WEBVTT - Rerun: The Dangers of Public WiFi

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<v Speaker 1>Welcome to Tech Stuff, a production from I Heart Radio.

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<v Speaker 1>Hey there, and welcome to tech Stuff. I'm your host,

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<v Speaker 1>Jonathan Strickland. I am an executive producer with I Heart

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<v Speaker 1>Radio and I love all things tech. And originally I

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<v Speaker 1>had intended to bring you a third installment on our

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<v Speaker 1>home theater basics, but stuff got got piled up. I

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<v Speaker 1>had to record episodes of a couple of other podcasts,

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<v Speaker 1>one of which is a spooky podcast that will be

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<v Speaker 1>coming out later this year. UH can't say a whole

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<v Speaker 1>lot about it, except it's not twelve days of Halloween

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<v Speaker 1>and it's not fourteen days of Halloween somewhere in between. Anyway,

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<v Speaker 1>Because of that, I got a little bit behind. So

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<v Speaker 1>we're going to have a rerun today of an episode

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<v Speaker 1>that published on Christmas Day in two thousand nineteen. UH

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<v Speaker 1>Spend guest Shannon Morrise joined the show to talk about

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<v Speaker 1>the dangers of public WiFi. So I hope you enjoy

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<v Speaker 1>this episode. Let's sit back and listen. There's a topic

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<v Speaker 1>that I really wanted to cover because as I record this,

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<v Speaker 1>we're in the holiday season. A lot of people are traveling,

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<v Speaker 1>They're going through airports, maybe you're visiting family and occasionally

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<v Speaker 1>you need to find a place to be elsewhere, like

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<v Speaker 1>maybe a coffee shop or something. That typically means we're

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<v Speaker 1>carrying our devices with us, and then we want to

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<v Speaker 1>connect to different networks. But that might not always be

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<v Speaker 1>a great idea, and so I decided I was going

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<v Speaker 1>to do an episode all about the best ways to

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<v Speaker 1>browse the Internet with privacy and safety in mind, going

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<v Speaker 1>from the least private and the least secure to perhaps

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<v Speaker 1>the most private and most secure. And then I thought, hey,

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<v Speaker 1>you dumb, dumb You know people who are extremely well

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<v Speaker 1>versed in this topic, and that's why I invited my

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<v Speaker 1>good friend, the phenomenal Shannon More to join this episode

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<v Speaker 1>to come back. So welcome back to Tech Stuff, Shannon.

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<v Speaker 1>Thank you so much. Jonathan. I'm so excited to be

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<v Speaker 1>back on the show. How are you doing. I'm tired.

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<v Speaker 1>But it's at the end of the year, so that

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<v Speaker 1>always happens, right like, And here's the thing, you know,

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<v Speaker 1>Shannon can tell you. In fact, we were just talking

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<v Speaker 1>about it before we went on to the record that

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<v Speaker 1>the tech journalists life does not get easier at the

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<v Speaker 1>end of the year because you immediately turn around and

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<v Speaker 1>head off to Vegas for ce S and that's where

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<v Speaker 1>you're gonna be in early January, as I understand it, right, Shannon, Yes,

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<v Speaker 1>I will. I'll be there all week covering everything over

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<v Speaker 1>on my channel, so make sure to link everybody to

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<v Speaker 1>my channel later, absolutely, because I ain't going folks. So

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<v Speaker 1>Shannon's your your your destination for finding all the really

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<v Speaker 1>cool stuff. And uh, Shannon, I can say from experience

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<v Speaker 1>because I've watched her work does amazing work. Not just

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<v Speaker 1>at c yes, but we were, but particularly like under

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<v Speaker 1>a high stress situation like c e S, certain people

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<v Speaker 1>can light up under the camera. And uh, I'm frankly

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<v Speaker 1>envious of your ability to do so. So um, that's

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<v Speaker 1>me be nice. Yeah, well, I mean I could be

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<v Speaker 1>more caddy about it, but I'm gonna be nice. The

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<v Speaker 1>Caddy would be like, how dare she? How dare she

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<v Speaker 1>show me up? But no, we're gonna talk about browsing safely.

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<v Speaker 1>So the first thing I wanted to do before we

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<v Speaker 1>get into the spectrum of browsing the Internet, because you

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<v Speaker 1>could argue that there's like the least safe, secure, naive

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<v Speaker 1>way to do it to what is perhaps the most

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<v Speaker 1>secure but not perfect. There's no perfect solution spoiler alert.

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<v Speaker 1>Before we get into any of that, I wanted to

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<v Speaker 1>talk about some stats, and these come from a few

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<v Speaker 1>different sources. Uh. One was a survey that was conducted

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<v Speaker 1>by one World Identity back in about public wi fi.

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<v Speaker 1>So this was just asking people about their perception and

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<v Speaker 1>their use of public WiFi. And Shannon, I kind of

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<v Speaker 1>wanted to get your reaction to this because being someone

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<v Speaker 1>who has been so entrenched in data security in the

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<v Speaker 1>hacker culture in you know, everything from how do we

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<v Speaker 1>make these systems more secure, to the white hat approach

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<v Speaker 1>of how do we find any vulnerability so that they

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<v Speaker 1>can be patched, to even the black hat culture where

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<v Speaker 1>people are exploiting this for their own gain. I wanted

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<v Speaker 1>to see what you thought about these stats. So the

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<v Speaker 1>first one was they asked a question to people in

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<v Speaker 1>the United States, in Germany and in France, and the

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<v Speaker 1>question they asked was do you ever use unsecured public

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<v Speaker 1>WiFi networks in the United States? So nearly half said,

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<v Speaker 1>you know, if there's no other option, sure, I'll do it.

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<v Speaker 1>Thirty two percent actually said I prefer using public WiFi

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<v Speaker 1>to using my cellular plan. Uh. Person sumably because they

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<v Speaker 1>would not be billed for data usage right because they're

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<v Speaker 1>using WiFi instead of their cell data only said they

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<v Speaker 1>never did it. One percent said they do it, but

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<v Speaker 1>only with a VPN. But we'll cover VPNs a little

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<v Speaker 1>bit later. So, Shannon, you've you've talked with hackers. What

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<v Speaker 1>do you think their reaction initially would be hearing that

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<v Speaker 1>nearly fifty of people in the United States said yeah,

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<v Speaker 1>you know, if there's no other connection, I'll I'll connect

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<v Speaker 1>to public WiFi, and another thirty two percent and I said, oh, heck, yeah,

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<v Speaker 1>sign me up. Well, I'm definitely in the one percent

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<v Speaker 1>of only with a VPN, and and that's assuming that

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<v Speaker 1>I have absolutely no other option. So I'm kind of

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<v Speaker 1>a mix of the and the one percent, but only

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<v Speaker 1>only if I have a vp n UM. I would

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<v Speaker 1>say from my experience, all of my friends would probably

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<v Speaker 1>not be surprised by the tent that prefer public WiFi

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<v Speaker 1>over their cellular plants, specifically because of what you said,

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<v Speaker 1>they'll be able to save money, especially if they don't

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<v Speaker 1>have an unlimited plan through their mobile carriers. So in

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<v Speaker 1>that way, it makes sense, uh that say yes, if

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<v Speaker 1>there's no other option, there's always another option. Come on, folks,

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<v Speaker 1>what are you doing? Where are you at? Yeah? I

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<v Speaker 1>mean we we have such good cellular coverage now there's

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<v Speaker 1>always another option, even if you just have three G

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<v Speaker 1>like that's manageable from most tasks. So what what are

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<v Speaker 1>they doing? I'm just my draw My job kind of

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<v Speaker 1>dropped a little bit when I heard that number. I

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<v Speaker 1>just thought it was I thought that I'm doing a

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<v Speaker 1>much better job of educating people about the importance of

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<v Speaker 1>not using public WiFi, and apparently I'm not doing my

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<v Speaker 1>job as well as I should have been, or or

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<v Speaker 1>the people who are already kind of hip to it

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<v Speaker 1>are the ones watching you, going yeah, she gets it,

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<v Speaker 1>she knows, and the people who need to see it

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<v Speaker 1>are like what's on the masked Singer today or whatever?

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<v Speaker 1>You know, Like so, yeah, I I look at this

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<v Speaker 1>and I think, man if I were a black hat,

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<v Speaker 1>I would just be doing the Mr Burns excellent. Just

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<v Speaker 1>you're over and over again just drooling at that opportunity,

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<v Speaker 1>because you know, public WiFi is definitely the most dangerous

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<v Speaker 1>option you can pick when you're talking about protecting your

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<v Speaker 1>own privacy and security, especially if you're not doing something

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<v Speaker 1>like using a VPN. UH spoiler alert will talk more

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<v Speaker 1>about that in a second. And so knowing that you're

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<v Speaker 1>your opportunity for targets is so vast has got to

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<v Speaker 1>be incredibly encouraging to someone who is ready to exploit that.

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<v Speaker 1>And that's really, you know, that's what we're trying to

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<v Speaker 1>protect everyone against, is you know, it's the likelihood of

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<v Speaker 1>you running into these situations is not necessarily high on

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<v Speaker 1>a day to day basis, but the opportunity is so

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<v Speaker 1>huge that you need to take it into account no

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<v Speaker 1>matter where you happen to be. So you you want

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<v Speaker 1>to make yourself the hard target. You want to be

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<v Speaker 1>the person that makes people work really hard to get

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<v Speaker 1>access to your data. You don't want to be the

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<v Speaker 1>easy target, because the easier target you are, the more

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<v Speaker 1>often you're going to be targeted. You don't want that. No, no,

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<v Speaker 1>And I was actually talking to a co worker today

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<v Speaker 1>and I said, honestly, when you look at data security,

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<v Speaker 1>even when you're talking like you always get naysayers who

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<v Speaker 1>will say, oh, sure you can use this, but it

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<v Speaker 1>doesn't protect you against everything, And they may technically be right,

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<v Speaker 1>but my answer is the harder you make it. Effectively,

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<v Speaker 1>what that means is you're making it more expensive for

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<v Speaker 1>someone to successfully target you. So if you price yourself

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<v Speaker 1>out where it would cost them more to break your security,

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<v Speaker 1>then they would get from whatever they took from you.

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<v Speaker 1>You win, because no one's going to lose money on that.

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<v Speaker 1>Uh exactly. It's when you've made it so convenient that

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<v Speaker 1>it's like it's like it's like when someone says about

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<v Speaker 1>a sale, I would lose money if I didn't buy that.

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<v Speaker 1>That's when you're in Yeah, yes, exactly, it's they're looking

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<v Speaker 1>for the bargain deal. And a lot of times when

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<v Speaker 1>a black hat is looking at public WiFi as a

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<v Speaker 1>way to access information, they're in tending to profit off

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<v Speaker 1>of that information, whether by stealing an idea, identity, or

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<v Speaker 1>reselling that data on the black market, like on the

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<v Speaker 1>dark web. So making yourself the hard target is absolutely

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<v Speaker 1>crucial to helping to protect you. Yeah. And and just

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<v Speaker 1>so that you guys out there, no, I mean I

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<v Speaker 1>mentioned the United States numbers. It's not like Germany and

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<v Speaker 1>France were shining examples of data privacy and security among

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<v Speaker 1>the public. In Germany, in fact, of respondents said they'd

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<v Speaker 1>used unsecured, unsecured public WiFi over their cellular data, So

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<v Speaker 1>it was even a larger percentage than the United States.

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<v Speaker 1>And the United States it was that it said, oh yeah,

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<v Speaker 1>I've got a choice, I'll use public over my cellular data.

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<v Speaker 1>In Germany it was fort um and and said they

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<v Speaker 1>would use it if they could not get a cellular option.

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<v Speaker 1>And then in France it was closer to what the

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<v Speaker 1>United States said, said they preferred using public WiFi to

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<v Speaker 1>using their cellular data, and forty percent said they'd used

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<v Speaker 1>it if they couldn't get any other option. So again

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<v Speaker 1>that mirrored very closely what the folks in the United

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<v Speaker 1>States said. So this is a trend that goes beyond

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<v Speaker 1>the US. I know that because I'm centered in the US,

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<v Speaker 1>I often get very US centric, And I also tend

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<v Speaker 1>to harp on how American citizens in particular seemed to

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<v Speaker 1>come across to me as being security illiterate for in

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<v Speaker 1>a in large part, I mean, I just see it

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<v Speaker 1>all the time, But I don't know if it's not

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<v Speaker 1>exactly reassuring to see that that way in other parts

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<v Speaker 1>of the world. That doesn't fill me with confidence. I

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<v Speaker 1>think a lot of times people either don't know where

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<v Speaker 1>to look for the information, for accessible information that's that

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<v Speaker 1>that's explained in a way that is it's scary, or

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<v Speaker 1>doesn't you know, create create emotions of paranoia or just

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<v Speaker 1>close people down so that they just get lose interest insecurity. Uh.

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<v Speaker 1>And you also have a lot of folks out there

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<v Speaker 1>that just don't care. But I think a lot of

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<v Speaker 1>people do care, they just don't know where to look

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<v Speaker 1>for this kind of information. So I'm glad that you, Jonathan,

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<v Speaker 1>as well as myself on my channel, we're putting that

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<v Speaker 1>information out there in a way that's easy to understand,

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<v Speaker 1>and I'm hoping that even if it just helps one

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<v Speaker 1>person understand a little bit better security and privacy, hopefully

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<v Speaker 1>we change that percentage over time. Absolutely, I agree. I think, uh,

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<v Speaker 1>it can be one of those situations where you get

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<v Speaker 1>overwhelmed by the scope of something. And when you get overwhelmed,

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<v Speaker 1>it's almost like there's a defense mechanism in your brain, right,

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<v Speaker 1>It's like this is too hard, so I can't worry

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<v Speaker 1>about it. And I have seen this in action when

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<v Speaker 1>trying to tell people about like password managers, for example,

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<v Speaker 1>and lead shut down. They have no interest. They get

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<v Speaker 1>glassy eyed, and they just say, well, I don't see

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<v Speaker 1>what the point is on I try to explain the point.

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<v Speaker 1>But as after that point, it's just it's just like

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<v Speaker 1>talking through talking through the air. They just don't want

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<v Speaker 1>anything to do with it. And and as someone who

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<v Speaker 1>relies heavily on a password manager like it is, it's

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<v Speaker 1>it's fundamentally one of the most important tools in my

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<v Speaker 1>toolbox to make certain that I don't do rookie mistakes

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<v Speaker 1>like using the same password for multiple accounts. Right because

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<v Speaker 1>as as we'll discuss as we get into this discussion

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<v Speaker 1>about safely browsing the Internet, one of the big dangers

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<v Speaker 1>is that if you, through accident or or your tricked

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<v Speaker 1>or whatever, if you somehow share your log in information

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<v Speaker 1>for one service. Let's say that you have one service

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<v Speaker 1>that isn't using uh secure encryption for some reason. First

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<v Speaker 1>of all, don't do that, But if you are, if

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<v Speaker 1>you're using that same password anywhere else, it's like you

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<v Speaker 1>just handed a skeleton key to somebody, because now they

0:13:03.920 --> 0:13:06.880
<v Speaker 1>can access everything you've used that password with. I mean,

0:13:06.880 --> 0:13:10.160
<v Speaker 1>this is this is blatantly obvious. So that's why it's

0:13:10.160 --> 0:13:13.240
<v Speaker 1>so important to have unique, strong passwords for all the

0:13:13.280 --> 0:13:16.240
<v Speaker 1>different services you use. That way, if one if worst

0:13:16.240 --> 0:13:22.319
<v Speaker 1>case scenario one gets compromised, it doesn't compromise everything else. Yes, absolutely,

0:13:22.400 --> 0:13:26.160
<v Speaker 1>I'm glad you mentioned that because the more different things

0:13:26.240 --> 0:13:30.040
<v Speaker 1>that you use that help your security and privacy, every

0:13:30.080 --> 0:13:34.040
<v Speaker 1>single step you take absolutely helps. And that's just one

0:13:34.080 --> 0:13:36.959
<v Speaker 1>of the many steps that you can take. Every single

0:13:36.960 --> 0:13:39.080
<v Speaker 1>consumer in the world does not have to take all

0:13:39.120 --> 0:13:41.520
<v Speaker 1>of these steps all at once, because that would be

0:13:41.640 --> 0:13:45.920
<v Speaker 1>quite mind boggling. But if you do take steps towards

0:13:45.960 --> 0:13:50.200
<v Speaker 1>these over time, you can increase your privacy and security

0:13:50.200 --> 0:13:53.160
<v Speaker 1>two fold times fold. Yeah, it's fantastic. Yeah, I mean

0:13:53.200 --> 0:13:55.880
<v Speaker 1>and and and to be fair, like like I'm going

0:13:55.920 --> 0:13:57.760
<v Speaker 1>to be upfront guys, like I used to be the

0:13:57.840 --> 0:14:02.559
<v Speaker 1>dude who had like three passwords and for everything. Yeah,

0:14:02.640 --> 0:14:05.439
<v Speaker 1>I was like that for years until until I finally

0:14:05.480 --> 0:14:09.160
<v Speaker 1>like woke up to how dangerous that was. I was

0:14:09.280 --> 0:14:13.880
<v Speaker 1>fortunate in that I was never knowingly anyway targeted for

0:14:14.160 --> 0:14:17.920
<v Speaker 1>a specific like intrusion. Uh, as far as I know,

0:14:18.000 --> 0:14:20.760
<v Speaker 1>I never none of my stuff ever got compromised because

0:14:20.880 --> 0:14:23.680
<v Speaker 1>of that. Stuff has been compromised because of data breaches

0:14:23.720 --> 0:14:26.600
<v Speaker 1>that are beyond our control. But we're really focusing on

0:14:26.640 --> 0:14:28.760
<v Speaker 1>the stuff that we as end users can do to

0:14:28.800 --> 0:14:31.000
<v Speaker 1>improve our security as best we can knowing that we

0:14:31.040 --> 0:14:34.479
<v Speaker 1>live in a world where that's just one point of vulnerability.

