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Speaker 1: Welcome to Tech Stuff, a production from I Heart Radio.

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Speaker 1: Hey there, and welcome to tech Stuff. I'm your host,

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Speaker 1: Jonathan Strickland. I am an executive producer with I Heart

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Speaker 1: Radio and I love all things tech. And originally I

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Speaker 1: had intended to bring you a third installment on our

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Speaker 1: home theater basics, but stuff got got piled up. I

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Speaker 1: had to record episodes of a couple of other podcasts,

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Speaker 1: one of which is a spooky podcast that will be

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Speaker 1: coming out later this year. UH can't say a whole

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Speaker 1: lot about it, except it's not twelve days of Halloween

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Speaker 1: and it's not fourteen days of Halloween somewhere in between. Anyway,

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Speaker 1: Because of that, I got a little bit behind. So

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Speaker 1: we're going to have a rerun today of an episode

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Speaker 1: that published on Christmas Day in two thousand nineteen. UH

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Speaker 1: Spend guest Shannon Morrise joined the show to talk about

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Speaker 1: the dangers of public WiFi. So I hope you enjoy

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Speaker 1: this episode. Let's sit back and listen. There's a topic

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Speaker 1: that I really wanted to cover because as I record this,

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Speaker 1: we're in the holiday season. A lot of people are traveling,

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Speaker 1: They're going through airports, maybe you're visiting family and occasionally

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Speaker 1: you need to find a place to be elsewhere, like

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Speaker 1: maybe a coffee shop or something. That typically means we're

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Speaker 1: carrying our devices with us, and then we want to

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Speaker 1: connect to different networks. But that might not always be

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Speaker 1: a great idea, and so I decided I was going

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Speaker 1: to do an episode all about the best ways to

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Speaker 1: browse the Internet with privacy and safety in mind, going

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Speaker 1: from the least private and the least secure to perhaps

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Speaker 1: the most private and most secure. And then I thought, hey,

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Speaker 1: you dumb, dumb You know people who are extremely well

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Speaker 1: versed in this topic, and that's why I invited my

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Speaker 1: good friend, the phenomenal Shannon More to join this episode

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Speaker 1: to come back. So welcome back to Tech Stuff, Shannon.

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Speaker 1: Thank you so much. Jonathan. I'm so excited to be

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Speaker 1: back on the show. How are you doing. I'm tired.

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Speaker 1: But it's at the end of the year, so that

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Speaker 1: always happens, right like, And here's the thing, you know,

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Speaker 1: Shannon can tell you. In fact, we were just talking

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Speaker 1: about it before we went on to the record that

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Speaker 1: the tech journalists life does not get easier at the

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Speaker 1: end of the year because you immediately turn around and

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Speaker 1: head off to Vegas for ce S and that's where

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Speaker 1: you're gonna be in early January, as I understand it, right, Shannon, Yes,

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Speaker 1: I will. I'll be there all week covering everything over

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Speaker 1: on my channel, so make sure to link everybody to

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Speaker 1: my channel later, absolutely, because I ain't going folks. So

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Speaker 1: Shannon's your your your destination for finding all the really

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Speaker 1: cool stuff. And uh, Shannon, I can say from experience

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Speaker 1: because I've watched her work does amazing work. Not just

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Speaker 1: at c yes, but we were, but particularly like under

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Speaker 1: a high stress situation like c e S, certain people

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Speaker 1: can light up under the camera. And uh, I'm frankly

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Speaker 1: envious of your ability to do so. So um, that's

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Speaker 1: me be nice. Yeah, well, I mean I could be

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Speaker 1: more caddy about it, but I'm gonna be nice. The

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Speaker 1: Caddy would be like, how dare she? How dare she

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Speaker 1: show me up? But no, we're gonna talk about browsing safely.

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Speaker 1: So the first thing I wanted to do before we

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Speaker 1: get into the spectrum of browsing the Internet, because you

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Speaker 1: could argue that there's like the least safe, secure, naive

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Speaker 1: way to do it to what is perhaps the most

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Speaker 1: secure but not perfect. There's no perfect solution spoiler alert.

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Speaker 1: Before we get into any of that, I wanted to

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Speaker 1: talk about some stats, and these come from a few

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Speaker 1: different sources. Uh. One was a survey that was conducted

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Speaker 1: by one World Identity back in about public wi fi.

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Speaker 1: So this was just asking people about their perception and

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Speaker 1: their use of public WiFi. And Shannon, I kind of

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Speaker 1: wanted to get your reaction to this because being someone

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Speaker 1: who has been so entrenched in data security in the

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Speaker 1: hacker culture in you know, everything from how do we

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Speaker 1: make these systems more secure, to the white hat approach

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Speaker 1: of how do we find any vulnerability so that they

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Speaker 1: can be patched, to even the black hat culture where

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Speaker 1: people are exploiting this for their own gain. I wanted

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Speaker 1: to see what you thought about these stats. So the

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Speaker 1: first one was they asked a question to people in

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Speaker 1: the United States, in Germany and in France, and the

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Speaker 1: question they asked was do you ever use unsecured public

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Speaker 1: WiFi networks in the United States? So nearly half said,

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Speaker 1: you know, if there's no other option, sure, I'll do it.

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Speaker 1: Thirty two percent actually said I prefer using public WiFi

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Speaker 1: to using my cellular plan. Uh. Person sumably because they

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Speaker 1: would not be billed for data usage right because they're

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Speaker 1: using WiFi instead of their cell data only said they

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Speaker 1: never did it. One percent said they do it, but

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Speaker 1: only with a VPN. But we'll cover VPNs a little

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Speaker 1: bit later. So, Shannon, you've you've talked with hackers. What

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Speaker 1: do you think their reaction initially would be hearing that

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Speaker 1: nearly fifty of people in the United States said yeah,

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Speaker 1: you know, if there's no other connection, I'll I'll connect

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Speaker 1: to public WiFi, and another thirty two percent and I said, oh, heck, yeah,

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Speaker 1: sign me up. Well, I'm definitely in the one percent

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Speaker 1: of only with a VPN, and and that's assuming that

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Speaker 1: I have absolutely no other option. So I'm kind of

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Speaker 1: a mix of the and the one percent, but only

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Speaker 1: only if I have a vp n UM. I would

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Speaker 1: say from my experience, all of my friends would probably

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Speaker 1: not be surprised by the tent that prefer public WiFi

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Speaker 1: over their cellular plants, specifically because of what you said,

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Speaker 1: they'll be able to save money, especially if they don't

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Speaker 1: have an unlimited plan through their mobile carriers. So in

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Speaker 1: that way, it makes sense, uh that say yes, if

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Speaker 1: there's no other option, there's always another option. Come on, folks,

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Speaker 1: what are you doing? Where are you at? Yeah? I

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Speaker 1: mean we we have such good cellular coverage now there's

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Speaker 1: always another option, even if you just have three G

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Speaker 1: like that's manageable from most tasks. So what what are

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Speaker 1: they doing? I'm just my draw My job kind of

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Speaker 1: dropped a little bit when I heard that number. I

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Speaker 1: just thought it was I thought that I'm doing a

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Speaker 1: much better job of educating people about the importance of

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Speaker 1: not using public WiFi, and apparently I'm not doing my

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Speaker 1: job as well as I should have been, or or

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Speaker 1: the people who are already kind of hip to it

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Speaker 1: are the ones watching you, going yeah, she gets it,

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Speaker 1: she knows, and the people who need to see it

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Speaker 1: are like what's on the masked Singer today or whatever?

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Speaker 1: You know, Like so, yeah, I I look at this

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Speaker 1: and I think, man if I were a black hat,

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Speaker 1: I would just be doing the Mr Burns excellent. Just

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Speaker 1: you're over and over again just drooling at that opportunity,

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Speaker 1: because you know, public WiFi is definitely the most dangerous

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Speaker 1: option you can pick when you're talking about protecting your

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Speaker 1: own privacy and security, especially if you're not doing something

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Speaker 1: like using a VPN. UH spoiler alert will talk more

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Speaker 1: about that in a second. And so knowing that you're

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Speaker 1: your opportunity for targets is so vast has got to

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Speaker 1: be incredibly encouraging to someone who is ready to exploit that.

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Speaker 1: And that's really, you know, that's what we're trying to

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Speaker 1: protect everyone against, is you know, it's the likelihood of

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Speaker 1: you running into these situations is not necessarily high on

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Speaker 1: a day to day basis, but the opportunity is so

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Speaker 1: huge that you need to take it into account no

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Speaker 1: matter where you happen to be. So you you want

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Speaker 1: to make yourself the hard target. You want to be

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Speaker 1: the person that makes people work really hard to get

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Speaker 1: access to your data. You don't want to be the

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Speaker 1: easy target, because the easier target you are, the more

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Speaker 1: often you're going to be targeted. You don't want that. No, no,

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Speaker 1: And I was actually talking to a co worker today

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Speaker 1: and I said, honestly, when you look at data security,

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Speaker 1: even when you're talking like you always get naysayers who

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Speaker 1: will say, oh, sure you can use this, but it

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Speaker 1: doesn't protect you against everything, And they may technically be right,

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Speaker 1: but my answer is the harder you make it. Effectively,

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Speaker 1: what that means is you're making it more expensive for

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Speaker 1: someone to successfully target you. So if you price yourself

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Speaker 1: out where it would cost them more to break your security,

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Speaker 1: then they would get from whatever they took from you.

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Speaker 1: You win, because no one's going to lose money on that.

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Speaker 1: Uh exactly. It's when you've made it so convenient that

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Speaker 1: it's like it's like it's like when someone says about

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Speaker 1: a sale, I would lose money if I didn't buy that.

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Speaker 1: That's when you're in Yeah, yes, exactly, it's they're looking

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Speaker 1: for the bargain deal. And a lot of times when

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Speaker 1: a black hat is looking at public WiFi as a

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Speaker 1: way to access information, they're in tending to profit off

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Speaker 1: of that information, whether by stealing an idea, identity, or

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Speaker 1: reselling that data on the black market, like on the

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Speaker 1: dark web. So making yourself the hard target is absolutely

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Speaker 1: crucial to helping to protect you. Yeah. And and just

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Speaker 1: so that you guys out there, no, I mean I

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Speaker 1: mentioned the United States numbers. It's not like Germany and

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Speaker 1: France were shining examples of data privacy and security among

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Speaker 1: the public. In Germany, in fact, of respondents said they'd

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Speaker 1: used unsecured, unsecured public WiFi over their cellular data, So

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Speaker 1: it was even a larger percentage than the United States.

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Speaker 1: And the United States it was that it said, oh yeah,

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Speaker 1: I've got a choice, I'll use public over my cellular data.

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Speaker 1: In Germany it was fort um and and said they

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Speaker 1: would use it if they could not get a cellular option.

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Speaker 1: And then in France it was closer to what the

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Speaker 1: United States said, said they preferred using public WiFi to

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Speaker 1: using their cellular data, and forty percent said they'd used

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Speaker 1: it if they couldn't get any other option. So again

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Speaker 1: that mirrored very closely what the folks in the United

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Speaker 1: States said. So this is a trend that goes beyond

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Speaker 1: the US. I know that because I'm centered in the US,

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Speaker 1: I often get very US centric, And I also tend

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Speaker 1: to harp on how American citizens in particular seemed to

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Speaker 1: come across to me as being security illiterate for in

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Speaker 1: a in large part, I mean, I just see it

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Speaker 1: all the time, But I don't know if it's not

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Speaker 1: exactly reassuring to see that that way in other parts

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Speaker 1: of the world. That doesn't fill me with confidence. I

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Speaker 1: think a lot of times people either don't know where

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Speaker 1: to look for the information, for accessible information that's that

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Speaker 1: that's explained in a way that is it's scary, or

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Speaker 1: doesn't you know, create create emotions of paranoia or just

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Speaker 1: close people down so that they just get lose interest insecurity. Uh.

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Speaker 1: And you also have a lot of folks out there

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Speaker 1: that just don't care. But I think a lot of

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Speaker 1: people do care, they just don't know where to look

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Speaker 1: for this kind of information. So I'm glad that you, Jonathan,

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Speaker 1: as well as myself on my channel, we're putting that

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Speaker 1: information out there in a way that's easy to understand,

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Speaker 1: and I'm hoping that even if it just helps one

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Speaker 1: person understand a little bit better security and privacy, hopefully

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Speaker 1: we change that percentage over time. Absolutely, I agree. I think, uh,

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Speaker 1: it can be one of those situations where you get

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Speaker 1: overwhelmed by the scope of something. And when you get overwhelmed,

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Speaker 1: it's almost like there's a defense mechanism in your brain, right,

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Speaker 1: It's like this is too hard, so I can't worry

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Speaker 1: about it. And I have seen this in action when

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Speaker 1: trying to tell people about like password managers, for example,

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Speaker 1: and lead shut down. They have no interest. They get

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Speaker 1: glassy eyed, and they just say, well, I don't see

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Speaker 1: what the point is on I try to explain the point.

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Speaker 1: But as after that point, it's just it's just like

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Speaker 1: talking through talking through the air. They just don't want

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Speaker 1: anything to do with it. And and as someone who

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Speaker 1: relies heavily on a password manager like it is, it's

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Speaker 1: it's fundamentally one of the most important tools in my

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Speaker 1: toolbox to make certain that I don't do rookie mistakes

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Speaker 1: like using the same password for multiple accounts. Right because

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Speaker 1: as as we'll discuss as we get into this discussion

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Speaker 1: about safely browsing the Internet, one of the big dangers

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Speaker 1: is that if you, through accident or or your tricked

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Speaker 1: or whatever, if you somehow share your log in information

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Speaker 1: for one service. Let's say that you have one service

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Speaker 1: that isn't using uh secure encryption for some reason. First

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Speaker 1: of all, don't do that, But if you are, if

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Speaker 1: you're using that same password anywhere else, it's like you

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Speaker 1: just handed a skeleton key to somebody, because now they

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Speaker 1: can access everything you've used that password with. I mean,

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Speaker 1: this is this is blatantly obvious. So that's why it's

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Speaker 1: so important to have unique, strong passwords for all the

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Speaker 1: different services you use. That way, if one if worst

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Speaker 1: case scenario one gets compromised, it doesn't compromise everything else. Yes, absolutely,

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Speaker 1: I'm glad you mentioned that because the more different things

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Speaker 1: that you use that help your security and privacy, every

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Speaker 1: single step you take absolutely helps. And that's just one

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Speaker 1: of the many steps that you can take. Every single

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Speaker 1: consumer in the world does not have to take all

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Speaker 1: of these steps all at once, because that would be

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Speaker 1: quite mind boggling. But if you do take steps towards

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Speaker 1: these over time, you can increase your privacy and security

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Speaker 1: two fold times fold. Yeah, it's fantastic. Yeah, I mean

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Speaker 1: and and and to be fair, like like I'm going

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Speaker 1: to be upfront guys, like I used to be the

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Speaker 1: dude who had like three passwords and for everything. Yeah,

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Speaker 1: I was like that for years until until I finally

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Speaker 1: like woke up to how dangerous that was. I was

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Speaker 1: fortunate in that I was never knowingly anyway targeted for

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Speaker 1: a specific like intrusion. Uh, as far as I know,

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Speaker 1: I never none of my stuff ever got compromised because

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Speaker 1: of that. Stuff has been compromised because of data breaches

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Speaker 1: that are beyond our control. But we're really focusing on

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Speaker 1: the stuff that we as end users can do to

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Speaker 1: improve our security as best we can knowing that we

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Speaker 1: live in a world where that's just one point of vulnerability.

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Speaker 1: That's one point of attack, but it's it's one that

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Speaker 1: we have some control over another. Another scary statistic, or

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Speaker 1: at least I thought it was scary, is that Kaspersky

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Speaker 1: did a UH survey back in ten and are They

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Speaker 1: did an analysis of thirty two million hot spots, hot

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Speaker 1: spots being points of contact where your device connects over

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Speaker 1: to the Internet at large, and a hot spot can

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Speaker 1: be everything from the router in a like a coffee

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Speaker 1: shop to your own cell phone you might be using

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Speaker 1: that as a portable hot spot. Out of the thirty

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Speaker 1: two million hot spots they examined, one quarter of them

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Speaker 1: had no encryption in use at all, meaning everything is

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Speaker 1: being sent in plain text, which means that if anyone

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Speaker 1: has any method of eavesdropping on those communications, they see

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Speaker 1: it all, which again blows my mind that there would

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Speaker 1: be that many networks that have no encryption in place

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Speaker 1: at all, not even bad encryption. Yeah, that's a very

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Speaker 1: scary number. That's extremely high and is a lot higher

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Speaker 1: than what I thought it would be. UH. If if

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Speaker 1: they're not using any sort of encryption whatsoever, for a

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Speaker 1: hot spot. That means that anybody within that vicinity, within

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Speaker 1: range of that device would be able to see everything

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Speaker 1: you're doing. It's very, very mind boggling, and this is

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Speaker 1: one of the reasons why I wanted to have you

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Speaker 1: on the show because we say these things, right, we

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Speaker 1: say that when you use public WiFi, you're using if

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Speaker 1: you're using an unsecured public WiFi hot spot, especially one

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Speaker 1: that is unencrypted, that you are in danger of this.

