker 1: picture in mind, and today she's CEO of New America,
Speaker 1: the public policy think tank with which I have been
Speaker 1: fortunate enough to be associated at various times throughout my
Speaker 1: own career. In short, Anne Marie is one of the
Speaker 1: most listened to and respected experts who thinks about the
Speaker 1: way power is deployed in our world, and especially about
Speaker 1: the people who deploy that power through networks. Anne Marie,
Speaker 1: thank you so much for joining me. An Marie, I'm
Speaker 1: so grateful to you for coming on the show. I
Speaker 1: really wanted to talk to you about the big theme
Speaker 1: that we're focused on this season on deep background, which
Speaker 1: is the theme of power, because you've written so deeply
Speaker 1: about power and also participated in the shaping and distribution
Speaker 1: of power in the sphere of foreign affairs and international
Speaker 1: relations over your fascinating career. So I thought maybe one
Speaker 1: way to structure the conversation was to begin by asking
Speaker 1: you how things have changed over the course of your time.
Speaker 1: So let's start with you when you first found yourself
Speaker 1: as an active participant in power, maybe when you helped
Speaker 1: Abe Shas to help Nicaragua to sue the United States
Speaker 1: in front of the International Court of Justice. How did
Speaker 1: you think about international power and the United States then
Speaker 1: compared to how it's changed since. Such a great question,
Speaker 1: and that in many ways, the changes in the distribution
Speaker 1: of power, but also the way power is wielded has
Speaker 1: defined my career in international relations, or over my lifetime,
Speaker 1: we've seen dramatic shifts. I worked with Abe representing Nicaragua
Speaker 1: in the eighties, so we're still in the Cold War,
Speaker 1: and that is the place to start. When you were
Speaker 1: studying international relations in the seventies and eighties, anytime after
Speaker 1: the Soviet Union really rose, you are looking at a
Speaker 1: bipolar world and everything is seen through that lens, even
Speaker 1: the case that Nicaragua brings against the United States and
Speaker 1: the World Court, because the United States had mined the
Speaker 1: waters of the Port of Nicaragua, which is actually kind
Speaker 1: of astounding because we were opposed to the Sandinistas. Why
Speaker 1: are we opposed to the Sandinistas because they're supported by
Speaker 1: the Russians or the Soviets at that point, So everything
Speaker 1: is seen through this lens of you have two massive
Speaker 1: superpowers who are opposed and they support proxy wars of
Speaker 1: all kinds. But I'd say that's the Cold War distribution
Speaker 1: of power. Two superpowers, obviously other nuclear powers France, Britain, China,
Speaker 1: who are very important, and then a structure of global
Speaker 1: governance that worked when the superpowers weren't trying to block
Speaker 1: one another. Today the first thing you'd say, as well,
Speaker 1: but there aren't two superpowers. And I do not believe
Speaker 1: that China and the United States are the superpowers of
Speaker 1: the twenty first century. I think that's far too simple.
Speaker 1: There are the traditional great powers, and Russia is still
Speaker 1: a great power its ability to disrupt anyway. But then
Speaker 1: of course you have the rising powers or the returning
Speaker 1: powers India clearly, Brazil, South Africa, but also digital powers.
Speaker 1: It's just a much more complex landscape of power. The
Speaker 1: other thing I would start with is look at the
Speaker 1: largest companies in the world. They are far more powerful
Speaker 1: than a hundred of the states and the United Nations,
Speaker 1: and then lots of civic groups. So you have a complex,
Speaker 1: shifting landscape of power that is layered on top of
Speaker 1: a traditional state system of power, and that itself has changed.
Speaker 1: We'll go more deeply into each of those types of
Speaker 1: power before we do. I actually want to ask something
Speaker 1: about how people who wield power in foreign affairs, individual
Speaker 1: human beings operated in that bipolar Cold War era. Because
Speaker 1: Abehas at the time that you were working with him,
Speaker 1: was a professor at Harvard Law School, and there you
Speaker 1: were at the cusp of what will be a career
Speaker 1: where you two would work for the US government. Was
Speaker 1: there something strange at that time or was it perceived
Speaker 1: as strange or was it perceived as completely normal for
Speaker 1: you and he to help represent a country that wasn't
Speaker 1: on the US side in the Cold War? Yes, The
Speaker 1: New York Times ran a story called America's Accuser. Abe's argument,
Speaker 1: which I still use today, is there is nothing wrong
Speaker 1: withholding the United States to its own highest standards, that
Speaker 1: this was appalling the behavior of the United States. So
Speaker 1: it was again this ideal of the rule of law,
Speaker 1: of the global rule of law, as well as the
Speaker 1: domestic rule of law. And for somebody like Abe who
Speaker 1: believed in international law, he also believed in the intersection
Speaker 1: of law and politics, this was a perfectly reasonable thing
Speaker 1: to do and really a patriotic thing to do. Today
Speaker 1: people would say, well, you're helping an enemy of the
Speaker 1: United States engaged in what we today call lawfair. Yes, right,
Speaker 1: which is there are a lot of definitions of law fair,
Speaker 1: but people often define it as the use of law
Speaker 1: and legal institutions to push the geopolitical interests of a
Speaker 1: party in a conflict. That wasn't really though, seen as
Speaker 1: the salient issue. It was more like, there's an ideal
Speaker 1: of international law in the United States, arrantly broke it,
Speaker 1: and so therefore it was patriotic to stand up for
Speaker 1: that principle. One of the family as takeaways of that
Speaker 1: case was that you guys won, yes, right, Nicaraguo won
Speaker 1: its lawsuit in the World Court, and the US took
Speaker 1: its ball and went home, yes, and just refused to
Speaker 1: allow that judgment to mean much of anything in practice.
