1 00:00:01,440 --> 00:00:05,040 Speaker 1: Welcome to Crash Course, a podcast about business, political, and 2 00:00:05,080 --> 00:00:08,240 Speaker 1: social disruption and what we can learn from it. I'm 3 00:00:08,280 --> 00:00:14,000 Speaker 1: Tim O'Brien. Today's Crash Course Nukes, Russia and our new 4 00:00:14,040 --> 00:00:17,360 Speaker 1: Cold War. The world has never been a settled place, 5 00:00:17,880 --> 00:00:21,360 Speaker 1: but it has been enveloped by sweeping existential challenges in 6 00:00:21,400 --> 00:00:24,960 Speaker 1: recent years. The COVID nineteen lockdowns offered a public health 7 00:00:25,000 --> 00:00:29,840 Speaker 1: crisis reminiscent of epidemics that once seemed pass a and 8 00:00:29,840 --> 00:00:32,879 Speaker 1: that Russian US Cold War from the nineteen fifties, sixties 9 00:00:32,920 --> 00:00:36,000 Speaker 1: and seventies that also seemed consigned to the history books. 10 00:00:36,600 --> 00:00:40,440 Speaker 1: Well that's back with us too. In other words, everything 11 00:00:40,440 --> 00:00:45,040 Speaker 1: old is new again, including frosty global military conflicts and 12 00:00:45,080 --> 00:00:48,839 Speaker 1: the looming threat of nuclear confrontations. There's even a hit 13 00:00:48,920 --> 00:00:52,280 Speaker 1: movie out about the dawn of the nuclear era Oppenheimer. 14 00:00:53,680 --> 00:00:57,200 Speaker 1: Ever since Vladimir Putin sent Russian tanks rolling into Ukraine 15 00:00:57,440 --> 00:01:01,120 Speaker 1: in early twenty twenty two, assumptions about the possibility of 16 00:01:01,160 --> 00:01:03,720 Speaker 1: war in the twenty first century have been turned on 17 00:01:03,760 --> 00:01:07,160 Speaker 1: their heads. A long absence of conflict in Europe gave 18 00:01:07,200 --> 00:01:10,720 Speaker 1: way to a bloody and sustained ground war. Russia has 19 00:01:10,760 --> 00:01:15,560 Speaker 1: even warned it might unleash nuclear missiles, China, rattling its 20 00:01:15,600 --> 00:01:19,600 Speaker 1: own saber in Asia, looms large in the background, just 21 00:01:19,640 --> 00:01:24,520 Speaker 1: as it did in the fifties, sixties, and seventies. The 22 00:01:24,560 --> 00:01:27,920 Speaker 1: primary lesson of the Ukraine War, hal Brands has written 23 00:01:28,600 --> 00:01:32,039 Speaker 1: is that nuclear coercion will be essential to prevailing in 24 00:01:32,080 --> 00:01:36,440 Speaker 1: the rivalries that define our age. The nukes are now 25 00:01:36,480 --> 00:01:40,400 Speaker 1: the new normal. Hal's a foreign policy professor at Johns 26 00:01:40,400 --> 00:01:44,840 Speaker 1: Hopkins University, co author of Danger Zone, The Coming Conflict 27 00:01:44,920 --> 00:01:48,320 Speaker 1: with China, a member of the State Department's Foreign Affairs 28 00:01:48,400 --> 00:01:52,240 Speaker 1: Policy Board, and a Bloomberg opinion columnist, and he joins 29 00:01:52,240 --> 00:01:53,320 Speaker 1: Crash Course today. 30 00:01:54,000 --> 00:01:55,800 Speaker 2: Welcome Hell, Thanks for having me. 31 00:01:56,680 --> 00:01:58,960 Speaker 1: Great to spend time with you. You know, my big 32 00:01:58,960 --> 00:02:02,920 Speaker 1: overarching question, if somebody like you who studies and watches 33 00:02:02,960 --> 00:02:06,400 Speaker 1: these things, is would you have thought ten years ago, 34 00:02:06,680 --> 00:02:09,640 Speaker 1: or say even a year and a half ago, that 35 00:02:09,760 --> 00:02:12,760 Speaker 1: this is where Europe and the US would be right 36 00:02:12,800 --> 00:02:14,519 Speaker 1: now with Russia. 37 00:02:14,639 --> 00:02:19,440 Speaker 2: No, probably not ten years ago. We were still before 38 00:02:20,080 --> 00:02:24,000 Speaker 2: the Russian invasion and annexation of Crimea, although we had 39 00:02:24,040 --> 00:02:27,800 Speaker 2: seen the Russian attack on Georgia in two thousand and eight, 40 00:02:27,880 --> 00:02:31,359 Speaker 2: but I think there was still a significantly greater degree 41 00:02:31,360 --> 00:02:34,480 Speaker 2: of hope then in Washington, but especially in a number 42 00:02:34,520 --> 00:02:38,919 Speaker 2: of European capitals, that Russia might still make its peace 43 00:02:39,120 --> 00:02:43,400 Speaker 2: with the international system that the United States and its 44 00:02:43,440 --> 00:02:46,680 Speaker 2: European allies had done so much to construct and maintain 45 00:02:46,960 --> 00:02:50,080 Speaker 2: over the years. That obviously turned out not to be 46 00:02:50,200 --> 00:02:53,080 Speaker 2: the case, But even I guess a little bit more 47 00:02:53,080 --> 00:02:54,320 Speaker 2: than a year and a half ago, if you go 48 00:02:54,400 --> 00:02:57,919 Speaker 2: back to the run up to Russia's invasion of Ukraine, 49 00:02:58,600 --> 00:03:02,399 Speaker 2: there was a significant amount out of disbelief in Washington, 50 00:03:02,480 --> 00:03:06,200 Speaker 2: but also even more so in European capitals, that Russia 51 00:03:06,280 --> 00:03:08,320 Speaker 2: was actually going to do this, that it was actually 52 00:03:08,320 --> 00:03:11,480 Speaker 2: going to try to wipe a sovereign state off the map, 53 00:03:12,320 --> 00:03:16,720 Speaker 2: annex much, if not all, of its territory, and extinguish 54 00:03:17,000 --> 00:03:22,040 Speaker 2: its existence as an independent political entity. That just didn't 55 00:03:22,040 --> 00:03:25,920 Speaker 2: seem like something that happened in the modern world. It 56 00:03:25,960 --> 00:03:29,360 Speaker 2: seemed like something that was ripped from the nineteen thirties. 57 00:03:29,360 --> 00:03:31,640 Speaker 2: And so I think it actually took the shock of 58 00:03:31,680 --> 00:03:35,320 Speaker 2: the invasion to convince a lot of skeptics that we 59 00:03:35,440 --> 00:03:39,560 Speaker 2: had entered either a fundamentally new world or we were 60 00:03:39,600 --> 00:03:42,960 Speaker 2: threatened with a return to an older, darker world. And 61 00:03:43,000 --> 00:03:47,080 Speaker 2: that has really produced a lot of the intensified transatlantic 62 00:03:47,120 --> 00:03:49,600 Speaker 2: cooperation we've seen over the past year and a half. 63 00:03:49,600 --> 00:03:51,760 Speaker 2: And some of what we've seen is actually quite remarkable. 64 00:03:51,760 --> 00:03:54,600 Speaker 2: And so you've seen Germany, which spent more than a 65 00:03:54,640 --> 00:03:59,760 Speaker 2: generation cultivating its addiction to Russian energy, kick that habit 66 00:04:00,080 --> 00:04:03,520 Speaker 2: fairly quickly. You've seen Poland take steps to turn itself 67 00:04:03,560 --> 00:04:07,600 Speaker 2: into a major military power. You've seen Ukraine pulled closer 68 00:04:07,680 --> 00:04:10,080 Speaker 2: to NATO and the European Union and the West writ 69 00:04:10,120 --> 00:04:13,560 Speaker 2: large than anyone would have anticipated. And you've seen the 70 00:04:13,800 --> 00:04:18,440 Speaker 2: North Atlantic Treaty Organization be revitalized and expanded to bring 71 00:04:18,480 --> 00:04:20,640 Speaker 2: in Finland and Sweden in a way that many people 72 00:04:20,640 --> 00:04:22,520 Speaker 2: certainly would not have predicted two years ago. 73 00:04:23,400 --> 00:04:25,799 Speaker 1: And why was that? This is one of the curious 74 00:04:25,839 --> 00:04:30,040 Speaker 1: things to be given all of the informational and observational 75 00:04:30,080 --> 00:04:33,760 Speaker 1: firepower that exists in the digital era, and the amount 76 00:04:33,800 --> 00:04:38,800 Speaker 1: of communication and analysis that's available to both policymakers and 77 00:04:38,880 --> 00:04:44,359 Speaker 1: diplomats certainly, and to others as well military strategists. Was 78 00:04:44,400 --> 00:04:47,720 Speaker 1: it simply that no one thought that Vladimir Putin would 79 00:04:47,760 --> 00:04:50,560 Speaker 1: be willing to send tanks over a border. Was it 80 00:04:50,600 --> 00:04:53,720 Speaker 1: that simple that there was an appraisal of him as 81 00:04:53,760 --> 00:04:58,760 Speaker 1: a person and a decision maker that didn't encompass launching 82 00:04:58,800 --> 00:05:02,719 Speaker 1: a very ill considered and possibly self defeating ground war. 83 00:05:03,560 --> 00:05:05,280 Speaker 2: I think there were a couple of things going on, 84 00:05:05,360 --> 00:05:08,120 Speaker 2: and first, as a caveat, I should say that I 85 00:05:08,120 --> 00:05:11,400 Speaker 2: think the US intelligence community should get a huge amount 86 00:05:11,440 --> 00:05:15,640 Speaker 2: of credit for snipping out what was coming, and the 87 00:05:15,680 --> 00:05:19,800 Speaker 2: Biden administration for warning everyone what was coming. If you wonder, 88 00:05:19,880 --> 00:05:23,280 Speaker 2: you know why the United States has this massive intelligence 89 00:05:23,400 --> 00:05:27,200 Speaker 2: establishment that costs tons of money. This is why, right, 90 00:05:27,240 --> 00:05:31,640 Speaker 2: because it gave us advanced warning of this major geopolitical shock, 91 00:05:32,360 --> 00:05:35,320 Speaker 2: and notwithstanding what I said about people not being willing 92 00:05:35,440 --> 00:05:37,880 Speaker 2: to believe it was coming, actually positioned the US and 93 00:05:37,920 --> 00:05:40,760 Speaker 2: other countries better than they would have been to respond. 94 00:05:41,040 --> 00:05:42,760 Speaker 1: But I think, and just to stay on that for 95 00:05:42,760 --> 00:05:44,120 Speaker 1: a sec before you go on to your next point, 96 00:05:44,160 --> 00:05:46,599 Speaker 1: is it was very interesting to watch how the Biden 97 00:05:46,600 --> 00:05:49,760 Speaker 1: administration handled that intel and made it public, because remember 98 00:05:49,800 --> 00:05:53,120 Speaker 1: they were sort of leaking bits about a massing of 99 00:05:53,200 --> 00:05:56,600 Speaker 1: Russian forces on Ukraine's eastern border, and people were like, 100 00:05:57,240 --> 00:05:59,760 Speaker 1: you know, is this wagging the dog? You know, are 101 00:05:59,800 --> 00:06:03,080 Speaker 1: they just trying to manipulate public opinion, etc. Etc. And 102 00:06:03,120 --> 00:06:05,880 Speaker 1: what they were saying to people was you should believe 103 00:06:05,880 --> 00:06:07,240 Speaker 1: what we're seeing and hearing. 