1 00:00:00,160 --> 00:00:03,880 Speaker 1: Oh man, you know, we did not know exactly what 2 00:00:03,880 --> 00:00:07,400 Speaker 1: we're getting into when we started. When we started diving 3 00:00:07,440 --> 00:00:11,120 Speaker 1: into today's classic episode, you remember this one man Cuba. 4 00:00:11,160 --> 00:00:13,960 Speaker 2: Oh boy, do I ever the idea that some sort 5 00:00:13,960 --> 00:00:17,560 Speaker 2: of future tech, some kind of weapon that we don't 6 00:00:17,600 --> 00:00:21,360 Speaker 2: really know about in the public sphere is at work 7 00:00:21,520 --> 00:00:25,720 Speaker 2: causing problems for folks working at the US Embassy in Cuba. 8 00:00:25,840 --> 00:00:30,040 Speaker 1: And when we did this episode back in twenty eighteen, 9 00:00:30,560 --> 00:00:33,480 Speaker 1: there were still a lot of questions that were unanswered, 10 00:00:33,560 --> 00:00:37,320 Speaker 1: and some questions remain unanswered. Today's special shout out to 11 00:00:37,320 --> 00:00:40,839 Speaker 1: our pal Jack O'Brien from the Daily Zeitgeist. But we 12 00:00:40,920 --> 00:00:42,360 Speaker 1: hope you enjoy this one. Folks. 13 00:00:42,640 --> 00:00:47,240 Speaker 3: Here we go from UFOs to psychic powers and government conspiracies. 14 00:00:47,440 --> 00:00:51,240 Speaker 3: History is riddled with unexplained events. You can turn back 15 00:00:51,320 --> 00:00:54,440 Speaker 3: now or learn this stuff they don't want you to know. 16 00:01:07,840 --> 00:01:10,400 Speaker 4: Hello, welcome back to the show. My name is Matt, 17 00:01:10,560 --> 00:01:11,440 Speaker 4: my name is Nolan. 18 00:01:11,840 --> 00:01:14,800 Speaker 1: They call me Ben. We're joined with our super producer 19 00:01:14,920 --> 00:01:17,800 Speaker 1: Paul Decint as always, but most importantly, you are you, 20 00:01:17,920 --> 00:01:21,880 Speaker 1: and that makes this stuff they don't want you to know. 21 00:01:23,080 --> 00:01:27,679 Speaker 1: The US military has cooked up some pretty bizarre ideas 22 00:01:27,760 --> 00:01:31,440 Speaker 1: over the past few decades and longtime listeners you know 23 00:01:31,520 --> 00:01:34,440 Speaker 1: that Matt Nolan and I have covered some of the 24 00:01:34,440 --> 00:01:36,959 Speaker 1: more nefarious ones in past episodes. 25 00:01:37,280 --> 00:01:39,840 Speaker 4: Yeah, when you're on the edge and you're the leader 26 00:01:39,880 --> 00:01:42,720 Speaker 4: of all the military technology, you really just got to 27 00:01:42,800 --> 00:01:43,679 Speaker 4: test it all, man. 28 00:01:43,880 --> 00:01:45,520 Speaker 5: You just throw stuff at the wall and see if 29 00:01:45,520 --> 00:01:46,319 Speaker 5: it blows it up. 30 00:01:46,920 --> 00:01:50,880 Speaker 1: Literally, like the jet copter. Yes, the jet copter where 31 00:01:50,920 --> 00:01:55,240 Speaker 1: someone finally came together with their friends and said, what 32 00:01:55,320 --> 00:01:58,760 Speaker 1: if we had a jet that wait for it, guys 33 00:01:59,080 --> 00:02:02,800 Speaker 1: has three way for guys, and each of those wings 34 00:02:02,840 --> 00:02:05,200 Speaker 1: has a jet and wait for it, and we spin 35 00:02:05,320 --> 00:02:08,600 Speaker 1: it really really fast and make it go. 36 00:02:08,560 --> 00:02:11,880 Speaker 5: Somewhere to what end? Is a vehicle or just an 37 00:02:11,919 --> 00:02:12,920 Speaker 5: agent of chaos? 38 00:02:13,320 --> 00:02:16,800 Speaker 1: It's both meant to be a vehicle. Didn't work out though. 39 00:02:16,919 --> 00:02:20,200 Speaker 1: There's also the idea of a blinding phaser. 40 00:02:20,320 --> 00:02:22,000 Speaker 4: Yeah, they went Star Trek with that one. 41 00:02:22,120 --> 00:02:24,679 Speaker 1: It looks really cool. Actually, it looks like one of 42 00:02:24,720 --> 00:02:27,960 Speaker 1: those heavy duty Star Trek phasers that they only use 43 00:02:28,000 --> 00:02:30,160 Speaker 1: when they're facing a serious threat like the Borg. 44 00:02:30,560 --> 00:02:35,600 Speaker 4: Yeah, set your phasers to blind cass you, bog. I 45 00:02:35,639 --> 00:02:37,919 Speaker 4: wonder how that would affect, you know, because they've got 46 00:02:37,919 --> 00:02:40,720 Speaker 4: the one human eye usually and then the other eye. 47 00:02:40,480 --> 00:02:42,840 Speaker 1: Well, they adapt their hive mind. 48 00:02:42,840 --> 00:02:46,000 Speaker 5: On the land of the borg. The one eyed man. 49 00:02:45,880 --> 00:02:52,680 Speaker 1: Is a borg assimilated. They'll also they also tried, of course, 50 00:02:52,800 --> 00:02:57,320 Speaker 1: the one of the more infamous ones was they worked 51 00:02:57,320 --> 00:03:00,720 Speaker 1: on a plan for a bomb that would turn people 52 00:03:00,840 --> 00:03:02,120 Speaker 1: into homosexuals. 53 00:03:02,480 --> 00:03:04,480 Speaker 5: Yep, is that the one that Alex Jones is always 54 00:03:04,520 --> 00:03:06,440 Speaker 5: talking about turns to all the frogs gay. 55 00:03:07,639 --> 00:03:12,760 Speaker 1: He's also maybe he's thinking about environmental contaminant too. I 56 00:03:12,800 --> 00:03:13,519 Speaker 1: think right. 57 00:03:14,800 --> 00:03:19,200 Speaker 4: Hands down my favorite one was a pigeon guided missile. 58 00:03:20,080 --> 00:03:22,080 Speaker 4: This one just really quick to get into it. I 59 00:03:22,120 --> 00:03:25,799 Speaker 4: don't think we've ever talked about it before in the show. Maybe, Okay, No, 60 00:03:26,280 --> 00:03:29,239 Speaker 4: So this guy bf Skinner, during around the World War 61 00:03:29,240 --> 00:03:31,960 Speaker 4: two times, was trying to figure out a way to 62 00:03:32,639 --> 00:03:36,120 Speaker 4: basically have a missile hone in on somebody. And he thought, oh, 63 00:03:36,160 --> 00:03:39,760 Speaker 4: you know what, I've got honing pigeons honing missile. Let's 64 00:03:39,760 --> 00:03:43,200 Speaker 4: put these two together. And he literally made a warhead 65 00:03:43,640 --> 00:03:49,160 Speaker 4: that was three pigeons sitting inside of warhead, live pigeons 66 00:03:49,560 --> 00:03:54,200 Speaker 4: that had these rudimentary screens of and that would show 67 00:03:54,200 --> 00:03:56,720 Speaker 4: what the ground looked like as this missiles flying through 68 00:03:56,720 --> 00:03:59,560 Speaker 4: the air and the pigeons, if they see the target 69 00:03:59,600 --> 00:04:02,600 Speaker 4: that they've been trained to attack, they would all, in 70 00:04:02,720 --> 00:04:05,800 Speaker 4: theory peck at the screen, and if all three pecked 71 00:04:05,800 --> 00:04:08,560 Speaker 4: at the screen, then detonation would occur. 72 00:04:08,920 --> 00:04:12,440 Speaker 1: Of course, this makes quite a few assumptions, the idea 73 00:04:12,480 --> 00:04:15,240 Speaker 1: that the pigeons would behave normally when they're strapped into 74 00:04:15,280 --> 00:04:19,440 Speaker 1: this contraption, right, the idea that that redundancy would work. 75 00:04:20,480 --> 00:04:24,880 Speaker 1: Members of the National Research Defense Committee did give him 76 00:04:24,920 --> 00:04:28,240 Speaker 1: twenty five grandeah to do this again. Throw it at 77 00:04:28,279 --> 00:04:30,799 Speaker 1: the wall, see if it blows up. There are also 78 00:04:31,000 --> 00:04:36,680 Speaker 1: bat bombs, seeking to utilize the echolocative abilities of bats. 79 00:04:37,360 --> 00:04:39,880 Speaker 5: There's actually a really great episode of the lovely podcast 80 00:04:39,960 --> 00:04:43,559 Speaker 5: The Memory Palace called Itty Bitty Bombs that talks about 81 00:04:43,560 --> 00:04:44,440 Speaker 5: that very thing. 82 00:04:44,800 --> 00:04:47,280 Speaker 1: Nice and check it out if you get a chance. 83 00:04:47,440 --> 00:04:50,239 Speaker 1: Of course, this isn't going to be an episode where 84 00:04:50,279 --> 00:04:55,080 Speaker 1: we just keep ridicule on Uncle Sam, because Uncle Sam 85 00:04:55,240 --> 00:04:57,880 Speaker 1: is not the only government thinking outside of the box 86 00:04:57,920 --> 00:05:00,839 Speaker 1: when it comes to military hardware and technique. In the 87 00:05:00,880 --> 00:05:05,200 Speaker 1: cryptocurrency series that we earlier recorded, we spoke with our 88 00:05:05,279 --> 00:05:09,480 Speaker 1: old friend Jonathan Strickland about a larger trend toward what's 89 00:05:09,560 --> 00:05:13,440 Speaker 1: called asymmetrical warfare. And that's the idea that if you 90 00:05:13,880 --> 00:05:17,159 Speaker 1: and like, if the three of us are the top 91 00:05:17,279 --> 00:05:21,919 Speaker 1: military minds of China or Russia or something, we know 92 00:05:22,120 --> 00:05:25,600 Speaker 1: that we cannot compete one on one in a conventional 93 00:05:25,640 --> 00:05:29,560 Speaker 1: battle with the United States. But maybe it turns out 94 00:05:29,600 --> 00:05:35,000 Speaker 1: that Nol has a great lead on information warfare. Maybe 95 00:05:35,000 --> 00:05:38,480 Speaker 1: it turns out that Matt is super good at delivering 96 00:05:38,560 --> 00:05:40,400 Speaker 1: poison in unexpected ways. 97 00:05:40,480 --> 00:05:44,400 Speaker 4: Yeah, it's all about innovation, and you're right, unexpectedness. 98 00:05:43,760 --> 00:05:45,960 Speaker 1: Right, the element of surprise, And this is where we 99 00:05:46,000 --> 00:05:50,560 Speaker 1: see things like Soviet attack dolphins, or like the United 100 00:05:50,640 --> 00:05:54,080 Speaker 1: Kingdom's ill fated attempt to build an aircraft carrier that 101 00:05:54,200 --> 00:05:55,840 Speaker 1: was also an iceberg. 102 00:05:55,839 --> 00:05:57,840 Speaker 5: Wow, because no one would ever see it coming because 103 00:05:57,839 --> 00:06:01,559 Speaker 5: it moves so slowly. It's almost imperceptible that it's coming 104 00:06:01,600 --> 00:06:01,919 Speaker 5: at you. 105 00:06:02,160 --> 00:06:06,159 Speaker 1: Yeah, yeah, and sure it's I could be doing much 106 00:06:06,520 --> 00:06:10,320 Speaker 1: damage around the equator, but oh man, but they wanted 107 00:06:10,360 --> 00:06:13,600 Speaker 1: to try it. And there are numerous other silly examples. 108 00:06:14,480 --> 00:06:18,800 Speaker 1: We've looked at the assassination attempts for Fidel Castro. In 109 00:06:19,040 --> 00:06:22,840 Speaker 1: a different show, Nola and I looked at an attempt 110 00:06:22,880 --> 00:06:25,440 Speaker 1: to kill Winston Churchill via an evil. 111 00:06:25,240 --> 00:06:28,320 Speaker 5: Chocolate bar ex bloating chocolate where and when you broke 112 00:06:28,400 --> 00:06:32,320 Speaker 5: that delightful little line of demarcation to get that perfect 113 00:06:32,360 --> 00:06:36,359 Speaker 5: chocolate square, it would blow your fingers and face off. Geez. 114 00:06:36,680 --> 00:06:40,279 Speaker 1: And there was also a halatosis bomb, which is super 115 00:06:40,360 --> 00:06:46,719 Speaker 1: interesting because halatosis was primarily conditioned, made up by advertisers. 