1 00:00:04,040 --> 00:00:07,760 Speaker 1: Again text with technology with tech Stuff from stuff works 2 00:00:07,800 --> 00:00:14,280 Speaker 1: dot com. Hey there, and welcome to tech Stuff. I 3 00:00:14,320 --> 00:00:18,520 Speaker 1: am your host, Jonathan Strickland, executive producer at how Stuff Works. 4 00:00:18,520 --> 00:00:21,880 Speaker 1: And in our last episode we started the story of 5 00:00:22,040 --> 00:00:26,200 Speaker 1: Operation Sun Devil and how that leads into the formation 6 00:00:26,280 --> 00:00:29,440 Speaker 1: of the Electronic Frontier Foundation. As it turned out, it's 7 00:00:29,480 --> 00:00:32,680 Speaker 1: a much bigger story than I had originally anticipated, and 8 00:00:32,720 --> 00:00:38,200 Speaker 1: thus necessitated two episodes to talk about this amazing story. 9 00:00:38,680 --> 00:00:41,840 Speaker 1: So here is part two. I hope you guys enjoy, 10 00:00:42,080 --> 00:00:45,239 Speaker 1: and I'm probably gonna start like mid sentence because we 11 00:00:45,280 --> 00:00:47,760 Speaker 1: had to interrupt the last one right in the middle 12 00:00:47,760 --> 00:00:53,120 Speaker 1: of somewhere. So let's go now. On Martin Luther King 13 00:00:53,520 --> 00:00:58,320 Speaker 1: Junior Day in nine So, several months after this raid 14 00:00:58,400 --> 00:01:01,040 Speaker 1: had happened, a T and T E crashed. There was 15 00:01:01,080 --> 00:01:03,800 Speaker 1: a nationwide crash of a T and T S phone service, 16 00:01:05,200 --> 00:01:08,240 Speaker 1: which since Fry Guy had mentioned the possibility of a 17 00:01:08,319 --> 00:01:12,199 Speaker 1: phone service crashing nationwide on fourth of July and Martin 18 00:01:12,240 --> 00:01:15,679 Speaker 1: Luther King Jr. Days another holiday, made the Secret Service 19 00:01:15,680 --> 00:01:18,880 Speaker 1: totally flip out and suspect that the Legion of Doom 20 00:01:18,920 --> 00:01:22,600 Speaker 1: was responsible, and so they stepped up surveillance of the 21 00:01:22,600 --> 00:01:26,000 Speaker 1: group in general beyond the Atlanta three. Remember those are 22 00:01:26,040 --> 00:01:28,600 Speaker 1: just three people who are in this larger hacker group. 23 00:01:28,640 --> 00:01:32,559 Speaker 1: That's that's roster changed regularly. It's not like people would 24 00:01:33,440 --> 00:01:36,800 Speaker 1: become a member of this hacker group for life. That 25 00:01:37,200 --> 00:01:40,880 Speaker 1: list of members changed pretty frequently, uh, And there was 26 00:01:40,880 --> 00:01:43,640 Speaker 1: a lot of turnover. People would go off and form 27 00:01:43,680 --> 00:01:47,440 Speaker 1: splinter groups, or they would just drop out entirely. But 28 00:01:47,840 --> 00:01:52,400 Speaker 1: the Legion of Doom had no responsibility for that phone crash. However, 29 00:01:52,480 --> 00:01:54,520 Speaker 1: things were already getting out of control. There was this 30 00:01:54,600 --> 00:01:58,320 Speaker 1: growing sense of unease and law enforcement. Hackers were getting 31 00:01:58,360 --> 00:02:02,320 Speaker 1: access to critical infrastructure. Now, a lot of that fell 32 00:02:02,760 --> 00:02:05,920 Speaker 1: onto the entities responsible for creating the infrastructure in the 33 00:02:05,960 --> 00:02:09,320 Speaker 1: first place. So, for example, Bell South, which was really 34 00:02:09,320 --> 00:02:12,480 Speaker 1: flipping out when discovered that hackers were reprogramming its digital 35 00:02:12,520 --> 00:02:17,640 Speaker 1: switching systems, had pretty lousy security on some of their systems, 36 00:02:17,840 --> 00:02:21,920 Speaker 1: particularly the Bell South that was focusing in the Atlanta 37 00:02:22,000 --> 00:02:26,280 Speaker 1: and Georgia area. Georgia and Florida area, I should say 38 00:02:26,639 --> 00:02:29,760 Speaker 1: they their security at the time was pretty terrible. They 39 00:02:29,760 --> 00:02:32,880 Speaker 1: had entire phone the computer systems that were not even 40 00:02:32,919 --> 00:02:37,200 Speaker 1: protected by passwords. So once you knew that the system 41 00:02:37,240 --> 00:02:40,160 Speaker 1: existed and you found an entry way into it. It 42 00:02:40,240 --> 00:02:46,720 Speaker 1: was pretty much free gain. And people argued, well, yeah, 43 00:02:46,760 --> 00:02:49,560 Speaker 1: hackers are getting access to this infrastructure, but a large 44 00:02:49,560 --> 00:02:52,200 Speaker 1: part of that is because there's no security on the 45 00:02:52,240 --> 00:02:56,480 Speaker 1: infrastructure infrastructure side, So whose fault is that? Really there 46 00:02:56,480 --> 00:03:00,360 Speaker 1: should be much better security. If you have a a 47 00:03:00,440 --> 00:03:04,240 Speaker 1: bank and there's no back wall to the vault, then 48 00:03:05,400 --> 00:03:08,040 Speaker 1: it's kind of hard to say that, Uh, you know, 49 00:03:08,120 --> 00:03:10,120 Speaker 1: you should expect that money to be there the next 50 00:03:10,320 --> 00:03:13,040 Speaker 1: the next day, and people just walk in through the 51 00:03:13,040 --> 00:03:18,440 Speaker 1: back and take it. So there was definitely a shared 52 00:03:18,480 --> 00:03:22,160 Speaker 1: responsibility here, although ultimately you could argue people who choose 53 00:03:22,200 --> 00:03:27,160 Speaker 1: to infiltrate a system are ultimately responsible. But still there 54 00:03:27,240 --> 00:03:31,920 Speaker 1: was it was complicated, and some folks said that it 55 00:03:32,000 --> 00:03:34,600 Speaker 1: just felt like there was There was the thought of 56 00:03:34,639 --> 00:03:37,440 Speaker 1: someone breaking into a system like that was just outside 57 00:03:37,480 --> 00:03:39,880 Speaker 1: the realm of possibility, not because it was too difficult, 58 00:03:39,880 --> 00:03:43,760 Speaker 1: but just because the system was considered to be so important. 59 00:03:44,640 --> 00:03:48,000 Speaker 1: Who would have the temerity to go in and break 60 00:03:48,000 --> 00:03:50,840 Speaker 1: into such a system. Once bell Seuth became aware that 61 00:03:50,880 --> 00:03:53,320 Speaker 1: this was happening and that it had been going on 62 00:03:53,400 --> 00:03:55,520 Speaker 1: for a while, it's just that again, most hackers were 63 00:03:55,520 --> 00:03:58,200 Speaker 1: smart enough to cover their tracks. Fry Guy was just 64 00:03:58,280 --> 00:04:01,160 Speaker 1: not one of them. The company agan to dedicate time 65 00:04:01,200 --> 00:04:04,680 Speaker 1: and resources hiring on people and having them tracked down 66 00:04:04,800 --> 00:04:09,560 Speaker 1: other instances of abuse. Now across the nation, law enforcement 67 00:04:09,560 --> 00:04:13,040 Speaker 1: officials were closing in on various hackers, many of them teenagers, 68 00:04:13,680 --> 00:04:18,120 Speaker 1: and the Secret Service really were focusing on Erville, Leftist 69 00:04:18,160 --> 00:04:21,599 Speaker 1: and Profit. The Atlanta Three, those members of the Legion 70 00:04:21,640 --> 00:04:26,960 Speaker 1: of Doom. They all three were infamous for exploring systems 71 00:04:26,960 --> 00:04:31,000 Speaker 1: that they had no business being in. But unlike Fry Guy, 72 00:04:31,040 --> 00:04:34,920 Speaker 1: they weren't interested in causing really mischief for stealing money. 