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Speaker 1: And a lot of people say, all right, but exactly

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Speaker 1: what's going on? Right? How are they doing this? And

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Speaker 1: it's that there are various pieces of software out there

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Speaker 1: that allow people who are who get onto a network

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Speaker 1: to monitor traffic that's going across that network. I mean,

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Speaker 1: their entire groups out there that make different software and

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Speaker 1: hardware uh solutions to do just this. Right. Yeah, not

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Speaker 1: gonna lie. Um. I used to solder and sell some

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Speaker 1: of these products at a company that I used to

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Speaker 1: work with called hack five. So I'll definitely share some

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Speaker 1: of that information once we get closer to those those

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Speaker 1: topics with today's discussion. But yeah, those products exist, They're

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Speaker 1: very inexpensive, and some of the software is free, and

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Speaker 1: there's tutorials made by yours truly on YouTube that show

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Speaker 1: you how to use these things. It's definitely a thing

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Speaker 1: that pretty much anybody can introduce themselves to and then

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Speaker 1: they will be able to see what's going on on

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Speaker 1: a network. And there are different reasons to even do this.

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Speaker 1: There's obviously there's the nefarious ones that were concerned about,

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Speaker 1: but there's also like if you're a network administrator, being

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Speaker 1: able to do things like monitor network traffic and see

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Speaker 1: points of congestion education as well. Yeah, there's like there's

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Speaker 1: there are legit reasons to use that sort of technology

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Speaker 1: that don't that don't immediately point to to the to

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Speaker 1: the road of I'm here to steal all your infos.

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Speaker 1: It's like there's stuff that where this is used in

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Speaker 1: quote unquote legitimate purposes. I mean like packet sniffers. That's

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Speaker 1: something that sounds like it's underhanded and shady, but they

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Speaker 1: were invented not to try and sniff out what's someone

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Speaker 1: else was doing, but literally to help network administrators see

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Speaker 1: how network how network traffic was moving across so that

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Speaker 1: they could make sure that everything was working properly. So

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Speaker 1: but it doesn't mean that you can't think a tool.

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Speaker 1: A tool is either a tool or a weapon, depending

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Speaker 1: upon how you want to use it. And so the

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Speaker 1: same stuff that was used to help networks is also

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Speaker 1: used to exploit them. Um, exactly, you could say the

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Speaker 1: same thing about a kitchen knife. I mean kitchen knives

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Speaker 1: to to you know, cut up fruits and veggies. Some

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Speaker 1: nefarious people might use one to murder somebody part of me.

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Speaker 1: But I used the exact same sort of analogy except

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Speaker 1: when I was talking to someone earlier today. But it

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Speaker 1: was a hammer. But same thing, Like a hammer is

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Speaker 1: either something that you're using to to build stuff with

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Speaker 1: or it could be used to bludgeon somebody. And it

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Speaker 1: all comes down to it's not that the tool itself

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Speaker 1: is bad, it's the intent and use of the person

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Speaker 1: wielding that tool. And the same is true of technology.

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Speaker 1: Uh So, one other stat that I wanted to mention

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Speaker 1: that's pretty alarming. Norton found out this was in so

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Speaker 1: it's a few years ago, but Americans had had their

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Speaker 1: email hacked at some point, and that twelve percent had

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Speaker 1: their financial data stolen while they were shopping online, and

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Speaker 1: that in four million people globally had been a victim

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Speaker 1: of some sort of cyber crime, and that kind of

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Speaker 1: shows us the scale of why this is an important topic.

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Speaker 1: It's not just because the opportunity is there, it's because

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Speaker 1: people are actually actively taking advantage of those opportunities, and

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Speaker 1: you could be the victim of one of those actions

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Speaker 1: if you're not careful. And we love you absolutely, we

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Speaker 1: do love you very much. I'm kind of I'm kind

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Speaker 1: of thinking that all of those numbers have probably increased

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Speaker 1: given that it's been about four years since they were

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Speaker 1: they analyzed the data and had those those too sticks available,

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Speaker 1: because in the past couple of years we've seen hacks

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Speaker 1: go from a few hundred million people to almost a

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Speaker 1: billion people get hacked online. So it's entirely possible that

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Speaker 1: those numbers have increased quite a bit since, especially in

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Speaker 1: the realm of the mobile app becoming king right, because

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Speaker 1: there's there's such a proliferation of apps out there that

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Speaker 1: either through a conscious effort, are creating vulnerabilities or because

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Speaker 1: of poor design, create vulnerabilities that can later be exploited.

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Speaker 1: You know, we've seen so many examples of that where

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Speaker 1: an a p I didn't take everything into account and

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Speaker 1: then someone was able to exploit it, famous one being

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Speaker 1: Facebook and Cambridge Analytica, where you had an app that

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Speaker 1: if you installed the app, like you would voluntarily install

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Speaker 1: it within your Facebook and you're voluntary lee sharing your

359
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Speaker 1: own information. All of that is fine, right if you've

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Speaker 1: agreed to do it such a good not a good idea,

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Speaker 1: such a good example, good example, Yeah, good example, not

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Speaker 1: a good idea to do. But it's fine if you

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Speaker 1: if you are knowingly doing that, that's fine. But the

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Speaker 1: problem that the Cambradge Analytica story brought to bears that

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Speaker 1: they took advantage of a loophole in Facebook's API and

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Speaker 1: they were able to to phish out a ton of

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Speaker 1: information about all the contacts of the people who had

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Speaker 1: installed the app. These are people who did not, uh,

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Speaker 1: you know, give permission to share their information, but the

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Speaker 1: app collected all that information regardless. And that's where we see, like,

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Speaker 1: you know, there were countless victims of this app because

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Speaker 1: none of them opted in to share that information. It

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Speaker 1: was just taken from them. And uh, that's just one

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Speaker 1: little example of the world we live in where you know,

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Speaker 1: even when you are being careful, there are there are

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Speaker 1: these opportunities for your information to get out there, which

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Speaker 1: is why we're like this is why you need to

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Speaker 1: take the steps necessary to protect yourself as best you can,

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Speaker 1: because we live in a world where there are numerous

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Speaker 1: attack vectors that point back to us. All right, I

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Speaker 1: mean just mid December, the New York Times discussed location

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Speaker 1: tracking on phones and how ping pings to local towers

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Speaker 1: can basically give you a map of a certain phone

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Speaker 1: I D and you can track that and figure out

385
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Speaker 1: who that phone belongs to based on what residents and

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Speaker 1: what office they go to every day. It's extremely scary,

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Speaker 1: and the more information we have about it as consumers,

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Speaker 1: the better we can protect ourselves. Yeah, and again, like, uh,

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Speaker 1: back to what you were just saying, Shannon, Facebook send

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Speaker 1: a letter to Congress just a couple of days before

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Speaker 1: we record this episode where they said, yeah, even if

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Speaker 1: you opted out of location tracking, we actually know where

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Speaker 1: you are, partly because of the information people are voluntarily sharing.

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Speaker 1: Like if I tag If I take a photo while

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Speaker 1: I'm at a party and I tagged the location and

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Speaker 1: I tag people are in the photo, well, I'm voluntarily

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Speaker 1: sharing a lot of information. Maybe those people haven't given

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Speaker 1: me permission to do that, but I'm I'm sharing the information.

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Speaker 1: So yeah, of course, Facebook knows where I am, when

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Speaker 1: I when I'm there, and who I'm with because I

401
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Speaker 1: shared the information. But they also admitted, yeah, we also

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Speaker 1: use a lot of other methods where we can suss

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Speaker 1: out where you were and who you were with at

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Speaker 1: what time that aren't as obvious and aren't examples of

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Speaker 1: the user voluntarily handing over information. So yeah, scary stuff. Um.

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Speaker 1: One of the things I wanted to mention is sort

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Speaker 1: of the bird's eye view of the process of what

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Speaker 1: it's like just connecting to WiFi, so we can kind

409
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Speaker 1: of understand, uh, you know, what's going on, because I

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Speaker 1: think a lot of people if they think that if

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Speaker 1: they see that, for example, that there's a WiFi hotspot

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Speaker 1: that requires a password, they immediately think that that is

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Speaker 1: inherently more secure here than a public WiFi spot that

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Speaker 1: has no password, which is not necessarily true. Um. So

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Speaker 1: connecting to WiFi is really you can think of it

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Speaker 1: as a series of handshakes between whatever device you're using

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Speaker 1: and the hot spot, whether it's a router or something else.

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Speaker 1: And this series of handshakes is not meant to secure

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Speaker 1: the data. It's not meant to encrypt a channel necessarily,

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Speaker 1: it's not meant to protect it. What's meant to do

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Speaker 1: is to identify the device and the hot spot so

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Speaker 1: that they know where the data needs to go. Right. Otherwise,

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Speaker 1: if if we all connected to a public WiFi hot

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Speaker 1: spot and there wasn't this handshake thing going on, it

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Speaker 1: would be as if we were all listening to an

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Speaker 1: open broadcast of everything all at once, and it would

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Speaker 1: just be meaningless garbage and we would just get we

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Speaker 1: would just get everyone's data simultaneously, and we're like, I

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Speaker 1: don't even I don't know what this we could I

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Speaker 1: don't think it would go well. But so this was

431
00:24:58,240 --> 00:25:01,119
Speaker 1: this was literally the solution into that problem. Like, you know,

432
00:25:01,160 --> 00:25:03,960
Speaker 1: if you're using wired connections, that's one thing, right, you

433
00:25:03,960 --> 00:25:07,560
Speaker 1: can wire things to specific ports, you have physical hardware.

434
00:25:07,800 --> 00:25:10,240
Speaker 1: When you go wireless, you have to create a virtual

435
00:25:10,480 --> 00:25:13,360
Speaker 1: version of that. That's sort of what the handshake processes for.

436
00:25:13,680 --> 00:25:16,800
Speaker 1: It's saying, hey, there's this device that wants to connect

437
00:25:16,800 --> 00:25:19,280
Speaker 1: to the network. The network says, okay, I'm giving you permission.

438
00:25:19,400 --> 00:25:21,560
Speaker 1: The device is okay, this is who I am, and

439
00:25:21,600 --> 00:25:24,080
Speaker 1: the network devices all right, I I see who you are,

440
00:25:24,440 --> 00:25:26,919
Speaker 1: and now we can send information back and forth. You

441
00:25:26,960 --> 00:25:29,360
Speaker 1: can send requests out to the internet. I'll go out

442
00:25:29,400 --> 00:25:31,520
Speaker 1: and grab whatever it is you wanted, and I'll return

443
00:25:31,560 --> 00:25:34,840
Speaker 1: it just to you. That's the idea. That's actually a

444
00:25:34,840 --> 00:25:38,440
Speaker 1: great explanation without using any of the terminology. So I

445
00:25:38,800 --> 00:25:41,440
Speaker 1: thank you for the doing that. Yeah, I tried. I tried.

446
00:25:41,440 --> 00:25:44,199
Speaker 1: At one point I had a spoiler alert or well

447
00:25:44,240 --> 00:25:47,080
Speaker 1: not even spoiler, look behind the curtain, folks. I had

448
00:25:47,119 --> 00:25:50,280
Speaker 1: originally started this episode as a solo show, and that's

449
00:25:50,359 --> 00:25:52,560
Speaker 1: when it struck me that it would be way easier

450
00:25:52,600 --> 00:25:54,600
Speaker 1: if I brought Shannon on, because she's much smarter than

451
00:25:54,640 --> 00:25:57,320
Speaker 1: I am. And so as I was doing it, I

452
00:25:57,359 --> 00:26:00,520
Speaker 1: was trying to describe this process, and I think I

453
00:26:00,560 --> 00:26:02,320
Speaker 1: went through two or three drafts when I said, you

454
00:26:02,320 --> 00:26:04,640
Speaker 1: know what, I can just step back and not get

455
00:26:04,640 --> 00:26:08,320
Speaker 1: so technical, because the technical parts aren't really what's important.

456
00:26:08,440 --> 00:26:11,439
Speaker 1: What's important is just sort of understanding the concept of

457
00:26:11,480 --> 00:26:15,000
Speaker 1: the process and why it is not inherently tied to

458
00:26:15,400 --> 00:26:19,640
Speaker 1: security and privacy. It's inherently tied to just what does

459
00:26:19,680 --> 00:26:22,280
Speaker 1: it take so that you can have these two devices

460
00:26:22,320 --> 00:26:25,399
Speaker 1: communicate with one another and not have them confused with

461
00:26:25,480 --> 00:26:28,280
Speaker 1: all the other devices that hook into the same network.

462
00:26:28,760 --> 00:26:30,320
Speaker 1: And once I figured that out, was like, I'm going

463
00:26:30,359 --> 00:26:32,879
Speaker 1: to go with that because I'm tired of trying to

464
00:26:32,880 --> 00:26:36,480
Speaker 1: figure out how to explain this handshake process. Um, it

465
00:26:36,480 --> 00:26:40,160
Speaker 1: totally works. I mean I like the handshake terminology because

466
00:26:40,280 --> 00:26:43,240
Speaker 1: it is kind of like that, like in person, whenever

467
00:26:43,320 --> 00:26:46,600
Speaker 1: you meet somebody, you acknowledge each other, you shake each

468
00:26:46,600 --> 00:26:50,080
Speaker 1: other's hands, you kind of authenticate each other by name

469
00:26:50,119 --> 00:26:53,520
Speaker 1: and by face. And that's very similar to what a

470
00:26:53,640 --> 00:26:57,639
Speaker 1: router does with a device like your smartphone or a laptop.

471
00:26:57,720 --> 00:27:00,960
Speaker 1: It's basically doing the same thing where you're you're looking

472
00:27:01,000 --> 00:27:04,680
Speaker 1: for somebody to introduce yourself to. You go in, you

473
00:27:05,040 --> 00:27:08,000
Speaker 1: acknowledge each other, you shake hands with each other, you

474
00:27:08,080 --> 00:27:11,040
Speaker 1: kind of authenticate each other by name, and then you

475
00:27:11,119 --> 00:27:13,879
Speaker 1: have that connection. Yeah, and you have that connection forever

476
00:27:13,960 --> 00:27:16,760
Speaker 1: until you break it off. Yes, And if if you're

477
00:27:16,760 --> 00:27:20,040
Speaker 1: at c S, it probably also requires you to hand

478
00:27:20,080 --> 00:27:22,960
Speaker 1: over a business card because that's like, yeah, most likely

479
00:27:23,119 --> 00:27:25,720
Speaker 1: that's that's the current I guess that would be your password, right, yeah,

480
00:27:25,800 --> 00:27:29,080
Speaker 1: I guess so yeah. All right, Well when we come back,

481
00:27:29,280 --> 00:27:33,320
Speaker 1: we're going to talk about the how how information is

482
00:27:33,359 --> 00:27:35,480
Speaker 1: sent through packets, just so that we can understand why

483
00:27:35,480 --> 00:27:39,520
Speaker 1: did that packet sniffing thing mean earlier. But first let's

484
00:27:39,520 --> 00:27:43,480
Speaker 1: take a quick break to thank our sponsor Shannon and

485
00:27:43,520 --> 00:27:45,520
Speaker 1: I have a lot more to say about the dangers

486
00:27:45,520 --> 00:27:48,000
Speaker 1: of public WiFi, but first let's take a quick break.