Speaker 1: Talk to me just for a moment about whether that
Speaker 1: marked an important inflection point for you in the history
Speaker 1: of how international institutions like the World Court participated in
Speaker 1: global power, because I guess that was just a huge
Speaker 1: blow to the prestige of the Court in a certain way.
Speaker 1: It was so I'm thinking back, So we have this
Speaker 1: whole fight about jurisdiction. The Court rules that it has jurisdiction,
Speaker 1: and then the United States stops playing. But the Court
Speaker 1: does issue a judgment against the United States. And so
Speaker 1: what Abe would have said, and what I would agree
Speaker 1: is international law is not going to work just like
Speaker 1: domestic law. It's not going to get enforced because the
Speaker 1: Court has no coercive powers. But when the government changed
Speaker 1: in the United States under the Clinton administration, there was
Speaker 1: a recognition that this was a black mark against the
Speaker 1: United States. When we're there, we are telling to other
Speaker 1: countries that they ought to abide by the rule of law,
Speaker 1: and they could just point to this and say, you're
Speaker 1: a complete hypocrite. And so it became a bargaining chip
Speaker 1: between the US government and the Nicaraguan government, and there
Speaker 1: was finally a settlement. And Abe would have said, that's
Speaker 1: the intersection of law and politics. I still think his
Speaker 1: book The Cuban Missile Crisis is one of the great
Speaker 1: works on international law and politics. And it's a monograph.
Speaker 1: It's one hundred and twenty five pages. I read it
Speaker 1: when I was an undergraduate in Richard Fox law class
Speaker 1: at Princeton, and it was all about out the ways
Speaker 1: in which you can use law to shape political choices
Speaker 1: and options. So I think he would have said overall
Speaker 1: that it was worth bringing the case. It was worth
Speaker 1: certainly litigating the case, and the Nicaraguan's got something out
Speaker 1: of it. I'm really interested in something you've written deeply
Speaker 1: and extensively about one or even two full books about this,
Speaker 1: depending on how you measure, which is the human networks
Speaker 1: of interaction between the real people who participate in the
Speaker 1: shaping of decisions in international affairs. You know, that's the
Speaker 1: way the real world works, and a lot of people
Speaker 1: don't know about it. And one of the things you've
Speaker 1: done in your work is to remind people out in
Speaker 1: the public that this is actually how international institutions often function.
Speaker 1: I want to ask you to start by just saying
Speaker 1: a word about how you think those networks of humans
Speaker 1: are shaping power now, and then I'll ask a follow
Speaker 1: on skeptical question about whether that's a good or a
Speaker 1: bad thing. But let's start with the how, because I
Speaker 1: think this is still not well understood by the general world.
Speaker 1: When people think whereas power international domain, they either think, well,
Speaker 1: they are governments and they're these big strong things, or
Speaker 1: their corporations and they are these big strong things. You've
Speaker 1: done a lot, at least in my reading, to draw
Speaker 1: people's attention to the fact that there are humans who
Speaker 1: do this, and they have friendships and networks and experiences
Speaker 1: and political responsibilities, and that plays a role. Yes, well,
Speaker 1: the first thing to say is, in my generation of
Speaker 1: international lawyers, people used to talk very openly about saying
Speaker 1: from Oscar Shackter, a former a great international law professor
Speaker 1: at Columbia, who talked about the invisible college of international law,
Speaker 1: and what he meant was international lawyers around the world
Speaker 1: who absolutely came together in places like the International Court
Speaker 1: of Justice, but also in countless arbitrations. Right, there's an
Speaker 1: entire world of international arbitration of states versus states, but
Speaker 1: off in corporations versus states, and everybody knew each other,
Speaker 1: and everybody had either taught one another or worked with
Speaker 1: one another or been classmates, and so this and he
Speaker 1: would say the invisible college of international law. Right today
Speaker 1: to say that would be automatically suspect, and I think
Speaker 1: rightly because it was a very closed shop. It was
Speaker 1: a white mail shop, but it wasn't just white men.
Speaker 1: It was of a very particular kind. And they went
Speaker 1: to long dinners in Geneva and the Hague in New
Speaker 1: York and various places, and all knew each other and
Speaker 1: did believe in the law. So I'm not saying that
Speaker 1: they bribed one another or anything like that, but it
Speaker 1: was a cozy world. It was a world of referrals.
