1 00:00:03,120 --> 00:00:14,320 Speaker 1: Bloomberg Audio Studios, podcasts, radio news. 2 00:00:17,160 --> 00:00:20,720 Speaker 2: Welcome to Voteronomics, where politics and markets collide. I'm made 3 00:00:20,680 --> 00:00:24,040 Speaker 2: from Woodridge. For my summer reading selection, I've chosen the 4 00:00:24,079 --> 00:00:28,840 Speaker 2: latest release from Fared Zacaria, Age of Revolutions. Freed, of course, 5 00:00:29,080 --> 00:00:34,159 Speaker 2: hosts CNN's flagship international affairs show, fored Zakaria GPS. He 6 00:00:34,200 --> 00:00:37,000 Speaker 2: writes a weekly column for The Washington Post and is 7 00:00:37,040 --> 00:00:40,440 Speaker 2: the author of the Future of Freedom, the Post American World, 8 00:00:40,520 --> 00:00:43,360 Speaker 2: and Ten Lessons for a Post Pandemic World. But as 9 00:00:43,400 --> 00:00:47,280 Speaker 2: I said, this conversation focuses on Age of Revolutions, Progress 10 00:00:47,280 --> 00:00:50,320 Speaker 2: and backlash from sixteen hundred to the present. This is 11 00:00:50,400 --> 00:00:53,400 Speaker 2: really a fascinating book about the rise of the liberal 12 00:00:53,560 --> 00:00:57,880 Speaker 2: order and the possible collapse of that liberal order. For Reid, 13 00:00:57,960 --> 00:01:00,960 Speaker 2: you have a record of taking on read big themes, 14 00:01:01,120 --> 00:01:04,759 Speaker 2: the Future of Freedom, the post American World. But this 15 00:01:05,040 --> 00:01:09,640 Speaker 2: is your biggest theme yet, the Age of Revolutions, Progress 16 00:01:09,680 --> 00:01:13,720 Speaker 2: and Backlash from sixteen hundred to the present. Tell us 17 00:01:13,760 --> 00:01:16,240 Speaker 2: a bit about your argument. What was it that inspired 18 00:01:16,319 --> 00:01:18,000 Speaker 2: this book and what is the main thesis. 19 00:01:18,840 --> 00:01:21,600 Speaker 3: That's a wonderful question, Adrian, What inspired the book, or 20 00:01:21,600 --> 00:01:24,760 Speaker 3: at least triggered the book was that about ten years 21 00:01:24,760 --> 00:01:27,160 Speaker 3: ago I started to notice something that I thought was 22 00:01:27,280 --> 00:01:30,520 Speaker 3: very unusual, which was the rise of the Tea Party. 23 00:01:30,720 --> 00:01:33,400 Speaker 3: And the reason I thought it was unusual was it 24 00:01:33,480 --> 00:01:38,160 Speaker 3: was a kind of grassroots insurgency that was taking over 25 00:01:38,480 --> 00:01:44,520 Speaker 3: or upending, the most hierarchical of the political parties in 26 00:01:44,560 --> 00:01:47,400 Speaker 3: America and one of the most hierarchical in the Western world. 27 00:01:47,440 --> 00:01:50,440 Speaker 3: If you think of the Republican Party, the old saying 28 00:01:50,520 --> 00:01:54,600 Speaker 3: about presidential nominations used to be that the Democrats have 29 00:01:54,680 --> 00:01:58,240 Speaker 3: to fall in love, but Republicans fall in line. And 30 00:01:58,280 --> 00:02:01,080 Speaker 3: if you think about, you know, the Democrat nominating John 31 00:02:01,200 --> 00:02:06,440 Speaker 3: Kennedy and Clinton and Obama, you understand that, whereas the 32 00:02:06,440 --> 00:02:10,240 Speaker 3: Republicans would nominate you know, Nixon and then Nixon and 33 00:02:10,280 --> 00:02:14,320 Speaker 3: then Nixon and then Bush and another Bush. You know, 34 00:02:14,360 --> 00:02:18,239 Speaker 3: it was very hierarchical. You stud your turn. And here 35 00:02:18,280 --> 00:02:23,680 Speaker 3: the Tea Party was upending that bottom up and was 36 00:02:24,280 --> 00:02:27,919 Speaker 3: animated by issues that were not the traditional Republican issues, 37 00:02:28,360 --> 00:02:31,640 Speaker 3: not about economics, cutting budgets, all that stuff. It was 38 00:02:31,680 --> 00:02:37,960 Speaker 3: all cultural immigration, Obama as a black president. And it 39 00:02:38,080 --> 00:02:41,840 Speaker 3: made me just begin to think about how politics was changing. 40 00:02:42,160 --> 00:02:44,519 Speaker 3: And I read a speech by Tony Blair, in which 41 00:02:44,520 --> 00:02:48,040 Speaker 3: he talked about how the old division of left versus 42 00:02:48,160 --> 00:02:50,440 Speaker 3: right on the basis of economics, you know, kind of 43 00:02:50,480 --> 00:02:53,280 Speaker 3: the size of the state was giving way to a 44 00:02:53,840 --> 00:02:57,640 Speaker 3: politics based on your attitude towards a world that was 45 00:02:57,760 --> 00:03:03,800 Speaker 3: open versus closed, you know, globalization, immigration, technology, even and 46 00:03:03,880 --> 00:03:06,440 Speaker 3: that's where it all began. And then in order to 47 00:03:06,680 --> 00:03:10,800 Speaker 3: you know, I found myself asking, if we're going through 48 00:03:10,840 --> 00:03:14,399 Speaker 3: this kind of period of enormous change which is producing 49 00:03:14,440 --> 00:03:17,560 Speaker 3: a backlash, when did this begin? When have we seen 50 00:03:17,560 --> 00:03:21,320 Speaker 3: this before? And I thought about the Industrial Revolution, But 51 00:03:21,360 --> 00:03:24,400 Speaker 3: then that took me back further and I ended up, 52 00:03:24,680 --> 00:03:27,600 Speaker 3: as you know, starting with the Dutch in the seventeenth century. 53 00:03:28,080 --> 00:03:31,040 Speaker 3: The basic argument of the book is that whenever you 54 00:03:31,120 --> 00:03:35,760 Speaker 3: have periods of enormous technological and economic change, it tends 55 00:03:35,800 --> 00:03:40,440 Speaker 3: to transform societies and you also end up getting a 56 00:03:40,480 --> 00:03:43,920 Speaker 3: third revolution, which is a kind of identity revolution. People 57 00:03:44,080 --> 00:03:46,520 Speaker 3: change the way they think of themselves. So when the 58 00:03:46,640 --> 00:03:50,160 Speaker 3: Dutch for the first time became rich, they began to 59 00:03:50,240 --> 00:03:54,080 Speaker 3: think of themselves differently, not as part of the Habsburg Empire, 60 00:03:54,480 --> 00:04:00,360 Speaker 3: not as simply Christians, but as Protestants, and essentially broke 61 00:04:00,400 --> 00:04:04,280 Speaker 3: away from the Habsburg Empire and created the Dutch Republic, 62 00:04:05,080 --> 00:04:10,760 Speaker 3: and then that identity revolution trans most into a political revolution. 63 00:04:11,280 --> 00:04:15,040 Speaker 3: And whenever you have this process that I just described, 64 00:04:15,280 --> 00:04:19,400 Speaker 3: there is almost always a backlash. And how you navigate 65 00:04:19,520 --> 00:04:24,520 Speaker 3: through this forward movement and backlash determines how successfully you 66 00:04:24,640 --> 00:04:27,200 Speaker 3: kind of make your way in the world. The Dutch 67 00:04:27,279 --> 00:04:30,080 Speaker 3: and the British, I argue, in the sixteenth seventeen eighteenth 68 00:04:30,120 --> 00:04:35,920 Speaker 3: centuries handled this largely well. The French, in the French Revolution, 69 00:04:36,040 --> 00:04:38,960 Speaker 3: handled it very badly. And those are in some ways 70 00:04:39,000 --> 00:04:45,640 Speaker 3: the two archetypal examples, one being evolutionary change of bottom 71 00:04:45,720 --> 00:04:50,520 Speaker 3: up these trends of technology, economics to reshaping society and 72 00:04:50,600 --> 00:04:55,560 Speaker 3: politics adapting to it, versus the French, who decide top 73 00:04:55,640 --> 00:05:00,159 Speaker 3: down political elites are going to decree a revolution in 74 00:05:00,320 --> 00:05:03,600 Speaker 3: a transformation of society, and the whole thing explodes. 