116 00:06:46,920 --> 00:06:48,919 Speaker 4: So it's a bad breath bomb, right. 117 00:06:49,360 --> 00:06:52,040 Speaker 1: And halatosis as a condition is not real. 118 00:06:52,120 --> 00:06:53,440 Speaker 5: That sounds like more of a prank. 119 00:06:54,279 --> 00:06:56,760 Speaker 4: Yeah, I think you just get that by eating regular 120 00:06:56,839 --> 00:06:58,719 Speaker 4: chocolate and then not brushing your teeth. 121 00:06:58,839 --> 00:07:02,920 Speaker 1: Gus, you Americans full ruining? How a great evil inmbio 122 00:07:03,040 --> 00:07:08,360 Speaker 1: without terrible breath so minty freshness aside. A lot of 123 00:07:08,400 --> 00:07:11,800 Speaker 1: these techniques and these weapons and this hardware that various 124 00:07:11,840 --> 00:07:16,680 Speaker 1: governments dream up never make it past the brainstorming. Wouldn't 125 00:07:16,680 --> 00:07:20,120 Speaker 1: it be cool if phase or the research and development phase? 126 00:07:20,480 --> 00:07:23,960 Speaker 1: Somebody somewhere along the line thankfully says, guys, I think 127 00:07:24,080 --> 00:07:27,560 Speaker 1: jet copter is kind of a dumb idea, or someone says. 128 00:07:27,560 --> 00:07:30,240 Speaker 5: Whatever, say that it sounds amazing. 129 00:07:31,040 --> 00:07:33,640 Speaker 1: It sounds amazing, I guess depends on what you want 130 00:07:33,680 --> 00:07:36,000 Speaker 1: it for. As an agent of chaos, it would be 131 00:07:36,040 --> 00:07:37,440 Speaker 1: one of the coolest fireworks ever. 132 00:07:37,520 --> 00:07:38,080 Speaker 5: That's true. 133 00:07:38,680 --> 00:07:43,200 Speaker 1: But the problem is this, it can be very difficult 134 00:07:43,280 --> 00:07:48,560 Speaker 1: for us, the general public, even members of other militaries, 135 00:07:48,600 --> 00:07:50,840 Speaker 1: even in the top levels of intelligence, it can be 136 00:07:50,960 --> 00:07:53,920 Speaker 1: very difficult to tell what has actually been deployed, what 137 00:07:54,160 --> 00:07:57,640 Speaker 1: was kicked around and then scrapped, what's actively working is 138 00:07:57,720 --> 00:08:00,320 Speaker 1: under wraps, or as we saw often the Cold War, 139 00:08:00,720 --> 00:08:03,400 Speaker 1: what's been just sort of marketed as something to be 140 00:08:03,600 --> 00:08:08,000 Speaker 1: scared of, as an attempt to drain the other side's resources. Right, 141 00:08:08,680 --> 00:08:10,320 Speaker 1: there's a lot of propaganda around. 142 00:08:10,640 --> 00:08:13,040 Speaker 4: You know, a lot of these things do come into 143 00:08:13,040 --> 00:08:16,760 Speaker 4: the public eye, but only after something goes really, really wrong, 144 00:08:17,320 --> 00:08:19,560 Speaker 4: as we saw in the case with that stealth helicopter. 145 00:08:20,480 --> 00:08:24,600 Speaker 1: Yeah, in the US raid on the bin Laden compound 146 00:08:24,680 --> 00:08:31,280 Speaker 1: in Islamabad, most of the taxpayer public learned that stealth 147 00:08:31,320 --> 00:08:33,880 Speaker 1: helicopters were a thing when one of them crashed, and 148 00:08:33,880 --> 00:08:35,280 Speaker 1: you guys remember that, right. 149 00:08:35,280 --> 00:08:37,720 Speaker 5: Yeah, Well, you would hope that you wouldn't know about 150 00:08:37,760 --> 00:08:44,040 Speaker 5: a stealth helicopter unless it's stealth abilities failed drastically. 151 00:08:43,679 --> 00:08:46,120 Speaker 4: Yeah, or you wouldn't know about it until you heard 152 00:08:46,120 --> 00:08:49,800 Speaker 4: the sound of whatever, you know, weaponry it's got on it. 153 00:08:50,640 --> 00:08:50,960 Speaker 5: Yeah. 154 00:08:51,040 --> 00:08:56,120 Speaker 1: So This is interesting because ethically, there's a little bit 155 00:08:56,120 --> 00:09:00,920 Speaker 1: of a pickle. You know, most people pay taxes on 156 00:09:01,040 --> 00:09:04,240 Speaker 1: some level, right, whether it's sales or property or income, 157 00:09:04,800 --> 00:09:08,079 Speaker 1: just something. Most people pay taxes and often don't know 158 00:09:08,120 --> 00:09:14,559 Speaker 1: where that money is going. So these weapons, this suppressed technology, 159 00:09:14,600 --> 00:09:17,559 Speaker 1: of this classified technology definitely does exist. It's not a 160 00:09:17,600 --> 00:09:21,560 Speaker 1: conspiracy theory to say that, it's conspiracy realism. And there 161 00:09:21,600 --> 00:09:25,040 Speaker 1: are a number of compelling arguments for why that should 162 00:09:25,040 --> 00:09:28,960 Speaker 1: be kept secret, why we should be paying for things 163 00:09:29,000 --> 00:09:31,840 Speaker 1: that we don't know about, and even when they might 164 00:09:32,120 --> 00:09:33,679 Speaker 1: adversely affect us. 165 00:09:33,840 --> 00:09:35,920 Speaker 4: Yeah, stamp up with national security and let's move on 166 00:09:36,120 --> 00:09:37,280 Speaker 4: the great boogeymanoo. 167 00:09:38,240 --> 00:09:41,839 Speaker 1: Right, And now we're at a point where it turns 168 00:09:41,840 --> 00:09:44,560 Speaker 1: out that just last year we may have learned of 169 00:09:44,640 --> 00:09:47,680 Speaker 1: another type of weapon, something we knew could exist in 170 00:09:47,800 --> 00:09:53,160 Speaker 1: theory but hadn't seen in action. This way, here's where 171 00:09:53,160 --> 00:09:56,160 Speaker 1: it gets crazy already already. 172 00:09:56,400 --> 00:09:59,880 Speaker 4: Yeah, So, over the course of two years and six 173 00:10:00,400 --> 00:10:04,400 Speaker 4: and twenty seventeen, there was some weird stuff going on 174 00:10:04,640 --> 00:10:07,880 Speaker 4: in Cubas. Specifically, there were US citizens who were serving 175 00:10:07,880 --> 00:10:12,160 Speaker 4: at the embassy there. They were complaining of these various 176 00:10:12,200 --> 00:10:14,800 Speaker 4: strange ailments. A lot of it had to do with 177 00:10:15,040 --> 00:10:18,120 Speaker 4: things affecting their ears and their ability to hear, like 178 00:10:18,160 --> 00:10:22,000 Speaker 4: they were experiencing hearing loss, they were experiencing vertigo, feeling 179 00:10:22,040 --> 00:10:25,280 Speaker 4: like they were going to fall or were falling, they 180 00:10:25,280 --> 00:10:29,960 Speaker 4: were having headaches. They were even complaining about cognitive deficiencies, 181 00:10:30,000 --> 00:10:34,400 Speaker 4: like having problems remembering something you know more than just 182 00:10:34,440 --> 00:10:36,120 Speaker 4: when you walk through a door and you forget something, 183 00:10:36,120 --> 00:10:38,880 Speaker 4: which is something we all experience. They're talking about much 184 00:10:38,920 --> 00:10:43,839 Speaker 4: more severe versions of this, and just so everybody knows, 185 00:10:43,840 --> 00:10:47,360 Speaker 4: severe hearing loss was the most common complaint, like I 186 00:10:47,400 --> 00:10:50,280 Speaker 4: cannot hear right now, and I've never had a problem 187 00:10:50,280 --> 00:10:51,360 Speaker 4: with this before in my life. 188 00:10:51,840 --> 00:10:55,839 Speaker 1: And the injuries were thankfully not found to be life threatening. 189 00:10:56,320 --> 00:11:01,840 Speaker 1: But all of the victims had a prime primary complaint 190 00:11:02,360 --> 00:11:06,760 Speaker 1: that preceded their experience of this vertigo, this hearing loss, 191 00:11:07,160 --> 00:11:15,560 Speaker 1: this difficulty with recollection, and it's this They heard a distinct, loud, pitched, 192 00:11:15,960 --> 00:11:20,880 Speaker 1: incredibly annoying and painful sound in unusual places, including their homes. 193 00:11:21,200 --> 00:11:25,880 Speaker 5: Shall we punish our listeners with a clip, yes, and ourselves. 194 00:11:33,000 --> 00:11:35,920 Speaker 5: So the caveat that there are a few limiting factors here. 195 00:11:36,640 --> 00:11:41,840 Speaker 5: This is multiple frequencies stacked together but they're not just 196 00:11:41,920 --> 00:11:44,760 Speaker 5: the ones that the human ear can perceive or that 197 00:11:44,880 --> 00:11:48,719 Speaker 5: can be recreated with phones or speakers or any other 198 00:11:48,920 --> 00:11:50,280 Speaker 5: method of reproducing sound. 199 00:11:50,480 --> 00:11:51,880 Speaker 1: That's a really good point exactly. 200 00:11:51,920 --> 00:11:54,920 Speaker 4: That sound comes from the Associated Press. They actually went in, 201 00:11:55,160 --> 00:11:58,920 Speaker 4: they got this sound while they were in Cuba, and 202 00:11:59,200 --> 00:12:02,760 Speaker 4: they were just mentioning that there's a lot of lower 203 00:12:02,840 --> 00:12:05,640 Speaker 4: much lower frequency and much higher frequency stuff going on. 204 00:12:05,840 --> 00:12:09,840 Speaker 1: Sure. Yeah, and eventually the State Department did go public 205 00:12:09,920 --> 00:12:13,240 Speaker 1: with this. Keep in mind, for supports or from twenty sixteen, 206 00:12:13,400 --> 00:12:17,199 Speaker 1: so twenty seventeen, the State Department goes public. They pull 207 00:12:17,679 --> 00:12:20,760 Speaker 1: all the non essential staff from the embassy there in 208 00:12:20,800 --> 00:12:24,720 Speaker 1: Havana and the capital of Cuba, and they allow others 209 00:12:24,720 --> 00:12:28,400 Speaker 1: to return to the US for treatment. On May twenty third, 210 00:12:28,559 --> 00:12:33,720 Speaker 1: the State Department also began expelling Cuban diplomats. They started 211 00:12:33,760 --> 00:12:37,520 Speaker 1: with two. Eventually they would expel fifteen in total from 212 00:12:37,600 --> 00:12:38,840 Speaker 1: the United States. 213 00:12:39,120 --> 00:12:42,680 Speaker 4: And it should be noted here that the Cuban government 214 00:12:43,080 --> 00:12:46,600 Speaker 4: vehemently denies that anything is going on here, like they 215 00:12:46,640 --> 00:12:50,199 Speaker 4: had any involvement in these health incidents. And there's a 216 00:12:50,280 --> 00:12:50,920 Speaker 4: quote right here. 217 00:12:51,440 --> 00:12:55,040 Speaker 5: Cuba has never nor would it ever allow that the 218 00:12:55,200 --> 00:12:58,960 Speaker 5: Cuban territory be used for any action against accredited diplomatic 219 00:12:59,040 --> 00:13:03,360 Speaker 5: agents or their fans without exception, full stop. Yeah, pretty 220 00:13:03,400 --> 00:13:04,679 Speaker 5: categorical there, you know. 221 00:13:05,520 --> 00:13:10,040 Speaker 1: And although the US officially states they're still investigating the 222 00:13:10,040 --> 00:13:14,520 Speaker 1: cause of these conditions, government officials from the US side, 223 00:13:14,559 --> 00:13:17,680 Speaker 1: from Uncle Sam, speaking on the condition of anonymity, have 224 00:13:17,800 --> 00:13:21,920 Speaker 1: said that they believe someone in Cuba was operating a 225 00:13:22,160 --> 00:13:24,240 Speaker 1: quote sonic weapon. 