487
00:27:55,840 --> 00:27:58,919
Speaker 1: All right, then we're back. So I promised that we

488
00:27:58,920 --> 00:28:01,240
Speaker 1: were going to talk about pack it's packets is pretty

489
00:28:01,320 --> 00:28:05,080
Speaker 1: simple concept. So a packet switching network. You've probably heard

490
00:28:05,080 --> 00:28:08,720
Speaker 1: that term before, uh the Internet. When the pioneers of

491
00:28:08,720 --> 00:28:12,560
Speaker 1: the Internet were sort of designing this thing, they thought, well,

492
00:28:12,640 --> 00:28:15,439
Speaker 1: how do we make it so that information can be

493
00:28:15,480 --> 00:28:18,160
Speaker 1: sent from one computer to another in such a way

494
00:28:18,400 --> 00:28:22,280
Speaker 1: that if something happens, the information can continue to make

495
00:28:22,320 --> 00:28:24,800
Speaker 1: its way to its destination even if there's some sort

496
00:28:24,840 --> 00:28:28,200
Speaker 1: of interruption. And if it were just an uninterrupted string

497
00:28:28,240 --> 00:28:30,880
Speaker 1: of data and there was an interruption, then you would

498
00:28:30,880 --> 00:28:33,480
Speaker 1: have a corrupt file or you know, things would not

499
00:28:33,520 --> 00:28:36,600
Speaker 1: work right. You wouldn't get what you were wanting. So

500
00:28:36,640 --> 00:28:41,760
Speaker 1: they said, what if we bundled data into uh certain sizes,

501
00:28:41,800 --> 00:28:45,360
Speaker 1: We'll call it packets. The packets will have information on

502
00:28:45,400 --> 00:28:47,800
Speaker 1: them that will tell the data where it needs to go,

503
00:28:47,880 --> 00:28:51,240
Speaker 1: where it came from, and how it fits within all

504
00:28:51,240 --> 00:28:54,400
Speaker 1: the other packets. To make whatever the thing is. And

505
00:28:54,520 --> 00:28:56,959
Speaker 1: since we're talking about the Internet, let's be honest, chances

506
00:28:57,000 --> 00:28:59,880
Speaker 1: are it's a picture of a cat. So that cat

507
00:29:00,000 --> 00:29:02,120
Speaker 1: picture is going to be a lot of different data packets,

508
00:29:02,160 --> 00:29:03,920
Speaker 1: and they have to put the packets together kind of

509
00:29:03,920 --> 00:29:06,040
Speaker 1: like a puzzle in order to recreate that image of

510
00:29:06,040 --> 00:29:08,680
Speaker 1: a cat. So that's that's what a packet is. Well,

511
00:29:08,720 --> 00:29:11,840
Speaker 1: the packet because it has that information on it about

512
00:29:11,880 --> 00:29:14,000
Speaker 1: where it's going and where it's from. That's what we

513
00:29:14,040 --> 00:29:17,600
Speaker 1: would call metadata, right, It's the data about the data,

514
00:29:18,200 --> 00:29:21,080
Speaker 1: or it's data that somehow describes the data that's inside.

515
00:29:21,640 --> 00:29:24,080
Speaker 1: And um and I always always try and say that

516
00:29:24,080 --> 00:29:26,400
Speaker 1: the packets on the other side get reassembled Willy Wonka

517
00:29:26,440 --> 00:29:30,160
Speaker 1: style like Mike TV when he goes across the camera. Um.

518
00:29:30,840 --> 00:29:32,960
Speaker 1: I like that. Yeah, I mean it's a it's a

519
00:29:33,240 --> 00:29:35,520
Speaker 1: nice way of putting it, especially since I mean that's

520
00:29:35,560 --> 00:29:37,280
Speaker 1: one of my favorite films of all time, the Gene

521
00:29:37,320 --> 00:29:40,520
Speaker 1: Wilder version of the Not the not the Johnny version yet.

522
00:29:40,960 --> 00:29:45,400
Speaker 1: So that's where we get the words for packets. So

523
00:29:45,480 --> 00:29:49,120
Speaker 1: a packet sniffer, as we mentioned earlier, can be software,

524
00:29:49,200 --> 00:29:51,120
Speaker 1: it can be hardware, it can be a combination of

525
00:29:51,120 --> 00:29:55,080
Speaker 1: the two. That is meant to sort of check out

526
00:29:55,200 --> 00:29:58,520
Speaker 1: the packets that are being sent across a network UH

527
00:29:58,600 --> 00:30:01,920
Speaker 1: and get an idea of what's going on there. And

528
00:30:02,040 --> 00:30:05,160
Speaker 1: one of the things someone can do if they have

529
00:30:05,200 --> 00:30:07,720
Speaker 1: a packet sniffer and they know how to do it,

530
00:30:07,760 --> 00:30:11,000
Speaker 1: is they can look for packets that represent essentially an

531
00:30:11,040 --> 00:30:16,000
Speaker 1: unencrypted cookie or a session key, And this is essentially

532
00:30:16,000 --> 00:30:19,000
Speaker 1: where a user has sent a request to log into

533
00:30:19,040 --> 00:30:22,520
Speaker 1: a service of some sort UH and if the hacker

534
00:30:22,640 --> 00:30:25,440
Speaker 1: is able to sniff out that cookie, they might be

535
00:30:25,480 --> 00:30:30,640
Speaker 1: able to step in and pose as that user and

536
00:30:30,720 --> 00:30:34,440
Speaker 1: thus get access to the user's account or services UM.

537
00:30:34,800 --> 00:30:38,960
Speaker 1: And this is sometimes referred to as side jacking. I

538
00:30:40,200 --> 00:30:43,120
Speaker 1: learned a lot of hacker slang while I was doing

539
00:30:43,120 --> 00:30:45,880
Speaker 1: the research. This. I'm so proud of you. I'm not

540
00:30:45,920 --> 00:30:49,000
Speaker 1: good at using it, but I learned it. It's okay.

541
00:30:49,040 --> 00:30:51,600
Speaker 1: You could go to def Con next year and totally fitting. Yeah,

542
00:30:51,600 --> 00:30:53,320
Speaker 1: except I would be like, all right, well, I'm gonna

543
00:30:53,400 --> 00:30:57,800
Speaker 1: leave all of my devices at home. Another great idea

544
00:30:58,840 --> 00:31:01,000
Speaker 1: def con for those who do not know is a

545
00:31:01,520 --> 00:31:06,040
Speaker 1: information security and hacking convention where if you aren't careful,

546
00:31:06,320 --> 00:31:09,840
Speaker 1: they will let you know about it. Oh yeah, they do.

547
00:31:10,040 --> 00:31:12,200
Speaker 1: Usually they're nice about it, and you just end up

548
00:31:12,200 --> 00:31:15,840
Speaker 1: on this thing called the wall of shame. But luckily

549
00:31:16,240 --> 00:31:19,959
Speaker 1: generally people don't nefariously hack each other there. It's just

550
00:31:20,080 --> 00:31:22,760
Speaker 1: kind of to pop your name up on a wall

551
00:31:22,760 --> 00:31:26,560
Speaker 1: of shame and that's about it. Yeah, essentially, essentially they're saying, hey,

552
00:31:26,800 --> 00:31:28,920
Speaker 1: you need to have a heads up, like whatever you're

553
00:31:28,920 --> 00:31:31,960
Speaker 1: doing is not sufficient. Yeah, it's it's really more like

554
00:31:32,480 --> 00:31:36,200
Speaker 1: it's really more like saying like, listen, we want you

555
00:31:36,280 --> 00:31:39,320
Speaker 1: to be safe, and right now you're not being safe.

556
00:31:39,800 --> 00:31:43,440
Speaker 1: So but but yeah, but still there's also the shame factor.

557
00:31:43,720 --> 00:31:46,400
Speaker 1: And the more the more known you are in the sphere,

558
00:31:46,440 --> 00:31:48,680
Speaker 1: I imagine, the greater the shame would be to appear

559
00:31:48,680 --> 00:31:52,960
Speaker 1: on that wall. Oh yeah, definitely. So this was never

560
00:31:53,040 --> 00:31:54,320
Speaker 1: been on the wall of shame, and I hope I

561
00:31:54,360 --> 00:31:57,000
Speaker 1: never congratulations. Yeah, I've never been on the wall of

562
00:31:57,040 --> 00:31:59,800
Speaker 1: shame either, but that's because I haven't gone. I am

563
00:32:00,000 --> 00:32:02,640
Speaker 1: certain I would end up doing something bone headed and

564
00:32:02,720 --> 00:32:05,120
Speaker 1: mess up. So you were talking earlier about how you

565
00:32:05,160 --> 00:32:09,120
Speaker 1: have actually actively worked on technologies that do this this

566
00:32:09,320 --> 00:32:14,400
Speaker 1: packet sniffing uh approach. Yes, yes, I have. I used

567
00:32:14,400 --> 00:32:16,840
Speaker 1: to work at a company called Hack five. I still

568
00:32:16,880 --> 00:32:20,800
Speaker 1: do shows on that channel, j K five, and our

569
00:32:20,920 --> 00:32:24,320
Speaker 1: our premise for that channel is educating people who are

570
00:32:24,440 --> 00:32:27,600
Speaker 1: interested in security and privacy and might want to go

571
00:32:27,680 --> 00:32:34,120
Speaker 1: into information technology or penetration testing or infosec info security

572
00:32:34,720 --> 00:32:39,000
Speaker 1: as a profession. So we teach young hackers how to

573
00:32:39,800 --> 00:32:43,520
Speaker 1: legally use their talents to actually get a job that

574
00:32:43,560 --> 00:32:47,480
Speaker 1: will help them spur the economy, help them protect companies,

575
00:32:48,080 --> 00:32:52,440
Speaker 1: h and help them really get involved with their passion. Um. So,

576
00:32:52,640 --> 00:32:55,680
Speaker 1: one of the products that we created is something called

577
00:32:55,800 --> 00:32:59,120
Speaker 1: called the WiFi Pineapple. It's a little hardware device. It's

578
00:32:59,160 --> 00:33:02,680
Speaker 1: basically a round outer, but the software that's built into

579
00:33:02,920 --> 00:33:07,920
Speaker 1: the WiFi Pineapple allows us to do things like get

580
00:33:07,960 --> 00:33:11,160
Speaker 1: people to connect to a WiFi Pineapple as opposed to

581
00:33:11,200 --> 00:33:14,959
Speaker 1: a regular router and allow us to sniff packets just

582
00:33:15,040 --> 00:33:19,239
Speaker 1: like you were saying. Um. The the product has been

583
00:33:19,280 --> 00:33:22,160
Speaker 1: around for half a decade at this point. No, actually

584
00:33:22,200 --> 00:33:24,480
Speaker 1: it's been almost a decade. Wow, I can't believe it's

585
00:33:24,480 --> 00:33:27,840
Speaker 1: been so long. But we've gone through various revisions of it,

586
00:33:28,000 --> 00:33:32,440
Speaker 1: and as security has gotten stronger, there's always been new

587
00:33:32,520 --> 00:33:37,200
Speaker 1: vulnerabilities available in wireless network technology, so we've always been

588
00:33:37,240 --> 00:33:40,840
Speaker 1: able to update the WiFi Pineapple to continue to educate

589
00:33:40,880 --> 00:33:45,040
Speaker 1: people why it's still a good idea to not connect

590
00:33:45,080 --> 00:33:50,800
Speaker 1: to public WiFi or open hotspots. And uh, it's been

591
00:33:50,840 --> 00:33:54,880
Speaker 1: a wonderful education tool since we can use it as

592
00:33:54,920 --> 00:33:57,800
Speaker 1: this kind of man in the middle attack for for

593
00:33:58,000 --> 00:34:02,160
Speaker 1: you know, helping people understand and I mean, like the

594
00:34:02,320 --> 00:34:05,720
Speaker 1: thing that I see people sometimes and I know you've

595
00:34:05,760 --> 00:34:08,720
Speaker 1: seen it sometimes protests they're like, why are you making

596
00:34:08,760 --> 00:34:11,520
Speaker 1: this thing? And the argument I would make to them,

597
00:34:11,520 --> 00:34:13,279
Speaker 1: and I'm sure it's an argument that you guys have

598
00:34:13,360 --> 00:34:16,640
Speaker 1: made numerous times, is you know that people who have

599
00:34:16,719 --> 00:34:20,680
Speaker 1: bad intentions are making stuff like this already. They're they're

600
00:34:20,800 --> 00:34:23,960
Speaker 1: they're doing it all the time. They're doing and they're

601
00:34:24,000 --> 00:34:26,880
Speaker 1: not talking about it. They're not upfront about it because

602
00:34:26,920 --> 00:34:29,839
Speaker 1: they want to take advantage of it. The reason why

603
00:34:29,920 --> 00:34:33,520
Speaker 1: you guys do it is to raise awareness, to teach

604
00:34:33,560 --> 00:34:37,359
Speaker 1: people how it works, and presumably they can then take

605
00:34:37,400 --> 00:34:41,040
Speaker 1: that knowledge and better protect whatever their future clients might

606
00:34:41,040 --> 00:34:43,160
Speaker 1: be if they end up working as a white hat hacker.

607
00:34:43,840 --> 00:34:46,760
Speaker 1: And yeah, straight up, people have made their own WiFi

608
00:34:46,800 --> 00:34:50,440
Speaker 1: pineapples using you know, different types of hardware and different

609
00:34:50,480 --> 00:34:53,719
Speaker 1: kind of software that they've made their own, but our

610
00:34:53,840 --> 00:34:57,120
Speaker 1: our products are well. Hack fives products are listed in MIST,

611
00:34:57,200 --> 00:35:01,680
Speaker 1: which is the National Institute of Standards and Technologies as

612
00:35:01,719 --> 00:35:06,200
Speaker 1: a wireless penetration testing device. So a lot of companies

613
00:35:06,239 --> 00:35:09,719
Speaker 1: see it as a professional tool and they get their

614
00:35:09,760 --> 00:35:13,319
Speaker 1: employees to purchase these items to use and make sure

615
00:35:13,360 --> 00:35:15,799
Speaker 1: that their networks are protected. Because as much as you

616
00:35:15,840 --> 00:35:19,120
Speaker 1: could use a WiFi Pineapple to hack somebody, you can

617
00:35:19,160 --> 00:35:21,879
Speaker 1: also use it to protect yourself because you're still doing

618
00:35:21,920 --> 00:35:25,839
Speaker 1: the same kind of tracking on your known network. So

619
00:35:25,920 --> 00:35:28,640
Speaker 1: if I had a WiFi Pineapple on a company's network

620
00:35:28,719 --> 00:35:33,280
Speaker 1: that I'm legally have access to as since that's my profession,

621
00:35:33,320 --> 00:35:37,160
Speaker 1: for example, hypothetically, uh, then I could see what employees

622
00:35:37,200 --> 00:35:39,640
Speaker 1: are doing on that network. So if somebody is visiting

623
00:35:39,640 --> 00:35:41,640
Speaker 1: Facebook when they shouldn't be, I could see that and

624
00:35:41,680 --> 00:35:43,480
Speaker 1: I could tell them, hey, you need to, you know,

625
00:35:43,640 --> 00:35:45,440
Speaker 1: cut that off or you're going to get written up.

626
00:35:46,000 --> 00:35:49,000
Speaker 1: Or if there was an attacker trying to gain access

627
00:35:49,000 --> 00:35:51,359
Speaker 1: to a wireless network, I would be able to see

628
00:35:51,400 --> 00:35:54,200
Speaker 1: those packets because they would not be what I normally see,

629
00:35:54,560 --> 00:35:56,600
Speaker 1: and I would be able to protect my network because

630
00:35:56,640 --> 00:36:00,000
Speaker 1: I could blacklist them then, So there's so many different

631
00:36:00,040 --> 00:36:02,839
Speaker 1: ways that you can use these tools, not just nefariously

632
00:36:02,920 --> 00:36:07,080
Speaker 1: like you had mentioned, but in like these amazing ways

633
00:36:07,160 --> 00:36:10,200
Speaker 1: that help protect so much more than just companies but

634
00:36:10,239 --> 00:36:13,239
Speaker 1: also the employees that are working there as well. Yeah. Yeah,

635
00:36:13,239 --> 00:36:15,719
Speaker 1: and that. And I've always been the type to say,

636
00:36:15,800 --> 00:36:19,759
Speaker 1: if if someone's outwardly talking about what their technology can do,

637
00:36:20,520 --> 00:36:23,480
Speaker 1: then those are the people you should trust. It's the

638
00:36:23,520 --> 00:36:26,800
Speaker 1: ones who aren't talking that you have to worry about.