75 00:05:03,839 --> 00:05:08,040 Speaker 2: So the Dutch, followed by the British, followed presumably by 76 00:05:08,040 --> 00:05:12,080 Speaker 2: the Americans, of the good guys exactly, and the French 77 00:05:12,279 --> 00:05:14,920 Speaker 2: not quite so good is that because they go over 78 00:05:15,000 --> 00:05:17,720 Speaker 2: the top, and then you know, the revolution with all 79 00:05:17,760 --> 00:05:22,599 Speaker 2: its blood leads to Napoleon. Is that the sequence of events. 80 00:05:22,600 --> 00:05:25,839 Speaker 3: Basically, the French get it all wrong in the sense 81 00:05:25,920 --> 00:05:30,320 Speaker 3: that France was not a society that was being transformed 82 00:05:30,400 --> 00:05:33,839 Speaker 3: bottom up by economics and technology. At the time of 83 00:05:33,880 --> 00:05:40,039 Speaker 3: the French Revolution. France was a large agrarian, centralized society. 84 00:05:40,360 --> 00:05:45,000 Speaker 3: It was not particularly urban, the merchants were not particularly dominant. 85 00:05:45,040 --> 00:05:48,880 Speaker 3: So all the forces of kind of modernization and change 86 00:05:49,320 --> 00:05:53,560 Speaker 3: that had been roiling or transforming the Netherlands in Britain 87 00:05:53,640 --> 00:05:58,160 Speaker 3: were absent in France. But the French politically, a certain 88 00:05:58,600 --> 00:06:04,360 Speaker 3: group of Frenchman decide that they want to accelerate change 89 00:06:04,600 --> 00:06:07,479 Speaker 3: and to achieve not quite a merchant republic, but a 90 00:06:07,520 --> 00:06:12,160 Speaker 3: republic nonetheless, and they decreate it from above. And what 91 00:06:12,200 --> 00:06:14,600 Speaker 3: it turns out is that France is still a very 92 00:06:14,920 --> 00:06:20,200 Speaker 3: old fashioned, traditional agrarian society and it doesn't take and 93 00:06:20,279 --> 00:06:22,800 Speaker 3: so the revolution goes, you know, it kind of goes 94 00:06:22,800 --> 00:06:27,040 Speaker 3: helter skelter in various ways. As you know, the story 95 00:06:27,080 --> 00:06:29,599 Speaker 3: of the French orpwe is so complicated. One of the 96 00:06:29,600 --> 00:06:32,000 Speaker 3: great challenges of the book was getting it down to 97 00:06:32,040 --> 00:06:35,320 Speaker 3: forty pages. But basically, the best way to think about 98 00:06:35,360 --> 00:06:38,600 Speaker 3: it is it fails on its own terms. This is 99 00:06:38,640 --> 00:06:42,839 Speaker 3: a revolution that begins with the execution of a monarch 100 00:06:43,360 --> 00:06:47,160 Speaker 3: and it ends with Napoleon crowning himself as monarch. So 101 00:06:47,360 --> 00:06:51,080 Speaker 3: on its own terms, it is unable to achieve the 102 00:06:51,080 --> 00:06:53,120 Speaker 3: political modernization it looks for. 103 00:06:53,440 --> 00:06:56,799 Speaker 2: But you have a great lineage of liberal societies starting 104 00:06:56,800 --> 00:06:59,760 Speaker 2: with the Netherlands, going to Britain and then going to 105 00:06:59,800 --> 00:07:04,880 Speaker 2: the United States with this sort of failed detour with France. 106 00:07:05,600 --> 00:07:08,479 Speaker 2: Can you tell us something about what that means for 107 00:07:08,560 --> 00:07:12,840 Speaker 2: the for the modern world. This is essentially North European 108 00:07:12,920 --> 00:07:15,920 Speaker 2: Anglo Saxon lineage of ideas. 109 00:07:17,120 --> 00:07:20,760 Speaker 3: Yeah, it's actually fascinating when you think about how unusual 110 00:07:20,880 --> 00:07:23,680 Speaker 3: or narrow or serendipitous this path is. You know, you 111 00:07:23,760 --> 00:07:28,360 Speaker 3: have this, this extraordinary breakout in the Netherlands. This is 112 00:07:28,400 --> 00:07:34,120 Speaker 3: the first country to really redefine national power by using 113 00:07:34,560 --> 00:07:38,080 Speaker 3: not agriculture and extraction. That was the old way. The 114 00:07:38,440 --> 00:07:41,160 Speaker 3: only way people countries knew how to get rich was 115 00:07:41,720 --> 00:07:44,960 Speaker 3: you know, your agriculture, which basically produced about the same 116 00:07:45,240 --> 00:07:50,520 Speaker 3: level of wealth per capita for thousands of years, or 117 00:07:50,560 --> 00:07:53,280 Speaker 3: you could go into another country stealer's goal. Those are 118 00:07:53,280 --> 00:07:56,400 Speaker 3: the two way and that and the Dutch basically find 119 00:07:56,960 --> 00:08:01,280 Speaker 3: that they use innovation, they use tech chnological innovation, they 120 00:08:01,360 --> 00:08:05,160 Speaker 3: use financial innovation. Crucially important to Holland's rise is the 121 00:08:05,200 --> 00:08:08,040 Speaker 3: invention of the joint stock company, the invention of the 122 00:08:08,040 --> 00:08:11,920 Speaker 3: Amsterdam stock Market, first grade multinational company in the world, 123 00:08:12,280 --> 00:08:16,360 Speaker 3: the Dutch East Indies Company, and all these things propel 124 00:08:17,400 --> 00:08:19,880 Speaker 3: the Netherlands to become the richest country in Europe, which 125 00:08:19,920 --> 00:08:22,720 Speaker 3: means the richest country in the world. And that part 126 00:08:22,720 --> 00:08:25,640 Speaker 3: of the practices are, you know, an emphasis on an 127 00:08:25,640 --> 00:08:30,920 Speaker 3: egalitarian political and social structure, a republic rather than a monarchy, 128 00:08:31,720 --> 00:08:35,000 Speaker 3: a merchants having an enormous say, political parties for the 129 00:08:35,000 --> 00:08:37,400 Speaker 3: first time rather than a court being the locusts of 130 00:08:37,480 --> 00:08:42,280 Speaker 3: political influence. Tolerance because you discover that tapping human talent 131 00:08:42,400 --> 00:08:46,679 Speaker 3: wherever it is becomes important. So the Dutch, you know, 132 00:08:46,679 --> 00:08:49,840 Speaker 3: are much more tolerant towards Jews, much more tolerant towards 133 00:08:50,440 --> 00:08:54,760 Speaker 3: Protestants and Catholics than any other place in Europe. That 134 00:08:54,960 --> 00:08:59,440 Speaker 3: model moves to England, which had many similar characteristics, also 135 00:08:59,559 --> 00:09:03,760 Speaker 3: very decent centralized part of Europe. Both of these places 136 00:09:03,800 --> 00:09:07,160 Speaker 3: were the farthest provinces of the Roman Empire and were 137 00:09:07,160 --> 00:09:10,559 Speaker 3: therefore the least centrally governed from Rome, and so they 138 00:09:10,559 --> 00:09:13,920 Speaker 3: had developed a kind of autonomy as a result, and 139 00:09:14,200 --> 00:09:19,600 Speaker 3: it is in this cocoon, the Netherlands, in Britain and England, 140 00:09:19,640 --> 00:09:25,640 Speaker 3: really that ideas about individual liberty, individual rights, private property, 141 00:09:26,160 --> 00:09:28,959 Speaker 3: the idea of the dignity of the individual and his 142 00:09:29,280 --> 00:09:33,640 Speaker 3: or her and really his ability to pursue a life 143 00:09:33,640 --> 00:09:40,280 Speaker 3: that he wants freed from monarchical tyranny, church dogma. All 144 00:09:40,320 --> 00:09:44,839 Speaker 3: these ideas sort of take root in this area. And 145 00:09:44,880 --> 00:09:49,640 Speaker 3: then I would argue, because of the inherent virtue of 146 00:09:49,679 --> 00:09:54,520 Speaker 3: these ideas, or certainly the technical superiority of these ideas, 147 00:09:54,840 --> 00:09:58,880 Speaker 3: Britain becomes the most powerful country since Rome, and it 148 00:09:59,000 --> 00:10:03,480 Speaker 3: colonizes parts of the world and globalizes these ideas. So 149 00:10:03,559 --> 00:10:05,920 Speaker 3: a crucial part of that is that Britain ended up 150 00:10:05,960 --> 00:10:10,839 Speaker 3: colonizing North America, which became the next superpower. But also 151 00:10:10,920 --> 00:10:14,360 Speaker 3: important is the fact that Britain spread these ideas to 152 00:10:15,040 --> 00:10:20,120 Speaker 3: all over the world, from India to South Africa to Australia. 