226 00:13:24,600 --> 00:13:26,880 Speaker 4: So what could the sonic weapon be? 227 00:13:27,720 --> 00:13:37,320 Speaker 1: Will tell you after a word from our sponsors, So 228 00:13:37,320 --> 00:13:40,840 Speaker 1: sonic weapons. You might also hear these called ultrasonic weapons 229 00:13:40,960 --> 00:13:44,839 Speaker 1: or usws do what it says on the tin. They 230 00:13:44,920 --> 00:13:50,640 Speaker 1: use sound to incapacitate, injure or potentially in theory kill 231 00:13:51,120 --> 00:13:53,720 Speaker 1: their victims, believe it or not, through the use of 232 00:13:53,920 --> 00:13:58,720 Speaker 1: sound alone. And perhaps you've heard of these weapons being 233 00:13:58,760 --> 00:14:03,160 Speaker 1: deployed by police and for the purposes of crowd disposal 234 00:14:03,320 --> 00:14:06,680 Speaker 1: or corallying. One of the most well known examples of this, 235 00:14:06,800 --> 00:14:09,640 Speaker 1: at least in the world of policing, is something called 236 00:14:09,679 --> 00:14:12,439 Speaker 1: the long range acoustic device or l RAD. 237 00:14:13,000 --> 00:14:17,000 Speaker 4: Yeah, this thing produces noises fifty times above the human 238 00:14:17,000 --> 00:14:20,040 Speaker 4: threshold for pain. So that moment when you're listening to 239 00:14:20,160 --> 00:14:22,400 Speaker 4: music at a concert and you start to go, oh wait, 240 00:14:22,440 --> 00:14:25,400 Speaker 4: this actually hurts a little bit. It's it's fifty times 241 00:14:25,520 --> 00:14:29,080 Speaker 4: above that. It's about around one hundred and twenty to 242 00:14:29,160 --> 00:14:31,720 Speaker 4: one and forty decibels. 243 00:14:32,000 --> 00:14:35,840 Speaker 1: At high power. This sort of stuff can cause nausea, vomiting, 244 00:14:35,960 --> 00:14:39,720 Speaker 1: and so on. However, it is considered a non lethal weapon. 245 00:14:40,200 --> 00:14:43,800 Speaker 1: It's literally just so loud that it hurts to be there. 246 00:14:44,120 --> 00:14:47,280 Speaker 1: So crowds that, you know, Occupy Wall. 247 00:14:47,040 --> 00:14:51,119 Speaker 4: Street or the Ferguson protests. 248 00:14:51,160 --> 00:14:54,680 Speaker 1: Sure, yeah, for any protest or something. The idea is 249 00:14:54,720 --> 00:14:56,880 Speaker 1: that they go, ah, my ears, I'm leaving. 250 00:14:57,160 --> 00:14:57,680 Speaker 4: Yeah. 251 00:14:57,760 --> 00:15:00,200 Speaker 5: I'm more of a fan of non lethal weapon too. 252 00:15:01,360 --> 00:15:02,000 Speaker 4: Which one is that? 253 00:15:02,120 --> 00:15:03,280 Speaker 5: The one with Joe Pesci? 254 00:15:03,520 --> 00:15:04,280 Speaker 4: Oh okay, all right. 255 00:15:06,000 --> 00:15:08,160 Speaker 1: I wonder why they never did a non lethal weapon. 256 00:15:08,160 --> 00:15:09,280 Speaker 1: That's actually a good idea. 257 00:15:09,480 --> 00:15:11,240 Speaker 5: I think I think it'd be kind of dull, Right, 258 00:15:11,280 --> 00:15:12,000 Speaker 5: nothing happen. 259 00:15:12,880 --> 00:15:16,320 Speaker 4: What was the what was the parody of the lethal 260 00:15:16,360 --> 00:15:17,120 Speaker 4: weapon series? 261 00:15:18,760 --> 00:15:20,240 Speaker 1: Naked Gun, Naked. 262 00:15:19,920 --> 00:15:25,680 Speaker 5: Gun, Well, Naked Gun police Squad? Yeah, Leslie Nielsen. Wasn't 263 00:15:25,720 --> 00:15:28,680 Speaker 5: there one called legal weapon or something like that. It 264 00:15:28,680 --> 00:15:29,200 Speaker 5: doesn't matter. 265 00:15:29,280 --> 00:15:31,760 Speaker 1: It might be one of those Hollywood knockoffs. 266 00:15:31,800 --> 00:15:32,680 Speaker 5: So we'll get back to it. 267 00:15:32,880 --> 00:15:35,640 Speaker 1: We've got top men on the research here in the meantime, 268 00:15:35,720 --> 00:15:38,280 Speaker 1: you'll hear a lot of variations on this basic idea 269 00:15:38,280 --> 00:15:41,720 Speaker 1: of sound as a weapon, loaded weapon, loaded weapon there go, 270 00:15:41,880 --> 00:15:42,600 Speaker 1: and it was called. 271 00:15:42,400 --> 00:15:46,400 Speaker 5: Loaded weapon one, and there wasn't a sequel that it's 272 00:15:46,440 --> 00:15:47,920 Speaker 5: important that we have that solved. 273 00:15:48,040 --> 00:15:51,560 Speaker 1: Yes, So the variations you'll hear, much like the variations 274 00:15:51,600 --> 00:15:54,080 Speaker 1: of lethal versus loaded weapon, are all going to be 275 00:15:54,600 --> 00:15:58,400 Speaker 1: new takes on the same concept. You'll hear about sonic grenade, 276 00:15:58,520 --> 00:16:01,440 Speaker 1: something you could throw that emit. It's a powerful, dangerous sound, 277 00:16:01,760 --> 00:16:06,280 Speaker 1: sonic cannons, sonic guns, and so on, and this hardware 278 00:16:06,400 --> 00:16:10,360 Speaker 1: can produce different effects. The majority that we know about 279 00:16:10,440 --> 00:16:14,560 Speaker 1: right now are designed to be non lethal, painful, slap 280 00:16:14,600 --> 00:16:17,240 Speaker 1: on the wrists, don't do it. We're not minimizing the 281 00:16:17,240 --> 00:16:22,440 Speaker 1: effects of these because non lethal weapons that term sometimes 282 00:16:22,520 --> 00:16:27,880 Speaker 1: gets a better rep than it deserves. Technically, people who 283 00:16:27,920 --> 00:16:31,160 Speaker 1: shoot rock salt at you out of a shotgun are 284 00:16:31,960 --> 00:16:34,680 Speaker 1: exercising a non lethal weapon. But I can tell you 285 00:16:34,760 --> 00:16:36,400 Speaker 1: that is a very painful experience. 286 00:16:36,440 --> 00:16:38,920 Speaker 5: And I mean it could you know, injure you such 287 00:16:38,960 --> 00:16:43,360 Speaker 5: that you could die from your wound, if an infection 288 00:16:43,480 --> 00:16:45,800 Speaker 5: or something like that, totally you would bleed from getting. 289 00:16:45,560 --> 00:16:47,520 Speaker 1: A shot with rock salt, I think right, yes, yeah, 290 00:16:47,920 --> 00:16:49,120 Speaker 1: depend on distance. 291 00:16:49,080 --> 00:16:51,520 Speaker 4: Yeah, well, and things like tasers too that are considered 292 00:16:51,600 --> 00:16:54,760 Speaker 4: less than lethal. Do have You can be killed by 293 00:16:54,800 --> 00:16:58,480 Speaker 4: that because you're dealing with your heart, and everybody has 294 00:16:58,520 --> 00:17:02,200 Speaker 4: a differently functioning heart and a circulatory system and everything, 295 00:17:02,240 --> 00:17:05,480 Speaker 4: so much in the same way, you can imagine, there 296 00:17:05,520 --> 00:17:06,680 Speaker 4: are dangers. 297 00:17:06,280 --> 00:17:09,040 Speaker 1: Yeah, especially you might have a pre existing heart condition 298 00:17:09,200 --> 00:17:13,199 Speaker 1: or something, and then it's boom, game over. So some 299 00:17:13,560 --> 00:17:16,439 Speaker 1: are designed. Some of these weapons are designed to shoot 300 00:17:16,760 --> 00:17:19,480 Speaker 1: what it's called a focus point or a focused area 301 00:17:19,520 --> 00:17:21,840 Speaker 1: of sound, like a bullet from a gun or maybe 302 00:17:21,880 --> 00:17:26,439 Speaker 1: a laser is a better description, while others create a 303 00:17:26,480 --> 00:17:30,920 Speaker 1: sustained field of effect. Despite their names, not all of 304 00:17:30,920 --> 00:17:36,040 Speaker 1: these weapons are gigantic, big booming, oversized nineteen eighties golden 305 00:17:36,080 --> 00:17:40,399 Speaker 1: era of hip hop boomboxes. They're operating some of them 306 00:17:40,440 --> 00:17:43,280 Speaker 1: are operating outside of the range of human hearing, like 307 00:17:44,080 --> 00:17:47,119 Speaker 1: Nol and Matt were talking about with the clip that 308 00:17:47,160 --> 00:17:52,080 Speaker 1: they played and what's happening there. It's similar to that 309 00:17:52,240 --> 00:17:55,359 Speaker 1: so called brown note. Do you guys remember the story 310 00:17:55,359 --> 00:17:56,199 Speaker 1: of the brown note? 311 00:17:56,320 --> 00:17:56,439 Speaker 4: Oh? 312 00:17:56,560 --> 00:17:58,280 Speaker 1: Yeah, I think South Park made it famous. 313 00:17:58,280 --> 00:18:00,439 Speaker 5: To one that makes you poop, right, Yeah, Yeah. 314 00:18:00,280 --> 00:18:03,600 Speaker 1: It's the one you can't hear but makes you poop, yes, 315 00:18:05,680 --> 00:18:09,919 Speaker 1: which we've examined in the past. At this point, there 316 00:18:09,960 --> 00:18:12,960 Speaker 1: is no universally accepted proof of the brown note, and 317 00:18:13,040 --> 00:18:16,160 Speaker 1: who knows. Maybe it's because it's not real. Maybe it's 318 00:18:16,200 --> 00:18:19,159 Speaker 1: because everybody who proved it was too embarrassed, you know, 319 00:18:19,320 --> 00:18:24,160 Speaker 1: nobody wanted to soil themselves for the sake of scientific research. 320 00:18:24,560 --> 00:18:27,640 Speaker 1: But we're pretty sure it's not real at this point. Yeah, 321 00:18:28,280 --> 00:18:32,000 Speaker 1: there's no real solid proof. So what this means if 322 00:18:32,000 --> 00:18:35,879 Speaker 1: something is outside the range of conscious human hearing, is 323 00:18:35,920 --> 00:18:38,879 Speaker 1: that victims can feel the effects of one of these 324 00:18:39,440 --> 00:18:43,879 Speaker 1: pieces of technology without necessarily associating those effects with an 325 00:18:43,920 --> 00:18:48,359 Speaker 1: actual sound. And through part of this, I have to 326 00:18:48,680 --> 00:18:53,520 Speaker 1: defer to my colleagues Matt and nol here because you 327 00:18:53,680 --> 00:18:58,560 Speaker 1: all are audio experts and you have I think you 328 00:18:58,600 --> 00:19:04,560 Speaker 1: can give good explanation at times with what sound is, 329 00:19:04,680 --> 00:19:07,439 Speaker 1: how it works, how the perception of sound works, what 330 00:19:07,480 --> 00:19:09,240 Speaker 1: we mean when we say a frequency, and all that. 331 00:19:09,680 --> 00:19:11,560 Speaker 1: So I just want to set that up that I 332 00:19:11,600 --> 00:19:14,280 Speaker 1: may ask some questions and relatively elementary. 333 00:19:13,720 --> 00:19:17,080 Speaker 4: To you all, Okay, no problem, and I will probably 334 00:19:17,119 --> 00:19:19,159 Speaker 4: defer to Noel. So I'm gonna set him up with a. 335 00:19:19,200 --> 00:19:21,160 Speaker 5: Question right now, and I will defer and turn. 336 00:19:21,000 --> 00:19:23,880 Speaker 4: Back to Matt, and then I will then defer to Paul, 337 00:19:24,320 --> 00:19:27,720 Speaker 4: and then he will defer to you, Ben, and then 338 00:19:27,760 --> 00:19:32,639 Speaker 4: we'll defer to you specifically. You listen, So here we go. 339 00:19:32,680 --> 00:19:35,760 Speaker 4: Here's the round robin. So when you're dealing with sounds, 340 00:19:35,800 --> 00:19:38,920 Speaker 4: you're talking about waves. You're talking about energy being moved 341 00:19:39,000 --> 00:19:42,240 Speaker 4: through the air with these waves, So you've got amplitudes, 342 00:19:43,040 --> 00:19:48,480 Speaker 4: you've got frequencies, so like how close together the sound 343 00:19:48,520 --> 00:19:52,720 Speaker 4: wave is happening, how large that wave actually. 