73 00:04:34,960 --> 00:04:37,279 Speaker 1: They just wanted to poke around to see what was 74 00:04:37,320 --> 00:04:40,839 Speaker 1: going on. But one of them did do something supremely 75 00:04:41,040 --> 00:04:45,159 Speaker 1: dumb that would cause huge issues for numerous other people. 76 00:04:45,800 --> 00:04:48,640 Speaker 1: And the one who did something supremely dumb was Profit. 77 00:04:49,000 --> 00:04:51,839 Speaker 1: So Erville was kind of a problem because he wasn't 78 00:04:51,839 --> 00:04:54,360 Speaker 1: really considering anything that he had done to have been 79 00:04:54,400 --> 00:04:58,239 Speaker 1: wrong in the first place, which was antagonizing his interrogators. 80 00:04:59,160 --> 00:05:02,680 Speaker 1: But Profit had taken a trophy while exploring what was 81 00:05:02,720 --> 00:05:07,440 Speaker 1: supposed to be a very private computer system, and that 82 00:05:07,520 --> 00:05:11,719 Speaker 1: trophy is what would ultimately lead to a massive sting 83 00:05:11,760 --> 00:05:15,360 Speaker 1: operation that would go far beyond the reach of the 84 00:05:15,400 --> 00:05:19,880 Speaker 1: Secret Service. Now, this actually happened a little bit earlier. 85 00:05:20,120 --> 00:05:22,240 Speaker 1: We had been talking about eighty nine and nine. But 86 00:05:22,320 --> 00:05:26,600 Speaker 1: back in Profit had broken into a Bell South automation 87 00:05:26,640 --> 00:05:31,839 Speaker 1: system called AMSX, which stood for Advanced Information Management System, 88 00:05:31,880 --> 00:05:34,800 Speaker 1: and it was an internal business network at Bell South, 89 00:05:35,640 --> 00:05:38,160 Speaker 1: not terribly interesting. It had a lot of files that 90 00:05:38,200 --> 00:05:41,040 Speaker 1: people within Bell South might need access to. Think of 91 00:05:41,080 --> 00:05:44,919 Speaker 1: like a company intranet has a lot of just you know, 92 00:05:46,080 --> 00:05:49,640 Speaker 1: working documents that you would need access to for whatever reason, 93 00:05:50,360 --> 00:05:53,600 Speaker 1: but nothing that's of particular interest to anyone on the 94 00:05:53,640 --> 00:05:58,520 Speaker 1: outside necessarily. But getting into the system was tricky, not 95 00:05:58,680 --> 00:06:00,680 Speaker 1: due to security because again and this was one of 96 00:06:00,720 --> 00:06:03,880 Speaker 1: those systems that didn't even have password protection, but because 97 00:06:04,160 --> 00:06:08,160 Speaker 1: it was largely invisible. There were no forward facing or 98 00:06:08,200 --> 00:06:11,120 Speaker 1: public facing portals into the system. You had to get 99 00:06:11,360 --> 00:06:15,159 Speaker 1: into a Bell South system and then from their log 100 00:06:15,240 --> 00:06:20,000 Speaker 1: into this other computer system. Uh, it wasn't much of 101 00:06:20,000 --> 00:06:22,120 Speaker 1: a problem for Profit. He was able to compromise a 102 00:06:22,200 --> 00:06:24,320 Speaker 1: valid user I D and then he was able to 103 00:06:24,320 --> 00:06:27,920 Speaker 1: access the am SX system that way, and he did 104 00:06:27,960 --> 00:06:32,039 Speaker 1: so almost a dozen times, and as a trophy, he 105 00:06:32,160 --> 00:06:34,560 Speaker 1: made a copy of a document that he came across. 106 00:06:34,600 --> 00:06:37,360 Speaker 1: He wasn't looking for it, He just saw it and thought, 107 00:06:37,880 --> 00:06:40,080 Speaker 1: I'll make a copy of this to prove that I 108 00:06:40,160 --> 00:06:43,520 Speaker 1: was here. So I when I tell my hacker friends, hey, 109 00:06:43,560 --> 00:06:46,640 Speaker 1: I broke into that system. This is the proof I 110 00:06:46,680 --> 00:06:51,640 Speaker 1: will have. The document he copied was titled Bell South 111 00:06:51,920 --> 00:06:55,960 Speaker 1: Standard Practice six six zero DASH two to five DASH 112 00:06:56,040 --> 00:07:00,000 Speaker 1: one oh four s V Control Office, Administration of Enhance 113 00:07:00,440 --> 00:07:05,080 Speaker 1: nine eleven Services for Special Services and Major Account Centers, 114 00:07:05,400 --> 00:07:09,040 Speaker 1: and it was dated March. This is the e N 115 00:07:09,640 --> 00:07:14,040 Speaker 1: one document, the Enhanced nine one services document. Then he 116 00:07:14,160 --> 00:07:18,480 Speaker 1: made a copy of this document and he stored it 117 00:07:18,560 --> 00:07:21,360 Speaker 1: on an account he had made on a Unix bulletin 118 00:07:21,440 --> 00:07:24,400 Speaker 1: board system called Joel Net j O L n Et, 119 00:07:25,480 --> 00:07:28,080 Speaker 1: and Joel Nett belonged to a guy named Richard Andrews, 120 00:07:28,200 --> 00:07:31,160 Speaker 1: who would end up suffering a huge amount of grief 121 00:07:31,200 --> 00:07:35,720 Speaker 1: for this. And you then have two unauthorized copies of 122 00:07:35,720 --> 00:07:39,400 Speaker 1: this out in the wild, beyond the ones that actual 123 00:07:39,480 --> 00:07:43,680 Speaker 1: BellSouth employees might have had access to. So real BELLSOFF 124 00:07:43,680 --> 00:07:46,560 Speaker 1: employees may have had copies of this on their machines, 125 00:07:46,600 --> 00:07:53,280 Speaker 1: which isn't terribly safe either, but profits certainly wasn't supposed 126 00:07:53,320 --> 00:07:54,960 Speaker 1: to have it, and not only did he have a 127 00:07:55,000 --> 00:07:58,520 Speaker 1: copy on his computer, yet now one on someone else's computer. 128 00:07:58,640 --> 00:08:01,400 Speaker 1: That would be Richard Drew's computer, the one that was 129 00:08:01,480 --> 00:08:05,760 Speaker 1: running this bulletin board system. Well, then Richard Andrews notices 130 00:08:06,000 --> 00:08:09,200 Speaker 1: that there's this new account on joel Net that he 131 00:08:09,240 --> 00:08:11,840 Speaker 1: doesn't recognize, and he gets a little suspicious about it. 132 00:08:11,920 --> 00:08:14,360 Speaker 1: You know, he's the administrator of this bulletin board system, 133 00:08:14,360 --> 00:08:16,960 Speaker 1: so he sees when stuff is going up or down 134 00:08:16,960 --> 00:08:20,120 Speaker 1: on it, and he investigated and saw the copy of 135 00:08:20,200 --> 00:08:24,520 Speaker 1: the document and figured something hinky was going on. So 136 00:08:24,560 --> 00:08:28,280 Speaker 1: then he makes a copy of this file and he 137 00:08:28,320 --> 00:08:30,080 Speaker 1: sends it to a friend of his who worked at 138 00:08:30,120 --> 00:08:32,520 Speaker 1: A T and T. This would be a guy named 139 00:08:32,600 --> 00:08:36,800 Speaker 1: Charles Boykin. Now Boykin was not in voice communication, that 140 00:08:37,000 --> 00:08:39,520 Speaker 1: wasn't the department he worked in, but he immediately knew 141 00:08:39,559 --> 00:08:43,599 Speaker 1: that the document was serious business. Boy can get a 142 00:08:43,640 --> 00:08:46,160 Speaker 1: little upset because he's like, why are people messing with this? 143 00:08:46,160 --> 00:08:50,560 Speaker 1: This is critical stuff? And he decided to consult with 144 00:08:50,600 --> 00:08:53,600 Speaker 1: an A T and T corporate information security officer named 145 00:08:53,720 --> 00:08:57,880 Speaker 1: Jerome Dalton. That meant that Boykin had to make another 146 00:08:58,000 --> 00:09:01,520 Speaker 1: copy of the E nine one document. So you're seeing 147 00:09:01,520 --> 00:09:05,240 Speaker 1: how this is starting to escalate. Dalton would in turn 148 00:09:05,360 --> 00:09:08,800 Speaker 1: send a copy of the file to a telecommunications fraud 149 00:09:08,880 --> 00:09:12,839 Speaker 1: expert named Henry Klipfel. But Clipfel was a happy cat. 150 00:09:12,920 --> 00:09:16,199 Speaker 1: He figured this document was a hacker trophy. It wasn't 151 00:09:16,240 --> 00:09:21,679 Speaker 1: meant to be a guide for some sort of nationwide catastrophe. 