153 00:10:20,360 --> 00:10:24,720 Speaker 3: They developed a kind of a broad universe of liberal ideas. 154 00:10:24,960 --> 00:10:27,480 Speaker 3: But I think crucial to the spreading of them was 155 00:10:27,480 --> 00:10:30,320 Speaker 3: the fact that then Britain passes the mantle to the 156 00:10:30,400 --> 00:10:33,280 Speaker 3: United States. So if you think about it for two 157 00:10:33,360 --> 00:10:36,000 Speaker 3: and a half centuries. Now we have lived in a 158 00:10:36,080 --> 00:10:39,560 Speaker 3: world in which the dominant power has been one that 159 00:10:39,679 --> 00:10:43,320 Speaker 3: adopted these very peculiar ideas that grew out of a 160 00:10:43,440 --> 00:10:47,000 Speaker 3: tiny part of northwestern Europe. 161 00:10:47,520 --> 00:10:52,240 Speaker 2: Now this is a very weak liberal interpretation of human history. 162 00:10:52,640 --> 00:10:54,920 Speaker 2: And let me say that I completely agree with it. 163 00:10:55,360 --> 00:10:58,160 Speaker 2: But let me put on my woke cat for a 164 00:10:58,200 --> 00:11:01,679 Speaker 2: moment and saying that what you're doing is celebrating the 165 00:11:01,720 --> 00:11:07,360 Speaker 2: triumph of capitalist imperialism, That these are countries that grew 166 00:11:07,440 --> 00:11:12,760 Speaker 2: rich partly by colonialism, partly by slavery, partly by exploiting 167 00:11:13,679 --> 00:11:16,720 Speaker 2: what they would have regarded as lesser breeds. You're an Indian, 168 00:11:16,760 --> 00:11:21,720 Speaker 2: but you're celebrating that the power of this liberal imperialism. 169 00:11:22,000 --> 00:11:24,880 Speaker 2: How do you respond to them? To the critique which 170 00:11:24,920 --> 00:11:28,600 Speaker 2: is very dominant in America American higher education. 171 00:11:28,720 --> 00:11:32,520 Speaker 3: Now it's a very fair critique, and it's a fair argument. 172 00:11:32,559 --> 00:11:36,880 Speaker 3: It's worth noting that the original opposition to Whig history 173 00:11:37,160 --> 00:11:39,760 Speaker 3: came actually from the right, not from the left. There 174 00:11:40,120 --> 00:11:45,200 Speaker 3: was a much more traditional kind of deep historical school 175 00:11:45,200 --> 00:11:48,600 Speaker 3: of thought in Britain in other places which said this 176 00:11:48,760 --> 00:11:52,720 Speaker 3: whole idea that there is any progress in history is 177 00:11:52,760 --> 00:11:56,760 Speaker 3: the fallacy. The Whigs think that things have gotten better, 178 00:11:57,160 --> 00:12:00,400 Speaker 3: and this is nonsense. Where the history is cyclical, you know, 179 00:12:00,520 --> 00:12:04,080 Speaker 3: morally we have degenerated. This used to be the argument 180 00:12:04,120 --> 00:12:07,480 Speaker 3: against Whig history, and when Herbert Butterfield writes his his 181 00:12:07,640 --> 00:12:11,319 Speaker 3: essay on wik history, that's what he's defending himself against. Today, 182 00:12:11,360 --> 00:12:15,080 Speaker 3: You're absolutely right, the critique comes from the left. And 183 00:12:15,120 --> 00:12:18,000 Speaker 3: look what I would say is, there's no question I'm 184 00:12:18,080 --> 00:12:23,240 Speaker 3: celebrating capitalism and democracy and individual liberty and individual rights 185 00:12:23,280 --> 00:12:26,559 Speaker 3: because I do believe they are in they are fundamentally 186 00:12:26,600 --> 00:12:29,959 Speaker 3: superior to everything that came before them in terms of 187 00:12:30,040 --> 00:12:32,720 Speaker 3: political organization, from the point of view of the rights 188 00:12:32,720 --> 00:12:35,960 Speaker 3: of individuals, which I hold very dear, and everything that 189 00:12:36,000 --> 00:12:41,920 Speaker 3: has come after in terms of challengers, whether it's been fascism, communism, 190 00:12:42,240 --> 00:12:46,640 Speaker 3: Islamic fundamentalism, whatever else you may look at. I regard, 191 00:12:47,040 --> 00:12:52,199 Speaker 3: you know, the social democracy as a variant of of liberalism. 192 00:12:52,640 --> 00:12:55,760 Speaker 3: On the imperialism part, it's a it's a harder one, 193 00:12:56,080 --> 00:12:59,560 Speaker 3: it's it's entire It's absolutely true that part and parcel 194 00:13:00,240 --> 00:13:04,199 Speaker 3: of this process was the exploitation of people who were 195 00:13:04,240 --> 00:13:08,680 Speaker 3: considered second class citizens, lesser breeds and such. I would 196 00:13:08,760 --> 00:13:11,520 Speaker 3: argue that was not inherent in the project. I don't 197 00:13:11,520 --> 00:13:15,160 Speaker 3: think you can make the case that Britain only gained 198 00:13:15,160 --> 00:13:18,760 Speaker 3: its strength from colonies, so that they did help. You 199 00:13:18,800 --> 00:13:20,640 Speaker 3: can look at I mean, I go through this as 200 00:13:20,640 --> 00:13:24,360 Speaker 3: you know in the book Japan had you know, is 201 00:13:24,440 --> 00:13:28,360 Speaker 3: a good contrast because they both had textile industries. Japan 202 00:13:28,400 --> 00:13:31,880 Speaker 3: had no colonies, Britain had colonies. You know, it's it's 203 00:13:31,920 --> 00:13:34,240 Speaker 3: not it's not easy to make the case in my 204 00:13:34,400 --> 00:13:38,480 Speaker 3: view that Britain only advanced because of the because of 205 00:13:38,520 --> 00:13:42,760 Speaker 3: the colonies. And much more importantly, what you can see 206 00:13:42,800 --> 00:13:46,200 Speaker 3: the power of these ideas by the fact that it 207 00:13:46,320 --> 00:13:51,880 Speaker 3: is these ideas that caused Europe to decolonize. And it 208 00:13:51,920 --> 00:13:54,959 Speaker 3: is only in Europe that you begin you got the 209 00:13:55,000 --> 00:13:58,400 Speaker 3: anti slavery movement. There's slavery all over the world, but 210 00:13:58,559 --> 00:14:01,800 Speaker 3: what caused Europe to be come the locusts classics of 211 00:14:01,840 --> 00:14:05,440 Speaker 3: anti slavery. It was these liberal ideas. So I think 212 00:14:05,440 --> 00:14:09,439 Speaker 3: there's something to it, and it's it's probably worth always 213 00:14:09,520 --> 00:14:15,480 Speaker 3: remembering that the rise of these liberalism and industrialization did 214 00:14:15,559 --> 00:14:20,440 Speaker 3: come along with an enormous exploitation of other countries. You know, 215 00:14:20,600 --> 00:14:22,840 Speaker 3: as as somebody who grew up in India. I'm well 216 00:14:22,880 --> 00:14:25,760 Speaker 3: aware of it, and you know, we lived it. I 217 00:14:25,760 --> 00:14:28,960 Speaker 3: mean I saw it more from my father's generation. But 218 00:14:29,000 --> 00:14:32,880 Speaker 3: my father was very attracted to British ideas of liberalism 219 00:14:32,880 --> 00:14:35,400 Speaker 3: and in his case, kind of Fabian socialism as well, 220 00:14:36,000 --> 00:14:40,640 Speaker 3: but