0:14:34.520 --> 0:14:36.840
<v Speaker 1>That's one point of attack, but it's it's one that

0:14:36.920 --> 0:14:42.160
<v Speaker 1>we have some control over another. Another scary statistic, or

0:14:42.160 --> 0:14:45.000
<v Speaker 1>at least I thought it was scary, is that Kaspersky

0:14:45.080 --> 0:14:49.400
<v Speaker 1>did a UH survey back in ten and are They

0:14:49.400 --> 0:14:52.960
<v Speaker 1>did an analysis of thirty two million hot spots, hot

0:14:53.040 --> 0:14:57.440
<v Speaker 1>spots being points of contact where your device connects over

0:14:57.520 --> 0:14:59.880
<v Speaker 1>to the Internet at large, and a hot spot can

0:14:59.880 --> 0:15:03.400
<v Speaker 1>be everything from the router in a like a coffee

0:15:03.400 --> 0:15:06.640
<v Speaker 1>shop to your own cell phone you might be using

0:15:06.640 --> 0:15:09.400
<v Speaker 1>that as a portable hot spot. Out of the thirty

0:15:09.440 --> 0:15:13.480
<v Speaker 1>two million hot spots they examined, one quarter of them

0:15:13.720 --> 0:15:16.600
<v Speaker 1>had no encryption in use at all, meaning everything is

0:15:16.640 --> 0:15:20.320
<v Speaker 1>being sent in plain text, which means that if anyone

0:15:20.520 --> 0:15:25.440
<v Speaker 1>has any method of eavesdropping on those communications, they see

0:15:25.440 --> 0:15:29.440
<v Speaker 1>it all, which again blows my mind that there would

0:15:29.440 --> 0:15:33.400
<v Speaker 1>be that many networks that have no encryption in place

0:15:33.440 --> 0:15:39.200
<v Speaker 1>at all, not even bad encryption. Yeah, that's a very

0:15:39.240 --> 0:15:43.040
<v Speaker 1>scary number. That's extremely high and is a lot higher

0:15:43.040 --> 0:15:45.880
<v Speaker 1>than what I thought it would be. UH. If if

0:15:45.920 --> 0:15:49.360
<v Speaker 1>they're not using any sort of encryption whatsoever, for a

0:15:49.360 --> 0:15:53.160
<v Speaker 1>hot spot. That means that anybody within that vicinity, within

0:15:53.360 --> 0:15:56.440
<v Speaker 1>range of that device would be able to see everything

0:15:56.480 --> 0:16:00.640
<v Speaker 1>you're doing. It's very, very mind boggling, and this is

0:16:00.800 --> 0:16:02.440
<v Speaker 1>one of the reasons why I wanted to have you

0:16:02.600 --> 0:16:05.920
<v Speaker 1>on the show because we say these things, right, we

0:16:06.000 --> 0:16:09.320
<v Speaker 1>say that when you use public WiFi, you're using if

0:16:09.320 --> 0:16:13.400
<v Speaker 1>you're using an unsecured public WiFi hot spot, especially one

0:16:13.440 --> 0:16:17.040
<v Speaker 1>that is unencrypted, that you are in danger of this.

0:16:17.640 --> 0:16:20.400
<v Speaker 1>And a lot of people say, all right, but exactly

0:16:20.400 --> 0:16:22.960
<v Speaker 1>what's going on? Right? How are they doing this? And

0:16:23.000 --> 0:16:26.080
<v Speaker 1>it's that there are various pieces of software out there

0:16:26.720 --> 0:16:29.880
<v Speaker 1>that allow people who are who get onto a network

0:16:30.400 --> 0:16:34.000
<v Speaker 1>to monitor traffic that's going across that network. I mean,

0:16:34.000 --> 0:16:39.040
<v Speaker 1>their entire groups out there that make different software and

0:16:39.200 --> 0:16:44.840
<v Speaker 1>hardware uh solutions to do just this. Right. Yeah, not

0:16:44.880 --> 0:16:48.640
<v Speaker 1>gonna lie. Um. I used to solder and sell some

0:16:48.720 --> 0:16:50.840
<v Speaker 1>of these products at a company that I used to

0:16:50.840 --> 0:16:53.720
<v Speaker 1>work with called hack five. So I'll definitely share some

0:16:53.800 --> 0:16:56.360
<v Speaker 1>of that information once we get closer to those those

0:16:56.400 --> 0:17:00.560
<v Speaker 1>topics with today's discussion. But yeah, those products exist, They're

0:17:00.720 --> 0:17:04.439
<v Speaker 1>very inexpensive, and some of the software is free, and

0:17:04.480 --> 0:17:08.440
<v Speaker 1>there's tutorials made by yours truly on YouTube that show

0:17:08.480 --> 0:17:12.360
<v Speaker 1>you how to use these things. It's definitely a thing

0:17:12.480 --> 0:17:15.560
<v Speaker 1>that pretty much anybody can introduce themselves to and then

0:17:15.600 --> 0:17:17.639
<v Speaker 1>they will be able to see what's going on on

0:17:17.680 --> 0:17:21.520
<v Speaker 1>a network. And there are different reasons to even do this.

0:17:21.600 --> 0:17:24.960
<v Speaker 1>There's obviously there's the nefarious ones that were concerned about,

0:17:25.320 --> 0:17:28.280
<v Speaker 1>but there's also like if you're a network administrator, being

0:17:28.320 --> 0:17:31.320
<v Speaker 1>able to do things like monitor network traffic and see

0:17:31.320 --> 0:17:35.960
<v Speaker 1>points of congestion education as well. Yeah, there's like there's

0:17:36.000 --> 0:17:38.680
<v Speaker 1>there are legit reasons to use that sort of technology

0:17:38.720 --> 0:17:41.800
<v Speaker 1>that don't that don't immediately point to to the to

0:17:41.880 --> 0:17:44.960
<v Speaker 1>the road of I'm here to steal all your infos.

0:17:45.400 --> 0:17:48.720
<v Speaker 1>It's like there's stuff that where this is used in

0:17:48.960 --> 0:17:52.480
<v Speaker 1>quote unquote legitimate purposes. I mean like packet sniffers. That's

0:17:52.480 --> 0:17:56.439
<v Speaker 1>something that sounds like it's underhanded and shady, but they

0:17:56.440 --> 0:18:00.200
<v Speaker 1>were invented not to try and sniff out what's someone

0:18:00.200 --> 0:18:03.720
<v Speaker 1>else was doing, but literally to help network administrators see

0:18:03.800 --> 0:18:07.200
<v Speaker 1>how network how network traffic was moving across so that

0:18:07.320 --> 0:18:10.600
<v Speaker 1>they could make sure that everything was working properly. So

0:18:11.240 --> 0:18:13.399
<v Speaker 1>but it doesn't mean that you can't think a tool.

0:18:13.800 --> 0:18:15.600
<v Speaker 1>A tool is either a tool or a weapon, depending

0:18:15.640 --> 0:18:18.399
<v Speaker 1>upon how you want to use it. And so the

0:18:18.440 --> 0:18:20.560
<v Speaker 1>same stuff that was used to help networks is also

0:18:20.640 --> 0:18:23.720
<v Speaker 1>used to exploit them. Um, exactly, you could say the

0:18:23.720 --> 0:18:26.639
<v Speaker 1>same thing about a kitchen knife. I mean kitchen knives

0:18:26.680 --> 0:18:30.040
<v Speaker 1>to to you know, cut up fruits and veggies. Some

0:18:30.200 --> 0:18:34.119
<v Speaker 1>nefarious people might use one to murder somebody part of me.

0:18:34.240 --> 0:18:38.479
<v Speaker 1>But I used the exact same sort of analogy except

0:18:38.640 --> 0:18:40.359
<v Speaker 1>when I was talking to someone earlier today. But it

0:18:40.400 --> 0:18:43.040
<v Speaker 1>was a hammer. But same thing, Like a hammer is

0:18:43.040 --> 0:18:45.359
<v Speaker 1>either something that you're using to to build stuff with

0:18:45.480 --> 0:18:48.199
<v Speaker 1>or it could be used to bludgeon somebody. And it

0:18:48.240 --> 0:18:50.960
<v Speaker 1>all comes down to it's not that the tool itself

0:18:51.080 --> 0:18:54.280
<v Speaker 1>is bad, it's the intent and use of the person

0:18:54.400 --> 0:18:58.119
<v Speaker 1>wielding that tool. And the same is true of technology.

0:18:58.680 --> 0:19:01.320
<v Speaker 1>Uh So, one other stat that I wanted to mention

0:19:01.359 --> 0:19:04.919
<v Speaker 1>that's pretty alarming. Norton found out this was in so

0:19:04.960 --> 0:19:09.400
<v Speaker 1>it's a few years ago, but Americans had had their

0:19:09.440 --> 0:19:13.200
<v Speaker 1>email hacked at some point, and that twelve percent had

0:19:13.240 --> 0:19:16.800
<v Speaker 1>their financial data stolen while they were shopping online, and

0:19:16.880 --> 0:19:23.240
<v Speaker 1>that in four million people globally had been a victim

0:19:23.320 --> 0:19:26.439
<v Speaker 1>of some sort of cyber crime, and that kind of

0:19:26.480 --> 0:19:30.359
<v Speaker 1>shows us the scale of why this is an important topic.

0:19:30.400 --> 0:19:33.480
<v Speaker 1>It's not just because the opportunity is there, it's because

0:19:33.520 --> 0:19:37.840
<v Speaker 1>people are actually actively taking advantage of those opportunities, and

0:19:37.920 --> 0:19:41.639
<v Speaker 1>you could be the victim of one of those actions

0:19:41.800 --> 0:19:46.280
<v Speaker 1>if you're not careful. And we love you absolutely, we

0:19:46.359 --> 0:19:50.160
<v Speaker 1>do love you very much. I'm kind of I'm kind

0:19:50.160 --> 0:19:53.080
<v Speaker 1>of thinking that all of those numbers have probably increased

0:19:53.359 --> 0:19:56.040
<v Speaker 1>given that it's been about four years since they were

0:19:56.920 --> 0:20:00.800
<v Speaker 1>they analyzed the data and had those those too sticks available,

0:20:01.200 --> 0:20:04.960
<v Speaker 1>because in the past couple of years we've seen hacks

0:20:05.119 --> 0:20:08.600
<v Speaker 1>go from a few hundred million people to almost a

0:20:08.600 --> 0:20:13.320
<v Speaker 1>billion people get hacked online. So it's entirely possible that

0:20:13.359 --> 0:20:17.399
<v Speaker 1>those numbers have increased quite a bit since, especially in

0:20:17.560 --> 0:20:21.159
<v Speaker 1>the realm of the mobile app becoming king right, because

0:20:21.760 --> 0:20:25.280
<v Speaker 1>there's there's such a proliferation of apps out there that

0:20:25.720 --> 0:20:31.840
<v Speaker 1>either through a conscious effort, are creating vulnerabilities or because

0:20:31.840 --> 0:20:35.840
<v Speaker 1>of poor design, create vulnerabilities that can later be exploited.

0:20:36.040 --> 0:20:39.320
<v Speaker 1>You know, we've seen so many examples of that where

0:20:39.600 --> 0:20:42.920
<v Speaker 1>an a p I didn't take everything into account and

0:20:42.960 --> 0:20:46.000
<v Speaker 1>then someone was able to exploit it, famous one being

0:20:46.119 --> 0:20:50.640
<v Speaker 1>Facebook and Cambridge Analytica, where you had an app that

0:20:50.840 --> 0:20:53.760
<v Speaker 1>if you installed the app, like you would voluntarily install

0:20:53.840 --> 0:20:56.760
<v Speaker 1>it within your Facebook and you're voluntary lee sharing your

0:20:56.760 --> 0:21:00.520
<v Speaker 1>own information. All of that is fine, right if you've

0:21:00.520 --> 0:21:03.879
<v Speaker 1>agreed to do it such a good not a good idea,

0:21:03.960 --> 0:21:07.359
<v Speaker 1>such a good example, good example, Yeah, good example, not

0:21:07.440 --> 0:21:09.280
<v Speaker 1>a good idea to do. But it's fine if you

0:21:09.359 --> 0:21:11.280
<v Speaker 1>if you are knowingly doing that, that's fine. But the

0:21:11.320 --> 0:21:14.679
<v Speaker 1>problem that the Cambradge Analytica story brought to bears that

0:21:14.720 --> 0:21:18.399
<v Speaker 1>they took advantage of a loophole in Facebook's API and

0:21:18.440 --> 0:21:21.000
<v Speaker 1>they were able to to phish out a ton of

0:21:21.040 --> 0:21:24.320
<v Speaker 1>information about all the contacts of the people who had

0:21:24.359 --> 0:21:28.040
<v Speaker 1>installed the app. These are people who did not, uh,

0:21:28.080 --> 0:21:31.359
<v Speaker 1>you know, give permission to share their information, but the

0:21:31.440 --> 0:21:36.760
<v Speaker 1>app collected all that information regardless. And that's where we see, like,

0:21:36.800 --> 0:21:41.760
<v Speaker 1>you know, there were countless victims of this app because

0:21:41.800 --> 0:21:44.480
<v Speaker 1>none of them opted in to share that information. It

0:21:44.520 --> 0:21:48.160
<v Speaker 1>was just taken from them. And uh, that's just one

0:21:48.240 --> 0:21:51.399
<v Speaker 1>little example of the world we live in where you know,

0:21:51.560 --> 0:21:55.320
<v Speaker 1>even when you are being careful, there are there are

0:21:55.359 --> 0:21:58.840
<v Speaker 1>these opportunities for your information to get out there, which

0:21:58.840 --> 0:22:00.840
<v Speaker 1>is why we're like this is why you need to

0:22:00.880 --> 0:22:04.600
<v Speaker 1>take the steps necessary to protect yourself as best you can,

0:22:04.880 --> 0:22:08.080
<v Speaker 1>because we live in a world where there are numerous

0:22:08.560 --> 0:22:12.720
<v Speaker 1>attack vectors that point back to us. All right, I

0:22:12.720 --> 0:22:16.919
<v Speaker 1>mean just mid December, the New York Times discussed location

0:22:16.960 --> 0:22:20.600
<v Speaker 1>tracking on phones and how ping pings to local towers

0:22:20.640 --> 0:22:23.760
<v Speaker 1>can basically give you a map of a certain phone

0:22:23.800 --> 0:22:26.000
<v Speaker 1>I D and you can track that and figure out

0:22:26.040 --> 0:22:29.080
<v Speaker 1>who that phone belongs to based on what residents and

0:22:29.080 --> 0:22:32.480
<v Speaker 1>what office they go to every day. It's extremely scary,

0:22:32.560 --> 0:22:35.919
<v Speaker 1>and the more information we have about it as consumers,

0:22:35.960 --> 0:22:39.200
<v Speaker 1>the better we can protect ourselves. Yeah, and again, like, uh,

0:22:39.760 --> 0:22:43.240
<v Speaker 1>back to what you were just saying, Shannon, Facebook send

0:22:43.240 --> 0:22:45.440
<v Speaker 1>a letter to Congress just a couple of days before

0:22:45.440 --> 0:22:49.880
<v Speaker 1>we record this episode where they said, yeah, even if

0:22:49.880 --> 0:22:53.720
<v Speaker 1>you opted out of location tracking, we actually know where

0:22:53.760 --> 0:22:58.280
<v Speaker 1>you are, partly because of the information people are voluntarily sharing.

0:22:58.400 --> 0:23:01.920
<v Speaker 1>Like if I tag If I take a photo while

0:23:01.960 --> 0:23:04.679
<v Speaker 1>I'm at a party and I tagged the location and

0:23:04.720 --> 0:23:07.520
<v Speaker 1>I tag people are in the photo, well, I'm voluntarily

0:23:07.600 --> 0:23:10.000
<v Speaker 1>sharing a lot of information. Maybe those people haven't given

0:23:10.000 --> 0:23:12.920
<v Speaker 1>me permission to do that, but I'm I'm sharing the information.

0:23:13.000 --> 0:23:15.840
<v Speaker 1>So yeah, of course, Facebook knows where I am, when

0:23:15.880 --> 0:23:18.119
<v Speaker 1>I when I'm there, and who I'm with because I

0:23:18.200 --> 0:23:21.720
<v Speaker 1>shared the information. But they also admitted, yeah, we also

0:23:22.359 --> 0:23:24.520
<v Speaker 1>use a lot of other methods where we can suss

0:23:24.560 --> 0:23:27.320
<v Speaker 1>out where you were and who you were with at

0:23:27.359 --> 0:23:32.200
<v Speaker 1>what time that aren't as obvious and aren't examples of

0:23:32.359 --> 0:23:38.200
<v Speaker 1>the user voluntarily handing over information. So yeah, scary stuff. Um.

0:23:38.440 --> 0:23:40.359
<v Speaker 1>One of the things I wanted to mention is sort

0:23:40.359 --> 0:23:44.159
<v Speaker 1>of the bird's eye view of the process of what

0:23:44.280 --> 0:23:46.920
<v Speaker 1>it's like just connecting to WiFi, so we can kind

0:23:46.920 --> 0:23:50.080
<v Speaker 1>of understand, uh, you know, what's going on, because I

0:23:50.119 --> 0:23:53.119
<v Speaker 1>think a lot of people if they think that if

0:23:53.160 --> 0:23:55.960
<v Speaker 1>they see that, for example, that there's a WiFi hotspot

0:23:55.960 --> 0:23:58.800
<v Speaker 1>that requires a password, they immediately think that that is

0:23:58.880 --> 0:24:02.199
<v Speaker 1>inherently more secure here than a public WiFi spot that

0:24:02.240 --> 0:24:06.919
<v Speaker 1>has no password, which is not necessarily true. Um. So

0:24:06.960 --> 0:24:09.040
<v Speaker 1>connecting to WiFi is really you can think of it

0:24:09.080 --> 0:24:13.119
<v Speaker 1>as a series of handshakes between whatever device you're using

0:24:13.640 --> 0:24:16.359
<v Speaker 1>and the hot spot, whether it's a router or something else.