639
00:36:27,360 --> 00:36:29,640
Speaker 1: So yeah, it's the same thing for me when people

640
00:36:29,680 --> 00:36:32,640
Speaker 1: are talking about security vulnerabilities that they found in systems,

641
00:36:32,640 --> 00:36:35,200
Speaker 1: where they might come forward and say, yeah, I reported

642
00:36:35,239 --> 00:36:37,920
Speaker 1: this like three months ago, the company still hasn't done

643
00:36:37,920 --> 00:36:40,200
Speaker 1: anything about it. The only reason I'm coming forward is

644
00:36:40,239 --> 00:36:42,960
Speaker 1: because that puts the pressure on the company to definitely

645
00:36:42,960 --> 00:36:46,600
Speaker 1: make a change, because that vulnerability exists, whether they talk

646
00:36:46,640 --> 00:36:49,160
Speaker 1: about it or not. Now they have to do something

647
00:36:49,160 --> 00:36:52,440
Speaker 1: because the public knows about it, and and they're I'm

648
00:36:52,480 --> 00:36:54,239
Speaker 1: I'm fully on board with that too. I mean, I

649
00:36:54,280 --> 00:36:57,759
Speaker 1: think that you always give the entity the chance to

650
00:36:57,840 --> 00:37:02,279
Speaker 1: address it, but if they haven't shown any movement towards that,

651
00:37:02,719 --> 00:37:04,920
Speaker 1: I think it's the responsibility of someone who's found a

652
00:37:04,960 --> 00:37:09,279
Speaker 1: vulnerability to come forward with it, because otherwise it's just

653
00:37:09,440 --> 00:37:11,440
Speaker 1: it's just a ticking time bomb. Someone's going to take

654
00:37:11,440 --> 00:37:14,600
Speaker 1: advantage of it, and then it becomes a problem far

655
00:37:14,719 --> 00:37:17,319
Speaker 1: bigger than coming forward and saying, hey, guys, need to

656
00:37:17,320 --> 00:37:20,600
Speaker 1: fix your stuff. And it's it's not just you know,

657
00:37:20,680 --> 00:37:24,000
Speaker 1: devices like the WiFi Pineapple, but as we had mentioned,

658
00:37:24,040 --> 00:37:27,000
Speaker 1: it's also software that's involved too that can do very

659
00:37:27,040 --> 00:37:32,200
Speaker 1: similar type of tracking on networks. There's a technology called

660
00:37:32,200 --> 00:37:35,360
Speaker 1: wire Shark, which I'll bring up not just because you know,

661
00:37:35,480 --> 00:37:40,440
Speaker 1: I have no financial responsibility via hack five. So like

662
00:37:41,120 --> 00:37:43,879
Speaker 1: if if you know, somebody purchases a WiFi Pineapple when

663
00:37:43,880 --> 00:37:46,080
Speaker 1: they hear this talk, I don't get anything from that,

664
00:37:46,120 --> 00:37:48,840
Speaker 1: no compensation whatsoever. I just do a show on that channel,

665
00:37:48,880 --> 00:37:51,560
Speaker 1: So don't worry. I'm not. I don't get referrals or anything.

666
00:37:52,080 --> 00:37:55,080
Speaker 1: But there's also software like wire shark, which is a

667
00:37:55,120 --> 00:37:58,720
Speaker 1: free service online that anybody can download and that allows

668
00:37:58,719 --> 00:38:02,840
Speaker 1: you to do packets niffing. I've used it to test

669
00:38:02,920 --> 00:38:05,640
Speaker 1: my own home network and make sure that my smart

670
00:38:05,680 --> 00:38:11,600
Speaker 1: coot devices are secure and they're encrypted, and that has luckily, luckily,

671
00:38:11,600 --> 00:38:14,439
Speaker 1: all of my devices are you know, totally secure, which

672
00:38:14,480 --> 00:38:17,080
Speaker 1: is wonderful. But back in the day when I first

673
00:38:17,080 --> 00:38:20,560
Speaker 1: started using wire shark, I discovered that when I was

674
00:38:20,640 --> 00:38:24,319
Speaker 1: using Instagram on my phone, I could see links to

675
00:38:24,480 --> 00:38:27,799
Speaker 1: the pictures that I was liking as I liked them,

676
00:38:27,880 --> 00:38:30,600
Speaker 1: So as I gave them the little hearts, uh, it

677
00:38:30,600 --> 00:38:33,120
Speaker 1: would pull up a little HTTP link and I could

678
00:38:33,120 --> 00:38:35,359
Speaker 1: click on that through wire Shark, and I could see

679
00:38:35,400 --> 00:38:39,320
Speaker 1: exactly which pictures I was liking, which was so creepy.

680
00:38:39,360 --> 00:38:43,480
Speaker 1: I mean, definitely something that you should be aware of

681
00:38:43,680 --> 00:38:46,600
Speaker 1: is what kind of data is being passed through with

682
00:38:46,640 --> 00:38:49,160
Speaker 1: no encryption whatsoever, and what kind of data is being

683
00:38:49,239 --> 00:38:53,720
Speaker 1: encrypted too. Yeah, totally, and you means crazy. You mentioned

684
00:38:53,760 --> 00:38:56,880
Speaker 1: the man in the middle attack. That's that's kind of

685
00:38:56,920 --> 00:39:01,360
Speaker 1: another step up, where you have a hacker that sets

686
00:39:01,600 --> 00:39:06,280
Speaker 1: their machine in between a user and some other computer

687
00:39:06,440 --> 00:39:08,640
Speaker 1: that might be a router. So you might actually have

688
00:39:08,640 --> 00:39:10,439
Speaker 1: a man in the middle of attack where someone say

689
00:39:10,480 --> 00:39:13,000
Speaker 1: at the coffee shop, and they set up uh their

690
00:39:13,160 --> 00:39:16,800
Speaker 1: computer so that it appears to be the coffee shops network.

691
00:39:17,360 --> 00:39:20,360
Speaker 1: There's actually ways where you can force a reboot of

692
00:39:20,360 --> 00:39:22,920
Speaker 1: a system and then pose as that system so that

693
00:39:23,360 --> 00:39:28,399
Speaker 1: when it does reboot, you are effectively a middleman. In

694
00:39:28,400 --> 00:39:31,239
Speaker 1: that relationship, and meanwhile you see all the stuff that

695
00:39:31,280 --> 00:39:34,279
Speaker 1: goes across that because your computer is acting as the

696
00:39:34,400 --> 00:39:38,400
Speaker 1: network spot for where where everybody's connecting through. Uh So

697
00:39:38,480 --> 00:39:41,200
Speaker 1: that's that's one way, But there's also ways of doing

698
00:39:41,239 --> 00:39:44,560
Speaker 1: a man in the middle of attack between a like

699
00:39:44,760 --> 00:39:48,840
Speaker 1: a client and an actual service, like you know, directing

700
00:39:48,840 --> 00:39:52,000
Speaker 1: people to fake bank log in pages and things of

701
00:39:52,040 --> 00:39:54,360
Speaker 1: that nature. UM So those are things you also have

702
00:39:54,360 --> 00:39:57,960
Speaker 1: to be aware of. Although that can happen pretty much

703
00:39:57,960 --> 00:40:00,480
Speaker 1: in every scenario we're going to talk about. That requires

704
00:40:00,520 --> 00:40:02,960
Speaker 1: you to pay close attention to what you are doing

705
00:40:03,000 --> 00:40:06,960
Speaker 1: as you're browsing. Um And I mentioned earlier about the

706
00:40:07,000 --> 00:40:09,960
Speaker 1: idea that if you are using public WiFi that is

707
00:40:10,000 --> 00:40:13,439
Speaker 1: password protected, Let's say you're at a coffee shop where yeah,

708
00:40:13,480 --> 00:40:16,279
Speaker 1: you can log into their their WiFi, but you have

709
00:40:16,320 --> 00:40:18,600
Speaker 1: to first go up to the cash register and find

710
00:40:18,600 --> 00:40:20,319
Speaker 1: out what the password is, and then you find that

711
00:40:20,360 --> 00:40:22,680
Speaker 1: out and you log in. Some people feel like that

712
00:40:22,760 --> 00:40:26,200
Speaker 1: gives them that extra area of security. Honestly, that doesn't

713
00:40:26,400 --> 00:40:29,680
Speaker 1: because there's nothing stopping a hacker going into that same

714
00:40:29,719 --> 00:40:33,120
Speaker 1: coffee shop getting that same password and like that. It

715
00:40:33,160 --> 00:40:35,879
Speaker 1: doesn't add any like by itself. It doesn't add any

716
00:40:35,880 --> 00:40:40,120
Speaker 1: extra security. It just is one extra little step. Yeah,

717
00:40:40,160 --> 00:40:44,000
Speaker 1: it's true. Uh yeah, anybody even in the vicinity, if

718
00:40:44,000 --> 00:40:49,279
Speaker 1: they've ever had access to that wireless password and the

719
00:40:49,320 --> 00:40:51,960
Speaker 1: coffee shop, for example, has never changed the password, like

720
00:40:52,000 --> 00:40:55,520
Speaker 1: they could easily get access again with a long range

721
00:40:55,560 --> 00:40:57,799
Speaker 1: antenna on the other side of a parking lot and

722
00:40:57,840 --> 00:41:00,640
Speaker 1: be able to sniff what everybody in that coffee shop

723
00:41:00,680 --> 00:41:04,120
Speaker 1: is doing. So yeah, I don't even use coffee shop

724
00:41:04,120 --> 00:41:07,520
Speaker 1: WiFi or airport WiFi if we want to use that example,

725
00:41:08,440 --> 00:41:12,160
Speaker 1: those even trustworthy exactly, and I think that those are

726
00:41:12,360 --> 00:41:15,279
Speaker 1: perfect examples, especially as people are traveling a lot for

727
00:41:15,280 --> 00:41:19,440
Speaker 1: the holidays. Like that's where I think of seeing people

728
00:41:19,440 --> 00:41:22,080
Speaker 1: whipping out their computers the most is airports and coffee shops.

729
00:41:22,120 --> 00:41:28,600
Speaker 1: That's it. Um. But yeah, if you have an encrypted network,

730
00:41:29,160 --> 00:41:33,239
Speaker 1: that's better. It's again like this is another step where

731
00:41:33,280 --> 00:41:37,359
Speaker 1: we're getting into uh more secure area. And we'll talk

732
00:41:37,400 --> 00:41:40,439
Speaker 1: about different types of encryption in a second, but before

733
00:41:40,480 --> 00:41:44,480
Speaker 1: we get to that, there's actually also a difference in

734
00:41:44,520 --> 00:41:48,680
Speaker 1: the types of browsers, right. Different browsers offer different levels

735
00:41:48,880 --> 00:41:54,759
Speaker 1: of features that either uh enable security and privacy or

736
00:41:55,080 --> 00:41:58,520
Speaker 1: they make it really difficult to protect, so on the

737
00:41:58,600 --> 00:42:02,640
Speaker 1: bad end of the scale as an Internet explorer for

738
00:42:02,719 --> 00:42:07,640
Speaker 1: multiple reasons. It was never the best browser when it

739
00:42:07,680 --> 00:42:11,120
Speaker 1: comes to security and privacy, but it's really not great

740
00:42:11,160 --> 00:42:14,920
Speaker 1: now because Microsoft no longer actively supports it. UM. They

741
00:42:14,960 --> 00:42:18,719
Speaker 1: will push out a security update on occasion, but it's

742
00:42:19,160 --> 00:42:22,399
Speaker 1: not frequent, which means that there are a lot more

743
00:42:22,440 --> 00:42:27,759
Speaker 1: opportunities for people to discover and exploit vulnerabilities and and

744
00:42:27,920 --> 00:42:31,880
Speaker 1: be fairly sure that those vulnerabilities will stick around for

745
00:42:31,920 --> 00:42:35,520
Speaker 1: a while. So it's not even like a rush because

746
00:42:35,840 --> 00:42:40,400
Speaker 1: Microsoft isn't updating it that frequently with security patches, So

747
00:42:40,719 --> 00:42:45,279
Speaker 1: that's a bad one. Don't use it. Microsoft Microsoft Edge

748
00:42:45,920 --> 00:42:50,879
Speaker 1: only slightly better than the completely unsupported Internet Explorer UM,

749
00:42:50,920 --> 00:42:54,840
Speaker 1: at least as far as privacy is concerned. Uh. I

750
00:42:54,960 --> 00:42:57,640
Speaker 1: use Google Chrome a lot, but admittedly Google Chrome not

751
00:42:57,760 --> 00:43:00,160
Speaker 1: great either. It's kind of on the bottom half off

752
00:43:00,160 --> 00:43:03,879
Speaker 1: of the middle of the pack. So uh, they're better

753
00:43:03,880 --> 00:43:06,799
Speaker 1: about security, but they are the pets when it comes

754
00:43:06,800 --> 00:43:10,040
Speaker 1: to privacy. Also not a big surprise, because I mean,

755
00:43:11,120 --> 00:43:15,040
Speaker 1: what's Google's business, right? Google owns you? Yeah, your data

756
00:43:15,360 --> 00:43:18,839
Speaker 1: is Google's That's what Google buys and sells. Like it's

757
00:43:18,880 --> 00:43:24,080
Speaker 1: your information. That's that's Google's currency. So clearly it does

758
00:43:24,080 --> 00:43:29,279
Speaker 1: not behoove Google too lockdown privacy super tight. They want

759
00:43:29,320 --> 00:43:31,879
Speaker 1: to know all the information about you they make that's

760
00:43:31,880 --> 00:43:35,239
Speaker 1: how they make their money. UM. So, of all the

761
00:43:35,280 --> 00:43:38,359
Speaker 1: common browsers, like the ones that are frequently used out there,

762
00:43:38,840 --> 00:43:41,760
Speaker 1: the one that UH that tends to rank the highest

763
00:43:41,840 --> 00:43:47,120
Speaker 1: is Firefox, higher than Opera, higher than Chrome, higher than Safari. UM.

764
00:43:47,360 --> 00:43:51,160
Speaker 1: So it does really well, especially for security and privacy.

765
00:43:51,800 --> 00:43:55,080
Speaker 1: It can support a lot of features that protect you

766
00:43:55,160 --> 00:43:57,960
Speaker 1: when you're when you're surfing stuff that will end up

767
00:43:58,000 --> 00:44:01,200
Speaker 1: cutting down on things like targeted advertise because you can

768
00:44:01,440 --> 00:44:05,640
Speaker 1: really limit the information that's being shared by the sites

769
00:44:05,680 --> 00:44:09,759
Speaker 1: that you're visiting. UM And you can also enhance it

770
00:44:09,840 --> 00:44:13,440
Speaker 1: with various add ons that you can find, although obviously

771
00:44:13,480 --> 00:44:18,520
Speaker 1: anytime you're going to be adding anything to an existing program,

772
00:44:18,520 --> 00:44:21,200
Speaker 1: it pays to do your research to make sure that

773
00:44:21,239 --> 00:44:29,399
Speaker 1: it is offered by a reputable and dependable app developer. Yeah,

774
00:44:29,440 --> 00:44:33,520
Speaker 1: Firefox is an excellent choice UH and two fold. If

775
00:44:33,560 --> 00:44:36,600
Speaker 1: you download something like Firefox, you also get a very

776
00:44:36,640 --> 00:44:39,399
Speaker 1: fast browser because they have worked very hard to make

777
00:44:39,440 --> 00:44:42,239
Speaker 1: that browser quick. So even if you don't care about

778
00:44:42,239 --> 00:44:44,920
Speaker 1: the security and you just want to access your sites

779
00:44:44,960 --> 00:44:49,920
Speaker 1: really fast, you should use Firefox. Yeah, yeah, I got Firefox.

780
00:44:49,960 --> 00:44:52,360
Speaker 1: I got stuck on Chrome because for a while Chrome

781
00:44:52,480 --> 00:44:55,399
Speaker 1: was super fast and then it got super bloated. And

782
00:44:55,600 --> 00:44:58,440
Speaker 1: also there's the more tabs you have opening Chrome. Anyone

783
00:44:58,440 --> 00:45:00,719
Speaker 1: who's done this with Chrome knows. Even though it are

784
00:45:00,760 --> 00:45:04,440
Speaker 1: all supposed to be distinct instances that don't bleed over

785
00:45:04,440 --> 00:45:07,160
Speaker 1: into each other, Uh, there gets to be some memory

786
00:45:07,200 --> 00:45:10,680
Speaker 1: issues if you happen to be really a heavy user,

787
00:45:10,719 --> 00:45:13,120
Speaker 1: and everyone here at this company is a heavy user.