always also aware that for Britain they came coupled 221 00:14:40,720 --> 00:14:45,280 Speaker 3: with a certain kind of pretty unvarnished racism. There was 222 00:14:45,320 --> 00:14:48,800 Speaker 3: the reality that Britain was, in a sense the tutor 223 00:14:49,920 --> 00:14:52,720 Speaker 3: for so much of the Indian kind of political elite, 224 00:14:53,320 --> 00:14:56,360 Speaker 3: and yet the same political elite were jailed by the 225 00:14:56,400 --> 00:14:59,200 Speaker 3: British and in trials that were not free and fair. 226 00:14:59,480 --> 00:15:02,920 Speaker 3: They walk past clubs and buildings which said which had 227 00:15:03,000 --> 00:15:07,120 Speaker 3: signs which said dogs and Indians not allowed. You know, 228 00:15:07,200 --> 00:15:09,920 Speaker 3: my father once pointed out a couple of places where 229 00:15:09,920 --> 00:15:13,000 Speaker 3: there used to be that sign. So that is the 230 00:15:13,040 --> 00:15:17,040 Speaker 3: mixed legacy of the Enlightenment, and you can't get away 231 00:15:17,040 --> 00:15:19,480 Speaker 3: from it. But I think it was a historical fact, 232 00:15:19,840 --> 00:15:21,120 Speaker 3: not a logical fact. 233 00:15:21,520 --> 00:15:24,640 Speaker 2: But when Kipling says take up the white man's burden, 234 00:15:25,040 --> 00:15:28,560 Speaker 2: he's talking to the United States, and this mixed legacy 235 00:15:28,680 --> 00:15:31,400 Speaker 2: is even stronger in the United States, I think than Britain, 236 00:15:31,440 --> 00:15:33,920 Speaker 2: because it has the institution of slavery, and it has 237 00:15:34,000 --> 00:15:38,160 Speaker 2: the institutions of Jim Crow, right, you know, and voting 238 00:15:38,200 --> 00:15:41,000 Speaker 2: discrimination and things like that right up to the nineteen sixties. 239 00:15:41,160 --> 00:15:43,520 Speaker 2: It does seem to be extraordinary that you can have 240 00:15:44,520 --> 00:15:50,320 Speaker 2: liberal values and those very very anti liberal values coexisting 241 00:15:50,440 --> 00:15:53,960 Speaker 2: within this global hegemon, which is the United States. How 242 00:15:54,000 --> 00:15:54,960 Speaker 2: can we explain that? 243 00:15:56,080 --> 00:15:58,320 Speaker 3: Yeah, it's a very good point, and I think it's 244 00:15:58,360 --> 00:16:01,720 Speaker 3: a point that tells us something about the present as well, 245 00:16:01,760 --> 00:16:06,760 Speaker 3: which is tribalism and tribal affiliation is one of the 246 00:16:06,880 --> 00:16:12,200 Speaker 3: deepest social organizing factors of life. The ability to think 247 00:16:12,520 --> 00:16:16,640 Speaker 3: about your tribe as separate, distinct better than the other 248 00:16:16,760 --> 00:16:21,720 Speaker 3: tribe is the oldest form of politics, really, and what 249 00:16:21,880 --> 00:16:25,080 Speaker 3: you see with liberalism is that it is not able 250 00:16:25,120 --> 00:16:30,840 Speaker 3: to completely overcome that, and that it rests uneasily alongside 251 00:16:30,960 --> 00:16:36,040 Speaker 3: that reality. And in the American case, think of Jefferson 252 00:16:37,080 --> 00:16:40,280 Speaker 3: as such an interesting example, right, because of course he's 253 00:16:40,320 --> 00:16:43,960 Speaker 3: a slaver owner, but as so many of the biography's 254 00:16:43,960 --> 00:16:47,640 Speaker 3: point out, he was tortured by this. Yeah, quite not 255 00:16:47,720 --> 00:16:50,920 Speaker 3: so tortured that he freed his own flags, but you know, 256 00:16:51,680 --> 00:16:54,320 Speaker 3: it was tortured by it, and ultimately what gets rid 257 00:16:54,400 --> 00:16:58,600 Speaker 3: of slavery is the you know, those same liberal ideals, 258 00:16:58,400 --> 00:17:02,240 Speaker 3: as a Lincoln points out that we're in the Declaration, 259 00:17:03,000 --> 00:17:05,679 Speaker 3: you know that were that were in there and in 260 00:17:05,720 --> 00:17:08,919 Speaker 3: a sense have to be have to triumph over the 261 00:17:08,960 --> 00:17:12,720 Speaker 3: tribalism that says white sou superior to blacks. And then 262 00:17:12,800 --> 00:17:17,159 Speaker 3: what makes Jim Crow disappear is again those same ideals. 263 00:17:17,200 --> 00:17:20,240 Speaker 3: You know, Martin Luther King talks about how the Declaration 264 00:17:20,320 --> 00:17:25,080 Speaker 3: of Independence was a promisory note to blacks, in other words, saying, 265 00:17:25,359 --> 00:17:28,800 Speaker 3: you know, we are using those same ideas to break 266 00:17:28,840 --> 00:17:34,560 Speaker 3: through the irrational tribalism that has kept us down. And 267 00:17:35,280 --> 00:17:38,760 Speaker 3: even now, you know, we see that the return to 268 00:17:38,880 --> 00:17:42,600 Speaker 3: tribalism is very easy. And whether you look in the 269 00:17:42,680 --> 00:17:45,480 Speaker 3: United States, whether you look in Europe, you see that 270 00:17:46,000 --> 00:17:48,560 Speaker 3: it doesn't take a lot to get us back to 271 00:17:48,600 --> 00:17:50,119 Speaker 3: a kind of tribal way of thinking. 272 00:17:50,960 --> 00:17:54,160 Speaker 2: Now, I'm quite convinced by your wig interpretation of history. 273 00:17:54,200 --> 00:17:57,320 Speaker 2: I share it quite strongly. I'm less convinced by this 274 00:17:57,480 --> 00:18:02,240 Speaker 2: notion of the open versus the closed, which is something 275 00:18:02,280 --> 00:18:06,439 Speaker 2: that Tony Blair embraced and you embraces in this book, 276 00:18:07,280 --> 00:18:11,199 Speaker 2: that liberals are essentially open to the world, open to change, 277 00:18:11,240 --> 00:18:17,320 Speaker 2: open to immigration, open to globalization, and nonliberals, conservatives, reactionaries, 278 00:18:17,359 --> 00:18:19,600 Speaker 2: whatever you want to call them, are much more closed. 279 00:18:20,160 --> 00:18:23,240 Speaker 2: And let me say why, I'm a bit skeptical about this. 280 00:18:24,080 --> 00:18:27,399 Speaker 2: It strikes me that it's rather the victor's propaganda, and 281 00:18:27,440 --> 00:18:31,400 Speaker 2: that many liberals, though they claim to be open, are 282 00:18:31,400 --> 00:18:34,920 Speaker 2: actually very good at protecting themselves. They protect themselves through 283 00:18:35,080 --> 00:18:40,560 Speaker 2: educational credentials, through various sorts of certificates, licenses to operate. 284 00:18:40,760 --> 00:18:43,679 Speaker 2: For example, barristers in this country don't let solicitors go 285 00:18:43,720 --> 00:18:46,560 Speaker 2: into courts. If you go to university towns, they seem 286 00:18:46,560 --> 00:18:51,040 Speaker 2: to be well defended against change. And if you look 287 00:18:51,080 --> 00:18:54,320 Speaker 2: at the service sector, it's much much less globalized than 288 00:18:54,359 --> 00:18:58,119 Speaker 2: the manufacturing sector. If you look at immigration, openness to immigration, 289 00:18:58,280 --> 00:19:02,440 Speaker 2: the's so called disupposedly troglodite people who are opposed to 290 00:19:02,480 --> 00:19:06,160 Speaker 2: immigration actually a people who are badly affected by immigration. 