0:24:16.880 --> 0:24:20.400
<v Speaker 1>And this series of handshakes is not meant to secure

0:24:20.440 --> 0:24:23.520
<v Speaker 1>the data. It's not meant to encrypt a channel necessarily,

0:24:23.880 --> 0:24:26.320
<v Speaker 1>it's not meant to protect it. What's meant to do

0:24:26.840 --> 0:24:29.959
<v Speaker 1>is to identify the device and the hot spot so

0:24:30.000 --> 0:24:33.959
<v Speaker 1>that they know where the data needs to go. Right. Otherwise,

0:24:34.320 --> 0:24:36.960
<v Speaker 1>if if we all connected to a public WiFi hot

0:24:36.960 --> 0:24:42.000
<v Speaker 1>spot and there wasn't this handshake thing going on, it

0:24:42.040 --> 0:24:43.600
<v Speaker 1>would be as if we were all listening to an

0:24:43.640 --> 0:24:45.880
<v Speaker 1>open broadcast of everything all at once, and it would

0:24:45.880 --> 0:24:48.399
<v Speaker 1>just be meaningless garbage and we would just get we

0:24:48.400 --> 0:24:50.960
<v Speaker 1>would just get everyone's data simultaneously, and we're like, I

0:24:51.000 --> 0:24:54.760
<v Speaker 1>don't even I don't know what this we could I

0:24:54.800 --> 0:24:58.159
<v Speaker 1>don't think it would go well. But so this was

0:24:58.240 --> 0:25:01.119
<v Speaker 1>this was literally the solution into that problem. Like, you know,

0:25:01.160 --> 0:25:03.960
<v Speaker 1>if you're using wired connections, that's one thing, right, you

0:25:03.960 --> 0:25:07.560
<v Speaker 1>can wire things to specific ports, you have physical hardware.

0:25:07.800 --> 0:25:10.240
<v Speaker 1>When you go wireless, you have to create a virtual

0:25:10.480 --> 0:25:13.360
<v Speaker 1>version of that. That's sort of what the handshake processes for.

0:25:13.680 --> 0:25:16.800
<v Speaker 1>It's saying, hey, there's this device that wants to connect

0:25:16.800 --> 0:25:19.280
<v Speaker 1>to the network. The network says, okay, I'm giving you permission.

0:25:19.400 --> 0:25:21.560
<v Speaker 1>The device is okay, this is who I am, and

0:25:21.600 --> 0:25:24.080
<v Speaker 1>the network devices all right, I I see who you are,

0:25:24.440 --> 0:25:26.919
<v Speaker 1>and now we can send information back and forth. You

0:25:26.960 --> 0:25:29.360
<v Speaker 1>can send requests out to the internet. I'll go out

0:25:29.400 --> 0:25:31.520
<v Speaker 1>and grab whatever it is you wanted, and I'll return

0:25:31.560 --> 0:25:34.840
<v Speaker 1>it just to you. That's the idea. That's actually a

0:25:34.840 --> 0:25:38.440
<v Speaker 1>great explanation without using any of the terminology. So I

0:25:38.800 --> 0:25:41.440
<v Speaker 1>thank you for the doing that. Yeah, I tried. I tried.

0:25:41.440 --> 0:25:44.199
<v Speaker 1>At one point I had a spoiler alert or well

0:25:44.240 --> 0:25:47.080
<v Speaker 1>not even spoiler, look behind the curtain, folks. I had

0:25:47.119 --> 0:25:50.280
<v Speaker 1>originally started this episode as a solo show, and that's

0:25:50.359 --> 0:25:52.560
<v Speaker 1>when it struck me that it would be way easier

0:25:52.600 --> 0:25:54.600
<v Speaker 1>if I brought Shannon on, because she's much smarter than

0:25:54.640 --> 0:25:57.320
<v Speaker 1>I am. And so as I was doing it, I

0:25:57.359 --> 0:26:00.520
<v Speaker 1>was trying to describe this process, and I think I

0:26:00.560 --> 0:26:02.320
<v Speaker 1>went through two or three drafts when I said, you

0:26:02.320 --> 0:26:04.640
<v Speaker 1>know what, I can just step back and not get

0:26:04.640 --> 0:26:08.320
<v Speaker 1>so technical, because the technical parts aren't really what's important.

0:26:08.440 --> 0:26:11.439
<v Speaker 1>What's important is just sort of understanding the concept of

0:26:11.480 --> 0:26:15.000
<v Speaker 1>the process and why it is not inherently tied to

0:26:15.400 --> 0:26:19.640
<v Speaker 1>security and privacy. It's inherently tied to just what does

0:26:19.680 --> 0:26:22.280
<v Speaker 1>it take so that you can have these two devices

0:26:22.320 --> 0:26:25.399
<v Speaker 1>communicate with one another and not have them confused with

0:26:25.480 --> 0:26:28.280
<v Speaker 1>all the other devices that hook into the same network.

0:26:28.760 --> 0:26:30.320
<v Speaker 1>And once I figured that out, was like, I'm going

0:26:30.359 --> 0:26:32.879
<v Speaker 1>to go with that because I'm tired of trying to

0:26:32.880 --> 0:26:36.480
<v Speaker 1>figure out how to explain this handshake process. Um, it

0:26:36.480 --> 0:26:40.160
<v Speaker 1>totally works. I mean I like the handshake terminology because

0:26:40.280 --> 0:26:43.240
<v Speaker 1>it is kind of like that, like in person, whenever

0:26:43.320 --> 0:26:46.600
<v Speaker 1>you meet somebody, you acknowledge each other, you shake each

0:26:46.600 --> 0:26:50.080
<v Speaker 1>other's hands, you kind of authenticate each other by name

0:26:50.119 --> 0:26:53.520
<v Speaker 1>and by face. And that's very similar to what a

0:26:53.640 --> 0:26:57.639
<v Speaker 1>router does with a device like your smartphone or a laptop.

0:26:57.720 --> 0:27:00.960
<v Speaker 1>It's basically doing the same thing where you're you're looking

0:27:01.000 --> 0:27:04.680
<v Speaker 1>for somebody to introduce yourself to. You go in, you

0:27:05.040 --> 0:27:08.000
<v Speaker 1>acknowledge each other, you shake hands with each other, you

0:27:08.080 --> 0:27:11.040
<v Speaker 1>kind of authenticate each other by name, and then you

0:27:11.119 --> 0:27:13.879
<v Speaker 1>have that connection. Yeah, and you have that connection forever

0:27:13.960 --> 0:27:16.760
<v Speaker 1>until you break it off. Yes, And if if you're

0:27:16.760 --> 0:27:20.040
<v Speaker 1>at c S, it probably also requires you to hand

0:27:20.080 --> 0:27:22.960
<v Speaker 1>over a business card because that's like, yeah, most likely

0:27:23.119 --> 0:27:25.720
<v Speaker 1>that's that's the current I guess that would be your password, right, yeah,

0:27:25.800 --> 0:27:29.080
<v Speaker 1>I guess so yeah. All right, Well when we come back,

0:27:29.280 --> 0:27:33.320
<v Speaker 1>we're going to talk about the how how information is

0:27:33.359 --> 0:27:35.480
<v Speaker 1>sent through packets, just so that we can understand why

0:27:35.480 --> 0:27:39.520
<v Speaker 1>did that packet sniffing thing mean earlier. But first let's

0:27:39.520 --> 0:27:43.480
<v Speaker 1>take a quick break to thank our sponsor Shannon and

0:27:43.520 --> 0:27:45.520
<v Speaker 1>I have a lot more to say about the dangers

0:27:45.520 --> 0:27:48.000
<v Speaker 1>of public WiFi, but first let's take a quick break.

0:27:55.840 --> 0:27:58.919
<v Speaker 1>All right, then we're back. So I promised that we

0:27:58.920 --> 0:28:01.240
<v Speaker 1>were going to talk about pack it's packets is pretty

0:28:01.320 --> 0:28:05.080
<v Speaker 1>simple concept. So a packet switching network. You've probably heard

0:28:05.080 --> 0:28:08.720
<v Speaker 1>that term before, uh the Internet. When the pioneers of

0:28:08.720 --> 0:28:12.560
<v Speaker 1>the Internet were sort of designing this thing, they thought, well,

0:28:12.640 --> 0:28:15.439
<v Speaker 1>how do we make it so that information can be

0:28:15.480 --> 0:28:18.160
<v Speaker 1>sent from one computer to another in such a way

0:28:18.400 --> 0:28:22.280
<v Speaker 1>that if something happens, the information can continue to make

0:28:22.320 --> 0:28:24.800
<v Speaker 1>its way to its destination even if there's some sort

0:28:24.840 --> 0:28:28.200
<v Speaker 1>of interruption. And if it were just an uninterrupted string

0:28:28.240 --> 0:28:30.880
<v Speaker 1>of data and there was an interruption, then you would

0:28:30.880 --> 0:28:33.480
<v Speaker 1>have a corrupt file or you know, things would not

0:28:33.520 --> 0:28:36.600
<v Speaker 1>work right. You wouldn't get what you were wanting. So

0:28:36.640 --> 0:28:41.760
<v Speaker 1>they said, what if we bundled data into uh certain sizes,

0:28:41.800 --> 0:28:45.360
<v Speaker 1>We'll call it packets. The packets will have information on

0:28:45.400 --> 0:28:47.800
<v Speaker 1>them that will tell the data where it needs to go,

0:28:47.880 --> 0:28:51.240
<v Speaker 1>where it came from, and how it fits within all

0:28:51.240 --> 0:28:54.400
<v Speaker 1>the other packets. To make whatever the thing is. And

0:28:54.520 --> 0:28:56.959
<v Speaker 1>since we're talking about the Internet, let's be honest, chances

0:28:57.000 --> 0:28:59.880
<v Speaker 1>are it's a picture of a cat. So that cat

0:29:00.000 --> 0:29:02.120
<v Speaker 1>picture is going to be a lot of different data packets,

0:29:02.160 --> 0:29:03.920
<v Speaker 1>and they have to put the packets together kind of

0:29:03.920 --> 0:29:06.040
<v Speaker 1>like a puzzle in order to recreate that image of

0:29:06.040 --> 0:29:08.680
<v Speaker 1>a cat. So that's that's what a packet is. Well,

0:29:08.720 --> 0:29:11.840
<v Speaker 1>the packet because it has that information on it about

0:29:11.880 --> 0:29:14.000
<v Speaker 1>where it's going and where it's from. That's what we

0:29:14.040 --> 0:29:17.600
<v Speaker 1>would call metadata, right, It's the data about the data,

0:29:18.200 --> 0:29:21.080
<v Speaker 1>or it's data that somehow describes the data that's inside.

0:29:21.640 --> 0:29:24.080
<v Speaker 1>And um and I always always try and say that

0:29:24.080 --> 0:29:26.400
<v Speaker 1>the packets on the other side get reassembled Willy Wonka

0:29:26.440 --> 0:29:30.160
<v Speaker 1>style like Mike TV when he goes across the camera. Um.

0:29:30.840 --> 0:29:32.960
<v Speaker 1>I like that. Yeah, I mean it's a it's a

0:29:33.240 --> 0:29:35.520
<v Speaker 1>nice way of putting it, especially since I mean that's

0:29:35.560 --> 0:29:37.280
<v Speaker 1>one of my favorite films of all time, the Gene

0:29:37.320 --> 0:29:40.520
<v Speaker 1>Wilder version of the Not the not the Johnny version yet.

0:29:40.960 --> 0:29:45.400
<v Speaker 1>So that's where we get the words for packets. So

0:29:45.480 --> 0:29:49.120
<v Speaker 1>a packet sniffer, as we mentioned earlier, can be software,

0:29:49.200 --> 0:29:51.120
<v Speaker 1>it can be hardware, it can be a combination of

0:29:51.120 --> 0:29:55.080
<v Speaker 1>the two. That is meant to sort of check out

0:29:55.200 --> 0:29:58.520
<v Speaker 1>the packets that are being sent across a network UH

0:29:58.600 --> 0:30:01.920
<v Speaker 1>and get an idea of what's going on there. And

0:30:02.040 --> 0:30:05.160
<v Speaker 1>one of the things someone can do if they have

0:30:05.200 --> 0:30:07.720
<v Speaker 1>a packet sniffer and they know how to do it,

0:30:07.760 --> 0:30:11.000
<v Speaker 1>is they can look for packets that represent essentially an

0:30:11.040 --> 0:30:16.000
<v Speaker 1>unencrypted cookie or a session key, And this is essentially

0:30:16.000 --> 0:30:19.000
<v Speaker 1>where a user has sent a request to log into

0:30:19.040 --> 0:30:22.520
<v Speaker 1>a service of some sort UH and if the hacker

0:30:22.640 --> 0:30:25.440
<v Speaker 1>is able to sniff out that cookie, they might be

0:30:25.480 --> 0:30:30.640
<v Speaker 1>able to step in and pose as that user and

0:30:30.720 --> 0:30:34.440
<v Speaker 1>thus get access to the user's account or services UM.

0:30:34.800 --> 0:30:38.960
<v Speaker 1>And this is sometimes referred to as side jacking. I

0:30:40.200 --> 0:30:43.120
<v Speaker 1>learned a lot of hacker slang while I was doing

0:30:43.120 --> 0:30:45.880
<v Speaker 1>the research. This. I'm so proud of you. I'm not

0:30:45.920 --> 0:30:49.000
<v Speaker 1>good at using it, but I learned it. It's okay.

0:30:49.040 --> 0:30:51.600
<v Speaker 1>You could go to def Con next year and totally fitting. Yeah,

0:30:51.600 --> 0:30:53.320
<v Speaker 1>except I would be like, all right, well, I'm gonna

0:30:53.400 --> 0:30:57.800
<v Speaker 1>leave all of my devices at home. Another great idea

0:30:58.840 --> 0:31:01.000
<v Speaker 1>def con for those who do not know is a

0:31:01.520 --> 0:31:06.040
<v Speaker 1>information security and hacking convention where if you aren't careful,

0:31:06.320 --> 0:31:09.840
<v Speaker 1>they will let you know about it. Oh yeah, they do.

0:31:10.040 --> 0:31:12.200
<v Speaker 1>Usually they're nice about it, and you just end up

0:31:12.200 --> 0:31:15.840
<v Speaker 1>on this thing called the wall of shame. But luckily

0:31:16.240 --> 0:31:19.959
<v Speaker 1>generally people don't nefariously hack each other there. It's just

0:31:20.080 --> 0:31:22.760
<v Speaker 1>kind of to pop your name up on a wall

0:31:22.760 --> 0:31:26.560
<v Speaker 1>of shame and that's about it. Yeah, essentially, essentially they're saying, hey,

0:31:26.800 --> 0:31:28.920
<v Speaker 1>you need to have a heads up, like whatever you're

0:31:28.920 --> 0:31:31.960
<v Speaker 1>doing is not sufficient. Yeah, it's it's really more like

0:31:32.480 --> 0:31:36.200
<v Speaker 1>it's really more like saying like, listen, we want you

0:31:36.280 --> 0:31:39.320
<v Speaker 1>to be safe, and right now you're not being safe.

0:31:39.800 --> 0:31:43.440
<v Speaker 1>So but but yeah, but still there's also the shame factor.