Speaker 1: So once you're in it, you know, you recommend other
Speaker 1: people as arbitrators or of counsel. It's a lucrative world.
Speaker 1: I think people would look at maybe the International Court
Speaker 1: of Justice or the International Bar or the United Nations
Speaker 1: and see that it's a pretty clubby group of diplomats
Speaker 1: and understand that there are corridors of power there and
Speaker 1: deals made that No one has any understanding of what
Speaker 1: I wrote about in my first book in two thousand
Speaker 1: and four, but I really started studying this in nineteen
Speaker 1: ninety four. Were networks of judges, not international judges, but
Speaker 1: US judges, Canadian judges, South African, European judges who were
Speaker 1: talking to one another and meeting at international conferences and
Speaker 1: exchanging opinions. And then these networks, very powerful networks of
Speaker 1: central bankers, of finance ministers, securities commissioners, insurance commissioners. They
Speaker 1: have the same language, they face the same issues, and
Speaker 1: they have a very strong professional set of biases. And
Speaker 1: if we are going to have an open international order,
Speaker 1: you have to be aware of who those folks are.
Speaker 1: You have to be able to lobby them, you have
Speaker 1: to be able to restrain them. I think there's there's
Speaker 1: good power there, but only if it is held to
Speaker 1: account and made more transparent. Arguably that that network has
Speaker 1: those networks that you mentioned have now interpenetrated with each other. Yes,
Speaker 1: And sometimes as a shorthand, people will just say the
Speaker 1: one word Davos to describe the World Economic Forum that
Speaker 1: meets in Davos and elsewhere, and it's really hard to
Speaker 1: get invited, And it's all the room where it happened, Yes,
Speaker 1: And it's a lot of rooms, and you know, people
Speaker 1: with power go and are excited to go. And you know,
Speaker 1: maybe there's something that critics of this, both from the
Speaker 1: left and the right, are onto when they say, gee,
Speaker 1: a lot of global geopolitics is being done by a
Speaker 1: small number of powerful people behind closed doors. And some
Speaker 1: people have a conspiracy theory about that, and I always say, look,
Speaker 1: you don't need a conspiracy theory about it. You know
Speaker 1: it actually happens. It is real. It is you know,
Speaker 1: you have to be objective about what power it does
Speaker 1: and doesn't deploy. It's not absolute, but it's it's going
Speaker 1: on there. So I wonder if you would reflect on
Speaker 1: whether that's okay at all in their first place. I mean,
Speaker 1: could we make it better if we made the sessions
Speaker 1: more transparent at Davos, No, because people would still talk
Speaker 1: in the hallways or over exactly, and so it's not
Speaker 1: so anyway, I want to hear your thoughts about that. Yeah,
Speaker 1: that that is very right, And yeah, I will just
Speaker 1: say I stopped going years ago, and it's it's it's
Speaker 1: awful because it is all the room where it happens,
Speaker 1: and it's all concentric circles radiating out from the central hotels.
Speaker 1: But it's also a version of high school, right, It's
Speaker 1: it's like high school crossed with Hamilton, where you know,
Speaker 1: everybody wants to be in the room where it happens,
Speaker 1: and everybody is sure, there's there's a party going on somewhere,
Speaker 1: and there is, you know that much like high school.
Speaker 1: So as you were talking, I was thinking, yes, how
Speaker 1: is that? Back in two thousand and four, I could
Speaker 1: have written a book called a New World Order where
Speaker 1: I really thought that these networks of government officials, again
Speaker 1: of financial officials, but also any trust officials, environmental officials,
Speaker 1: judges were really positive because I look at what you're
Speaker 1: describing now and think, no, there is no way to
Speaker 1: hold that accountable. It's like the global blab You're not
Speaker 1: There's so much power there that there is no way
Speaker 1: to hold it accountable, to make it transparent, to lobby it.
Speaker 1: None of that will work. You actually have to change
Speaker 1: the power structures. But back you know, from nineteen ninety
Speaker 1: four to two thousand and four, it shows you where
Speaker 1: the American internationalist mindset was. I'm not going to talk
Speaker 1: about the world. This is the American international mindset, which
Speaker 1: was the Coal Wars. Finally, over the global governance infrastructure
Speaker 1: we and our allies put in place after nineteen forty
Speaker 1: five can actually work. You created the International Criminal Court,
Speaker 1: You're bringing people to account. And I was writing saying,
Speaker 1: you know, instead of just focusing on these big global institutions,
Speaker 1: Let's look at these networks because they can get things
Speaker 1: done and we need things done. Like if you have
Speaker 1: all global environmental ministers and they're all meeting and they
Speaker 1: all adopt a missions controls, we could get something done.
Speaker 1: And that was still a very optimistic vision of global governance.
Speaker 1: Since then, a again, as you pointed out, the CEOs
Speaker 1: are more powerful than many many, many of the government leaders.
Speaker 1: And you've also got even civic groups, which I admire.