291 00:19:06,280 --> 00:19:09,960 Speaker 2: They lose jobs, they see their wages decline, whereas most 292 00:19:10,040 --> 00:19:13,600 Speaker 2: liberals benefit from immigration. They get cheap servants, they get 293 00:19:13,680 --> 00:19:17,000 Speaker 2: cheap cheap services and things like that. Isn't this a 294 00:19:17,040 --> 00:19:19,280 Speaker 2: bit of a liberal illusion that they open. 295 00:19:19,800 --> 00:19:24,399 Speaker 3: Yeah, So let me first explain in the broadest sets 296 00:19:24,480 --> 00:19:26,520 Speaker 3: what I meant I mean by that, and in a 297 00:19:26,560 --> 00:19:28,679 Speaker 3: way you can see it in the transformation of the 298 00:19:28,720 --> 00:19:33,600 Speaker 3: Republican Party. The old model, the Republican Party was basically 299 00:19:33,680 --> 00:19:37,879 Speaker 3: a free market party, believed in low taxes, low regulation, 300 00:19:38,119 --> 00:19:44,040 Speaker 3: low tariffs, welcomed immigration. Ronald Reagan famously signed the eighty 301 00:19:44,080 --> 00:19:47,119 Speaker 3: six amnesty Bill, So it was, you know, it was 302 00:19:47,440 --> 00:19:51,479 Speaker 3: arrayed largely along the kind of free market orientation. And 303 00:19:51,520 --> 00:19:55,040 Speaker 3: what has happened to the Republican Party now it's essentially 304 00:19:55,119 --> 00:19:59,760 Speaker 3: almost entirely transformed itself. It is now largely skeptical of 305 00:20:00,400 --> 00:20:02,879 Speaker 3: In fact, it is the most protectionist major party, I 306 00:20:02,880 --> 00:20:06,520 Speaker 3: would argue in the Western world these days. It has 307 00:20:06,600 --> 00:20:11,760 Speaker 3: become much more uneasy about even things like fiscal conservatism. 308 00:20:11,880 --> 00:20:17,760 Speaker 3: You know, Trump was a big spender. The degree to 309 00:20:17,800 --> 00:20:21,040 Speaker 3: which it has completely try and reversed itself on immigration 310 00:20:22,040 --> 00:20:27,119 Speaker 3: is striking. So it's become a party more comfortable with 311 00:20:27,200 --> 00:20:31,040 Speaker 3: the idea of a society that's more closed, more protected, 312 00:20:31,160 --> 00:20:35,560 Speaker 3: more culturally chauvinistic, more nationalistic. Now, when you get to liberals, 313 00:20:35,840 --> 00:20:39,240 Speaker 3: you're right, they have a slightly more uneasy relationship. In general, 314 00:20:39,280 --> 00:20:41,359 Speaker 3: I would say they are more comfortable with the world 315 00:20:41,440 --> 00:20:46,280 Speaker 3: that's open and things like that. In theory, they are 316 00:20:46,280 --> 00:20:50,320 Speaker 3: in favor of meritocracy. You are right that they preach 317 00:20:50,480 --> 00:20:55,160 Speaker 3: more meritocracy than they practice, and that they quietly managed 318 00:20:55,200 --> 00:20:58,680 Speaker 3: to find some ways to protect themselves. But I recall 319 00:20:58,880 --> 00:21:05,120 Speaker 3: a wonderful book Meritocracy by ade Reinvolridge that basically concludes, 320 00:21:05,600 --> 00:21:09,680 Speaker 3: look for all its problems, there is no other solution, 321 00:21:10,480 --> 00:21:13,520 Speaker 3: and the answer to the problems of meritocracy is surely 322 00:21:13,720 --> 00:21:17,359 Speaker 3: more meritocracy. In other words, you're absolutely right that there 323 00:21:17,400 --> 00:21:20,560 Speaker 3: are places where they do this. But just as you know, 324 00:21:20,960 --> 00:21:25,080 Speaker 3: Martin Luther King used liberalism to push out the illiberal 325 00:21:25,119 --> 00:21:29,200 Speaker 3: features of life, I think one could effectively use liberalism. 326 00:21:29,280 --> 00:21:31,440 Speaker 3: And it is as you know, there is now pressure 327 00:21:31,560 --> 00:21:36,040 Speaker 3: on universities, for example, not to have legacy admissions in 328 00:21:36,080 --> 00:21:38,919 Speaker 3: that sense. Most people don't realize this, but Oxford and 329 00:21:38,920 --> 00:21:42,680 Speaker 3: Cambridge are much more meritocratic than Harvard and Yale. Oxford 330 00:21:42,680 --> 00:21:45,600 Speaker 3: and Cambridge just have a you know, essentially an entrance 331 00:21:45,640 --> 00:21:49,719 Speaker 3: exam these professions, though they would argue they're trying to 332 00:21:49,800 --> 00:21:53,000 Speaker 3: maintain a certain kind of standards, but those standards again 333 00:21:53,040 --> 00:21:56,320 Speaker 3: should be more meritocratic. But I think that to me, 334 00:21:56,600 --> 00:22:01,360 Speaker 3: the question is is politics becoming more about these two 335 00:22:01,440 --> 00:22:06,199 Speaker 3: poles not so much? Are liberals always consistently open or 336 00:22:06,240 --> 00:22:11,000 Speaker 3: consistently closed. I think in all politics there's a certain 337 00:22:11,000 --> 00:22:14,440 Speaker 3: amount of hypocrisy and all that. What I would ask 338 00:22:14,520 --> 00:22:17,760 Speaker 3: you is, isn't it fair to say that the old 339 00:22:17,840 --> 00:22:20,800 Speaker 3: left right divide has gone away largely because the two 340 00:22:20,840 --> 00:22:24,080 Speaker 3: parties are relatively close to one another. You can see 341 00:22:24,119 --> 00:22:27,119 Speaker 3: this in Britain where the Labor Party has come in 342 00:22:27,119 --> 00:22:30,800 Speaker 3: to barn this seemingly revolutionary election and said, oh, by 343 00:22:30,840 --> 00:22:32,639 Speaker 3: the way, we're not going to change anything that the 344 00:22:32,680 --> 00:22:36,600 Speaker 3: Conservatives have done on economic policy. The battleground is now 345 00:22:36,680 --> 00:22:42,320 Speaker 3: immigration and so called woke woke ideology and assimilation and culture. 346 00:22:43,119 --> 00:22:46,000 Speaker 2: I'm skeptical about it. I'm willing to be skeptical about it. 347 00:22:46,080 --> 00:22:48,040 Speaker 2: Is when you talk about the rise of the rest 348 00:22:48,480 --> 00:22:52,000 Speaker 2: and the relative decline of America, which you do in 349 00:22:52,520 --> 00:22:55,160 Speaker 2: this book towards the end, is it true that we're 350 00:22:55,160 --> 00:22:57,320 Speaker 2: seeing the rise of the rest and the relative decline 351 00:22:57,359 --> 00:23:01,639 Speaker 2: of America? Or is America pretty constant? You know, twenty 352 00:23:01,680 --> 00:23:05,480 Speaker 2: five percent of GDP in nineteen ninety twenty five percent 353 00:23:05,520 --> 00:23:08,800 Speaker 2: of GDP now a big chunk of the most highly 354 00:23:08,880 --> 00:23:12,520 Speaker 2: valued companies in the world now American. Isn't it really 355 00:23:12,600 --> 00:23:16,680 Speaker 2: what we're seeing the decline of Europe, American maintaining its position, 356 00:23:16,800 --> 00:23:20,720 Speaker 2: the rest certainly rising, particularly India and obviously China. But really, 357 00:23:20,800 --> 00:23:22,960 Speaker 2: isn't it a story of the decline of this chunk 358 00:23:23,000 --> 00:23:25,479 Speaker 2: of the West that is Europe that we're saying at 359 00:23:25,480 --> 00:23:25,879 Speaker 2: the moment. 360 00:23:27,280 --> 00:23:29,959 Speaker 3: Yeah, it's a very good question, because it's The answer 361 00:23:30,040 --> 00:23:32,480 Speaker 3: is I think complicated, and I tried to explain it 362 00:23:32,600 --> 00:23:35,200 Speaker 3: better in I think in my book The Post American World, 363 00:23:35,280 --> 00:23:38,359 Speaker 3: Which is the reason I talk about the decline of 364 00:23:38,400 --> 00:23:41,800 Speaker 3: America in a post American world, is that the most 365 00:23:41,840 --> 00:23:45,959 Speaker 3: important shift that's taken place is the decline in American influence, 366 00:23:46,400 --> 00:23:49,760 Speaker 3: not American power. You're absolutely right, American heart power has 367 00:23:49,800 --> 00:23:53,320 Speaker 3: stayed constant. In fact, you could argue on some levels, Adrian, 368 00:23:53,359 --> 00:23:56,639 Speaker 3: as I'm sure you would agree, American power has grown. 