104 00:06:07,760 --> 00:06:10,679 Speaker 2: And they were taking away some of the options Putin 105 00:06:10,720 --> 00:06:14,960 Speaker 2: otherwise would have had for manipulating the situation to make 106 00:06:15,000 --> 00:06:18,160 Speaker 2: it look as though Ukraine had somehow provoked a conflict. 107 00:06:18,240 --> 00:06:19,920 Speaker 2: And so a lot of what the US intelligent community 108 00:06:20,000 --> 00:06:22,480 Speaker 2: was doing was saying, the Russians are going to stage 109 00:06:22,520 --> 00:06:25,920 Speaker 2: this sort of false flag operation, don't believe it when 110 00:06:25,920 --> 00:06:30,000 Speaker 2: it happens. So that, notwithstanding, I think there were really 111 00:06:30,080 --> 00:06:33,640 Speaker 2: two big things that stood in the way of more 112 00:06:33,680 --> 00:06:38,159 Speaker 2: people heeding those warnings and understanding what was coming at them. 113 00:06:38,480 --> 00:06:40,920 Speaker 2: The first was that I think a lot of us 114 00:06:41,040 --> 00:06:48,120 Speaker 2: failed to understand how much Putin's decision making had atrophied 115 00:06:48,800 --> 00:06:52,360 Speaker 2: over his twenty plus years in power, and in particular 116 00:06:52,560 --> 00:06:55,960 Speaker 2: during his two plus years, i guess, almost two years 117 00:06:56,520 --> 00:07:00,600 Speaker 2: of COVID induced isolation and so well. The reason a 118 00:07:00,600 --> 00:07:02,920 Speaker 2: lot of people didn't think Putin was going to stage 119 00:07:02,920 --> 00:07:05,200 Speaker 2: a full on invasion is because what he was doing 120 00:07:05,279 --> 00:07:08,560 Speaker 2: didn't seem to make sense. It made a lot more 121 00:07:08,600 --> 00:07:10,360 Speaker 2: sense to think that Putin was just going to try 122 00:07:10,400 --> 00:07:12,960 Speaker 2: to nibble away in a little bit more Ukrainian territory, 123 00:07:13,520 --> 00:07:15,040 Speaker 2: And the reason we didn't get that is we didn't 124 00:07:15,040 --> 00:07:18,320 Speaker 2: realize I think how much decision making had atrophied with Putin, 125 00:07:18,360 --> 00:07:22,800 Speaker 2: but also within a regime that had become increasingly dysfunctional 126 00:07:23,040 --> 00:07:27,800 Speaker 2: as the level of sycophancy around Putin increased. The second thing, though, 127 00:07:27,920 --> 00:07:31,160 Speaker 2: is that I think it was just shocking to people 128 00:07:31,560 --> 00:07:34,760 Speaker 2: to think that this sort of thing could happen in 129 00:07:34,800 --> 00:07:38,320 Speaker 2: the modern age, right, you know, it looked like nineteenth 130 00:07:38,360 --> 00:07:41,800 Speaker 2: century conquest, and so I think it took the thing 131 00:07:41,920 --> 00:07:45,720 Speaker 2: actually happening, right and seeing these images of Russian tanks 132 00:07:45,760 --> 00:07:49,200 Speaker 2: streaming across the border, learning what the Russians had done 133 00:07:49,240 --> 00:07:53,960 Speaker 2: in Bucha and countless other places in Ukraine to realize 134 00:07:53,960 --> 00:07:56,880 Speaker 2: that this sort of behavior is still real. Right, it 135 00:07:56,920 --> 00:07:59,160 Speaker 2: doesn't go away. The question is just whether we can 136 00:07:59,200 --> 00:08:00,640 Speaker 2: suppress it and keep it at bay. 137 00:08:01,520 --> 00:08:03,840 Speaker 1: And not to be forgotten. He rolled into Crimea in 138 00:08:03,880 --> 00:08:07,160 Speaker 1: twenty fourteen, so eight years earlier he had already sort 139 00:08:07,160 --> 00:08:10,280 Speaker 1: of done an opening act to a land grab. Yes, 140 00:08:10,840 --> 00:08:13,120 Speaker 1: from his side of the ledger. Do you think the 141 00:08:13,240 --> 00:08:18,760 Speaker 1: US pull out from Afghanistan and Ukraine moving more warmly 142 00:08:18,800 --> 00:08:25,080 Speaker 1: toward NATO membership also encouraged him to act or one 143 00:08:25,120 --> 00:08:27,120 Speaker 1: of those, both of those, none of those. What do 144 00:08:27,120 --> 00:08:28,440 Speaker 1: you think about those things? 145 00:08:29,160 --> 00:08:31,800 Speaker 2: I think Putin definitely got stuck in a trap of 146 00:08:31,840 --> 00:08:35,840 Speaker 2: his own making, in the sense that his aggression in 147 00:08:35,880 --> 00:08:40,559 Speaker 2: twenty fourteen, which you mentioned and after, really left Ukraine 148 00:08:40,720 --> 00:08:43,959 Speaker 2: with no choice but to move closer to the West 149 00:08:44,200 --> 00:08:46,000 Speaker 2: in a way that I think would have been quite 150 00:08:46,120 --> 00:08:50,320 Speaker 2: controversial in Ukrainian politics. Prior to the taking of Crimea 151 00:08:50,520 --> 00:08:53,559 Speaker 2: in twenty fourteen, Ukraine was actually quite divided on the 152 00:08:53,640 --> 00:08:56,600 Speaker 2: question of, you know, whether it wanted a Western identity, 153 00:08:56,640 --> 00:08:58,560 Speaker 2: whether it wanted to move closer to NATO in the 154 00:08:58,559 --> 00:09:01,559 Speaker 2: European Union, or whether it wanted a close affiliation with 155 00:09:01,640 --> 00:09:04,800 Speaker 2: Russia prior to that, but you know, by burying his 156 00:09:04,880 --> 00:09:08,440 Speaker 2: teeth in the way that he did, Putin basically left 157 00:09:08,520 --> 00:09:12,440 Speaker 2: Ukraine's only option for maintaining its territorial integrity such as 158 00:09:12,440 --> 00:09:16,040 Speaker 2: it was, and perhaps even survival as moving closer to 159 00:09:16,080 --> 00:09:19,080 Speaker 2: the West. And then as that happens, Putin says, oh, 160 00:09:19,200 --> 00:09:21,280 Speaker 2: Ukraine is moving closer to the West. I really don't 161 00:09:21,320 --> 00:09:24,040 Speaker 2: want that. I'd better do something to prevent that from 162 00:09:24,040 --> 00:09:27,080 Speaker 2: being consolidated. And so, even though Ukraine was not on 163 00:09:27,120 --> 00:09:29,360 Speaker 2: the verge of being admitted to NATO or anything like that. 164 00:09:29,400 --> 00:09:32,400 Speaker 2: In early twenty twenty two, I think Putin was genuinely 165 00:09:32,440 --> 00:09:37,559 Speaker 2: worried by the westward drift of Ukrainian policy. He didn't realize, 166 00:09:37,640 --> 00:09:39,920 Speaker 2: or at least chose not to acknowledge, that that drift 167 00:09:40,040 --> 00:09:43,240 Speaker 2: was largely a result of his own actions on the 168 00:09:43,720 --> 00:09:46,479 Speaker 2: first issue he raised, which is the pullout from Afghanistan. 169 00:09:47,360 --> 00:09:51,600 Speaker 2: It's really difficult to say for certain. In general, I 170 00:09:51,640 --> 00:09:56,199 Speaker 2: think it's bad for US policy when the US fails 171 00:09:56,280 --> 00:09:59,760 Speaker 2: in a major undertaking of some twenty years, when there's 172 00:09:59,760 --> 00:10:02,520 Speaker 2: achaotic rush to the exits and so on and so forth, 173 00:10:02,559 --> 00:10:06,240 Speaker 2: and so I wouldn't be shocked if, at the margin, 174 00:10:06,440 --> 00:10:09,400 Speaker 2: right it was some small percentage of Putin's calculus was 175 00:10:09,480 --> 00:10:13,800 Speaker 2: influenced by this view that the United States was weak, 176 00:10:13,880 --> 00:10:16,559 Speaker 2: that it was in decline, that it was losing resolved 177 00:10:16,600 --> 00:10:19,120 Speaker 2: to pursue its interests in an assertive way in the 178 00:10:19,160 --> 00:10:22,080 Speaker 2: international system. And he might have gotten some of that 179 00:10:22,080 --> 00:10:24,400 Speaker 2: impression from Afghanistan. But I think if it mattered, it 180 00:10:24,440 --> 00:10:27,720 Speaker 2: mattered mostly at the margin. I think the invasion was 181 00:10:27,760 --> 00:10:32,080 Speaker 2: mostly about his perception of the strategic situation in and 182 00:10:32,120 --> 00:10:33,680 Speaker 2: around Ukraine, and. 183 00:10:33,640 --> 00:10:38,640 Speaker 1: So regardless of causation, here we are. And what do 184 00:10:38,720 --> 00:10:41,040 Speaker 1: you think are some of the most significant things that 185 00:10:41,040 --> 00:10:43,480 Speaker 1: have changed. You talked a little bit earlier about the 186 00:10:43,480 --> 00:10:47,240 Speaker 1: militarization of Poland, the expansion of NATO, include Finland and Sweden, 187 00:10:47,600 --> 00:10:50,160 Speaker 1: things that would have been unheard of. But what do 188 00:10:50,200 --> 00:10:52,160 Speaker 1: you think are some of the other sort of big 189 00:10:52,320 --> 00:10:55,319 Speaker 1: tent pole changes that this is catalyzed. 190 00:10:56,440 --> 00:11:00,000 Speaker 2: I think there are three. The first is the revival 191 00:11:00,200 --> 00:11:02,760 Speaker 2: and reconsolidation of what we would have called the free 192 00:11:02,760 --> 00:11:05,760 Speaker 2: world back in the Cold War. And so the Ukraine 193 00:11:05,760 --> 00:11:09,920 Speaker 2: War has obviously led to greater cohesion and greater effort 194 00:11:10,000 --> 00:11:13,960 Speaker 2: within NATO, but it's also had that effect on the 195 00:11:14,000 --> 00:11:16,440 Speaker 2: other side of Eurasia, in East Asia and in the 196 00:11:16,440 --> 00:11:20,680 Speaker 2: Western Pacific, where the war has given momentum to the 197 00:11:20,720 --> 00:11:24,760 Speaker 2: defense reforms that Japan and Taiwan are making. It has 198 00:11:24,880 --> 00:11:27,400 Speaker 2: led to fears that aggression in Europe might be a 199 00:11:27,400 --> 00:11:30,280 Speaker 2: prelude to aggression in Asia, and so it has facilitated 200 00:11:30,760 --> 00:11:34,120 Speaker 2: US coalition building efforts visa VI China. And so what 201 00:11:34,120 --> 00:11:36,960 Speaker 2: the Ukraine War has done is it's strengthened kind of 202 00:11:36,960 --> 00:11:41,200 Speaker 2: the free world, the Democratic alliance blocks on both sides 203 00:11:41,360 --> 00:11:44,679 Speaker 2: of Eurasia and also led them to do more together. 