Speaker 1: But you know, the big eight civic groups they're in
Speaker 1: those rooms too, and you will listeners what you mean
Speaker 1: by that. Yes, sorry, the big eight non governmental organizations OXFAM, Mercy,
Speaker 1: Core Care, Doctors Without Borders, who are great organizations, but
Speaker 1: they have a lot of power because they're very big,
Speaker 1: they're global, and in a way they kind of represent
Speaker 1: global civil society in a lot of these rooms of power.
Speaker 1: And whereas there are many smaller non governmental organizations, civic
Speaker 1: organizations of all kinds, who also feel that they don't
Speaker 1: have power. Many of them are in the global South.
Speaker 1: They are upset about the global North. But the larger picture,
Speaker 1: I think for many people is just as you said
Speaker 1: that there's this deeply networked global elite of people have
Speaker 1: been in government, people who are in business, people who
Speaker 1: are at the heads of top universities and top civic organizations,
Speaker 1: the Davos crowd, and I would be counted as one.
Speaker 1: I was going to say, I's gonna say I'm not
Speaker 1: Jack policy planning. The State Department was in the Woodrow
Speaker 1: Wilson at Princeton. Absolutely. That's one of the reasons you
Speaker 1: were so insightful about this, I think is that you
Speaker 1: were telling the story from the inside. So what changed?
Speaker 1: I mean, one one crude way to say it would
Speaker 1: be two thousand and four immediate post Cold War US
Speaker 1: has a very dominant global position, mostly because the Soviets
Speaker 1: have just crumbled. Yes, and so you know, American foreign
Speaker 1: policy thinkers like you are trying to figure out what
Speaker 1: will work right and one possibility is maybe these networks
Speaker 1: would be a way for US to express power without
Speaker 1: pushing people around. You know, they would that that's that's
Speaker 1: maybe what a foreign policy realist, the cynic would say
Speaker 1: about why that looked good? Then what what what turned what?
Speaker 1: You could also see it optimistically, right, I mean, people
Speaker 1: were well meaning. The Soviet Union was gone. We were
Speaker 1: hoping to really make change in that period of time.
Speaker 1: That's when the International Criminal Court was coming into existence.
Speaker 1: Horrible things happened in Rwanda and Yugoslavia, but we created
Speaker 1: the International Tribunals for Yugoslavia Criminal Tribunalist Yugoslavia and for
Speaker 1: Rwanda in order to respond to those been better if
Speaker 1: they hadn't happened to in the first place, but once
Speaker 1: they happen, at least people were going to be held
Speaker 1: to account. What's happened over the last now nearly twenty years.
Speaker 1: That has made it so clear to you, and I
Speaker 1: think to many observers, at least those who are outside
Speaker 1: of the blob, that the blob isn't working. And I
Speaker 1: mean here, I would just say Donald Trump is just
Speaker 1: a symptom, yes, of a lot of people's feeling that
Speaker 1: it's not working, rather than any kind of a cause
Speaker 1: of it. Yes. And I would add that during that
Speaker 1: same period ninety four to two thousand and four, the
Speaker 1: European Union is becoming a union. Right. So when I
Speaker 1: look at NET, I was looking at networked government structures.
Speaker 1: That is the European Union. It is networks of all
Speaker 1: their officials and it develops a single market, it develops
Speaker 1: a common currency, it comes together as a political union.
Speaker 1: So it was a much more optimistic period for the
Speaker 1: ability to have both law and government capacity at the
Speaker 1: global level. And I saw these networks, if they could
Speaker 1: be more participatory, inclusive and transparent as a big piece
Speaker 1: of it. So what has changed, Well, the starting point,
Speaker 1: I think you would say is that hasn't delivered. Right
Speaker 1: as I sit now, I just have to start from
Speaker 1: the prospect of however imperfect the UN system was, and
Speaker 1: it always was. But before the end of the Cod
Speaker 1: War and after you still you had a Asian financial
Speaker 1: crisis in nineteen ninety seven and the finance ministers came
Speaker 1: together and stabilized it. And climate change, we had the
Speaker 1: Kyoto Protocol. There was still global problem solving capacity. Today
Speaker 1: you're looking at a climate that is out of control.
Speaker 1: There we have the Paris Agreement, but nobody thinks that
Speaker 1: that is going to get us there. We have a
Speaker 1: global pandemic. The who was relatively powerless. You had to
Speaker 1: put together private again and public networks, and even that
Speaker 1: didn't work nearly as well. You have global corruption. Tax
Speaker 1: haven's if you are not just even a member of
Speaker 1: the elite looking around much less somebody who's been on
Speaker 1: the losing end of the global economy. You just sense
Speaker 1: that these institutions are talking shops at best, and these
Speaker 1: deals that are being cut are benefiting the privileged at
Speaker 1: the expense of everyone else. So I think there's not
Speaker 1: optimism about what the international system is doing. I do
Speaker 1: also think the Internet is a huge part of this,
Speaker 1: because we now actually have a tangible sense when we
Speaker 1: think about the Worldwide Web of just the extraordinary complexity
Speaker 1: of it all, and with all these different groups coming together,
Speaker 1: and of course they can come together virtually and then
Speaker 1: come together in the dark web, and we have a
Speaker 1: much better sense of all the crime that is a
Speaker 1: part of all those networks. So you know, my book
Speaker 1: in twenty seventeen is about how do we use networks
Speaker 1: to fight criminal networks, how do we use networks to
Speaker 1: undo the power of other networks, or simply how do
Speaker 1: we see a map and try to control networks. So
Speaker 1: it's a far more complex world and a much less
Speaker 1: optimistic one. We'll be right back and what would work?