344 00:19:52,400 --> 00:19:54,520 Speaker 5: Is, which translates to volume. 345 00:19:55,520 --> 00:19:57,080 Speaker 4: So there are all kinds of things that we're going 346 00:19:57,119 --> 00:19:58,840 Speaker 4: to be discussing as we get into this, and we're 347 00:19:58,880 --> 00:20:02,440 Speaker 4: talking about hurt killer hurts and megahurts. Do you want 348 00:20:02,440 --> 00:20:03,359 Speaker 4: to walk us through any of that? 349 00:20:04,359 --> 00:20:07,600 Speaker 5: I mean only that it's a spectrum in the same 350 00:20:07,600 --> 00:20:10,880 Speaker 5: way that color is a spectrum. And you know, sound 351 00:20:11,240 --> 00:20:16,080 Speaker 5: is measured from the lowest to the highest in terms 352 00:20:16,119 --> 00:20:18,800 Speaker 5: of and then you know as something goes from low 353 00:20:19,040 --> 00:20:22,480 Speaker 5: frequency to high frequency, they get closer together, so you 354 00:20:22,520 --> 00:20:25,200 Speaker 5: can see it like on a waveform, a lower sound 355 00:20:25,280 --> 00:20:27,359 Speaker 5: is going to be is going to have more space 356 00:20:27,400 --> 00:20:28,879 Speaker 5: in between them than a higher sound is going to 357 00:20:28,920 --> 00:20:31,280 Speaker 5: have like less space in between And just to jump in, 358 00:20:31,280 --> 00:20:33,639 Speaker 5: when I say low, I mean low in pitch and 359 00:20:33,720 --> 00:20:36,280 Speaker 5: high in pitch when I'm talking about volumes. So a 360 00:20:36,359 --> 00:20:40,280 Speaker 5: lower sound could have a wavelength up to seventeen meters, 361 00:20:40,320 --> 00:20:43,040 Speaker 5: which would be twenty hurts wow. And then a high 362 00:20:43,119 --> 00:20:46,440 Speaker 5: frequency could have something that you would measure in centimeters, 363 00:20:46,600 --> 00:20:49,360 Speaker 5: which would be twenty thousand hurts wow. 364 00:20:49,960 --> 00:20:54,200 Speaker 4: And it's also important to remember that when you're hearing sounds, 365 00:20:54,480 --> 00:20:57,560 Speaker 4: it's not just your ears. Your entire body is being 366 00:20:57,560 --> 00:21:00,720 Speaker 4: bombarded by these waves that are coming from a source. 367 00:21:01,400 --> 00:21:04,000 Speaker 4: So you know, when you imagine as a weapon, it's 368 00:21:04,400 --> 00:21:07,320 Speaker 4: not like they're attacking your ears, They're attacking your entire 369 00:21:07,560 --> 00:21:08,600 Speaker 4: corporeal form, right. 370 00:21:08,640 --> 00:21:08,800 Speaker 1: Yeah. 371 00:21:08,800 --> 00:21:10,720 Speaker 5: And in the case of the brown note, your bowels. 372 00:21:10,800 --> 00:21:12,960 Speaker 5: That would be a very low sound that would move 373 00:21:13,480 --> 00:21:15,919 Speaker 5: you and your bowels and make you. 374 00:21:17,119 --> 00:21:21,760 Speaker 1: And that's an incredibly important point. You know, the brown 375 00:21:21,800 --> 00:21:26,000 Speaker 1: note may sound humorous, but Matt, you're absolutely correct in 376 00:21:26,040 --> 00:21:30,320 Speaker 1: that this does. It's a body wide effect. Your drums 377 00:21:30,400 --> 00:21:33,200 Speaker 1: and the auditory system are going to be the most sensitive. 378 00:21:33,240 --> 00:21:35,399 Speaker 1: And the thing we notice the most, but that doesn't 379 00:21:35,400 --> 00:21:37,320 Speaker 1: mean the rest of the body is immune to it. 380 00:21:37,520 --> 00:21:38,840 Speaker 5: And if you hear a low sound, like a real 381 00:21:38,920 --> 00:21:40,919 Speaker 5: basic sound and a concert, you can feel it in 382 00:21:40,960 --> 00:21:42,880 Speaker 5: your guts and your sternum and stuff, you know. 383 00:21:43,720 --> 00:21:50,080 Speaker 1: And that's what sound is, right, vibration. So this idea 384 00:21:50,359 --> 00:21:54,479 Speaker 1: of taking taking a phenomenon that is responsible for some 385 00:21:54,520 --> 00:21:59,720 Speaker 1: of the most beautiful moments of human existence, listening to music, communicating, 386 00:22:00,080 --> 00:22:02,720 Speaker 1: saying I love you to a relative, or you know 387 00:22:03,160 --> 00:22:05,480 Speaker 1: someone you're hitting on a romantic partner. 388 00:22:05,200 --> 00:22:06,800 Speaker 4: Hearing your son's voice for the first time. 389 00:22:06,920 --> 00:22:09,879 Speaker 1: There we go, There we go. The idea of turning 390 00:22:09,920 --> 00:22:13,600 Speaker 1: that into a weapon sounds like some old school sci 391 00:22:13,640 --> 00:22:16,680 Speaker 1: fi comic book stuff from the golden age of comics. 392 00:22:16,880 --> 00:22:20,000 Speaker 1: But the truth is this technology is not theoretical. It's 393 00:22:20,000 --> 00:22:23,840 Speaker 1: already being deployed in the field on an experimental, marginal basis, 394 00:22:24,240 --> 00:22:27,280 Speaker 1: and research on it continues. And this is not just 395 00:22:27,600 --> 00:22:31,720 Speaker 1: a thing that is the domain of DARPA. Multiple government 396 00:22:31,840 --> 00:22:35,320 Speaker 1: agencies across the world have conducted research with this, along 397 00:22:35,359 --> 00:22:38,080 Speaker 1: with quite a few private entities, and they're doing that 398 00:22:38,400 --> 00:22:41,040 Speaker 1: because science backs up the claim that sound can be 399 00:22:41,119 --> 00:22:44,360 Speaker 1: used as a weapon. Earlier, we had explored the use 400 00:22:44,400 --> 00:22:48,080 Speaker 1: of sound as a psychological or even a supernatural weapon 401 00:22:48,760 --> 00:22:51,480 Speaker 1: shout out to us, See you next time. But the 402 00:22:51,520 --> 00:22:55,600 Speaker 1: weapons we're exploring now are meant to physically injure people. 403 00:22:56,000 --> 00:22:59,200 Speaker 1: We know that high powered sound waves can easily disrupt 404 00:22:59,280 --> 00:23:03,280 Speaker 1: or even destroy ear drums, and this creates intense disorientation 405 00:23:03,520 --> 00:23:07,600 Speaker 1: because our inner ear is a primary method of determining 406 00:23:07,800 --> 00:23:09,760 Speaker 1: balance for an individual body. 407 00:23:10,680 --> 00:23:13,240 Speaker 5: It's making me think back to those side effects you 408 00:23:13,280 --> 00:23:14,760 Speaker 5: talked about at the top of the show, that it 409 00:23:14,800 --> 00:23:17,960 Speaker 5: could cause you to get a little cattywampus and start 410 00:23:18,040 --> 00:23:20,720 Speaker 5: to kind of get that vertigo. Yeah, it makes me 411 00:23:20,760 --> 00:23:24,760 Speaker 5: think of the character on Arrested Development played by Eliza 412 00:23:24,800 --> 00:23:27,679 Speaker 5: Minelli who's always got that she's got a case of 413 00:23:27,680 --> 00:23:29,879 Speaker 5: the dizzas, and she'll be walking around normal and then 414 00:23:29,880 --> 00:23:31,560 Speaker 5: all of a sudden kind of like well, stumble and 415 00:23:31,600 --> 00:23:33,399 Speaker 5: then kind of have to pick herself back up. You know, 416 00:23:33,400 --> 00:23:36,000 Speaker 5: it's a legitimate thing that people suffer from, just you know, 417 00:23:36,040 --> 00:23:40,400 Speaker 5: without being afflicted by weird secret government sound cannons. 418 00:23:40,760 --> 00:23:45,560 Speaker 1: Yes, yeah, and high intensity ultrasound of frequencies from seven 419 00:23:45,640 --> 00:23:48,440 Speaker 1: hundred kilo hurts to the three point six mega hurts 420 00:23:48,840 --> 00:23:52,560 Speaker 1: can cause lung and intestinal damage in mice, so it's 421 00:23:52,600 --> 00:23:58,000 Speaker 1: beyond the ear. We luckily don't have hard data about 422 00:23:58,040 --> 00:24:01,399 Speaker 1: that in the realm of human experimentation. 423 00:24:00,880 --> 00:24:03,240 Speaker 4: At least not that is publicly available. 424 00:24:03,440 --> 00:24:10,040 Speaker 1: Right, heart rate patterns following vibroacoustic simulation can create serious 425 00:24:10,080 --> 00:24:16,160 Speaker 1: negative consequences, such as brady cardia atrial flutter. Sonic weapons 426 00:24:16,240 --> 00:24:19,080 Speaker 1: are used in non military applications too. 427 00:24:19,359 --> 00:24:23,880 Speaker 4: Yes, there is a ship called the Seaborn Spirit that 428 00:24:24,240 --> 00:24:27,480 Speaker 4: at one point used a long range acoustic device an 429 00:24:27,600 --> 00:24:30,639 Speaker 4: l RAD to deter some pirates that were attempting to 430 00:24:30,640 --> 00:24:34,000 Speaker 4: board the ship and take things from it and perhaps 431 00:24:34,080 --> 00:24:34,879 Speaker 4: even take the ship. 432 00:24:35,480 --> 00:24:39,080 Speaker 1: And they successfully used it, Yeah, they did. There's another 433 00:24:39,280 --> 00:24:44,040 Speaker 1: example that I find pretty funny, and I hope that 434 00:24:44,080 --> 00:24:46,159 Speaker 1: no one was seriously injured with this, But in the 435 00:24:46,280 --> 00:24:50,959 Speaker 1: United Kingdom, some stores began using sonic devices to prevent 436 00:24:51,080 --> 00:24:55,639 Speaker 1: teenagers from loitering. Because as you age, as the human 437 00:24:55,680 --> 00:24:59,520 Speaker 1: body ages, your hearing begins to decay, and there are 438 00:24:59,640 --> 00:25:03,680 Speaker 1: certain sounds that you will not be able to hear 439 00:25:03,880 --> 00:25:04,919 Speaker 1: later in life. 440 00:25:05,240 --> 00:25:07,639 Speaker 4: It's generally the higher frequencies. 441 00:25:07,160 --> 00:25:11,240 Speaker 1: Right right spot on, And so these store owners were 442 00:25:11,320 --> 00:25:16,680 Speaker 1: taking mobile devices and setting them up to emit a 443 00:25:16,760 --> 00:25:20,679 Speaker 1: sound at a pitch only younger ears were capable of hearings, Like, 444 00:25:20,760 --> 00:25:24,840 Speaker 1: only teenagers could hear this kind of thing. 