152 00:09:21,960 --> 00:09:25,880 Speaker 1: He figured someone broke into the system. This was their 153 00:09:25,960 --> 00:09:28,000 Speaker 1: proof that they did it. So he just kind of 154 00:09:28,080 --> 00:09:30,040 Speaker 1: put it on the shelf and didn't really think about 155 00:09:30,080 --> 00:09:35,120 Speaker 1: it again and wasn't too worried about it until later. Um, 156 00:09:35,200 --> 00:09:38,720 Speaker 1: he just figured it was what it actually was. He 157 00:09:38,760 --> 00:09:41,560 Speaker 1: would sell this for a while, although he would eventually 158 00:09:41,600 --> 00:09:44,679 Speaker 1: become heavily involved in a response team a little bit 159 00:09:44,760 --> 00:09:47,600 Speaker 1: later on. Now we've got a lot more to talk 160 00:09:47,640 --> 00:09:51,600 Speaker 1: about for this whole series of events that would end 161 00:09:51,679 --> 00:09:57,400 Speaker 1: up perpetuating a seriously a series of bad decisions that 162 00:09:57,480 --> 00:10:00,000 Speaker 1: led to the formation of the FF which, by the way, 163 00:10:00,080 --> 00:10:01,920 Speaker 1: it was not a bad decision. It's just that a 164 00:10:01,920 --> 00:10:04,079 Speaker 1: bunch of bad decisions happened and the e f F 165 00:10:04,320 --> 00:10:07,960 Speaker 1: had to come into creation because of it. But before 166 00:10:08,000 --> 00:10:09,520 Speaker 1: I get into that part of the story, let's take 167 00:10:09,520 --> 00:10:19,360 Speaker 1: another quick break and thank our sponsor. All right, let's 168 00:10:19,360 --> 00:10:23,160 Speaker 1: get back to profit profit. What had decided that he 169 00:10:23,200 --> 00:10:27,200 Speaker 1: was going to really revel in his victorious infiltration of 170 00:10:27,240 --> 00:10:30,240 Speaker 1: the Bell South system. He was not aware of this 171 00:10:30,400 --> 00:10:34,840 Speaker 1: leap frogging of the document that was going down the 172 00:10:34,880 --> 00:10:38,320 Speaker 1: line being sent from one person to another, and an 173 00:10:38,400 --> 00:10:41,320 Speaker 1: effort to figure out what exactly is going on here? 174 00:10:42,160 --> 00:10:46,920 Speaker 1: He thought, I wanna, I want to really brag about this. 175 00:10:46,920 --> 00:10:49,160 Speaker 1: This was a big achievement. How can I how can 176 00:10:49,160 --> 00:10:53,720 Speaker 1: I let the community know that I have this this 177 00:10:54,240 --> 00:10:57,679 Speaker 1: amazing document. Well, there was a journalist who was working 178 00:10:57,800 --> 00:11:03,240 Speaker 1: on a publication, a digital publication called Frack. Fracks spelled 179 00:11:03,240 --> 00:11:05,960 Speaker 1: with a pH, so it was a portmanteau of the 180 00:11:06,000 --> 00:11:11,679 Speaker 1: words freak and hack and uh. The journalist used the 181 00:11:11,720 --> 00:11:17,200 Speaker 1: handle night lightning and a night, as in like a 182 00:11:17,240 --> 00:11:21,199 Speaker 1: man dressed up in big old armored underpants, that kind 183 00:11:21,200 --> 00:11:23,480 Speaker 1: of night, which, by the way, you do not want 184 00:11:23,520 --> 00:11:26,760 Speaker 1: to be a night when there's lightning around. That's a 185 00:11:26,880 --> 00:11:31,400 Speaker 1: bad combination. Anyway, night Lightning was writing this publication called Frack, 186 00:11:31,480 --> 00:11:34,880 Speaker 1: which was very popular. It was distributed to multiple bolletin 187 00:11:34,920 --> 00:11:38,760 Speaker 1: board systems across the entire world, primarily the United States, 188 00:11:38,760 --> 00:11:41,760 Speaker 1: but also beyond that, and night Lightning had been bothering 189 00:11:41,800 --> 00:11:46,280 Speaker 1: the Atlanta Three for years about giving the giving the 190 00:11:46,360 --> 00:11:50,280 Speaker 1: publication more information so they could publish stories about them. 191 00:11:50,360 --> 00:11:54,320 Speaker 1: And typically the Atlanta Freight three weren't interested in doing that. 192 00:11:54,360 --> 00:11:57,720 Speaker 1: They just didn't really play ball very much. But Profits 193 00:11:57,720 --> 00:12:00,120 Speaker 1: saw this as being a great opportunity, and so a 194 00:12:00,120 --> 00:12:05,679 Speaker 1: Profit sent a copy of the nine one file tonight Lightning. 195 00:12:06,920 --> 00:12:10,000 Speaker 1: Night Lightning was going to the University of Missouri, and 196 00:12:10,120 --> 00:12:14,280 Speaker 1: so this copy of E nine one one then goes 197 00:12:14,320 --> 00:12:19,280 Speaker 1: on to a computer at the University of Missouri campus. Uh. 198 00:12:19,440 --> 00:12:22,199 Speaker 1: Profit figured that he was pretty safe because no one 199 00:12:22,240 --> 00:12:25,560 Speaker 1: had said anything to him and he wasn't aware of 200 00:12:25,600 --> 00:12:27,720 Speaker 1: this other activity that was going on with the file 201 00:12:27,800 --> 00:12:31,320 Speaker 1: at the time, and then he and night Lightning together 202 00:12:31,679 --> 00:12:37,640 Speaker 1: started to edit down the document. They wanted to publish it. Well, 203 00:12:37,760 --> 00:12:40,240 Speaker 1: night Lightning really wanted to publish it, but Profit was 204 00:12:40,280 --> 00:12:45,400 Speaker 1: scared that one the information inside it could be put 205 00:12:45,440 --> 00:12:49,480 Speaker 1: to malicious use and it could cause a catastrophe. I mean, 206 00:12:49,520 --> 00:12:55,000 Speaker 1: it did involve the emergency phone system in the United States. 207 00:12:55,040 --> 00:12:57,800 Speaker 1: That's a big deal. And two he didn't want anything 208 00:12:57,800 --> 00:13:02,040 Speaker 1: that could ultimately be traced back to him so together 209 00:13:02,080 --> 00:13:05,480 Speaker 1: they edited out all the sensitive information while keeping the 210 00:13:05,559 --> 00:13:07,160 Speaker 1: rest of it as much as they could so that 211 00:13:07,200 --> 00:13:09,600 Speaker 1: they could prove that, yes, this document did come from 212 00:13:09,640 --> 00:13:11,960 Speaker 1: Bell South, but they leave out all the things like 213 00:13:12,080 --> 00:13:15,880 Speaker 1: all the phone numbers for the various officers at Bell South, 214 00:13:15,920 --> 00:13:18,680 Speaker 1: which were part of this document. They didn't want that 215 00:13:18,720 --> 00:13:21,040 Speaker 1: to be revealed to the general public because then a 216 00:13:21,040 --> 00:13:23,680 Speaker 1: bunch of hackers would end up just using those phone 217 00:13:23,720 --> 00:13:27,480 Speaker 1: numbers for various malicious purposes. So they're trying to limit 218 00:13:28,200 --> 00:13:30,840 Speaker 1: the amount of damage that could be done with this document, 219 00:13:31,040 --> 00:13:34,560 Speaker 1: and Frank would end up publishing this edited document on 220 00:13:34,640 --> 00:13:41,800 Speaker 1: February twenty nine. I remember July of that year would 221 00:13:41,800 --> 00:13:44,600 Speaker 1: be when the raid would happen, so this is still 222 00:13:44,679 --> 00:13:48,760 Speaker 1: before the raid that hit fry Guy profit or Vile 223 00:13:48,920 --> 00:13:52,439 Speaker 1: and the Leftist. The Digital dogument was then published to 224 00:13:52,559 --> 00:13:57,200 Speaker 1: one fifty different hacker sites or hacker bolton board systems 225 00:13:57,240 --> 00:14:00,719 Speaker 1: would be more appropriate to say, so it got very 226 00:14:00,720 --> 00:14:05,000 Speaker 1: wide distribution, even though this was an edited down version 227 00:14:05,160 --> 00:14:08,080 Speaker 1: of that document, and at this point law enforcement and 228 00:14:08,160 --> 00:14:13,800 Speaker 1: Bell South had totally gone eight. They flipped their collective lids. 229 00:14:14,679 --> 00:14:17,880 Speaker 1: This is what helped fuel the move to the Legion 230 00:14:17,920 --> 00:14:21,120 Speaker 1: of Doom and Fry Guy sweep At later on that year, 231 00:14:21,120 --> 00:14:25,000 Speaker 1: on July two. It's what really motivated the Secret Service 232 00:14:25,040 --> 00:14:29,560 Speaker 1: to make that make that sting operation. The intrusion was 233 00:14:29,600 --> 00:14:32,360 Speaker 1: a huge problem, but the apparent distribution of what was 234 00:14:32,400 --> 00:14:38,240 Speaker 1: considered a critical document was really the catastrophe in question. 235 00:14:38,320 --> 00:14:43,600 Speaker 1: It It terrified people because here was a sensitive document 236 00:14:43,800 --> 00:14:48,520 Speaker 1: about a critical service and who knows what could happen. 237 00:14:49,280 --> 00:14:51,320 Speaker 1: As far as the Secret Service could tell, there was 238 00:14:51,400 --> 00:14:54,760 Speaker 1: some sort of conspiracy going on among the hacker subculture 239 00:14:55,280 --> 00:14:58,600 Speaker 1: to take down the phone system or the emergency phone 240 00:14:58,600 --> 00:15:02,440 Speaker 1: system specifically, and it was a coordinated attack that was 241 00:15:02,520 --> 00:15:06,200 Speaker 1: going across the nation. It was being spread around, and 242 00:15:06,280 --> 00:15:10,360 Speaker 1: so the Secret Service was highly motivated to pursue this. 243 00:15:11,240 --> 00:15:15,200 Speaker 1: The problem was that they weren't necessarily doing it in 244 00:15:15,240 --> 00:15:18,040 Speaker 1: a way that was technically what you would call legal. 245 00:15:19,160 --> 00:15:25,560 Speaker 1: As it turns out, So you have a a an 246 00:15:25,720 --> 00:15:33,000 Speaker 1: arguably understandable motivation for the Secret Service. They really have 247 00:15:33,200 --> 00:15:36,520 Speaker 1: to buckle down and make sure that the nation is safe. 248 00:15:37,400 --> 00:15:41,120 Speaker 1: Uh You. There, you then have the more mischievous community 249 00:15:41,160 --> 00:15:43,840 Speaker 1: of the hackers who are just kind of reveling in 250 00:15:43,880 --> 00:15:48,360 Speaker 1: this thought that here's this private computer system that's supposed 251 00:15:48,400 --> 00:15:51,520 Speaker 1: to be off limits, and yet a hacker strolled right 252 00:15:51,560 --> 00:15:55,360 Speaker 1: in and took one of these files. Um and both 253 00:15:55,640 --> 00:16:00,520 Speaker 1: groups had totally not really considered the other the motivations 254 00:16:00,520 --> 00:16:04,520 Speaker 1: of the other one. So the hackers were mostly ignorant 255 00:16:04,680 --> 00:16:06,520 Speaker 1: of what was going on with the Secret Service at 256 00:16:06,520 --> 00:16:10,800 Speaker 1: this time, and the Secret Service was just imagining a 257 00:16:10,880 --> 00:16:14,000 Speaker 1: worst case scenario in the case of the hackers, and 258 00:16:14,040 --> 00:16:17,880 Speaker 1: it would lead to enormous problems further down the road. 259 00:16:18,680 --> 00:16:22,400 Speaker 1: And we also know that if you take down a 260 00:16:22,440 --> 00:16:26,440 Speaker 1: digital file once it's been put up online, that's it. 261 00:16:26,440 --> 00:16:28,880 Speaker 1: It's out there. The genie is out of the bottle, 262 00:16:28,920 --> 00:16:32,000 Speaker 1: the cat is out of the bag. You're not getting 263 00:16:32,040 --> 00:16:35,520 Speaker 1: it back because someone's gonna make a copy of it 264 00:16:35,560 --> 00:16:37,960 Speaker 1: and post it somewhere else. We've seen it with videos. 265 00:16:38,000 --> 00:16:41,640 Speaker 1: We've seen it with tweets, We've seen it with social 266 00:16:41,680 --> 00:16:44,720 Speaker 1: media posts, We've seen it with files. It's just once 267 00:16:44,720 --> 00:16:47,080 Speaker 1: it goes up, all it takes is one other person 268 00:16:47,120 --> 00:16:50,360 Speaker 1: to download it and then host it somewhere else and 269 00:16:50,400 --> 00:16:54,840 Speaker 1: it's game over. Then the phone system would crash on January. 270 00:16:56,840 --> 00:16:59,680 Speaker 1: This is after those rates with Fry Guy in the 271 00:16:59,680 --> 00:17:03,520 Speaker 1: atlant A three, and it seemed to prove what Fry 272 00:17:03,560 --> 00:17:07,159 Speaker 1: Guy had been saying. Fry Guy had said that the 273 00:17:07,440 --> 00:17:10,640 Speaker 1: group of hackers, the Legion of Dooms, specifically, we're going 274 00:17:10,680 --> 00:17:13,719 Speaker 1: to end up crashing the phone system. Now, he had 275 00:17:13,720 --> 00:17:15,119 Speaker 1: said it was going to be on the fourth of 276 00:17:15,200 --> 00:17:18,560 Speaker 1: July nine, and instead it happens on Martin Luther King 277 00:17:18,600 --> 00:17:21,600 Speaker 1: Junior Day in nineteen and that's when the poo hit 278 00:17:21,600 --> 00:17:24,960 Speaker 1: the oscillating cooling device, as they say. Three days later, 279 00:17:25,280 --> 00:17:29,719 Speaker 1: January four, people would show up to night Lightning's frat 280 00:17:29,720 --> 00:17:33,159 Speaker 1: house at the University of Missouri. Two of those people 281 00:17:33,240 --> 00:17:36,880 Speaker 1: were Secret Service agents, one was an agent for Southwestern 282 00:17:36,920 --> 00:17:39,880 Speaker 1: Bell and one was a University of Missouri security officer, 283 00:17:40,320 --> 00:17:45,240 Speaker 1: and they accused night Lightning of causing this phone system crash, 284 00:17:45,640 --> 00:17:49,040 Speaker 1: or at least coordinating it. Now, night Lightning had nothing 285 00:17:49,040 --> 00:17:52,600 Speaker 1: to do with the phone system coming down, but, like 286 00:17:53,080 --> 00:17:57,359 Speaker 1: lots of other hackers before, decided to cooperate fully within 287 00:17:57,560 --> 00:18:01,800 Speaker 1: terry Gators, sharing an entire of the subscribers to the 288 00:18:02,000 --> 00:18:06,800 Speaker 1: Fracking Newsletter, or the Frack Newsletter, i should say, and 289 00:18:07,800 --> 00:18:11,560 Speaker 1: that gave law enforcement a ton of other leads to follow. 