0:31:43.720 --> 0:31:46.400
<v Speaker 1>And the more the more known you are in the sphere,

0:31:46.440 --> 0:31:48.680
<v Speaker 1>I imagine, the greater the shame would be to appear

0:31:48.680 --> 0:31:52.960
<v Speaker 1>on that wall. Oh yeah, definitely. So this was never

0:31:53.040 --> 0:31:54.320
<v Speaker 1>been on the wall of shame, and I hope I

0:31:54.360 --> 0:31:57.000
<v Speaker 1>never congratulations. Yeah, I've never been on the wall of

0:31:57.040 --> 0:31:59.800
<v Speaker 1>shame either, but that's because I haven't gone. I am

0:32:00.000 --> 0:32:02.640
<v Speaker 1>certain I would end up doing something bone headed and

0:32:02.720 --> 0:32:05.120
<v Speaker 1>mess up. So you were talking earlier about how you

0:32:05.160 --> 0:32:09.120
<v Speaker 1>have actually actively worked on technologies that do this this

0:32:09.320 --> 0:32:14.400
<v Speaker 1>packet sniffing uh approach. Yes, yes, I have. I used

0:32:14.400 --> 0:32:16.840
<v Speaker 1>to work at a company called Hack five. I still

0:32:16.880 --> 0:32:20.800
<v Speaker 1>do shows on that channel, j K five, and our

0:32:20.920 --> 0:32:24.320
<v Speaker 1>our premise for that channel is educating people who are

0:32:24.440 --> 0:32:27.600
<v Speaker 1>interested in security and privacy and might want to go

0:32:27.680 --> 0:32:34.120
<v Speaker 1>into information technology or penetration testing or infosec info security

0:32:34.720 --> 0:32:39.000
<v Speaker 1>as a profession. So we teach young hackers how to

0:32:39.800 --> 0:32:43.520
<v Speaker 1>legally use their talents to actually get a job that

0:32:43.560 --> 0:32:47.480
<v Speaker 1>will help them spur the economy, help them protect companies,

0:32:48.080 --> 0:32:52.440
<v Speaker 1>h and help them really get involved with their passion. Um. So,

0:32:52.640 --> 0:32:55.680
<v Speaker 1>one of the products that we created is something called

0:32:55.800 --> 0:32:59.120
<v Speaker 1>called the WiFi Pineapple. It's a little hardware device. It's

0:32:59.160 --> 0:33:02.680
<v Speaker 1>basically a round outer, but the software that's built into

0:33:02.920 --> 0:33:07.920
<v Speaker 1>the WiFi Pineapple allows us to do things like get

0:33:07.960 --> 0:33:11.160
<v Speaker 1>people to connect to a WiFi Pineapple as opposed to

0:33:11.200 --> 0:33:14.959
<v Speaker 1>a regular router and allow us to sniff packets just

0:33:15.040 --> 0:33:19.239
<v Speaker 1>like you were saying. Um. The the product has been

0:33:19.280 --> 0:33:22.160
<v Speaker 1>around for half a decade at this point. No, actually

0:33:22.200 --> 0:33:24.480
<v Speaker 1>it's been almost a decade. Wow, I can't believe it's

0:33:24.480 --> 0:33:27.840
<v Speaker 1>been so long. But we've gone through various revisions of it,

0:33:28.000 --> 0:33:32.440
<v Speaker 1>and as security has gotten stronger, there's always been new

0:33:32.520 --> 0:33:37.200
<v Speaker 1>vulnerabilities available in wireless network technology, so we've always been

0:33:37.240 --> 0:33:40.840
<v Speaker 1>able to update the WiFi Pineapple to continue to educate

0:33:40.880 --> 0:33:45.040
<v Speaker 1>people why it's still a good idea to not connect

0:33:45.080 --> 0:33:50.800
<v Speaker 1>to public WiFi or open hotspots. And uh, it's been

0:33:50.840 --> 0:33:54.880
<v Speaker 1>a wonderful education tool since we can use it as

0:33:54.920 --> 0:33:57.800
<v Speaker 1>this kind of man in the middle attack for for

0:33:58.000 --> 0:34:02.160
<v Speaker 1>you know, helping people understand and I mean, like the

0:34:02.320 --> 0:34:05.720
<v Speaker 1>thing that I see people sometimes and I know you've

0:34:05.760 --> 0:34:08.720
<v Speaker 1>seen it sometimes protests they're like, why are you making

0:34:08.760 --> 0:34:11.520
<v Speaker 1>this thing? And the argument I would make to them,

0:34:11.520 --> 0:34:13.279
<v Speaker 1>and I'm sure it's an argument that you guys have

0:34:13.360 --> 0:34:16.640
<v Speaker 1>made numerous times, is you know that people who have

0:34:16.719 --> 0:34:20.680
<v Speaker 1>bad intentions are making stuff like this already. They're they're

0:34:20.800 --> 0:34:23.960
<v Speaker 1>they're doing it all the time. They're doing and they're

0:34:24.000 --> 0:34:26.880
<v Speaker 1>not talking about it. They're not upfront about it because

0:34:26.920 --> 0:34:29.839
<v Speaker 1>they want to take advantage of it. The reason why

0:34:29.920 --> 0:34:33.520
<v Speaker 1>you guys do it is to raise awareness, to teach

0:34:33.560 --> 0:34:37.359
<v Speaker 1>people how it works, and presumably they can then take

0:34:37.400 --> 0:34:41.040
<v Speaker 1>that knowledge and better protect whatever their future clients might

0:34:41.040 --> 0:34:43.160
<v Speaker 1>be if they end up working as a white hat hacker.

0:34:43.840 --> 0:34:46.760
<v Speaker 1>And yeah, straight up, people have made their own WiFi

0:34:46.800 --> 0:34:50.440
<v Speaker 1>pineapples using you know, different types of hardware and different

0:34:50.480 --> 0:34:53.719
<v Speaker 1>kind of software that they've made their own, but our

0:34:53.840 --> 0:34:57.120
<v Speaker 1>our products are well. Hack fives products are listed in MIST,

0:34:57.200 --> 0:35:01.680
<v Speaker 1>which is the National Institute of Standards and Technologies as

0:35:01.719 --> 0:35:06.200
<v Speaker 1>a wireless penetration testing device. So a lot of companies

0:35:06.239 --> 0:35:09.719
<v Speaker 1>see it as a professional tool and they get their

0:35:09.760 --> 0:35:13.319
<v Speaker 1>employees to purchase these items to use and make sure

0:35:13.360 --> 0:35:15.799
<v Speaker 1>that their networks are protected. Because as much as you

0:35:15.840 --> 0:35:19.120
<v Speaker 1>could use a WiFi Pineapple to hack somebody, you can

0:35:19.160 --> 0:35:21.879
<v Speaker 1>also use it to protect yourself because you're still doing

0:35:21.920 --> 0:35:25.839
<v Speaker 1>the same kind of tracking on your known network. So

0:35:25.920 --> 0:35:28.640
<v Speaker 1>if I had a WiFi Pineapple on a company's network

0:35:28.719 --> 0:35:33.280
<v Speaker 1>that I'm legally have access to as since that's my profession,

0:35:33.320 --> 0:35:37.160
<v Speaker 1>for example, hypothetically, uh, then I could see what employees

0:35:37.200 --> 0:35:39.640
<v Speaker 1>are doing on that network. So if somebody is visiting

0:35:39.640 --> 0:35:41.640
<v Speaker 1>Facebook when they shouldn't be, I could see that and

0:35:41.680 --> 0:35:43.480
<v Speaker 1>I could tell them, hey, you need to, you know,

0:35:43.640 --> 0:35:45.440
<v Speaker 1>cut that off or you're going to get written up.

0:35:46.000 --> 0:35:49.000
<v Speaker 1>Or if there was an attacker trying to gain access

0:35:49.000 --> 0:35:51.359
<v Speaker 1>to a wireless network, I would be able to see

0:35:51.400 --> 0:35:54.200
<v Speaker 1>those packets because they would not be what I normally see,

0:35:54.560 --> 0:35:56.600
<v Speaker 1>and I would be able to protect my network because

0:35:56.640 --> 0:36:00.000
<v Speaker 1>I could blacklist them then, So there's so many different

0:36:00.040 --> 0:36:02.839
<v Speaker 1>ways that you can use these tools, not just nefariously

0:36:02.920 --> 0:36:07.080
<v Speaker 1>like you had mentioned, but in like these amazing ways

0:36:07.160 --> 0:36:10.200
<v Speaker 1>that help protect so much more than just companies but

0:36:10.239 --> 0:36:13.239
<v Speaker 1>also the employees that are working there as well. Yeah. Yeah,

0:36:13.239 --> 0:36:15.719
<v Speaker 1>and that. And I've always been the type to say,

0:36:15.800 --> 0:36:19.759
<v Speaker 1>if if someone's outwardly talking about what their technology can do,

0:36:20.520 --> 0:36:23.480
<v Speaker 1>then those are the people you should trust. It's the

0:36:23.520 --> 0:36:26.800
<v Speaker 1>ones who aren't talking that you have to worry about.

0:36:27.360 --> 0:36:29.640
<v Speaker 1>So yeah, it's the same thing for me when people

0:36:29.680 --> 0:36:32.640
<v Speaker 1>are talking about security vulnerabilities that they found in systems,

0:36:32.640 --> 0:36:35.200
<v Speaker 1>where they might come forward and say, yeah, I reported

0:36:35.239 --> 0:36:37.920
<v Speaker 1>this like three months ago, the company still hasn't done

0:36:37.920 --> 0:36:40.200
<v Speaker 1>anything about it. The only reason I'm coming forward is

0:36:40.239 --> 0:36:42.960
<v Speaker 1>because that puts the pressure on the company to definitely

0:36:42.960 --> 0:36:46.600
<v Speaker 1>make a change, because that vulnerability exists, whether they talk

0:36:46.640 --> 0:36:49.160
<v Speaker 1>about it or not. Now they have to do something

0:36:49.160 --> 0:36:52.440
<v Speaker 1>because the public knows about it, and and they're I'm

0:36:52.480 --> 0:36:54.239
<v Speaker 1>I'm fully on board with that too. I mean, I

0:36:54.280 --> 0:36:57.759
<v Speaker 1>think that you always give the entity the chance to

0:36:57.840 --> 0:37:02.279
<v Speaker 1>address it, but if they haven't shown any movement towards that,

0:37:02.719 --> 0:37:04.920
<v Speaker 1>I think it's the responsibility of someone who's found a

0:37:04.960 --> 0:37:09.279
<v Speaker 1>vulnerability to come forward with it, because otherwise it's just

0:37:09.440 --> 0:37:11.440
<v Speaker 1>it's just a ticking time bomb. Someone's going to take

0:37:11.440 --> 0:37:14.600
<v Speaker 1>advantage of it, and then it becomes a problem far

0:37:14.719 --> 0:37:17.319
<v Speaker 1>bigger than coming forward and saying, hey, guys, need to

0:37:17.320 --> 0:37:20.600
<v Speaker 1>fix your stuff. And it's it's not just you know,

0:37:20.680 --> 0:37:24.000
<v Speaker 1>devices like the WiFi Pineapple, but as we had mentioned,

0:37:24.040 --> 0:37:27.000
<v Speaker 1>it's also software that's involved too that can do very

0:37:27.040 --> 0:37:32.200
<v Speaker 1>similar type of tracking on networks. There's a technology called

0:37:32.200 --> 0:37:35.360
<v Speaker 1>wire Shark, which I'll bring up not just because you know,

0:37:35.480 --> 0:37:40.440
<v Speaker 1>I have no financial responsibility via hack five. So like

0:37:41.120 --> 0:37:43.879
<v Speaker 1>if if you know, somebody purchases a WiFi Pineapple when

0:37:43.880 --> 0:37:46.080
<v Speaker 1>they hear this talk, I don't get anything from that,

0:37:46.120 --> 0:37:48.840
<v Speaker 1>no compensation whatsoever. I just do a show on that channel,

0:37:48.880 --> 0:37:51.560
<v Speaker 1>So don't worry. I'm not. I don't get referrals or anything.

0:37:52.080 --> 0:37:55.080
<v Speaker 1>But there's also software like wire shark, which is a

0:37:55.120 --> 0:37:58.720
<v Speaker 1>free service online that anybody can download and that allows

0:37:58.719 --> 0:38:02.840
<v Speaker 1>you to do packets niffing. I've used it to test

0:38:02.920 --> 0:38:05.640
<v Speaker 1>my own home network and make sure that my smart

0:38:05.680 --> 0:38:11.600
<v Speaker 1>coot devices are secure and they're encrypted, and that has luckily, luckily,

0:38:11.600 --> 0:38:14.439
<v Speaker 1>all of my devices are you know, totally secure, which

0:38:14.480 --> 0:38:17.080
<v Speaker 1>is wonderful. But back in the day when I first

0:38:17.080 --> 0:38:20.560
<v Speaker 1>started using wire shark, I discovered that when I was

0:38:20.640 --> 0:38:24.319
<v Speaker 1>using Instagram on my phone, I could see links to

0:38:24.480 --> 0:38:27.799
<v Speaker 1>the pictures that I was liking as I liked them,

0:38:27.880 --> 0:38:30.600
<v Speaker 1>So as I gave them the little hearts, uh, it

0:38:30.600 --> 0:38:33.120
<v Speaker 1>would pull up a little HTTP link and I could

0:38:33.120 --> 0:38:35.359
<v Speaker 1>click on that through wire Shark, and I could see

0:38:35.400 --> 0:38:39.320
<v Speaker 1>exactly which pictures I was liking, which was so creepy.

0:38:39.360 --> 0:38:43.480
<v Speaker 1>I mean, definitely something that you should be aware of

0:38:43.680 --> 0:38:46.600
<v Speaker 1>is what kind of data is being passed through with

0:38:46.640 --> 0:38:49.160
<v Speaker 1>no encryption whatsoever, and what kind of data is being

0:38:49.239 --> 0:38:53.720
<v Speaker 1>encrypted too. Yeah, totally, and you means crazy. You mentioned

0:38:53.760 --> 0:38:56.880
<v Speaker 1>the man in the middle attack. That's that's kind of

0:38:56.920 --> 0:39:01.360
<v Speaker 1>another step up, where you have a hacker that sets

0:39:01.600 --> 0:39:06.280
<v Speaker 1>their machine in between a user and some other computer

0:39:06.440 --> 0:39:08.640
<v Speaker 1>that might be a router. So you might actually have

0:39:08.640 --> 0:39:10.439
<v Speaker 1>a man in the middle of attack where someone say

0:39:10.480 --> 0:39:13.000
<v Speaker 1>at the coffee shop, and they set up uh their

0:39:13.160 --> 0:39:16.800
<v Speaker 1>computer so that it appears to be the coffee shops network.

0:39:17.360 --> 0:39:20.360
<v Speaker 1>There's actually ways where you can force a reboot of

0:39:20.360 --> 0:39:22.920
<v Speaker 1>a system and then pose as that system so that

0:39:23.360 --> 0:39:28.399
<v Speaker 1>when it does reboot, you are effectively a middleman. In

0:39:28.400 --> 0:39:31.239
<v Speaker 1>that relationship, and meanwhile you see all the stuff that

0:39:31.280 --> 0:39:34.279
<v Speaker 1>goes across that because your computer is acting as the

0:39:34.400 --> 0:39:38.400
<v Speaker 1>network spot for where where everybody's connecting through. Uh So

0:39:38.480 --> 0:39:41.200
<v Speaker 1>that's that's one way, But there's also ways of doing

0:39:41.239 --> 0:39:44.560
<v Speaker 1>a man in the middle of attack between a like

0:39:44.760 --> 0:39:48.840
<v Speaker 1>a client and an actual service, like you know, directing

0:39:48.840 --> 0:39:52.000
<v Speaker 1>people to fake bank log in pages and things of

0:39:52.040 --> 0:39:54.360
<v Speaker 1>that nature. UM So those are things you also have

0:39:54.360 --> 0:39:57.960
<v Speaker 1>to be aware of. Although that can happen pretty much

0:39:57.960 --> 0:40:00.480
<v Speaker 1>in every scenario we're going to talk about. That requires

0:40:00.520 --> 0:40:02.960
<v Speaker 1>you to pay close attention to what you are doing

0:40:03.000 --> 0:40:06.960
<v Speaker 1>as you're browsing. Um And I mentioned earlier about the

0:40:07.000 --> 0:40:09.960
<v Speaker 1>idea that if you are using public WiFi that is

0:40:10.000 --> 0:40:13.439
<v Speaker 1>password protected, Let's say you're at a coffee shop where yeah,

0:40:13.480 --> 0:40:16.279
<v Speaker 1>you can log into their their WiFi, but you have

0:40:16.320 --> 0:40:18.600
<v Speaker 1>to first go up to the cash register and find

0:40:18.600 --> 0:40:20.319
<v Speaker 1>out what the password is, and then you find that

0:40:20.360 --> 0:40:22.680
<v Speaker 1>out and you log in. Some people feel like that

0:40:22.760 --> 0:40:26.200
<v Speaker 1>gives them that extra area of security. Honestly, that doesn't

0:40:26.400 --> 0:40:29.680
<v Speaker 1>because there's nothing stopping a hacker going into that same

0:40:29.719 --> 0:40:33.120
<v Speaker 1>coffee shop getting that same password and like that. It

0:40:33.160 --> 0:40:35.879
<v Speaker 1>doesn't add any like by itself. It doesn't add any

0:40:35.880 --> 0:40:40.120
<v Speaker 1>extra security. It just is one extra little step. Yeah,

0:40:40.160 --> 0:40:44.000
<v Speaker 1>it's true. Uh yeah, anybody even in the vicinity, if

0:40:44.000 --> 0:40:49.279
<v Speaker 1>they've ever had access to that wireless password and the

0:40:49.320 --> 0:40:51.960
<v Speaker 1>coffee shop, for example, has never changed the password, like

0:40:52.000 --> 0:40:55.520
<v Speaker 1>they could easily get access again with a long range

0:40:55.560 --> 0:40:57.799
<v Speaker 1>antenna on the other side of a parking lot and

0:40:57.840 --> 0:41:00.640
<v Speaker 1>be able to sniff what everybody in that coffee shop

0:41:00.680 --> 0:41:04.120
<v Speaker 1>is doing. So yeah, I don't even use coffee shop

0:41:04.120 --> 0:41:07.520
<v Speaker 1>WiFi or airport WiFi if we want to use that example,

0:41:08.440 --> 0:41:12.160
<v Speaker 1>those even trustworthy exactly, and I think that those are

0:41:12.360 --> 0:41:15.279
<v Speaker 1>perfect examples, especially as people are traveling a lot for

0:41:15.280 --> 0:41:19.440
<v Speaker 1>the holidays. Like that's where I think of seeing people

0:41:19.440 --> 0:41:22.080
<v Speaker 1>whipping out their computers the most is airports and coffee shops.