204 00:11:44,920 --> 00:11:48,480 Speaker 2: And so it's really interesting that South Korea has quietly 205 00:11:48,559 --> 00:11:52,040 Speaker 2: been one of the most indispensable members of the coalition, 206 00:11:52,120 --> 00:11:56,400 Speaker 2: supporting Ukraine by supplying artillery, ammunition and things like that. 207 00:11:56,480 --> 00:11:59,400 Speaker 2: Japan and Taiwan and Australia have joined in the sanctions 208 00:12:00,280 --> 00:12:02,360 Speaker 2: and helped in other ways as well, because there's an 209 00:12:02,360 --> 00:12:05,520 Speaker 2: increasing recognition that what happens on one side of the 210 00:12:05,600 --> 00:12:07,720 Speaker 2: Asian land mask can still matter for countries on the 211 00:12:07,760 --> 00:12:10,280 Speaker 2: other side. So thing one would be kind of consolidation 212 00:12:10,320 --> 00:12:14,319 Speaker 2: of this free world community. Thing two, unfortunately, is a 213 00:12:14,440 --> 00:12:16,800 Speaker 2: greater integration of what you might think of as the 214 00:12:16,840 --> 00:12:20,240 Speaker 2: axis of Eurasian autocracies. And so the war has pushed 215 00:12:20,760 --> 00:12:23,840 Speaker 2: Russia closer to China, because as Russia is cut off 216 00:12:23,880 --> 00:12:25,960 Speaker 2: from the West as a result of its own actions, 217 00:12:26,480 --> 00:12:29,680 Speaker 2: it has few strategic alternatives other than too deep in 218 00:12:29,720 --> 00:12:33,800 Speaker 2: its relationship with China. It's gotten a much deeper military 219 00:12:33,840 --> 00:12:36,600 Speaker 2: relationship with Iran as well, So it's not just Russia 220 00:12:36,640 --> 00:12:40,160 Speaker 2: selling Iran gear anymore. It's Iran providing Russia with drones 221 00:12:40,200 --> 00:12:42,360 Speaker 2: and artillery and maybe some missiles that it's used on 222 00:12:42,440 --> 00:12:47,559 Speaker 2: the battlefield. And so you're seeing overlapping closer relationships between 223 00:12:47,679 --> 00:12:52,280 Speaker 2: Eurasian autocracies that have in common they're shared antipathy to 224 00:12:52,360 --> 00:12:55,520 Speaker 2: a US led international order. So that would be thing two. 225 00:12:56,080 --> 00:12:58,480 Speaker 2: And then thing three is you get what you might 226 00:12:58,520 --> 00:13:00,840 Speaker 2: think of as non alignment to point ozh, but you 227 00:13:00,880 --> 00:13:03,839 Speaker 2: get a whole bunch of countries around the world that 228 00:13:03,960 --> 00:13:07,240 Speaker 2: basically say, we prefer to avoid choosing a side in 229 00:13:07,280 --> 00:13:10,440 Speaker 2: this right. And it could be Brazil, which gets tons 230 00:13:10,480 --> 00:13:14,079 Speaker 2: of fertilizer and other things from Russia and under Lula 231 00:13:14,200 --> 00:13:17,720 Speaker 2: in particular, is not particularly desirous of following the United 232 00:13:17,720 --> 00:13:22,280 Speaker 2: States into a geopolitical and ideological showdown with the Eurasian autogracies. 233 00:13:22,600 --> 00:13:24,960 Speaker 2: You've got India, which is aligning ever more closely with 234 00:13:24,960 --> 00:13:27,680 Speaker 2: the United States on China issues but not doing anything 235 00:13:27,720 --> 00:13:30,240 Speaker 2: of the sort with respect to Russia. You've got countries 236 00:13:30,240 --> 00:13:32,760 Speaker 2: throughout Southeast Asia and Africa and a variety of other 237 00:13:32,800 --> 00:13:36,480 Speaker 2: places that have basically said, either we don't have a 238 00:13:36,520 --> 00:13:39,680 Speaker 2: dog in this fight, or a pox on both your houses. 239 00:13:39,760 --> 00:13:42,360 Speaker 2: Because yes, the war is bad in terms of food 240 00:13:42,360 --> 00:13:46,040 Speaker 2: security and international economic security, but so are the sanctions, 241 00:13:46,120 --> 00:13:48,120 Speaker 2: and so in some ways the international system we have 242 00:13:48,200 --> 00:13:51,000 Speaker 2: now is coming to look a little bit more like 243 00:13:51,080 --> 00:13:53,920 Speaker 2: the Cold War, where you've got these two opposing blocks 244 00:13:53,960 --> 00:13:56,760 Speaker 2: that are consolidating, and then a large group of countries 245 00:13:56,800 --> 00:13:59,559 Speaker 2: that are trying to sort of navigate the territory in between. 246 00:14:00,280 --> 00:14:02,120 Speaker 1: You know, I love how that you respond in bullet 247 00:14:02,120 --> 00:14:05,600 Speaker 1: points and lists and numbered things as a It makes 248 00:14:05,600 --> 00:14:07,720 Speaker 1: it a life, you know, very apprehensible and easy, and 249 00:14:07,720 --> 00:14:10,000 Speaker 1: that you call it thing one and thing two like 250 00:14:10,120 --> 00:14:12,840 Speaker 1: Doctor Seuss. You like the Doctor Seuss. So foreign policies, Oh, 251 00:14:13,360 --> 00:14:15,679 Speaker 1: I'm glad we've arrived there. You know. One of the 252 00:14:15,720 --> 00:14:19,840 Speaker 1: other extraordinary things to me about the consequences of this 253 00:14:20,040 --> 00:14:24,400 Speaker 1: war is that Germany and Japan are rearming. And that's 254 00:14:24,440 --> 00:14:27,840 Speaker 1: another one of those who would have thought, especially anyone 255 00:14:28,040 --> 00:14:31,800 Speaker 1: who's interested in our student of World War two, that 256 00:14:31,960 --> 00:14:35,320 Speaker 1: you know, we'd be eighty ish years on where everyone 257 00:14:35,360 --> 00:14:39,240 Speaker 1: is advocating rearming Germany to deal with a more aggressive 258 00:14:39,280 --> 00:14:42,760 Speaker 1: Russia and rearming Japan to deal with more aggressive China. 259 00:14:43,120 --> 00:14:45,080 Speaker 1: That also just seems extraordinary to me. 260 00:14:46,400 --> 00:14:49,560 Speaker 2: Yeah, And I think it's probably important to note that 261 00:14:50,160 --> 00:14:54,480 Speaker 2: Germany's rearmament is a bit more aspirational, whereas Japan's is 262 00:14:54,520 --> 00:14:56,760 Speaker 2: happening in real time, and so the Germans have made 263 00:14:56,760 --> 00:14:59,440 Speaker 2: a variety of commitments to get to two percent of 264 00:14:59,520 --> 00:15:02,760 Speaker 2: GDP for their level of military spending, which is the 265 00:15:02,800 --> 00:15:05,040 Speaker 2: standard within NATO, at least it's supposed to be the 266 00:15:05,040 --> 00:15:08,640 Speaker 2: standard within NATO, but as is often the case, there 267 00:15:08,680 --> 00:15:12,680 Speaker 2: have subsequently been delays and modifications such that you know, 268 00:15:12,760 --> 00:15:15,920 Speaker 2: the moment when we get a Germany that wields meaningful 269 00:15:15,960 --> 00:15:20,160 Speaker 2: military powers still some years in the future. Japan's rearmament 270 00:15:20,480 --> 00:15:24,120 Speaker 2: is remarkable by historical standards, and so at the end 271 00:15:24,200 --> 00:15:28,160 Speaker 2: of twenty twenty two, the Japanese government pushed through a 272 00:15:28,240 --> 00:15:32,360 Speaker 2: series of reforms that would see defense spending increase by 273 00:15:32,360 --> 00:15:35,720 Speaker 2: about seventy or eighty percent over a five year period, 274 00:15:36,240 --> 00:15:41,520 Speaker 2: that would see Japan acquire more offensive military capabilities like 275 00:15:41,760 --> 00:15:46,080 Speaker 2: Tomahawk missiles and things of that nature, and would basically 276 00:15:46,480 --> 00:15:51,800 Speaker 2: help Japan make this transformation from what it was in 277 00:15:51,840 --> 00:15:54,360 Speaker 2: say the nineteen fifties, when it was basically a strategic 278 00:15:54,400 --> 00:15:58,840 Speaker 2: protectorate of the United States, to a real regional military 279 00:15:59,080 --> 00:16:04,160 Speaker 2: power and maybe America's most important single ally in the 280 00:16:04,200 --> 00:16:07,200 Speaker 2: world because of geography, because of the capabilities it has 281 00:16:07,240 --> 00:16:08,360 Speaker 2: and things of that nature. 282 00:16:09,040 --> 00:16:11,640 Speaker 1: Do you think it's an overstatement given all of these 283 00:16:11,640 --> 00:16:14,440 Speaker 1: big global chess pieces that are moving around, and these 284 00:16:14,480 --> 00:16:19,720 Speaker 1: realignments of oversea powers in new combinations and in very 285 00:16:19,760 --> 00:16:23,280 Speaker 1: clear ways. Now it's not foggy. There are very purposeful 286 00:16:23,440 --> 00:16:28,440 Speaker 1: alliances being formed for largely military and strategic reasons. That 287 00:16:28,640 --> 00:16:32,640 Speaker 1: the risk of global war hasn't seen so pronounced since 288 00:16:32,640 --> 00:16:35,440 Speaker 1: the early nineteen sixties. Or is that an overstatement. 