445 00:25:24,880 --> 00:25:31,040 Speaker 5: It's like the millennial yelp, Yeah, I think so in 446 00:25:31,160 --> 00:25:35,920 Speaker 5: every song and every song it's like I think it's well, yeah, 447 00:25:36,000 --> 00:25:37,080 Speaker 5: only millennials can hear that. 448 00:25:37,160 --> 00:25:40,640 Speaker 4: Oh man, it does remind me of the sonic anti 449 00:25:40,800 --> 00:25:43,160 Speaker 4: pest devices that exist. You can find them in any 450 00:25:43,160 --> 00:25:47,600 Speaker 4: hardware store for you know, rodents and insects that emit 451 00:25:47,640 --> 00:25:49,399 Speaker 4: a high pitch sound. But if you turn those things on, 452 00:25:49,520 --> 00:25:52,360 Speaker 4: I swear to you you can. You can. You can 453 00:25:52,400 --> 00:25:54,600 Speaker 4: hear it, there's air moving and you can tell. 454 00:25:55,400 --> 00:25:57,600 Speaker 5: Do you think those actually work? Have you seen evidence 455 00:25:57,640 --> 00:25:58,440 Speaker 5: that they that they work. 456 00:25:58,560 --> 00:26:01,320 Speaker 4: I've not. I've never wanted to have one in my home. 457 00:26:01,480 --> 00:26:03,280 Speaker 5: Wait, but you can actually go real clean home. 458 00:26:03,440 --> 00:26:06,040 Speaker 1: Yeah, and you can actually hear them. You said, so 459 00:26:06,480 --> 00:26:07,439 Speaker 1: maybe they work on you. 460 00:26:07,920 --> 00:26:13,560 Speaker 4: It's not so much hearing is sensing the disturbing. Does 461 00:26:13,600 --> 00:26:14,400 Speaker 4: that compute at all? 462 00:26:14,880 --> 00:26:17,560 Speaker 5: Yeah, totally, And there's probably an obvious one. But like 463 00:26:17,600 --> 00:26:20,960 Speaker 5: things like sonar, where you know, you use sonic waves 464 00:26:21,000 --> 00:26:26,320 Speaker 5: to detect objects and map distances underwater, but it can 465 00:26:26,680 --> 00:26:30,280 Speaker 5: really mess with underwater creatures who encounter and it can 466 00:26:30,960 --> 00:26:34,960 Speaker 5: jack with their equilibrium like things we're talking about whales exactly. 467 00:26:35,040 --> 00:26:39,840 Speaker 1: Yeah, whales will have migration roots disrupted, and there's a 468 00:26:40,000 --> 00:26:44,879 Speaker 1: dearth of very significant or substantial research on that because 469 00:26:46,160 --> 00:26:49,159 Speaker 1: I'm gonna argue maybe this is a topic for a 470 00:26:49,200 --> 00:26:54,159 Speaker 1: different show, but because various governments operating submarines don't want 471 00:26:54,200 --> 00:26:58,919 Speaker 1: to admit that they're destroying this wildlife, right yep. And 472 00:26:59,000 --> 00:27:01,080 Speaker 1: of course I'm sure there are lot of people say, oh, 473 00:27:01,119 --> 00:27:05,879 Speaker 1: you're going to put the price of a whales life 474 00:27:06,320 --> 00:27:10,960 Speaker 1: over national security? Yeah you jerk, to which I say, oh, 475 00:27:11,040 --> 00:27:19,480 Speaker 1: national security. But overall this is fascinating but pretty spooky stuff. 476 00:27:19,200 --> 00:27:23,200 Speaker 4: Right yeah, actual humans being affected somehow by some sound. 477 00:27:23,640 --> 00:27:25,320 Speaker 1: So what happened next? 478 00:27:25,720 --> 00:27:28,440 Speaker 5: Well, we'll tell you after a quick word from our sponsor. 479 00:27:35,359 --> 00:27:40,040 Speaker 1: As the US Cuba joint investigation into this incident continued, 480 00:27:40,680 --> 00:27:44,200 Speaker 1: with the US staff leaving or leaving specifically for treatment 481 00:27:44,640 --> 00:27:47,280 Speaker 1: and Cuban staff being expelled from the US and so on, 482 00:27:47,720 --> 00:27:52,600 Speaker 1: more theories cropped up. For example, what if this was 483 00:27:52,640 --> 00:27:56,720 Speaker 1: a weapon operating in the infrasound ranges? 484 00:27:56,960 --> 00:28:00,920 Speaker 4: Ooh, anyone who's stuck with us for all while will 485 00:28:01,200 --> 00:28:04,760 Speaker 4: pyroic their ears when they hear infrasound, it's because we've 486 00:28:04,760 --> 00:28:08,359 Speaker 4: covered this before, we talked about it with regards to 487 00:28:08,560 --> 00:28:11,600 Speaker 4: Vic Tandy. It's the man that thought he'd encountered some 488 00:28:11,720 --> 00:28:16,320 Speaker 4: kind of actual ghost for real, before discovering that there 489 00:28:16,400 --> 00:28:19,920 Speaker 4: was a fan, literally a fan, an oscillating fan nearby 490 00:28:20,040 --> 00:28:23,520 Speaker 4: that was emitting a sound below the range that he 491 00:28:23,560 --> 00:28:26,280 Speaker 4: could hear, and it was triggering all kinds of things 492 00:28:26,359 --> 00:28:30,520 Speaker 4: in his body, hallucinations, headaches, just weird feelings. 493 00:28:30,920 --> 00:28:38,680 Speaker 1: And eventually what Vic Tandy learned was that there actually 494 00:28:38,840 --> 00:28:42,000 Speaker 1: was something like a ghost. It was this frequency. Yes, 495 00:28:42,800 --> 00:28:45,720 Speaker 1: so the effects he was encountering were not just his 496 00:28:45,880 --> 00:28:49,040 Speaker 1: mind playing tricks on him. They were his body responding 497 00:28:49,080 --> 00:28:53,600 Speaker 1: to an external stimulus. And what's fascinating about this, at 498 00:28:53,680 --> 00:28:57,560 Speaker 1: least to me, is that if it's true, if somebody 499 00:28:57,640 --> 00:29:02,280 Speaker 1: weaponized this infrasound idea, then and if it works the 500 00:29:02,280 --> 00:29:06,720 Speaker 1: way that this worked in Vic Tandy's experience, then someone 501 00:29:06,880 --> 00:29:08,920 Speaker 1: literally invented a ghost gun. 502 00:29:09,520 --> 00:29:12,280 Speaker 4: Yeah. And can you imagine if you had a large 503 00:29:12,360 --> 00:29:15,080 Speaker 4: enough whatever you would need set of speakers. I don't 504 00:29:15,080 --> 00:29:16,760 Speaker 4: know exactly how large you would have to be to 505 00:29:16,800 --> 00:29:20,600 Speaker 4: emit that kind of low frequency sound that far or 506 00:29:20,640 --> 00:29:24,320 Speaker 4: that loud. But what you could do to a population 507 00:29:24,440 --> 00:29:27,960 Speaker 4: in a building or in maybe an entire city. I'm 508 00:29:28,000 --> 00:29:32,400 Speaker 4: just picturing like a giant, massive subwafer, just a single one. 509 00:29:33,400 --> 00:29:35,880 Speaker 4: You carry it around like on a hand trunck. No, no, 510 00:29:35,960 --> 00:29:40,000 Speaker 4: you you'd put it on a jet copter and you 511 00:29:40,320 --> 00:29:41,560 Speaker 4: just go around the city. 512 00:29:41,600 --> 00:29:43,000 Speaker 5: So you're always thinking one step ahead. 513 00:29:43,800 --> 00:29:47,240 Speaker 1: However, there are some issues with the idea of infrasound. 514 00:29:47,280 --> 00:29:50,880 Speaker 1: If infrasound is the culprit here or the means of transmission, 515 00:29:51,360 --> 00:29:55,880 Speaker 1: then why did Handy not experience severe hearing loss? Is 516 00:29:55,920 --> 00:29:58,760 Speaker 1: that is that? You know? To Matt's point, is that 517 00:29:58,840 --> 00:30:03,440 Speaker 1: because the source of Tandy's experience was just not as 518 00:30:03,560 --> 00:30:07,000 Speaker 1: large or perhaps not as optimized for damage. 519 00:30:07,120 --> 00:30:10,520 Speaker 4: Well, maybe the frequencies were a little different, or maybe 520 00:30:10,600 --> 00:30:13,720 Speaker 4: we're what we're dealing with in the Cuban embassy case, 521 00:30:14,320 --> 00:30:20,040 Speaker 4: is this infrasound mixed with the high pitched tone we heard. Ah, yeah, 522 00:30:20,120 --> 00:30:22,560 Speaker 4: that's right, because it's multiple frequencies, we. 523 00:30:22,520 --> 00:30:26,240 Speaker 1: Have an audio potpourrie. That's a very important point. Additionally, 524 00:30:26,280 --> 00:30:28,920 Speaker 1: according to New York Times, a report by the National 525 00:30:28,960 --> 00:30:31,800 Speaker 1: Institute of Environmental Health Sciences that came out in two 526 00:30:31,840 --> 00:30:35,200 Speaker 1: thousand and two noted that the US military tried to 527 00:30:35,240 --> 00:30:39,400 Speaker 1: weaponize infrasound but had not succeeded because it was so 528 00:30:39,560 --> 00:30:44,400 Speaker 1: hard to focus the wavelengths. The primary effective infrasound they 529 00:30:44,480 --> 00:30:51,120 Speaker 1: found appears to be annoyance. That's a quote. Huh, it's 530 00:30:51,160 --> 00:30:53,920 Speaker 1: just like silly. It goes to what Noel was saying 531 00:30:53,960 --> 00:30:58,400 Speaker 1: about pranks. You know, is this just a Is this 532 00:30:58,600 --> 00:31:02,720 Speaker 1: just the equivalent of incessantly Facebook poking people? 533 00:31:03,240 --> 00:31:05,360 Speaker 5: You know, you use it on the enemy and it 534 00:31:05,440 --> 00:31:07,400 Speaker 5: keeps them from getting any work done. See. 535 00:31:07,480 --> 00:31:11,920 Speaker 4: I but I gotta say, I don't know if I 536 00:31:12,120 --> 00:31:15,640 Speaker 4: really believe this. I mean, I hate to say I 537 00:31:15,640 --> 00:31:18,360 Speaker 4: don't believe a report by the National Institute of Environmental 538 00:31:18,440 --> 00:31:19,400 Speaker 4: Health Sciences, but. 539 00:31:19,800 --> 00:31:21,120 Speaker 1: I think it's fine. 540 00:31:21,240 --> 00:31:26,520 Speaker 4: Yeah, it feels like you could definitely weaponize this thing. 541 00:31:26,640 --> 00:31:29,480 Speaker 4: I can understand the biggest problem being not being able 542 00:31:29,520 --> 00:31:32,560 Speaker 4: to focus the wavelengths because maybe you're affecting the people 543 00:31:32,600 --> 00:31:35,720 Speaker 4: who are also supposed to be operating whatever you're deploying, 544 00:31:36,480 --> 00:31:37,160 Speaker 4: or something. 545 00:31:36,920 --> 00:31:40,720 Speaker 1: Like that, like those giant guns like the Babylon gun 546 00:31:40,760 --> 00:31:43,280 Speaker 1: and rickets where they had to where the gun was 547 00:31:43,360 --> 00:31:47,080 Speaker 1: so large that the operators had to go three hundred 548 00:31:47,160 --> 00:31:51,560 Speaker 1: yards away, cover their eyes, nose, ears, and I think 549 00:31:51,600 --> 00:31:55,960 Speaker 1: basically all their other orifices with cotton, and then would 550 00:31:55,960 --> 00:31:57,840 Speaker 1: still be bleeding when they launched it. 551 00:31:58,000 --> 00:31:58,400 Speaker 5: Geez. 552 00:31:58,600 --> 00:32:02,200 Speaker 1: So maybe it's maybe it's situation where they said they 553 00:32:02,200 --> 00:32:05,160 Speaker 1: couldn't effectively weaponize it because they couldn't weaponize it in 554 00:32:05,160 --> 00:32:08,440 Speaker 1: a way that conformed to the operational constraints, like if 555 00:32:08,480 --> 00:32:10,680 Speaker 1: it needs to affect somebody with an x amount of 556 00:32:10,720 --> 00:32:12,520 Speaker 1: yards without. 557 00:32:12,160 --> 00:32:16,400 Speaker 5: Making everyone's anus bleed, without making everyone's anus bleed, and. 558 00:32:18,840 --> 00:32:21,720 Speaker 1: If you know, like those are considerations, and right now 559 00:32:21,760 --> 00:32:25,200 Speaker 1: we don't know what those exact constraints would be. But 560 00:32:25,320 --> 00:32:29,640 Speaker 1: this leads us to another possible culprit. So if infrasound, 561 00:32:29,720 --> 00:32:34,600 Speaker 1: if we are taking the word of the National Institute 562 00:32:34,640 --> 00:32:38,920 Speaker 1: of Environmental Health Sciences and their secondhand report, which it 563 00:32:39,040 --> 00:32:41,320 Speaker 1: is secondhand, it's not a primary source. If we're taking 564 00:32:41,360 --> 00:32:44,000 Speaker 1: their word for it, an infrasound for some reason doesn't 565 00:32:44,040 --> 00:32:47,240 Speaker 1: work out, then what about ultrasound? 