788
00:45:13,200 --> 00:45:16,680
Speaker 1: So uh, Firefox is definitely going to be my browser

789
00:45:16,760 --> 00:45:20,400
Speaker 1: of choice moving forward after I did this research. I also,

790
00:45:20,560 --> 00:45:22,960
Speaker 1: I should point out, before I did this research, I

791
00:45:23,000 --> 00:45:26,480
Speaker 1: did not know this. I was just a happy, blithe,

792
00:45:26,640 --> 00:45:31,560
Speaker 1: naive Chrome user handing handing over reams of personal data

793
00:45:31,640 --> 00:45:34,840
Speaker 1: to Google, which I mean, granted, I'm sure that company's

794
00:45:34,840 --> 00:45:37,400
Speaker 1: board with me by now, but still there's some value

795
00:45:37,400 --> 00:45:41,719
Speaker 1: there um. And then that brings us to encryption. And

796
00:45:41,800 --> 00:45:45,680
Speaker 1: this encryption it gets this is sort of like complicated,

797
00:45:45,680 --> 00:45:48,319
Speaker 1: like the handshake thing, but encryption, when you boil it down,

798
00:45:48,840 --> 00:45:51,959
Speaker 1: is all about scrambling messages so that the only people

799
00:45:52,000 --> 00:45:54,400
Speaker 1: who can access it are the ones who have the

800
00:45:54,480 --> 00:45:56,799
Speaker 1: key to decode it, right, So you have the key

801
00:45:56,800 --> 00:45:59,600
Speaker 1: to encode and the key to decode. There are various

802
00:46:00,239 --> 00:46:04,720
Speaker 1: implementations of that technology, different ways to have the public

803
00:46:04,800 --> 00:46:07,880
Speaker 1: key and private key operations. I don't need to get

804
00:46:07,920 --> 00:46:11,360
Speaker 1: into all of that because it gets way too technical. Obviously,

805
00:46:11,920 --> 00:46:16,080
Speaker 1: encrypted is better than unencrypted, but not all encryption schemes

806
00:46:16,080 --> 00:46:19,919
Speaker 1: are created equal, and it pays which ones are in use.

807
00:46:21,239 --> 00:46:24,320
Speaker 1: So yes, that's very true. There's there's even like there's

808
00:46:24,719 --> 00:46:29,719
Speaker 1: symmetrical keys and asymmetrical keys, and then there's like SHAW

809
00:46:29,840 --> 00:46:32,680
Speaker 1: one and be crypt and r s A. There's all

810
00:46:32,719 --> 00:46:36,520
Speaker 1: these different terminologies for encryption. But for what it's worth,

811
00:46:37,280 --> 00:46:41,279
Speaker 1: all of them jumble up your information into some kind

812
00:46:41,320 --> 00:46:44,719
Speaker 1: of format that will hopefully hopefully encrypted, so that anybody

813
00:46:44,760 --> 00:46:48,239
Speaker 1: who does gain access to the encrypted version of your

814
00:46:48,280 --> 00:46:51,920
Speaker 1: information will not be able to reverse engineer it or

815
00:46:52,680 --> 00:46:56,279
Speaker 1: change it back to its original plain text formats, so

816
00:46:56,320 --> 00:46:59,000
Speaker 1: they can't read it in like English speak, right, it

817
00:46:59,040 --> 00:47:02,560
Speaker 1: would just be mean less garbage to them, hopefully in

818
00:47:02,640 --> 00:47:06,520
Speaker 1: its ideal, ideal implementation. So one of the things that

819
00:47:06,560 --> 00:47:08,480
Speaker 1: you may have encountered if you've ever set up any

820
00:47:08,480 --> 00:47:10,600
Speaker 1: sort of wireless network. I think most people have, or

821
00:47:10,600 --> 00:47:13,080
Speaker 1: at least they've they've had to connect to one where

822
00:47:13,120 --> 00:47:19,440
Speaker 1: they've seen the different types of UH network security protocols.

823
00:47:20,040 --> 00:47:24,440
Speaker 1: These are certifications that the WiFi Security Alliance creates, and

824
00:47:24,719 --> 00:47:29,000
Speaker 1: the earliest one was the Wired Equivalent Privacy Protocol or

825
00:47:29,160 --> 00:47:34,080
Speaker 1: w e p H. That one is decrepit, it's old,

826
00:47:34,160 --> 00:47:37,399
Speaker 1: it's vulnerable as heck, so don't use it. Yeah, if

827
00:47:37,440 --> 00:47:39,640
Speaker 1: you have the if if your router tells you, like

828
00:47:39,680 --> 00:47:41,880
Speaker 1: asks you which one you want to use, don't use

829
00:47:42,000 --> 00:47:46,160
Speaker 1: w ep UM. It is not secure. It is it's

830
00:47:46,200 --> 00:47:48,239
Speaker 1: I mean, you could argue it's better than nothing, but

831
00:47:48,400 --> 00:47:51,560
Speaker 1: not by much because the vulnerabilities have been known for

832
00:47:51,600 --> 00:47:54,879
Speaker 1: a long time. In fact, so long that even before

833
00:47:54,880 --> 00:47:57,759
Speaker 1: the nineties were up, you had people developing the next generation,

834
00:47:58,560 --> 00:48:01,840
Speaker 1: which would have been the WiFi Protected Access or w

835
00:48:02,000 --> 00:48:04,520
Speaker 1: p A. So w p A came out. Then you

836
00:48:04,520 --> 00:48:07,080
Speaker 1: get w p A two, which was trying to address

837
00:48:07,239 --> 00:48:12,239
Speaker 1: some of the shortcomings of w p A UH. Both

838
00:48:12,280 --> 00:48:15,720
Speaker 1: of those also still have vulnerabilities. W p A two

839
00:48:15,880 --> 00:48:19,640
Speaker 1: is generally talked about as being one of the more

840
00:48:19,680 --> 00:48:23,920
Speaker 1: secure UH certifications these days. There is a w p

841
00:48:24,040 --> 00:48:28,080
Speaker 1: A three also has vulnerabilities that have pointed out within

842
00:48:28,080 --> 00:48:31,719
Speaker 1: the year of coming out. Yeah so, but w P I,

843
00:48:31,400 --> 00:48:33,800
Speaker 1: I don't think I've even seen a lot of stuff

844
00:48:33,840 --> 00:48:37,359
Speaker 1: that's certified w P A three yet. Like we've we've

845
00:48:37,360 --> 00:48:40,040
Speaker 1: started to see some wireless routers come out with w

846
00:48:40,120 --> 00:48:44,040
Speaker 1: P A three, but they there's still a little expensive

847
00:48:44,200 --> 00:48:49,520
Speaker 1: and they haven't really gotten widespread adoption by consumers quite yet.

848
00:48:49,760 --> 00:48:53,279
Speaker 1: So w P A two is fine for most consumers

849
00:48:53,280 --> 00:48:55,759
Speaker 1: to use. Uh, you just have to make sure that

850
00:48:55,840 --> 00:48:58,480
Speaker 1: you set it up correctly and you don't give the

851
00:48:58,640 --> 00:49:02,400
Speaker 1: entire world access to your password for your account. Yeah that,

852
00:49:02,760 --> 00:49:05,959
Speaker 1: because then there's what what were you even thinking? There's

853
00:49:06,000 --> 00:49:09,880
Speaker 1: no point then? Yeah. So, so w P A three

854
00:49:10,040 --> 00:49:13,520
Speaker 1: on w P A two. All these are our designations.

855
00:49:13,560 --> 00:49:16,960
Speaker 1: And what happens is a manufacturer will make a piece

856
00:49:16,960 --> 00:49:21,480
Speaker 1: of equipment or uh either it's a computer or handset

857
00:49:21,600 --> 00:49:24,160
Speaker 1: or maybe it's a router, and then they submit it

858
00:49:24,320 --> 00:49:28,440
Speaker 1: to this WiFi Security alliance that then makes sure that

859
00:49:28,440 --> 00:49:32,200
Speaker 1: that technology meets whatever the requirements are for the particular designation.

860
00:49:32,560 --> 00:49:34,680
Speaker 1: Then they put the stamp on it and they say, yes,

861
00:49:34,719 --> 00:49:37,320
Speaker 1: this is w P A two compliant or w P

862
00:49:37,440 --> 00:49:41,600
Speaker 1: A three compliant. So that just tells you that compliance

863
00:49:41,640 --> 00:49:45,680
Speaker 1: really there. It gets more granular than that. For example,

864
00:49:46,640 --> 00:49:50,080
Speaker 1: w P A two has two different types of encryption

865
00:49:50,080 --> 00:49:53,160
Speaker 1: standards that can be used. There's the bad one. It's

866
00:49:53,200 --> 00:49:56,160
Speaker 1: Temporal key Integrity Protocol or t k I P, and

867
00:49:56,160 --> 00:49:59,399
Speaker 1: I call it bad because yeah, t KIP. T KIP

868
00:49:59,480 --> 00:50:02,239
Speaker 1: is no longer safe, skip the tea KIP. If you

869
00:50:02,719 --> 00:50:04,799
Speaker 1: skip the tea KIP, I like that. Yeah, it's nice

870
00:50:04,840 --> 00:50:08,759
Speaker 1: mnemonic device. And then there's Advanced Encryption Standard or a

871
00:50:08,840 --> 00:50:10,680
Speaker 1: e S, and that's the more secure of the two.

872
00:50:11,480 --> 00:50:15,239
Speaker 1: So don't rely on tea KIP, rely on a S uh.

873
00:50:15,320 --> 00:50:19,160
Speaker 1: So that will end up protecting you quite a bit

874
00:50:19,400 --> 00:50:23,160
Speaker 1: as well. The encryption will end up helping a great

875
00:50:23,239 --> 00:50:27,440
Speaker 1: deal because you've just made it more difficult for someone

876
00:50:27,480 --> 00:50:32,960
Speaker 1: to get anything meaningful from your browsing activity. It does

877
00:50:33,040 --> 00:50:36,760
Speaker 1: not mean that you are immune. But again, the harder

878
00:50:36,840 --> 00:50:39,839
Speaker 1: you make it for somebody, the less chance they're gonna

879
00:50:39,880 --> 00:50:43,000
Speaker 1: put forth the effort to break through whatever protections you

880
00:50:43,040 --> 00:50:47,320
Speaker 1: put up. So just general note um, and then that

881
00:50:47,440 --> 00:50:51,680
Speaker 1: also brings us to secure browsing. So back in the day,

882
00:50:52,200 --> 00:50:53,640
Speaker 1: which was the Thursday, I don't know if you know

883
00:50:53,719 --> 00:50:57,920
Speaker 1: that UH, there was the the Secure Sockets Layer SSL,

884
00:50:58,920 --> 00:51:00,960
Speaker 1: whenever you went to a website that had the little

885
00:51:00,960 --> 00:51:04,839
Speaker 1: padlock and the lock on it and the HTTPS like

886
00:51:04,960 --> 00:51:07,239
Speaker 1: the original version of that was SSL. In fact, a

887
00:51:07,239 --> 00:51:09,360
Speaker 1: lot of people still refer to SSL, even though that

888
00:51:09,440 --> 00:51:13,360
Speaker 1: technically has been and has before a while been replaced

889
00:51:13,760 --> 00:51:17,439
Speaker 1: by the Transport Layer Security or TLS. But the same

890
00:51:17,480 --> 00:51:20,120
Speaker 1: sort of purpose it's too. It's meant to create the

891
00:51:20,239 --> 00:51:24,520
Speaker 1: secure channel of communication between you and a specific UH

892
00:51:24,680 --> 00:51:29,239
Speaker 1: website U r L address. So if you see HTTPS

893
00:51:29,520 --> 00:51:32,440
Speaker 1: or you see that little locked padlock in the address

894
00:51:32,440 --> 00:51:35,319
Speaker 1: bar of your browser, then you know you are in

895
00:51:35,520 --> 00:51:40,480
Speaker 1: a secure channel between you know, your your device and

896
00:51:40,520 --> 00:51:45,680
Speaker 1: that browser, at least as far as information going between

897
00:51:45,680 --> 00:51:47,640
Speaker 1: those two points are. I mean, obviously, if you're on

898
00:51:47,680 --> 00:51:51,640
Speaker 1: a public WiFi hotspot that's unsecured, you've got other issues.

899
00:51:52,160 --> 00:51:55,040
Speaker 1: But it means that when you're browsing, you want to

900
00:51:55,080 --> 00:51:58,040
Speaker 1: make sure that that HTTPS is showing up. You don't

901
00:51:58,160 --> 00:52:00,239
Speaker 1: you don't want the h T t P, you you

902
00:52:00,239 --> 00:52:03,120
Speaker 1: want to make sure that S is there. So one

903
00:52:03,200 --> 00:52:07,880
Speaker 1: thing I've noticed very rarely, but it has happened on occasion,

904
00:52:08,040 --> 00:52:11,680
Speaker 1: is where a website that requires you to log in

905
00:52:11,719 --> 00:52:15,600
Speaker 1: somewhere like their main page there dot com address will

906
00:52:15,719 --> 00:52:19,680
Speaker 1: be encrypted with HTTPS, but as soon as you go

907
00:52:19,800 --> 00:52:22,080
Speaker 1: over to the log in page or go through any

908
00:52:22,160 --> 00:52:25,480
Speaker 1: tree of different sites that they have created on their

909
00:52:25,560 --> 00:52:28,600
Speaker 1: dot com domain, all the rest of their pages are

910
00:52:28,960 --> 00:52:31,239
Speaker 1: h T T P. They are unencrypted. So if you

911
00:52:31,280 --> 00:52:33,560
Speaker 1: go to the log in page and my cat agrees

912
00:52:33,719 --> 00:52:36,239
Speaker 1: she's mewing behind me, uh, and you put in your

913
00:52:36,320 --> 00:52:40,560
Speaker 1: user name and password, those would be copied through plain text,

914
00:52:40,840 --> 00:52:45,160
Speaker 1: and if anybody was, you know, tracking or sniffing your packets,

915
00:52:45,239 --> 00:52:48,120
Speaker 1: they would be able to see that plane text user

916
00:52:48,200 --> 00:52:51,520
Speaker 1: name and passwords. So, for example, if my password was

917
00:52:51,880 --> 00:52:55,360
Speaker 1: my cat's name is Starbuck, and that was a plain text,

918
00:52:55,480 --> 00:53:00,680
Speaker 1: unencrypted website just using HTTP, then if somebody was sniffing

919
00:53:00,680 --> 00:53:03,600
Speaker 1: those packets, they could see that passwords show up in

920
00:53:03,640 --> 00:53:07,160
Speaker 1: their software through whatever hardware device they might be using,

921
00:53:07,640 --> 00:53:10,239
Speaker 1: and just be able to see, oh, she entered Starbuck,

922
00:53:10,400 --> 00:53:12,160
Speaker 1: and then they couldn't go to the website type that

923
00:53:12,239 --> 00:53:16,520
Speaker 1: in and gain access to my login account information. Yeah,

924
00:53:16,600 --> 00:53:20,520
Speaker 1: and that is what we call no bueno, right like yeah, yeah,

925
00:53:20,520 --> 00:53:24,520
Speaker 1: And more and more sites are getting better about making

926
00:53:24,600 --> 00:53:28,280
Speaker 1: certain that their entire presence they are is being secure,

927
00:53:28,320 --> 00:53:31,440
Speaker 1: but you can. It's actually harder and harder to find

928
00:53:31,520 --> 00:53:35,279
Speaker 1: examples websites doing that, so which I'm happy to see

929
00:53:35,360 --> 00:53:37,600
Speaker 1: because that makes my job harder and that means people

930
00:53:37,640 --> 00:53:40,640
Speaker 1: are listening. Uh So, I am happy to see that

931
00:53:40,800 --> 00:53:43,160
Speaker 1: less sites are doing that, but we still have issues.

932
00:53:43,480 --> 00:53:45,799
Speaker 1: There's still some out there. And then occasionally you have

933
00:53:46,120 --> 00:53:49,719
Speaker 1: browsers that will alert you if you try to navigate

934
00:53:49,800 --> 00:53:52,120
Speaker 1: to a site that is not secure. It'll give you

935
00:53:52,160 --> 00:53:55,480
Speaker 1: a little alert, which is good too, because you know

936
00:53:55,520 --> 00:53:59,640
Speaker 1: if the people on the website aren't being diligent and

937
00:53:59,719 --> 00:54:02,680
Speaker 1: at gives the user on the other end the heads

938
00:54:02,719 --> 00:54:04,840
Speaker 1: up of hey, you probably thought this was secure, but

939
00:54:05,000 --> 00:54:07,040
Speaker 1: turns out it's not. Maybe you want to rethink that.