289 00:16:36,240 --> 00:16:39,160 Speaker 2: No. I think the basic statement that the risk of 290 00:16:39,880 --> 00:16:42,680 Speaker 2: not just war but great power war, so war between 291 00:16:42,720 --> 00:16:45,640 Speaker 2: the most powerful actors in the international system. I think 292 00:16:45,680 --> 00:16:49,080 Speaker 2: that risk is higher, certainly than any time since the 293 00:16:49,200 --> 00:16:53,000 Speaker 2: end of the Cold War, and maybe even since the 294 00:16:53,040 --> 00:16:55,240 Speaker 2: hottest part of the Cold War, So the period of 295 00:16:55,360 --> 00:16:58,480 Speaker 2: crisis in the late fifties and nineteen sixties which you 296 00:16:58,600 --> 00:17:03,520 Speaker 2: referred to. Tend to think that the alliance building we're seeing, 297 00:17:03,560 --> 00:17:06,040 Speaker 2: in the coalition building we're seeing, is more the symptom 298 00:17:06,160 --> 00:17:09,560 Speaker 2: than the cause, right, And so you see countries in 299 00:17:09,680 --> 00:17:12,760 Speaker 2: Europe and the Transatlantic Community, countries in the Indo Pacific 300 00:17:12,800 --> 00:17:17,680 Speaker 2: doing more together because they're observing either what Russia has 301 00:17:17,840 --> 00:17:21,520 Speaker 2: done or what they fear China might do in the 302 00:17:21,520 --> 00:17:24,320 Speaker 2: Western Pacific and deciding they have to get together to 303 00:17:24,320 --> 00:17:28,920 Speaker 2: strengthen their collective capabilities. And you know, it's maybe worth 304 00:17:28,920 --> 00:17:33,399 Speaker 2: mentioning here that China is engaged in what US officials 305 00:17:33,480 --> 00:17:37,919 Speaker 2: have said is the most significant peacetime military build up 306 00:17:37,960 --> 00:17:40,520 Speaker 2: we've seen since the run up to World War Two. 307 00:17:40,560 --> 00:17:43,960 Speaker 2: The military balance in the region has changed dramatically. China 308 00:17:44,040 --> 00:17:47,120 Speaker 2: has become much more willing to court friction with its 309 00:17:47,160 --> 00:17:50,399 Speaker 2: neighbors and the United States. We've got a preview last 310 00:17:50,480 --> 00:17:54,560 Speaker 2: August and the crisis that followed House Speaker Nancy Pelosi's 311 00:17:54,600 --> 00:17:57,040 Speaker 2: trip to Taiwan of some of the ways in which 312 00:17:57,119 --> 00:18:00,560 Speaker 2: the People's Liberation Army might use those capabilities to blockade, 313 00:18:00,640 --> 00:18:04,399 Speaker 2: or bombard or even invade Taiwan. And so there's just 314 00:18:04,440 --> 00:18:10,120 Speaker 2: a much greater degree of anxiety among democratic states, in 315 00:18:10,119 --> 00:18:13,840 Speaker 2: particular in Europe and East Asia, which leads to a 316 00:18:13,840 --> 00:18:17,280 Speaker 2: greater willingness to try to band together for security. 317 00:18:17,760 --> 00:18:19,440 Speaker 1: Hal I want to take a quick break here from 318 00:18:19,480 --> 00:18:21,879 Speaker 1: one of our sponsors, and then we'll come back and 319 00:18:21,880 --> 00:18:29,040 Speaker 1: pick this conversation up. We're back and we're joined by 320 00:18:29,040 --> 00:18:32,560 Speaker 1: Hal Brands, a foreign policy savant and a very elegant thinker, 321 00:18:33,160 --> 00:18:36,680 Speaker 1: and we're talking about war hell. Before we took a break, 322 00:18:36,720 --> 00:18:39,199 Speaker 1: we spent some time discussing Japan in the context of 323 00:18:39,240 --> 00:18:42,680 Speaker 1: the great global Cold War that's taken shape. Let's recall 324 00:18:42,720 --> 00:18:44,720 Speaker 1: that Japan is the only country who've been attacked with 325 00:18:44,840 --> 00:18:48,359 Speaker 1: nuclear weapons by the US during World War Two, So 326 00:18:48,480 --> 00:18:52,520 Speaker 1: let's talk some more about nukes, and specifically, as a 327 00:18:52,560 --> 00:18:56,160 Speaker 1: departure point, I wanted to talk about the movie Oppenheimer, 328 00:18:56,440 --> 00:19:01,160 Speaker 1: which I thought was a provocative, entertaining, and troubling examination 329 00:19:01,359 --> 00:19:05,680 Speaker 1: of what it means to have unleashed this incredible force 330 00:19:05,680 --> 00:19:09,359 Speaker 1: of energy, power and destruction into the world. What lessons 331 00:19:09,400 --> 00:19:11,480 Speaker 1: did you draw from Oppenheimer? 332 00:19:12,280 --> 00:19:16,560 Speaker 2: I think the major message that the movie tries to 333 00:19:16,600 --> 00:19:20,520 Speaker 2: convey and the major insight or take away that I 334 00:19:20,560 --> 00:19:24,879 Speaker 2: got from it was just the intense moral dilemmas that 335 00:19:24,920 --> 00:19:28,879 Speaker 2: are created by nuclear weapons. And so nuclear weapons were 336 00:19:29,680 --> 00:19:34,200 Speaker 2: created in a context where it seemed plausible that some 337 00:19:34,280 --> 00:19:39,520 Speaker 2: of the worst regimes ever seen on Earth might conquer 338 00:19:39,760 --> 00:19:43,879 Speaker 2: much of the Earth, and it was entirely plausible that 339 00:19:43,880 --> 00:19:47,280 Speaker 2: they might develop nuclear weapons of their own. We know 340 00:19:47,359 --> 00:19:50,600 Speaker 2: in retrospect the German program wasn't as advanced as we 341 00:19:50,760 --> 00:19:52,440 Speaker 2: feared it was, but it was hard to know that 342 00:19:53,080 --> 00:19:54,919 Speaker 2: at the time, and so I think that the moral 343 00:19:55,040 --> 00:19:59,520 Speaker 2: case for building nuclear weapons in the first place was very, 344 00:19:59,600 --> 00:20:03,360 Speaker 2: very strong. The challenge, though, is that nuclear weapons are 345 00:20:03,440 --> 00:20:07,520 Speaker 2: kind of the most indiscriminate weapon that humanity has ever 346 00:20:08,160 --> 00:20:11,720 Speaker 2: come up with. When they were used against Japan, against 347 00:20:12,000 --> 00:20:15,360 Speaker 2: cities in Japan, they killed a lot of non combatants. 348 00:20:16,040 --> 00:20:18,639 Speaker 2: And as you got into not just the nuclear but 349 00:20:18,720 --> 00:20:22,639 Speaker 2: the thermonuclear age, so the development of the hydrogen bomb 350 00:20:23,240 --> 00:20:25,280 Speaker 2: and a lot of the follow on weapons in the 351 00:20:25,359 --> 00:20:28,719 Speaker 2: nineteen fifties and after, you were talking about weapons that 352 00:20:28,760 --> 00:20:32,440 Speaker 2: could be civilization shattering in their effects. And so if 353 00:20:32,440 --> 00:20:35,320 Speaker 2: there was a full on nuclear exchange between the United 354 00:20:35,320 --> 00:20:38,840 Speaker 2: States and the Soviet Union, it's not clear you know, 355 00:20:38,880 --> 00:20:41,920 Speaker 2: how much of humanity would have been left after that. 356 00:20:42,440 --> 00:20:46,560 Speaker 2: And so these weapons served important strategic purposes in winning 357 00:20:46,640 --> 00:20:50,480 Speaker 2: World War Two and hopefully deterring World War three visa 358 00:20:50,560 --> 00:20:55,000 Speaker 2: VI the Soviet Union, But they were weapons whose use 359 00:20:55,520 --> 00:20:59,840 Speaker 2: was so destructive that it was hard to understand what 360 00:21:00,280 --> 00:21:03,800 Speaker 2: moral or political purpose that could actually serve. And I 361 00:21:03,800 --> 00:21:07,000 Speaker 2: think that tormented the real Oppenheimer as well as the 362 00:21:07,000 --> 00:21:11,360 Speaker 2: Oppenheimer in the film. And I think that dilemma consumed 363 00:21:11,400 --> 00:21:14,560 Speaker 2: a lot of American policymakers during the Cold War as well. 364 00:21:15,320 --> 00:21:17,679 Speaker 1: There's this one moment during the film where all of 365 00:21:17,680 --> 00:21:21,359 Speaker 1: the scientists involved in researching fission and fusion and the 366 00:21:21,440 --> 00:21:24,560 Speaker 1: use of a nuclear weapon are uncertain whether or not 367 00:21:24,600 --> 00:21:29,000 Speaker 1: even the tests might actually ignite the entire atmosphere. And 368 00:21:29,040 --> 00:21:32,800 Speaker 1: there's this just sort of troubling, you know, moment where well, 369 00:21:32,840 --> 00:21:34,680 Speaker 1: we just have to go for it, and yes, the 370 00:21:34,720 --> 00:21:38,400 Speaker 1: atmosphere may actually get torched by our test, but there's 371 00:21:38,440 --> 00:21:41,359 Speaker 1: no other way to test it. And fortunately, you know, 372 00:21:41,400 --> 00:21:44,439 Speaker 1: they didn't torch the entire atmosphere. But you know, I 373 00:21:44,560 --> 00:21:46,879 Speaker 1: feel some of this now in the present in a 374 00:21:46,920 --> 00:21:50,520 Speaker 1: different way, in that Putin has threatened to use nuclear 375 00:21:50,520 --> 00:21:54,359 Speaker 1: weapons in Ukraine, and he certainly won't torch the atmosphere, 376 00:21:54,960 --> 00:21:57,800 Speaker 1: but he could ignite a broader war, and it's going 377 00:21:57,880 --> 00:22:02,119 Speaker 1: to present this complex response if we were to go there. 378 00:22:02,600 --> 00:22:06,480 Speaker 1: And you recently wrote in a really long, wonderfully all 379 00:22:06,600 --> 00:22:10,560 Speaker 1: encompassing Bloomberg opinion column that the true impact of nuclear 380 00:22:10,560 --> 00:22:15,320 Speaker 1: stockpiles in the world we're in right now is largely psychological. 381 00:22:15,760 --> 00:22:17,639 Speaker 1: And I always enjoy quoting you, but I'm just going 382 00:22:17,680 --> 00:22:20,440 Speaker 1: to quote you here because it's very descriptive, and you say, 383 00:22:20,520 --> 00:22:23,840 Speaker 1: nuclear weapons may be good insurance against invasion, but they 384 00:22:23,880 --> 00:22:26,520 Speaker 1: aren't a full proof guarantee that a country fighting for 385 00:22:26,600 --> 00:22:30,000 Speaker 1: survival won't hit back with attacks on a nuclear armed 386 00:22:30,040 --> 00:22:32,600 Speaker 1: aggressor soil. And so you sort of have these two 387 00:22:32,600 --> 00:22:36,080 Speaker 1: forces in play. One is that the nukes themselves discourage 388 00:22:36,119 --> 00:22:40,119 Speaker 1: overly aggressive confrontations or maybe confrontations at all, and then 389 00:22:40,160 --> 00:22:43,560 Speaker 1: once they occur, because as you've already mentioned, they're so 390 00:22:43,680 --> 00:22:48,200 Speaker 1: indiscriminate in their destructive force that they don't really deter 391 00:22:48,440 --> 00:22:52,479 Speaker 1: conventional warfare in certain theaters. Can you just expound on 392 00:22:52,520 --> 00:22:54,959 Speaker 1: this a little bit and then sort of offer our 393 00:22:55,040 --> 00:22:57,840 Speaker 1: listeners a take on whether or not this is a 394 00:22:57,880 --> 00:22:59,959 Speaker 1: good rule of the road to think about going forward, 395 00:23:00,080 --> 00:23:01,000 Speaker 1: because I'm not sure. 396 00:23:01,920 --> 00:23:03,960 Speaker 2: Yeah. So, I think there are two ways of thinking 397 00:23:03,960 --> 00:23:06,960 Speaker 2: about the role that nuclear weapons have played in Ukraine, 398 00:23:07,320 --> 00:23:10,680 Speaker 2: and the first way essentially holds that they haven't had 399 00:23:11,000 --> 00:23:13,840 Speaker 2: much effect at all. And so since day one of 400 00:23:13,880 --> 00:23:19,960 Speaker 2: the war, literally Putin has been brandishing nuclear weapons against Ukraine, 401 00:23:20,040 --> 00:23:24,160 Speaker 2: against the West, threatening to use them if certain things happen. 