0:41:22.120 --> 0:41:28.600
<v Speaker 1>That's it. Um. But yeah, if you have an encrypted network,

0:41:29.160 --> 0:41:33.239
<v Speaker 1>that's better. It's again like this is another step where

0:41:33.280 --> 0:41:37.359
<v Speaker 1>we're getting into uh more secure area. And we'll talk

0:41:37.400 --> 0:41:40.439
<v Speaker 1>about different types of encryption in a second, but before

0:41:40.480 --> 0:41:44.480
<v Speaker 1>we get to that, there's actually also a difference in

0:41:44.520 --> 0:41:48.680
<v Speaker 1>the types of browsers, right. Different browsers offer different levels

0:41:48.880 --> 0:41:54.759
<v Speaker 1>of features that either uh enable security and privacy or

0:41:55.080 --> 0:41:58.520
<v Speaker 1>they make it really difficult to protect, so on the

0:41:58.600 --> 0:42:02.640
<v Speaker 1>bad end of the scale as an Internet explorer for

0:42:02.719 --> 0:42:07.640
<v Speaker 1>multiple reasons. It was never the best browser when it

0:42:07.680 --> 0:42:11.120
<v Speaker 1>comes to security and privacy, but it's really not great

0:42:11.160 --> 0:42:14.920
<v Speaker 1>now because Microsoft no longer actively supports it. UM. They

0:42:14.960 --> 0:42:18.719
<v Speaker 1>will push out a security update on occasion, but it's

0:42:19.160 --> 0:42:22.399
<v Speaker 1>not frequent, which means that there are a lot more

0:42:22.440 --> 0:42:27.759
<v Speaker 1>opportunities for people to discover and exploit vulnerabilities and and

0:42:27.920 --> 0:42:31.880
<v Speaker 1>be fairly sure that those vulnerabilities will stick around for

0:42:31.920 --> 0:42:35.520
<v Speaker 1>a while. So it's not even like a rush because

0:42:35.840 --> 0:42:40.400
<v Speaker 1>Microsoft isn't updating it that frequently with security patches, So

0:42:40.719 --> 0:42:45.279
<v Speaker 1>that's a bad one. Don't use it. Microsoft Microsoft Edge

0:42:45.920 --> 0:42:50.879
<v Speaker 1>only slightly better than the completely unsupported Internet Explorer UM,

0:42:50.920 --> 0:42:54.840
<v Speaker 1>at least as far as privacy is concerned. Uh. I

0:42:54.960 --> 0:42:57.640
<v Speaker 1>use Google Chrome a lot, but admittedly Google Chrome not

0:42:57.760 --> 0:43:00.160
<v Speaker 1>great either. It's kind of on the bottom half off

0:43:00.160 --> 0:43:03.879
<v Speaker 1>of the middle of the pack. So uh, they're better

0:43:03.880 --> 0:43:06.799
<v Speaker 1>about security, but they are the pets when it comes

0:43:06.800 --> 0:43:10.040
<v Speaker 1>to privacy. Also not a big surprise, because I mean,

0:43:11.120 --> 0:43:15.040
<v Speaker 1>what's Google's business, right? Google owns you? Yeah, your data

0:43:15.360 --> 0:43:18.839
<v Speaker 1>is Google's That's what Google buys and sells. Like it's

0:43:18.880 --> 0:43:24.080
<v Speaker 1>your information. That's that's Google's currency. So clearly it does

0:43:24.080 --> 0:43:29.279
<v Speaker 1>not behoove Google too lockdown privacy super tight. They want

0:43:29.320 --> 0:43:31.879
<v Speaker 1>to know all the information about you they make that's

0:43:31.880 --> 0:43:35.239
<v Speaker 1>how they make their money. UM. So, of all the

0:43:35.280 --> 0:43:38.359
<v Speaker 1>common browsers, like the ones that are frequently used out there,

0:43:38.840 --> 0:43:41.760
<v Speaker 1>the one that UH that tends to rank the highest

0:43:41.840 --> 0:43:47.120
<v Speaker 1>is Firefox, higher than Opera, higher than Chrome, higher than Safari. UM.

0:43:47.360 --> 0:43:51.160
<v Speaker 1>So it does really well, especially for security and privacy.

0:43:51.800 --> 0:43:55.080
<v Speaker 1>It can support a lot of features that protect you

0:43:55.160 --> 0:43:57.960
<v Speaker 1>when you're when you're surfing stuff that will end up

0:43:58.000 --> 0:44:01.200
<v Speaker 1>cutting down on things like targeted advertise because you can

0:44:01.440 --> 0:44:05.640
<v Speaker 1>really limit the information that's being shared by the sites

0:44:05.680 --> 0:44:09.759
<v Speaker 1>that you're visiting. UM And you can also enhance it

0:44:09.840 --> 0:44:13.440
<v Speaker 1>with various add ons that you can find, although obviously

0:44:13.480 --> 0:44:18.520
<v Speaker 1>anytime you're going to be adding anything to an existing program,

0:44:18.520 --> 0:44:21.200
<v Speaker 1>it pays to do your research to make sure that

0:44:21.239 --> 0:44:29.399
<v Speaker 1>it is offered by a reputable and dependable app developer. Yeah,

0:44:29.440 --> 0:44:33.520
<v Speaker 1>Firefox is an excellent choice UH and two fold. If

0:44:33.560 --> 0:44:36.600
<v Speaker 1>you download something like Firefox, you also get a very

0:44:36.640 --> 0:44:39.399
<v Speaker 1>fast browser because they have worked very hard to make

0:44:39.440 --> 0:44:42.239
<v Speaker 1>that browser quick. So even if you don't care about

0:44:42.239 --> 0:44:44.920
<v Speaker 1>the security and you just want to access your sites

0:44:44.960 --> 0:44:49.920
<v Speaker 1>really fast, you should use Firefox. Yeah, yeah, I got Firefox.

0:44:49.960 --> 0:44:52.360
<v Speaker 1>I got stuck on Chrome because for a while Chrome

0:44:52.480 --> 0:44:55.399
<v Speaker 1>was super fast and then it got super bloated. And

0:44:55.600 --> 0:44:58.440
<v Speaker 1>also there's the more tabs you have opening Chrome. Anyone

0:44:58.440 --> 0:45:00.719
<v Speaker 1>who's done this with Chrome knows. Even though it are

0:45:00.760 --> 0:45:04.440
<v Speaker 1>all supposed to be distinct instances that don't bleed over

0:45:04.440 --> 0:45:07.160
<v Speaker 1>into each other, Uh, there gets to be some memory

0:45:07.200 --> 0:45:10.680
<v Speaker 1>issues if you happen to be really a heavy user,

0:45:10.719 --> 0:45:13.120
<v Speaker 1>and everyone here at this company is a heavy user.

0:45:13.200 --> 0:45:16.680
<v Speaker 1>So uh, Firefox is definitely going to be my browser

0:45:16.760 --> 0:45:20.400
<v Speaker 1>of choice moving forward after I did this research. I also,

0:45:20.560 --> 0:45:22.960
<v Speaker 1>I should point out, before I did this research, I

0:45:23.000 --> 0:45:26.480
<v Speaker 1>did not know this. I was just a happy, blithe,

0:45:26.640 --> 0:45:31.560
<v Speaker 1>naive Chrome user handing handing over reams of personal data

0:45:31.640 --> 0:45:34.840
<v Speaker 1>to Google, which I mean, granted, I'm sure that company's

0:45:34.840 --> 0:45:37.400
<v Speaker 1>board with me by now, but still there's some value

0:45:37.400 --> 0:45:41.719
<v Speaker 1>there um. And then that brings us to encryption. And

0:45:41.800 --> 0:45:45.680
<v Speaker 1>this encryption it gets this is sort of like complicated,

0:45:45.680 --> 0:45:48.319
<v Speaker 1>like the handshake thing, but encryption, when you boil it down,

0:45:48.840 --> 0:45:51.959
<v Speaker 1>is all about scrambling messages so that the only people

0:45:52.000 --> 0:45:54.400
<v Speaker 1>who can access it are the ones who have the

0:45:54.480 --> 0:45:56.799
<v Speaker 1>key to decode it, right, So you have the key

0:45:56.800 --> 0:45:59.600
<v Speaker 1>to encode and the key to decode. There are various

0:46:00.239 --> 0:46:04.720
<v Speaker 1>implementations of that technology, different ways to have the public

0:46:04.800 --> 0:46:07.880
<v Speaker 1>key and private key operations. I don't need to get

0:46:07.920 --> 0:46:11.360
<v Speaker 1>into all of that because it gets way too technical. Obviously,

0:46:11.920 --> 0:46:16.080
<v Speaker 1>encrypted is better than unencrypted, but not all encryption schemes

0:46:16.080 --> 0:46:19.919
<v Speaker 1>are created equal, and it pays which ones are in use.

0:46:21.239 --> 0:46:24.320
<v Speaker 1>So yes, that's very true. There's there's even like there's

0:46:24.719 --> 0:46:29.719
<v Speaker 1>symmetrical keys and asymmetrical keys, and then there's like SHAW

0:46:29.840 --> 0:46:32.680
<v Speaker 1>one and be crypt and r s A. There's all

0:46:32.719 --> 0:46:36.520
<v Speaker 1>these different terminologies for encryption. But for what it's worth,

0:46:37.280 --> 0:46:41.279
<v Speaker 1>all of them jumble up your information into some kind

0:46:41.320 --> 0:46:44.719
<v Speaker 1>of format that will hopefully hopefully encrypted, so that anybody

0:46:44.760 --> 0:46:48.239
<v Speaker 1>who does gain access to the encrypted version of your

0:46:48.280 --> 0:46:51.920
<v Speaker 1>information will not be able to reverse engineer it or

0:46:52.680 --> 0:46:56.279
<v Speaker 1>change it back to its original plain text formats, so

0:46:56.320 --> 0:46:59.000
<v Speaker 1>they can't read it in like English speak, right, it

0:46:59.040 --> 0:47:02.560
<v Speaker 1>would just be mean less garbage to them, hopefully in

0:47:02.640 --> 0:47:06.520
<v Speaker 1>its ideal, ideal implementation. So one of the things that

0:47:06.560 --> 0:47:08.480
<v Speaker 1>you may have encountered if you've ever set up any

0:47:08.480 --> 0:47:10.600
<v Speaker 1>sort of wireless network. I think most people have, or

0:47:10.600 --> 0:47:13.080
<v Speaker 1>at least they've they've had to connect to one where

0:47:13.120 --> 0:47:19.440
<v Speaker 1>they've seen the different types of UH network security protocols.

0:47:20.040 --> 0:47:24.440
<v Speaker 1>These are certifications that the WiFi Security Alliance creates, and

0:47:24.719 --> 0:47:29.000
<v Speaker 1>the earliest one was the Wired Equivalent Privacy Protocol or

0:47:29.160 --> 0:47:34.080
<v Speaker 1>w e p H. That one is decrepit, it's old,

0:47:34.160 --> 0:47:37.399
<v Speaker 1>it's vulnerable as heck, so don't use it. Yeah, if

0:47:37.440 --> 0:47:39.640
<v Speaker 1>you have the if if your router tells you, like

0:47:39.680 --> 0:47:41.880
<v Speaker 1>asks you which one you want to use, don't use

0:47:42.000 --> 0:47:46.160
<v Speaker 1>w ep UM. It is not secure. It is it's

0:47:46.200 --> 0:47:48.239
<v Speaker 1>I mean, you could argue it's better than nothing, but

0:47:48.400 --> 0:47:51.560
<v Speaker 1>not by much because the vulnerabilities have been known for

0:47:51.600 --> 0:47:54.879
<v Speaker 1>a long time. In fact, so long that even before

0:47:54.880 --> 0:47:57.759
<v Speaker 1>the nineties were up, you had people developing the next generation,

0:47:58.560 --> 0:48:01.840
<v Speaker 1>which would have been the WiFi Protected Access or w

0:48:02.000 --> 0:48:04.520
<v Speaker 1>p A. So w p A came out. Then you

0:48:04.520 --> 0:48:07.080
<v Speaker 1>get w p A two, which was trying to address

0:48:07.239 --> 0:48:12.239
<v Speaker 1>some of the shortcomings of w p A UH. Both

0:48:12.280 --> 0:48:15.720
<v Speaker 1>of those also still have vulnerabilities. W p A two

0:48:15.880 --> 0:48:19.640
<v Speaker 1>is generally talked about as being one of the more

0:48:19.680 --> 0:48:23.920
<v Speaker 1>secure UH certifications these days. There is a w p

0:48:24.040 --> 0:48:28.080
<v Speaker 1>A three also has vulnerabilities that have pointed out within

0:48:28.080 --> 0:48:31.719
<v Speaker 1>the year of coming out. Yeah so, but w P I,

0:48:31.400 --> 0:48:33.800
<v Speaker 1>I don't think I've even seen a lot of stuff

0:48:33.840 --> 0:48:37.359
<v Speaker 1>that's certified w P A three yet. Like we've we've

0:48:37.360 --> 0:48:40.040
<v Speaker 1>started to see some wireless routers come out with w

0:48:40.120 --> 0:48:44.040
<v Speaker 1>P A three, but they there's still a little expensive

0:48:44.200 --> 0:48:49.520
<v Speaker 1>and they haven't really gotten widespread adoption by consumers quite yet.

0:48:49.760 --> 0:48:53.279
<v Speaker 1>So w P A two is fine for most consumers

0:48:53.280 --> 0:48:55.759
<v Speaker 1>to use. Uh, you just have to make sure that

0:48:55.840 --> 0:48:58.480
<v Speaker 1>you set it up correctly and you don't give the

0:48:58.640 --> 0:49:02.400
<v Speaker 1>entire world access to your password for your account. Yeah that,

0:49:02.760 --> 0:49:05.959
<v Speaker 1>because then there's what what were you even thinking? There's

0:49:06.000 --> 0:49:09.880
<v Speaker 1>no point then? Yeah. So, so w P A three

0:49:10.040 --> 0:49:13.520
<v Speaker 1>on w P A two. All these are our designations.

0:49:13.560 --> 0:49:16.960
<v Speaker 1>And what happens is a manufacturer will make a piece

0:49:16.960 --> 0:49:21.480
<v Speaker 1>of equipment or uh either it's a computer or handset

0:49:21.600 --> 0:49:24.160
<v Speaker 1>or maybe it's a router, and then they submit it

0:49:24.320 --> 0:49:28.440
<v Speaker 1>to this WiFi Security alliance that then makes sure that

0:49:28.440 --> 0:49:32.200
<v Speaker 1>that technology meets whatever the requirements are for the particular designation.

0:49:32.560 --> 0:49:34.680
<v Speaker 1>Then they put the stamp on it and they say, yes,

0:49:34.719 --> 0:49:37.320
<v Speaker 1>this is w P A two compliant or w P

0:49:37.440 --> 0:49:41.600
<v Speaker 1>A three compliant. So that just tells you that compliance

0:49:41.640 --> 0:49:45.680
<v Speaker 1>really there. It gets more granular than that. For example,

0:49:46.640 --> 0:49:50.080
<v Speaker 1>w P A two has two different types of encryption

0:49:50.080 --> 0:49:53.160
<v Speaker 1>standards that can be used. There's the bad one. It's

0:49:53.200 --> 0:49:56.160
<v Speaker 1>Temporal key Integrity Protocol or t k I P, and

0:49:56.160 --> 0:49:59.399
<v Speaker 1>I call it bad because yeah, t KIP. T KIP

0:49:59.480 --> 0:50:02.239
<v Speaker 1>is no longer safe, skip the tea KIP. If you

0:50:02.719 --> 0:50:04.799
<v Speaker 1>skip the tea KIP, I like that. Yeah, it's nice

0:50:04.840 --> 0:50:08.759
<v Speaker 1>mnemonic device. And then there's Advanced Encryption Standard or a

0:50:08.840 --> 0:50:10.680
<v Speaker 1>e S, and that's the more secure of the two.

0:50:11.480 --> 0:50:15.239
<v Speaker 1>So don't rely on tea KIP, rely on a S uh.

0:50:15.320 --> 0:50:19.160
<v Speaker 1>So that will end up protecting you quite a bit

0:50:19.400 --> 0:50:23.160
<v Speaker 1>as well. The encryption will end up helping a great

0:50:23.239 --> 0:50:27.440
<v Speaker 1>deal because you've just made it more difficult for someone

0:50:27.480 --> 0:50:32.960
<v Speaker 1>to get anything meaningful from your browsing activity. It does

0:50:33.040 --> 0:50:36.760
<v Speaker 1>not mean that you are immune. But again, the harder

0:50:36.840 --> 0:50:39.839
<v Speaker 1>you make it for somebody, the less chance they're gonna

0:50:39.880 --> 0:50:43.000
<v Speaker 1>put forth the effort to break through whatever protections you

0:50:43.040 --> 0:50:47.320
<v Speaker 1>put up. So just general note um, and then that

0:50:47.440 --> 0:50:51.680
<v Speaker 1>also brings us to secure browsing. So back in the day,

0:50:52.200 --> 0:50:53.640
<v Speaker 1>which was the Thursday, I don't know if you know

0:50:53.719 --> 0:50:57.920
<v Speaker 1>that UH, there was the the Secure Sockets Layer SSL,

0:50:58.920 --> 0:51:00.960
<v Speaker 1>whenever you went to a website that had the little

0:51:00.960 --> 0:51:04.839
<v Speaker 1>padlock and the lock on it and the HTTPS like

0:51:04.960 --> 0:51:07.239
<v Speaker 1>the original version of that was SSL. In fact, a

0:51:07.239 --> 0:51:09.360
<v Speaker 1>lot of people still refer to SSL, even though that

0:51:09.440 --> 0:51:13.360
<v Speaker 1>technically has been and has before a while been replaced

0:51:13.760 --> 0:51:17.439
<v Speaker 1>by the Transport Layer Security or TLS. But the same

0:51:17.480 --> 0:51:20.120
<v Speaker 1>sort of purpose it's too. It's meant to create the

0:51:20.239 --> 0:51:24.520
<v Speaker 1>secure channel of communication between you and a specific UH

0:51:24.680 --> 0:51:29.239
<v Speaker 1>website U r L address. So if you see HTTPS

0:51:29.520 --> 0:51:32.440
<v Speaker 1>or you see that little locked padlock in the address

0:51:32.440 --> 0:51:35.319
<v Speaker 1>bar of your browser, then you know you are in

0:51:35.520 --> 0:51:40.480
<v Speaker 1>a secure channel between you know, your your device and

0:51:40.520 --> 0:51:45.680
<v Speaker 1>that browser, at least as far as information going between

0:51:45.680 --> 0:51:47.640
<v Speaker 1>those two points are. I mean, obviously, if you're on

0:51:47.680 --> 0:51:51.640
<v Speaker 1>a public WiFi hotspot that's unsecured, you've got other issues.