566 00:32:47,600 --> 00:32:50,960 Speaker 4: Okay, So with infrasound, we're talking about the lowest end 567 00:32:51,040 --> 00:32:54,640 Speaker 4: of the spectrum as far as wavelengths go. What about 568 00:32:54,680 --> 00:32:56,280 Speaker 4: that high end stuff? 569 00:32:56,880 --> 00:32:59,320 Speaker 5: So at those really high frequencies we were talking about, 570 00:32:59,320 --> 00:33:02,840 Speaker 5: with the really wavelengths that are measured in centimeters rather 571 00:33:02,880 --> 00:33:07,600 Speaker 5: than meters. Higher than twenty thousand hertz, which is beyond 572 00:33:07,680 --> 00:33:12,440 Speaker 5: the range of human hearing, ultrasound can totally do serious 573 00:33:12,520 --> 00:33:18,600 Speaker 5: tissue damage if produced with enough juice. That's key, right, 574 00:33:18,720 --> 00:33:19,120 Speaker 5: that's why. 575 00:33:19,200 --> 00:33:23,320 Speaker 1: Okay, So for anybody in the audience who had kidney 576 00:33:23,400 --> 00:33:26,600 Speaker 1: stones or knows somebody in your family who had kidney stones, 577 00:33:26,880 --> 00:33:29,360 Speaker 1: that's why one of the treatments that doctors use for 578 00:33:29,480 --> 00:33:33,960 Speaker 1: kidney stones is ultrasound. They'll use focus blasts of this 579 00:33:34,200 --> 00:33:39,800 Speaker 1: very high frequency sound to break kidney stones apart and 580 00:33:39,840 --> 00:33:42,360 Speaker 1: do small enough pieces that they can pass through your body. 581 00:33:42,600 --> 00:33:45,760 Speaker 5: But luckily it does not affect your boys. 582 00:33:46,040 --> 00:33:47,720 Speaker 1: You're right, Yeah, luckily. 583 00:33:47,520 --> 00:33:50,160 Speaker 4: Yeah, for sure about that, because I still haven't had one. 584 00:33:50,320 --> 00:33:52,600 Speaker 5: Well, I don't know, that's my question. I mean, I 585 00:33:54,520 --> 00:33:56,720 Speaker 5: guess it's the focused nature of it, Like if they 586 00:33:56,800 --> 00:34:00,959 Speaker 5: shot you directly in the testes with that, maybe it 587 00:34:01,000 --> 00:34:02,960 Speaker 5: could have some impact. 588 00:34:03,040 --> 00:34:03,720 Speaker 1: I imagine. 589 00:34:03,760 --> 00:34:06,400 Speaker 4: Well, yeah, that's that's good. It just turns it from 590 00:34:06,760 --> 00:34:08,680 Speaker 4: kidney stones into kidney shards. 591 00:34:08,920 --> 00:34:14,879 Speaker 1: Balls aren't built for ultrasound. But yeah, without without being 592 00:34:15,719 --> 00:34:18,759 Speaker 1: frightening about it or alarmist it is. It is absolutely 593 00:34:18,800 --> 00:34:22,960 Speaker 1: true that this stuff can do physical damage in this 594 00:34:23,120 --> 00:34:28,120 Speaker 1: focus form of damaging kidney stones is only one application. 595 00:34:28,320 --> 00:34:28,560 Speaker 4: You know. 596 00:34:28,640 --> 00:34:31,959 Speaker 1: You also hear about lower versions of this from someone 597 00:34:31,960 --> 00:34:33,920 Speaker 1: has an ultrasound during a pregnancy. 598 00:34:34,360 --> 00:34:37,960 Speaker 5: Right, So, why again can't they focus it more and 599 00:34:38,120 --> 00:34:40,560 Speaker 5: and raise the power If we're talking about doing you know, 600 00:34:40,680 --> 00:34:43,600 Speaker 5: tissue damage, if it's produced with enough energy, why can't 601 00:34:43,600 --> 00:34:46,160 Speaker 5: they just use a really really in by day, I mean, 602 00:34:46,280 --> 00:34:49,239 Speaker 5: the the ultimate evil that's out to destroy us all, 603 00:34:50,000 --> 00:34:52,040 Speaker 5: whoever that may be. Why can't they just use a 604 00:34:52,160 --> 00:34:55,840 Speaker 5: giant power source and do the same technology and have 605 00:34:55,960 --> 00:34:58,839 Speaker 5: it be focused enough to shoot over long distances and 606 00:34:59,239 --> 00:35:01,640 Speaker 5: you know, use it to like assassinate somebody for example, 607 00:35:01,640 --> 00:35:04,800 Speaker 5: and it would be undetectable like an invisible bullet. 608 00:35:05,080 --> 00:35:09,080 Speaker 1: This, you know, this reminds me of Illumination Global Unlimited 609 00:35:09,200 --> 00:35:11,680 Speaker 1: and their fantastic products. Would like to think that my 610 00:35:11,840 --> 00:35:15,880 Speaker 1: sponsored the show, and we assure you that we are 611 00:35:15,920 --> 00:35:18,239 Speaker 1: required to say they are in no way related to 612 00:35:18,280 --> 00:35:21,400 Speaker 1: the Shadowy Cabal and the we'll just mentioned it is. 613 00:35:21,600 --> 00:35:23,479 Speaker 1: It is a question, though, it's a great question. Why 614 00:35:23,520 --> 00:35:27,720 Speaker 1: can't we Why can't they use it as a bullet 615 00:35:27,719 --> 00:35:31,200 Speaker 1: and their advantages to this invisible bullet. First off, there 616 00:35:31,280 --> 00:35:35,319 Speaker 1: wouldn't be a physical artifact in the dead body of 617 00:35:35,360 --> 00:35:37,640 Speaker 1: the victim, right, it would look as though their body 618 00:35:37,680 --> 00:35:43,800 Speaker 1: were shattered. But the issue is even though they found 619 00:35:44,280 --> 00:35:47,520 Speaker 1: researchers found that they could create beams that were powerful 620 00:35:47,600 --> 00:35:50,879 Speaker 1: enough in a laboratory, so maybe not mobile to kill 621 00:35:50,920 --> 00:35:56,319 Speaker 1: a mouse at close range a fatal sonic weapon. But 622 00:35:57,840 --> 00:36:00,799 Speaker 1: despite the fact that you could take the same technology 623 00:36:00,880 --> 00:36:04,160 Speaker 1: that's used in medical scans and so on and up 624 00:36:04,320 --> 00:36:07,160 Speaker 1: up its power level to the point of causing death, 625 00:36:08,719 --> 00:36:13,319 Speaker 1: the problem is that it's almost like DC power. So 626 00:36:13,440 --> 00:36:17,239 Speaker 1: direct current power had one primary one big disadvantage was 627 00:36:17,239 --> 00:36:21,400 Speaker 1: that it dissipated quickly over distances. So in Edison's original 628 00:36:21,480 --> 00:36:25,600 Speaker 1: plan for an energy infrastructure, there would have to be 629 00:36:25,680 --> 00:36:29,360 Speaker 1: these stations in a relatively small distance apart from one another, 630 00:36:30,520 --> 00:36:34,440 Speaker 1: pretty much. Yeah, yeah, And what's happening with this idea 631 00:36:34,480 --> 00:36:39,160 Speaker 1: with ultrasound is that it's also losing power pretty quickly 632 00:36:39,719 --> 00:36:43,960 Speaker 1: over long distances. And you know the reality is that 633 00:36:45,040 --> 00:36:47,120 Speaker 1: if you have a gun that you could go and 634 00:36:47,600 --> 00:36:50,319 Speaker 1: point at someone, say Paul finally gets tired, of us 635 00:36:50,480 --> 00:36:52,720 Speaker 1: and decides to kill us with a sonic weapon because 636 00:36:52,719 --> 00:36:54,759 Speaker 1: it's like, I don't know, you got time on your 637 00:36:54,760 --> 00:36:55,680 Speaker 1: hands or something. 638 00:36:55,480 --> 00:36:57,640 Speaker 4: And he could totally get through that window. 639 00:36:57,640 --> 00:37:01,279 Speaker 1: Right then, How close does he have to be? The 640 00:37:01,360 --> 00:37:04,680 Speaker 1: other problem with it, specifically in the case of Havana, 641 00:37:04,880 --> 00:37:09,160 Speaker 1: is that humidity really really messes with the effect. 642 00:37:09,360 --> 00:37:12,400 Speaker 5: Well that's a dampener. Yeah, no pun intended, but I 643 00:37:12,400 --> 00:37:14,920 Speaker 5: mean it is. It's like another material that it has 644 00:37:14,960 --> 00:37:18,080 Speaker 5: to pass through that dissipates the sound in the same 645 00:37:18,160 --> 00:37:20,719 Speaker 5: way we have crap up on the walls in this 646 00:37:20,800 --> 00:37:24,120 Speaker 5: here room that soaks up sound waves and keeps the 647 00:37:24,160 --> 00:37:28,160 Speaker 5: room from sounding echoey. That's because it's dissipating the sound 648 00:37:28,160 --> 00:37:29,839 Speaker 5: waves in a way. And you could use the same 649 00:37:29,840 --> 00:37:34,200 Speaker 5: stuff to break up a sound wave or damping it 650 00:37:34,320 --> 00:37:37,280 Speaker 5: like and keep it from transmitting from one room to another, 651 00:37:37,560 --> 00:37:41,000 Speaker 5: because it's literally stopping it or at least slowing it 652 00:37:41,040 --> 00:37:43,120 Speaker 5: down or breaking it up to the point where it's 653 00:37:43,120 --> 00:37:44,280 Speaker 5: not going to be as powerful. 654 00:37:45,360 --> 00:37:49,759 Speaker 4: So for a second, let's imagine that something like this 655 00:37:50,160 --> 00:37:53,719 Speaker 4: weapon exists out there and it's in the hands of 656 00:37:53,800 --> 00:37:57,920 Speaker 4: somebody in Cuba, and it was being deployed in twenty sixteen, 657 00:37:57,960 --> 00:38:02,320 Speaker 4: twenty seventeen. Who would be doing it the Cuban government. 658 00:38:02,920 --> 00:38:07,280 Speaker 1: That's a really interesting question because naturally the Cuban government 659 00:38:07,360 --> 00:38:11,480 Speaker 1: is going to deny this stuff, but some people from 660 00:38:11,560 --> 00:38:14,319 Speaker 1: the US side would be tempted to agree with them. 661 00:38:15,040 --> 00:38:19,359 Speaker 1: Former officials from the Obama administration believe that if there 662 00:38:19,440 --> 00:38:22,560 Speaker 1: were a weapon in play, Cuba would definitely not be 663 00:38:23,080 --> 00:38:27,640 Speaker 1: the person or the organization pulling the trigger. Really, yeah, 664 00:38:27,760 --> 00:38:29,600 Speaker 1: you're setting me up, and I appreciate it. 665 00:38:29,719 --> 00:38:33,440 Speaker 4: Oh well, No, I think it's just because it's the 666 00:38:33,520 --> 00:38:37,600 Speaker 4: US embassy inside Cuba. There have been tensions there for 667 00:38:37,640 --> 00:38:40,960 Speaker 4: a long time between the United States and Cuba, and 668 00:38:41,040 --> 00:38:44,279 Speaker 4: it seems like if you're attacking them, as if that's 669 00:38:44,320 --> 00:38:47,520 Speaker 4: your target, then it would be motivated for some reason 670 00:38:47,600 --> 00:38:50,839 Speaker 4: because of those tensions. At least that's me coming from 671 00:38:50,880 --> 00:38:54,320 Speaker 4: a complete novice of international affairs side. 672 00:38:54,440 --> 00:39:00,439 Speaker 1: I think that's completely reasonable too. That doesn't seem far 673 00:39:00,640 --> 00:39:04,440 Speaker 1: leap to make. According to a foreign policy advisor for 674 00:39:04,680 --> 00:39:10,080 Speaker 1: the Obama administration, a guy named Ben Rhodes GOPNZ, this 675 00:39:10,360 --> 00:39:16,560 Speaker 1: is it's sort of counterintuitive to blame Cuba for this. 676 00:39:17,320 --> 00:39:20,520 Speaker 1: Rhodes says, I don't think the Cuban government is behind it. 677 00:39:21,239 --> 00:39:25,920 Speaker 1: He was also involved in negotiating the opening or the 678 00:39:26,000 --> 00:39:28,520 Speaker 1: approachment between Havana and DC. 679 00:39:28,800 --> 00:39:31,799 Speaker 4: Well, that is true, and around this time, we're like, 680 00:39:31,840 --> 00:39:35,759 Speaker 4: youban the United States are going through kind of a reconnecting. 