402 00:23:24,400 --> 00:23:29,280 Speaker 2: Russia has the world's largest nuclear arsenal, and yet Putin 403 00:23:29,359 --> 00:23:32,639 Speaker 2: hasn't used nuclear weapons, and the fact that he possesses 404 00:23:32,720 --> 00:23:35,160 Speaker 2: so many nuclear weapons, it hasn't allowed him to win 405 00:23:35,200 --> 00:23:38,800 Speaker 2: the war. It hasn't deterred Ukraine from fighting back and 406 00:23:38,840 --> 00:23:42,440 Speaker 2: even bringing the war onto Russian soil. It hasn't deterred 407 00:23:42,480 --> 00:23:46,200 Speaker 2: the United States and other countries from supporting Ukrainian forces 408 00:23:46,240 --> 00:23:50,399 Speaker 2: as they killed tens of thousands of Russian personnel and 409 00:23:50,560 --> 00:23:53,439 Speaker 2: target Russia's generals and do a lot of things that 410 00:23:53,480 --> 00:23:57,480 Speaker 2: are hugely embarrassing to Putin's regime. And so one way 411 00:23:57,520 --> 00:23:59,000 Speaker 2: of looking at this is, you can have all the 412 00:23:59,080 --> 00:24:03,240 Speaker 2: nuclear weapons, but it's not necessarily a guarantee that you're 413 00:24:03,240 --> 00:24:05,800 Speaker 2: going to prevail in a contest against a weaker, non 414 00:24:05,920 --> 00:24:09,480 Speaker 2: nuclear country, and you may run into the problem that 415 00:24:09,520 --> 00:24:13,280 Speaker 2: actually using nuclear weapons deploying them in battle provokes so 416 00:24:13,520 --> 00:24:16,359 Speaker 2: much global blowback that it's not worth it, and that 417 00:24:16,520 --> 00:24:19,240 Speaker 2: this appears to be the lesson that Putin drew in 418 00:24:19,359 --> 00:24:21,320 Speaker 2: late twenty twenty two when he was making all sorts 419 00:24:21,320 --> 00:24:24,320 Speaker 2: of nuclear threats, and the Chinese and the Indians and 420 00:24:24,359 --> 00:24:26,399 Speaker 2: a bunch of other countries basically said, it would be 421 00:24:26,400 --> 00:24:29,080 Speaker 2: a really bad idea for you to do this, comrade. 422 00:24:29,680 --> 00:24:32,040 Speaker 2: But the second way of looking at this is that 423 00:24:32,280 --> 00:24:36,639 Speaker 2: even if nuclear weapons aren't used in battle, they still 424 00:24:36,720 --> 00:24:40,240 Speaker 2: profoundly shape the way that this war and other wars 425 00:24:40,800 --> 00:24:45,520 Speaker 2: play out. And so Russia's nuclear weapons have had a 426 00:24:45,560 --> 00:24:49,080 Speaker 2: deterrent effect on the United States. They have deterred the 427 00:24:49,160 --> 00:24:53,200 Speaker 2: United States from getting directly involved in the fighting, which 428 00:24:53,280 --> 00:24:55,760 Speaker 2: I think might well have happened already if we were 429 00:24:55,800 --> 00:24:59,199 Speaker 2: talking about a nuclear United States and NATO confronting of 430 00:24:59,240 --> 00:25:02,520 Speaker 2: Russia that did not have nuclear weapons. They have deterred 431 00:25:02,560 --> 00:25:06,000 Speaker 2: the United States from providing certain capabilities to Ukraine. So 432 00:25:06,000 --> 00:25:08,639 Speaker 2: the United States has been very cautious about providing Ukraine 433 00:25:09,000 --> 00:25:12,560 Speaker 2: with capabilities that can allow Ukraine to reach into Russia 434 00:25:13,240 --> 00:25:18,280 Speaker 2: for fear of sparking escalation. And so Russian nuclear coercion 435 00:25:18,520 --> 00:25:21,639 Speaker 2: is working to an important degree, even if it hasn't 436 00:25:21,640 --> 00:25:25,720 Speaker 2: achieved as much as Putin likes. But US nuclear coercion 437 00:25:25,800 --> 00:25:29,280 Speaker 2: is also working, right, And so if the United States 438 00:25:29,320 --> 00:25:32,840 Speaker 2: didn't have an alliance like NATO that was backed by 439 00:25:32,880 --> 00:25:36,679 Speaker 2: the US nuclear arsenal, I think it's entirely likely that 440 00:25:36,720 --> 00:25:39,679 Speaker 2: Putin would be doing much more to try to coerce 441 00:25:40,320 --> 00:25:43,360 Speaker 2: or bloody the countries that are supporting Ukraine. Right, it's 442 00:25:43,359 --> 00:25:45,719 Speaker 2: not like Putin doesn't know where the weapons that are 443 00:25:45,720 --> 00:25:48,920 Speaker 2: coming into Ukraine are coming from, there being a symbol 444 00:25:49,000 --> 00:25:51,840 Speaker 2: that logistical hubs and staging points and pull in other 445 00:25:51,840 --> 00:25:54,800 Speaker 2: countries not that far across the border. Right, The Russians 446 00:25:54,800 --> 00:25:57,199 Speaker 2: could go when attack these things with their power or 447 00:25:57,240 --> 00:25:59,840 Speaker 2: ground based missiles if they wanted to. They've chosen not 448 00:25:59,880 --> 00:26:02,119 Speaker 2: to because they know that that would lead to a 449 00:26:02,119 --> 00:26:04,640 Speaker 2: war with NATO, which is backed by the nuclear arsenal 450 00:26:05,080 --> 00:26:07,880 Speaker 2: of the United States. And so both sides are actually 451 00:26:07,920 --> 00:26:11,320 Speaker 2: coercing each other to a degree, and so the contours 452 00:26:11,320 --> 00:26:13,960 Speaker 2: of the war have been powerfully shaped by nuclear weapons 453 00:26:14,000 --> 00:26:16,679 Speaker 2: even though they haven't actually been fired off in anger. 454 00:26:17,320 --> 00:26:19,440 Speaker 1: But as I think this through hell and it's interesting 455 00:26:19,480 --> 00:26:24,080 Speaker 1: because mutually assured destruction and coequal coercion and the reality 456 00:26:24,119 --> 00:26:27,840 Speaker 1: of nuclear weapons has created this kind of proxy war 457 00:26:27,920 --> 00:26:30,679 Speaker 1: at this point, with Russia's being supported by other countries 458 00:26:30,720 --> 00:26:33,159 Speaker 1: as well, Ukraine's being supported by the US and other 459 00:26:33,160 --> 00:26:38,480 Speaker 1: countries as well. And this horrible military confrontation is also 460 00:26:38,560 --> 00:26:41,960 Speaker 1: this dance that has gotten everyone into a bit of 461 00:26:41,960 --> 00:26:42,399 Speaker 1: a corner. 462 00:26:42,480 --> 00:26:42,560 Speaker 2: Now. 463 00:26:42,800 --> 00:26:45,240 Speaker 1: I don't know if it's a stalemate just yet, but 464 00:26:45,480 --> 00:26:48,440 Speaker 1: certainly it's gotten to the point where it's not clear 465 00:26:48,480 --> 00:26:52,960 Speaker 1: if Ukraine pushes Russia out of eastern Ukraine that they'll 466 00:26:53,040 --> 00:26:55,640 Speaker 1: stop at the border. It's not clear that Russia would 467 00:26:55,680 --> 00:26:58,480 Speaker 1: stop the wharf that happened. And then what brings this 468 00:26:58,600 --> 00:27:00,960 Speaker 1: kind of a war to conclusion unless there's some sort 469 00:27:01,000 --> 00:27:04,400 Speaker 1: of an escalation. In the absence of a diplomatic resolution, 470 00:27:05,240 --> 00:27:08,600 Speaker 1: nothing will end it unless there's an escalation, And US 471 00:27:08,680 --> 00:27:12,080 Speaker 1: National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan has said that America has 472 00:27:12,160 --> 00:27:17,960 Speaker 1: warned Putin of undisclosed catastrophic consequences if Russia went nuclear. 473 00:27:18,560 --> 00:27:21,320 Speaker 1: But even if Russia doesn't go nuclear, the US is 474 00:27:21,400 --> 00:27:24,520 Speaker 1: alsibly going to have to raise the stakes to force 475 00:27:24,560 --> 00:27:27,120 Speaker 1: a conclusion here. So how do you think about those things? 476 00:27:27,560 --> 00:27:31,560 Speaker 2: I think you're exactly right if the US wants to 477 00:27:32,840 --> 00:27:36,199 Speaker 2: not just help Ukraine liberate its territory. But and this 478 00:27:36,320 --> 00:27:39,840 Speaker 2: maybe the even harder part, convince Putin to accept that, 479 00:27:40,080 --> 00:27:43,520 Speaker 2: or convince Putin to accept any settlement that leaves Ukraine 480 00:27:44,320 --> 00:27:50,040 Speaker 2: mostly intact territorially viable, economically defensible, militarily, and things of 481 00:27:50,080 --> 00:27:53,840 Speaker 2: that nature. It's going to have to exert more coercion 482 00:27:54,080 --> 00:27:57,240 Speaker 2: than it has exerted to date, and We've already seen 483 00:27:57,280 --> 00:28:01,440 Speaker 2: this dynamic at work in US policy. So the US 484 00:28:01,480 --> 00:28:04,760 Speaker 2: has been more willing, not so much to kind of 485 00:28:04,800 --> 00:28:08,040 Speaker 2: sprint across, but to stick a toe across Putin's red 486 00:28:08,080 --> 00:28:10,760 Speaker 2: lines in this conflict. It's more willing to do that 487 00:28:10,800 --> 00:28:13,040 Speaker 2: now than it was a year ago. And so the 488 00:28:13,119 --> 00:28:15,359 Speaker 2: United States initially said it wasn't going to provide F 489 00:28:15,400 --> 00:28:18,400 Speaker 2: sixteens because that might be escalatory. Well, now we're providing 490 00:28:18,880 --> 00:28:21,760 Speaker 2: F sixteens. The United States initially said we're not going 491 00:28:21,800 --> 00:28:25,240 Speaker 2: to provide a Tackums missiles, basically the longer range version 492 00:28:25,280 --> 00:28:28,399 Speaker 2: of the Himars rockets that the Ukrainians have used to 493 00:28:28,480 --> 00:28:31,440 Speaker 2: good effect. Well, now there's some reporting that the US 494 00:28:31,560 --> 00:28:34,960 Speaker 2: might be sending a tackems to Ukraine after all. And 495 00:28:35,000 --> 00:28:37,639 Speaker 2: I think what this reflects is a realization that the 496 00:28:37,760 --> 00:28:39,840 Speaker 2: US is going to have to do more to help 497 00:28:40,520 --> 00:28:43,840 Speaker 2: Ukraine win this conflict, even if it requires testing some 498 00:28:43,880 --> 00:28:46,400 Speaker 2: of these Russian red lines. And the US has more 499 00:28:46,440 --> 00:28:49,960 Speaker 2: confidence in doing this because Putin has talked a lot 500 00:28:50,000 --> 00:28:52,239 Speaker 2: about using nuclear weapons, or he's hinted at it, at 501 00:28:52,320 --> 00:28:55,000 Speaker 2: least some of his subordinates have talked about it more explicitly, 502 00:28:55,800 --> 00:28:58,400 Speaker 2: and Russia hasn't actually done anything so far, so that 503 00:28:58,440 --> 00:29:01,719 Speaker 2: makes US officials feel that the Russian red lines may 504 00:29:01,760 --> 00:29:04,480 Speaker 2: not be so read after all. But there is a 505 00:29:04,560 --> 00:29:07,040 Speaker 2: bigger question out there, which is that is it going 506 00:29:07,080 --> 00:29:11,040 Speaker 2: to be possible for the US to help Ukraine accomplish 507 00:29:11,080 --> 00:29:15,560 Speaker 2: its objectives without the US intervening more directly in the war. 508 00:29:16,040 --> 00:29:19,320 Speaker 2: And that would be a big escalatory move on the 509 00:29:19,360 --> 00:29:22,600 Speaker 2: part of the United States. It might be warranted morally 510 00:29:23,160 --> 00:29:26,760 Speaker 2: and otherwise, but it would require a much more deliberate 511 00:29:26,800 --> 00:29:30,240 Speaker 2: decision to test Russian red lines directly and to test 512 00:29:30,280 --> 00:29:34,280 Speaker 2: the proposition of whether two nuclear arm great powers can 513 00:29:34,320 --> 00:29:37,560 Speaker 2: fight a conventional war, which is what this would entail 514 00:29:38,120 --> 00:29:40,200 Speaker 2: without nuclear escalation occurring. 