369 00:23:56,720 --> 00:24:00,840 Speaker 3: American technological dominance of the world is probably today than 370 00:24:00,880 --> 00:24:03,480 Speaker 3: it's ever been. I looked it up to see what 371 00:24:03,600 --> 00:24:06,920 Speaker 3: were the top top ten technology companies in nineteen eighty nine. 372 00:24:07,280 --> 00:24:11,600 Speaker 3: Only four were American, four were Japanese, and two were European. Today, 373 00:24:11,680 --> 00:24:14,320 Speaker 3: ten out of ten out of ten are American. So 374 00:24:15,320 --> 00:24:18,760 Speaker 3: American power has stayed at least constant, if not increased, 375 00:24:19,000 --> 00:24:22,080 Speaker 3: but American influence has declined. And what I mean by 376 00:24:22,119 --> 00:24:24,320 Speaker 3: that is and this is why the rise of the 377 00:24:24,359 --> 00:24:29,000 Speaker 3: rest becomes important. Take a country like Turkey. Forty years ago, 378 00:24:29,160 --> 00:24:33,960 Speaker 3: Turkey was a basket case economy with a military junta 379 00:24:34,080 --> 00:24:38,920 Speaker 3: that ruled it and was absolutely reliably pro American and 380 00:24:40,040 --> 00:24:44,000 Speaker 3: did whatever Washington told it to do. Today, the Turkish 381 00:24:44,040 --> 00:24:47,080 Speaker 3: economy is about four times bigger, or maybe five times 382 00:24:47,119 --> 00:24:49,800 Speaker 3: bigger than it was forty years ago. It has a 383 00:24:49,840 --> 00:24:54,120 Speaker 3: stable political system with a very powerful, charismatic leader who 384 00:24:54,200 --> 00:24:57,760 Speaker 3: routinely tells the United States to go to hell when 385 00:24:57,800 --> 00:25:02,199 Speaker 3: America asks it what to do. That pattern recurs with India, 386 00:25:02,440 --> 00:25:06,919 Speaker 3: because of course with China and with Russia, but with Indonesia, 387 00:25:06,960 --> 00:25:10,800 Speaker 3: with Vietnam, with Brazil. And that's what I was trying 388 00:25:10,840 --> 00:25:13,320 Speaker 3: to get across, which was that the United States had 389 00:25:13,320 --> 00:25:17,800 Speaker 3: a certain kind of extraordinary political influence after the end 390 00:25:17,840 --> 00:25:22,120 Speaker 3: of the Cold War. It literally set the terms for 391 00:25:22,160 --> 00:25:26,439 Speaker 3: the rest of the world. And that influences waning because 392 00:25:26,440 --> 00:25:29,760 Speaker 3: you have a lot of uppity middle powers who are 393 00:25:29,800 --> 00:25:31,960 Speaker 3: willing to say, we're just going to do our own thing. 394 00:25:32,000 --> 00:25:34,080 Speaker 3: And look at India and the way it's handling the 395 00:25:34,200 --> 00:25:38,800 Speaker 3: Ukraine War. You know, it is happy to be courted 396 00:25:38,800 --> 00:25:43,320 Speaker 3: by Washington and sometimes agrees with Washington when it serves 397 00:25:43,359 --> 00:25:47,040 Speaker 3: its own India's purposes, for example, the anti Chinese element 398 00:25:47,080 --> 00:25:50,200 Speaker 3: to Indian policy. But at the same time, it happily 399 00:25:50,200 --> 00:25:54,080 Speaker 3: buys oil from Russia, trades with Russia, consorts with Russia, 400 00:25:54,359 --> 00:25:57,240 Speaker 3: buys weapons from Russia because that helps it on its 401 00:25:57,240 --> 00:26:00,879 Speaker 3: own defense independence line. So that's the reality of the 402 00:26:00,880 --> 00:26:03,359 Speaker 3: world today. And I couldn't I couldn't think of a 403 00:26:03,359 --> 00:26:07,600 Speaker 3: better term than post American because it's not a Chinese word. 404 00:26:07,960 --> 00:26:12,400 Speaker 3: Dominated world certainly, but it's not quite the American dominance 405 00:26:12,440 --> 00:26:15,439 Speaker 3: that you had now Europe, I think just the coda 406 00:26:15,520 --> 00:26:18,679 Speaker 3: to I would say to Europe is, in my view, 407 00:26:19,080 --> 00:26:21,440 Speaker 3: you're absolutely right by the way, of course Europe has 408 00:26:21,480 --> 00:26:25,080 Speaker 3: declined and China's rise in India's rise has all come out. 409 00:26:25,160 --> 00:26:28,040 Speaker 3: You know, if you're trying to think about Europe, Yeah, 410 00:26:28,920 --> 00:26:31,520 Speaker 3: who declined so that China could rise? It was Europe. 411 00:26:32,119 --> 00:26:36,879 Speaker 3: But Europe was never politically powerful, unified and strategic in 412 00:26:36,920 --> 00:26:40,600 Speaker 3: the first place. So the economic decline of Europe has 413 00:26:40,640 --> 00:26:45,120 Speaker 3: not actually had that much geopolitical effect, because Europe has 414 00:26:45,160 --> 00:26:47,919 Speaker 3: never been united as a geopolitical player. 415 00:26:48,680 --> 00:26:51,159 Speaker 2: One wrinkle to the argument that strikes me is it 416 00:26:51,280 --> 00:26:54,680 Speaker 2: used to be the case that America was influential because 417 00:26:54,720 --> 00:26:58,520 Speaker 2: it exported its best features, like good governance, like the 418 00:26:58,600 --> 00:27:03,600 Speaker 2: charisma of of Kennedy, like the commitment of the liberal 419 00:27:03,640 --> 00:27:06,360 Speaker 2: democratic order. Now it seems as America is getting better 420 00:27:06,359 --> 00:27:09,920 Speaker 2: at exporting its worst features, which you know, to some 421 00:27:09,960 --> 00:27:14,399 Speaker 2: extent is wocism, to some extent is polarization, and to 422 00:27:14,440 --> 00:27:18,400 Speaker 2: some extent is a sort of technology that exacerbates anger 423 00:27:18,640 --> 00:27:23,679 Speaker 2: and angst. America is. People around the world are obsessed 424 00:27:23,720 --> 00:27:26,280 Speaker 2: by America, but they no longer see it on as 425 00:27:26,280 --> 00:27:28,120 Speaker 2: a shining city on the hill. They quite often see 426 00:27:28,119 --> 00:27:29,919 Speaker 2: it as a sort of version of hell. Actually it 427 00:27:29,920 --> 00:27:33,639 Speaker 2: doesn't stop them being obsessed, but they're still fixated, but 428 00:27:33,800 --> 00:27:37,240 Speaker 2: not fixated in an admiring way. America is treated as 429 00:27:37,280 --> 00:27:41,240 Speaker 2: an example of politics we don't want to imitate, as 430 00:27:41,280 --> 00:27:44,720 Speaker 2: an example of an administrative system we don't want to imitate, 431 00:27:45,000 --> 00:27:47,080 Speaker 2: and in an example is a healthcare system that we 432 00:27:47,119 --> 00:27:49,359 Speaker 2: don't want to imitate. It's a very different sort of 433 00:27:49,359 --> 00:27:51,760 Speaker 2: influence from the nineteen sixties influence. 434 00:27:52,359 --> 00:27:54,280 Speaker 3: Yeah, I would agree with that, and I think that 435 00:27:54,280 --> 00:27:57,360 Speaker 3: that's part of what has caused the decline in American influence. 