681 00:39:35,520 --> 00:39:39,760 Speaker 1: Right yeah, huh, first, says Rhodes. These things apparently started 682 00:39:39,840 --> 00:39:42,880 Speaker 1: in December. At the same time attacks were starting, the 683 00:39:42,880 --> 00:39:46,680 Speaker 1: Cuban government was frantically concluding agreements with US, US being 684 00:39:47,000 --> 00:39:50,640 Speaker 1: the Obama administration, signing business deals, in other words, trying 685 00:39:50,640 --> 00:39:53,160 Speaker 1: to preserve the relationships. So the notion that at the 686 00:39:53,200 --> 00:39:55,879 Speaker 1: same time is doing that, they would initiate something that's 687 00:39:55,920 --> 00:39:59,920 Speaker 1: so obviously designed to blow up the relationship doesn't make sense. 688 00:40:00,120 --> 00:40:03,480 Speaker 4: Ah, but you know it does make sense. What's that 689 00:40:03,560 --> 00:40:07,840 Speaker 4: a splinter group within the government or within some intelligence 690 00:40:07,840 --> 00:40:11,359 Speaker 4: agency that's functioning in the Cuban government or the United States. 691 00:40:11,040 --> 00:40:14,239 Speaker 1: Government, or yeah, an agent of chaos who doesn't want 692 00:40:14,280 --> 00:40:18,120 Speaker 1: the relationship to go a jet copter of sorts. 693 00:40:18,320 --> 00:40:23,040 Speaker 4: Ooh, I could totally see that happening. Somebody, even from 694 00:40:23,080 --> 00:40:26,920 Speaker 4: the US side. This is complete speculation. Sure, someone from 695 00:40:26,960 --> 00:40:30,360 Speaker 4: the US side that didn't want the relationship, relationship to 696 00:40:30,400 --> 00:40:33,040 Speaker 4: be rekindled, and so they do an attack on the 697 00:40:33,080 --> 00:40:36,240 Speaker 4: US embassy to make it look as though relations are souring. 698 00:40:36,840 --> 00:40:40,120 Speaker 1: So this takes us to another question then, which would 699 00:40:40,200 --> 00:40:45,120 Speaker 1: be who then would be the hand that moves the 700 00:40:45,120 --> 00:40:49,879 Speaker 1: sonic weapon. It could be, as you proposed, Matt, a 701 00:40:49,920 --> 00:40:52,440 Speaker 1: splinter group on the US side or on the Cuban 702 00:40:52,520 --> 00:40:56,799 Speaker 1: side who doesn't want to see the relationship open or 703 00:40:56,840 --> 00:40:59,640 Speaker 1: wants to at least maintain a status quo of isolation 704 00:40:59,760 --> 00:41:04,040 Speaker 1: on on Cuba's end. Other people will point the finger 705 00:41:04,200 --> 00:41:09,360 Speaker 1: at some of the US's long time recurring boogeyman. A 706 00:41:09,440 --> 00:41:13,520 Speaker 1: similar case was reported in Uzbekistan. A USAID officer and 707 00:41:13,560 --> 00:41:17,440 Speaker 1: his wife had symptoms that closely matched what was happening 708 00:41:18,000 --> 00:41:21,360 Speaker 1: or what the what the employees in Cuba said was 709 00:41:21,400 --> 00:41:25,000 Speaker 1: happening to them, and this led some media sources to 710 00:41:25,200 --> 00:41:28,759 Speaker 1: blame Russia and say that Russia was deploying this. They 711 00:41:28,760 --> 00:41:32,360 Speaker 1: did it in Uzbekistan, they're doing it in Cuba. Interesting 712 00:41:32,600 --> 00:41:37,360 Speaker 1: because they're bad. Oh like that, that's like the assumption. 713 00:41:37,480 --> 00:41:40,240 Speaker 4: Well yeah, but that is another angle though. I guess 714 00:41:40,600 --> 00:41:43,680 Speaker 4: because Quban Russia again have a long standing relationship, and 715 00:41:43,719 --> 00:41:47,239 Speaker 4: I wonder if there was anything there. Oh man, I 716 00:41:47,280 --> 00:41:51,120 Speaker 4: love I love pondering these things without knowing all the information, 717 00:41:52,440 --> 00:41:55,720 Speaker 4: because it leaves so many different avenues open to think about. 718 00:41:56,360 --> 00:42:00,000 Speaker 1: So the other twist there is. Cuba went a step further. 719 00:42:00,440 --> 00:42:03,520 Speaker 1: They said there's absolutely no proof that any weapon exists 720 00:42:03,640 --> 00:42:07,080 Speaker 1: or was deployed, not just by them, but by anyone. 721 00:42:07,440 --> 00:42:10,239 Speaker 1: They're saying, look at what happened, look at what people 722 00:42:10,280 --> 00:42:13,200 Speaker 1: are reporting. There's no gun. 723 00:42:13,640 --> 00:42:16,680 Speaker 4: Yeah, you know what I mean, at least no large gun. 724 00:42:17,719 --> 00:42:21,120 Speaker 1: Right into Knowl's earlier point, how large would have to be. 725 00:42:21,480 --> 00:42:25,400 Speaker 1: Now we have to ask ourselves, what if there's no weapon, 726 00:42:25,480 --> 00:42:27,800 Speaker 1: What if there's no spoon to quote the matrix, What 727 00:42:28,400 --> 00:42:32,120 Speaker 1: if no actual weapon exists? What does that even mean? 728 00:42:32,680 --> 00:42:35,960 Speaker 5: Well, I mean, you know, skeptics will say that allegations 729 00:42:36,120 --> 00:42:39,759 Speaker 5: of this kind of sonic weaponry just don't add up 730 00:42:39,960 --> 00:42:44,960 Speaker 5: and kind of defy the laws of nature of science. 731 00:42:45,760 --> 00:42:49,040 Speaker 1: Yeah, right, like just the everything we know about how 732 00:42:49,200 --> 00:42:52,120 Speaker 1: sound works, how it travels, like the points you brought 733 00:42:52,200 --> 00:42:52,680 Speaker 1: up earlier. 734 00:42:52,719 --> 00:42:55,720 Speaker 5: No, like humidity, which I now feel like a fool, 735 00:42:56,920 --> 00:42:58,960 Speaker 5: I don't know about the long distance. About. My whole 736 00:42:58,960 --> 00:43:01,080 Speaker 5: thing was why can't we have us sonic sniper gun 737 00:43:01,120 --> 00:43:02,920 Speaker 5: that just uses the technology they used to break up 738 00:43:02,920 --> 00:43:05,919 Speaker 5: your kidney stones to assassinate someone from far, far away. 739 00:43:05,960 --> 00:43:10,000 Speaker 5: And I realize now that that is a pipe dream. 740 00:43:10,480 --> 00:43:12,960 Speaker 1: Maybe not. It just really we're arguing the size of 741 00:43:13,000 --> 00:43:13,319 Speaker 1: the gun. 742 00:43:14,040 --> 00:43:16,319 Speaker 5: I guess it's true. And like you know, when I 743 00:43:16,320 --> 00:43:18,480 Speaker 5: say a long distance, I'm not saying miles. I just 744 00:43:18,560 --> 00:43:20,920 Speaker 5: mean far enough away that it could be focused and 745 00:43:21,080 --> 00:43:25,640 Speaker 5: used unseen. Right, But maybe there is a way. I 746 00:43:25,640 --> 00:43:29,399 Speaker 5: don't know. Yeah, I keep back pedaling, you know, I'm 747 00:43:29,400 --> 00:43:31,520 Speaker 5: going out there on the limit. I'm saying it's possible. 748 00:43:31,560 --> 00:43:33,960 Speaker 4: Well, so far we've kind of been imagining that it's 749 00:43:34,040 --> 00:43:37,719 Speaker 4: one large weapon that a military someone would deploy. What 750 00:43:37,840 --> 00:43:43,600 Speaker 4: if we're talking more about very tiny maybe not maybe 751 00:43:43,640 --> 00:43:47,400 Speaker 4: not so tiny, but small versions that are maybe littered 752 00:43:47,440 --> 00:43:51,279 Speaker 4: throughout an embassy where they're able to produce that kind 753 00:43:51,280 --> 00:43:54,200 Speaker 4: of sound and have that frequency response, but they're just 754 00:43:54,239 --> 00:43:57,440 Speaker 4: in the walls somewhere, or in the ducting system, or 755 00:43:57,800 --> 00:43:59,960 Speaker 4: somewhere where they can where it's audible and you can 756 00:44:00,080 --> 00:44:02,719 Speaker 4: still get hit with the sound waves, but you wouldn't 757 00:44:02,960 --> 00:44:03,600 Speaker 4: see it. 758 00:44:03,760 --> 00:44:08,239 Speaker 1: Similar perhaps to the way that a hotel room would 759 00:44:08,239 --> 00:44:11,040 Speaker 1: be bugged with it to your cameras wanted. 760 00:44:10,840 --> 00:44:13,600 Speaker 5: To get really dark and disturbing about it the way 761 00:44:13,960 --> 00:44:16,640 Speaker 5: in that show OZ, a lot of times folks were 762 00:44:16,760 --> 00:44:20,360 Speaker 5: killed by slowly being fed ground up glass and their food. 763 00:44:20,600 --> 00:44:23,080 Speaker 5: Oh right, So if you have these sonic devices that 764 00:44:23,080 --> 00:44:24,960 Speaker 5: are in your office and you go in there every 765 00:44:25,040 --> 00:44:28,359 Speaker 5: day and you're constantly getting doses of this stuff, maybe 766 00:44:28,360 --> 00:44:30,640 Speaker 5: it wouldn't hit you all at once, but it would 767 00:44:30,719 --> 00:44:32,440 Speaker 5: slowly weaken you over time. 768 00:44:32,880 --> 00:44:37,280 Speaker 1: Maybe there's an aggregate effect, especially in your sleep. Yeah, 769 00:44:37,440 --> 00:44:39,919 Speaker 1: but if the noise was audible to them, how could 770 00:44:39,960 --> 00:44:42,960 Speaker 1: they sleep? You know what? There are questions there. 771 00:44:42,960 --> 00:44:45,200 Speaker 5: Wouldn't it not be audible though, because I mean, surely 772 00:44:45,239 --> 00:44:47,840 Speaker 5: when you get that treatment done, you know, for kidney stones, 773 00:44:47,840 --> 00:44:50,400 Speaker 5: you're not hearing a horrible shrill, high pitched sound. 774 00:44:50,480 --> 00:44:51,319 Speaker 1: That's true, you're not. 775 00:44:51,400 --> 00:44:53,200 Speaker 4: But in this case we have an example of what 776 00:44:53,280 --> 00:44:55,480 Speaker 4: it did sound like that, and they were They did 777 00:44:55,520 --> 00:44:57,000 Speaker 4: report an audible shrill sound. 778 00:44:57,040 --> 00:45:00,560 Speaker 1: So I don't know, but that's what they heard. Also, 779 00:45:00,760 --> 00:45:03,320 Speaker 1: so they may have had other times where they only 780 00:45:03,880 --> 00:45:06,920 Speaker 1: you know, maybe an iceberg of sorts like the audible 781 00:45:06,960 --> 00:45:09,000 Speaker 1: stuff is what they can see. That's the iceberg above 782 00:45:09,000 --> 00:45:09,319 Speaker 1: the water. 783 00:45:09,400 --> 00:45:13,839 Speaker 5: Audible dot Com is the leading provider of audiobooks and no. 784 00:45:14,080 --> 00:45:18,520 Speaker 4: Yeah, if you enter our promotion code sonic death ray. Yep, 785 00:45:18,680 --> 00:45:22,400 Speaker 4: you can get ten percent off a cookie at my house. 