515 00:29:41,000 --> 00:29:43,080 Speaker 1: And we've been focusing a lot on Russia, but of 516 00:29:43,120 --> 00:29:48,880 Speaker 1: course China itself strategizes around its own nuclear capability, having 517 00:29:48,880 --> 00:29:52,440 Speaker 1: a nuclear neighbor like Russia, and jousting with the US 518 00:29:52,440 --> 00:29:56,320 Speaker 1: for military dominance. Biden has said at different points he 519 00:29:56,360 --> 00:29:59,800 Speaker 1: wouldn't fight Russia directly in Ukraine, and I wonder if 520 00:30:00,280 --> 00:30:03,520 Speaker 1: draws a happy lesson from that as they watch how 521 00:30:03,600 --> 00:30:06,880 Speaker 1: the US maneuvers in Ukraine and thinks, well, if the 522 00:30:06,960 --> 00:30:10,280 Speaker 1: US isn't really going to confront Russia. Here, nothing's preventing 523 00:30:10,360 --> 00:30:13,240 Speaker 1: us from, say, dipping our toe into Taiwan. 524 00:30:14,240 --> 00:30:16,160 Speaker 2: I think this is a real challenge. You know. One 525 00:30:16,200 --> 00:30:18,479 Speaker 2: of the big guessing games in DC these days is 526 00:30:18,520 --> 00:30:22,040 Speaker 2: what lessons is shizhin Ping learning from the war in Ukraine. 527 00:30:22,560 --> 00:30:26,360 Speaker 2: And you can tell a good news story where Shixhinping 528 00:30:26,480 --> 00:30:29,720 Speaker 2: is learning that conquest is hard, He's learning that US 529 00:30:29,800 --> 00:30:35,040 Speaker 2: intelligence is really good. He's learning that outrageous aggression tends 530 00:30:35,080 --> 00:30:37,080 Speaker 2: to provoke a lot of blowback that you might not 531 00:30:37,160 --> 00:30:40,080 Speaker 2: have expected, and a variety of other bad consequences. And 532 00:30:40,120 --> 00:30:43,240 Speaker 2: if that's the case, that might make him more hesitant 533 00:30:43,320 --> 00:30:47,200 Speaker 2: to use force against Taiwan. He may also be drawing 534 00:30:47,240 --> 00:30:50,960 Speaker 2: the lesson, however, that the United States simply won't go 535 00:30:51,000 --> 00:30:55,240 Speaker 2: to war conventionally against a nuclear arm great power. Because 536 00:30:55,280 --> 00:30:57,680 Speaker 2: this is exactly what Joe Biden has said in the 537 00:30:57,720 --> 00:30:59,720 Speaker 2: context of the war in Ukraine. If you go back 538 00:30:59,760 --> 00:31:02,440 Speaker 2: to the beginning of the war, he issued a tweet 539 00:31:02,440 --> 00:31:04,920 Speaker 2: and made a variety of other statements essentially saying what 540 00:31:05,000 --> 00:31:07,120 Speaker 2: I've just said verbatim that there's no way the United 541 00:31:07,160 --> 00:31:09,800 Speaker 2: States can fight Russia and conflict because that would lead 542 00:31:09,800 --> 00:31:11,480 Speaker 2: to World War three. And we obviously all want to 543 00:31:11,520 --> 00:31:14,480 Speaker 2: avoid World War three. The challenge, of course, is that 544 00:31:14,600 --> 00:31:17,080 Speaker 2: China is also a nuclear armed great power, and so 545 00:31:17,160 --> 00:31:21,640 Speaker 2: if China attacks Taiwan, the United States has to choose 546 00:31:22,480 --> 00:31:26,880 Speaker 2: between fighting a nuclear armed great power and letting Taiwan 547 00:31:27,120 --> 00:31:30,880 Speaker 2: be conquered. And China has been developing its own nuclear 548 00:31:31,000 --> 00:31:35,600 Speaker 2: arsenal very rapidly, not just strategic nuclear capabilities, so things 549 00:31:35,600 --> 00:31:37,400 Speaker 2: that can reach all the way to the United States, 550 00:31:37,800 --> 00:31:40,880 Speaker 2: but so called theater nuclear capabilities, things that are perhaps 551 00:31:40,880 --> 00:31:42,920 Speaker 2: a little bit more useful in terms of actually fighting 552 00:31:42,920 --> 00:31:46,000 Speaker 2: a regional war against the United States. And it's entirely 553 00:31:46,040 --> 00:31:49,880 Speaker 2: plausible that if China did move against Taiwan, it would 554 00:31:49,960 --> 00:31:53,280 Speaker 2: couple that with warnings to the United States saying this 555 00:31:53,360 --> 00:31:56,960 Speaker 2: is a fight over China's territorial integrity. If you get involved, 556 00:31:57,040 --> 00:31:59,880 Speaker 2: we reserve the right to use nuclear weapons. And that 557 00:32:00,200 --> 00:32:03,880 Speaker 2: threat would be very difficult for the United States to 558 00:32:03,920 --> 00:32:06,520 Speaker 2: deal with. And so one of the challenges the Biden administration, 559 00:32:06,600 --> 00:32:08,280 Speaker 2: i think has faced over the past couple of years 560 00:32:08,840 --> 00:32:12,040 Speaker 2: is trying to disabuse Hijinping of this notion that the 561 00:32:12,120 --> 00:32:15,520 Speaker 2: United States would only support Taiwan in the same way 562 00:32:15,560 --> 00:32:18,360 Speaker 2: that it has supported Ukraine by sending weapons and other 563 00:32:18,360 --> 00:32:23,240 Speaker 2: things without actually getting directly involved. But if Xijinping thought 564 00:32:23,280 --> 00:32:26,400 Speaker 2: that America's actions in Ukraine spoke louder than its words 565 00:32:26,440 --> 00:32:29,440 Speaker 2: about Taiwan, he might be wrong, but he wouldn't be 566 00:32:29,440 --> 00:32:32,320 Speaker 2: insane to draw that conclusion. So I worry a little 567 00:32:32,360 --> 00:32:37,160 Speaker 2: bit that the declaratory statements we've made about nuclear weapons 568 00:32:37,480 --> 00:32:41,400 Speaker 2: in the Ukraine context may actually be somewhat unhelpful in 569 00:32:41,400 --> 00:32:42,560 Speaker 2: the Taiwan context. 570 00:32:43,920 --> 00:32:46,920 Speaker 1: So many scary things to worry about, interesting things to 571 00:32:47,080 --> 00:32:49,760 Speaker 1: think about. Let's take one more break and then we'll 572 00:32:49,760 --> 00:32:55,400 Speaker 1: come back to the show. I'm back with how Brands, 573 00:32:55,520 --> 00:32:58,600 Speaker 1: who's educated me about how the world works. How we've 574 00:32:58,640 --> 00:33:01,360 Speaker 1: been talking about the chill wins of our current cold 575 00:33:01,360 --> 00:33:05,040 Speaker 1: wars in twenty twenty four as an election year. So 576 00:33:05,160 --> 00:33:07,880 Speaker 1: talk to me about how you assess the Biden team's 577 00:33:08,120 --> 00:33:11,360 Speaker 1: foreign policy conduct thus far, taking into accounts some of 578 00:33:11,400 --> 00:33:12,720 Speaker 1: the things we've already discussed. 579 00:33:13,640 --> 00:33:15,840 Speaker 2: I think, on the whole, the Biden team has done 580 00:33:15,840 --> 00:33:19,040 Speaker 2: a pretty good job on foreign policy. I think there 581 00:33:19,040 --> 00:33:25,000 Speaker 2: were definitely some hiccups or stumbles early on. The Afghanistan 582 00:33:25,120 --> 00:33:28,280 Speaker 2: war ended in a way that nobody can think particularly 583 00:33:28,920 --> 00:33:32,440 Speaker 2: good things about there were a variety of other challenges. 584 00:33:32,600 --> 00:33:34,600 Speaker 2: There are a variety of challenges that are still out there. 585 00:33:34,680 --> 00:33:36,440 Speaker 2: I'm not sure that the administration has much of a 586 00:33:36,520 --> 00:33:39,640 Speaker 2: viable Middle East strategy at this point, for instance, But 587 00:33:39,960 --> 00:33:43,400 Speaker 2: on the two biggest issues, which are the Ukraine War 588 00:33:43,520 --> 00:33:46,720 Speaker 2: and the competition with China, I would certainly give the 589 00:33:46,720 --> 00:33:49,880 Speaker 2: administration passing marks, and I think they've done pretty well. 590 00:33:49,880 --> 00:33:51,760 Speaker 2: So I think the administration has done pretty well in 591 00:33:51,840 --> 00:33:56,640 Speaker 2: imposing a huge cost on Ukraine and using that war 592 00:33:56,920 --> 00:34:00,120 Speaker 2: as an opportunity, tragic as it is, to rally the 593 00:34:00,200 --> 00:34:02,520 Speaker 2: larger free world community. There are times I wish the 594 00:34:02,520 --> 00:34:05,040 Speaker 2: administration had done a little bit more, a little bit 595 00:34:05,080 --> 00:34:08,239 Speaker 2: faster to support Ukraine, but most of my critiques would 596 00:34:08,239 --> 00:34:11,879 Speaker 2: be kind of quibbles at the margin. With respect to China, 597 00:34:11,920 --> 00:34:14,840 Speaker 2: I think the United States as a country needs to 598 00:34:14,840 --> 00:34:18,719 Speaker 2: go faster to develop the sort of capabilities and coalitions 599 00:34:18,760 --> 00:34:22,200 Speaker 2: that would ensure stability in the Western Pacific. But the 600 00:34:22,200 --> 00:34:24,920 Speaker 2: Biden administration, to give it some credit, has done remarkable 601 00:34:24,960 --> 00:34:28,160 Speaker 2: things in terms of strengthening and expanding US coalitions and 602 00:34:28,160 --> 00:34:30,440 Speaker 2: that part of the world. Again, there are things I 603 00:34:30,480 --> 00:34:34,440 Speaker 2: would critique this administration, like the last one is a 604 00:34:34,440 --> 00:34:36,840 Speaker 2: bit of a disaster when it comes to the economic 605 00:34:36,880 --> 00:34:40,560 Speaker 2: elements of US policy in the Indo Pacific, namely the 606 00:34:40,560 --> 00:34:44,080 Speaker 2: absence of a meaningful trade policy. But as I mentioned, 607 00:34:44,080 --> 00:34:46,600 Speaker 2: that's a bypartisan failing, and so it's hard to get 608 00:34:46,600 --> 00:34:49,920 Speaker 2: particularly mad at the Biden administration as opposed to the 609 00:34:49,920 --> 00:34:53,920 Speaker 2: sort of broader US political class for that particular shortcoming. 