290 00:18:12,480 --> 00:18:15,080 Speaker 1: Around that same time, agents were starting to do stuff 291 00:18:15,080 --> 00:18:17,479 Speaker 1: that was really causing a lot of concern, not just 292 00:18:17,520 --> 00:18:22,160 Speaker 1: in the hacking community, but in the broader computer industry community. So, 293 00:18:22,240 --> 00:18:26,600 Speaker 1: for example, one target of this investigation was a guy 294 00:18:26,680 --> 00:18:30,800 Speaker 1: named Robert Eisenberg who ran a node. A node is 295 00:18:31,520 --> 00:18:36,520 Speaker 1: part of an interconnected system of message boards, so it's 296 00:18:36,520 --> 00:18:39,200 Speaker 1: like a bolton Board system, but amped up because it 297 00:18:39,240 --> 00:18:43,320 Speaker 1: could actually connect directly to other nodes. Bolton Board systems 298 00:18:43,320 --> 00:18:45,840 Speaker 1: were kind of like an island, right. There was no 299 00:18:46,200 --> 00:18:49,880 Speaker 1: connection directly to other bolton Board systems for the most part. 300 00:18:50,040 --> 00:18:53,840 Speaker 1: There were some exceptions, but generally speaking, it was like 301 00:18:54,040 --> 00:18:56,879 Speaker 1: an individual computer system that you would log into and 302 00:18:56,920 --> 00:19:00,800 Speaker 1: that's all you saw. Nodes were more like web pages 303 00:19:00,840 --> 00:19:04,359 Speaker 1: on the Internet, though not quite as sophisticated as that, 304 00:19:04,800 --> 00:19:07,400 Speaker 1: so sort of somewhere in between a bolton Board system 305 00:19:07,440 --> 00:19:09,960 Speaker 1: and a web page, but they could interconnect with each 306 00:19:09,960 --> 00:19:14,800 Speaker 1: other and allow for direct communication and file transfers between them. 307 00:19:14,920 --> 00:19:19,359 Speaker 1: So Eisenberg was running a node that was a a 308 00:19:19,560 --> 00:19:24,959 Speaker 1: Unix node. It was called Elephant. Eisenberg was targeted because 309 00:19:25,000 --> 00:19:28,600 Speaker 1: a task force out of Chicago, a very active task 310 00:19:28,640 --> 00:19:31,800 Speaker 1: force that was largely responsible for leading some of these 311 00:19:31,840 --> 00:19:36,920 Speaker 1: investigations into hackers, had identified elephant uh the node that 312 00:19:36,960 --> 00:19:40,840 Speaker 1: he was running after performing a raid on a different 313 00:19:41,080 --> 00:19:47,880 Speaker 1: Unix expert called Terminus, or his handle was Terminus. Eisenberg 314 00:19:47,960 --> 00:19:53,240 Speaker 1: was a Unix consultant, and they thought because Terminus was 315 00:19:53,280 --> 00:19:58,639 Speaker 1: connected to this world, that Eisenberg too must be connected 316 00:19:58,720 --> 00:20:02,160 Speaker 1: to it. Eisenberg, though, was a total stand up dude, 317 00:20:02,280 --> 00:20:05,840 Speaker 1: a straight shooter. He was not someone who acted outside 318 00:20:05,840 --> 00:20:08,679 Speaker 1: of the law. He did do some contract work with 319 00:20:08,760 --> 00:20:12,280 Speaker 1: a phone company, and while technically his contract was up, 320 00:20:12,320 --> 00:20:15,600 Speaker 1: he could log into the phone company systems and occasionally 321 00:20:15,640 --> 00:20:18,080 Speaker 1: he would do so. But he wasn't stealing files, he 322 00:20:18,160 --> 00:20:22,440 Speaker 1: wasn't distributing files, he wasn't causing any sort of sabotage. 323 00:20:23,440 --> 00:20:25,439 Speaker 1: So you could argue that he was still being a 324 00:20:25,480 --> 00:20:28,280 Speaker 1: little questionable because he was poking his nose someplace where 325 00:20:28,280 --> 00:20:31,760 Speaker 1: technically he was no longer working. But beyond that, he 326 00:20:31,800 --> 00:20:35,199 Speaker 1: wasn't really doing anything. He wasn't publishing any of that 327 00:20:35,280 --> 00:20:39,520 Speaker 1: on his Bolton board system or his node. Rather, and 328 00:20:39,960 --> 00:20:43,240 Speaker 1: the investigators were asking them all about the legion of Doom, 329 00:20:43,320 --> 00:20:45,560 Speaker 1: and he says, what are you talking about? And they 330 00:20:45,600 --> 00:20:47,880 Speaker 1: started asking about Terminus, and then he said, I don't 331 00:20:48,280 --> 00:20:50,320 Speaker 1: I don't know who you're I don't know these people. 332 00:20:51,440 --> 00:20:55,720 Speaker 1: Then they gave him the actual name for the guy 333 00:20:55,960 --> 00:20:59,480 Speaker 1: who was using the handle, Terminus, and Eisenberg says, oh, yeah, 334 00:20:59,520 --> 00:21:02,720 Speaker 1: that guy. Know that guy because he is an expert 335 00:21:02,800 --> 00:21:06,560 Speaker 1: on this one particular very powerful computer system, and we've 336 00:21:06,560 --> 00:21:10,440 Speaker 1: talked about that, but we've talked as you know, human beings, 337 00:21:10,480 --> 00:21:14,600 Speaker 1: not to hacker handles and otherwise. He really had no 338 00:21:14,640 --> 00:21:17,200 Speaker 1: connection to Terminus or hackers like the Legion of Doom. 339 00:21:18,040 --> 00:21:21,960 Speaker 1: But that didn't stop the government from seizing Eisenberg's equipment 340 00:21:22,359 --> 00:21:27,439 Speaker 1: and the node itself. Eisenberg wasn't arrested, he was not 341 00:21:27,600 --> 00:21:30,879 Speaker 1: charged with any crimes, but the government would end up 342 00:21:30,880 --> 00:21:34,000 Speaker 1: holding onto his equipment for a couple of years, so 343 00:21:35,080 --> 00:21:38,880 Speaker 1: he had no access to things that he he outright owned. 344 00:21:39,160 --> 00:21:41,680 Speaker 1: The government did say that the modem he was using 345 00:21:41,800 --> 00:21:45,680 Speaker 1: was likely hot as in it was stolen property, but 346 00:21:45,880 --> 00:21:49,640 Speaker 1: Eisenberg didn't purchase it as stolen. He wasn't like going 347 00:21:49,680 --> 00:21:52,800 Speaker 1: to some sort of person who's like, hey, this modem 348 00:21:52,800 --> 00:21:54,560 Speaker 1: fell off the back of a truck. He bought it 349 00:21:55,000 --> 00:21:57,680 Speaker 1: second hand. But that's what a lot of hackers were doing. 350 00:21:57,720 --> 00:22:02,400 Speaker 1: They were buying equipment she that was usually equipment that say, 351 00:22:02,480 --> 00:22:04,960 Speaker 1: a university was getting rid of because they were upgrading 352 00:22:04,960 --> 00:22:08,480 Speaker 1: to the next level of equipment, so then they offload 353 00:22:09,119 --> 00:22:12,080 Speaker 1: the stuff that they already had. According to the government, 354 00:22:12,440 --> 00:22:16,119 Speaker 1: the modem that Eisenberg had was likely stolen property, but 355 00:22:16,200 --> 00:22:20,000 Speaker 1: he didn't know that, so he was like, well, I'm sorry, 356 00:22:20,359 --> 00:22:22,640 Speaker 1: I wasn't trying to buy stolen property. I just needed 357 00:22:22,640 --> 00:22:28,880 Speaker 1: a modem. Uh. This whole move of the government taking 358 00:22:29,560 --> 00:22:33,200 Speaker 1: Eisenberg's equipment without charging him of any sort of crime, 359 00:22:33,800 --> 00:22:38,720 Speaker 1: as you might imagine, is problematic because if you assume 360 00:22:38,800 --> 00:22:43,840 Speaker 1: we're in adjust society, which is obviously being very lenient, 361 00:22:44,800 --> 00:22:48,040 Speaker 1: you don't have governments sweep in to take possession of 362 00:22:48,080 --> 00:22:52,920 Speaker 1: someone else's property with no legal justification. But that's totally 363 00:22:52,960 --> 00:22:55,119 Speaker 1: what happened to Eisenberg as well as to other people. 