0:51:52.160 --> 0:51:55.040
<v Speaker 1>But it means that when you're browsing, you want to

0:51:55.080 --> 0:51:58.040
<v Speaker 1>make sure that that HTTPS is showing up. You don't

0:51:58.160 --> 0:52:00.239
<v Speaker 1>you don't want the h T t P, you you

0:52:00.239 --> 0:52:03.120
<v Speaker 1>want to make sure that S is there. So one

0:52:03.200 --> 0:52:07.880
<v Speaker 1>thing I've noticed very rarely, but it has happened on occasion,

0:52:08.040 --> 0:52:11.680
<v Speaker 1>is where a website that requires you to log in

0:52:11.719 --> 0:52:15.600
<v Speaker 1>somewhere like their main page there dot com address will

0:52:15.719 --> 0:52:19.680
<v Speaker 1>be encrypted with HTTPS, but as soon as you go

0:52:19.800 --> 0:52:22.080
<v Speaker 1>over to the log in page or go through any

0:52:22.160 --> 0:52:25.480
<v Speaker 1>tree of different sites that they have created on their

0:52:25.560 --> 0:52:28.600
<v Speaker 1>dot com domain, all the rest of their pages are

0:52:28.960 --> 0:52:31.239
<v Speaker 1>h T T P. They are unencrypted. So if you

0:52:31.280 --> 0:52:33.560
<v Speaker 1>go to the log in page and my cat agrees

0:52:33.719 --> 0:52:36.239
<v Speaker 1>she's mewing behind me, uh, and you put in your

0:52:36.320 --> 0:52:40.560
<v Speaker 1>user name and password, those would be copied through plain text,

0:52:40.840 --> 0:52:45.160
<v Speaker 1>and if anybody was, you know, tracking or sniffing your packets,

0:52:45.239 --> 0:52:48.120
<v Speaker 1>they would be able to see that plane text user

0:52:48.200 --> 0:52:51.520
<v Speaker 1>name and passwords. So, for example, if my password was

0:52:51.880 --> 0:52:55.360
<v Speaker 1>my cat's name is Starbuck, and that was a plain text,

0:52:55.480 --> 0:53:00.680
<v Speaker 1>unencrypted website just using HTTP, then if somebody was sniffing

0:53:00.680 --> 0:53:03.600
<v Speaker 1>those packets, they could see that passwords show up in

0:53:03.640 --> 0:53:07.160
<v Speaker 1>their software through whatever hardware device they might be using,

0:53:07.640 --> 0:53:10.239
<v Speaker 1>and just be able to see, oh, she entered Starbuck,

0:53:10.400 --> 0:53:12.160
<v Speaker 1>and then they couldn't go to the website type that

0:53:12.239 --> 0:53:16.520
<v Speaker 1>in and gain access to my login account information. Yeah,

0:53:16.600 --> 0:53:20.520
<v Speaker 1>and that is what we call no bueno, right like yeah, yeah,

0:53:20.520 --> 0:53:24.520
<v Speaker 1>And more and more sites are getting better about making

0:53:24.600 --> 0:53:28.280
<v Speaker 1>certain that their entire presence they are is being secure,

0:53:28.320 --> 0:53:31.440
<v Speaker 1>but you can. It's actually harder and harder to find

0:53:31.520 --> 0:53:35.279
<v Speaker 1>examples websites doing that, so which I'm happy to see

0:53:35.360 --> 0:53:37.600
<v Speaker 1>because that makes my job harder and that means people

0:53:37.640 --> 0:53:40.640
<v Speaker 1>are listening. Uh So, I am happy to see that

0:53:40.800 --> 0:53:43.160
<v Speaker 1>less sites are doing that, but we still have issues.

0:53:43.480 --> 0:53:45.799
<v Speaker 1>There's still some out there. And then occasionally you have

0:53:46.120 --> 0:53:49.719
<v Speaker 1>browsers that will alert you if you try to navigate

0:53:49.800 --> 0:53:52.120
<v Speaker 1>to a site that is not secure. It'll give you

0:53:52.160 --> 0:53:55.480
<v Speaker 1>a little alert, which is good too, because you know

0:53:55.520 --> 0:53:59.640
<v Speaker 1>if the people on the website aren't being diligent and

0:53:59.719 --> 0:54:02.680
<v Speaker 1>at gives the user on the other end the heads

0:54:02.719 --> 0:54:04.840
<v Speaker 1>up of hey, you probably thought this was secure, but

0:54:05.000 --> 0:54:07.040
<v Speaker 1>turns out it's not. Maybe you want to rethink that.

0:54:07.239 --> 0:54:09.359
<v Speaker 1>Are you sure you want to go ahead? You will

0:54:09.360 --> 0:54:11.920
<v Speaker 1>probably be eaten by a group, and then you decide

0:54:11.920 --> 0:54:15.040
<v Speaker 1>what you can do it. Um Now, when we come back,

0:54:15.440 --> 0:54:18.839
<v Speaker 1>we're gonna talk about one other topic before we get

0:54:18.880 --> 0:54:21.919
<v Speaker 1>into like the super secret stuff, and that is what

0:54:21.960 --> 0:54:26.200
<v Speaker 1>the heck is incognito mode for. But before we do that,

0:54:26.320 --> 0:54:30.200
<v Speaker 1>let's take another quick break. We've got some more discussion

0:54:30.200 --> 0:54:33.200
<v Speaker 1>about public WiFi and the steps you should take to

0:54:33.239 --> 0:54:35.600
<v Speaker 1>protect yourself But before we get to that, let's take

0:54:35.680 --> 0:54:50.480
<v Speaker 1>another break. So Shannon, I have I've gone to a

0:54:51.280 --> 0:54:56.279
<v Speaker 1>private network, right, I'm it's not maybe mine, but it's

0:54:56.280 --> 0:54:59.120
<v Speaker 1>a private once, not open to the public, it's encrypted,

0:54:59.360 --> 0:55:03.560
<v Speaker 1>it's password access. I've done all those wonderful things. And

0:55:03.560 --> 0:55:05.319
<v Speaker 1>then I think, you know what, I'm gonna look at

0:55:05.360 --> 0:55:08.720
<v Speaker 1>some so like your friend's house or something. Yeah, yeah, yeah,

0:55:09.239 --> 0:55:10.960
<v Speaker 1>And uh, I decided, you know what I want to do.

0:55:11.000 --> 0:55:14.359
<v Speaker 1>I wanna I'm gonna look at some I'm gonna look

0:55:14.400 --> 0:55:16.880
<v Speaker 1>at some some stuff that I don't think my friends

0:55:16.920 --> 0:55:20.120
<v Speaker 1>would really understand. Maybe maybe I'm gonna look into that

0:55:20.120 --> 0:55:23.439
<v Speaker 1>that my little pony fan fiction. Uh, and I don't

0:55:23.520 --> 0:55:25.279
<v Speaker 1>want my friends to know about it. So I'm like, well,

0:55:25.320 --> 0:55:28.040
<v Speaker 1>I'm gonna be super sneaky. I'm gonna go into incognito mode.

0:55:28.040 --> 0:55:30.359
<v Speaker 1>Now no one's ever done to know. So I click

0:55:30.400 --> 0:55:33.840
<v Speaker 1>on that little incognito mode and little bitty shadow Man

0:55:33.880 --> 0:55:36.280
<v Speaker 1>pops up, and I'm like, oh yeah, I'm totally safe

0:55:36.320 --> 0:55:39.400
<v Speaker 1>and totally secret. Nobody knows it's me. And I start

0:55:39.520 --> 0:55:45.680
<v Speaker 1>looking at my brony fan fiction. Oh you know the term. Hey, look,

0:55:47.080 --> 0:55:50.760
<v Speaker 1>I wouldn't listen listen, you just give yourself away. Listen,

0:55:50.800 --> 0:55:54.640
<v Speaker 1>Princess Celestia and I have an understanding. Okay, so we

0:55:54.680 --> 0:55:57.080
<v Speaker 1>are not gonna go down that road. We're not gonna

0:55:57.080 --> 0:55:59.879
<v Speaker 1>go there. Like yeah, Fluttershy and I we're like, we're tight,

0:56:00.040 --> 0:56:03.880
<v Speaker 1>so we're not. It's fine, Okay, it's acceptable behavior. But no,

0:56:04.040 --> 0:56:06.560
<v Speaker 1>it is acceptable, but I don't want my friend to

0:56:06.560 --> 0:56:10.680
<v Speaker 1>know that. Now here's the sad thing folks told everybody

0:56:10.680 --> 0:56:14.560
<v Speaker 1>on the podcast. One one, whoops, I guess I should

0:56:14.560 --> 0:56:18.520
<v Speaker 1>be more secure with my data. And secondly, secondly, incognito mode,

0:56:18.560 --> 0:56:22.120
<v Speaker 1>that's not how that works. It doesn't protect you from

0:56:22.160 --> 0:56:25.480
<v Speaker 1>anyone who has any access to the network from seeing

0:56:25.480 --> 0:56:28.400
<v Speaker 1>what you're doing, right right, that's correct. Um. Yeah, so

0:56:28.480 --> 0:56:31.400
<v Speaker 1>incognito mode. Uh, you you've probably seen it on your

0:56:31.400 --> 0:56:34.200
<v Speaker 1>own computer. If you go up into the menu for

0:56:34.239 --> 0:56:37.239
<v Speaker 1>your regular browser and go into like the dropdown menu,

0:56:37.320 --> 0:56:41.160
<v Speaker 1>there's usually an option to choose incognito mode or like

0:56:41.239 --> 0:56:44.600
<v Speaker 1>secret mode or something like private browsing or whatever. Yeah,

0:56:44.600 --> 0:56:47.880
<v Speaker 1>private browsing, Yeah, that's another one. Uh So if you

0:56:47.920 --> 0:56:50.640
<v Speaker 1>click that, it opens up a completely different window on

0:56:50.719 --> 0:56:53.239
<v Speaker 1>your computer or on your phone as well. You can

0:56:53.320 --> 0:56:56.560
<v Speaker 1>do it on your phone. Uh, and you start to browse.

0:56:56.640 --> 0:57:00.000
<v Speaker 1>But basically the only thing that incognito mode is really

0:57:00.120 --> 0:57:05.000
<v Speaker 1>doing is uh not putting anything into your local history

0:57:05.320 --> 0:57:08.719
<v Speaker 1>for your your web browsing history, so if somebody else

0:57:08.760 --> 0:57:10.799
<v Speaker 1>got it on your computer, they would not know what

0:57:10.880 --> 0:57:14.160
<v Speaker 1>you were doing in incognito mode. Uh. And it also

0:57:14.280 --> 0:57:19.000
<v Speaker 1>doesn't store the cookies on your computer, so any information

0:57:19.040 --> 0:57:21.720
<v Speaker 1>that you were sharing with a website during your incognito

0:57:21.760 --> 0:57:25.560
<v Speaker 1>mode would not be stored afterwards. So all those cookies

0:57:25.640 --> 0:57:27.920
<v Speaker 1>that might have happened during a session, they'll just be

0:57:28.000 --> 0:57:31.840
<v Speaker 1>erased like you never existed. Uh. That that can actually

0:57:31.840 --> 0:57:35.200
<v Speaker 1>be very useful. For example, if you're looking for a

0:57:35.240 --> 0:57:38.160
<v Speaker 1>fun hack, if you want to save some money on

0:57:38.280 --> 0:57:41.360
<v Speaker 1>airplane flights, you can track them. You can look up

0:57:41.360 --> 0:57:45.800
<v Speaker 1>airplane flight prices in incognito mode and compare them to

0:57:45.880 --> 0:57:50.120
<v Speaker 1>your regular browser. And sometimes on occasion you can find

0:57:50.200 --> 0:57:54.360
<v Speaker 1>cheaper prices in incognito mode. Because it doesn't see how

0:57:54.440 --> 0:57:56.680
<v Speaker 1>much you are searching, it doesn't see how how many

0:57:56.680 --> 0:57:59.600
<v Speaker 1>websites you've gone to. Those cookies just aren't it there,

0:58:00.200 --> 0:58:02.280
<v Speaker 1>so the website is going to give you the best

0:58:02.320 --> 0:58:06.960
<v Speaker 1>price through that that private browsing mode. Uh. That's pretty

0:58:07.000 --> 0:58:09.600
<v Speaker 1>much like the most interesting thing that I use for

0:58:09.840 --> 0:58:14.040
<v Speaker 1>incognito mode four, but it can be used to secretly

0:58:14.160 --> 0:58:18.560
<v Speaker 1>access websites without anybody else knowing that you're accessing those

0:58:18.560 --> 0:58:22.400
<v Speaker 1>websites at the time. For example, if you are a Brownie. Yeah,

0:58:22.560 --> 0:58:25.360
<v Speaker 1>so this works on the device level, but not the

0:58:25.400 --> 0:58:28.880
<v Speaker 1>network level. So yeah, so if my friend gets hold

0:58:28.920 --> 0:58:31.560
<v Speaker 1>of my phone or my computer, there would be no

0:58:31.640 --> 0:58:34.840
<v Speaker 1>record of me having gone on the Browny fan fiction

0:58:35.080 --> 0:58:40.040
<v Speaker 1>community site. Uh where I post by q D mark.

0:58:41.440 --> 0:58:43.200
<v Speaker 1>They would not be able to see that. But if

0:58:43.200 --> 0:58:46.520
<v Speaker 1>they were to look at the network traffic, they'd say, huh,

0:58:46.920 --> 0:58:49.880
<v Speaker 1>this I P address is going to this Brownie site

0:58:49.920 --> 0:58:53.920
<v Speaker 1>a lot, and it's not my computer, so it's obviously

0:58:54.120 --> 0:58:57.280
<v Speaker 1>your device and so and so this is why, like,

0:58:57.320 --> 0:58:59.240
<v Speaker 1>if you were to use let's say that you're at work,

0:58:59.440 --> 0:59:01.400
<v Speaker 1>let's hit your what the The example I like to

0:59:01.400 --> 0:59:03.480
<v Speaker 1>give is your Let's say you are stuck in a

0:59:03.560 --> 0:59:07.840
<v Speaker 1>crappy job. You're doing your job, but you're miserable and

0:59:07.840 --> 0:59:10.520
<v Speaker 1>you would really love to be able to get something else,

0:59:10.600 --> 0:59:13.080
<v Speaker 1>but you don't have any time outside of your job

0:59:13.240 --> 0:59:16.720
<v Speaker 1>where you can really dedicate towards things like searching for

0:59:16.800 --> 0:59:19.600
<v Speaker 1>job openings. So on your lunch break, you slip into

0:59:19.600 --> 0:59:23.520
<v Speaker 1>incognito mode and you go on a job search website. Well,

0:59:24.000 --> 0:59:26.840
<v Speaker 1>just because you're an incognito mode doesn't mean that at

0:59:26.880 --> 0:59:29.360
<v Speaker 1>the network level they can't see exactly what's going on,

0:59:29.840 --> 0:59:32.400
<v Speaker 1>So it doesn't actually protect what you're doing or how

0:59:32.440 --> 0:59:35.960
<v Speaker 1>you're doing it. So one thing you might want to

0:59:36.040 --> 0:59:39.120
<v Speaker 1>use incognito mode for if you're someone like me who

0:59:39.120 --> 0:59:41.680
<v Speaker 1>does a lot of research. Let's say I'm researching into

0:59:41.720 --> 0:59:44.920
<v Speaker 1>something that you know, it's it's just not my bag.

0:59:44.960 --> 0:59:46.880
<v Speaker 1>You know, it's I need to do an episode about it,

0:59:46.920 --> 0:59:49.520
<v Speaker 1>but it's not something I'm particularly interested in on a

0:59:49.560 --> 0:59:53.080
<v Speaker 1>personal level, or might even be something that I would

0:59:53.120 --> 0:59:56.920
<v Speaker 1>find very awkward. Let's say that I was doing an

0:59:56.960 --> 1:00:01.320
<v Speaker 1>episode about, uh, dating websites, and so I have to

1:00:01.320 --> 1:00:03.480
<v Speaker 1>do a whole bunch of research on dating websites. Well,

1:00:03.480 --> 1:00:05.400
<v Speaker 1>then I might want to use incognito mode so it

1:00:05.440 --> 1:00:09.000
<v Speaker 1>doesn't build up this cookie history that relates back to

1:00:09.040 --> 1:00:12.200
<v Speaker 1>me personally, so that maybe I log onto something like

1:00:12.240 --> 1:00:14.760
<v Speaker 1>Facebook and then suddenly all the ads are for dating sites.