610 00:34:54,000 --> 00:34:57,120 Speaker 2: And so I think foreign policy is an area where 611 00:34:57,120 --> 00:34:59,719 Speaker 2: the administration hasn't done everything right, but they have a 612 00:34:59,719 --> 00:35:01,680 Speaker 2: decent record DURAN in twenty twenty four. 613 00:35:02,080 --> 00:35:04,520 Speaker 1: It's also about a long time since any administration of 614 00:35:04,520 --> 00:35:07,880 Speaker 1: any political stripe has had to really think in a 615 00:35:07,920 --> 00:35:14,600 Speaker 1: real time way about multi theater engagement with very robust opponents. 616 00:35:14,920 --> 00:35:16,880 Speaker 2: Yeah, that's right, and this is an area where I 617 00:35:16,880 --> 00:35:19,680 Speaker 2: think it is probably fair to give the administration a 618 00:35:19,680 --> 00:35:21,840 Speaker 2: little bit of criticism in the first year. One of 619 00:35:21,920 --> 00:35:24,960 Speaker 2: the things the administration argued in the first year was 620 00:35:25,000 --> 00:35:28,680 Speaker 2: that it basically just needed to park the confrontations with 621 00:35:29,360 --> 00:35:33,480 Speaker 2: Russia in Iran so it could focus on China. I 622 00:35:33,520 --> 00:35:36,800 Speaker 2: think that rhetoric was probably a little bit unhelpful in 623 00:35:36,880 --> 00:35:39,120 Speaker 2: the impact that it had on Vladimir Putin, because it 624 00:35:39,160 --> 00:35:41,279 Speaker 2: may have helped convince him that if he pushed hard 625 00:35:41,280 --> 00:35:44,279 Speaker 2: in Ukraine, the US would be distracted and unwilling to 626 00:35:44,320 --> 00:35:47,040 Speaker 2: respond as strongly as it actually did. But I think 627 00:35:47,040 --> 00:35:50,080 Speaker 2: the administration has started to get a better handle on 628 00:35:50,200 --> 00:35:52,720 Speaker 2: that strategically the last couple of years. It does raise 629 00:35:52,800 --> 00:35:56,239 Speaker 2: a larger question, though, which is that the US has 630 00:35:56,480 --> 00:36:00,719 Speaker 2: been moving toward a military strategy over the past ten 631 00:36:00,840 --> 00:36:03,400 Speaker 2: years or so that's essentially premised on the idea that 632 00:36:03,400 --> 00:36:06,359 Speaker 2: the United States would not need to fight more than 633 00:36:06,440 --> 00:36:11,080 Speaker 2: one significant war at once. That shift was necessary in 634 00:36:11,120 --> 00:36:14,400 Speaker 2: a way to help the Pentagon focus on the demands 635 00:36:14,960 --> 00:36:18,000 Speaker 2: of competition and potentially conflict with China as opposed to 636 00:36:18,000 --> 00:36:20,319 Speaker 2: getting pulled in a lot of different directions. But if 637 00:36:20,360 --> 00:36:23,120 Speaker 2: you just look at the way the world is going today, 638 00:36:23,120 --> 00:36:26,680 Speaker 2: it's unfortunately not that hard to imagine scenarios in which 639 00:36:26,719 --> 00:36:29,880 Speaker 2: the US might face violent instability in Eastern Europe and 640 00:36:29,920 --> 00:36:32,319 Speaker 2: East Asia, or East Asia and the Persian Gulf at 641 00:36:32,320 --> 00:36:32,919 Speaker 2: the same time. 642 00:36:34,000 --> 00:36:36,880 Speaker 1: If polls are to be believed, Donald Trump is highly 643 00:36:37,000 --> 00:36:40,600 Speaker 1: likely to be the Republican nominee for president if he 644 00:36:40,680 --> 00:36:43,239 Speaker 1: winds up in the White House again. How do you 645 00:36:43,320 --> 00:36:47,279 Speaker 1: think about the second Trump administration's foreign policy as it 646 00:36:47,440 --> 00:36:49,919 Speaker 1: enters this very perilous world we're living in right now. 647 00:36:50,800 --> 00:36:53,279 Speaker 2: I think it would be really dangerous and really bad. 648 00:36:53,400 --> 00:36:55,719 Speaker 2: Just to be perfectly honest with you, I think that 649 00:36:55,840 --> 00:37:03,239 Speaker 2: Donald Trump brings a unique combination of incompetence, illiberalism, and 650 00:37:03,360 --> 00:37:09,400 Speaker 2: unilateralism to US domestic policy and US foreign policy, and 651 00:37:09,440 --> 00:37:12,920 Speaker 2: that would be a pretty destabilizing element on the international 652 00:37:12,920 --> 00:37:15,919 Speaker 2: stage right now. Yes, Trump would do some things that 653 00:37:16,520 --> 00:37:19,799 Speaker 2: you know, a card carrying China hawk like me would appreciate. 654 00:37:19,920 --> 00:37:23,799 Speaker 2: He would be economically fairly tough with the Chinese, but 655 00:37:24,040 --> 00:37:27,760 Speaker 2: you know, Trump has shown very little understanding of why, 656 00:37:27,920 --> 00:37:31,880 Speaker 2: for instance, Taiwan matters strategically. He would also. 657 00:37:32,040 --> 00:37:34,280 Speaker 1: Where it is on a map, perhaps. 658 00:37:34,560 --> 00:37:35,960 Speaker 2: Like where it is on a map the role of 659 00:37:36,040 --> 00:37:38,839 Speaker 2: plays in the First Island chain. I think he would 660 00:37:38,840 --> 00:37:43,160 Speaker 2: probably pursue a policy of omnidirectional antagonism, so he would 661 00:37:43,160 --> 00:37:46,240 Speaker 2: annoy the Chinese while also picking fights with US allies 662 00:37:46,920 --> 00:37:50,399 Speaker 2: in the Asia Pacific. And certainly it would be bad 663 00:37:50,480 --> 00:37:54,160 Speaker 2: news from Ukraine's perspective, because Trump, you know, as was 664 00:37:54,200 --> 00:37:56,719 Speaker 2: the case during his first term, continues to kind of, 665 00:37:56,800 --> 00:37:59,160 Speaker 2: you know, read the lines that the Russians might have 666 00:37:59,160 --> 00:38:02,400 Speaker 2: written for him on the Ukraine War and how the 667 00:38:02,480 --> 00:38:06,520 Speaker 2: United States needs to extricate itself from that fight. Whether 668 00:38:06,520 --> 00:38:09,000 Speaker 2: he would actually do that or not is a different question, 669 00:38:09,120 --> 00:38:12,600 Speaker 2: but certainly the prospect that Trump might become president is 670 00:38:12,719 --> 00:38:15,839 Speaker 2: one of the things that Putin is looking to as 671 00:38:15,840 --> 00:38:18,560 Speaker 2: a means of salvation in the Ukraine War. He can 672 00:38:18,600 --> 00:38:21,040 Speaker 2: hold out hope that Trump will be elected and the 673 00:38:21,120 --> 00:38:23,759 Speaker 2: US will drop out of the Ukraine Coalition. I think 674 00:38:23,760 --> 00:38:25,680 Speaker 2: it'd be more complicated than that. But what I think 675 00:38:25,760 --> 00:38:29,080 Speaker 2: is an important What Putin thinks is important. So I 676 00:38:29,120 --> 00:38:33,080 Speaker 2: think the reality is that countries around the world, in Europe, 677 00:38:33,280 --> 00:38:37,360 Speaker 2: in Asia, and the Middle East are already trying to 678 00:38:37,400 --> 00:38:40,319 Speaker 2: figure out what a second Trump presidency would mean for them. 679 00:38:40,880 --> 00:38:43,960 Speaker 2: They're trying to hedge their bets now so that they 680 00:38:43,960 --> 00:38:47,920 Speaker 2: are not caught out if Trump is reelected. And if 681 00:38:47,920 --> 00:38:51,239 Speaker 2: Trump is reelected, it would make it far harder to 682 00:38:51,280 --> 00:38:53,560 Speaker 2: make the argument that the Biden administration has tried to 683 00:38:53,600 --> 00:38:56,520 Speaker 2: make that. Yes, there was this period when Trump was president. 684 00:38:56,600 --> 00:38:59,760 Speaker 2: It was very disruptive, but that's not the real American 685 00:38:59,800 --> 00:39:02,480 Speaker 2: foreign policy. The real American foreign policy is what we're 686 00:39:02,480 --> 00:39:06,319 Speaker 2: seeing now. If Trump gets a second term, I think 687 00:39:06,320 --> 00:39:08,319 Speaker 2: it's much harder to make that argument, and so you 688 00:39:08,360 --> 00:39:10,960 Speaker 2: just inject a much higher degree of uncertainty about the 689 00:39:11,040 --> 00:39:13,279 Speaker 2: long term future of US foreign policy as. 690 00:39:13,200 --> 00:39:16,399 Speaker 1: Well, and every other global player has to consider an 691 00:39:16,480 --> 00:39:21,640 Speaker 1: unpredictable but powerful US with unclear strategic goals and a 692 00:39:21,840 --> 00:39:25,719 Speaker 1: very itchy but unstable trigger finger in the Oval Office. 693 00:39:26,280 --> 00:39:28,839 Speaker 1: You know, if you could wave your magic diplomatic wand 694 00:39:28,880 --> 00:39:32,239 Speaker 1: across the globe looking at you know, essentially at what's 695 00:39:32,239 --> 00:39:34,000 Speaker 1: going on in Eastern Europe right now, and what's going 696 00:39:34,000 --> 00:39:36,880 Speaker 1: on in East Asia in terms of militarization and this 697 00:39:37,280 --> 00:39:40,560 Speaker 1: lurking cold war, how would you like to see it resolve? 