436 00:27:57,640 --> 00:27:59,239 Speaker 3: As you know, in the book, I argue there's sort 437 00:27:59,280 --> 00:28:02,600 Speaker 3: of there were three bloss to American influence. One, the 438 00:28:02,640 --> 00:28:08,439 Speaker 3: Iraq War damaged America's military credibility. The economic crisis of 439 00:28:08,480 --> 00:28:13,400 Speaker 3: oaight damaged its economic credibility. And the rise of populism 440 00:28:13,440 --> 00:28:16,080 Speaker 3: and the paralysis that came out of that damaged its 441 00:28:16,160 --> 00:28:20,480 Speaker 3: political credibility. And those three things together, I think you 442 00:28:20,520 --> 00:28:23,400 Speaker 3: put it very well. I would actually even border it's 443 00:28:23,440 --> 00:28:25,960 Speaker 3: not just the healthcare system, I think, and you may 444 00:28:25,960 --> 00:28:29,480 Speaker 3: be more uncomfortable with this as I am as well, 445 00:28:29,480 --> 00:28:34,320 Speaker 3: but most of the world sees Europe's social market as 446 00:28:34,440 --> 00:28:39,280 Speaker 3: much more attractive than America's kind of laissez faire, you know, 447 00:28:39,280 --> 00:28:42,280 Speaker 3: And I would argue highly inefficiently say fair system, because 448 00:28:42,280 --> 00:28:45,240 Speaker 3: as you know, we do plenty of government spending, it's 449 00:28:45,360 --> 00:28:48,200 Speaker 3: just very badly done. And you know, we have our 450 00:28:48,240 --> 00:28:51,880 Speaker 3: own weird welfare state which mostly coddles the middle class 451 00:28:52,000 --> 00:28:55,840 Speaker 3: and it miserates the poor. I saw a poll recently 452 00:28:55,880 --> 00:28:59,040 Speaker 3: that ipsisted as I recall twenty four thousand people thirty 453 00:28:59,040 --> 00:29:02,640 Speaker 3: one countries. Most people were still very admiring of or 454 00:29:02,680 --> 00:29:06,160 Speaker 3: not admiring, thought that America did more good in the 455 00:29:06,200 --> 00:29:09,520 Speaker 3: world than China or Russia by far. But when asked 456 00:29:09,560 --> 00:29:14,120 Speaker 3: what model people liked, Europe was number one, America was 457 00:29:14,200 --> 00:29:17,600 Speaker 3: number two. In a way, Europe has done something very extraordinary, 458 00:29:17,600 --> 00:29:20,200 Speaker 3: even as it has declined in terms of raw power, 459 00:29:20,880 --> 00:29:24,960 Speaker 3: it has shown that past a certain level of economic wealth, 460 00:29:26,520 --> 00:29:31,360 Speaker 3: what matters is not just sheer economic wealth. What matters 461 00:29:31,400 --> 00:29:35,000 Speaker 3: is quality of life. What matters a certain level of 462 00:29:35,040 --> 00:29:37,360 Speaker 3: equality and things like that. You know the Europeans have. 463 00:29:37,720 --> 00:29:41,320 Speaker 3: As you know, for most of history, a kind of 464 00:29:41,600 --> 00:29:45,760 Speaker 3: general quality of life was closely correlated with wealth. The 465 00:29:45,880 --> 00:29:49,680 Speaker 3: richer you were, the better. And what's happened in the 466 00:29:49,720 --> 00:29:52,320 Speaker 3: most in the richest countries in the world is that 467 00:29:52,360 --> 00:29:55,800 Speaker 3: has now gotten decoupled. I think most people would say 468 00:29:55,840 --> 00:29:59,600 Speaker 3: that they would prefer to live as an average person 469 00:29:59,640 --> 00:30:02,080 Speaker 3: in your Europe than they would in Americas. It's so 470 00:30:02,280 --> 00:30:06,000 Speaker 3: great to be rich in America, probably better than anywhere else. 471 00:30:06,040 --> 00:30:09,040 Speaker 3: But for the average person, I think Europe is the model. 472 00:30:09,520 --> 00:30:12,320 Speaker 2: Absolutely, And this brings me on to the final thing 473 00:30:12,320 --> 00:30:14,959 Speaker 2: I want to talk about, which is the notion of 474 00:30:15,120 --> 00:30:20,680 Speaker 2: a liberal hegimen. That since about eighteen hundred we've pretty 475 00:30:20,720 --> 00:30:24,600 Speaker 2: much always had a liberal hegimen, starting off with Britain, which, 476 00:30:24,640 --> 00:30:27,000 Speaker 2: for all its faults, is wedded to a certain set 477 00:30:27,040 --> 00:30:30,880 Speaker 2: of liberal values and a certain set of liberal norms 478 00:30:30,920 --> 00:30:34,120 Speaker 2: about how to run into national affairs. America takes over 479 00:30:34,160 --> 00:30:36,960 Speaker 2: that position. It's a bit of a messy handover. But 480 00:30:37,160 --> 00:30:40,560 Speaker 2: even during the sort of the messiest part of the handover, 481 00:30:40,560 --> 00:30:43,600 Speaker 2: the nineteen twenties and nineteen thirties, America is essentially a 482 00:30:43,600 --> 00:30:46,960 Speaker 2: liberal power which is in a state of retrenchment. And 483 00:30:47,000 --> 00:30:50,360 Speaker 2: then of course after forty five America takes up the 484 00:30:50,360 --> 00:30:54,880 Speaker 2: burden and becomes the great liberal hegimen. We are now, 485 00:30:55,440 --> 00:30:57,680 Speaker 2: as far as I can see, in danger of having 486 00:30:57,960 --> 00:31:01,160 Speaker 2: a hegeman which is not a liberal power. I mean 487 00:31:01,200 --> 00:31:04,800 Speaker 2: by that that Trump and JD. Vance are not liberals. 488 00:31:05,200 --> 00:31:07,840 Speaker 2: They will be in charge of the world's most powerful country, 489 00:31:08,080 --> 00:31:10,040 Speaker 2: but wedded to a set of policies and a set 490 00:31:10,080 --> 00:31:14,600 Speaker 2: of assumptions which we haven't seen in two hundred years. 491 00:31:15,280 --> 00:31:17,120 Speaker 2: Is that true? And if so, does it worry you? 492 00:31:17,680 --> 00:31:21,240 Speaker 3: It worries me deeply. So there are two problems. One 493 00:31:21,520 --> 00:31:24,520 Speaker 3: I think is exactly what you say with Trump and Vance, 494 00:31:24,600 --> 00:31:29,640 Speaker 3: who fundamentally reject that kind of open liberal internationalism that 495 00:31:29,760 --> 00:31:34,280 Speaker 3: really has been practiced by every American administration since FDR. 496 00:31:35,000 --> 00:31:37,840 Speaker 3: I think what we are watching historically, I mean, it 497 00:31:37,880 --> 00:31:41,400 Speaker 3: comes straight out of my book, is that the period 498 00:31:41,440 --> 00:31:47,160 Speaker 3: of high open globalization immigration led to a backlash in 499 00:31:47,200 --> 00:31:49,960 Speaker 3: the twenties, as you note, and you know, the United 500 00:31:49,960 --> 00:31:53,880 Speaker 3: States ended up very closed with the immigration policy much 501 00:31:53,920 --> 00:31:59,080 Speaker 3: more restrictive than anything Trump or Vance as proposing. And 502 00:31:59,320 --> 00:32:03,960 Speaker 3: maybe we're watching a similar kind of retreat or turning back. 503 00:32:04,840 --> 00:32:07,160 Speaker 3: But there's a you know, the optimist in me hopes, 504 00:32:07,320 --> 00:32:11,000 Speaker 3: just as the twenties didn't last forever, that that will 505 00:32:11,000 --> 00:32:13,040 Speaker 3: be reversed. I hope it doesn't take a world war 506 00:32:13,120 --> 00:32:17,120 Speaker 3: to do that. But I think that there's a I'm 507 00:32:17,240 --> 00:32:21,840 Speaker 3: still I still believe that the larger liberal project is 508 00:32:21,920 --> 00:32:25,200 Speaker 3: so it benefits so many countries, it benefits so many 509 00:32:25,280 --> 00:32:29,120 Speaker 3: human beings around the world, that ultimately, you know, we 510 00:32:29,160 --> 00:32:32,040 Speaker 3: will come to we will come to realize that. For example, 511 00:32:32,280 --> 00:32:34,800 Speaker 3: I don't think Europe will go in that direction if 512 00:32:34,840 --> 00:32:37,160 Speaker 3: America goes in that direction. I don't think this is 513 00:32:37,200 --> 00:32:40,000 Speaker 3: a case you know, for one thing, other countries can't 514 00:32:40,080 --> 00:32:42,920 Speaker 3: become as protectionists as America because they don't have the option. 