1:00:14.880 --> 1:00:17.960
<v Speaker 1>That would be awkward, Right, that would be super awkward,

1:00:18.080 --> 1:00:21.200
<v Speaker 1>especially if you were married. Yes, I'm not a good thing. Yeah,

1:00:21.240 --> 1:00:23.520
<v Speaker 1>I had a similar occasion with I was looking up

1:00:23.680 --> 1:00:28.600
<v Speaker 1>pregnancy and birth information for somebody in my family. I'm

1:00:28.600 --> 1:00:31.960
<v Speaker 1>nowhere near any time soon giving you know, birth to

1:00:32.040 --> 1:00:34.840
<v Speaker 1>any children in my life except for my beautiful for

1:00:35.000 --> 1:00:37.280
<v Speaker 1>babies that I have in my house with me. Uh

1:00:37.320 --> 1:00:39.360
<v Speaker 1>So I was looking up this information and I was

1:00:39.440 --> 1:00:43.600
<v Speaker 1>just like, do I want Twitter on Instagram to start

1:00:43.640 --> 1:00:47.040
<v Speaker 1>promoting like baby items to me or do I want

1:00:47.040 --> 1:00:50.160
<v Speaker 1>them to keep on promoting like makeup in sailor moon items,

1:00:50.160 --> 1:00:53.960
<v Speaker 1>which I'm actually into. So I looked up the information

1:00:53.960 --> 1:00:58.080
<v Speaker 1>about pregnancy and birth for the other person through incognito

1:00:58.160 --> 1:01:01.440
<v Speaker 1>mode so that that informa and wouldn't actually be tracked

1:01:01.440 --> 1:01:06.840
<v Speaker 1>and identified as a part of my online personality. So

1:01:06.880 --> 1:01:09.280
<v Speaker 1>that way I was able to keep the same ads

1:01:09.360 --> 1:01:13.800
<v Speaker 1>that I actually, you know, sometimes kind of enjoy looking

1:01:13.800 --> 1:01:17.560
<v Speaker 1>at because they do pertain to my lifestyle, but nothing

1:01:17.600 --> 1:01:19.959
<v Speaker 1>that had to do with pregnancies. Right. And and that's

1:01:19.960 --> 1:01:22.720
<v Speaker 1>a great example too, because there was that famous example

1:01:22.720 --> 1:01:26.440
<v Speaker 1>a few years ago of a retailer I want to

1:01:26.440 --> 1:01:28.720
<v Speaker 1>say it was target, but I could be wrong, but

1:01:28.800 --> 1:01:31.640
<v Speaker 1>it was a retailer target, Yeah, And they had identified

1:01:31.760 --> 1:01:36.680
<v Speaker 1>through the browsing history of a user that she was

1:01:36.720 --> 1:01:38.760
<v Speaker 1>pregnant because of the things she was searching for, so

1:01:38.800 --> 1:01:43.400
<v Speaker 1>they proactively sent her through the snail mail a package

1:01:43.440 --> 1:01:47.400
<v Speaker 1>of coupons for pregnancy related items, and her father was

1:01:47.440 --> 1:01:52.280
<v Speaker 1>the one who intercepted the letter the coupons, and she

1:01:52.360 --> 1:01:55.840
<v Speaker 1>had not told him that she was pregnant, and he

1:01:55.960 --> 1:01:59.600
<v Speaker 1>had assumed that target had made this assumption and got

1:01:59.640 --> 1:02:03.480
<v Speaker 1>super mad, and then turned out that he was mad

1:02:03.480 --> 1:02:06.080
<v Speaker 1>about something that actually had happened. She just had not

1:02:06.640 --> 1:02:08.880
<v Speaker 1>She had not had the occasion, she had not found

1:02:08.920 --> 1:02:13.160
<v Speaker 1>the way to tell him. And that's awful. Uh. Yeah,

1:02:13.200 --> 1:02:16.720
<v Speaker 1>it's such a breach of privacy, to be honest, is

1:02:16.880 --> 1:02:19.880
<v Speaker 1>when they start tracking you like that and sending you information.

1:02:20.240 --> 1:02:25.200
<v Speaker 1>It's like unsolicited advertising, and I hate it. We deal

1:02:25.240 --> 1:02:28.480
<v Speaker 1>with it every single day online. Yeah, it's it's it's

1:02:28.520 --> 1:02:32.760
<v Speaker 1>even worse than unsolicited advice, Like that's bad, but unsolicited

1:02:32.880 --> 1:02:36.400
<v Speaker 1>advertising is even worse because they're like, yeah, they're so

1:02:36.440 --> 1:02:41.600
<v Speaker 1>eager to make that sale that they can overstep very easily. Well,

1:02:41.680 --> 1:02:44.160
<v Speaker 1>let's wrap up by talking about some of the more

1:02:44.200 --> 1:02:46.960
<v Speaker 1>secure ways you can browse if you have to connect him.

1:02:47.000 --> 1:02:48.479
<v Speaker 1>We mentioned this at the very top of the show,

1:02:48.480 --> 1:02:53.720
<v Speaker 1>where VPNs are virtual private networks, and we mentioned that

1:02:53.760 --> 1:02:55.919
<v Speaker 1>sort of man in the middle attack where you are

1:02:56.360 --> 1:03:00.440
<v Speaker 1>logging into a hackers machine thinking that that's a legit spot,

1:03:00.520 --> 1:03:03.920
<v Speaker 1>and then the hackers kind of relaying information and sniffing

1:03:03.920 --> 1:03:07.480
<v Speaker 1>the entire time and learning all about you. VPNs are

1:03:07.520 --> 1:03:09.360
<v Speaker 1>kind of like that, but on the legit side, where

1:03:09.360 --> 1:03:13.440
<v Speaker 1>you are logging into a remote server somewhere far away,

1:03:13.480 --> 1:03:18.520
<v Speaker 1>probably through an encrypted connection, and then when you browse,

1:03:18.760 --> 1:03:21.960
<v Speaker 1>it's as if you're browsing from the server's location, not

1:03:22.240 --> 1:03:26.880
<v Speaker 1>your personal device. So if I were to blog into

1:03:26.920 --> 1:03:29.680
<v Speaker 1>a VPN and then log into a web service, the

1:03:29.680 --> 1:03:32.920
<v Speaker 1>web service would see my location as the location of

1:03:32.960 --> 1:03:36.640
<v Speaker 1>the VPN server, not my gadget that's actually in front

1:03:36.640 --> 1:03:41.360
<v Speaker 1>of me, right and not necessarily just for if you

1:03:41.360 --> 1:03:44.400
<v Speaker 1>want to look at your my little pony browny fan fix,

1:03:45.080 --> 1:03:47.760
<v Speaker 1>but VPNs can be extremely useful if you're trying to

1:03:47.800 --> 1:03:52.000
<v Speaker 1>access a website that's only available in select countries. So

1:03:52.160 --> 1:03:56.040
<v Speaker 1>if you choose to purchase like a consumer facing VPN product,

1:03:56.160 --> 1:03:59.320
<v Speaker 1>and there's many out there, I could make recommendations, but

1:03:59.480 --> 1:04:02.200
<v Speaker 1>they're can instantly changing as far as their privacy and

1:04:02.800 --> 1:04:06.520
<v Speaker 1>security terms and policies go, So I won't make any

1:04:06.800 --> 1:04:11.200
<v Speaker 1>major recommendations here. But if you choose a VPN that

1:04:11.320 --> 1:04:15.880
<v Speaker 1>has a a UH, for example, a country facing server

1:04:16.000 --> 1:04:19.240
<v Speaker 1>that's in Japan, that means that I could download this VPN,

1:04:19.320 --> 1:04:22.320
<v Speaker 1>log into it, connect through Japan, and be able to

1:04:22.360 --> 1:04:27.560
<v Speaker 1>access a website that's only available to Japanese residences. UH.

1:04:27.720 --> 1:04:29.680
<v Speaker 1>So I I had to do that a few years

1:04:29.720 --> 1:04:32.840
<v Speaker 1>ago when I wanted to purchase tickets for the Studio

1:04:32.880 --> 1:04:36.680
<v Speaker 1>Ghibli Museum through the Japanese website. It wouldn't let you

1:04:36.720 --> 1:04:40.840
<v Speaker 1>access it through an American server or an American connection.

1:04:41.160 --> 1:04:44.160
<v Speaker 1>So I logged in through my VPN through the Japanese

1:04:44.760 --> 1:04:47.960
<v Speaker 1>server UH, and I was able to purchase those tickets

1:04:47.960 --> 1:04:51.080
<v Speaker 1>through the Japanese website. It thought that I was in Japan,

1:04:51.160 --> 1:04:52.560
<v Speaker 1>so it let me do it, and that way I

1:04:52.600 --> 1:04:55.760
<v Speaker 1>was able to save myself so much money. It was wonderful.

1:04:56.560 --> 1:04:58.640
<v Speaker 1>So you can do it for you know, buying goods,

1:04:58.640 --> 1:05:02.440
<v Speaker 1>buying tickets for where, you know, going to a concert

1:05:02.520 --> 1:05:04.800
<v Speaker 1>in a different country, or a museum or something like

1:05:04.840 --> 1:05:07.280
<v Speaker 1>that in a different country. You can use it to

1:05:07.320 --> 1:05:13.800
<v Speaker 1>access online streaming portals that are only available in specific countries.

1:05:14.640 --> 1:05:16.960
<v Speaker 1>You can use it to download specific things that are

1:05:17.000 --> 1:05:19.640
<v Speaker 1>only available in specific countries like the list goes on

1:05:19.680 --> 1:05:22.440
<v Speaker 1>and on as far as different ways that you can

1:05:22.520 --> 1:05:26.720
<v Speaker 1>use VPNs that aren't necessarily just directed for security and privacy,

1:05:26.720 --> 1:05:31.360
<v Speaker 1>but are also directed at manipulating where the website thinks

1:05:31.400 --> 1:05:34.080
<v Speaker 1>that you are coming from. Yeah, and this can be

1:05:34.160 --> 1:05:36.280
<v Speaker 1>a matter of life and death for some people. Like

1:05:36.360 --> 1:05:38.560
<v Speaker 1>here in the United States, we largely use it for

1:05:38.640 --> 1:05:41.960
<v Speaker 1>the purposes of things like privacy, security, and convenience, but

1:05:42.080 --> 1:05:45.960
<v Speaker 1>in other places where you might be uh in a

1:05:46.000 --> 1:05:50.680
<v Speaker 1>country with a more authoritarian government, one that is far

1:05:50.800 --> 1:05:55.520
<v Speaker 1>more restrictive in access to certain services. If you're able

1:05:55.560 --> 1:05:58.360
<v Speaker 1>to connect through a VPN, which you know, granted, that

1:05:58.400 --> 1:06:00.640
<v Speaker 1>means that that government agency has have been paying very

1:06:00.640 --> 1:06:02.760
<v Speaker 1>close attention. But if you're able to do that, then

1:06:02.840 --> 1:06:05.320
<v Speaker 1>you can log in two different things as if you

1:06:05.360 --> 1:06:07.720
<v Speaker 1>were from some other part of the world, and maybe

1:06:07.720 --> 1:06:10.760
<v Speaker 1>get access to vital information or services that otherwise you

1:06:10.800 --> 1:06:13.560
<v Speaker 1>would not have at your disposal. So they play a

1:06:13.680 --> 1:06:17.480
<v Speaker 1>very important role. In fact, I gave an example today

1:06:17.520 --> 1:06:19.760
<v Speaker 1>with a friend of mine about how I would see

1:06:19.840 --> 1:06:25.440
<v Speaker 1>VPNs and incognito mode together being incredibly important. So imagine

1:06:26.160 --> 1:06:28.640
<v Speaker 1>this is a terrible scenario and I put that out

1:06:28.640 --> 1:06:31.880
<v Speaker 1>there first. But imagine that you are in some form

1:06:32.200 --> 1:06:36.720
<v Speaker 1>of abusive situation at home, and whether it's a spouse,

1:06:36.800 --> 1:06:40.000
<v Speaker 1>a parent, a parent, some sort of authority figure, whatever

1:06:40.000 --> 1:06:43.000
<v Speaker 1>it may be. But you're in that abusive experience, You're

1:06:43.040 --> 1:06:45.600
<v Speaker 1>going to feel like you are helpless and you want

1:06:45.640 --> 1:06:48.720
<v Speaker 1>to look for resources that can help you get out

1:06:48.760 --> 1:06:50.840
<v Speaker 1>of that situation. But at the same time, you have

1:06:50.880 --> 1:06:55.000
<v Speaker 1>a very legitimate fear of being found out for seeking

1:06:55.000 --> 1:06:57.920
<v Speaker 1>out those resources and the fear of reprisal that you

1:06:58.000 --> 1:07:00.840
<v Speaker 1>might face as a result of that. Well, using something

1:07:00.840 --> 1:07:04.360
<v Speaker 1>like a VPN and incognito mode would mean that you're

1:07:04.400 --> 1:07:07.400
<v Speaker 1>not leaving a trace on the network of what you're doing,

1:07:07.480 --> 1:07:09.440
<v Speaker 1>because as far as the network is concerned, all you're

1:07:09.480 --> 1:07:12.760
<v Speaker 1>doing is visiting this VPN server. It's not seeing what

1:07:12.840 --> 1:07:14.880
<v Speaker 1>else you're doing. All of knows you went to that

1:07:14.960 --> 1:07:18.040
<v Speaker 1>VPN server. Incognito mode means you're not leaving the trace

1:07:18.120 --> 1:07:20.840
<v Speaker 1>on whatever device you're actually using to do that sort

1:07:20.840 --> 1:07:23.360
<v Speaker 1>of search. So these are the sort of tools that

1:07:23.400 --> 1:07:28.000
<v Speaker 1>can literally mean life or death scenarios for people. And

1:07:28.080 --> 1:07:31.960
<v Speaker 1>you know that's dramatically that's together and it yeah, and

1:07:32.040 --> 1:07:35.560
<v Speaker 1>once you start combining those different security and privacy products

1:07:35.560 --> 1:07:39.440
<v Speaker 1>together that are very consumer friendly. Then you can end

1:07:39.480 --> 1:07:43.440
<v Speaker 1>up having a much more secure experience online, especially if

1:07:43.480 --> 1:07:45.960
<v Speaker 1>you're dealing with some kind of like like an abusive

1:07:45.960 --> 1:07:50.160
<v Speaker 1>relationship or something like that that can be uh something

1:07:50.200 --> 1:07:53.919
<v Speaker 1>that you seriously have to worry about, so definitely take

1:07:53.960 --> 1:07:58.240
<v Speaker 1>those into consideration. Using an incognito mode and VPNs together

1:07:58.680 --> 1:08:01.400
<v Speaker 1>is so easy to It's just as simple as opening

1:08:01.480 --> 1:08:06.120
<v Speaker 1>up that browser window in private browsing mode and turning

1:08:06.160 --> 1:08:08.560
<v Speaker 1>on your VPN, which is usually with a lot of

1:08:08.600 --> 1:08:11.760
<v Speaker 1>software nowadays, is the click of a switch on your computer.

1:08:11.840 --> 1:08:14.560
<v Speaker 1>And there are a lot of VPN apps out there,

1:08:14.600 --> 1:08:16.000
<v Speaker 1>like there are a lot of the services where if

1:08:16.000 --> 1:08:20.040
<v Speaker 1>you subscribe to the service, you can use uh your computer,

1:08:20.320 --> 1:08:21.800
<v Speaker 1>or you can use a mobile device, or you can

1:08:21.880 --> 1:08:24.639
<v Speaker 1>use some combination of multiples. And they're even ones where

1:08:24.680 --> 1:08:27.280
<v Speaker 1>you can have it set as a default that as

1:08:27.320 --> 1:08:29.880
<v Speaker 1>soon as you connect to WiFi networks, you connect through

1:08:29.880 --> 1:08:31.880
<v Speaker 1>the VPN, so you don't even have to don't even

1:08:32.080 --> 1:08:35.080
<v Speaker 1>think about it in that case, which is definitely good.

1:08:35.120 --> 1:08:37.400
<v Speaker 1>If you're using like a mobile device and you're connecting

1:08:37.400 --> 1:08:39.839
<v Speaker 1>to public WiFi frequently, you definitely want to have that

1:08:39.840 --> 1:08:42.640
<v Speaker 1>that that turned on, because if you ever forget about it,

1:08:42.760 --> 1:08:45.759
<v Speaker 1>that's when you're going to have the opportunities for people

1:08:45.800 --> 1:08:49.719
<v Speaker 1>to take advantage of you. Uh, the last examples go ahead,

1:08:49.720 --> 1:08:54.360
<v Speaker 1>I'm sorry. There's also the option to build your own VPN,

1:08:54.479 --> 1:08:57.719
<v Speaker 1>but that gets very much into the nitty gritty, uh,

1:08:57.840 --> 1:09:00.160
<v Speaker 1>since there are a lot of consumer facing ones that

1:09:00.200 --> 1:09:03.960
<v Speaker 1>are generally fine for the average consumer. That's what I

1:09:03.960 --> 1:09:07.839
<v Speaker 1>wouldn't normally recommend. But when I go to Deacon, for example,

1:09:08.040 --> 1:09:11.880
<v Speaker 1>I bring like my own certificate, my own VPN, and

1:09:12.000 --> 1:09:15.719
<v Speaker 1>my own little o VPN basically file, and I stick

1:09:15.800 --> 1:09:19.120
<v Speaker 1>that on my phone to actually run my own VPN.

1:09:19.880 --> 1:09:23.879
<v Speaker 1>When you do that, you're basically creating your own secure profile,

1:09:23.960 --> 1:09:27.720
<v Speaker 1>as opposed to trusting a VPN company with your information

1:09:27.760 --> 1:09:30.240
<v Speaker 1>and hoping that they are doing it for you. Yeah.

1:09:30.320 --> 1:09:32.760
<v Speaker 1>That's a great point, Shannon, because a lot of these

1:09:32.800 --> 1:09:37.560
<v Speaker 1>solutions actually ultimately require you to put trust in another entity,

1:09:37.760 --> 1:09:41.400
<v Speaker 1>and you know, there have been cases where even VPNs

1:09:41.400 --> 1:09:45.880
<v Speaker 1>have suffered data breaches in recent past, where you know,

1:09:45.960 --> 1:09:48.040
<v Speaker 1>you have to worry about that kind of stuff too.