698 00:39:41,560 --> 00:39:48,000 Speaker 2: Well, ideally you would see Russia and China become, you know, 699 00:39:48,080 --> 00:39:53,400 Speaker 2: willing constructive members of the US led international order. And 700 00:39:53,440 --> 00:39:55,960 Speaker 2: I don't say that simply because I'm an American and 701 00:39:56,000 --> 00:39:59,279 Speaker 2: I like a US led international order for that reason, 702 00:39:59,360 --> 00:40:02,120 Speaker 2: although I'm sure that's true to a degree, but because 703 00:40:02,200 --> 00:40:04,640 Speaker 2: the international order that the US and its friends have 704 00:40:04,760 --> 00:40:11,560 Speaker 2: built since nineteen forty five has helped deliver the most peaceful, prosperous, 705 00:40:12,120 --> 00:40:16,200 Speaker 2: humane world we've ever lived in. If you had to 706 00:40:16,280 --> 00:40:19,760 Speaker 2: pick a seventy five year period in history in which 707 00:40:19,880 --> 00:40:23,480 Speaker 2: to live. You'd pick this one for that reason, and 708 00:40:23,600 --> 00:40:26,200 Speaker 2: I think it would serve a lot of people's interests 709 00:40:26,200 --> 00:40:29,120 Speaker 2: around the world of this international system where to continue 710 00:40:29,160 --> 00:40:33,239 Speaker 2: and it were to thrive. And moreover, the fact is 711 00:40:33,280 --> 00:40:37,800 Speaker 2: that the world is healthier if it has a China 712 00:40:37,840 --> 00:40:41,320 Speaker 2: and Russia playing constructive role in the international system, because 713 00:40:41,320 --> 00:40:43,759 Speaker 2: these countries make up a huge chunk of humanity to 714 00:40:43,840 --> 00:40:46,920 Speaker 2: make up a huge chunk of the Earth's surface, and 715 00:40:47,000 --> 00:40:50,359 Speaker 2: it's kind of hard to imagine a stable international system 716 00:40:50,600 --> 00:40:54,400 Speaker 2: if Russia and China are permanently excluded from it. So 717 00:40:54,480 --> 00:40:57,279 Speaker 2: that would be my wish. The reality, unfortunately, is that 718 00:40:57,360 --> 00:41:00,879 Speaker 2: I just don't see any prospect of this happening anytime soon. 719 00:41:00,920 --> 00:41:05,120 Speaker 2: It's certainly not going to happen on Putin's watch in Moscow, 720 00:41:05,800 --> 00:41:07,600 Speaker 2: and I worry that it's not going to happen on 721 00:41:07,680 --> 00:41:10,759 Speaker 2: Che's watch or perhaps even after that in China. And 722 00:41:10,800 --> 00:41:14,680 Speaker 2: so I think realistically the objective of the United States 723 00:41:14,760 --> 00:41:19,320 Speaker 2: has to be to strengthen the international order around Russia 724 00:41:19,320 --> 00:41:22,760 Speaker 2: and China, to limit their ability to do it harm, 725 00:41:22,880 --> 00:41:27,719 Speaker 2: whether through violent aggression or economic predation, and try to 726 00:41:27,760 --> 00:41:30,960 Speaker 2: build as strong as possible a community of like minded 727 00:41:31,000 --> 00:41:34,239 Speaker 2: states that are committed to the international order because they 728 00:41:34,280 --> 00:41:38,319 Speaker 2: recognize the benefits that it holds for them. Unfortunately, that's 729 00:41:38,360 --> 00:41:43,400 Speaker 2: also a recipe for a fairly long, protracted, difficult, dangerous 730 00:41:43,440 --> 00:41:48,240 Speaker 2: standoff with Moscow, Beijing and some of their confederates around 731 00:41:48,280 --> 00:41:50,640 Speaker 2: the world. But I think that's the best we're likely 732 00:41:50,719 --> 00:41:51,920 Speaker 2: to get in the coming years. 733 00:41:52,800 --> 00:41:54,719 Speaker 1: I always like to ask folks at the end of 734 00:41:54,719 --> 00:41:58,040 Speaker 1: the show what they've learned as you look at the 735 00:41:58,080 --> 00:41:59,719 Speaker 1: events of the last year and a half in a 736 00:42:00,239 --> 00:42:03,400 Speaker 1: tight time frame, What do you know now that you 737 00:42:03,480 --> 00:42:04,400 Speaker 1: didn't know then? 738 00:42:05,800 --> 00:42:09,080 Speaker 2: That's a great question. I think that the period since 739 00:42:09,480 --> 00:42:14,920 Speaker 2: February twenty twenty two has underscored a bunch of things 740 00:42:14,960 --> 00:42:18,760 Speaker 2: for me. I think one thing would be the events 741 00:42:18,760 --> 00:42:22,120 Speaker 2: in the last eighteen nineteen months are a reminder of 742 00:42:22,400 --> 00:42:27,879 Speaker 2: how fragile international order is. We take for granted that 743 00:42:27,920 --> 00:42:31,120 Speaker 2: we live in this world where global trade is possible, 744 00:42:31,239 --> 00:42:36,320 Speaker 2: where great power war is rare, where democracy is widespread, 745 00:42:37,160 --> 00:42:40,719 Speaker 2: But that order is really just the product of the 746 00:42:40,760 --> 00:42:43,719 Speaker 2: efforts of the states that are sustaining it. And what 747 00:42:43,760 --> 00:42:46,359 Speaker 2: the Ukraine War indicates is that there are actors out 748 00:42:46,440 --> 00:42:50,080 Speaker 2: there with dramatically different preferences for how the world should work. Right, 749 00:42:50,160 --> 00:42:52,320 Speaker 2: Vladimir Putin does not want to live in a liberal 750 00:42:52,360 --> 00:42:54,680 Speaker 2: international order. He does not want to live in a 751 00:42:54,680 --> 00:42:58,960 Speaker 2: world where territorial sovereignty is considered sacer sancti, does not 752 00:42:59,000 --> 00:43:01,000 Speaker 2: want to live in a world where human rights are 753 00:43:01,000 --> 00:43:04,400 Speaker 2: widely respected in democracy is the dominant form of government. 754 00:43:04,920 --> 00:43:07,680 Speaker 2: And so the war reveals the way in which the 755 00:43:07,719 --> 00:43:10,040 Speaker 2: world would change if these sorts of actors got the 756 00:43:10,080 --> 00:43:13,640 Speaker 2: upper hand. And so that's perhaps the first lesson. The 757 00:43:13,719 --> 00:43:18,200 Speaker 2: second lesson, though, I think, is how much gas there 758 00:43:18,280 --> 00:43:22,080 Speaker 2: still is in the tank when it comes to American leadership. 759 00:43:22,640 --> 00:43:25,200 Speaker 2: And we had heard a lot of talk after the 760 00:43:25,239 --> 00:43:28,279 Speaker 2: Trump era or after the global financial crisis before this 761 00:43:29,000 --> 00:43:31,560 Speaker 2: about how we're moving out of an era of American power, 762 00:43:31,760 --> 00:43:35,560 Speaker 2: moving into a multipolar world, how the world has changed fundamentally. 763 00:43:36,280 --> 00:43:39,799 Speaker 2: But when Russia attacks Ukraine, the fundamental rally point in 764 00:43:39,840 --> 00:43:43,040 Speaker 2: Europe was NATO, which the US led alliance. You see 765 00:43:43,080 --> 00:43:47,000 Speaker 2: off the chart demand for more American engagement in that 766 00:43:47,160 --> 00:43:50,520 Speaker 2: region and elsewhere you see how countries are clustering around 767 00:43:50,520 --> 00:43:53,480 Speaker 2: the United States. And so one of the fundamental enablers 768 00:43:53,520 --> 00:43:56,920 Speaker 2: of American influencing the international system is the fact that 769 00:43:56,960 --> 00:44:01,000 Speaker 2: the United States supports a concept of international order that 770 00:44:01,120 --> 00:44:04,160 Speaker 2: is attractive or at least acceptable to lots of other 771 00:44:04,400 --> 00:44:08,680 Speaker 2: powerful states in the world, particularly advanced democracies, and so 772 00:44:08,719 --> 00:44:11,600 Speaker 2: when a crisis like this happens, they try to do 773 00:44:11,680 --> 00:44:13,799 Speaker 2: more with the United States rather than less, and that 774 00:44:13,880 --> 00:44:16,839 Speaker 2: has the effect of further shoring up this order that's 775 00:44:16,920 --> 00:44:18,880 Speaker 2: under threat. And so you can look at this in 776 00:44:18,920 --> 00:44:21,279 Speaker 2: a couple of different ways. The war underscored for me 777 00:44:21,800 --> 00:44:24,640 Speaker 2: the fragility of international order, but also in some way 778 00:44:24,680 --> 00:44:25,600 Speaker 2: the resilience of it. 779 00:44:27,239 --> 00:44:28,600 Speaker 1: You know, Al, I could talk to you for the 780 00:44:28,640 --> 00:44:30,400 Speaker 1: rest of the day, but we have run out of 781 00:44:30,400 --> 00:44:32,319 Speaker 1: time in our little visit, so I'm going to have 782 00:44:32,360 --> 00:44:34,560 Speaker 1: to call it quits. But thank you so much for 783 00:44:34,600 --> 00:44:35,640 Speaker 1: spending time with me today. 784 00:44:35,960 --> 00:44:37,800 Speaker 2: Thank you, Tim, I really enjoyed the conversation. 785 00:44:39,680 --> 00:44:43,040 Speaker 1: Hal Brands is a foreign policy professor at Johns Hopkins University, 786 00:44:43,400 --> 00:44:47,840 Speaker 1: and he's a Bloomberg opinion columnist. Here at Crash Course, 787 00:44:47,920 --> 00:44:51,680 Speaker 1: we believe that collisions can be messy, impressive, challenging, surprising, 788 00:44:52,080 --> 00:44:56,080 Speaker 1: and always instructive. In today's Crash Course, I learned that 789 00:44:56,120 --> 00:44:57,840 Speaker 1: no matter how much a might be wishing for a 790 00:44:57,840 --> 00:45:02,040 Speaker 1: peaceful revolution to all of the compla and dangerous conflicts 791 00:45:02,239 --> 00:45:04,839 Speaker 1: that are brewing in the world right now. The need 792 00:45:04,920 --> 00:45:08,520 Speaker 1: to end them might involve something other than just diplomacy. 793 00:45:10,040 --> 00:45:12,759 Speaker 1: What did you learn? We'd love to hear from you. 794 00:45:12,760 --> 00:45:15,280 Speaker 1: You can tweet at the Bloomberg Opinion, handle at Opinion 795 00:45:15,680 --> 00:45:19,840 Speaker 1: or me at Tim O'Brien using the hashtag Bloomberg Crash Course. 796 00:45:20,360 --> 00:45:23,160 Speaker 1: You can also subscribe to our show wherever you're listening 797 00:45:23,200 --> 00:45:25,840 Speaker 1: right now, and please leave us a review. It helps 798 00:45:25,880 --> 00:45:29,200 Speaker 1: other people find the show. This episode was produced by 799 00:45:29,200 --> 00:45:34,560 Speaker 1: the indispensable Anamasarakus, moses On Dam and Me. Our supervising 800 00:45:34,560 --> 00:45:37,560 Speaker 1: producer is Magnus Henrickson, and we had editing help from 801 00:45:37,640 --> 00:45:42,600 Speaker 1: Sage Bauman, Katie Boyce, Jeff Grocott, Mike Nize and Christine Benden. 802 00:45:42,640 --> 00:45:46,760 Speaker 1: Bilart Blake Maples does our sound engineering, and our original 803 00:45:46,800 --> 00:45:50,440 Speaker 1: theme song was composed by Luis Gara. I'm Tim O'Brien. 804 00:45:50,840 --> 00:45:53,160 Speaker 1: We'll be back next week with another Crash Course