Speaker 1: What should we be trying to have in place of
Speaker 1: the blog? I mean, so, take the climate change issue,
Speaker 1: which is so pressing that you mentioned we had international agreements.
Speaker 1: We still have some international agreements. They don't look like
Speaker 1: they're enough. That said, climate change remains a global problem,
Speaker 1: and presumably any solution still is going to require coordinated
Speaker 1: global action. So what's going to work? Such a simple question.
Speaker 1: What's going to work? Well, I would just start for
Speaker 1: a reason, we don't don't. We don't bother with the
Speaker 1: chit chat. We just dive right in. So I would
Speaker 1: start by saying, any fantasy of world government, or even
Speaker 1: proto world government, cannot work because it's just far too complex.
Speaker 1: So if you look at the UN system, that's a
Speaker 1: proto world government with a hard power core, right, I mean,
Speaker 1: there's the Security Council is a realist core with an
Speaker 1: institutionalist rapping. Because Roosevelt and Stalin and Churchill knew full
Speaker 1: well that if the great powers were not on board,
Speaker 1: you weren't going to get anything done. But they thought
Speaker 1: that there were enough situations where the great powers would
Speaker 1: either be on board or would not block one another,
Speaker 1: that it could work. And I think I think, all
Speaker 1: things considered, the world's been better off with the United
Speaker 1: Nations and without one. But today even if you could
Speaker 1: convene some kind of global conference. It would be crazy
Speaker 1: to try to set something up that look like a
Speaker 1: global executive, a global legislature, so the Security Council, the
Speaker 1: General Assembly, and an international court. No, not that those
Speaker 1: things don't have someplace, But I think of the world
Speaker 1: in network terms. I think of it in the chessboard,
Speaker 1: the world of states and then the web, the world
Speaker 1: of all these networks, and they're superimposed on top of
Speaker 1: each other. And when you're thinking about how are you
Speaker 1: going to solve global problems with both of those, with
Speaker 1: the state world and this world of network corporations and
Speaker 1: government officials and everybody else and criminals, then I think
Speaker 1: you need to assume there is no one solution. They're
Speaker 1: not even probably even five solutions. But well, let's take
Speaker 1: climate chases as an example. You do need a global agreement.
Speaker 1: The Paris Agreement is quite important because it does set
Speaker 1: it's sort of distill scientific consensus and says this is
Speaker 1: what we're aiming for. You need focal points, and that's
Speaker 1: a focal point. The states at least are talking to
Speaker 1: each other and they keep coming back together. And so
Speaker 1: you have a diplomatic forum, which is useful politically. I
Speaker 1: think the most important part of that is the allowance
Speaker 1: for non party stakeholders, which just means everybody's not a state,
Speaker 1: but who has a huge stake in combating climate change.
Speaker 1: So all the mayors, all the governors. Right, if I'm
Speaker 1: thinking about how I want to fight climate change, governors
Speaker 1: of states and mayors of cities who actually have the
Speaker 1: ability to reduce carbon emissions are an enormous piece of
Speaker 1: the puzzle. More so, not more so, but certainly in
Speaker 1: addition to national governments, and you want to talk to
Speaker 1: them directly. The corporate power is vast, right last week
Speaker 1: the activists got to climate activists onto the board of
Speaker 1: Xon of Xon Mobile. If you can change the behavior
Speaker 1: of fossil fuel companies but also many others to get
Speaker 1: them to pledge to zero emissions, then you have many,
Speaker 1: many more levers. But you also then need to empower
Speaker 1: the people who are suffering the most from climate change politically,
Speaker 1: and you need to think about how do you empower
Speaker 1: those voices so that you get the political will Domestically
Speaker 1: all of that is really messy. I think you can
Speaker 1: That's why I wrote a book about network theory. You
Speaker 1: can map it and then you can say, who is
Speaker 1: connected to whom? And these are bad connections. And then
Speaker 1: you can say, and who is not connected to whom?
Speaker 1: Who needs to be and how do we do that efficiently?
Speaker 1: It can be done, but you need a very different
Speaker 1: way of thinking about global structures. And to your point,
Speaker 1: the power that gets wielded is not people sitting in
Speaker 1: foreign ministers sitting in a you know, paneled room in
Speaker 1: Davos making deals. It is power with power of movements, power,
Speaker 1: you know, digital power. It's it's all sorts of really
Speaker 1: messy kinds of power that you have to think about mobilize.