515 00:32:43,640 --> 00:32:46,160 Speaker 3: The US is a huge internal market. You know, there 516 00:32:46,160 --> 00:32:48,400 Speaker 3: are only two countries that can really thrive in this 517 00:32:48,480 --> 00:32:52,160 Speaker 3: kind of America first World, ironically, and that's America and China, 518 00:32:52,600 --> 00:32:55,520 Speaker 3: the two vast internal markets. But for a country like 519 00:32:55,560 --> 00:33:00,000 Speaker 3: Britain or Germany, where trade is almost half the economy, 520 00:33:00,120 --> 00:33:03,080 Speaker 3: you can't, you know, you can't succeed. So I think 521 00:33:03,160 --> 00:33:06,280 Speaker 3: that there will be a kind of self limiting quality 522 00:33:06,320 --> 00:33:08,720 Speaker 3: to it. I think the fact that half of America 523 00:33:08,760 --> 00:33:12,280 Speaker 3: doesn't agree with what Trump and Vans agree with helps enormously. 524 00:33:12,760 --> 00:33:16,240 Speaker 3: The second problem, though, is harder, which is this decline 525 00:33:16,240 --> 00:33:21,160 Speaker 3: of American influence. We've never had a world, a liberal 526 00:33:21,240 --> 00:33:26,480 Speaker 3: world without a liberal hegemon. And if the liberal hegemon 527 00:33:26,560 --> 00:33:29,720 Speaker 3: is getting weaker in influence of not in raw power, 528 00:33:30,400 --> 00:33:33,160 Speaker 3: how do you sustain that. My hope is that you 529 00:33:33,200 --> 00:33:37,000 Speaker 3: can have a kind of coalition of liberal powers Europe, 530 00:33:37,120 --> 00:33:42,640 Speaker 3: the United States, Japan, Australia, countries like Singapore, even countries 531 00:33:42,680 --> 00:33:45,040 Speaker 3: like Saudi Arabia. At the end of the they want 532 00:33:45,040 --> 00:33:49,360 Speaker 3: an open international system. But would that work, you know, 533 00:33:49,480 --> 00:33:54,480 Speaker 3: We've never had power that way shared that way. You've 534 00:33:54,520 --> 00:33:58,400 Speaker 3: never we've never had the world run by committee, and 535 00:33:58,520 --> 00:34:01,440 Speaker 3: that is a real puzzle. But we are going to 536 00:34:01,520 --> 00:34:05,960 Speaker 3: run this experiment, both experiments. You know, probably if you 537 00:34:06,000 --> 00:34:09,640 Speaker 3: assume Trump wins, we have to try the experiment of 538 00:34:09,680 --> 00:34:13,160 Speaker 3: a coalition of liberal powers, and in a way, that's 539 00:34:13,200 --> 00:34:15,799 Speaker 3: a more stable you know, in the long term, you 540 00:34:15,840 --> 00:34:17,879 Speaker 3: can't just hope that you're always going to have one 541 00:34:18,040 --> 00:34:21,839 Speaker 3: enormous liberal hegemon. Maybe you have to hope that enough 542 00:34:21,840 --> 00:34:24,680 Speaker 3: of the world is converted to this idea because it 543 00:34:24,760 --> 00:34:27,000 Speaker 3: really does help everyone. You know. That's why at the 544 00:34:27,120 --> 00:34:30,279 Speaker 3: end of the day, I'm an optimist, because I do 545 00:34:30,360 --> 00:34:33,080 Speaker 3: believe that these are better values. 546 00:34:33,760 --> 00:34:35,920 Speaker 2: But that means Europe stepping up a bit more in 547 00:34:36,000 --> 00:34:39,279 Speaker 2: terms of defense spending, in terms of acting on the 548 00:34:39,320 --> 00:34:43,760 Speaker 2: global stage, of course, but it's very hard for Europe 549 00:34:43,760 --> 00:34:47,239 Speaker 2: to do that at a time when America is treating 550 00:34:47,440 --> 00:34:50,560 Speaker 2: and embracing a set of values which sometimes look like 551 00:34:50,840 --> 00:34:53,080 Speaker 2: more like the values of autocracies than they do like 552 00:34:53,120 --> 00:34:55,080 Speaker 2: liberal powers. I mean, even if you go back to 553 00:34:55,120 --> 00:34:58,200 Speaker 2: the nineteen twenties and thirties, you know, the Harding and 554 00:34:58,280 --> 00:35:02,279 Speaker 2: Coolidge sort of seem half liberal and half not. I mean, 555 00:35:02,320 --> 00:35:07,600 Speaker 2: both Trump and Vance do seem to be very hostile 556 00:35:08,080 --> 00:35:09,680 Speaker 2: to the liberal project. 557 00:35:10,160 --> 00:35:14,279 Speaker 3: There's a possibility that that actually spurs the Europeans to 558 00:35:14,360 --> 00:35:18,280 Speaker 3: do more absolutely for example, on you know, on defense, 559 00:35:18,640 --> 00:35:22,359 Speaker 3: they realize they have no option and they do it. Look, 560 00:35:22,400 --> 00:35:26,920 Speaker 3: it's it's back to that ageal struggle between tribalism and liberalism. 561 00:35:27,000 --> 00:35:29,880 Speaker 3: Because in a way, the Europeans talk a good game, 562 00:35:30,320 --> 00:35:32,200 Speaker 3: but at the but at the end of the day, 563 00:35:32,320 --> 00:35:35,400 Speaker 3: you know, the Paris wants to make French foreign policy 564 00:35:35,880 --> 00:35:38,600 Speaker 3: and Berlin wants to make German foreign policy, and they 565 00:35:38,680 --> 00:35:43,440 Speaker 3: talk about delegating and having a unified strategic European foreign policy. 566 00:35:43,480 --> 00:35:45,840 Speaker 3: But you know, they don't want to give up the 567 00:35:45,960 --> 00:35:50,440 Speaker 3: national chauvinism and you know, so so maybe this is 568 00:35:50,560 --> 00:35:54,839 Speaker 3: a bit more of a spur for it happening. I 569 00:35:54,920 --> 00:35:58,879 Speaker 3: also do think that maybe I'm wrong about this, but 570 00:35:59,040 --> 00:36:03,319 Speaker 3: the trumpad clash is, you know, it's not the wave 571 00:36:03,400 --> 00:36:05,520 Speaker 3: of the future. I mean, look at the people who 572 00:36:05,600 --> 00:36:09,480 Speaker 3: vote for Trump. They're older, they're wider, they're they're you know, 573 00:36:09,560 --> 00:36:12,080 Speaker 3: this is the part of America that is fading, and 574 00:36:12,320 --> 00:36:15,640 Speaker 3: it might take a while to fade. But there is 575 00:36:15,680 --> 00:36:19,920 Speaker 3: a demographic reality to the change that's taking place, so 576 00:36:20,760 --> 00:36:22,120 Speaker 3: you know it can't go on forever. 577 00:36:22,400 --> 00:36:24,120 Speaker 2: I think the's truth in that, but I also think 578 00:36:24,160 --> 00:36:29,640 Speaker 2: that liberalism needs to examine itself and reform itself and 579 00:36:29,840 --> 00:36:33,600 Speaker 2: defend both the liberal cause but also the interests of 580 00:36:33,680 --> 00:36:36,239 Speaker 2: ordinary working, working people a bit better than it has. 581 00:36:36,760 --> 00:36:39,080 Speaker 2: But Freed, thank you, thank you very much for everything 582 00:36:39,080 --> 00:36:40,160 Speaker 2: you've said and for being here. 583 00:36:40,440 --> 00:36:42,680 Speaker 3: Arian's a huge pleasure to have this conversation. 584 00:36:42,840 --> 00:36:49,759 Speaker 2: Thank you, thanks for listening to this week's Photonomics from Bloomberg. 585 00:36:50,160 --> 00:36:53,719 Speaker 2: This episode was hosted by me Adrian Woodridge. It was 586 00:36:53,760 --> 00:36:58,680 Speaker 2: produced by Samasadi, with booking support from Chris Martleau, production 587 00:36:58,800 --> 00:37:02,800 Speaker 2: support and sound design from Moshus and m Random. Francis 588 00:37:02,920 --> 00:37:06,680 Speaker 2: Newnham is our executive producer. Sage Bowman is Head of 589 00:37:06,760 --> 00:37:11,400 Speaker 2: Podcasts Special thanks to Farid Zacaria. Please subscribe, rate, and 590 00:37:11,520 --> 00:37:14,520 Speaker 2: review highly wherever you listen to our podcasts.