940
00:54:07,239 --> 00:54:09,359
Speaker 1: Are you sure you want to go ahead? You will

941
00:54:09,360 --> 00:54:11,920
Speaker 1: probably be eaten by a group, and then you decide

942
00:54:11,920 --> 00:54:15,040
Speaker 1: what you can do it. Um Now, when we come back,

943
00:54:15,440 --> 00:54:18,839
Speaker 1: we're gonna talk about one other topic before we get

944
00:54:18,880 --> 00:54:21,919
Speaker 1: into like the super secret stuff, and that is what

945
00:54:21,960 --> 00:54:26,200
Speaker 1: the heck is incognito mode for. But before we do that,

946
00:54:26,320 --> 00:54:30,200
Speaker 1: let's take another quick break. We've got some more discussion

947
00:54:30,200 --> 00:54:33,200
Speaker 1: about public WiFi and the steps you should take to

948
00:54:33,239 --> 00:54:35,600
Speaker 1: protect yourself But before we get to that, let's take

949
00:54:35,680 --> 00:54:50,480
Speaker 1: another break. So Shannon, I have I've gone to a

950
00:54:51,280 --> 00:54:56,279
Speaker 1: private network, right, I'm it's not maybe mine, but it's

951
00:54:56,280 --> 00:54:59,120
Speaker 1: a private once, not open to the public, it's encrypted,

952
00:54:59,360 --> 00:55:03,560
Speaker 1: it's password access. I've done all those wonderful things. And

953
00:55:03,560 --> 00:55:05,319
Speaker 1: then I think, you know what, I'm gonna look at

954
00:55:05,360 --> 00:55:08,720
Speaker 1: some so like your friend's house or something. Yeah, yeah, yeah,

955
00:55:09,239 --> 00:55:10,960
Speaker 1: And uh, I decided, you know what I want to do.

956
00:55:11,000 --> 00:55:14,359
Speaker 1: I wanna I'm gonna look at some I'm gonna look

957
00:55:14,400 --> 00:55:16,880
Speaker 1: at some some stuff that I don't think my friends

958
00:55:16,920 --> 00:55:20,120
Speaker 1: would really understand. Maybe maybe I'm gonna look into that

959
00:55:20,120 --> 00:55:23,439
Speaker 1: that my little pony fan fiction. Uh, and I don't

960
00:55:23,520 --> 00:55:25,279
Speaker 1: want my friends to know about it. So I'm like, well,

961
00:55:25,320 --> 00:55:28,040
Speaker 1: I'm gonna be super sneaky. I'm gonna go into incognito mode.

962
00:55:28,040 --> 00:55:30,359
Speaker 1: Now no one's ever done to know. So I click

963
00:55:30,400 --> 00:55:33,840
Speaker 1: on that little incognito mode and little bitty shadow Man

964
00:55:33,880 --> 00:55:36,280
Speaker 1: pops up, and I'm like, oh yeah, I'm totally safe

965
00:55:36,320 --> 00:55:39,400
Speaker 1: and totally secret. Nobody knows it's me. And I start

966
00:55:39,520 --> 00:55:45,680
Speaker 1: looking at my brony fan fiction. Oh you know the term. Hey, look,

967
00:55:47,080 --> 00:55:50,760
Speaker 1: I wouldn't listen listen, you just give yourself away. Listen,

968
00:55:50,800 --> 00:55:54,640
Speaker 1: Princess Celestia and I have an understanding. Okay, so we

969
00:55:54,680 --> 00:55:57,080
Speaker 1: are not gonna go down that road. We're not gonna

970
00:55:57,080 --> 00:55:59,879
Speaker 1: go there. Like yeah, Fluttershy and I we're like, we're tight,

971
00:56:00,040 --> 00:56:03,880
Speaker 1: so we're not. It's fine, Okay, it's acceptable behavior. But no,

972
00:56:04,040 --> 00:56:06,560
Speaker 1: it is acceptable, but I don't want my friend to

973
00:56:06,560 --> 00:56:10,680
Speaker 1: know that. Now here's the sad thing folks told everybody

974
00:56:10,680 --> 00:56:14,560
Speaker 1: on the podcast. One one, whoops, I guess I should

975
00:56:14,560 --> 00:56:18,520
Speaker 1: be more secure with my data. And secondly, secondly, incognito mode,

976
00:56:18,560 --> 00:56:22,120
Speaker 1: that's not how that works. It doesn't protect you from

977
00:56:22,160 --> 00:56:25,480
Speaker 1: anyone who has any access to the network from seeing

978
00:56:25,480 --> 00:56:28,400
Speaker 1: what you're doing, right right, that's correct. Um. Yeah, so

979
00:56:28,480 --> 00:56:31,400
Speaker 1: incognito mode. Uh, you you've probably seen it on your

980
00:56:31,400 --> 00:56:34,200
Speaker 1: own computer. If you go up into the menu for

981
00:56:34,239 --> 00:56:37,239
Speaker 1: your regular browser and go into like the dropdown menu,

982
00:56:37,320 --> 00:56:41,160
Speaker 1: there's usually an option to choose incognito mode or like

983
00:56:41,239 --> 00:56:44,600
Speaker 1: secret mode or something like private browsing or whatever. Yeah,

984
00:56:44,600 --> 00:56:47,880
Speaker 1: private browsing, Yeah, that's another one. Uh So if you

985
00:56:47,920 --> 00:56:50,640
Speaker 1: click that, it opens up a completely different window on

986
00:56:50,719 --> 00:56:53,239
Speaker 1: your computer or on your phone as well. You can

987
00:56:53,320 --> 00:56:56,560
Speaker 1: do it on your phone. Uh, and you start to browse.

988
00:56:56,640 --> 00:57:00,000
Speaker 1: But basically the only thing that incognito mode is really

989
00:57:00,120 --> 00:57:05,000
Speaker 1: doing is uh not putting anything into your local history

990
00:57:05,320 --> 00:57:08,719
Speaker 1: for your your web browsing history, so if somebody else

991
00:57:08,760 --> 00:57:10,799
Speaker 1: got it on your computer, they would not know what

992
00:57:10,880 --> 00:57:14,160
Speaker 1: you were doing in incognito mode. Uh. And it also

993
00:57:14,280 --> 00:57:19,000
Speaker 1: doesn't store the cookies on your computer, so any information

994
00:57:19,040 --> 00:57:21,720
Speaker 1: that you were sharing with a website during your incognito

995
00:57:21,760 --> 00:57:25,560
Speaker 1: mode would not be stored afterwards. So all those cookies

996
00:57:25,640 --> 00:57:27,920
Speaker 1: that might have happened during a session, they'll just be

997
00:57:28,000 --> 00:57:31,840
Speaker 1: erased like you never existed. Uh. That that can actually

998
00:57:31,840 --> 00:57:35,200
Speaker 1: be very useful. For example, if you're looking for a

999
00:57:35,240 --> 00:57:38,160
Speaker 1: fun hack, if you want to save some money on

1000
00:57:38,280 --> 00:57:41,360
Speaker 1: airplane flights, you can track them. You can look up

1001
00:57:41,360 --> 00:57:45,800
Speaker 1: airplane flight prices in incognito mode and compare them to

1002
00:57:45,880 --> 00:57:50,120
Speaker 1: your regular browser. And sometimes on occasion you can find

1003
00:57:50,200 --> 00:57:54,360
Speaker 1: cheaper prices in incognito mode. Because it doesn't see how

1004
00:57:54,440 --> 00:57:56,680
Speaker 1: much you are searching, it doesn't see how how many

1005
00:57:56,680 --> 00:57:59,600
Speaker 1: websites you've gone to. Those cookies just aren't it there,

1006
00:58:00,200 --> 00:58:02,280
Speaker 1: so the website is going to give you the best

1007
00:58:02,320 --> 00:58:06,960
Speaker 1: price through that that private browsing mode. Uh. That's pretty

1008
00:58:07,000 --> 00:58:09,600
Speaker 1: much like the most interesting thing that I use for

1009
00:58:09,840 --> 00:58:14,040
Speaker 1: incognito mode four, but it can be used to secretly

1010
00:58:14,160 --> 00:58:18,560
Speaker 1: access websites without anybody else knowing that you're accessing those

1011
00:58:18,560 --> 00:58:22,400
Speaker 1: websites at the time. For example, if you are a Brownie. Yeah,

1012
00:58:22,560 --> 00:58:25,360
Speaker 1: so this works on the device level, but not the

1013
00:58:25,400 --> 00:58:28,880
Speaker 1: network level. So yeah, so if my friend gets hold

1014
00:58:28,920 --> 00:58:31,560
Speaker 1: of my phone or my computer, there would be no

1015
00:58:31,640 --> 00:58:34,840
Speaker 1: record of me having gone on the Browny fan fiction

1016
00:58:35,080 --> 00:58:40,040
Speaker 1: community site. Uh where I post by q D mark.

1017
00:58:41,440 --> 00:58:43,200
Speaker 1: They would not be able to see that. But if

1018
00:58:43,200 --> 00:58:46,520
Speaker 1: they were to look at the network traffic, they'd say, huh,

1019
00:58:46,920 --> 00:58:49,880
Speaker 1: this I P address is going to this Brownie site

1020
00:58:49,920 --> 00:58:53,920
Speaker 1: a lot, and it's not my computer, so it's obviously

1021
00:58:54,120 --> 00:58:57,280
Speaker 1: your device and so and so this is why, like,

1022
00:58:57,320 --> 00:58:59,240
Speaker 1: if you were to use let's say that you're at work,

1023
00:58:59,440 --> 00:59:01,400
Speaker 1: let's hit your what the The example I like to

1024
00:59:01,400 --> 00:59:03,480
Speaker 1: give is your Let's say you are stuck in a

1025
00:59:03,560 --> 00:59:07,840
Speaker 1: crappy job. You're doing your job, but you're miserable and

1026
00:59:07,840 --> 00:59:10,520
Speaker 1: you would really love to be able to get something else,

1027
00:59:10,600 --> 00:59:13,080
Speaker 1: but you don't have any time outside of your job

1028
00:59:13,240 --> 00:59:16,720
Speaker 1: where you can really dedicate towards things like searching for

1029
00:59:16,800 --> 00:59:19,600
Speaker 1: job openings. So on your lunch break, you slip into

1030
00:59:19,600 --> 00:59:23,520
Speaker 1: incognito mode and you go on a job search website. Well,

1031
00:59:24,000 --> 00:59:26,840
Speaker 1: just because you're an incognito mode doesn't mean that at

1032
00:59:26,880 --> 00:59:29,360
Speaker 1: the network level they can't see exactly what's going on,

1033
00:59:29,840 --> 00:59:32,400
Speaker 1: So it doesn't actually protect what you're doing or how

1034
00:59:32,440 --> 00:59:35,960
Speaker 1: you're doing it. So one thing you might want to

1035
00:59:36,040 --> 00:59:39,120
Speaker 1: use incognito mode for if you're someone like me who

1036
00:59:39,120 --> 00:59:41,680
Speaker 1: does a lot of research. Let's say I'm researching into

1037
00:59:41,720 --> 00:59:44,920
Speaker 1: something that you know, it's it's just not my bag.

1038
00:59:44,960 --> 00:59:46,880
Speaker 1: You know, it's I need to do an episode about it,

1039
00:59:46,920 --> 00:59:49,520
Speaker 1: but it's not something I'm particularly interested in on a

1040
00:59:49,560 --> 00:59:53,080
Speaker 1: personal level, or might even be something that I would

1041
00:59:53,120 --> 00:59:56,920
Speaker 1: find very awkward. Let's say that I was doing an

1042
00:59:56,960 --> 01:00:01,320
Speaker 1: episode about, uh, dating websites, and so I have to

1043
01:00:01,320 --> 01:00:03,480
Speaker 1: do a whole bunch of research on dating websites. Well,

1044
01:00:03,480 --> 01:00:05,400
Speaker 1: then I might want to use incognito mode so it

1045
01:00:05,440 --> 01:00:09,000
Speaker 1: doesn't build up this cookie history that relates back to

1046
01:00:09,040 --> 01:00:12,200
Speaker 1: me personally, so that maybe I log onto something like

1047
01:00:12,240 --> 01:00:14,760
Speaker 1: Facebook and then suddenly all the ads are for dating sites.

1048
01:00:14,880 --> 01:00:17,960
Speaker 1: That would be awkward, Right, that would be super awkward,

1049
01:00:18,080 --> 01:00:21,200
Speaker 1: especially if you were married. Yes, I'm not a good thing. Yeah,

1050
01:00:21,240 --> 01:00:23,520
Speaker 1: I had a similar occasion with I was looking up

1051
01:00:23,680 --> 01:00:28,600
Speaker 1: pregnancy and birth information for somebody in my family. I'm

1052
01:00:28,600 --> 01:00:31,960
Speaker 1: nowhere near any time soon giving you know, birth to

1053
01:00:32,040 --> 01:00:34,840
Speaker 1: any children in my life except for my beautiful for

1054
01:00:35,000 --> 01:00:37,280
Speaker 1: babies that I have in my house with me. Uh

1055
01:00:37,320 --> 01:00:39,360
Speaker 1: So I was looking up this information and I was

1056
01:00:39,440 --> 01:00:43,600
Speaker 1: just like, do I want Twitter on Instagram to start

1057
01:00:43,640 --> 01:00:47,040
Speaker 1: promoting like baby items to me or do I want

1058
01:00:47,040 --> 01:00:50,160
Speaker 1: them to keep on promoting like makeup in sailor moon items,

1059
01:00:50,160 --> 01:00:53,960
Speaker 1: which I'm actually into. So I looked up the information

1060
01:00:53,960 --> 01:00:58,080
Speaker 1: about pregnancy and birth for the other person through incognito

1061
01:00:58,160 --> 01:01:01,440
Speaker 1: mode so that that informa and wouldn't actually be tracked

1062
01:01:01,440 --> 01:01:06,840
Speaker 1: and identified as a part of my online personality. So

1063
01:01:06,880 --> 01:01:09,280
Speaker 1: that way I was able to keep the same ads

1064
01:01:09,360 --> 01:01:13,800
Speaker 1: that I actually, you know, sometimes kind of enjoy looking

1065
01:01:13,800 --> 01:01:17,560
Speaker 1: at because they do pertain to my lifestyle, but nothing

1066
01:01:17,600 --> 01:01:19,959
Speaker 1: that had to do with pregnancies. Right. And and that's

1067
01:01:19,960 --> 01:01:22,720
Speaker 1: a great example too, because there was that famous example

1068
01:01:22,720 --> 01:01:26,440
Speaker 1: a few years ago of a retailer I want to

1069
01:01:26,440 --> 01:01:28,720
Speaker 1: say it was target, but I could be wrong, but

1070
01:01:28,800 --> 01:01:31,640
Speaker 1: it was a retailer target, Yeah, And they had identified

1071
01:01:31,760 --> 01:01:36,680
Speaker 1: through the browsing history of a user that she was

1072
01:01:36,720 --> 01:01:38,760
Speaker 1: pregnant because of the things she was searching for, so

1073
01:01:38,800 --> 01:01:43,400
Speaker 1: they proactively sent her through the snail mail a package

1074
01:01:43,440 --> 01:01:47,400
Speaker 1: of coupons for pregnancy related items, and her father was

1075
01:01:47,440 --> 01:01:52,280
Speaker 1: the one who intercepted the letter the coupons, and she

1076
01:01:52,360 --> 01:01:55,840
Speaker 1: had not told him that she was pregnant, and he

1077
01:01:55,960 --> 01:01:59,600
Speaker 1: had assumed that target had made this assumption and got

1078
01:01:59,640 --> 01:02:03,480
Speaker 1: super mad, and then turned out that he was mad

1079
01:02:03,480 --> 01:02:06,080
Speaker 1: about something that actually had happened. She just had not

1080
01:02:06,640 --> 01:02:08,880
Speaker 1: She had not had the occasion, she had not found

1081
01:02:08,920 --> 01:02:13,160
Speaker 1: the way to tell him. And that's awful. Uh. Yeah,

1082
01:02:13,200 --> 01:02:16,720
Speaker 1: it's such a breach of privacy, to be honest, is

1083
01:02:16,880 --> 01:02:19,880
Speaker 1: when they start tracking you like that and sending you information.