Speaker 1: Let me ask you about that because I have a
Speaker 1: worry about the good side here. I mean the good
Speaker 1: side is, as you say, activists, climate activists on the
Speaker 1: exon board amazing, you know, bring people into the network
Speaker 1: who are from underprivileged backgrounds or from vulnerable communities, whether
Speaker 1: globally or locally excellent. We already saw this past year
Speaker 1: that the fact that there were just a small number,
Speaker 1: but they existed of African Americans who were CEOs of fortune.
Speaker 1: Five hundred companies affected at least to some degree, corporate
Speaker 1: behavior around the Georgia voter suppression laws as I think
Speaker 1: of it. Oh yeah, that all that said, that's all
Speaker 1: the good side. I have this worry that what we're
Speaker 1: really talking about is just slightly changing the conversation by
Speaker 1: virtue of slightly changing who's in the room, when the
Speaker 1: same powerful elites still make the decisions. So Xon, you know,
Speaker 1: two activists is great. They might affect the conversation. They
Speaker 1: don't control the board of directors, and they never will
Speaker 1: because as a numerical matter, we collectively have set up
Speaker 1: corporate governance so that the shareholders who sits on the
Speaker 1: board are those who own the shares, and that's the
Speaker 1: big institutional shareholders, and they're not likely to choose activists
Speaker 1: who would put the businesses into a position of making
Speaker 1: less money. So I guess what I'm trying to say
Speaker 1: is this. I take one of the deep lessons of
Speaker 1: your body of work to be we need to expand
Speaker 1: these networks because the networks are so powerful, and that
Speaker 1: makes it very valuable to expand the networks. But I
Speaker 1: also hear you saying at the same time, you know
Speaker 1: it's not enough just to expand the networks. We would
Speaker 1: need to change the structure of power behind the networks,
Speaker 1: And here sorry for being a bit long winded about this,
Speaker 1: but here it seems to me that the real power
Speaker 1: behind them is global capital. That unlike the Cold War,
Speaker 1: where the real power where the governments, the Eastern Block
Speaker 1: or Western Bloc, today it really is the big corporations
Speaker 1: that just brings so much money to bear, so much
Speaker 1: influence to bear on the governments that they will push
Speaker 1: the decision making in a way that serves their interests, which,
Speaker 1: to be fair, means the interests of their shareholders. Am
Speaker 1: I sounding too much like you know the young marks there?
Speaker 1: Or do you think there's do you think there is
Speaker 1: something to it? So first I think again you are correct.
Speaker 1: I'm trying to be realistic enough to say, look, there's
Speaker 1: never going to be a world where there isn't an
Speaker 1: elite and a power structure, or at least we've never
Speaker 1: seen that in no society. So this so to some
Speaker 1: extent you've just got to accept that. You can say, ours,
Speaker 1: at least in the United States is deeply corrupt. I mean,
Speaker 1: it's so closed and the political system does not allow
Speaker 1: you to change it. But I think what I would
Speaker 1: say in terms of so what do you do with
Speaker 1: these networks. I'd say two things. One, it's as important
Speaker 1: to disconnect connections that are dangerous or bad as it
Speaker 1: is to connect folks who you need to bring in.
Speaker 1: So it really is when I talk about strategies of
Speaker 1: connection as opposed to strategy of conflict, I'm saying, you've
Speaker 1: got to map this and you've got to see to
Speaker 1: use my example of if you really changed the lobbying laws,
Speaker 1: but more importantly, the campaign finance laws, because that's what
Speaker 1: gets lobbyist power, then you're disrupting the connection between corporate
Speaker 1: America and Congress in a way that is going to
Speaker 1: make it easier for people to get to elect people
Speaker 1: who will represent their interests and not corporate interests. And
Speaker 1: you can do that in many ways. And indeed, a
Speaker 1: aggressive politics should be about restraining corporate power, not just
Speaker 1: by any trust or other ways, but by really recognizing
Speaker 1: where are those pernicious connections. And again it's not just transparency.
Speaker 1: I think you have to rupture them. So partly I
Speaker 1: think you can really restrain corporate power that way. I think,
Speaker 1: on the other hand, a global tax regime. I was
Speaker 1: just reading a new book that's coming out by alec
Speaker 1: Ross about global taxation one global taxation. Those then you
Speaker 1: need to connect up all these tax regimes that right
Speaker 1: now tax lawyers and accountants can manipulate. So again I
Speaker 1: think if you can't, you cannot undo the networked world.
Speaker 1: I mean, it's just it's always been true and now
Speaker 1: it can be global. So you have to come up
Speaker 1: with strategies of connection and disconnection. And again, the other
Speaker 1: thing I would say, in terms of shifting the power balance,
Speaker 1: imagine if you have what I call an impact hub
Speaker 1: for every sustainable development goal. Sustainable development goals are sort
Speaker 1: of the bible of good things that we would love
Speaker 1: to see happen, and but each one has an impact
Speaker 1: hub that has yes, international organizations represented, but also civic
Speaker 1: groups of all kinds, investments, lots of impact capital, and
Speaker 1: metrics of how are you advancing toward this goal? So
Speaker 1: you can create a You've got networks, but hubs are
Speaker 1: where you can actually have people come together, where you
Speaker 1: can also make it much more transparent. But equally importantly,
Speaker 1: you can then have metrics of progress that advocacy can
Speaker 1: mobilize around, politics can mobilize around, and people can be
Speaker 1: called to account. I don't think it's perfect, but I
Speaker 1: think if you look at the Global Alliance for Vaccines
Speaker 1: and Immunization, they've done that. Yeah, let's just say a
Speaker 1: word more. This is a nice place for us to
Speaker 1: wind up about what an impact hub literally is. It's
Speaker 1: an abstract concept. It's an abstract You have a network
Speaker 1: which is lots of different people with lots of different interests.