364 00:22:55,119 --> 00:22:57,960 Speaker 1: Eisenberg was not an isolated case. There were other people 365 00:22:57,960 --> 00:23:01,480 Speaker 1: who also had their their various computer systems taken from 366 00:23:01,560 --> 00:23:06,200 Speaker 1: them without any actual evidence that they themselves had done 367 00:23:06,200 --> 00:23:08,800 Speaker 1: any sort of crime. Now, this was largely because there 368 00:23:08,840 --> 00:23:11,320 Speaker 1: was still so much uncertainty about what was actually going on. 369 00:23:11,440 --> 00:23:13,399 Speaker 1: The Secret Service was still trying to figure out is 370 00:23:13,440 --> 00:23:16,600 Speaker 1: there some sort of nationwide conspiracy that's gonna try and 371 00:23:16,680 --> 00:23:22,680 Speaker 1: do the equivalent of a cyber attack on the United States. Uh, 372 00:23:22,720 --> 00:23:26,080 Speaker 1: But they weren't really sure. They didn't have any evidence 373 00:23:26,119 --> 00:23:28,600 Speaker 1: of it apart from the fact that this one emergency 374 00:23:28,720 --> 00:23:32,040 Speaker 1: document had made its way through all these different hacker sites. 375 00:23:32,560 --> 00:23:35,240 Speaker 1: There were also fears that perhaps foreign agents were involved, 376 00:23:35,240 --> 00:23:40,880 Speaker 1: including possibly the involvement of the KGB out of Germany, which, 377 00:23:40,920 --> 00:23:42,920 Speaker 1: by the way, at that time there were two Germany's. 378 00:23:43,000 --> 00:23:46,560 Speaker 1: There was a West Germany in the East Germany. Now 379 00:23:46,640 --> 00:23:49,280 Speaker 1: the days that's not the case, but some of us 380 00:23:49,320 --> 00:23:51,919 Speaker 1: remember when the map was very different in Europe. So 381 00:23:51,960 --> 00:23:55,480 Speaker 1: the fear of what could possibly be was fueling a 382 00:23:55,520 --> 00:23:58,439 Speaker 1: lot of very questionable decisions over at the Secret Service. 383 00:23:58,680 --> 00:24:01,480 Speaker 1: Back to the Legion of Doom, one of the other members, 384 00:24:02,000 --> 00:24:05,199 Speaker 1: not the Atlanta three, but another member who had not 385 00:24:05,240 --> 00:24:09,160 Speaker 1: been picked up in this initial sweep, was known as 386 00:24:09,359 --> 00:24:14,000 Speaker 1: the Mentor. Mentor happened to work at a little company 387 00:24:14,040 --> 00:24:18,359 Speaker 1: called Steve Jackson Games. I mentioned them earlier in this episode. 388 00:24:19,400 --> 00:24:22,439 Speaker 1: Steve Jackson Games had its own little bolton board system 389 00:24:22,520 --> 00:24:27,679 Speaker 1: called Illuminati, which if you know what the Illuminati are 390 00:24:27,720 --> 00:24:30,640 Speaker 1: supposed to be, it's this hidden government organization that supposedly 391 00:24:30,680 --> 00:24:34,880 Speaker 1: was controlling the world. It obviously brings up other questions 392 00:24:34,920 --> 00:24:37,439 Speaker 1: of oh, maybe there is a hacker conspiracy here, but no, 393 00:24:37,560 --> 00:24:40,440 Speaker 1: that was because Steve Jackson Games had a game called 394 00:24:40,480 --> 00:24:44,360 Speaker 1: Illuminati and they named their bolton Board system after it. 395 00:24:44,359 --> 00:24:47,200 Speaker 1: It had nothing to do with any sort of hacker conspiracy. 396 00:24:47,480 --> 00:24:52,480 Speaker 1: Steve Jackson Games just makes games, and that game again, Illuminati, 397 00:24:52,560 --> 00:24:55,600 Speaker 1: the game of conspiracy was what they called their bolton 398 00:24:55,600 --> 00:24:59,440 Speaker 1: Board system. So the Secret Service was getting confused between 399 00:25:00,040 --> 00:25:03,560 Speaker 1: the actual games that Steve Jackson was making and reality, 400 00:25:04,040 --> 00:25:07,400 Speaker 1: kind of similar to what Erville had experienced with those 401 00:25:07,440 --> 00:25:11,080 Speaker 1: notes he had made for his Steve Jackson Girp's game 402 00:25:11,160 --> 00:25:13,679 Speaker 1: that he was game mastering, the fact that it was 403 00:25:13,840 --> 00:25:17,360 Speaker 1: all about espionage and had all these different spy terminology, 404 00:25:17,920 --> 00:25:23,160 Speaker 1: the elements in it that really made the Secret Service suspicious. 405 00:25:23,200 --> 00:25:25,840 Speaker 1: And now you had this whole bolton Board system filled 406 00:25:25,880 --> 00:25:28,879 Speaker 1: with that kind of information that also made them suspicious. 407 00:25:28,880 --> 00:25:31,639 Speaker 1: They were sure that there was some connection between this 408 00:25:31,720 --> 00:25:36,359 Speaker 1: bolletin board system and this document that was making the rounds. 409 00:25:36,520 --> 00:25:40,679 Speaker 1: So on March, one group of agents rated the Mentors 410 00:25:40,800 --> 00:25:44,320 Speaker 1: home where he lived with his wife and children, and 411 00:25:44,359 --> 00:25:47,120 Speaker 1: they took away his computer, his phone, his printer, and 412 00:25:47,160 --> 00:25:49,600 Speaker 1: all this other equipment. He was not arrested, he was 413 00:25:49,640 --> 00:25:52,280 Speaker 1: not charged with any crime, but his property was not 414 00:25:52,480 --> 00:25:56,000 Speaker 1: returned to him on any sort of decent time scale either. 415 00:25:56,040 --> 00:25:57,639 Speaker 1: I think they kept it for a couple of years. 416 00:25:58,119 --> 00:26:02,520 Speaker 1: Then the same team decided to move on and raid 417 00:26:02,840 --> 00:26:06,760 Speaker 1: Steve Jackson Games itself. The office for Steve Jackson Games. 418 00:26:13,400 --> 00:26:17,399 Speaker 1: The mentor had overheard some of the agents talking on 419 00:26:17,520 --> 00:26:22,240 Speaker 1: their radios about busting the door down and doing this raid, 420 00:26:22,359 --> 00:26:27,520 Speaker 1: and the mentor, absolutely aghast at the idea, knowing that 421 00:26:27,600 --> 00:26:30,600 Speaker 1: there was nothing at Steve Jackson Games that was remotely 422 00:26:30,640 --> 00:26:33,199 Speaker 1: connected to this world, said hey, let me just give 423 00:26:33,240 --> 00:26:35,399 Speaker 1: you my key so you can go in. Because you're 424 00:26:35,440 --> 00:26:38,160 Speaker 1: gonna go in anyway, you might as well not break 425 00:26:38,200 --> 00:26:41,080 Speaker 1: the door down, And so he did. He surrendered his 426 00:26:41,200 --> 00:26:44,520 Speaker 1: key voluntarily, and they went in and they started seizing 427 00:26:44,680 --> 00:26:47,639 Speaker 1: all these computers and other various pieces of equipment, and 428 00:26:47,680 --> 00:26:50,879 Speaker 1: they denied entry to all of the Steve Jackson employees 429 00:26:50,920 --> 00:26:55,160 Speaker 1: who were showing up, including Steve Jackson himself, and they said, 430 00:26:55,800 --> 00:26:59,840 Speaker 1: we're conducting an investigation and this is off limits. They 431 00:27:00,000 --> 00:27:03,840 Speaker 1: took three computers, a handful of hard disk drives, tons 432 00:27:03,920 --> 00:27:07,240 Speaker 1: of floppy disks, and lots of other pieces of equipment. 433 00:27:07,680 --> 00:27:09,680 Speaker 1: And it wasn't just the equipment, it was the stuff 434 00:27:09,720 --> 00:27:12,680 Speaker 1: that was stored on the equipment. On those hard drives 435 00:27:12,800 --> 00:27:19,040 Speaker 1: included financial information about the company, you know, customer contacts, uh, 436 00:27:19,359 --> 00:27:23,679 Speaker 1: personnel files, stuff that was sensitive. And of course the 437 00:27:23,680 --> 00:27:27,679 Speaker 1: bulletin board system itself existed on one of those computers, 438 00:27:27,760 --> 00:27:32,480 Speaker 1: and that also contained electronic communication between various employees. It 439 00:27:32,560 --> 00:27:35,840 Speaker 1: was sort of like their internal email server in a way. 440 00:27:36,880 --> 00:27:41,639 Speaker 1: And all of this equipment was seized by the Secret Service. 