1084
01:02:20,240 --> 01:02:25,200
Speaker 1: It's like unsolicited advertising, and I hate it. We deal

1085
01:02:25,240 --> 01:02:28,480
Speaker 1: with it every single day online. Yeah, it's it's it's

1086
01:02:28,520 --> 01:02:32,760
Speaker 1: even worse than unsolicited advice, Like that's bad, but unsolicited

1087
01:02:32,880 --> 01:02:36,400
Speaker 1: advertising is even worse because they're like, yeah, they're so

1088
01:02:36,440 --> 01:02:41,600
Speaker 1: eager to make that sale that they can overstep very easily. Well,

1089
01:02:41,680 --> 01:02:44,160
Speaker 1: let's wrap up by talking about some of the more

1090
01:02:44,200 --> 01:02:46,960
Speaker 1: secure ways you can browse if you have to connect him.

1091
01:02:47,000 --> 01:02:48,479
Speaker 1: We mentioned this at the very top of the show,

1092
01:02:48,480 --> 01:02:53,720
Speaker 1: where VPNs are virtual private networks, and we mentioned that

1093
01:02:53,760 --> 01:02:55,919
Speaker 1: sort of man in the middle attack where you are

1094
01:02:56,360 --> 01:03:00,440
Speaker 1: logging into a hackers machine thinking that that's a legit spot,

1095
01:03:00,520 --> 01:03:03,920
Speaker 1: and then the hackers kind of relaying information and sniffing

1096
01:03:03,920 --> 01:03:07,480
Speaker 1: the entire time and learning all about you. VPNs are

1097
01:03:07,520 --> 01:03:09,360
Speaker 1: kind of like that, but on the legit side, where

1098
01:03:09,360 --> 01:03:13,440
Speaker 1: you are logging into a remote server somewhere far away,

1099
01:03:13,480 --> 01:03:18,520
Speaker 1: probably through an encrypted connection, and then when you browse,

1100
01:03:18,760 --> 01:03:21,960
Speaker 1: it's as if you're browsing from the server's location, not

1101
01:03:22,240 --> 01:03:26,880
Speaker 1: your personal device. So if I were to blog into

1102
01:03:26,920 --> 01:03:29,680
Speaker 1: a VPN and then log into a web service, the

1103
01:03:29,680 --> 01:03:32,920
Speaker 1: web service would see my location as the location of

1104
01:03:32,960 --> 01:03:36,640
Speaker 1: the VPN server, not my gadget that's actually in front

1105
01:03:36,640 --> 01:03:41,360
Speaker 1: of me, right and not necessarily just for if you

1106
01:03:41,360 --> 01:03:44,400
Speaker 1: want to look at your my little pony browny fan fix,

1107
01:03:45,080 --> 01:03:47,760
Speaker 1: but VPNs can be extremely useful if you're trying to

1108
01:03:47,800 --> 01:03:52,000
Speaker 1: access a website that's only available in select countries. So

1109
01:03:52,160 --> 01:03:56,040
Speaker 1: if you choose to purchase like a consumer facing VPN product,

1110
01:03:56,160 --> 01:03:59,320
Speaker 1: and there's many out there, I could make recommendations, but

1111
01:03:59,480 --> 01:04:02,200
Speaker 1: they're can instantly changing as far as their privacy and

1112
01:04:02,800 --> 01:04:06,520
Speaker 1: security terms and policies go, So I won't make any

1113
01:04:06,800 --> 01:04:11,200
Speaker 1: major recommendations here. But if you choose a VPN that

1114
01:04:11,320 --> 01:04:15,880
Speaker 1: has a a UH, for example, a country facing server

1115
01:04:16,000 --> 01:04:19,240
Speaker 1: that's in Japan, that means that I could download this VPN,

1116
01:04:19,320 --> 01:04:22,320
Speaker 1: log into it, connect through Japan, and be able to

1117
01:04:22,360 --> 01:04:27,560
Speaker 1: access a website that's only available to Japanese residences. UH.

1118
01:04:27,720 --> 01:04:29,680
Speaker 1: So I I had to do that a few years

1119
01:04:29,720 --> 01:04:32,840
Speaker 1: ago when I wanted to purchase tickets for the Studio

1120
01:04:32,880 --> 01:04:36,680
Speaker 1: Ghibli Museum through the Japanese website. It wouldn't let you

1121
01:04:36,720 --> 01:04:40,840
Speaker 1: access it through an American server or an American connection.

1122
01:04:41,160 --> 01:04:44,160
Speaker 1: So I logged in through my VPN through the Japanese

1123
01:04:44,760 --> 01:04:47,960
Speaker 1: server UH, and I was able to purchase those tickets

1124
01:04:47,960 --> 01:04:51,080
Speaker 1: through the Japanese website. It thought that I was in Japan,

1125
01:04:51,160 --> 01:04:52,560
Speaker 1: so it let me do it, and that way I

1126
01:04:52,600 --> 01:04:55,760
Speaker 1: was able to save myself so much money. It was wonderful.

1127
01:04:56,560 --> 01:04:58,640
Speaker 1: So you can do it for you know, buying goods,

1128
01:04:58,640 --> 01:05:02,440
Speaker 1: buying tickets for where, you know, going to a concert

1129
01:05:02,520 --> 01:05:04,800
Speaker 1: in a different country, or a museum or something like

1130
01:05:04,840 --> 01:05:07,280
Speaker 1: that in a different country. You can use it to

1131
01:05:07,320 --> 01:05:13,800
Speaker 1: access online streaming portals that are only available in specific countries.

1132
01:05:14,640 --> 01:05:16,960
Speaker 1: You can use it to download specific things that are

1133
01:05:17,000 --> 01:05:19,640
Speaker 1: only available in specific countries like the list goes on

1134
01:05:19,680 --> 01:05:22,440
Speaker 1: and on as far as different ways that you can

1135
01:05:22,520 --> 01:05:26,720
Speaker 1: use VPNs that aren't necessarily just directed for security and privacy,

1136
01:05:26,720 --> 01:05:31,360
Speaker 1: but are also directed at manipulating where the website thinks

1137
01:05:31,400 --> 01:05:34,080
Speaker 1: that you are coming from. Yeah, and this can be

1138
01:05:34,160 --> 01:05:36,280
Speaker 1: a matter of life and death for some people. Like

1139
01:05:36,360 --> 01:05:38,560
Speaker 1: here in the United States, we largely use it for

1140
01:05:38,640 --> 01:05:41,960
Speaker 1: the purposes of things like privacy, security, and convenience, but

1141
01:05:42,080 --> 01:05:45,960
Speaker 1: in other places where you might be uh in a

1142
01:05:46,000 --> 01:05:50,680
Speaker 1: country with a more authoritarian government, one that is far

1143
01:05:50,800 --> 01:05:55,520
Speaker 1: more restrictive in access to certain services. If you're able

1144
01:05:55,560 --> 01:05:58,360
Speaker 1: to connect through a VPN, which you know, granted, that

1145
01:05:58,400 --> 01:06:00,640
Speaker 1: means that that government agency has have been paying very

1146
01:06:00,640 --> 01:06:02,760
Speaker 1: close attention. But if you're able to do that, then

1147
01:06:02,840 --> 01:06:05,320
Speaker 1: you can log in two different things as if you

1148
01:06:05,360 --> 01:06:07,720
Speaker 1: were from some other part of the world, and maybe

1149
01:06:07,720 --> 01:06:10,760
Speaker 1: get access to vital information or services that otherwise you

1150
01:06:10,800 --> 01:06:13,560
Speaker 1: would not have at your disposal. So they play a

1151
01:06:13,680 --> 01:06:17,480
Speaker 1: very important role. In fact, I gave an example today

1152
01:06:17,520 --> 01:06:19,760
Speaker 1: with a friend of mine about how I would see

1153
01:06:19,840 --> 01:06:25,440
Speaker 1: VPNs and incognito mode together being incredibly important. So imagine

1154
01:06:26,160 --> 01:06:28,640
Speaker 1: this is a terrible scenario and I put that out

1155
01:06:28,640 --> 01:06:31,880
Speaker 1: there first. But imagine that you are in some form

1156
01:06:32,200 --> 01:06:36,720
Speaker 1: of abusive situation at home, and whether it's a spouse,

1157
01:06:36,800 --> 01:06:40,000
Speaker 1: a parent, a parent, some sort of authority figure, whatever

1158
01:06:40,000 --> 01:06:43,000
Speaker 1: it may be. But you're in that abusive experience, You're

1159
01:06:43,040 --> 01:06:45,600
Speaker 1: going to feel like you are helpless and you want

1160
01:06:45,640 --> 01:06:48,720
Speaker 1: to look for resources that can help you get out

1161
01:06:48,760 --> 01:06:50,840
Speaker 1: of that situation. But at the same time, you have

1162
01:06:50,880 --> 01:06:55,000
Speaker 1: a very legitimate fear of being found out for seeking

1163
01:06:55,000 --> 01:06:57,920
Speaker 1: out those resources and the fear of reprisal that you

1164
01:06:58,000 --> 01:07:00,840
Speaker 1: might face as a result of that. Well, using something

1165
01:07:00,840 --> 01:07:04,360
Speaker 1: like a VPN and incognito mode would mean that you're

1166
01:07:04,400 --> 01:07:07,400
Speaker 1: not leaving a trace on the network of what you're doing,

1167
01:07:07,480 --> 01:07:09,440
Speaker 1: because as far as the network is concerned, all you're

1168
01:07:09,480 --> 01:07:12,760
Speaker 1: doing is visiting this VPN server. It's not seeing what

1169
01:07:12,840 --> 01:07:14,880
Speaker 1: else you're doing. All of knows you went to that

1170
01:07:14,960 --> 01:07:18,040
Speaker 1: VPN server. Incognito mode means you're not leaving the trace

1171
01:07:18,120 --> 01:07:20,840
Speaker 1: on whatever device you're actually using to do that sort

1172
01:07:20,840 --> 01:07:23,360
Speaker 1: of search. So these are the sort of tools that

1173
01:07:23,400 --> 01:07:28,000
Speaker 1: can literally mean life or death scenarios for people. And

1174
01:07:28,080 --> 01:07:31,960
Speaker 1: you know that's dramatically that's together and it yeah, and

1175
01:07:32,040 --> 01:07:35,560
Speaker 1: once you start combining those different security and privacy products

1176
01:07:35,560 --> 01:07:39,440
Speaker 1: together that are very consumer friendly. Then you can end

1177
01:07:39,480 --> 01:07:43,440
Speaker 1: up having a much more secure experience online, especially if

1178
01:07:43,480 --> 01:07:45,960
Speaker 1: you're dealing with some kind of like like an abusive

1179
01:07:45,960 --> 01:07:50,160
Speaker 1: relationship or something like that that can be uh something

1180
01:07:50,200 --> 01:07:53,919
Speaker 1: that you seriously have to worry about, so definitely take

1181
01:07:53,960 --> 01:07:58,240
Speaker 1: those into consideration. Using an incognito mode and VPNs together

1182
01:07:58,680 --> 01:08:01,400
Speaker 1: is so easy to It's just as simple as opening

1183
01:08:01,480 --> 01:08:06,120
Speaker 1: up that browser window in private browsing mode and turning

1184
01:08:06,160 --> 01:08:08,560
Speaker 1: on your VPN, which is usually with a lot of

1185
01:08:08,600 --> 01:08:11,760
Speaker 1: software nowadays, is the click of a switch on your computer.

1186
01:08:11,840 --> 01:08:14,560
Speaker 1: And there are a lot of VPN apps out there,

1187
01:08:14,600 --> 01:08:16,000
Speaker 1: like there are a lot of the services where if

1188
01:08:16,000 --> 01:08:20,040
Speaker 1: you subscribe to the service, you can use uh your computer,

1189
01:08:20,320 --> 01:08:21,800
Speaker 1: or you can use a mobile device, or you can

1190
01:08:21,880 --> 01:08:24,639
Speaker 1: use some combination of multiples. And they're even ones where

1191
01:08:24,680 --> 01:08:27,280
Speaker 1: you can have it set as a default that as

1192
01:08:27,320 --> 01:08:29,880
Speaker 1: soon as you connect to WiFi networks, you connect through

1193
01:08:29,880 --> 01:08:31,880
Speaker 1: the VPN, so you don't even have to don't even

1194
01:08:32,080 --> 01:08:35,080
Speaker 1: think about it in that case, which is definitely good.

1195
01:08:35,120 --> 01:08:37,400
Speaker 1: If you're using like a mobile device and you're connecting

1196
01:08:37,400 --> 01:08:39,839
Speaker 1: to public WiFi frequently, you definitely want to have that

1197
01:08:39,840 --> 01:08:42,640
Speaker 1: that that turned on, because if you ever forget about it,

1198
01:08:42,760 --> 01:08:45,759
Speaker 1: that's when you're going to have the opportunities for people

1199
01:08:45,800 --> 01:08:49,719
Speaker 1: to take advantage of you. Uh, the last examples go ahead,

1200
01:08:49,720 --> 01:08:54,360
Speaker 1: I'm sorry. There's also the option to build your own VPN,

1201
01:08:54,479 --> 01:08:57,719
Speaker 1: but that gets very much into the nitty gritty, uh,

1202
01:08:57,840 --> 01:09:00,160
Speaker 1: since there are a lot of consumer facing ones that

1203
01:09:00,200 --> 01:09:03,960
Speaker 1: are generally fine for the average consumer. That's what I

1204
01:09:03,960 --> 01:09:07,839
Speaker 1: wouldn't normally recommend. But when I go to Deacon, for example,

1205
01:09:08,040 --> 01:09:11,880
Speaker 1: I bring like my own certificate, my own VPN, and

1206
01:09:12,000 --> 01:09:15,719
Speaker 1: my own little o VPN basically file, and I stick

1207
01:09:15,800 --> 01:09:19,120
Speaker 1: that on my phone to actually run my own VPN.

1208
01:09:19,880 --> 01:09:23,879
Speaker 1: When you do that, you're basically creating your own secure profile,

1209
01:09:23,960 --> 01:09:27,720
Speaker 1: as opposed to trusting a VPN company with your information

1210
01:09:27,760 --> 01:09:30,240
Speaker 1: and hoping that they are doing it for you. Yeah.

1211
01:09:30,320 --> 01:09:32,760
Speaker 1: That's a great point, Shannon, because a lot of these

1212
01:09:32,800 --> 01:09:37,560
Speaker 1: solutions actually ultimately require you to put trust in another entity,

1213
01:09:37,760 --> 01:09:41,400
Speaker 1: and you know, there have been cases where even VPNs

1214
01:09:41,400 --> 01:09:45,880
Speaker 1: have suffered data breaches in recent past, where you know,

1215
01:09:45,960 --> 01:09:48,040
Speaker 1: you have to worry about that kind of stuff too.

1216
01:09:48,840 --> 01:09:51,640
Speaker 1: There does come a point where you ultimately you have

1217
01:09:51,720 --> 01:09:53,879
Speaker 1: to say to yourself, at what point am I comfortable

1218
01:09:53,920 --> 01:09:57,360
Speaker 1: handing over control or handing over you know, some of

1219
01:09:57,400 --> 01:10:01,759
Speaker 1: my data, because either you're doing that or you're doing nothing.

1220
01:10:02,240 --> 01:10:05,680
Speaker 1: But you know, deciding where that point is is a

1221
01:10:05,800 --> 01:10:08,640
Speaker 1: very personal choice. Uh. The very last one I want

1222
01:10:08,680 --> 01:10:10,519
Speaker 1: to talk about, and we can do this very briefly,

1223
01:10:11,080 --> 01:10:15,160
Speaker 1: is Tour, the Tour browser. Tour initially was an acronym

1224
01:10:15,200 --> 01:10:17,920
Speaker 1: instead for the Onion router. And the reason it's called

1225
01:10:17,960 --> 01:10:22,559
Speaker 1: Onion is because it does encryption in layers, each outer

1226
01:10:22,720 --> 01:10:26,080
Speaker 1: layer being another layer of encryption. And I gave a

1227
01:10:26,160 --> 01:10:29,519
Speaker 1: very simple analogy. Imagine that you are trying to ship

1228
01:10:29,680 --> 01:10:31,799
Speaker 1: a present. Let's say I'm shipping a present to Shannon,

1229
01:10:32,439 --> 01:10:35,240
Speaker 1: but You're welcome, but I don't want you to know

1230
01:10:35,240 --> 01:10:38,400
Speaker 1: where I live, um for some reason. And I don't

1231
01:10:38,400 --> 01:10:41,440
Speaker 1: want anyone to know that I'm sending a present specifically

1232
01:10:41,520 --> 01:10:44,280
Speaker 1: to you for some reason. So what I've done is

1233
01:10:44,360 --> 01:10:48,160
Speaker 1: I've nested your package that has your present in it

1234
01:10:48,280 --> 01:10:51,400
Speaker 1: inside another package that's gonna go to a totally different address.