786 00:45:23,239 --> 00:45:26,200 Speaker 1: Really, yep, how's your cookie business going so far? 787 00:45:26,239 --> 00:45:30,160 Speaker 4: We're just hemorrhaging money, so just giving them away? 788 00:45:30,760 --> 00:45:34,239 Speaker 1: Oh man, Well, I am a little bit offended. Or 789 00:45:34,280 --> 00:45:38,239 Speaker 1: maybe no cookies exist, just like maybe no sonic weapons 790 00:45:38,480 --> 00:45:43,080 Speaker 1: exist in this situation. In fact, some neurologists have argued 791 00:45:43,120 --> 00:45:45,400 Speaker 1: that the real source of the problem is not a 792 00:45:45,440 --> 00:45:49,040 Speaker 1: weapon and not a sound at all. Instead, they think 793 00:45:49,120 --> 00:45:56,120 Speaker 1: it's a sort of mass hysteria. Yeah. This is according 794 00:45:56,200 --> 00:45:59,840 Speaker 1: to Mark Hollett, the head of the Human Motor Controls 795 00:46:00,680 --> 00:46:05,239 Speaker 1: of the US National Institute of Neurological Disorders and Stroke. Wow. 796 00:46:05,280 --> 00:46:07,520 Speaker 4: Would you love to see that in your email every 797 00:46:07,560 --> 00:46:09,240 Speaker 4: time you have to send something out. 798 00:46:09,520 --> 00:46:11,040 Speaker 1: The head of Human Motor Control. 799 00:46:11,800 --> 00:46:14,280 Speaker 5: That's very That's yeah, that's important. 800 00:46:14,360 --> 00:46:17,760 Speaker 1: It does. And he says, from an objective point of view, 801 00:46:17,840 --> 00:46:22,160 Speaker 1: it's more like mass hysteria than anything else. Mass hysteria 802 00:46:22,560 --> 00:46:26,840 Speaker 1: is something we've mentioned before. Maybe we talk about Salem 803 00:46:26,880 --> 00:46:28,200 Speaker 1: witch trials, which was. 804 00:46:28,120 --> 00:46:30,319 Speaker 5: The source of my Ooh. By the way, I'm not 805 00:46:30,440 --> 00:46:34,279 Speaker 5: dismissing mass hysteria. It of course can absolutely be a thing. 806 00:46:34,480 --> 00:46:36,520 Speaker 5: I was just trying to play the game. 807 00:46:36,800 --> 00:46:40,200 Speaker 1: Yeah, and I think it works. So we know massestaria 808 00:46:40,239 --> 00:46:42,960 Speaker 1: is real. We know it's dangerous. It's resulted in deaths 809 00:46:43,000 --> 00:46:47,640 Speaker 1: throughout history, right, oftentimes the deaths of completely innocent people. 810 00:46:49,120 --> 00:46:52,319 Speaker 1: It describes an outbreak among groups of people that are 811 00:46:54,320 --> 00:47:01,000 Speaker 1: partially or holy psychosomatic, and that means, without deriding these 812 00:47:01,080 --> 00:47:04,799 Speaker 1: victims or placing any blame upon them, that means that 813 00:47:05,760 --> 00:47:09,680 Speaker 1: their perceptions or their beliefs of what are happening, their 814 00:47:09,719 --> 00:47:14,400 Speaker 1: internal narratives are determining these symptoms that they are encountering, 815 00:47:14,480 --> 00:47:17,400 Speaker 1: and they're attributing that to an external source. 816 00:47:17,800 --> 00:47:21,960 Speaker 4: Yeah, and I wonder throughout the investigation that's being conducted 817 00:47:22,640 --> 00:47:25,920 Speaker 4: if they're focusing on everything like the water supply for 818 00:47:26,000 --> 00:47:28,040 Speaker 4: that building, because you're talking about a lot of people 819 00:47:28,040 --> 00:47:30,160 Speaker 4: who are drinking the same water, who are using the 820 00:47:30,200 --> 00:47:33,400 Speaker 4: same facilities, who are breathing the same air. You know, 821 00:47:33,440 --> 00:47:35,520 Speaker 4: that's all in a closed system. So I wonder if 822 00:47:36,040 --> 00:47:38,799 Speaker 4: you know there are other extenuating circumstances there. 823 00:47:39,200 --> 00:47:42,200 Speaker 1: That's a good question. We don't know how far the 824 00:47:42,239 --> 00:47:46,040 Speaker 1: investigation has gone because they're not completely public about much 825 00:47:46,080 --> 00:47:50,160 Speaker 1: else other than the investigation is ongoing. Yeah, the phrase 826 00:47:50,200 --> 00:47:53,880 Speaker 1: we hear often well, al Ittt says this is more 827 00:47:54,000 --> 00:47:57,560 Speaker 1: commonly a thing that affects smaller groups of people, often 828 00:47:57,600 --> 00:48:00,160 Speaker 1: in families, but he does say it's feasible for a 829 00:48:00,239 --> 00:48:03,800 Speaker 1: larger group to be affected if they're working together closely, 830 00:48:03,960 --> 00:48:07,160 Speaker 1: especially in a tense and hostile environment. There you go, 831 00:48:07,440 --> 00:48:09,560 Speaker 1: and it's probably true they are seeing the same people 832 00:48:09,640 --> 00:48:13,320 Speaker 1: every day. They're probably living in somewhat of a bubble. 833 00:48:14,360 --> 00:48:18,319 Speaker 1: So that's that's a neurologist take on it, and it 834 00:48:18,400 --> 00:48:21,120 Speaker 1: leads us to some conclusions. Where are we at now? 835 00:48:21,360 --> 00:48:24,880 Speaker 5: Well, the Cuban Ministry of Foreign Affairs claimed that it 836 00:48:25,280 --> 00:48:29,560 Speaker 5: learned of these health issues on February seventeenth and opened 837 00:48:29,600 --> 00:48:35,920 Speaker 5: a quote comprehensive priority and urgent investigation and quote and 838 00:48:36,360 --> 00:48:39,920 Speaker 5: they formed a committee to carry out set investigation. 839 00:48:40,560 --> 00:48:44,600 Speaker 4: And so that's February seventeenth, twenty seventeen, and we know 840 00:48:44,640 --> 00:48:47,560 Speaker 4: what's been happening since before that. In twenty sixteen, that's 841 00:48:47,560 --> 00:48:49,120 Speaker 4: just when they heard about it. And they also said 842 00:48:49,560 --> 00:48:53,319 Speaker 4: the ministry had increased security around the American embassy and 843 00:48:53,360 --> 00:48:56,040 Speaker 4: all of the diplomatic residences where people working at the 844 00:48:56,040 --> 00:48:57,320 Speaker 4: embassy reside. 845 00:48:57,840 --> 00:49:01,319 Speaker 1: And they additionally said as we had mentioned earlier, is 846 00:49:01,360 --> 00:49:04,719 Speaker 1: not a weapon. If there was, Cuba had nothing to 847 00:49:04,760 --> 00:49:07,799 Speaker 1: do with it. Why Why on earth will we do that? 848 00:49:08,760 --> 00:49:12,560 Speaker 1: Stop accusing this stuff? And according to a spokesman for 849 00:49:12,680 --> 00:49:16,800 Speaker 1: the State Department's Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs, since September 850 00:49:16,840 --> 00:49:19,799 Speaker 1: twenty ninth, twenty seventeen, the Department of State has been 851 00:49:19,800 --> 00:49:25,120 Speaker 1: contacted by nineteen US citizens who are experiencing symptoms similar 852 00:49:25,160 --> 00:49:28,840 Speaker 1: to those listed in the travel warning after visiting Cuba. 853 00:49:28,920 --> 00:49:31,799 Speaker 4: So these are extra other people. 854 00:49:31,680 --> 00:49:36,239 Speaker 1: Right who are reporting these symptoms. At this point, we 855 00:49:36,560 --> 00:49:41,920 Speaker 1: do not have a conclusive cause. It's up in the 856 00:49:41,960 --> 00:49:45,320 Speaker 1: air as to whether we will ever find a conclusive cause. 857 00:49:45,920 --> 00:49:49,879 Speaker 1: Two of the big front runners for this event are 858 00:49:50,040 --> 00:49:53,680 Speaker 1: going to be mass hysteria, if you listen to some neurologists, 859 00:49:54,200 --> 00:49:59,360 Speaker 1: a sonic weapon, if you listen to some again anonymous 860 00:49:59,600 --> 00:50:02,680 Speaker 1: government and officials. You have to wonder about the timing 861 00:50:02,719 --> 00:50:06,879 Speaker 1: of this, as Matt said, you have to wonder about 862 00:50:07,520 --> 00:50:10,840 Speaker 1: the specifics and how much happened behind the curtain. But 863 00:50:11,280 --> 00:50:16,720 Speaker 1: as we know now, something happened. Something happened. Is there 864 00:50:16,800 --> 00:50:20,440 Speaker 1: is there a cover up? Is it just a case 865 00:50:20,480 --> 00:50:25,080 Speaker 1: of people being misinformed? Do you have some insider info 866 00:50:25,160 --> 00:50:27,160 Speaker 1: that you would like to share with us. If so, 867 00:50:27,200 --> 00:50:30,240 Speaker 1: we'd we'd love to hear your thoughts. You can find 868 00:50:30,640 --> 00:50:33,920 Speaker 1: Matt Noles, super producer, Paul and I on Instagram. You 869 00:50:33,920 --> 00:50:36,919 Speaker 1: can find us on Facebook. You can find us on Twitter. 870 00:50:36,840 --> 00:50:39,560 Speaker 4: And we're conspiracy stuff at most of those, but conspiracy 871 00:50:39,560 --> 00:50:43,319 Speaker 4: stuff show on Instagram and uh oh oh. One last 872 00:50:43,320 --> 00:50:48,480 Speaker 4: thing before we leave there is there's a declassified department 873 00:50:48,560 --> 00:50:52,360 Speaker 4: of the Army. I guess it's just a report or 874 00:50:52,400 --> 00:50:55,840 Speaker 4: part of a report that you can read search bio 875 00:50:55,920 --> 00:51:00,680 Speaker 4: effects of selected non lethal weapons, and you should find 876 00:51:00,680 --> 00:51:02,640 Speaker 4: a pdf. There's one on Wired I know that you 877 00:51:02,680 --> 00:51:04,719 Speaker 4: can get. It's just going through a lot of the 878 00:51:04,719 --> 00:51:09,040 Speaker 4: stuff with microwaves and radio frequencies and everything that they've 879 00:51:09,080 --> 00:51:12,480 Speaker 4: tested over the years to see what negative effects on 880 00:51:12,520 --> 00:51:15,839 Speaker 4: the humans and other animals can occur. It's a huge read. 881 00:51:16,160 --> 00:51:18,279 Speaker 4: You probably won't get through all of it, but there 882 00:51:18,320 --> 00:51:21,960 Speaker 4: is some meaty stuff in there just about the possibilities 883 00:51:22,160 --> 00:51:26,040 Speaker 4: and social media. And that's the end of this classic episode. 884 00:51:26,080 --> 00:51:29,880 Speaker 4: If you have any thoughts or questions about this episode, 885 00:51:30,280 --> 00:51:32,319 Speaker 4: you can get into contact with us in a number 886 00:51:32,360 --> 00:51:34,359 Speaker 4: of different ways. One of the best is to give 887 00:51:34,440 --> 00:51:39,120 Speaker 4: us a call. Our number is one eight three three STDWYTK. 888 00:51:39,560 --> 00:51:41,319 Speaker 4: If you don't want to do that, you can send 889 00:51:41,400 --> 00:51:42,800 Speaker 4: us a good old fashioned email. 890 00:51:43,080 --> 00:51:47,239 Speaker 1: We are conspiracy at iHeartRadio dot com. 891 00:51:47,360 --> 00:51:49,440 Speaker 4: Stuff they don't want you to know. Is a production 892 00:51:49,560 --> 00:51:54,080 Speaker 4: of iHeartRadio. For more podcasts from iHeartRadio, visit the iHeartRadio app, 893 00:51:54,160 --> 00:51:57,040 Speaker 4: Apple Podcasts, or wherever you listen to your favorite shows.