Speaker 1: I guess they are getting together in the impact What
Speaker 1: is the impact? No? So well, all right, so right
Speaker 1: now you'd say, well, the United Nations is the as
Speaker 1: I held of the system of global governance. Right, everybody
Speaker 1: comes together in New York. I'll take this example of
Speaker 1: the Global Alliance for Vaccines and Immunization. So we have
Speaker 1: a World Health Organization and that's a hub for global health.
Speaker 1: But the Gates Foundation and the World Health Organization and
Speaker 1: a group of pharmaceutical companies and a lot of civic
Speaker 1: organizations came together twenty years ago and said, you know,
Speaker 1: we're going to create an alliance. Very interesting. Alliances used
Speaker 1: to be only states. This is a global alliance of politics, people,
Speaker 1: corporate people, civic people, scientists, universities, and our goals going
Speaker 1: to be to immunize the world's children. And so the
Speaker 1: hub is simply the secretariat. It's much smaller and looser
Speaker 1: than something like the United Nations, but there is something.
Speaker 1: There's a website there, there is a you know, a
Speaker 1: governance structure, and they commit. Then they they have networks
Speaker 1: set up in many different countries, but with a very
Speaker 1: clear goal of immunizing children, and they connect all these
Speaker 1: different actors for measurable impact. So I call that an
Speaker 1: impact hub, and I can imagine doing that around water
Speaker 1: security and climate change is too big, you'd have to
Speaker 1: break it up into different different things. But lots of
Speaker 1: environmental goals, lots of social goals. Health is probably easier
Speaker 1: because it's very measurable. But you know, so if you
Speaker 1: say global peace, not so much. If you talked about
Speaker 1: good jobs, right, and what would that take? You can
Speaker 1: again take this vitangled more ass of networks everywhere and
Speaker 1: start thinking about how do you rationalize them and how
Speaker 1: do you structure them four specific goals And if I
Speaker 1: look at the world, I think about developing those impact
Speaker 1: hubs in many different places, this would not just be
Speaker 1: the North. In ways that would at least give you
Speaker 1: something to start with when you're thinking about actually getting
Speaker 1: these things done. It's fascinating. It also feels ever so
Speaker 1: slightly like coming full circle these alliances that produce the
Speaker 1: impact hubs. One way they differ from the old arrangements
Speaker 1: is that they're not really operating in the same way
Speaker 1: as tools of the big governments, tools of the states.
Speaker 1: They are as you describe them, and Geo's corporations, the
Speaker 1: super mega rich, and so I guess I want to
Speaker 1: close by asking you whether you think, with some others,
Speaker 1: that states are sort of receding in this world, not
Speaker 1: that they're gone, but that they're less important to solving
Speaker 1: stuff than you might have thought of them as being
Speaker 1: twenty five or thirty years ago, because they're part of
Speaker 1: the system that hasn't delivered for people. Or do you
Speaker 1: think they're just as strong and important as ever as
Speaker 1: some days I tend to think, and that these institutions
Speaker 1: are just alternative roots, as it were, for trying to
Speaker 1: get things done when the states don't have an interest.
Speaker 1: So I think states are less powerful than they were
Speaker 1: for sure. Look, the United Nations was designed for a
Speaker 1: world of sixty states, and it's got two hundred states
Speaker 1: and it doesn't work right. The European Union, for all
Speaker 1: of its flaws works because it's got twenty seven states,
Speaker 1: And so part of this, when we talk about global governance,
Speaker 1: is too much, too much bureaucracy, sort of victims of
Speaker 1: its own success. I do think governments have less power,
Speaker 1: but I also think will never address our problems unless
Speaker 1: we strengthen governmental power in lots of ways, certainly around corporations.
Speaker 1: You're never going to get global taxes unless you have
Speaker 1: governments who really come together and enforce it. I also
Speaker 1: think if you really look at at scale, governments have
Speaker 1: a scale that nothing else can reach. But government itself
Speaker 1: has to be reorganized. Right. You've got these huge hierarchies.
Speaker 1: They cannot operate in this world of connection and disconnection
Speaker 1: very well, but they are essential, and as broken as
Speaker 1: I think American democracy is, I'd still rather put my
Speaker 1: faith in the American government that any foundation or corporation.
Speaker 1: What I would say, though, is coming back to power.