1:09:48.840 --> 1:09:51.640
<v Speaker 1>There does come a point where you ultimately you have

1:09:51.720 --> 1:09:53.879
<v Speaker 1>to say to yourself, at what point am I comfortable

1:09:53.920 --> 1:09:57.360
<v Speaker 1>handing over control or handing over you know, some of

1:09:57.400 --> 1:10:01.759
<v Speaker 1>my data, because either you're doing that or you're doing nothing.

1:10:02.240 --> 1:10:05.680
<v Speaker 1>But you know, deciding where that point is is a

1:10:05.800 --> 1:10:08.640
<v Speaker 1>very personal choice. Uh. The very last one I want

1:10:08.680 --> 1:10:10.519
<v Speaker 1>to talk about, and we can do this very briefly,

1:10:11.080 --> 1:10:15.160
<v Speaker 1>is Tour, the Tour browser. Tour initially was an acronym

1:10:15.200 --> 1:10:17.920
<v Speaker 1>instead for the Onion router. And the reason it's called

1:10:17.960 --> 1:10:22.559
<v Speaker 1>Onion is because it does encryption in layers, each outer

1:10:22.720 --> 1:10:26.080
<v Speaker 1>layer being another layer of encryption. And I gave a

1:10:26.160 --> 1:10:29.519
<v Speaker 1>very simple analogy. Imagine that you are trying to ship

1:10:29.680 --> 1:10:31.799
<v Speaker 1>a present. Let's say I'm shipping a present to Shannon,

1:10:32.439 --> 1:10:35.240
<v Speaker 1>but You're welcome, but I don't want you to know

1:10:35.240 --> 1:10:38.400
<v Speaker 1>where I live, um for some reason. And I don't

1:10:38.400 --> 1:10:41.440
<v Speaker 1>want anyone to know that I'm sending a present specifically

1:10:41.520 --> 1:10:44.280
<v Speaker 1>to you for some reason. So what I've done is

1:10:44.360 --> 1:10:48.160
<v Speaker 1>I've nested your package that has your present in it

1:10:48.280 --> 1:10:51.400
<v Speaker 1>inside another package that's gonna go to a totally different address.

1:10:51.640 --> 1:10:56.040
<v Speaker 1>And I've nested that what's is it a brown package?

1:10:56.640 --> 1:11:00.519
<v Speaker 1>There's probably some you know, my little pony temper tattoo

1:11:00.920 --> 1:11:04.439
<v Speaker 1>sheets in there. So that's in there, and then that's

1:11:04.439 --> 1:11:06.600
<v Speaker 1>in a second package, and the second package is in

1:11:06.680 --> 1:11:09.120
<v Speaker 1>the third, the third packages in the fourth. Each package

1:11:09.160 --> 1:11:11.920
<v Speaker 1>has a different address on it. So I've got a

1:11:11.960 --> 1:11:14.720
<v Speaker 1>really big package that ultimately is just holding a bunch

1:11:14.760 --> 1:11:18.080
<v Speaker 1>of boxes and a couple of sheets of temporary tattoos

1:11:18.080 --> 1:11:21.800
<v Speaker 1>and the innermost box. I ship that to the first address.

1:11:22.240 --> 1:11:24.679
<v Speaker 1>The person at the first address opens up this big

1:11:24.680 --> 1:11:27.080
<v Speaker 1>box and they see that there's a slightly smaller box

1:11:27.080 --> 1:11:30.080
<v Speaker 1>inside with a different address on it. So they plopped

1:11:30.120 --> 1:11:32.280
<v Speaker 1>that back into the post office. Post office takes that

1:11:32.360 --> 1:11:35.680
<v Speaker 1>to the second destination. They open up the package, well,

1:11:35.720 --> 1:11:38.400
<v Speaker 1>destination number two. They know that the package came from

1:11:38.400 --> 1:11:41.160
<v Speaker 1>destination number one, but they don't know anything further back

1:11:41.200 --> 1:11:43.320
<v Speaker 1>from that. They don't know that I was the person

1:11:43.360 --> 1:11:46.280
<v Speaker 1>who originally put the package in the mail, and they

1:11:46.320 --> 1:11:48.760
<v Speaker 1>don't know where the package is ultimately going to. They

1:11:48.800 --> 1:11:52.760
<v Speaker 1>just see destination three on the shipping label of that

1:11:53.040 --> 1:11:56.280
<v Speaker 1>inner package, so they send it to destination three. Destination

1:11:56.320 --> 1:11:58.120
<v Speaker 1>three gets it. They opened it up. They know it

1:11:58.120 --> 1:12:00.880
<v Speaker 1>came from destination too. They don't know about destination one.

1:12:01.080 --> 1:12:03.559
<v Speaker 1>They definitely don't know about me, and they see that

1:12:03.560 --> 1:12:06.040
<v Speaker 1>they need to send on the next package to destination four,

1:12:06.040 --> 1:12:07.920
<v Speaker 1>and so on and so forth until finally you get

1:12:07.960 --> 1:12:10.760
<v Speaker 1>to that innermost package which has Shannon's address on it.

1:12:11.040 --> 1:12:14.080
<v Speaker 1>She gets it, she knows it came from the previous site,

1:12:14.280 --> 1:12:16.320
<v Speaker 1>but doesn't know any of the rest of the history,

1:12:16.400 --> 1:12:18.880
<v Speaker 1>including where it came from, except I probably put a

1:12:18.880 --> 1:12:21.519
<v Speaker 1>note in the inside of the package saying hey, it's

1:12:21.520 --> 1:12:25.920
<v Speaker 1>from me, Brownie Joe. And then then she gets the package.

1:12:26.000 --> 1:12:27.759
<v Speaker 1>You would probably want to make sure that your message

1:12:27.760 --> 1:12:31.320
<v Speaker 1>is encrypted. Yes, Uh, there's like a you know, I

1:12:31.720 --> 1:12:33.559
<v Speaker 1>tell you that you need to use your super secret

1:12:33.720 --> 1:12:37.360
<v Speaker 1>Captain Crusader decode ring or whatever to decrypt the message,

1:12:37.760 --> 1:12:40.160
<v Speaker 1>and then and then she would be able to to

1:12:40.280 --> 1:12:43.800
<v Speaker 1>use a similar process to send information to me. Uh. Now,

1:12:43.840 --> 1:12:47.160
<v Speaker 1>this is a very secure way typically of sending information.

1:12:47.200 --> 1:12:49.479
<v Speaker 1>There are ways to try and sniff out things, just

1:12:49.560 --> 1:12:53.320
<v Speaker 1>as there are with any network communication, but it's hard.

1:12:53.640 --> 1:12:57.200
<v Speaker 1>It's very hard to get anything meaningful through this process.

1:12:57.720 --> 1:13:00.920
<v Speaker 1>It is possible, it's not foolproof, but it's real hard

1:13:01.479 --> 1:13:04.880
<v Speaker 1>and uh. And so this is generally considered the most

1:13:04.920 --> 1:13:09.520
<v Speaker 1>secure way to browse the Internet. However, with that security

1:13:09.560 --> 1:13:11.360
<v Speaker 1>there comes a trade off, and that trade off is

1:13:11.400 --> 1:13:15.040
<v Speaker 1>mainly felt in the form of speed. We're in the

1:13:15.120 --> 1:13:17.920
<v Speaker 1>home stretch. Now we're going to have a little bit

1:13:18.000 --> 1:13:22.200
<v Speaker 1>more talk about public WiFi and safety measures you should

1:13:22.200 --> 1:13:25.479
<v Speaker 1>be observing. But before we get to that, let's take

1:13:25.520 --> 1:13:36.760
<v Speaker 1>one last break. There has been talk on on the

1:13:36.760 --> 1:13:41.640
<v Speaker 1>internet many years ago that government agencies had access to

1:13:41.720 --> 1:13:46.120
<v Speaker 1>some of the UM end notes, the very last place

1:13:46.200 --> 1:13:49.600
<v Speaker 1>that your package would hit before it went on to

1:13:49.840 --> 1:13:52.559
<v Speaker 1>whoever it was supposed to go to. UM. So you

1:13:52.600 --> 1:13:55.559
<v Speaker 1>do have to consider where where is this information being

1:13:55.640 --> 1:13:59.280
<v Speaker 1>sent and who has access to the very end of

1:13:59.280 --> 1:14:02.880
<v Speaker 1>that tunnel that you're sending that information through UM and

1:14:02.960 --> 1:14:07.240
<v Speaker 1>if that's protected, then yeah, it's great option UM. But

1:14:07.400 --> 1:14:10.640
<v Speaker 1>of course with tour as well as with VPNs and

1:14:10.680 --> 1:14:14.440
<v Speaker 1>incognito mode, you shouldn't use just one of these options.

1:14:14.479 --> 1:14:16.479
<v Speaker 1>You should use all of them if they are at

1:14:16.479 --> 1:14:20.080
<v Speaker 1>your disposal. But again, do you want to deal with

1:14:20.120 --> 1:14:23.320
<v Speaker 1>the slowness that you're going to experience when you add

1:14:23.360 --> 1:14:27.240
<v Speaker 1>these additional tunnels and additional nodes onto whatever you're trying

1:14:27.280 --> 1:14:30.120
<v Speaker 1>to gain access to, or are you going to deal

1:14:30.160 --> 1:14:36.800
<v Speaker 1>with the security um UH minimal experience and add that

1:14:36.880 --> 1:14:41.000
<v Speaker 1>additional convenience to your experience by just not using it,

1:14:41.320 --> 1:14:43.960
<v Speaker 1>so there are trade offs either way, and you've summarized

1:14:43.960 --> 1:14:45.920
<v Speaker 1>it perfectly, Shannon. I mean, this is like we said

1:14:45.960 --> 1:14:49.240
<v Speaker 1>at the beginning, this is a spectrum, and the important

1:14:49.240 --> 1:14:51.680
<v Speaker 1>thing is to be educated to that spectrum so you

1:14:51.720 --> 1:14:55.639
<v Speaker 1>can make your own educated decisions and not just trust

1:14:55.760 --> 1:14:58.639
<v Speaker 1>to the fates. I have a tattoo on my back

1:14:58.800 --> 1:15:03.240
<v Speaker 1>of the full Terror card, the Eternal Optimist. Don't be

1:15:03.360 --> 1:15:06.559
<v Speaker 1>the fool. You get the tattoo who wants pretty awesome,

1:15:06.600 --> 1:15:09.040
<v Speaker 1>It's dope, But don't don't be the Don't be the

1:15:09.040 --> 1:15:12.639
<v Speaker 1>fool in life, right, Don't just trust that you can

1:15:12.680 --> 1:15:14.640
<v Speaker 1>take a step off a cliff and you're not going

1:15:14.680 --> 1:15:17.960
<v Speaker 1>to fall to your death. The fool is taking a

1:15:18.000 --> 1:15:20.679
<v Speaker 1>step off a cliff in the traditional tarot card. So

1:15:21.000 --> 1:15:23.280
<v Speaker 1>you don't want to be like that. You want to

1:15:23.320 --> 1:15:26.720
<v Speaker 1>be informed and make choices. And you know there might

1:15:26.720 --> 1:15:30.160
<v Speaker 1>be instances where you think, Okay, I'm in a public spot,

1:15:30.400 --> 1:15:32.360
<v Speaker 1>I am going to use WiFi, but I'm using it

1:15:32.400 --> 1:15:35.880
<v Speaker 1>for something that's not related to my personal information. I'm

1:15:35.920 --> 1:15:38.479
<v Speaker 1>literally maybe I'm looking up a restaurant to find out

1:15:38.479 --> 1:15:41.559
<v Speaker 1>what hours it's open, and that's it. You know, they're

1:15:41.560 --> 1:15:43.920
<v Speaker 1>different levels. But if you're thinking, I want to do

1:15:44.000 --> 1:15:46.959
<v Speaker 1>some shopping, or I'm going to check my bank statement,

1:15:47.439 --> 1:15:50.240
<v Speaker 1>or I'm going to log into my email or this

1:15:50.240 --> 1:15:52.559
<v Speaker 1>one's a big one for us here at my heart.

1:15:52.840 --> 1:15:57.160
<v Speaker 1>If I'm going to access any of my my work stuff, right,

1:15:57.280 --> 1:15:59.559
<v Speaker 1>like anything that's stored on there, any of the services

1:15:59.600 --> 1:16:02.920
<v Speaker 1>that are on your definitely use a VPN in those cases,

1:16:02.960 --> 1:16:05.679
<v Speaker 1>because you're talking about things that affect not just you

1:16:06.000 --> 1:16:08.400
<v Speaker 1>but other people. Right, You're talking about the potential of

1:16:08.439 --> 1:16:15.080
<v Speaker 1>affecting uh, essentially an entire company if if the wrong

1:16:15.160 --> 1:16:17.720
<v Speaker 1>information were to get out, you know, especially for talking

1:16:17.720 --> 1:16:19.720
<v Speaker 1>about things like publicly traded companies. You want to make

1:16:19.720 --> 1:16:23.600
<v Speaker 1>sure that you're being a good steward of the information

1:16:23.600 --> 1:16:29.919
<v Speaker 1>that's been entrusted to you, not just your own but others. So, uh, Shannon,

1:16:30.439 --> 1:16:33.120
<v Speaker 1>this has been a joy. You have given generously of

1:16:33.160 --> 1:16:36.160
<v Speaker 1>your time and your expertise, and I greatly appreciate it.

1:16:36.200 --> 1:16:40.920
<v Speaker 1>Please let people know where they can find your work. Well.

1:16:41.080 --> 1:16:44.920
<v Speaker 1>Thank you so much, Jonathan. I love security and privacy

1:16:44.960 --> 1:16:47.599
<v Speaker 1>and I think of it as a habit that you

1:16:47.760 --> 1:16:50.559
<v Speaker 1>build upon over time, and the more that you learn

1:16:50.640 --> 1:16:52.759
<v Speaker 1>about it, the better off you can be in the future.

1:16:52.960 --> 1:16:57.320
<v Speaker 1>So build upon your security for your future self and

1:16:57.400 --> 1:17:00.920
<v Speaker 1>for your family too, because the more secure cure you are,

1:17:01.400 --> 1:17:03.960
<v Speaker 1>the more secure they will be as well. Uh. And

1:17:04.000 --> 1:17:08.240
<v Speaker 1>if you're interested in learning more about consumer privacy and security,

1:17:08.320 --> 1:17:10.679
<v Speaker 1>you can check out my YouTube channel. It's YouTube dot

1:17:10.680 --> 1:17:14.080
<v Speaker 1>com slash Shannon Morse uh and that's m O R

1:17:14.280 --> 1:17:16.439
<v Speaker 1>s E just like Morse Code and I will be

1:17:16.479 --> 1:17:20.600
<v Speaker 1>going to CS just like Jonathan Jonathan mentioned, I'm very excited,

1:17:20.640 --> 1:17:24.120
<v Speaker 1>so I will be posting a lot of content from

1:17:24.320 --> 1:17:27.360
<v Speaker 1>the Consumer Electronic Show and I will have tons in

1:17:27.439 --> 1:17:32.200
<v Speaker 1>store through the year. Awesome. Shannon's always a pleasure. I

1:17:32.200 --> 1:17:34.040
<v Speaker 1>am so sad that I will not be seeing you

1:17:34.080 --> 1:17:36.320
<v Speaker 1>at c E S. Will have to make time for

1:17:36.400 --> 1:17:39.400
<v Speaker 1>some other tech conference, I'm sure. Or next time i'm

1:17:39.439 --> 1:17:41.840
<v Speaker 1>out your way, I'll give you a shout and maybe

1:17:41.840 --> 1:17:43.720
<v Speaker 1>we can, like please do Yeah, we can can go

1:17:43.760 --> 1:17:47.080
<v Speaker 1>grab ramin or something and chat about security. I would

1:17:47.080 --> 1:17:50.240
<v Speaker 1>love That would be awesome. And that was an episode

1:17:50.280 --> 1:17:53.719
<v Speaker 1>from Christmas Day two thousand nineteen, The Dangers of Public WiFi.

1:17:53.760 --> 1:17:57.640
<v Speaker 1>I hope you enjoyed this look back on the episode.

1:17:57.640 --> 1:17:59.600
<v Speaker 1>That was one of the really epic ones when it

1:17:59.680 --> 1:18:03.880
<v Speaker 1>took a look at the full running time. I thought, wow, um,

1:18:03.920 --> 1:18:08.240
<v Speaker 1>I oe Shannon a really nice lunch or something for

1:18:08.320 --> 1:18:11.759
<v Speaker 1>agreeing to sit on a podcast for so long with me, Because,

1:18:11.960 --> 1:18:15.040
<v Speaker 1>as we all know, that's a big request. I hope

1:18:15.080 --> 1:18:17.840
<v Speaker 1>you are all staying safe and are well. If you

1:18:17.840 --> 1:18:20.759
<v Speaker 1>have suggestions for topics I should cover on future episodes

1:18:20.800 --> 1:18:22.760
<v Speaker 1>of tech Stuff, please reach out to me. The best

1:18:22.760 --> 1:18:25.160
<v Speaker 1>way to do that is on Twitter. The handle for

1:18:25.200 --> 1:18:28.080
<v Speaker 1>the show is text Stuff H s W and I'll

1:18:28.120 --> 1:18:38.200
<v Speaker 1>talk to you again really soon. Yeah. Text Stuff is

1:18:38.240 --> 1:18:41.360
<v Speaker 1>an I Heart Radio production. For more podcasts from my

1:18:41.520 --> 1:18:45.120
<v Speaker 1>Heart Radio, visit the i Heart Radio app, Apple Podcasts,

1:18:45.240 --> 1:18:47.240
<v Speaker 1>or wherever you listen to your favorite shows.