1235
01:10:51,640 --> 01:10:56,040
Speaker 1: And I've nested that what's is it a brown package?

1236
01:10:56,640 --> 01:11:00,519
Speaker 1: There's probably some you know, my little pony temper tattoo

1237
01:11:00,920 --> 01:11:04,439
Speaker 1: sheets in there. So that's in there, and then that's

1238
01:11:04,439 --> 01:11:06,600
Speaker 1: in a second package, and the second package is in

1239
01:11:06,680 --> 01:11:09,120
Speaker 1: the third, the third packages in the fourth. Each package

1240
01:11:09,160 --> 01:11:11,920
Speaker 1: has a different address on it. So I've got a

1241
01:11:11,960 --> 01:11:14,720
Speaker 1: really big package that ultimately is just holding a bunch

1242
01:11:14,760 --> 01:11:18,080
Speaker 1: of boxes and a couple of sheets of temporary tattoos

1243
01:11:18,080 --> 01:11:21,800
Speaker 1: and the innermost box. I ship that to the first address.

1244
01:11:22,240 --> 01:11:24,679
Speaker 1: The person at the first address opens up this big

1245
01:11:24,680 --> 01:11:27,080
Speaker 1: box and they see that there's a slightly smaller box

1246
01:11:27,080 --> 01:11:30,080
Speaker 1: inside with a different address on it. So they plopped

1247
01:11:30,120 --> 01:11:32,280
Speaker 1: that back into the post office. Post office takes that

1248
01:11:32,360 --> 01:11:35,680
Speaker 1: to the second destination. They open up the package, well,

1249
01:11:35,720 --> 01:11:38,400
Speaker 1: destination number two. They know that the package came from

1250
01:11:38,400 --> 01:11:41,160
Speaker 1: destination number one, but they don't know anything further back

1251
01:11:41,200 --> 01:11:43,320
Speaker 1: from that. They don't know that I was the person

1252
01:11:43,360 --> 01:11:46,280
Speaker 1: who originally put the package in the mail, and they

1253
01:11:46,320 --> 01:11:48,760
Speaker 1: don't know where the package is ultimately going to. They

1254
01:11:48,800 --> 01:11:52,760
Speaker 1: just see destination three on the shipping label of that

1255
01:11:53,040 --> 01:11:56,280
Speaker 1: inner package, so they send it to destination three. Destination

1256
01:11:56,320 --> 01:11:58,120
Speaker 1: three gets it. They opened it up. They know it

1257
01:11:58,120 --> 01:12:00,880
Speaker 1: came from destination too. They don't know about destination one.

1258
01:12:01,080 --> 01:12:03,559
Speaker 1: They definitely don't know about me, and they see that

1259
01:12:03,560 --> 01:12:06,040
Speaker 1: they need to send on the next package to destination four,

1260
01:12:06,040 --> 01:12:07,920
Speaker 1: and so on and so forth until finally you get

1261
01:12:07,960 --> 01:12:10,760
Speaker 1: to that innermost package which has Shannon's address on it.

1262
01:12:11,040 --> 01:12:14,080
Speaker 1: She gets it, she knows it came from the previous site,

1263
01:12:14,280 --> 01:12:16,320
Speaker 1: but doesn't know any of the rest of the history,

1264
01:12:16,400 --> 01:12:18,880
Speaker 1: including where it came from, except I probably put a

1265
01:12:18,880 --> 01:12:21,519
Speaker 1: note in the inside of the package saying hey, it's

1266
01:12:21,520 --> 01:12:25,920
Speaker 1: from me, Brownie Joe. And then then she gets the package.

1267
01:12:26,000 --> 01:12:27,759
Speaker 1: You would probably want to make sure that your message

1268
01:12:27,760 --> 01:12:31,320
Speaker 1: is encrypted. Yes, Uh, there's like a you know, I

1269
01:12:31,720 --> 01:12:33,559
Speaker 1: tell you that you need to use your super secret

1270
01:12:33,720 --> 01:12:37,360
Speaker 1: Captain Crusader decode ring or whatever to decrypt the message,

1271
01:12:37,760 --> 01:12:40,160
Speaker 1: and then and then she would be able to to

1272
01:12:40,280 --> 01:12:43,800
Speaker 1: use a similar process to send information to me. Uh. Now,

1273
01:12:43,840 --> 01:12:47,160
Speaker 1: this is a very secure way typically of sending information.

1274
01:12:47,200 --> 01:12:49,479
Speaker 1: There are ways to try and sniff out things, just

1275
01:12:49,560 --> 01:12:53,320
Speaker 1: as there are with any network communication, but it's hard.

1276
01:12:53,640 --> 01:12:57,200
Speaker 1: It's very hard to get anything meaningful through this process.

1277
01:12:57,720 --> 01:13:00,920
Speaker 1: It is possible, it's not foolproof, but it's real hard

1278
01:13:01,479 --> 01:13:04,880
Speaker 1: and uh. And so this is generally considered the most

1279
01:13:04,920 --> 01:13:09,520
Speaker 1: secure way to browse the Internet. However, with that security

1280
01:13:09,560 --> 01:13:11,360
Speaker 1: there comes a trade off, and that trade off is

1281
01:13:11,400 --> 01:13:15,040
Speaker 1: mainly felt in the form of speed. We're in the

1282
01:13:15,120 --> 01:13:17,920
Speaker 1: home stretch. Now we're going to have a little bit

1283
01:13:18,000 --> 01:13:22,200
Speaker 1: more talk about public WiFi and safety measures you should

1284
01:13:22,200 --> 01:13:25,479
Speaker 1: be observing. But before we get to that, let's take

1285
01:13:25,520 --> 01:13:36,760
Speaker 1: one last break. There has been talk on on the

1286
01:13:36,760 --> 01:13:41,640
Speaker 1: internet many years ago that government agencies had access to

1287
01:13:41,720 --> 01:13:46,120
Speaker 1: some of the UM end notes, the very last place

1288
01:13:46,200 --> 01:13:49,600
Speaker 1: that your package would hit before it went on to

1289
01:13:49,840 --> 01:13:52,559
Speaker 1: whoever it was supposed to go to. UM. So you

1290
01:13:52,600 --> 01:13:55,559
Speaker 1: do have to consider where where is this information being

1291
01:13:55,640 --> 01:13:59,280
Speaker 1: sent and who has access to the very end of

1292
01:13:59,280 --> 01:14:02,880
Speaker 1: that tunnel that you're sending that information through UM and

1293
01:14:02,960 --> 01:14:07,240
Speaker 1: if that's protected, then yeah, it's great option UM. But

1294
01:14:07,400 --> 01:14:10,640
Speaker 1: of course with tour as well as with VPNs and

1295
01:14:10,680 --> 01:14:14,440
Speaker 1: incognito mode, you shouldn't use just one of these options.

1296
01:14:14,479 --> 01:14:16,479
Speaker 1: You should use all of them if they are at

1297
01:14:16,479 --> 01:14:20,080
Speaker 1: your disposal. But again, do you want to deal with

1298
01:14:20,120 --> 01:14:23,320
Speaker 1: the slowness that you're going to experience when you add

1299
01:14:23,360 --> 01:14:27,240
Speaker 1: these additional tunnels and additional nodes onto whatever you're trying

1300
01:14:27,280 --> 01:14:30,120
Speaker 1: to gain access to, or are you going to deal

1301
01:14:30,160 --> 01:14:36,800
Speaker 1: with the security um UH minimal experience and add that

1302
01:14:36,880 --> 01:14:41,000
Speaker 1: additional convenience to your experience by just not using it,

1303
01:14:41,320 --> 01:14:43,960
Speaker 1: so there are trade offs either way, and you've summarized

1304
01:14:43,960 --> 01:14:45,920
Speaker 1: it perfectly, Shannon. I mean, this is like we said

1305
01:14:45,960 --> 01:14:49,240
Speaker 1: at the beginning, this is a spectrum, and the important

1306
01:14:49,240 --> 01:14:51,680
Speaker 1: thing is to be educated to that spectrum so you

1307
01:14:51,720 --> 01:14:55,639
Speaker 1: can make your own educated decisions and not just trust

1308
01:14:55,760 --> 01:14:58,639
Speaker 1: to the fates. I have a tattoo on my back

1309
01:14:58,800 --> 01:15:03,240
Speaker 1: of the full Terror card, the Eternal Optimist. Don't be

1310
01:15:03,360 --> 01:15:06,559
Speaker 1: the fool. You get the tattoo who wants pretty awesome,

1311
01:15:06,600 --> 01:15:09,040
Speaker 1: It's dope, But don't don't be the Don't be the

1312
01:15:09,040 --> 01:15:12,639
Speaker 1: fool in life, right, Don't just trust that you can

1313
01:15:12,680 --> 01:15:14,640
Speaker 1: take a step off a cliff and you're not going

1314
01:15:14,680 --> 01:15:17,960
Speaker 1: to fall to your death. The fool is taking a

1315
01:15:18,000 --> 01:15:20,679
Speaker 1: step off a cliff in the traditional tarot card. So

1316
01:15:21,000 --> 01:15:23,280
Speaker 1: you don't want to be like that. You want to

1317
01:15:23,320 --> 01:15:26,720
Speaker 1: be informed and make choices. And you know there might

1318
01:15:26,720 --> 01:15:30,160
Speaker 1: be instances where you think, Okay, I'm in a public spot,

1319
01:15:30,400 --> 01:15:32,360
Speaker 1: I am going to use WiFi, but I'm using it

1320
01:15:32,400 --> 01:15:35,880
Speaker 1: for something that's not related to my personal information. I'm

1321
01:15:35,920 --> 01:15:38,479
Speaker 1: literally maybe I'm looking up a restaurant to find out

1322
01:15:38,479 --> 01:15:41,559
Speaker 1: what hours it's open, and that's it. You know, they're

1323
01:15:41,560 --> 01:15:43,920
Speaker 1: different levels. But if you're thinking, I want to do

1324
01:15:44,000 --> 01:15:46,959
Speaker 1: some shopping, or I'm going to check my bank statement,

1325
01:15:47,439 --> 01:15:50,240
Speaker 1: or I'm going to log into my email or this

1326
01:15:50,240 --> 01:15:52,559
Speaker 1: one's a big one for us here at my heart.

1327
01:15:52,840 --> 01:15:57,160
Speaker 1: If I'm going to access any of my my work stuff, right,

1328
01:15:57,280 --> 01:15:59,559
Speaker 1: like anything that's stored on there, any of the services

1329
01:15:59,600 --> 01:16:02,920
Speaker 1: that are on your definitely use a VPN in those cases,

1330
01:16:02,960 --> 01:16:05,679
Speaker 1: because you're talking about things that affect not just you

1331
01:16:06,000 --> 01:16:08,400
Speaker 1: but other people. Right, You're talking about the potential of

1332
01:16:08,439 --> 01:16:15,080
Speaker 1: affecting uh, essentially an entire company if if the wrong

1333
01:16:15,160 --> 01:16:17,720
Speaker 1: information were to get out, you know, especially for talking

1334
01:16:17,720 --> 01:16:19,720
Speaker 1: about things like publicly traded companies. You want to make

1335
01:16:19,720 --> 01:16:23,600
Speaker 1: sure that you're being a good steward of the information

1336
01:16:23,600 --> 01:16:29,919
Speaker 1: that's been entrusted to you, not just your own but others. So, uh, Shannon,

1337
01:16:30,439 --> 01:16:33,120
Speaker 1: this has been a joy. You have given generously of

1338
01:16:33,160 --> 01:16:36,160
Speaker 1: your time and your expertise, and I greatly appreciate it.

1339
01:16:36,200 --> 01:16:40,920
Speaker 1: Please let people know where they can find your work. Well.

1340
01:16:41,080 --> 01:16:44,920
Speaker 1: Thank you so much, Jonathan. I love security and privacy

1341
01:16:44,960 --> 01:16:47,599
Speaker 1: and I think of it as a habit that you

1342
01:16:47,760 --> 01:16:50,559
Speaker 1: build upon over time, and the more that you learn

1343
01:16:50,640 --> 01:16:52,759
Speaker 1: about it, the better off you can be in the future.

1344
01:16:52,960 --> 01:16:57,320
Speaker 1: So build upon your security for your future self and

1345
01:16:57,400 --> 01:17:00,920
Speaker 1: for your family too, because the more secure cure you are,

1346
01:17:01,400 --> 01:17:03,960
Speaker 1: the more secure they will be as well. Uh. And

1347
01:17:04,000 --> 01:17:08,240
Speaker 1: if you're interested in learning more about consumer privacy and security,

1348
01:17:08,320 --> 01:17:10,679
Speaker 1: you can check out my YouTube channel. It's YouTube dot

1349
01:17:10,680 --> 01:17:14,080
Speaker 1: com slash Shannon Morse uh and that's m O R

1350
01:17:14,280 --> 01:17:16,439
Speaker 1: s E just like Morse Code and I will be

1351
01:17:16,479 --> 01:17:20,600
Speaker 1: going to CS just like Jonathan Jonathan mentioned, I'm very excited,

1352
01:17:20,640 --> 01:17:24,120
Speaker 1: so I will be posting a lot of content from

1353
01:17:24,320 --> 01:17:27,360
Speaker 1: the Consumer Electronic Show and I will have tons in

1354
01:17:27,439 --> 01:17:32,200
Speaker 1: store through the year. Awesome. Shannon's always a pleasure. I

1355
01:17:32,200 --> 01:17:34,040
Speaker 1: am so sad that I will not be seeing you

1356
01:17:34,080 --> 01:17:36,320
Speaker 1: at c E S. Will have to make time for

1357
01:17:36,400 --> 01:17:39,400
Speaker 1: some other tech conference, I'm sure. Or next time i'm

1358
01:17:39,439 --> 01:17:41,840
Speaker 1: out your way, I'll give you a shout and maybe

1359
01:17:41,840 --> 01:17:43,720
Speaker 1: we can, like please do Yeah, we can can go

1360
01:17:43,760 --> 01:17:47,080
Speaker 1: grab ramin or something and chat about security. I would

1361
01:17:47,080 --> 01:17:50,240
Speaker 1: love That would be awesome. And that was an episode

1362
01:17:50,280 --> 01:17:53,719
Speaker 1: from Christmas Day two thousand nineteen, The Dangers of Public WiFi.

1363
01:17:53,760 --> 01:17:57,640
Speaker 1: I hope you enjoyed this look back on the episode.

1364
01:17:57,640 --> 01:17:59,600
Speaker 1: That was one of the really epic ones when it

1365
01:17:59,680 --> 01:18:03,880
Speaker 1: took a look at the full running time. I thought, wow, um,

1366
01:18:03,920 --> 01:18:08,240
Speaker 1: I oe Shannon a really nice lunch or something for

1367
01:18:08,320 --> 01:18:11,759
Speaker 1: agreeing to sit on a podcast for so long with me, Because,

1368
01:18:11,960 --> 01:18:15,040
Speaker 1: as we all know, that's a big request. I hope

1369
01:18:15,080 --> 01:18:17,840
Speaker 1: you are all staying safe and are well. If you

1370
01:18:17,840 --> 01:18:20,759
Speaker 1: have suggestions for topics I should cover on future episodes

1371
01:18:20,800 --> 01:18:22,760
Speaker 1: of tech Stuff, please reach out to me. The best

1372
01:18:22,760 --> 01:18:25,160
Speaker 1: way to do that is on Twitter. The handle for

1373
01:18:25,200 --> 01:18:28,080
Speaker 1: the show is text Stuff H s W and I'll

1374
01:18:28,120 --> 01:18:38,200
Speaker 1: talk to you again really soon. Yeah. Text Stuff is

1375
01:18:38,240 --> 01:18:41,360
Speaker 1: an I Heart Radio production. For more podcasts from my

1376
01:18:41,520 --> 01:18:45,120
Speaker 1: Heart Radio, visit the i Heart Radio app, Apple Podcasts,

1377
01:18:45,240 --> 01:18:47,240
Speaker 1: or wherever you listen to your favorite shows.