Speaker 1: Where do I see real hope in this idea of
Speaker 1: impact hubs. It's more the mayors and the governors. And
Speaker 1: when I think about mayors, that's something any American can think,
Speaker 1: Oh well, wait a minute, I could work in the
Speaker 1: mayor's office. If you want to represent the population of
Speaker 1: the United States. If you bring together the staffs of
Speaker 1: mayors across the country, it is far more representative than
Speaker 1: the Washington bureaucracy. So there is a way there of
Speaker 1: redressing the power balance. You're still going to have elites,
Speaker 1: but it's not this, it's not the Davos elite, right,
Speaker 1: It is more people coming together around specific issues with
Speaker 1: lots again, think about mayors. I think you can redress
Speaker 1: the power balance by opening opening up these networks sort
Speaker 1: of sources of power that are more accessible to regular
Speaker 1: citizens than the kind of calcification of the global elite,
Speaker 1: which is what I think we see now. I'm very
Speaker 1: happy that you're able to end with that modestly optimistic picture,
Speaker 1: and I just want to express gratitude for your brilliance,
Speaker 1: your analysis, your generosity with your time today, and really
Speaker 1: for the whole body of your work. We need people
Speaker 1: like you who are in the inside and then are
Speaker 1: also capable of explaining it to us and then critiquing
Speaker 1: it simultaneously. Thank you so much, well, thank you, what
Speaker 1: a great conversation. One of the reasons I wanted to
Speaker 1: hear from Anne Marie was precisely that she's the leading
Speaker 1: theorist of how networks of powerful people interact in order
Speaker 1: to try to make change and to facilitate international organizations
Speaker 1: doing their job well. Anne Marie laid out very cogently
Speaker 1: and very honestly and self reflectively how her own perceptions
Speaker 1: of the power of those networks has changed over time.
Speaker 1: She is just as committed as she ever was to
Speaker 1: the idea that powers should be deployed equally, that it
Speaker 1: should be deployed fairly, and that it should contribute to
Speaker 1: an order in international relations that is rational, logical, and
Speaker 1: that looks out for fundamental rights and freedoms. Yet she
Speaker 1: herself has come to be skeptical of the way that
Speaker 1: networks of elite international actors are perceived globally, and indeed
Speaker 1: she's even skeptical about whether those same networks can always
Speaker 1: do everything that they set out to do successfully. In short,
Speaker 1: An Marie is describing a trajectory followed by many liberal internationalists,
Speaker 1: among whom I would count myself in the aftermath of
Speaker 1: the Cold War, great hope, optimism, and interest in the
Speaker 1: way that international global networks of thoughtful people making rational
Speaker 1: decisions could make the world a safer and a better place,
Speaker 1: and address long term serious problems, problems that today are
Speaker 1: clearer than ever on issues like climate. Yet, over the
Speaker 1: intervening decades since the end of the Cold War, we've
Speaker 1: been mugged by reality, forced to see the ways in
Speaker 1: which liberal internationalism and the globalization that's come with it
Speaker 1: has left many people behind and disillusioned many many people
Speaker 1: on the left and the right with the way international
Speaker 1: power is deployed under those circumstances. We need new imagining,
Speaker 1: We need new approaches, We need variety in how power
Speaker 1: it is deployed, and we need clarity in terms of
Speaker 1: the goals for which we are trying to deploy power.
Speaker 1: Anne Marie is at the forefront of those drawing our
Speaker 1: attention to the need for those things. It was and
Speaker 1: remains a privilege for me to learn from such a
Speaker 1: vibrant foreign policy intellectual as Anne Marie. I hope and
Speaker 1: trust that you enjoy the conversation as much as I did,
Speaker 1: and I hope you're looking forward as much as I
Speaker 1: am to the next several conversations that we will continue
Speaker 1: to have with foreign policy thinkers about the grand issues
Speaker 1: of America in the world, the transformation of power, and
Speaker 1: what needs to be done in the years ahead, I'll
Speaker 1: admit to regular listeners that I still have unsettled on
Speaker 1: the perfect substitute from my COVID sign off telling you
Speaker 1: all to be careful, be safe, and be well. But
Speaker 1: for the moment, as more and more of us are
Speaker 1: vaccinated and we come closer and closer to being able
Speaker 1: to begin to imagine a safer world, at least here
Speaker 1: in the United States, let me say for now, think
Speaker 1: deep thoughts, be well, and have a little fun. Deep
Speaker 1: background is brought to you by Pushkin Industries. Our producer
Speaker 1: is Mola Board, our engineer is Ben Tolliday, and our
Speaker 1: showrunner is Sophie Crane mckibbon. Editorial support from noahm Osband.
Speaker 1: Theme music by Luis Gara at Pushkin. Thanks to Mia Lobell,
Speaker 1: Julia Barton, Lydia, Jean Coott, Heather Faine, Carlie Migliori, Maggie Taylor,
Speaker 1: Eric Sandler, and Jacob Weisberg. You can find me on
Speaker 1: Twitter at Noah R. Feldman. I also write a column
Speaker 1: from Bloomberg Opinion, which you can find at bloomberg dot com.
Speaker 1: Slash Feldman to discover Bloomberg's original slate of podcasts go
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