441 00:27:41,720 --> 00:27:47,000 Speaker 1: But what about arrests Zero No one was arrested or 442 00:27:47,119 --> 00:27:49,560 Speaker 1: charged with any crime. There was no crime to charge 443 00:27:49,600 --> 00:27:54,240 Speaker 1: them with. There was just the seizure of property on 444 00:27:54,320 --> 00:28:00,080 Speaker 1: the suspicion that this document, the document might be on 445 00:28:00,080 --> 00:28:03,879 Speaker 1: one of those machines, So that was the actual reason 446 00:28:03,920 --> 00:28:07,719 Speaker 1: for the raid. But they couldn't find it anywhere on 447 00:28:07,760 --> 00:28:11,080 Speaker 1: any of the machines. There was no sign of it 448 00:28:11,200 --> 00:28:13,240 Speaker 1: on the bulletin board system, there was no sign of 449 00:28:13,240 --> 00:28:15,000 Speaker 1: it on any of the hard drives or on any 450 00:28:15,000 --> 00:28:19,159 Speaker 1: of the floppy disks. It was completely absent from the 451 00:28:19,200 --> 00:28:22,280 Speaker 1: property of Steve Jackson Games. Now, the fallout from that 452 00:28:22,359 --> 00:28:26,320 Speaker 1: raid was terrible for the company. Even though they were 453 00:28:26,320 --> 00:28:29,480 Speaker 1: completely innocent, they couldn't have access to their equipment. The 454 00:28:29,720 --> 00:28:32,359 Speaker 1: Secret Service did not return it to them very quickly 455 00:28:32,480 --> 00:28:36,920 Speaker 1: at all, and so as a result, their financials had 456 00:28:36,960 --> 00:28:40,560 Speaker 1: taken a huge hit. Steve Jackson had no choice but 457 00:28:40,680 --> 00:28:44,600 Speaker 1: to lay off nearly half of his employees. He just 458 00:28:44,640 --> 00:28:48,080 Speaker 1: couldn't afford to pay them and stay in business because 459 00:28:48,120 --> 00:28:53,360 Speaker 1: of this huge setback. So there was demonstrable harm from 460 00:28:53,360 --> 00:29:00,760 Speaker 1: this raid, which ultimately was an unjustified raid. Uh. Meanwhile, 461 00:29:01,080 --> 00:29:04,320 Speaker 1: you have the Secret Service convinced that because of the 462 00:29:04,400 --> 00:29:08,120 Speaker 1: subject matter of some of the games that Steve Jackson made, 463 00:29:08,560 --> 00:29:10,880 Speaker 1: that they were onto something and the whole thing would 464 00:29:10,880 --> 00:29:13,400 Speaker 1: be comical if it didn't actually mean that there was 465 00:29:13,440 --> 00:29:17,200 Speaker 1: a negative impact on decent people who were just doing 466 00:29:17,240 --> 00:29:20,280 Speaker 1: their job. Eventually, the Secret Service did return all the 467 00:29:20,280 --> 00:29:22,920 Speaker 1: equipment to the company, but the damage had already been done. 468 00:29:22,960 --> 00:29:25,040 Speaker 1: And worse than that, they had discovered that the electronic 469 00:29:25,160 --> 00:29:29,720 Speaker 1: mail that it existed on this bulletin board system was 470 00:29:29,800 --> 00:29:34,240 Speaker 1: missing information like there were entire communications that were gone 471 00:29:34,320 --> 00:29:38,040 Speaker 1: had been deleted. They had been accessed individually and deleted 472 00:29:38,120 --> 00:29:44,640 Speaker 1: from the bulletin board system. Which infuriated Steve Jackson. This 473 00:29:44,720 --> 00:29:46,760 Speaker 1: is what would end up becoming the starting point for 474 00:29:46,800 --> 00:29:52,040 Speaker 1: the Electronic Frontier Foundation. Steve Jackson was certain that his 475 00:29:52,080 --> 00:29:54,320 Speaker 1: First Amendment rights and the First Amendment rights of his 476 00:29:54,360 --> 00:29:57,320 Speaker 1: employees had been violated because the government had come in 477 00:29:57,800 --> 00:30:02,040 Speaker 1: seized a list of community cations and deleted some of them. 478 00:30:02,040 --> 00:30:04,959 Speaker 1: This would be like if the government raided a library, 479 00:30:05,200 --> 00:30:07,560 Speaker 1: grabbed a whole bunch of books from it, and then 480 00:30:07,600 --> 00:30:11,600 Speaker 1: just burnt them. It's not it's not within the realm 481 00:30:11,600 --> 00:30:15,600 Speaker 1: of government in a just and free society to do that. 482 00:30:15,600 --> 00:30:21,840 Speaker 1: That's an authoritarian move, not a democratic move. So Steve 483 00:30:21,920 --> 00:30:24,920 Speaker 1: Jackson started looking for civil liberties organizations to help him 484 00:30:24,960 --> 00:30:28,720 Speaker 1: pursue a claim against the U. S. Government to say 485 00:30:28,760 --> 00:30:31,920 Speaker 1: our free free speech was violated and we need to 486 00:30:32,400 --> 00:30:34,440 Speaker 1: have this resolved. But he was having a lot of 487 00:30:34,440 --> 00:30:37,560 Speaker 1: trouble finding anyone to help him because these problems were 488 00:30:37,600 --> 00:30:41,440 Speaker 1: really new. I mean, these were electronic communications, not hard copies, 489 00:30:41,520 --> 00:30:43,600 Speaker 1: and there are a lot of civil liberties groups that 490 00:30:43,720 --> 00:30:45,920 Speaker 1: just didn't know how to handle that because there really 491 00:30:46,240 --> 00:30:49,200 Speaker 1: there was no like precedent set. No one was really 492 00:30:49,200 --> 00:30:53,600 Speaker 1: sure how to argue it. So he was kind of stuck. 493 00:30:53,960 --> 00:30:58,080 Speaker 1: But three people felt that they understood these issues and 494 00:30:58,120 --> 00:31:01,520 Speaker 1: they were very much on the side of Steve Jackson 495 00:31:01,520 --> 00:31:04,560 Speaker 1: and his company. And those three people belonged to an 496 00:31:04,600 --> 00:31:08,520 Speaker 1: online community that was called the Whole Earth Electronic Link 497 00:31:08,880 --> 00:31:12,440 Speaker 1: or well w e l L. Those three people were 498 00:31:12,480 --> 00:31:15,479 Speaker 1: Mitch Kapoor, who was the former president of the Lotus 499 00:31:15,520 --> 00:31:20,200 Speaker 1: Development Corporation, John Perry Barlow, who was a cattle rancher 500 00:31:20,320 --> 00:31:23,440 Speaker 1: and who wrote lyrics for the band The Grateful Dead, 501 00:31:24,040 --> 00:31:28,920 Speaker 1: and John Gilmore, who worked for Sun Microsystems. These three 502 00:31:29,000 --> 00:31:32,800 Speaker 1: decided to form the nonprofit organization that would be dedicated 503 00:31:32,880 --> 00:31:36,200 Speaker 1: to defending civil liberties in the technology space, and they 504 00:31:36,240 --> 00:31:40,680 Speaker 1: called it the Electronic Frontier Foundation. Their first act as 505 00:31:40,760 --> 00:31:44,360 Speaker 1: an organization was to hire a legal team to represent 506 00:31:44,400 --> 00:31:48,240 Speaker 1: Steve Jackson Games in a lawsuit filed against the Secret Service. 507 00:31:48,960 --> 00:31:52,600 Speaker 1: So they brought on a law firm called George Donaldson 508 00:31:52,720 --> 00:31:57,400 Speaker 1: and Ford. The lead counsel was a fellow named Pete Kennedy. 509 00:31:59,000 --> 00:32:04,240 Speaker 1: They brought three charges against the Secret Service and Sam Sparks, 510 00:32:04,280 --> 00:32:07,560 Speaker 1: the court judge who heard the case, would uphold two 511 00:32:07,720 --> 00:32:10,920 Speaker 1: of those charges. The one that he would ultimately strike 512 00:32:11,000 --> 00:32:13,959 Speaker 1: down was an argument that the Secret Service had quote 513 00:32:14,080 --> 00:32:19,400 Speaker 1: intercepted end quote electronic messages illegally, and the way they 514 00:32:19,440 --> 00:32:24,000 Speaker 1: intercepted these messages was by taking the actual physical computer 515 00:32:24,080 --> 00:32:28,080 Speaker 1: equipment that the messages were stored on. So Steve Jackson 516 00:32:28,120 --> 00:32:30,920 Speaker 1: Games would appeal this decision saying no, no, no, we 517 00:32:31,040 --> 00:32:34,560 Speaker 1: need to have this resolved. The Fifth Circuit Court would 518 00:32:34,640 --> 00:32:39,200 Speaker 1: end up ruling against that appeal, so denying the appeal, 519 00:32:40,040 --> 00:32:43,920 Speaker 1: and that essentially set a precedent saying that physical possession 520 00:32:43,920 --> 00:32:47,920 Speaker 1: of computer equipment does not constitute interception of electronic communication 521 00:32:48,040 --> 00:32:50,800 Speaker 1: just because the communication happens to be on that equipment. 522 00:32:51,680 --> 00:32:55,000 Speaker 1: The judge gave a lengthy reprimand to the Secret Service, 523 00:32:55,560 --> 00:32:57,600 Speaker 1: and it's a pretty long summary, but let me give 524 00:32:57,640 --> 00:33:01,160 Speaker 1: you the rundown because I think it's very interesting. These 525 00:33:01,160 --> 00:33:05,720 Speaker 1: are the words of Sam Sparks. This is a complex case. 526 00:33:06,280 --> 00:33:10,480 Speaker 1: It is still not clear how sensitive and or proprietary 527 00:33:10,560 --> 00:33:15,680 Speaker 1: the one document was, or how genuinely harmful the potential 528 00:33:15,680 --> 00:33:19,680 Speaker 1: decryption scheme may have been, or if either were discovered 529 00:33:19,720 --> 00:33:22,560 Speaker 1: by the Secret Service and the information seized on March 530 00:33:22,640 --> 00:33:26,600 Speaker 1: first nine. The fact that no criminal charges have ever 531 00:33:26,680 --> 00:33:30,680 Speaker 1: been filed and the investigation remains ongoing is of course 532 00:33:30,880 --> 00:33:34,400 Speaker 1: not conclusive. The complexity of this case results from the 533 00:33:34,440 --> 00:33:39,600 Speaker 1: Secret services insufficient investigation and its lack of knowledge of 534 00:33:39,640 --> 00:33:42,800 Speaker 1: the specific laws that could apply to their conduct. On 535 00:33:42,840 --> 00:33:48,280 Speaker 1: February nine and thereafter, it appears obvious neither the government 536 00:33:48,320 --> 00:33:53,280 Speaker 1: employees nor the plaintiffs or their lawyers contemplated the statute 537 00:33:53,400 --> 00:33:57,320 Speaker 1: upon which this case is brought back in February, March, April, 538 00:33:57,520 --> 00:34:00,920 Speaker 1: May or June of n but this does not provide 539 00:34:00,960 --> 00:34:04,520 Speaker 1: assistance to the defense of the case. The Secret Service 540 00:34:04,560 --> 00:34:07,960 Speaker 1: and its personnel are the entities that citizens, like each 541 00:34:07,960 --> 00:34:11,120 Speaker 1: of the plaintiffs, rely upon and look to protect their 542 00:34:11,239 --> 00:34:15,160 Speaker 1: rights and properties. The Secret Service conduct resulted in the 543 00:34:15,239 --> 00:34:20,040 Speaker 1: seizure of property, products, business records, business documents, and electronic 544 00:34:20,040 --> 00:34:23,680 Speaker 1: communications of a corporate and for individual citizens that the 545 00:34:23,680 --> 00:34:27,200 Speaker 1: statutes were intended to protect. It may well be, as 546 00:34:27,200 --> 00:34:31,400 Speaker 1: the government defendants contend, these statutes relied upon by the 547 00:34:31,440 --> 00:34:34,480 Speaker 1: plaintiffs should not apply to the facts of this case, 548 00:34:34,760 --> 00:34:37,760 Speaker 1: as these holdings may result in the government having great 549 00:34:37,800 --> 00:34:43,200 Speaker 1: difficulties in obtaining information or computer documents representing illegal activities. 550 00:34:43,520 --> 00:34:48,280 Speaker 1: But this court cannot amend or rewrite the statutes involved. 551 00:34:48,520 --> 00:34:51,560 Speaker 1: The Secret Service must go to the Congress for relief 552 00:34:51,960 --> 00:34:56,640 Speaker 1: until that time. This Court recommends better education, investigation, and 553 00:34:56,719 --> 00:35:00,839 Speaker 1: strict compliance with the statutes as written. And that's how 554 00:35:00,880 --> 00:35:03,799 Speaker 1: the e f F was born out of the overreaching 555 00:35:03,840 --> 00:35:07,160 Speaker 1: response by the Secret Service to a perceived threat of 556 00:35:07,239 --> 00:35:10,960 Speaker 1: an imagined conspiracy of hackers determined to take down the 557 00:35:11,080 --> 00:35:16,440 Speaker 1: N one emergency services system. That is a heck of 558 00:35:16,480 --> 00:35:19,759 Speaker 1: a story, And as I said at the beginning, while 559 00:35:19,800 --> 00:35:25,000 Speaker 1: I was researching this topic, I realized that that origin 560 00:35:25,080 --> 00:35:28,879 Speaker 1: story was so fascinating that it involved a deeper look 561 00:35:28,920 --> 00:35:31,799 Speaker 1: than just Oh, the e f F started because the 562 00:35:31,880 --> 00:35:36,719 Speaker 1: Secret Service rated the offices of Steve Jackson Games. You've 563 00:35:36,719 --> 00:35:40,840 Speaker 1: got to know more than that. And since then, the 564 00:35:40,880 --> 00:35:42,919 Speaker 1: e f F has done a lot of different work 565 00:35:42,960 --> 00:35:48,200 Speaker 1: defending the various liberties of people in the Internet space, 566 00:35:48,920 --> 00:35:52,239 Speaker 1: and will definitely cover more of that in a future episode. 567 00:35:53,080 --> 00:35:55,920 Speaker 1: In the meantime, if you guys have suggestions for future 568 00:35:56,120 --> 00:35:59,839 Speaker 1: topics to cover on this show, being tech stuff, send 569 00:36:00,080 --> 00:36:02,959 Speaker 1: a message the email addresses tech stuff at how stuff 570 00:36:03,000 --> 00:36:05,879 Speaker 1: works dot com, or you know, drop me a line 571 00:36:05,880 --> 00:36:09,240 Speaker 1: on the social media like Facebook and Twitter the handle 572 00:36:09,239 --> 00:36:11,520 Speaker 1: of both of those tech stuff hs W. You're gonna 573 00:36:11,520 --> 00:36:14,040 Speaker 1: see a lot more activity from those in the days 574 00:36:14,120 --> 00:36:17,719 Speaker 1: moving forward. Remember you can watch me stream live over 575 00:36:17,760 --> 00:36:21,000 Speaker 1: at twitch dot tv slash tech stuff. I record on 576 00:36:21,040 --> 00:36:24,200 Speaker 1: Wednesdays and Fridays, so pop over to that link. You'll 577 00:36:24,239 --> 00:36:26,400 Speaker 1: see the schedule there, and you can participate in the 578 00:36:26,480 --> 00:36:29,239 Speaker 1: chat room, and I might even be able to read 579 00:36:29,280 --> 00:36:32,680 Speaker 1: it and chat with you. I try to multiple times 580 00:36:32,680 --> 00:36:36,400 Speaker 1: throw an episode, and uh, I guess I'll talk to 581 00:36:36,400 --> 00:36:44,880 Speaker 1: you guys again really soon for more on this and 582 00:36:44,960 --> 00:36:47,520 Speaker 1: thousands of other topics. Because it has stuff works dot 583 00:36:47,520 --> 00:36:57,520 Speaker 1: com